II. Marriage (Arts.

1-54)

K. Art. 40, FC; AM -02-10-11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule 108

1. SANTOS VS. SANTOS 737 SCRA 637 , OCTOBER 08, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were married. Petitioner wife convinced respondent husband
to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. She left two months after and
was never heard from again. Respondent husband further alleged that he exerted efforts
to locate his wife. He claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional
Trial Court petition since his wife left. He believed that she had passed away.

Petitioner wife then filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that it was he who
left the conjugal dwelling to cohabit with another woman.

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dismissing respondent wife’s petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of
Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry,
declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. The Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution.

Hence, this petition was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage?

HELD:

NO. This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for
terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485
SCRA 376 (2006). This court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there
was “no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by filing an affidavit
of reappearance or by court action” “Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law.”
2. GARCIA-QUIAZON V. BELEN GR# 189121/JULY 31, 2013 702 SCRA 707

FACTS:

Eliseo died intestate. Petition for Letters of Administration were filed by respondents who
are his common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by petitioner to whom
Eliseo was married. Respondent Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and respondent Lourdes to marry,
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to petitioner Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with
another. The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to respondent
daughter Elise. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. CA agreed that
Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence up to the time of Eliseo’s death. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether Elise may question the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia?

HELD:

YES. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A
void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling
in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), applicable four-square to the case at hand. In
Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit: Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
3. ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC GR# 158298/ AUG. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano and Leonila. Petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued
only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue. RTC dismissed the petition, stating that
petitioner is not a party to the marriage. The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. CA affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner may question the marriage of his brother?

HELD:

YES. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

However, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action.
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.

The petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit.
4. CARLOS V. SANDOVAL GR# 179922 / DEC. 16, 2008 574 SCRA 116

FACTS:

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two
parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995,
Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint,
Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in
view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his
deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received
by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

The RTC declared the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license. The
CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage?

HELD:

YES. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,
viz.: As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
5. CARIÑO V. CARIÑO GR# 132529/FEB. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127

FACTS:

Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. When Santiago
passed away, the two Susans filed with the RTC claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance. Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao,
collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the
Santiago took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and Santiago. She however claimed
that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased. The trial
court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

ISSUE:

For purposes other than remarriage, is a judicial action necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity?

HELD:

NO. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
6. NIÑAL V. BAYADOG GR#133778 / MAR. 14, 2000 328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Ninal was married to Bellones on 1974. Petitioners are there 3 children. After the death
of Bellones, Pepito and respondent Norma got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting
from securing the marriage license. After Pepito died, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was
void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUE:

1) Whether the subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses can make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife?

2) Whether a void marriage can be questioned even after the death of either party?

HELD:

1) NO. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
“husband and wife.”

2) YES. A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while
a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.