IF. Art. 15-17, 50-5, NCC; Art.

26, FC; Divorce [Filipino

People vs Marinay
GR. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the Philippines
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).

The RTC dismissed the petition based on sections 2 and 4 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC). The RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration in the RTC which the later denied. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.

Issue:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

Ruling:
The Court granted the petition. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage
in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests
in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Catalan vs. Catalan

Gr. No. 183622, February 8, 2012

Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce
in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage
with petitioner Merope Enriquez Catalan. On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate
in the Philippines.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

Thereafter, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee,
one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate
of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for
bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.Finally, the trial court found
that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition
for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous
bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has a better right to administer the decedent’s properties.

Held:

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the
finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio
Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy,
it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take
note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and
Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate
of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-
A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has
the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise,
letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter
or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

Gr. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert filed a petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

Issue:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Ruling:

No. However, Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies.

Based on the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.

Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Orbecido

Gr. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros Villanueva, both Filipino citizens at that time, got
married on May 4,1981. In 1986, Villanueva left for the United State and subsequently
has been naturalized as an American Citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same.
The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In
Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.