G.R. No.
L-273 March 29, 1947 been agreed that in the event trouble should arise the sellers should return to the buyer
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-
appellants.
Pedro Pañganiban y Tolentino for appellants.
Vicente Reyes Villavicencio for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and
Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They
acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land of which he died seized
and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion
which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, the
defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the
combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal
partition alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now
important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her
original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of
repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria
Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with
the property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause
was called for trial on March 8, she announced in open court that she was willing to
repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense;
that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other expenses;
that on 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was again
postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th,
Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor
of the intervenors, an amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the normal sale
price. The document of repurchase gave as reason for the transaction the fact that it had
what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina
Hernandez had sold him their respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and that
he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of the plaintiff for P860 plus
the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the deed of sale amounting to P50, but
that he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his
expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The
intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among them and their brother and
sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and after partition and delineation
everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his portion in the
partition." They charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for
chance that the sale to the defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed
till January of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they could sell to
the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise the amount of P860 offered
by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf.
Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the
defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the land in question until
he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the
land from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file her action.
He stated that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he
showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was able to do this because
he lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He
said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the document merely exclaimed, "Oh,
so you already have a document." When asked whether the land "described in the
complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among the co-owners
Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the
plaintiff objected on the ground that the best evidence was the document of partition,
and the objection was sustained. The same objection and the same ruling were made on
the same ground when the witness was queried how it was that the land he had bought
from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call any
more witnesses but only announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a parol
partition among the five brother and sisters had been made, mentioning the names of six
such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting that "under the Rules of
Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing
1
subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this objection, the
court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well
as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible,
adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by
the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by
Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith. It,
however, did not seem to have found as a fact the allegation that the resale was simulated.
The court then made this judgment:
(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado por el demandado
Zacarias Andal en 26 de marzo de 1944, a favor de Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el
terrenocuestionado que se presento como Exhibito 2 de dichodemandado, y
consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas lastransacciones posteriores que las
mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan hecho sobre el terreno cuestionado
despuesdel 26 de marzo de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera anotacionen la Oficiana
del Registrador de Titulos de Batangas que hayaanotado dicha reventa por el demandado
Zacarias Andal a favorde las terceristas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de
marzo de 1944; y
(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue unaescritura de reventa a
favor de la aqui demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las participaciones de las
terceristas en el terrenodescrito en la demanda suplementaria previo pago de P860 mas
lacantidad de P50 como gastos de documentacion. Se absuelve al demandado de los
daños y perjuicios que reclama la demandante. Se absuelve tambien a la demandante de
la contra-demanda de lasterceristas.
Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision and in their
joint brief made one assignment of error:
The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of partition
among the heirs on the ground that it was not admissible.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to point up
some seeming incongruities in the above-quoted judgment. Although Zacarias Andal is no
longer interested in the case, as far as the land is concerned, and even though the
intervenors have become again the absolute owners and are now in full possession of the
property, while Andal has already gotten his money back, the judgment would have Andal
execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff and received from her the price of
repurchase. The judgment is silent as to the intervenors with reference to the execution
of the deed of sale or the receipt of the sale price. And the lower court made no finding
and expressed no opinion as to whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention
Andal's expenses, by the plaintiff as price of repurchase was sufficient compliance with
article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the plaintiff's cause of action.
However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of section 21 of
Rule 123 and section 1 of Rule 74 both of the Rules of Court. Article 1248 of the Civil Code
has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract
as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds
the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for the rule that excludes
partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance
but simply a separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.) The differences in the conclusions reached are "due
perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.)
However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former
Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law
has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to executory and
not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this jurisdiction performance of
the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485;
Almirol and Cariño vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the
contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the
action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cariño vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the United
States, even in those states where the affirmative view of the question has been followed,
"the weight of authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is effective when several
possession is taken under it by the respective parties to the agreement." (27 C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable
at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been
consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by
the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol
partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession,
exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
2
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on
the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to
parts of the land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken
and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the
agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right
of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts
of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have
stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation
of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between
tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and
enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition that
there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section
reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument file in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files
a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be
validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a public document and its
registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be
reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing
evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for
example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The
decisions of this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The
Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument,
not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled
to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs .Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words,
is writing the act that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There are no indications
in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It
must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Thus,
the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states,
uses the words "utterly void" with statute transactions required to be in writing are
absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article
633 of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a public
document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law makes known its intention to have the
execution of a public instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the
validity of the contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary mortgages may be
legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same
purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document: "in
order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities of
last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No
will shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor change or affect the same,
unless it be written etc." Other examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public
instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting
this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent on the
execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite
theory is not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the
proposition that a public document and its registration were contemplated as necessary
ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition
can bind the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part
were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of
procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement
between co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights
of third parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. We bring out this limitation
upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of
arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a
rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical
implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the
bounds of this court's functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights
of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a notarized
instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the
3
rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under
the jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of third parties
eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the
realm of substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening and
instructive. The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds
the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an
intention to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol
partition. But what is far more to the point is that by logical process of deduction the
elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away
from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed
in the former code. At the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old
provision serves to emphasize the necessity of a positive and clear language if a given
contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the
parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the
prescribed public instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending
that such document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190
was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the
legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled,
except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation.
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with greater
liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncracies. In their
blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and foresight, and their
ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The
advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating
for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles
1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made provisions for public instrument for all
transactions and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real
rights in immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be
effective between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que
Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the decision. It was said in that case that
when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract is
binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action under article 1279 to compel the execution
of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an obligation, but
confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has not
made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article 1279, far from
making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic form,
recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an
adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any other special
form whenever such form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect
which is desired according to whatever its object. This doctrine was iterated and
reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal topic. And
it has been extended even to verbal contracts involving land registered under the Torrens
Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient
ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No considerations of public policy enter into
a partition of hereditary estate among co-heirs greater than those involved in a contract
between strangers which operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property
rights in land. If as between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or
extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the
requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when
the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of ownership but simply
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our
opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection
of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section
speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice,
and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as in this case,
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors
being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not
assigned as errors and that for this reason the appeal should be dismissed. We do not
think that the premise of this objection is exactly correct. The evidence on parol partition
tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled out and they specifically complain
of this exclusion as error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely meets and
attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. A superficial analysis of the case will
show that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of the entire litigation,
and on that validity depends in turn the competence of the excluded evidence. These two
interrelated points are the core of the whole case. All other points are incidental to and
revolve around them. If a completed oral partition may be enforced, as the defendant
and the intervenors contend and as we opine, their evidence should be allowed, and if
allowed and it establishes their allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.
If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to the decision
of the court below, we still believe that the objection takes a narrow view of practice and
procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court. The first
4
injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1, section 2) is that they "shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." In line with the modern
trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an assignment of error which is required by
law or rule of court has been held essential to appellate review, and only those assigned
will be considered, there are a number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate
court a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and
consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as error." (4 C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote 77.) At the least, the
assignment of error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to examine and pass upon the
decision of the court below.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceeding and a new decision not incompatible with this decision, with costs of this
appeal against the appellee.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

5
G.R. No. L-19064 January 31, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PAZ E. SIGUION TORRES, deceased,
ALBERTO S. TORRES, petition-appellant,
vs.
CONCHITA TORRES and ANGEL S. TORRES, oppositors- appellees.
Tolentino and Garcia for oppositor-appellee Angel S. Torres.
Narciso Peña for oppositor-appellee Conchita Torres.
BARRERA, J.:
In a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay branch) on January 4, 1961,
Alberto S. Torres, claiming to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion Torres
who died intestate on December 18, 1959, prayed for the issuance in his favor of letters
of administration in connection with the properties left by the decedent, with an
aggregate value of about P300,000.00. It was also alleged therein that petitioner was
unaware of any existing debt or obligation contracted by the deceased or by her estate,
from any of the heirs or from third persons.
This petition was opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, on the ground that the
appointment of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the fact that on January 27,
1960, the heirs of the deceased (including petitioner) had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court. This was answered by petitioner who, while admitting that such
extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual
designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing the court's intervention. It
was also claimed that some properties of considerable value were not included in said
extrajudicial partition. In a supplemental answer to the opposition, subsequently filed,
petitioner likewise alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third
persons, a fact which he claimed was not incorporated in the petition, through oversight.
Petitioner, however, offered to amend the petition before presentation of evidence, with
leave of court. On July 21, 1961, the court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had
already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed the petition. Hence, the institution of
the present appeal.
Petitioner-appellant does not controvert the execution of an extrajudicial deed of
partition of the estate, which, according to appellee, contains the following provisions:
1. That they (Alberto, Angel, Eduardo and Conchita, all surnamed Torres) are the only
legitimate children who survive the deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres;
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the said decedent died without leaving any will and her only surviving heirs are
the aforementioned parties who are her legitimate children;
4. That the deceased left no debts;
xxx xxx xxx
6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and in view of the difficulty of
making a physical division of the above properties, the parties have agreed to settle the
aforementioned estate by continuing the co-ownership on all the above properties in the
following proportion:
Alberto Torres — ¼ undivided interest
Angel Torres — ¼ undivided interest
Eduardo Torres — ¼ undivided interest
Conchita Torres — ¼ undivided interest (Emphasis supplied.)
It appears from the pleadings filed therein that the petition to place the estate under
administration was predicated mainly on the alleged inability of the heirs to agree on a
physical division of the properties. The alleged existence of an indebtedness and non-
inclusion in the list incorporated in the deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain
properties that form part of the estate, seemed to be merely an afterthought as the
reference to them was made only in the answer to the opposition and motion for
dismissal of the petition, and is not made under oath. There is also no allegation as to the
particulars of the debt and the omitted properties sufficient to identify them. In the
circumstances, we agree with the lower court that a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased is not here necessary.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left
no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office
of the Register of Deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action
of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affected affidavit filed in the office of the Register of Deeds.
It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters
of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.1äwphï1.ñët
Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case,
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either
6
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition. (Guico, et al. v. Bautista, et al.,
L-14921, December 31, 1960). If there is an actual necessity for court intervention, as
contended by appellant, in view of the heirs' failure to reach an agreement as to how the
estate would be divided physically, the latter, under the aforequoted Rule, have still the
remedy of an ordinary action for partition.

This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of
P50,000.00. It is to be noted, however, that appellant, as heretofore observed, did not
specify from whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare
allegation that, "the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot
be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of action. It must be for this
reason that the lower court, notwithstanding the existence of such averment in
appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the petition filed by said
appellant.

Nor does the unverified statement that there are other properties not included in the
deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution
of an administration proceeding because the same questions that may arise as to
them, viz, the title there and their partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be
properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appeal from, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal. JJ., concur.

7
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight
modification a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs
owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs.
The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of
the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share of the aforesaid
parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in
January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of
the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de
Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July
25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that
"the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the,
widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to
inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of
sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This
sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17,
1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for
P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate
of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her
appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis
pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on
certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however,
was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup,
which took place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the
affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold
to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties.
Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause
of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations; that
defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is malicious,
frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera,
declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and
the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half
portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary
rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case was appealed to the
Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits
"B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in
adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it
modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar
as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de
Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-
half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right
to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may
correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that
he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have
assigned the following errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action
to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed
at the time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for
value.
III
8
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for
new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted
almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has
prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years
as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of
McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived
of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of
satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent left no
debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office
of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action
of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring
to a case in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased
person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was taken from Section
596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said
Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all the
heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no
debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement
duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate
among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is
required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law
(Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title
of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights
violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no
mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who
did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any
doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are
bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they
may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they
are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to
their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is
no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement
to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express
legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process
of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we
held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may
be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such
application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be
seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex
parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the
court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon
minor heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit,
is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such
settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the
two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances
on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra,
we are of the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring
9
distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two
years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2)
when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all
the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both
requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial
settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his
widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of
limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is
predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the
first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of
limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties
who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not
Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different
chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a
statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines
the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the
defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the
lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece,
or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a
period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not
appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in
March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery
of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the
statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the
action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested
parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent
purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the
claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find
support in the evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted
fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both
Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents
of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo did not
know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and
nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact
furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison,
Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's
uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of
conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the
property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before
said notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the
consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief
that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may
claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem
concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim
that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to
Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the
property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of
title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith
for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of
registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and
investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such
inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and
he had acquired a valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644;
Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with
costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
10
G.R. No. L-11156 February 23, 1961
PURA CARREON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RUFO AGCAOILI and LOURDES SANTIAGO, defendants- appellees.
Domingo R. Maddumba for plaintiffs-appellants.
Meris, Moya, Revilla & Gaffud for defendant-appellee.
Nillo and Tiburcio for the other defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
During the marriage of Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina Dauag the registered land subject
of this case was acquired. After the death of Carreon, his widow Celerina executed on
September 24, 1946, an affidavit adjudicating to herself alone the said land. She declared
in said document that she was the only heiress of her husband. The original certificate of
title covering the land was cancelled and a transfer certificate was issued in her name.
There was however annotated on her certificate a lien to the effect that her title was
subject to Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
On September 25, 1946, she borrowed P1,200.00 from the Philippine National Bank
guaranteed by a mortgage on one-half of the land. A memorandum of the mortgage was
annotated on her transfer certificate. After the maturity of the loan, she requested a
certain Mr. Pintang to look for a buyer of the land for P3,000.00. One by the name of Rufo
Agcaoili was found. The latter made an advance payment of Pl,500.00 and the balance
was paid in full on October 13, 1947. The loan from the bank was paid, the mortgage was
released and the deed of absolute sale executed in his favor was registered.1 A new
transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of Agcaoili.
On February 19, 1955, the children of Celerina with the deceased husband filed a
complaint against the spouses Agcaoili seeking to have the deed of sale executed by their
mother declared as one of mortgage and to recover one half pro-indiviso of the land
described in the complaint. Simultaneous with the filing of said complaint, Celerina filed
an action for intervention which was dismissed by the trial court.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment upon the plea that the main averments
of the complaint even if admitted do not constitute a cause of action and supported their
plea with certain documentary evidence. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on the ground that
there was a genuine issue which could not be determined unless a trial is had. The trial
court, however, allowed the parties to submit evidence in support of their contentions
and after a careful analysis thereof found for defendants holding that plaintiffs, claim has
no legal basis.
As may be gleaned from the appellants' assignments of error, the present appeal is
predicated on the arguments that appellees were buyers in bad faith; that there existed
a trust relationship between them and appellants, and that such being the case, the action
against appellees is imprescriptible.
There is no clear proof that when Rufo Agcaoili bought the land he knew of any flaw in
the title of Celerina Dauag. The mere fact that he was a townmate of Celerina is not
sufficient basis to conclude that he knew that she had children by her first husband. It has
been shown that since 1920 Rufo Agcaoili has been an enlisted man in the Philippine
constabulary and seldom come home to visit his relatives. A man of such a situation
cannot be expected to know the relatives and children of his vendor even if they are
townmates,. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear and sufficient
evidence. Here every indication is that Agcaoili bought the land in all good faith oblivious
of the source of its acquisition.
If fraud had been committed such was perpetrated by Celerina, appellants' mother. By
her action she induced Agcaoili to believe that she was the absolute owner of the land
which bore a torrens title. In dealing with it he merely relied on such title. He was not
required to do more. He is only charged with notice of the burdens which are noted on
the face of said title. So, after he bought the land and a new title was issued in his name,
he became a purchaser thereof for value and a holder of a good and valid title. 2
On the transfer certificate of title issued to Agcaoili there was annotated a statement that
it was subject to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This was an annotation carried
over from Celerina's transfer certificate. Section 4, Rule 74, provides the following:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two
years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation
and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment
thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such
bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other
persons for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any
transfers of the real estate that may have been made.
11
The above lien is effective only for a period of two years. From September 28, 1946, when
a transfer certificate of title was issued to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed
of sale in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two years had elapsed
We sustain the lower court's opinion that thenceforth the right to have such lien cancelled
became vested on appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus oficio.3 And
there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of appellee, nor proof that he knew of
any legal infirmity in the title of his vendor, we find no reason to apply the proposition
that he is deemed to be holding the land in trust for the children of Celerina Dauag.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

12
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had
a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children
by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court
of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee
had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions
for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights
in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
13
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set
forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel
but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of
the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and
Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy
behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the
individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of
the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should
do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x
x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x
x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to
our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence"
is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile
14
at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot
be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence
in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating
the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent
also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent
by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply
the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
15
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the
alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The
Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise
cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
16
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
17
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid
v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
18
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA
VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision1 dated March 26, 2002, and the resolution2 dated December 17, 2002, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria A. Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon
Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua."
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs,
namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V.
Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas,
partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them
getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however,
did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for
three consecutive weeks.3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale4
was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the
document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua,
petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein,
she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November
16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in
May 1995.5 She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had been published in
the Catanduanes Tribune.6
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to
redeem the property, with the following letter7 sent to petitioner on her behalf:
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas,8 (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one of
the lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas, original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac,
Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.
I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale" was
executed by some of my client's co-heirs and alleged representatives of other co-heirs, by
virtue of which document you acquired by purchase from the signatories to the said
document, five (5) shares with a total area of fifty-five square meters of the above-
described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right of legal redemption of
said five (5) shares as well as other shares which you may likewise have acquired by
purchase. And you are hereby given an option to agree to legal redemption within a
period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15-day-period, proper legal
action shall be taken by my client to redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an amicable
settlement at the barangay level,9 Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra
Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and consigned the amount of P100,000 which is
the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20, 1996.10 Joining her in the
19
action were her children with Santiago, namely, Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina and
Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive owner of
the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the case.11
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged that
the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them
to exercise the right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice
was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no
legal and binding effect on them.12
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision 13 in favor of petitioner, dismissing
the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit, and declaring the
Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The MTC
upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the
partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs
could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC found that although
there was a failure to strictly comply with the requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil
Code14 for a written notice of sale to be served upon respondents by the vendors prior to
the exercise of the former's right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by
respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30 days before the filing
of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of Court,
so that the latter action came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents failed to
establish by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion of the
property owned by respondents' co-heirs.15
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the
MTC decision in a judgment dated November 25, 1999. The matter was thereafter raised
to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed decision dated March 26,
2002, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and November 15, 1994,
respectively, were void and without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section
1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 16 the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs
is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did
they ever signify their consent to the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition
for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure
to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published; and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who
did not participate therein, whether the written notice required to be served by an heir
to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before
partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with when such co-heirs
have actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can
exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the
date of actual knowledge of the sale.
Petitioner argues, as follows:
Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the
extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The publication
of the same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore estopped from denying the validity of
the partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.
Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.
Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its subject matter was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have been filed with the RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-heirs who sold their
interest in the subject property not having been impleaded by respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it was not properly verified
by respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that she was authorized to represent the
other respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the petition. Moreover, the verification
was inadequate because it did not state the basis of the alleged truth and/or correctness
of the material allegations in the petition.
The petition lacks merit.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out
or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
20
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed 19 as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who
had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of
execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed
either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before
the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do
not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary
rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually
participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to
petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.
Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article
1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were
never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there
is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a
co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is
indispensable and mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time
advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir
thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or
her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.21
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method of notification
remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law.22This proceeds from the
very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint
ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other
heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.23
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the
vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners
who, under the law, must be notified of the sale.24 This will remove all uncertainty as to
the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the
alienation is not definitive.25 As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that
the seller may still contest the alienation. 26
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement,
there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to
petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own
without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title.27Petitioner derived his title from
the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was
very much aware that not all of the heirs participated therein as it was evident on the face
of the document itself. Because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance
with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could have been identified
as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. This is because the alienation made by
respondents' co-heirs was limited to the portion which may be allotted to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Despite this glaring fact, and over the
protests of respondents, petitioner still constructed improvements on the property. For
this reason, his claim of good faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from raising the same for the
first time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below and sought
affirmative ruling from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to him of a
portion of the subject property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
Having failed to seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court
at this late stage. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time,
an exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after
voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's
opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting
the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.28
Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of indispensable parties, similarly
lacks merit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no
21
final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
defendant.29 The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought
is so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that the former's legal presence as a SO ORDERED.
party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence, an indispensable party is one Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
whose interest will be directly affected by the court's action in the litigation. In the
absence of such indispensable party, there cannot be a resolution of the controversy
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.30

In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint filed by respondents
ultimately prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by their
co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the
property to petitioner is not in dispute. Respondents concede that the other heirs acted
within their hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter completely and
effectively relinquished their interests in the property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the property with
respondents. As a result, only petitioner's presence is absolutely required for a complete
and final determination of the controversy because what respondents seek is to be
subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.

Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by respondents with the CA should have
been dismissed because the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping appended
to it were defective, citing specifically the failure of respondent Gloria Vargas to: (1)
indicate that she was authorized to represent her co-respondents in the petition, and (2)
state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient.31 Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective.
Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.32 Under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.33

Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the rules.34 The co-respondents of respondent
Gloria Vargas in this case were her children. In order not to defeat the ends of justice, the
Court deems it sufficient that she signed the petition on their behalf and as their
representative.

22
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL
SIKAT, Petitioners,
vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO
CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, "Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal
and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs
of Norberto Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, San Juan, M.M."
Facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand,
private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are
also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535
square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed
an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them
and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint 2 for
Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their
prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on
24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No.
165135 issued in the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the
subject property in accordance with the law of succession and the payment
of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4and the late Socorro 5 were presented. In the case of
Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification 6 issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that
records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows:
Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only one
year and seven months old. She lived with the sister of her father because the latter
married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived
with their father and the latter’s family in the subject property at P. Parada St., San Juan,
Metro Manila.
She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo stayed
with her and her auntie while Socorro stayed with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was
then married.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second
marriage lived with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal.
Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan,
Metro Manila, the property subject of the present litigation. She has been living in the
said property since 1948. She claimed that there are other houses in the area particularly
those which belong to her half brothers and sisters which were now converted into
factories.
She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she occupies only
thirty-six (36) square meters of the subject lot.
She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among themselves
without giving the [petitioners] their share. She said that she was offered by [private
respondent] Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land in question or money
because one of the children of defendant Jose Cristobal wanted to construct an
apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask the opinion of her other brothers
and sisters.
Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she found
out that the property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal had been
23
transferred to the defendants as evidenced by transfer certificates of title issued under
the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit "E"), Norberto Cristobal (Exhibit "F"), Eufrosina
Cristobal (Exhibit "G") and Jose Cristobal (Exhibit "H").
She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property belonging
to her father had been transferred to her half brothers and sisters with the exclusion of
herself and the other children from the first marriage.
She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves, however, no
settlement was reached therein. This prompted the [petitioners] to file the present case.
On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was aware that
the subject property was owned by her father Buenaventura Cristobal even before the
latter died. She likewise stated that the [private respondents] are the ones paying the real
estate tax due on the lot.
Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" she claimed that
she was a neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina
and Jose Cristobal in San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that she knows that Mercedes,
Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s
first marriage and the Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s second marriage.
The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived right across
where she stayed.
Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact that
Martina Cristobal is the sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura
Cristobal allegedly took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were taken care of by
Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter’s second wife, Donata Enriquez, at P. Parada St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila.
When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal
together with Elisa. Socorro on the other hand lived with Mercedes who was then married.
Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they finished high
school at the Philippine School of Commerce in Manila.
When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care of
Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal.
Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived
together with their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time.
When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located at 194
P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her family lives in the
said vicinity.
Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second marriage namely
Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built their houses and factory at 194 P. Parada St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila.
She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura Cristobal
had a harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when [petitioners] and Elisa
Cristobal’s grandchildren were called "squatters" by the [private respondents] and their
grandchildren for residing in the subject parcel of land.
On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the first
wife of Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be married although she
is not aware of the date when they were married.
[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers and
sisters of the [private respondents].
He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his brothers
and sisters was when he lived with their aunt Martina.
He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to Elisa
Cristobal Sikat was because the [private respondents] want her to have a piece of
property of her own and is not an admission that she is their sister.
[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first
witness. She testified that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were
married on March 24, 1919 at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Out of the
said union, Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal were born.
The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a certain
property containing five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters.
Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980 leaving his
wife Marcelina and children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr.
The witness presented marked as Exhibit "33" for Norberto, Exhibit "34" for Florencio,
Exhibit "35" for Eufrosina and Exhibit "36’ for Jose the birth certificates of her brothers
and sisters.
On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial Partition
(Exhibit "D-4") with her brothers and sisters of the property left by their parents.
24
She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never
asserted their alleged right over the property subject of the present litigation.
She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due on the
parcel of land and that title to the property has been subdivided under their respective
names.
On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were taken care
of by their aunt Martina who was the sister of her father. She testified that she addressed
Elisa Cristobal as "Kaka" and that since the time they were kids, she had known that the
[petitioners] are their brothers and sisters. 7
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment 8 on 11 July 1997, dismissing
the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant
evidentiary value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to
laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its
Decision 9 dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their
share of the subject property because of laches.
Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that:
RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO THE
CASE AT BAR RESULTING AS IT DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WHICH ARE
EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH PRINCIPLE 10
The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in upholding the claim of private respondents that they
acquired ownership of the entire subject property and that the claim of petitioners to the
subject property was barred by laches.
Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint filed by
petitioners before the RTC was denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages";
nevertheless, the complaint prayed for the following:
1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants NORBERTO CRISTOBAL,
FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL and JOSE CRISTOBAL on February 24,
1948 as null and void for being fraudulent contrary to law on succession.
2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal to wit:
(a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL married to MAURA
RUBIO;
(b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, married to PAULINA
IBANEZ;
(c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL married to FORTUNATO
DELA GUERRA; and
(d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL married to ADELAIDA IBANEZ
and/or TCT No. 3993- ( if TCT No. 165035 was cancelled and in lieu thereof to
ISABELITA/MA. VICTORIA, EMMA, MA. CRISTINA, JOSELITO and NELIA, all surnamed
CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE CRISTOBAL, one of the defendants.)
3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased BUENAVENTURA CRISTOBAL
according to the law on succession applicable at the time of his death.
4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as their lawful portions
in the inheritance.
5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the following sums of money, to wit:
a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
b. P300,000.00 as moral damages
c. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees
d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages 11
While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves property rights to a
piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in the complaint reveals that, more than property
rights, the action involves hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to their
deceased father’s estate solely, composed of the subject property.
Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated as
"Annulment of Title and Damages," we find it practicable to rule on the division of the
subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed for in the complaint,
considering that the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling. 12
To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone assignment of error
therein, the following need to be resolved first: (1) whether or not petitioners were able
to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or not the
25
petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the
private respondents; (3) whether or not petitioners’ right to question the Deed of
Partition had prescribed; and (4) whether or not petitioners’ right to recover their share
of the subject property is barred by laches.
Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have been
established. Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of
review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. 13 Since exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall
make its own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the
child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name
has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. 14
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late
Socorro 17 were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the
case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940,
1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners
enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the
children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also
presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. 19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any
proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied)
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons. 20 In the case at
bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the
subject property, the partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an
extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject
property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were
excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by
private respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the
transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents only
in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a
portion of the subject property or money, as one of the children of private respondent
26
Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject property. 21 This led petitioner Elisa
to inquire as to the status of the subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to
the subject property had been transferred to the names of private respondents, her half
brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of
Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of
Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject
property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of
Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on
them. 22 As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents in February
1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased
father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to
challenge the said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription
against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil
Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned." In Budlong v. Bondoc, 23 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to
mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription.
For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a
co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." 24
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of
petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide
the subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on
succession prescribes.
It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property of
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was
purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. 25Upon the deaths of Buenaventura
in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New Civil
Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four children of the second
marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code.
Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament,
the subject property shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 26 and
931 27 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters
thereof.
At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only entitled to the
usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or
should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal
to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants
who has not received any betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall have the
usufruct of the third availment for betterment, such child or descendant to have the
naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in
him.
Donata’s right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death in 1936.
Accordingly, the pro-indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobal’s eight children and their
heirs, by right of representation, upon his death in 1930, are as follows:
(1) Mercedes Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
(2) Amselmo Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(3) Socorrro Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(4) Elisa Crostobal-Sikat- 66.875 square meters
(5) Norberto Cristobal-66.875 square meters
(6) Florencio Cristobal-66.875 square meters
(7) Eufrocina Cristobal-66.875 square meters
(8) Jose Cristobal - 66.875 square meters
The Court will now determine whether petitioners’ right to their shares in the subject
property can be barred by laches.
Respondents’ defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve
mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair
to permit. 28
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon
petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been
transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from
the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their
barangay to settle the case among themselves and private respondents, but since no
settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul
private respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect
27
on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by (5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. Costs against private respondents.

Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply SO ORDERED.
the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. 29 Laches is a creation MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be Associate Justice
used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used
to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another. 30

Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal participation in
the partition of the subject property; (2) this case has dragged on for more than a decade,
and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact amount of which,
unfortunately, was not proved, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal
damages. Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. 31 Where these are allowed,
they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but simply in recognition of the existence
of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least be
commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioners considering the concept and
purpose of said damages. 32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances
cited and the special reasons extant in the present case; 33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:

(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;

(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;

(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;

(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No.
165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED
to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate
certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal
Buenaventura, and

28