Chapter 2 Judicial Due Process

Imelda Marcos vs Sandiganbayan
Due Process
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in
1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled
to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J
Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of
Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the
SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be
given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received
manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza.
Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue
be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation granted
that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of
Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of
Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent
Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its ”decision” convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already
created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices
in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices,
especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different
view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may
change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot
deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true
that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in
the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But
what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.
Emma Delgado vs Court of Appeals

Due Process
Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student.
Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial
and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate
was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as
Delgado’s waiver of her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed
before the CA and the CA sustained the lower court’s rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is not a
member of the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process.
CONSULTA VS PEOPLE
Due Process
Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower
court. Consulta raised before the CA the issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was represented by a non
lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Consulta’s claim of being misrepresented cannot be given due course. He was assisted by two
lawyers during the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a
lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the
defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO.
G.R. No. L-46272 June 13, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO OPIDA y QUIAMBAO and VIRGILIO MARCELO, accused-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District,
imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder.
Unlike the victim in this case, who died from only one stab wound, the decision under review suffers
from several fatal flaws, all equally deadly. It suffices to discuss only one of them.
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. 1 Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial
but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
2 The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. This guaranty was
not observed in this case.
On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit him
with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified
as Mario del Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with
murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death. 4
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, neither
of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions,
which were secured without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy
under the theory of interlocking confession. 5
What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused
and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times
irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had
allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the
defense.
Opida is a police character, admittedly a member of the Commando gang and with a string of
convictions for robbery, theft and vagrancy. 6 It is worth noting that the judge took special interest in
his tattoos, required him to remove his shirt so they could be examined, and even described them in
detail for the record. 7
Besides belaboring Opida's criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge asked him if he had "ever been
convicted at the National Mental Hospital with what else but malice and suggested to him that his
claim of manhandling by the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they torture a
suspect. 8 This was a point that could have been validly raised by the prosecution but certainly not by
the court. The judge also made it of record that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs
of hostility, that he was uneasy and that he was restless. "Now, whom do you want to fool the judge
asked, "the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court? 9
In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo, the other accused, was
conducted almost wholly by the judge who started cross-examining the witness even before the defense
counsel could ask his first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of impeaching
Marcelo's credibility.10 The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his membership in the
Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities, his criminal record all when he was supposed
to be under direct examination by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word
edgewise because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions. 11
The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not adversary, they were
irrelevant, and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the judge drew from the witness the statement that
his mother was living with another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his
father. 12 We deplore this sadistic treatment of the witness, especially as, for all his supposed
"toughness," he could not answer back. We fail to see what possible connection the mother's
infidelity could have had, by any stretch of the imagination, with the instant prosecution.
But the judge was to save the best or worst of his spite for the third witness, Lilian Layug, a waitress in
the restaurant where the appellant Opida was working as a cook. Noting at the outset that she spoke
English, he wanted to know where she had learned it and asked in ill-concealed insinuation if she had
worked in Angeles City or Olongapo or Sangley. 13 Because she was gesturing nervously, he
asked, "Are you a conductor? 14 Of the two accused, he asked her, "They are very proud of
belonging to the Commando gang to which the witness answered, putting him in his place,
"That I do not know, Your Honor." 15
One cannot but note the mockery in the following questions put by the judge to the witness, who was
probably wondering what the interrogation was all about
Court
Q You are a very good friend of Alberto Opida?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You have known him for years?
A One year only, Your Honor.
Q He always feed you with his favorite menu?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q He is a very good cook?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Because what he could cook, you could not cook?
A I know also how to cook, Your Honor.
Q Answer my question.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Whenever you try to cook what he cooked, you could not imitate it,
because he is a good cook?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, your admiration developed because of his cooking?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What favorite dish does he cook that you like, as far as you are
concerned?
A Adobo, Your Honor.
Q Most often you request him to cook adobo for you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That is precisely one of the reasons why you also admire him?
A That is also a part, Your Honor,
Q Whenever you request him to cook adobo for you, he always
accommodate you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q As a matter of fact, the moment that he starts cooking adobo, you could
smell it already?
A Yes, Your Honor,
Q That starts your admiration for him.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And in return you reciprocate?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What kind of reciprocation do you give to Alberto Opida, whenever
you admire his cooking of adobo for you, cooking just for you?
A None, Your Honor.
Q Whenever he cooks adobo, he was singing?
A Sometimes, Your Honor.
Q What kind of song?
A He is singing a song with intended for Cora, Your Honor.
Q And you were also affected by it?
A No, Your Honor.
Q You mean to say, you are not very fond of emotional songs?
A I am not, because Cora is not minding him, Your Honor.
Q But sometimes he sings in the absence of Cora because, as you said, he
is cooking adobo for you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What does he sings (sic) for you?
A He sings many songs, Your Honor.
Q For example, give the title
A Milagro, Your Honor.
Q He also sings Diyos Lamang Ang Nakakaalam?
A Sometimes, Your Honor.
Q He also sings Kapantay ay Langit?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q He also sings Sapagkat Tayo'y Tao Lamang?
A I did not hear, Your Honor.
Q But, you said he also sings even in the absence of Cora?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You smell adobo while he cooks and sings. So, you developed
admiration also?
A Little only, Your Honor.
Q One way or another you have appreciated him, but the only thing, as
you know, he is related to Cora in the same way?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That is why you are testifying in his favor? Because of the smell of
adobo and his songs and it is an admiration. Therefore, there is that
tendency to testify in his favor?
A Yes, Your Honor. 16
On direct examination, Opida challenged his extrajudicial confession, claiming it had been obtained
without observance of the rights available under Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, particularly
the right to counsel. 17 Parenthetically, the extrajudicial confession of Marcelo was also made
without assistance of counsel. 18 Opida also testified, under questioning from his counsel,
that he had been repeatedly hit with a "dos por dos" by a police officer while he was being
investigated. 19
We have consistently held that the rights guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed
to be merely communicated to the suspect, especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly
explained to him so he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of any
sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and renders it inadmissible
in evidence against him. 20
Those principles were given mere lip service by the judge, who did not bother to look deeper into the
validity of the challenged confessions.
Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations
of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were
admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy
among the accused.
The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even proud of their membership in
the Commando gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of notoriety. 21 Nevertheless, they
were entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 22
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had
manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the
decision now?" 23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to
be formalized.
The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused
because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to
every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his past.
Despite their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious adornments only and surely
not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad taste perhaps, but not of crime.
In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual
commission of crime, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the
law for all without favor or malice and always with justice.
Accused-appellants Opida and Marcelo, who have been imprisoned since 1976, have sent us separate
letters pleading for the resolution of their death sentences one way or the other once and for all.
Considering the way they were tried, we now declare that they should not be detained in jail a minute
longer. While this is not to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that, because their
constitutional rights have been violated, their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt and so cannot be pronounced. Due process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick
condemnor and must set the defendants free.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and they are hereby
ordered released immediately. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Mortera (Right Of The Accused To An Impartial Trial)
FACTS: This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in criminal case which found accused
Benancio Mortera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn
Rojas.
Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, he together with other men were
drinking tuba. They have just started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted to hit
Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while
the group of Ramil Gregorio were singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of
Alberto Diaz, arrived. Mortera said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told
Jomer Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter was not hit. Mortera left but he
said that he will return. After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, Robelyn
Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven
meters from the place where the group were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each other
and later shook hands. Robelyn turned his face and Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the
back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not
able to catch up but he fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother but
he was pronounced DOA at the hospital. Jovel Veñales who was drinking together with Ramil
Gregorio and others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony.
Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he admitted having
stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his account he
passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and
Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused
was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of
Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry.
After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall
down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that
he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got
stabbed. He then immediately fled.
On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder. In rejecting the
claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was belied by the
credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an
impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and
prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise
reiterated his claim of self-defense.
In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liabilities. The
CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate
and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory."
Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC.
ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an impartial trial.
HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial judge might have made improper
remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an
impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were
reflective of his partiality. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative
defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in
the dark as to his intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not persuade the SC. In Opida, SC did
not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by the trial judge
of the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the
commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution.
Therefore, SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.
ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, Petitioners,

vs.
The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan,
Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by
Alen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali),
Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to annul and set aside the
October 13, 2009 Decision1 of respondent Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor), Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise seeks to
prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing the said decision.
In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of
direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge
Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR
TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of their oath of office as member of the bar
and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00.
Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above grave offenses and
should they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and
they will not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
The Facts
Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case),
entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery
initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the
Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of
the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali
filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion
of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative
complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the
Office of the Governor of Palawan.
On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge
Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009,
he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on
matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the
administrative complaint against Awayan, among others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s
continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding
against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte
Manifestation.
As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor
issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty
of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of ₱100,000.00 each were imposed upon
them.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the assailed
November 6, 2009 Order.3
Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court anchored on the
following
GROUNDS
(A)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
(B)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.
(C)
SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION
MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT.4
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due
process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to
petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which
was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt
proceedings against them.
Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the "direct contempt" proceeding is
clearly oppressive and without basis.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,5 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that Judge
Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was not based on law and evidence.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to
exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or
vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be
exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory,
idea of punishment.6 Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
to unless necessary in the interest of justice.7
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor’s order penalizing petitioners for direct
contempt on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so.8
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be
construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject
manifestation bore Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of
collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in
the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he
should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in,
the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his
capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed
with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory
matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without
basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge
Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners.
Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of
equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding ₱2,000.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both.
The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00 each
with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently
unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt
proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are
absolutely unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be
regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the
OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.
If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal
action for joint hearing and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written
charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or
formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his
receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain
matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he
was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative
complaint against Awayan.
The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not
sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses’ testimonies had already been completed.
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality
expected of a magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the questions
propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:
a. Your [petitioner Rodriguez’s] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-parte manifestation
by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter to Gov. Joel T. Reyes dated
May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the Clerk of Court, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court,
Palawan;
b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you know, and if so
what was the official action thereon;
c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to answer the
charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez, calling
him "extortionist."
Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your conclusion that
Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a bag man and facilitator;
What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the City Jail without
permission from the Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0’clock in the afternoon and having been
interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was
Rolly Ami interviewed?
d. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to sign
affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why?
e. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close associate of yours,
and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch and ring), why?
What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of
Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009. Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as
an officer of the Court, pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your
loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and obligation? 9
Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of
judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience
and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the
power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that
they exercise.10
Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have different
objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor should
have conducted separate proceedings. As held in the case of People v. Godoy,11 thus:
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on
the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to
continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of
persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite
for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a
preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary
authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much
as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
x x x. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139
thereof.
Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt
charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of
law.1avvphi1
Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted, the
suspension of petitioners must still fail.
This Court is not unmindful of a judge’s power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause
pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor, however, must be
reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as mandated under Section 30,
Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides, viz:
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. – No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice
to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. It
must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a
disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.12
In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts
constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show
cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given
full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by
themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void,
having violated their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the
causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds
for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2)
malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to
do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.
In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule
71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides:
SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal
therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the
judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond
fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the
judgment should the petition be decided against him.
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor
must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the
contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will
abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009
Order are hereby annulled and set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined
from implementing the said decision and order. This injunctive order is immediately executory.
v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17

GR. NO. 157977 Feb. 27 2006
QUISUMBING, J
Lessons: Notice and Hearing for Cancellation of Bail in Extradition
Laws:
FACTS:
After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M
for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail which was denied. The US government filed a
petition for certiorari entitled Gov’t of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the
matter of bail guided by this court’s ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The lower court, without prior
notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners
filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied. Hence, this special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a warrant
of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail
HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ.
The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had
already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on

voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already
gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in
the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against
her; and that she is now in her 60’s, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued
temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner
being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior
notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175999, July 01, 2015
NELSON LAI Y BILBAO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide through the assailed decision
promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA).1 The conviction had been handed down
by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in Bacolod City (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y Bilbao.2 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Antecedents
The Prosecution's version was summarized by the RTC as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 16, 1995, at around 9 o'clock in the evening, the victim Enrico Villanueva,
Jr. together with his friends Burnie Fuentebella (a prosecution witness), Butsoy Arenas,
Raffy Gustilo, Nonoy Martinez, and Mark Anthony Merre, were seated inside the
passenger jeepney owned by the accused, Nelson Lai y Bilbao, which was parked at the
back of Pala-pala, Brgy. 6, corner North Capitol Road - San Juan Streets, Bacolod City,
where they were waiting for a female friend of theirs who was supposed to arrive at 9:30
o'clock of the same evening per their agreement. While they were waiting for their friend to
arrive, the accused Nelson Lai y Bilbao suddenly approached the vehicle and ordered all
the persons who were seated inside (including the deceased Enrico Villanueva, Jr.) to alight
therefrom. After all of them have alighted from the jeepney, the accused instantaneously
grabbed the victim by the latter's left arm and accused him (the deceased) of having stolen
the antenna of his (Lai's) vehicle. Denying that he was responsible for the theft of the
antenna, the victim was able to free himself from the hold of the accused and ran away
towards the direction of the house of Christopher Padigos located at Purok Narra Bukid
North, Brgy. 8, Bacolod City, across the Pala-pala. Upon arriving at the house of
Christopher Padigos, the victim ran all the way to the second floor room he shared with
Jemuel V. Gepaya (a prosecution witness). Finding his roommate inside the room, the
victim confided to the former that Nelson Lai had just accused him of stealing his (Lai's)
car antenna and that he (the deceased) was grabbed and hit by the accused at the neck but
that he (the victim) was able to retaliate by kicking the accused. There the victim remained
until about 11:00 o'clock of the same evening when he left the house of Christopher
Padigos to go to the dancehall located at nearby Purok Azucena, Barangay 6, Bacolod City
where a benefit dance was being held.
At around 11:00 o'clock of the same evening, both the accused and the victim were inside
the dancehall, the latter being seated on a bench together with his friends while the former
was dancing to the tune of the cha-cha. After dancing the accused stood immediately in
front at about one and a half arms length (sic.) from where the victim was seated.
Thereafter, the accused stepped towards where the victim was seated. As the accused was
about to approach the victim, a brownout suddenly occurred. Immediately after the lights
went out, a spark was seen and a gunshot rang out right in front where the victim was
seated. Suddenly, the victim fell down bloodied. Immediately thereafter, the victim was
rushed to the provincial hospital by his friends led by Burnie Fuentebella, a prosecution
witness, for treatment. Similarly, Jemuel V. Gepaya, a cousin of the victim, also followed
to the hospital after hearing the news that the victim was shot.
Inside the Emergency Room of the Provincial Hospital, while the victim lay (sic) bleeding
from a gunshot wound in the neck and awaiting medical attention, he was able to tell
Burnie Fuentebella and Jemuel Gepaya, both prosecution witnesses, that the accused
Nelson Lai was the one who shot him. Moreover, the victim likewise shouted the name
"Nelson Lai" when he was asked by PO3 Homer Vargas who shot him. Likewise, when
Enrico Villanueva, Sr., the father of the victim, arrived at the Emergency Room and asked
the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was "Nelson Lai", (parenthetical citations
omitted)3
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In contrast, the CA summed up the Defense's own version in its assailed decision, to wit:
Appellant Nelson Lai drives his own passenger jeep plying the Banago-Libertad route. At
around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 1995, appellant parked his jeepney at
the back of his house located at Purok Azucena, Barangay 6, Bacolod City. After resting for
a while, he went to the house of their Purok President, Ramero Jarabelo, where he drank
three bottles of beer. Thereafter, he went home at around 9:00 o'clock, passing by the
dancehall were (sic.) a benefit dance was being held as a thanksgiving party for the
Sangguniang Kabataan. There, he was invited by Merlyn Rojo, who acted as emcee of the
program, to open the first dance. Appellant acceded and danced the first dance with Merlyn
Rojo. After their dance, appellant went home as he still had to work early the next morning.
When appellant arrived home, he noticed that eight (8) persons, including the victim, were
seated inside his jeepney. He approached them and requested them not to stay inside his
jeepney. Thereafter, all of them went away without any untoward incident. When the
accused and his wife were about to have their late dinner at around 11:00 o'clock, a
brownout occurred. About two seconds after the lights went out; he heard a gunshot which
he initially thought was merely a firecracker. Later, when he overheard that someone was
shot at the dancehall which was only 40 meters away from his house, he went out to look
for his two sons. Along the way, he met Daisy Panes, who, together with her husband, were
also on their way to the dancehall.
At the dancehall, someone told appellant that his son, Windel, was the one who carried the
victim to the hospital. So appellant went home and proceeded to eat his dinner. At around
11:45 o'clock of the same evening, while appellant was already resting, three policemen
came to his house and told him that the victim mentioned his name as the one who shot
him. Believing that he has done nothing wrong, appellant volunteered to go with the
policemen. Appellant claims that when they arrived at the police station, he even asked that
a paraffin test be conducted on him, the result of which was negative.4
Judgment of the RTC
In its judgment dated August 22, 2001,5 the RTC, through Judge Elumba, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused NELSON LAI y
BILBAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Peñal Code of the Philippines, as amended, and, in the
absence of neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances which may be considered in
the imposition of the penalty thereof, this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, 8 months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum and orders the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim Enrico Villanueva,
Jr. in the amount of Fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos only without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency as well as to suffer the accessory penalty provided for
by law and to pay the costs.
SO
ORDERED.6
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner raised the following errors, to wit:
[T]hat the lower court:

1. ERRED in giving full credence to the alleged dying declaration of Enrico Villanueva. Jr.;
2. ERRED in considering the alleged earlier untoward incident between accused and the group of
Enrico Villanueva, Jr. as sufficient to motivate the former to kill the latter;
3. ERRED in discarding en (sic) toto the defense of alibi and the negative result of the paraffin test
conducted on the accused;
4. ERRED in failing to see that the entire evidence presented by both the prosecution and defense
engender a reasonable doubt which should be resolved in favor of the accused;
5. ERRED as accused was deprived of due process when this case was decided by the
honorable presiding judge who acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he was
appointed to the bench;
6. ERRED when it completely disregarded appellant's motion for reconsideration below with nary
a look into any issue raised therein; and
7. ERRED when it denied appellant's motion for new trial.7
On May 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision,8 disposing:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
42, in Criminal Case No. 17446 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO
ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court
In this appeal, the petitioner continues to assail the conviction, but the Court has immediately noted that
the right to due process of the petitioner had been denied to him by Judge Elumba, the trial judge, by
not disqualifying himself from sitting on and trying Criminal Case No. 17446 despite having
participated in the trial as the public prosecutor. Thus, it is necessary for the Court to first determine if
the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba prejudiced the petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial.
As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March 23, 1998 as the public prosecutor
in Branch 42 of the RTC in Negros Occidental to replace the previous public prosecutor,10 but became
the Presiding Judge of Branch 42 on April 27, 2000.11 Branch 42 was the trial court hearing and
ultimately deciding Criminal Case No. 17446 against the petitioner. As such, Judge Elumba should
have disqualified himself from having anything to do with the case once he became the trial judge
because he was compulsorily disqualified. The petitioner pointed to the need for Judge Elumba's
disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration,12 but the latter ignored his concerns upon the
excuse that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after the Prosecution had rested its case.
Judge Elumba argued that he did not personally prosecute the case, and that, at any rate, the petitioner
should have sought his disqualification prior to the rendition of the judgment of conviction.13 ChanRoblesV irtualawlibrary
On appeal, the petitioner focused the CA's attention to the denial of due process to him by the non-
disqualification of Judge Elumba, but the CA upheld Judge Elumba's justifications, stating:
As to the fifth assigned error, appellant claims that he was denied due process because the
judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public prosecutor of the
instant case. First, the record of this case shows that when the judge, who was then a public
prosecutor, entered his appearance, the prosecution had already long rested its case, more
specifically, he appeared therein only when the last witness for the defense was presented,
not to mention the fact that it was a private prosecutor who cross-examined the last witness,
Merlyn Rojo. Thus, it cannot be said that the presiding judge personally prosecuted the
instant case, nor supervised the prosecution thereof when the same was still pending.
Second, settled is the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition
of judgment by the judge. Having failed to move for the disqualification of the judge,
appellant cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn
about (sic.) and say that he was denied due process. 'One surely cannot have his cake and
eat
it too.'14
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to any accused.
The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."15 An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before
his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the
judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due
process.16 The Court has said:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have
held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no
less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at
all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-
judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make
the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. 17
The adoption of rules governing the disqualification of the judges from hearing and deciding cases
should there be any cause that diminishes or negates their impartiality is a firm means of ensuring their
impartiality as judges. In particular, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule on
self-disqualification by a sitting judge, viz.:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, contemplates two kinds of self-disqualification. The first paragraph
enumerates the instances when the judge is prohibited and disqualified from sitting on and deciding a
case.18 The prohibition is compulsory simply because the judge is conclusively presumed to be
incapable of impartiality.19 The second paragraph speaks of voluntary inhibition; whether or not the
judge can sit in and try the case is left to his discretion, depending on the existence of just and valid
reasons not included in the first paragraph, but in exercising the discretion, he must rely only on his
conscience.20 ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary
Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary,21 which pertinently demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously
served as a lawyer of any of the parties, to wit:
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in

which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings
include, but are not limited to instances where:
x x x x
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; x x x.
Given the foregoing, the CA's justifications directly contravened the letter and spirit of Section 1 of
Rule 137, supra, and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, supra. The words counsel in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and lawyer
in Section 5 of Canon 3, supra, are understood in their general acceptation because their usage by the
rules has not been made subject of any qualifications or distinctions. As such, the mere appearance of
his name as the public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No. 17446 sufficed to disqualify
Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the case. Having represented the State in the prosecution of
the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the trial judge who would
continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed himself from being the trial judge in
Criminal Case No. 17446.
To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he
entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the
petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no
relation whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He
must be reminded that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could similarly be
demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of them should be appointed as the
trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that
would affect the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and
determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. As the Court has
amplified in Garcia v. De la Peña:22 cralawlawlibrary
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant
case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he
is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that
a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason,
prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of
written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and
confidence in the
courts of justice.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba did not personally prosecute or supervise the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 17446 is to ignore that all criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. That a private prosecutor had appeared in the case was of no
consequence, for such private prosecutor still came under the direct control and supervision of the
public prosecutor. In this connection, we note that it was only on May 1, 2002, or two years after Judge
Elumba's appointment in the Judiciary, when Section 5,24 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, was amended
by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC in order to expressly authorize the intervention of the private prosecutor to
prosecute a criminal case in case of heavy work load or lack of the public prosecutor, provided that the
private prosecutor was authorized in writing for the purpose by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or
the Regional State Prosecutor. Even so, the records do not indicate that the private prosecutor who
appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 had been duly authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case by himself.
We have also observed that the CA appeared too eager to sustain the refusal of Judge Elumba to
disqualify himself as the trial judge. Such overeagerness was uncharacteristic of the CA as an appellate
court in a criminal case whose unmistakable duty was to thoroughly sift and scrutinize the records of
the trial court to search for errors that would reverse or modify the judgment in favor of the accused.
Had it done its duty, it would have quickly noticed a hard indication existing in the trial records of
Criminal Case No. 17446 exposing Judge Elumba to have actually taken an active participation in the
trial. The indication was in the form of the Motion to Present Rebuttal Evidence that then Public
Prosecutor Elumba had filed on January 25, 2000, the text of which is reproduced herein:
MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
x x x x
That the records of the above-entitled case would show that the accused rested his case on
October 29, 1999;
That, however, after going over the records of the case, the prosecution feels that there
is a need to present rebuttal evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Court that the prosecution be allowed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the
evidence presented by the accused.
(Sgd.)
FERNANDO R. ELUMBA
Trial Prosecutor25
The text of the motion disclosed that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had come to the conclusion that
"there is a need to present rebuttal evidence" after his having gone over the records of the case. Clearly,
he had formed an opinion that was absolutely adverse to the interest of the petitioner.
The CA's reliance on Lao v. Court of Appeals26 was inappropriate. In Lao, the Court opined and
declared that the petition to disqualify the trial judge must be filed prior to the rendition of judgment. 27
But the supposed disqualification of the judge in Lao was premised on bias as perceived by a party.28
We should point out that perceived bias was a ground covered by the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 37, supra, and would justify only the voluntary inhibition of the judge. In contrast, Judge
Elumba's situation rested on a ground for mandatory disqualification because it emanated from the
conclusive presumption of his bias.29 Such a ground should have been forthwith acknowledged upon
Judge Elumba's assumption of the judgeship in Branch 42, or, at the latest, upon the ground being
raised to his attention, regardless of the stage of the case.
Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be expected
to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His non-
disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as the accused. To restore
the right to the petitioner, the proceedings held against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing
conviction have to be nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded to the
RTC for a partial new trial to remove any of the prejudicial consequences of the violation of the right to
due process. The case shall be raffled to a Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba
under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. For, as we said in Pimentel v. Salanga:30 cralawlawlibrary
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a
litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will
not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice. Such was the view
taken by this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that case, we found that the
filing of charges by a party against a judge generated 'resentment' or the judge's part that led
to his "bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the decision." We there discoursed on the
'principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge' which 'is
as old as the history of courts.' We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the
circumstances obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial judge's finding were not
influenced by bias or prejudice. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and directed a new
trial.31
WHEREFORE, the Court ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 27, 2005
by the Court of Appeals and the judgment rendered on August 22, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court;
REMANDS Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y Bilbao to the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City with instructions to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court to assign it to any Regional Trial Judge not disqualified under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court; and INSTRUCTS the new trial judge to resume the trial in Criminal Case No. 17446 starting
from the stage just prior to the assumption of Judge Fernando R. Elumba as the trial judge, and to hear
and decide Criminal Case No. 17446 with reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
JOSE T. TUBOLA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Jose Tubola, Jr. (petitioner) appeals the December 7, 2000 Decision1 and June 10, 2002 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 12015 which found him guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That within the period from June 25, 1982 up to November 8, 1982, and for sometime prior thereto, in
Iloilo City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused who was a
duly appointed cashier/collecting officer of the National Irrigation System, Iloilo City and as such was
an accountable public officer for public funds that were in his official custody by reason of his official
position, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence
misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of NINE THREE
THOUSAND FIFTY ONE PESOS AND EIGHTY- EIGHT CENTAVOS ₱93,051.88 to the damage
and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan, Sta. Barbara River
Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8, 1982, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditing
Examiners Yvonne Gotera (Gotera) and Theresita Cajita (Cajita) conducted an audit examination of
petitioner’s account which indicated a shortage of ₱93,051.88.3
Gotera and Cajita thus sent a letter of demand dated November 23, 1982 to petitioner directing him to
account for the shortage.4 Petitioner refused to receive the letter, however, hence, Gotera and Cajita
sent it by registered mail.5
Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing malversation of public funds before the
Sandiganbayan to which he pleaded "not guilty."6
By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the prosecution, petitioner had an account balance of
₱30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June 25 to November 8, 1982, the date petitioner’s
account was audited, his cash collections totaled ₱347,995.64; that his remittances from June 25 to
November 8, 1982 totaled ₱285,105.41; and that the total collections less total remittances amounted to
₱93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982.7
Still by Gotera’s account, the audit team found in petitioner’s drawer "vales/chits" or promissory notes
or receivables signed by NIA employees involving the total amount of ₱79,044.51.8
Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of payment
of salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project, declared that his task of
keeping the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon
instruction of his superior, Regional Director Manuel Hicao,9 for he (petitioner) was also handling the
payroll of around 2,000 employees.
Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the collected fees was undertaken since he trusted
Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after he signed the statement of collection without
reading the contents thereof. 10
Petitioner presented "vales" and "chits" involving the total amount of ₱115,661.66 representing loans
extended by Valeria to certain NIA employees and even COA auditors.11 And he identified "chits" and
"vales" dated 1975 to 1981 inclusive representing loans extended prior to the audit period.12
By Decision of December 7, 2000,13 the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as charged, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused, JOSE TUBOLA, JR., having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court hereby CONVICTS him of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TEN (10) years and ONE (1) day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR
(4) months of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum, and the accessory penalties provided for by law.
He is likewise ordered to indemnify the Republic of the Philippines the amount of Ninety Three
Thousand Fifty One Pesos and Eighty Eight Centavos (₱93,051.88); to pay a fine in the same amount,
which is the amount of money malversed and the costs of suit, and finally to suffer perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
SO ORDERED.14 (Capitalization, italics and emphasis in the original)
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,15 petitioner lodged the present appeal, imputing
error on the Sandiganbayan for
I
. . . CONCLUD[ING] THAT [HE] FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION UNDER

ARTICLE 217 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE . . .
II
. . . CONCLUDING THAT [HE] HAS COMMITTED INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE

IN DELEGATING THE CUSTODY OF THE ACCOUNT TO [AN]OTHER PERSON.
III
. . . RENDERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT

THAT IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT [HE] IS NOT AN ACTUAL
AND POTENTIAL WRONGDOER.
IV
. . . VIOLAT[ING] [HIS] BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

WHEN IT ACTIVELY TOOK PART IN THE QUESTIONING OF THE ACCUSED
WHEN HE WAS PRESENTED AS A WITNESS.16
To petitioner, the evidence adduced at the trial had overcome the legal presumption that he put the
missing funds to his personal use. There is, he argues, "incontrovertible fact that [he] ha[d] not received
any single centavo in the form of irrigation fees" since the collections were actually received by
Valeria.17
According to petitioner, he being the superior of Valeria, he had to rely on her honesty and competence
in the performance of her duties. He cites Arias v. Sandiganbayan,18 which ruled that a head of office is
not required to examine every single detail of any transaction from its inception until it is finally
approved, to deem it no longer necessary for him to examine all the details each time a remittance of
the fees was made.
Petitioner even posits that the Sandiganbayan was unsure whether he was guilty of malversation
intentionally or through negligence.
In fine, petitioner insists that as the primary task of collecting the irrigation fees was the responsibility
of Valeria, he cannot be faulted for negligence.19
Further, petitioner posits that he was neither an actual or potential wrongdoer and, absent criminal
intent, he should not be convicted with the full harshness of the law.20
Finally, petitioner points out that his right to due process was violated, the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan having actively participated in the criminal proceedings by "tak[ing] into their own
hands in proving the case against [him]."21
The People, through the Special Prosecutor, draws attention to the failure of petitioner to present
Valeria to shed light on her actual duties, or to at least present a certification from then Regional
Director Manuel Hicao, who allegedly ordered Valeria to take over from petitioner the duty of
collecting irrigation fees. To the People, petitioner’s self-serving testimony failed to controvert the
legal presumption of misappropriation.22
The People goes on to contend that petitioner may still be convicted of malversation by negligence
even if the Information alleged the commission of intentional malversation since the "dolo or culpa
present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony."23
Respecting the supposed violation of petitioner’s right to due process in light of the alleged "active"
participation of the Sandiganbayan Justices in questioning him during the hearing of the case, the
People underscores that it is the duty of a trial judge to examine a witness "to secure a full and clear
understanding of the facts or to test to his satisfaction the credibility of the witness…"24
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal uses. (italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The elements of malversation of public funds are thus:
1. that the offender is a public officer;
2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and
4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.25
All the above-mentioned elements are here present. Petitioner was a public officer26 ─ he occupied the
position of cashier at the NIA. By reason of his position, he was tasked to regularly handle irrigation
fees, which are indubitably public funds pertaining to the NIA, and to remit them to the depositary
bank.
As established by the prosecution, petitioner was the one who remitted irrigation fees collected from
June 25, 1982 to October 31, 198327 inclusive, so that even if the Court were to credit petitioner’s
allegation that Valeria had actually taken over his function of collecting the irrigation fees, the
collections were still, in fact by his admission, turned over to him.
Q: How about the money after this payment for irrigation fees are entered in the Collection Book for
which Ms. Edita Valeria is the one in charge, who keeps the money being paid for irrigation fees?
A: She is the one holding the money turned over to her by the farmers who paid their irrigation fees,
sir. I am just reporting in my office every 7th, 15th.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Confine your answer to the question. Who keeps the irrigation fees being collected?
A: Edita Valeria, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q: Is that part of her functions?
WITNESS
A: No, your Honor.
Q: Whose function is it to keep the irrigation fees?
A: My function, your Honor.
x x x x.
Q: After Edita Valeria receives the money representing the irrigation fees of farmers, does she turn
over the collections to you?
A: Yes, sir.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In fact, petitioner’s admission that his signature was required before remitting the irrigation fees to the
depositary bank reinforces the fact that he had complete control and custody thereof.
WITNESS
A: Everytime she reported to me, she just fold [sic] the page of the collection book and he [sic] tells
[sic] me, this is okay and you can just sign this statement of collection.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q: So you are being made to sign a statement of collection without looking at the supporting
documents to validate the correctness of the figures nor even to determine whether the figures there and
the ones remitted to the Philippine National Bank?
A: Yes, your Honor. I just asked her, "Is this accounting okay?" and she said "Yes".29 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to rebut the legal presumption that he
had misappropriated the fees to his personal use, his disclaimer being self-serving.
Why, indeed, Valeria, whom petitioner had pointed to as having full responsibility for the collections,
including their deposit to the bank, covered by the audit period, was never presented to corroborate his
claim dents his defense as does his failure to present the Regional Director or a certification from him
for the same purpose.
As for petitioner’s explanation that the unaccounted fees were extended as loans to employees as
evidenced by "vales" and "chits" found in his drawer which involved a total of ₱79,044.51, it fails. If
this claim were true, petitioner could have at least promptly collected them, and/or offered the
testimonies of the employees-obligors to prove good faith on his part.
As for the "vales" and "chits" that he offered in evidence, as the same were admittedly incurred before
the period of audit, they are immaterial, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan:
PROS GALINDEZ
Q: Mr. Witness, since these chits and vales were incurred before the period [covered by the ] audit, you
could not have possibly used the money collected by you in your capacity as Cashier for the period
from June 25, 1982 to November 8, 1982.
A: Yes, sir. I have told you before that Mrs. Valeria is the one handling my collections. I am just
concentrating on my disbursements. I have two disbursement books and my collection book is handled
by Mrs. Valeria including the payments and …
x x x x.
Q: So that these chits and vales which were merely listed by the Auditing Examiners as they were
found inside your safe are irrelevant to the accusation?
WITNESS
A: Where can Mrs. Valeria get the cash to extend vales, sir? Because my collection book is balance as
found by the examiners. So, she herself extended vales from her collections.
Q: Mr. Witness, we are speaking about the chits and vales which you extended.
PJ GARCHITORENA
It is clear that the accused is being charged for shortage covered by the period June 25, 1982 to
November 8, 1982 and that Exhibit "1" series refers to accounts prior to that period of audit so that you
have a point. You have covered that point already.
PROS GALINDEZ
Q: This inventory of cash and cash items which is from 1975 to 1981, did you attempt to collect this
from the payees?
A: No, sir.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner’s assertion, vis-à-vis his citation of the ruling in Arias, that he was the superior of Valeria
was later belied by him:
Q: But she [referring to Valeria] is under your direct supervision?
A: Under the Chief of Office, the Irrigation Superintendent.31

Aside then from the lack of a superior-subordinate relationship with Valeria, the circumstances
obtaining in Arias and the present case are entirely different. Arias involved the culpability of a final
approving authority on the basis of criminal conspiracy, whereas the present case involves petitioner’s
culpability on the basis of his being the accountable public officer.1avvphil
On petitioner’s assertion that the Sandiganbayan erred in concluding that he committed malversation
through inexcusable negligence when the Information alleges intentional malversation, it does not
impress.
To be sure, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner for intentional malversation on the basis of his
failure to refute the presumption that he converted the money to his personal use. Petitioner misreads
the assailed Decision since the discussion about his culpability for malversation through inexcusable
negligence was merely academic in light of the postulation that a subordinate (Valeria) was at fault.32
Nonetheless, in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan,33 the Court ratiocinated that:

On the other hand, petitioner contends that the bulk of said amount represented "vales" he granted to
the postal employees and the minor portion consisted of unremitted, unreimbursed or uncollected
amounts. His very own explanation, therefore, shows that the embezzlement, as claimed by the
prosecution, or the expenditures, as posited by him, were not only unauthorized but intentionally and
voluntarily made. Under no stretch of legal hermeneutics can it be contended that these funds were lost
through abandonment or negligence without petitioner's knowledge as to put the loss within a merely
culpable category. From the contention of either party, the misappropriation was intentional and not
through negligence.
Besides, even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from
the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. A
possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment
is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was
denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against him. That no
such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the
records of this case.34 (italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to due process vis-à-vis the Sandiganbayan Justices’
active "participation" during the trial fails too. For he has not specified any instance of supposed bias of
the Justices, or cited what questions adversely affected him. The record does not reflect any question or
objection raised by petitioner’s counsel during the trial to the Justices’ questions or the tenor or manner
they were propounded. Nor does the record reflect any move to inhibit the Justices if petitioner
perceived that they were biased against him.
That a magistrate may propound clarificatory questions to secure a full and clear understanding of the
facts in the case is not proscribed.35
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 7, 2000 Decision and June 10, 2002
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 12015 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement the promotion and appointments
of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of
CHED and the Civil Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending that he was denied
due process when he was not allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative case against
him.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019, was well founded despite the
refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as evidence.
Held:
The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued by CHED was attended by ill
motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was affirmed by the sandiganbayan, was
based on the evidence presented before it. The non-admittance of the dismissal of the administrative case did not
violate petitioner’s right to due process where such dismissal was not relevant to the adjudication of the criminal
case. After all, administrative proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to criminal
proceedings, the judgment in one is not dependent on the other.
Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: 1.that
the accused was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury
was caused to another party because of such act.
JOSE R. CATACUTAN, G.R. No. 175991
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE , Promulgated:
Respondent. August 31, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is well within the Courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it
judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan

seeking to set aside and reverse the Decision[1] dated December 7, 2006 of the
Sandiganbayan which affirmed the Decision[2] dated July 25, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Surigao City convicting him of the crime of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Factual Antecedents
The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.
Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while
private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II
with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades
(SNSAT).[3]
On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative

Region, appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction
Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.[4] These promotional appointments
were duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
on June 3, 1997.[5] Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved
appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997,[6] copy
furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private
complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made known
that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them
despite written orders from CHED[7] and the CSC, Caraga Regional Office.[8] Thus, on
August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for
grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the
Ombudsman for .[9]
In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of
Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, committed in the
following manner, to wit:
That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School
of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his
official duties, thus committing the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did
then and there, with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the
promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational
Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and
despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil
Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to
receive a higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were
deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena
A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors [III].
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional
appointments of the private complainants because of some procedural lapses or
infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. According to him, the
appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera,
using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional
Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment papers cited
the entire plantilla[11] (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead
of only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He likewise claimed that he
received only the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure
where the original appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to
his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify
the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he contended, were
formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997[12]
who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were regular and valid and
directed him to implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession
of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13]
but the latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the
appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just
wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the
preparation of appointment papers.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 25, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[14] holding that the act of the
petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject
promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his
palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The trial court ruled that petitioners
refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants had caused undue
injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month
and perpetual disqualification from public office.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of]
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of] SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) MONTH and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, and to
pay the costs.
The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito Posesano and
Magdalena Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but it was denied in an Order[17] dated
October 13, 2005.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.[18] The

appellate court ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being supported by evidence
and firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed to
show that the trial court committed any reversible error in judgment.
Hence, this petition.
In the Courts Resolution[19] dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment[20] on
June 5, 2007 while the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment[21] for
respondent People of the on February 22, 2008.
Issue
The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:
Whether the [petitioners] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection of [the]
law x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court
of Appeals] Decision dated April 18, 2001 x x x in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled Jose R. Catacutan,
petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents.[22]
Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,[23] petitioner argues that the
Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be
heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the
findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs)
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the administrative case filed against
him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the
private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks of merit.
Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due

process.
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be
heard.[24] Due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy.[25] Where an opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.[26]
Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim

denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and
explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied
due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of
procedural due process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to
introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the
courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes
irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the
evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an
administrative matter. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the
Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal
case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or
necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter. x
x x[27]
This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not
without legal precedent. In Paredes v. Court of Appeals,[28] this Court ruled:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent
from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a
bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another
thing is the criminal liability for the same act.
xxxx
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative
case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. x x x
In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated:

This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and
that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice
versa. x x x
On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare
that the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA
Decision. Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to
refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the
purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it.[30]
At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as
evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner
could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by
the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the
CAs Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his
offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party
producing it should ask the courts permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.
As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it
has no probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and
rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and
jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not
formally offered.
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[31]
All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully
proven by the prosecution.
First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time
material to this case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-
Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised official duties and
functions, which include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such
as taking charge of personnel management and finances, as well as implementing
instruction as far as appointment of teachers.[32]
Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the
appointments of private complainants. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no
longer anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of the CHED
Regional Director addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latters protest letter.
x x x In light of the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutans reason for not
implementing the appointments was a personal dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano, this Court
believes that Catacutans refusal was impelled by an ill motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of
bad faith. x x x
xxxx
In the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was once
again directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully
acted upon by competent authorities. Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even
challenged the private complainants to file a case against him. Such arrogance is indicative of the bad
faith of the accused-appellant.
Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997, clarifying
with finality the validity of the appointment. Still, Accused-appellant failed to implement the subject
promotions. This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent
authorities established the evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the
contrary.[33]
While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private
complainants valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith
when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject
appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. It is well to
remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence does.[34]
Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral
certainty. Here, the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able
to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their
valid appointments. As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new
positions only on November 19, 1997. So in the interregnum from June to November
1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary
corresponding to their newly appointed positions. Likewise established is that as a result
of petitioners unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments
notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private
complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the
award of moral damages under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.
At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that
were threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed
by the Sandiganbayan. Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this Court. In any event, apart from
these factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment and review of
the records considers the findings in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on December 7, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUSIE CHAN-TAN, G.R. No. 167139

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
JESSE C. TAN, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 25, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution[2] amending the 30
March 2004 Decision[3] and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution[4] of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743. In its 30 March
2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner Susie Chan-Tan
and respondent Jesse Tan void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated as part
of the decision was the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment[5] approving the Compromise
Agreement[6] of the parties. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the trial court granted to
respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latters name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family
dwelling. In its 15 February 2005 Resolution, the trial court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution[7] denying petitioners motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution, [8] which in
turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004
resolution.
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in

Intramuros, Manila.[9] They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was born in
Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the Philippines in 1993.[10]
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a
compromise agreement, which we quote in full:
1. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at Corinthian Hills, Quezon City
and more particularly described in the Contract to Sell, marked in open court as Exhibits H to H-3 shall
be considered as part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor children namely, Justin Tan
born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan born on November 28, 1993. Copies of the Contract to Sell
are hereto attached as Annexes A and B and made integral parts hereof.
2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of her own funds/assets
whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof
directly with Megaworld Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract amounts are fully paid.
Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate, transact, pay and deal with the
seller/developer Megaworld Properties, Inc., in connection with the Contract to Sell marked as
Annexes A and B hereof.
The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and located at Unit O,
Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City shall be placed in co-ownership under the
name of Susie Tan (1/3), Justin Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan.
The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and located at View
Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to
the exclusion of Susie Tan.
The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse Tan shall exclusively own
blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under the respective names of Jesse
Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by the spouse whose name appears as the
registered/account owner or holder in the corporate records/stock transfer books, passbooks and/or the
one in possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits thereof, to the exclusion of the other spouse.
Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and under the name and/or in the
possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively owned by him only and all shares, accounts and properties
registered and/or in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by her
only.
However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall execute any and all documents
transferring the shares of stocks registered in his name in favor of Susie Tan, or Justin Tan/Russel Tan.
A copy of the list of the corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached as Annex C
and made an integral part hereof.
The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the other spouse any and all
original documents, papers, titles, contracts registered in the name of the other spouse that are in their
respective possessions and/or safekeeping.
3. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Court, the
existing property regime of the spouses shall be dissolved and shall now be governed by Complete
Separation of Property. Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors that will be
prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.
The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the two (2) minor children shall
stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City.
The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children every Sunday of each
month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor children shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street,
Quezon City on or before 9:00 PM of every Sunday of each month.
The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children in school/or in the house
every Thursday of each month. The husband shall ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said
Thursdays.
During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the children, the parties shall
discuss the proper arrangement to be made regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan.
Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the love and affection between the
children and the other party, or in the way of a reasonable and proper companionship between them,
either by influencing the children against the other, or otherwise; nor shall they do anything to estrange
any of them from the other.
The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in dealing with each other and shall
not insult, malign or commit discourteous acts against each other and shall endeavor to cause their
other relatives to act similarly.
4. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the children on the following
additional dates, provided that the same will not impede or disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier
School, the dates are as follows:
a. Birthday of Jesse Tan
b. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins and uncles and aunties
c. Father's Day
d. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan
e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on such dates as when the
children can stay with their father. Provided that if the children stay with their father on Christmas Day
from December 24th to December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with their mother on
December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or vice versa.
The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children and shall see to it that he
will exert his best effort to attend the same.
5. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as far as practicable have one
celebration.
Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have the right to see and bring
out the children for at least four (4) hours during the day or the day immediately following/or after the
birthday, if said visit or birthday coincides with the school day.
6. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and utilized for their High
School and College education, in the event that the Educational Plans are insufficient to cover their
tuition, the Husband shall shoulder the tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of books and
educational materials, uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses like summer workshops which
are taken in Xavier School, which will be paid directly by Jesse Tan to the children's school when the
same fall due. Jesse Tan, if necessary, shall pay tutorial expenses, directly to the tutor concerned.
The husband further undertake to pay P10,000.00/monthly support pendente lite to be deposited in the
ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with account no. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the
15th of each month. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two (2) sons every Sunday,
the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of the daily meals of the two (2) children in school.
7. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public policy, public order and
good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and bind themselves to execute and sign any and all
documents to give effect to this Compromise Agreement.[11]
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment [12] approving the compromise
agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological
incapacity of the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise
agreement of the parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and
property relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision
Lot No. 12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate the amount of
P11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the following manner:
(a) P3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian Hills on Lot 11, Block 2;
(b) P7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit 9H of the 8 Wack Wack
Road Condominium project; and
(c) P533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. to cover the marketing
and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12, Block 2.[13]
Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to
other interested buyers. It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country
bringing the children with her.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The
evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of
the country without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court;
petitioner failed to pay the P8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property
which, if forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to
turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latters name.
Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of
the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the
latters name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon
City.
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration [14] alleging denial of due
process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was
not able to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear
for her life and the future of the children. She claimed she was forced to leave the
country, together with her children, due to the alleged beating she received from
respondent and the pernicious effects of the latters supposed gambling and womanizing
ways. She prayed for an increase in respondents monthly support obligation in the
amount of P150,000.
Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,[15] denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. It
also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-compliance with the partial
judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. The trial court also denied petitioners prayer
for increase in monthly support. The trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it
upon herself to enroll the children in another school without respondents knowledge, she
should therefore defray the resulting increase in their expenses.
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss[16] and a motion for
reconsideration[17] of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she was no longer
interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the
conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children. She
prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the
status quo ante the filing of the suit.
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,[18] the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss
and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the 30 March 2004
decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse
of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either
party.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004
resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February 2005 resolution.[19] The trial
court then issued a Certificate of Finality[20] of the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17
May 2004 resolution.
The Trial Courts Rulings
The 30 March 2004 Decision[21] declared the marriage between the parties void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It
incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment[22] approving the Compromise
Agreement[23] between the parties. The 17 May 2004 Resolution[24] amended the earlier
partial judgment in granting to respondent custody of the children, ordering petitioner to
turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latters name, and allowing
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15 February
2005 Resolution[25] denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the 28 December
2004 Resolution[26] denying petitioners motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution,[27] which in turn denied for late
filing petitioners motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May
2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of
due process.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings
and appear at the hearings for respondents omnibus motion to amend the partial
judgment as regards the custody of the children and the properties in her possession.
Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the
testimony of respondent. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her
motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the
provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the
preservation of the family.
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution
of the trial court are now final and executory and could no longer be reviewed, modified,
or vacated. Respondent alleges petitioner is making a mockery of our justice system in
disregarding our lawful processes. Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel
appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioners
motion to dismiss.
The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. Court of
Appeals.[28] In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition for the annulment of
her marriage on the ground of her husbands psychological incapacity. There, the trial
court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of the marriage and awarding custody of
the children to private respondent therein. No timely appeal was taken from the trial
courts judgment.
We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final and
executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period. The
husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his
right to due process. He argued he was denied due process when, after failing to appear
on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to
present evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by
private respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was
based solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent.
We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the
client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of the latters right to appeal is not a ground for setting
aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[29]
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the
trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal.[30] Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which
the trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the
doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioners
loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts judgments.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have
lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she
cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through counsel,
actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to
petitioners allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the
negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioners end, as may be gleaned from her
counsels manifestation dated 3 May 2004:
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity proceedings, respectfully informs the
Honorable Court that she has not heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner
have failed.
Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an intelligent manner to the
Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.[31]
Clearly, despite her counsels efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in
the hearings on respondents omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the
children. The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings
and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot
now come to this Court crying denial of due process.
As for the applicability to petitioners motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided,
however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be
raised as an affirmative defense in an answer. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible
defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be
made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law is an
important factor to be considered.[32] Further, the letter of the law admits of no other
interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a
respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the
annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a
dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only
logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss
filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage.
Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage,
Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of
the Rule not being applicable, petitioners claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly
setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without basis.
Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable
marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows dismissal of the
action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff, to wit:
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed by the
plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an
order confirming the dismissal. x x x
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30
March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become
final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely
appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May
2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory,
it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.[33] The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or
orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has
become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest.[34]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May 2004
Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15 February 2005
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No.
Q-01-45743.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Noryn Tan vs Judge Clarita Tabin
March 8, 2014
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ADVERTISEMENTS
Remedial Law – Summary Procedure – Warrant of Arrest – Notice to the Accused

Legal Ethics – Judicial Ethics – Abuse of Authority
In 2006, a criminal case was filed against Noryn Tan for estafa in the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
(Branch 4). Arraignment was set to fall on October 10, 2006. Tan was not able to appear in court hence
the presiding judge, Judge Clarita Tabin, issued a warrant of arrest against Tan. Tan was arrested in
Quezon City, her place of residence.
Tan posted bail. Later on, she filed an administrative case against Judge Tabin on the ground of denial
of due process. Tan alleged that she never received notice about the said arraignment.
In her comment, Judge Tabin said that the notice was coursed through the Chief of Police of Quezon
City and that when two months lapsed after the issuance of said notice and no return was made by the
QC police office, Judge Tabin presumed that Tan received the notice in the regular course of mail and
that there was presumption of regularity in favor of the police officers. Thus, she issued the arrest
warrant against Tan but such issuance was made in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the arrest warrant was proper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court clarified whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary
Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the accused
fails to appear whenever required. In this case, the estafa case falls under the Rules on Summary
procedure. Judge Tabin is not justified in issuing the warrant of arrest and her defense of good faith is
not tenable.
The judge herself admitted that there was no proof that Tan received the notice for her to appear in
court. She merely relied on the presumption of regularity which should not be used as an excuse in
violating the right of the accused to due process. So basic and fundamental is a person’s right to liberty
that it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside with the presumption that the police through which
the notice had been sent, actually served the same on Tan whose address was not even specified.
Judge Tabin failed to uphold the rules. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to her office
to know and simply apply it. The Supreme Court held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority
when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary procedure
rule that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file
his counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence. Judge Tabin was found guilty of abuse of authority
and was fined P10,000.00.
NORYN S. TAN, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1729
Petitioner, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1910-MTJ)
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
JUDGE MARIA CLARITA DE CASTRO, JJ.
CASUGA-TABIN, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 4, , Promulgated:
Respondent. January 20, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Noryn S. Tan (complainant) filed a Complaint dated against Judge Maria Clarita
Casuga-Tabin (respondent) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
for denial of due process relative to Criminal Case No. 118628.
Complainant avers: On , the Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police
District (QCPD) served her a warrant of arrest dated , issued by the , Branch 4, presided
by respondent, relative to Criminal Case No. 118628 for alleged violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. It was only then that she learned for the first time that a criminal case
was filed against her before the court. She was detained at the Quezon City Hall
Complex Police Office and had to post bail of P1,000.00 before the Office of the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of for her temporary release. Upon
verification, she learned that respondent issued on an Order directing her to appear
before the court on for arraignment. It was sent by mail to PNP for service to her.
However, she did not receive any copy of the Order and up to the present has not seen
the same; hence, she was not able to attend her arraignment. She also found out that
there was no proof of service of the Order or any notice to her of the arraignment. This
notwithstanding, respondent issued a warrant for her arrest. Complainant alleges that she
was deeply aggrieved and embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant for her arrest
despite the fact that she was never notified of her arraignment. Complainant prayed that
the appropriate investigation be conducted as to the undue issuance of a warrant for her
arrest.[1]
In her Comment[2] dated , respondent answered: She issued the warrant of arrest
because when the case was called for appearance, the complainant, as accused therein,
failed to appear. Prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, her staff sent by registered
mail the court's Order dated August 8, 2006 addressed to complainant through the Chief
of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City directing complainant to appear on October 10, 2006
at 8:30 a.m. for the arraignment and preliminary conference in Criminal Case No.
118628, as proven by Registry Receipt No. 0310. It is true that the return on the court's
Order dated had not yet been made by the QC Police on or before . Nonetheless, she
issued the warrant of arrest in good faith and upon the following grounds: (a) under Sec.
3 of Rule 131[3] of the Rules of Court, the court was entitled to presume that on October
10, 2006, after the lapse of a little over two months, official duty had been regularly
performed and a letter duly directed and mailed had been received in the regular course
of mail; and (b) Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases
provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the place where
the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. The warrant of arrest she issued
was meant to implement this provision, which was not repealed by the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, since complainant is a resident of and not of . If her
interpretation was erroneous, she (respondent) believes that an administrative sanction
for such error would be harsh and unsympathetic. She has nothing personal against
complainant and did not want to embarrass or humiliate her. She issued the warrant in
the honest belief that her act was in compliance with the rules. She prays that the case
against her be dismissed and that a ruling on the interpretation of Secs. 10 & 12, of the
1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, in relation to Sec. 16 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure be made for the guidance of the bench and bar.[4]
The OCA, in its agenda report dated , recommended that the case be dismissed for lack
of merit. It held: Prior to the filing of the information, a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the provincial prosecutor resulting in the Resolution dated July 11, 2006
recommending the filing of the case; it was incredulous for complainant to claim that
she came to learn for the first time of the filing of the criminal case when the warrant of
arrest was served on her; furthermore, there was already a complete service of notice as
contemplated in Sec. 10, Rule 13[5] of the Rules of Court; hence the requirement of
notice was fully satisfied by the service of the Order dated August 8, 2006 and the
completion of the service thereof.[6]
Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court on issued a Resolution dismissing
the case for lack of merit.[7]
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 8, 2008 alleging: The
issue in this case was not whether complainant was aware of the criminal complaint
against her, but whether the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her despite the
absence of notice should be administratively dealt with; complainant was never notified
of the arraignment; thus, she was not able to attend the same; respondent admitted in her
Comment that no return had yet been made on or before October 10, 2006, the date
respondent ordered the warrant to be issued; her explanation of good faith was therefore
unjustifiable; neither could respondent invoke the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty, since the complainant did not actually receive any notice;
respondent in an Order dated March 14, 2007 admitted that since she did not usually
wear eyeglasses during hearings, she thought that the acknowledgment receipt at the
back of the Order referred to the copy sent to complainant; later scrutiny, however,
showed that it pertained to the one sent to the prosecutor's office; Section 10, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court did not apply to the instant case; the Order was addressed and sent to
PNP Quezon City; assuming that the Order was properly served on the PNP, it was not
equivalent to a service on complainant; there was no actual delivery of the Order to the
complainant; hence, there was no personal service; neither was it served by ordinary
mail or by registered mail; thus, the rule on completeness of service had not been
satisfied; complainant was not aware of and therefore did not attend the preliminary
investigation of her case; no proof can be shown that she was ever notified of the said
preliminary investigation, much less of the filing of the same.[8]
In a Resolution dated , the Court required respondent to Comment on complainant's

Motion for Reconsideration.[9]
Complainant filed a Comment stating: Complainant's motion did not raise any new issue
or ground that would merit the reconsideration of the Court's November 12, 2007
Resolution; complainant failed to rebut the presumption that she was notified of the
scheduled arraignment; what complainant propounded was a mere self-serving denial
that she never received the subpoena intended for her; there was no explanation why she
would be able to receive a warrant of arrest; which was coursed in the same manner as
the subpoena, in a little less than a month, but allegedly to receive the subpoena in
almost two months; if complainant's assertion was to be believed, the effect would be to
paralyze the operation of courts in the provinces that had to inevitably rely on the police
resources of Metro Manila; arraignments could not proceed and trials could not go on; it
was reasonable to follow as a rule that once a pleading or any other official document
was received in the ordinary course of sending them, it must be presumed that others of
the same nature were also delivered to the named addressees; to believe otherwise would
be to delay justice for those residing outside Metro Manila.[10]
The Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration to be impressed with merit.
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that
the court shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the accused fails to appear
whenever required.[11] This is clearly provided in Section 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure which states:
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to
appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be in bail or on recognizance
by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, respondent claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
complainant was justified, since complainant failed to appear during the arraignment in
spite of an order requiring her to do so. Respondent admits, however, that a copy of the
Order dated , was sent to complainant through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, .
While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions, one of which is that
official duty has been regularly performed, such presumption should not be the sole
basis of a magistrate in concluding that a person called to court has failed to appear as
required, which in turn justifies the issuance of a warrant for her arrest, when such
notice was not actually addressed to her residence but to the police in her city. So basic
and fundamental is a person's right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or
brushed aside with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been
sent, actually served the same on complainant whose address was not even specified.
Respondent further admitted in her Comment dated that when she proceeded with the
arraignment on as scheduled, no return had yet been made by the Quezon City
Police.[12] Nevertheless, she issued the warrant of arrest, arguing that she did so on the
presumption that regular duty had been performed, and that the Order had been received
in the regular course of mail; and since Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary
Procedure provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the
place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed, the warrant of arrest
she issued was justified since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not of
Baguio City.
The Court disagrees.

Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases (As
Amended) state:
Sec. 10. Duty of the Court. - On the basis of the complaint of information and the affidavits
accompanying the same, the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case
outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to require further proceedings to be taken. In the
latter case, the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an accused under custody, and if he
pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If he pleads not guilty, and in all other cases, the court
shall issue an order, accompanied by copies of all the affidavits submitted by the complainant, directing
the defendant(s) to appear and submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses at a specified date
not later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever required, shall cause the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists after an examination in
writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Sec. 12. Bail not required; Exception. --- No bail shall be required except when a warrant of arrest is
issued in accordance with Section 10 hereon or where the accused (a) is a recidivist; (b) is fugitive
from justice; (c) is charged with physical injuries; (d) does not reside in the place where the violation
of the law or ordinance was committed, or (e) has no known residence.
Section 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure was not reproduced in the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, while Section 10 was revised and portions
thereof reproduced in Sections 12[13] and 16 of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure.
Granting, arguendo, that Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure
in Special Cases were not repealed by the 1991 Revised Rules, still it does not justify the
warrant of arrest issued in this case. Section 12 talks of instances when bails are
required, one of which is when the accused does not reside in the place where the
violation of the law or ordinance was committed. It does not state, however, that a
warrant of arrest shall immediately issue even without actual notice to the accused.
Respondent's interpretation ascribes to the rules those which were not expressly stated
therein and unduly expands their meaning.
The Court also notes that in an Order dated , a copy of which was attached by
complainant to her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent admitted that:
As a point of clarification, during the hearing on October 10, 2006, when the case was called and
the accused failed to appear, the Court verified from the staff if the Accused was notified to
which said staff answered in the affirmative, showing to the Court a copy of the Order dated August
8, 2006, setting this case for Appearance of the Accused on October 10, 2006. At the back of the
Order was an attached Acknowledgment Receipt. A quick glance of the said receipt, and without
eyeglasses of the Presiding Judge, as she does not usually wear one during Court sessions, made
this Court believed that indeed, that was the Acknowledgment Receipt proving that the Accused
was served with a copy of the said Order.
The attention of the Court was called upon receipt of the Accused's Motion for Clarification and
a closer look on the Acknowledgment Receipt shows that the same was for the City Prosecutor's
Office. x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied)
From this, it can be inferred that respondent issued the warrant of arrest on the mistaken
belief that complainant was actually notified of the arraignment. A closer scrutiny of the
records however showed that the Acknowledgment Receipt pertained to the copy of the
City Prosecutor's Office and not that of complainant's.
Whatever the real reasons behind respondent's issuance of complainant's warrant of

arrest -- whether from the mistaken belief that complainant was actually notified, or the
presumption that the police had served a copy of the order on complainant or that the
rules allow immediate issuance of warrants of arrests whenever the accused does not
reside in the locality where the crime was committed -- the fact is, respondent failed to
uphold the rules, for which she should be held administratively liable.
The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily
issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule
that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the
opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence.[15]
While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous
order or decision they render, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent,
abusive and arbitrary in their prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested
in them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.[16] While there appears
to be no malicious intent on the part of respondent, such lack of intent, however, cannot
completely free her from liability.[17] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it
to her office to know and simply apply it.[18]
Considering that this is respondent's first administrative infraction in her more than 8
years of service in the judiciary,[19] which serves to mitigate her liability, the Court
holds the imposition of a fine in the amount of P10,000.00 to be proper in this case.[20]
WHEREFORE, Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

Branch 4, is hereby found guilty of abuse of authority for which she is fined in the sum
of P10,000.00.

Chapter 2 Judicial Due Process

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Chapter 2 Judicial Due Process

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Imelda Marcos vs Sandiganbayan

Emma Delgado vs Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process.

G.R. No. L-46272 June 13, 1986

ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, Petitioners,

v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17

Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on

Judgment of the RTC

On appeal, the petitioner raised the following errors, to wit:

[T]hat the lower court:

7. ERRED when it denied appellant's motion for new trial.7

On May 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision,8 disposing:

Ruling of the Court

Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in

MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

JOSE T. TUBOLA, JR., Petitioner,

CONTRARY TO LAW.2 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

SO ORDERED.14 (Capitalization, italics and emphasis in the original)

. . . CONCLUD[ING] THAT [HE] FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION UNDER

. . . CONCLUDING THAT [HE] HAS COMMITTED INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE

. . . RENDERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT

. . . VIOLAT[ING] [HIS] BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

A: Yes, sir.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A: No, sir.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A: Under the Chief of Office, the Irrigation Superintendent.31

Nonetheless, in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan,33 the Court ratiocinated that:

G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN, G.R. No. 175991

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE , Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan

The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.

On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative

During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but it was denied in an Order[17] dated

October 13, 2005.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.[18] The

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:

The petition lacks of merit.

Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due

Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim

In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated:

Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

SUSIE CHAN-TAN, G.R. No. 167139

Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Costs against petitioner.

Noryn Tan vs Judge Clarita Tabin

Remedial Law – Summary Procedure – Warrant of Arrest – Notice to the Accused

NORYN S. TAN, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1729

Petitioner, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1910-MTJ)

JUDGE MARIA CLARITA DE CASTRO, JJ.

CASUGA-TABIN, Municipal Trial