DAY TWO
3.3.1. DISTINGUISHED FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT AND
TORT FROM CONTRACT
BARREDO vs GARCIA
FACTS:
 Barredo employer was sued for damages for the death of the defendant’s
son.Barredo is the owner of taxi whose driver (Fontanilla) bumped a calesa
resulting into the death of the defendant’s son.
 The driver was convicted as a result.
 The Civil case to claim damages was reserved by the victim’s family.
 On this regard, Barredo contends that his liability is subsidiary only to that of
the driver as per Art 100 of RPC.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against FaustoBarredo,
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
HELD:
Yes, he is primarily liable for damages based on quasi-delict.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this
principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
ELCANO vs HILL
FACTS:
 For the killing of his son by Reginald, a minor, for which the latter was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake".
 Petitioner instituted a civil case to claim damages arising from the death
of his son.
 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that action is barred
by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resent civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed.
HELD:
No. It is not barred.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through
at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery."
VIRATA vs OCHOA
FACTS:
 Virata died as a result of being hit by a jeepney driven by an employee.
 During the criminal proceeding, the family manifested a reservation to file
civil case separately.
 Heirs of Virata thereafter instituted a civil action against driver & owner
based on quasi-delict.
ISSUE:
Whether CandidaVirata wife of deceased, can prosecute an action for the damages
based on quasi-delict against MaximoBorilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner,
respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped ArsenioVirata.
HELD:
YES.
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before
Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that
they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of
the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver,
DAY TWO
MaximoBorilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict.The source of
the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an
act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different
sources of obligation.
BANAL vs TADEO
FACTS:
 15 separate informations for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks
Law, docketed as Criminal Cases were filed against respondent Claudio
before the RTC of QC.
 Respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty.
Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is
for the violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 which does not provide for any
civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property
but public order."
 The petitioner filed MR – denied. Hence, this petition questioning the
orders of the respondent Court.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its
jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of criminal cases is justified not
only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution. A separate civil
action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-
consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to
recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the
case at bar. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another
is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal
actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained
of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to
another.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides that “Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.” Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss
or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime. Every crime gives rise to a penal or
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the
check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check
was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense. And
surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa
Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by
excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so,
may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check
due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee.
OCCENA vs ICAMINA
FACTS:
 Petitioner EulogioOccena instituted before the Second MCTC of Sibalom,
San Remigio — Belison, Province of Antique, a criminal complaint for
Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina
Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the
following insulting words and statements: "Gagoikawnga Barangay
Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," and statements of similar
import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his
person and honor.
 Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to
file a separate civil action for damages.
DAY TWO

 MCTC ruled convicting Occena of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and
and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of
were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. It is
facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to
warrant the awarding of moral damages." conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence
 Petitioner then sought relief from the RTC- denied. do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC
decision. From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and
reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the
ISSUE: sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
Won petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered
by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
PACIS vs MORALES
HELD:
YES.
FACTS:
• On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and
(petitioners) filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent
sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
Jerome Jovanne Morales (respondent). Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis
but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This
Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the
is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable
Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent
offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual
is the owner of the gun store.
member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the
• An AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial No. SN-H34194,
punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found
was left by defendant Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store. It
guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either
appears that sales agents Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from
there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is
the drawer and placed it on top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the
here an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he suffered
young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis
damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private
Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It
respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages
went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
• A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before branch VII
of this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case
the exempting circumstance of "accident" under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law establishes
Code.
the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the
• RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. Respondent appealed to
guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is
the CA. CA reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil
likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages. It must be
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even
if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And
malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain
ISSUE:
exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.
WON respondent should be absolved from civil liability pursuant to Art 2180 of the
NCC.
DAY TWO
HELD:
No. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son.
Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for
damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages
under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in
the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent
civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s
employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own
negligence.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the "Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair," a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a
gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
cancelled. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no
risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms
safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure
that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded
and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not
be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent
when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without
ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should
have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair,
respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person,
until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon
is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded,
respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case
whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair
defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing
with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
3.3.2. RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO INSTITUTE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES
PEOPLE vs AMISTAD
FACTS:
 Itong Amistad was accused of the crime of Estafa. He sold a parcel of land,
part of which was already previously sold to Mercedes Javellana for P10, 000
and had already received from her P5, 000.00, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to said Javellana in the amount of P5,000.
 The CFI acquitted Amistad holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in
nature" and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt."
 Petitioner appealed to CA insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. CA dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that an
appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed
from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the
latter's civil liability is concerned.
HELD: NO. Petition is DENIED. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether
or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch
as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, there having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a
waiver of the right to file one. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle,
primarily the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution of the crime remaining under
the direction and control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor
presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum
DAY TWO
he filed, he also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite
which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the complainant.
We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the CA on the purely legal question
of whether the petitioner, as complainant in the case for estafa, can appeal from
the judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court failed to declare the
latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the
evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly
requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To
such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate
responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal
action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the
same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil
actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal
action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from
the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to
the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of
civil liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing
of criminal action, unless it is reserved or waived, as so expressly provided in
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense,
such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an
ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may
be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant.
The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the
charge and did not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable
put an end to the case, not only by freeing the defendant from criminal
responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for damages arising from the
alleged crime of malicious mischief. The offended parties not having reserved their
right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered
both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of
the new Rules of Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance,
as intended by the offended parties, would reopen the question of defendant's civil
liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must
be based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal
Code), any review or re-examination of the question of civil liability would perforce
require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. But another trial upon
defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal
in the justice of the peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of
the peace court is not authorized by law.
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought
simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil
liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall together.
However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the
complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the
commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be
required.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complain, as she does of being denied due
process for disallowing her appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if her
cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or one arising from
law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore
from the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair to
require petitioner to take this course of action, not only because she would have to
pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks
from respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case,
but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as
are open to him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a criminal
action that carries with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it,
to recover civil liability arising from the crime charged
JARANTILLA vs CA
FACTS:
 Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle driven by Jarantilla and
sustained physical injuries as a consequence.
 Jarantilla was charged before the City Court of Iloilo for serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence in a criminal case. Kuan Sing did not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in
the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor.
 Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt"
 Kuan Sing then filed a complaint, a civil action that involved the same
subject matter and act complained of in the criminal case. Jarantilla
alleged as a defense a lack of cause of action on the part of Sing, and bar
DAY TWO
by prior judgment in the previous criminal case even if there was a cause
of action.
 The trial court denied Jarantilla's motion to dismiss, suggesting he take
the case to the SC via certiorari.
 After trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of Sing and
ordered Jarantilla to pay the former the sum for hospitalization,
medicines and so forth, other actual expenses, for moral damages, for
attorney's fees, and costs. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kuan Sing could file a separate civil action arising from the criminal
complaint filed against Jarantilla when Jarantilla had been acquitted for reasonable
doubt.
HELD: Yes. It is a settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the
negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto.
Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-
delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence... Another consideration in favor of Kuan Sing is the doctrine that the
failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to
the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the
civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere
provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable.
The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no
longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. The acquittal of the
accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction
of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the
causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action
based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be
proved by mere preponderance of evidence. Since this action is based on a quasi-
delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case
and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate
civil action for damages.
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
In Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., which involved virtually the same factual
situation, the Court held,
“the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is
not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a
separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein
was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the
two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being
on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent
complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the
criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved.
Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil
Code.”
HUN HYUNG PARK vs EUN WON CHOI
FACTS:
 Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP22, for issuing a PNB Check
which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
 MTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.
 Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC, contending
that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
 RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove
respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil
liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of Park.
 Upon Choi’sMR, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of
the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant Choi
may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case."
 Park’sMR of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the
case to the CA which, dismissed his petition for Park’s failure to implead
the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.
DAY TWO
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to implead the People is fatal to the appeal.
HELD:
No. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two
actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the
punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the
plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil
action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the
accused is the defendant.
The MeTC acquitted respondent. Either the offended party or the accused may,
however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the
accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil
aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The real parties in interest in the civil
aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is
submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the
accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture,
the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or
reserved.
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no
distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of
evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In
other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at
the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far
presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the
same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere
preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond
reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to
establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer,
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized
instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil
aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil
aspect of the case must perforce continue.
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without
any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, which is DIRECTED to forthwith set
the Criminal Case for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving
evidence on the civil aspect of the case
SALAZAR vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
An Information for Estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer Salazar and co-
accused Nena Timario with the RTC of Legazpi. Timario drew and issued Prudential
Bank Legazpi Branch Check (P214,000) in favor of J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation.
Accused Salazar endorsed and negotiated said check, knowing fully well that at the
time said check was issued and endorsed, Nena Timario did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee bank to cover the amount. Consequently, the check was
dishonored when presented to the drawee bank for payment for the reason of
ACCOUNT CLOSED.
DAY TWO
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
with Leave of Court, alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as she was
merely an indorser of the check issued by Timario, and Art. 315 (2, d) on Estafa
penalizer only the issuer of the check and not the indorser.
The trial court acquitted the petitioner but ordered her to remit the amount of the
check as payment for her purchase. It ruled that the evidence for the prosecution
did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the
petitioner and the issuer of the check, Nena Timario.
he petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision
with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules
of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that
after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due
process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she
was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the
applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that
before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been
first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.
HELD: Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to present her
evidence as regards the civil aspect of the case. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court explained the demurrer to evidence partakes of a motion to
dismiss the case for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence
without leave of court, thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits
the case for decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence he has the right to
adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect, but also on the civil aspect of the
case of the demurrer is denied by the court. In addition, the Court said if the
demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also
declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it violates
the constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court explained that the trial
court erred in rendering judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordering the
petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the
petitioner could adduce evidence thereon is patently a denial of her right to due
process.
Safeguard Security Agency Inc. and Admer Pajarillo vs. Lauro Tangco
G.R. No. 165732, 14 December 2006 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS: On 3 November 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco went to
Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch in Quezon City to renew her time deposit.
Evangeline, a duly licensed rearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside of her residence, approached Pajarillo, security guard of Ecology Bank
to deposit the rearm for safekeeping, suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his
service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Evangeline’s husband, Lauro, together with his six minor children led with the RTC
of QC a criminal case against Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved their right to le
a separate civil action on the said criminal case. Pajarillo was subsequently
convicted of homicide in 19 January 2000 by the RTC and the CA upheld the
decision with modi cation on the penalty on 31 July 2000.
On 14 January 1998, respondents led with the RTC of Marikina City a complaint for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. The respondents prayed for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The RTC of Marikina rendered judgment in favor of Lauro Tangco et. al. ordering
Pajarillo and Safeguard Security agency Inc. ,jointly and severally, to pay:
a. ₱157,430.00 as actual damages;
b. ₱50,000 as death indemnity;
c. ₱1million pesos as moral damages;
d. ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.
The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense; giving no weight to his claim
that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the incident given that
 DAY TWO
Pajarillo had not made any such reports to the head o ice and the police
authorities. Pajarillo should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care in
ascertaining the matter instead of shooting her instantly. The RTC likewise found
Safeguard to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo since there was no su icient
evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father by simply
showing that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision as contemplated under the law. It includes the duty to see to it that
such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
The CA modi ed that decision of the RTC saying that Safeguard Security Agency Inc.
is only subsidiarily liable. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently led and
denied by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline
2. Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for
the damages awarded to respondents in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
RATIO:
1. 1. Yes, Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline as upheld by both the
RTC and CA in separate decisions. The SC a irms these decisions since based on the
evidence presented, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claims that Evangeline was
seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously which Pajarillo
mistook as a bank robbery which led him to draw his service rearm and shot
Evangeline.
2. Yes, Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for the
damages awarded to the respondents. The nature of the respondents’ cause of
action is determined in the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. In
the complaint, the respondents are invoking their right to recover damages
against Safeguard for their indirect responsibility for the injury caused by
Pajarillo’s act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176. Thus, the civil
action led by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo
but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi delict which is a separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from crime. As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is
primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by Pajarillo and is
presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by
operation of law. The Court agrees with the RTC’s nding that Safeguard had
exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since records show that he
underwent psychological and neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training
course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances. However,
Safeguard was not diligent in providing trainings, classroom instructions and
continuous evaluation of the security guard’s performance. Thus, the SC a irms
with modi cation that the civil liability of Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is solidary
and primary under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
3.3.3. EXTINCTION OR SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL
OFFENSES
PEOPLE vs NAVOA
FACTS:
 Mario Navoa et al. was convicted by the trial court for murder and
sentenced to reclusion temporal. It was appealed to the IAC.
 On April 1984, the IAC affirmed the findings but modified the punishment
to reclusion perpetua, but refrained from entering judgment per RA 296 1
as amended pursuant to the case of People vs Daniel, and certified the
case to the SC, as it is within the SC’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
 On June 1984, Navoa’s lawyer filed with the IAC the Death Certificate of
Navoa who died of heart attack, unaware that it was already certified to
the SC.
 On July 1984, the SC affirmed the conviction and sentenced Navoa et al.
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the civil liability thereon.
 Navoa’s lawyer filed an MR questioning the conviction and arguing that
the criminal and civil liability of Navoa be extinguished because of his
death.
1
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; ...
DAY TWO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability will be extinguished.
HELD:
NO.Petition is partly granted.
In respect of the second contention, it appears that the accused, Mario Navoa, died
on June 14, 1984 due to a cerebro-vascular attack as shown by the Death Certificate
attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. When counsel for the accused
manifested the fact before the Appellate Court, on June 20, 1984. he was unaware
that the latter had already certified the case to this Court, which, in turn,
promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of appellant Mario
Navoa'sdeath. The judgment of conviction will thus have to be set aside as against
him. However, the plea for extinguishment of the deceased's civil and criminal
liability is without merit. Only his criminal liability is extinguished by his death but
the civil liability remains.
PEOPLE vs MANUEL BADEO
FACTS:
 A certain Cresencio was hacked to death.
 Eyewitness for the prosecution testified that she saw Manuel Badeo hack
Cresencio to death, helped by his father Esperidion, and two others.
 Defense of Manuel was self-defense, arguing that Cresencio drunkenly
pointed a gun to him. Defense of Esperidion however was that he was
engaged in kaingin in the mountains (a good 5 hr hike due to the heavy
forest trail) corroborated by his wife.
 RTC convicted both Manuel and Espridion and sentenced them to
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Cresencio.
 Manuel and Espiridion appealed to the SC.
 During the pendency of the appeal, Espiridion died of pulmonary
tuberculosis, such fact was made known to the SC. SC dismissed the case
against Espiridion, insofar as he died without the conviction attaining
finality. His criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.
 The OSG filed an MR on the dismissal of the civil liability of Espiridion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability will be extinguished.
HELD:
NO. Petition is partly granted.
We find merit in the motion for reconsideration. Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the death of the
convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment."
In People vs. Alison, the Court, upon the recommendation of the then Solicitor
General who was required to comment on the information that appellant Alison
had died at the prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment as yet,
"the criminal and civil liability (sic) of Alison was extinguished by his death."
The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre similarly
dismissing the case against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the
resolution, then Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal
penalties, criminal liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the term
"pecuniary penalties" (laspecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as
distinguished from " pecuniary liability" (responsabilidadespecunarias) in Article 38
which include reparation and indemnity.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the
guilty party, and also to a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage and indemnification for the losses whether the particular act or omission is
done intentionally or negligently or whether or not punishable by law, subsequent
decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an appellant is
extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. In such case, the heirs of the
deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate
shall answer for his civil liability.
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS (1994)
In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova wascharged
with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
diedat the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepaticencephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
DAY TWO
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego
insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the
accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position,
said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability.
RULING:
The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and
Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished
only when death of the accused occurred before
the finaljudgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished
because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be
no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is,
thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations
other than delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states
that civil liability will only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI
of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support
to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on
which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore,
Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.
CALANG and PHILTRANCO vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
 At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, RolitoCalang was driving
aPhiltranco Busalong DaangMaharlika Highway in Samar when its rear left
side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite
direction.
 As a result of the collision, Cresencio, the jeep’s driver, lost control of the
vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was
standing along the highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3)
andtwo of the jeep’s passengers were instantly killed, while the other
passengers sustained serious physical injuries.
 The prosecution charged Calalang with multiple homicide, and damages
before the RTC.RTC convicted Calalang and held him and Philtranco jointly
and severally liable for the death indemnities and damages to the private
complainants.
 CA affirmed the conviction and the solidary liability.
 The CA ruled that Calang failed to exercise due care and precaution in
driving the Philtranco bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses
testified that the bus was traveling fast and encroached into the opposite
lane when it evaded a pushcart that was on the side of the road. In
addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had
already seen the jeep coming from the opposite direction when it was still
half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang demonstrated a
reckless attitude when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was
suffering from loose compression, hence, not roadworthy.
 SC denied the petition. Hence this MR. Philtranco argues it cannot be held
severally liable as it was not a party in the criminal case for multiple
homicide and damages before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philtranco is civilly liable.
HELD:
NO. Petition is granted.
We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly,
Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against
Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco
DAY TWO
jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the
vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed.
Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary by virtue of RPC 102 regarding
civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. As
stated in RPC 103, such subsidiary liability attaches also to the employers of an
employee.
The provisions of the RPC on subsidiary liability are deemed written into the
judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of
its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of
the employer. Nonetheless, before the employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced,
adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers
of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the
crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the
execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The
determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in
which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
PEOPLE vs AMISTOSO
FACTS:
 Amistoso raped his 12 year old daughter.
 RTC convicted him, and sentenced him to death and ordered to pay
indemnity and moral damages.
 CA affirmed, but modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua, increasing
the amount of moral damages and adding exemplary damages.
 SC affirmed the conviction, also making him liable on interests on all
damages awarded.
 NBP sent a letter to the SC that Amistoso died of cardiac arrest.
Unknowingly, the PAO still filed an MR.
 It appears Amistoso died before promulgation of the judgment affirming
conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Amistoso is still liable civilly.
HELD:
NO. Case is dismissed.
In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to
final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
sensostrictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
thandelict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a. Law
b. Contracts
c. Quasi-contracts
d. x xx
e. Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.
Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
DAY TWO
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by
the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before
the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal
only because it was not immediately informed of his death.
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January
9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual.
Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the
jurisdiction to set it aside.
3.3.4. NO INDEPENDENT ACTION TO RECOVER CIVIL LIABILITY FROM BP22
HEIRS OF SIMON vs CHAN and CA
FACTS:
 Simon was charged of violating BP 22 in issuing a bouncing check for
Chan, which was dishonoured for insufficient funds.
 3 years after the criminal case, Chan instituted a civil case for damages for
the amount of the check, with a prayer for WPA.
 Chan answered and sought to dismiss the case, with a claim against the
attachment bond.
 RTC dismissed the civil case. CA reversed and remanded the case to the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case can be independently pursued in BP 22.
HELD:
NO. Petition is partly granted.
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate
civil action is no longer needed. The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No.
57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the
complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion
of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to
help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually
use the courts as collectors.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only
a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down
by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even
prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The
only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is
filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation
of the civil and criminal cases.
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a
separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, as DMPI Employees has allowed. In
prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to
prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil
liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check.
To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved
in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained
under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
DAY TWO

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who should
stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages
3.3.5. EXTENT OF LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS AS AGAINST EMPLOYERS suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died.
Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their
liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically
FRANCO vs IAC therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible.

FACTS:
 MacarioYuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus, he was driving to the
left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the
cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Tarlac, thereby taking
the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by one MagdalenoLugue
and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and
disastrous eventuality.
 The two drivers died, while two of the minibus passengers died.
 The owner of the minibus, the wife of the deceased passenger, and wife
of the minibus driver sued spouses Franco for damages.
 Franco raised the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee Yuro, arguing that the case is for torts.
 RTC held them liable, holding that employers are liable for the criminal
negligence of the employees, regardless of due diligence
 CA upheld.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action was predicated on crime or tort.
On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based
on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its
employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo, supra, where it was
held that the defense of observance of due diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of employees is not applicable to the subsidiary
liability provided in RPC 102. It is erroneous because the conviction of the employee
primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability 10
and, at the same time, absurd because we will be faced with a situation where the
employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being previously
established.
HOWEVER, factual considerations of the lower court are upheld, holding that there
was no concrete evidence of alleged supervision as to safety. Only the ticket
inspectors at terminal points.

HELD:
YES. However, due diligence is not proven.

Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under
the RPC and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-
delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles
102 and 103 of RPC.

Under Article 103 of the RPC, liability originates from a delict committed by the
employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his
employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary
liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal
action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding
liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's
liability would not be predicated under Article 103.