EN BANC

[G.R. No. 106695. August 4, 1994.]

EDWARD T. MARCELO, DIONILO D. MARFIL, CELIA C. CABURNAY, and DANIEL T.

PASCUAL, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, and THE QUEZON CITY PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; WHEN CERTIORARI OR PROHIBITION LIES. — The
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari not necessarily
for the reason it relied upon, i.e.," certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against
an order denying a motion to quash," but because the Santiago court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. It is settled
that if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a motion to dismiss), acts without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or prohibition lies.

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; DOUBLE JEOPARDY, NOT A CASE OF; CASE
AT BAR. — The denial by the Santiago court of the motion to quash suffers from no fatal infirmity. .
. . The withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, or even the dismissal of the
said case as decreed by the Bersamin court, did not bar the finding of a new information as
directed by the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of 27 January 1992. No jeopardy had
attached as a result of the earlier termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because the
petitioners therein had not been arraigned and had, in fact, asked for its dismissal for a cause
other than that which would constitute double jeopardy. On the contrary, the filing of the new
information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 straightened the course of criminal justice which had
earlier gone awry due to the precipitate action of the Bersamin court. Nor may it be said that the
prosecutor who filed the information had no authority to do so. The Santiago court, therefore,
correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to quash in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 and the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681.

3. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR;

POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE TO REVIEW THE SAME; CASE AT BAR. — The Secretary of
Justice has the power or authority to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The
Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court.
In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of
Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. Insofar as this
case is concerned, the procedure on appeals from the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
(which was duly approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City) as well as that from
the resolution of the Review Committee was governed by Department Circular No. 7, dated 25
January 1990, of the Department of Justice. This was superseded by Department Order No. 223,
dated 30 June 1993. Pursuant to Section 1 of Department Circular No. 7, only resolutions of the
Chief State Prosecutor, the Regional State Prosecutor, and the Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice, except as otherwise
provided in Section 4 thereof. Under the latter, a resolution of the aforesaid prosecutors finding
probable cause may be appealed only upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion;
however, even with such showing, the appeal shall not be entertained if the appellant had already
been arraigned, and if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal
shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice. In this case, the petitioners did not at
once appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the resolution of Assistant Prosecutor Israel. Instead,
they initially filed the Motion for Review.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL THEREFROM AS A GROUND FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS; DEFERMENT
OF COURT ACTION PROPER UNTIL FINAL DETERMINATION OF APPEAL. — It is clear that the
Bersamin court knew and took cognizance of the Motion for Review, deferred the arraignment of
the accused until the resolution of the said motion, and even directed the Office of the City
Prosecutor "to conclude the pending review . . . and to render a report of the results of the review
on or before" 8 October 1991. In thus recognizing and allowing the Motion for Review, the
Bersamin court deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the government to resolve with
finality the issue of whether or not the information should have been filed. The Review Committee’s
resolution was of course not final because under Department Circular No. 7 both the offended party
and the petitioners could still appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice under Section 1 and
Section 4 thereof. The Bersamin court knew or was expected to know, since it had to take judicial
notice of Department Circular No. 7, that the resolution of the Review Committee was not final.
The offended party had, in fact, appealed from the said resolution to the Secretary of Justice on 10
December 1991. Consequently, the 5 December 1991 Manifestation and Motion of the petitioners
praying for the dismissal of the case and the 10 December 1991 motion of Assistant City
Prosecutor Jamolin asking for the withdrawal of the information were prematurely filed, because as
to the first, the period of the offended party to appeal from the resolution to the Secretary of
Justice had not yet lapsed or even begun, there being no showing of the date the offended party
received a copy thereof; and, as to the second, an appeal had in fact been filed on 10 December
1991. Prudence, if not wisdom or at the very least respect for the authority of the prosecution
agency to which the Bermasin court deferred, dictated against a favorable action on the Review
Committee’s resolution until the denial of the appeal or the affirmance of the resolution by the
Secretary of Justice. The Bersamin court acted then with precipitate or undue haste in issuing the
13 December 1991 Order granting the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and Prosecutor Jamolin’s
motion to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. Accordingly, we rule that the
trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until
resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor’s
finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already
final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.

MELO, J., dissenting: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; SCOPE AND MEANING OF. — This Court in
Acebedo v. Sarmiento (36 SCRA 247 [1970]) stated that "the right to a speedy trial means one
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that
an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation . . ." It is not
alone the right of an accused to have his guilt determined by a court of justice within the shortest
possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of legitimate defenses. Equally
important is not to be brought to court at all, to be spared the embarrassment, anxiety, and
expense of court litigation in proper cases. We stated in Acebedo that the remedy for the non-
observance of the above rule is habeas corpus where the accused is already incarcerated or
by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; WHEN A PROPER REMEDY AGAINST AN
ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO QUASH. — When a case like the instant petition, with all its
attendant facts and circumstances, reaches us, it is not in the best traditions of the Supreme Court
to automatically approach it in the impulsive and unvarying methodology of a criminal trial court
and declare that the issues raised are matters of defense to be interposed only at the trial. Indeed,
not infrequently, this court has departed from the general rule and, taking cognizance of petitions
for certiorari involving orders denying motions to quash on the ground that it would be unfair and
unjust, and violative of the constitutional rights of an accused, to require him to undergo trial
under an information which is legally flawed (Yap v. Inciso, 105 Phil. 1307 [1959]; Pineda v.
Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930 [1954]; Villa v. Ibanez, 88 Phil. 402 [1951]; Mead v. Angel, 115 SCRA 256
[1982]), and so as to spare the courts from unnecessarily spending precious time and energy and
to save the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety, and embarrassment, let alone the
expenditure of effort and money in undergoing a trial for a case the proceedings in which could
possibly be annulled for want of, or excess in, or with grave abuse of, jurisdiction (Villa v. Ibanez,
supra, and Mead v. Angel, supra).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFILING INFORMATION IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; REASONS THEREFOR. — As stated, the criminal information for alleged falsification
of public documents against petitioners involves the same charges which had been twice
investigated, passed upon, and twice dismissed, for lack or insufficiency of evidence, and based on
a positive finding of the genuineness and due execution by Jose Marcelo, Sr. of the Voting Trust
Agreements in favor of Edward. . . . The Secretary of Justice thus, to my mind, exceeded his
jurisdictional competence and acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the re-filing of
the same criminal information against petitioners involving the same voting trust agreements
notwithstanding the fact that Judge Bersamin in the second case (I.S. No. 91-3049; Civil Case No.
Q-91-21285, RTC Quezon City, Branch 96) had already ordered its dismissal, as it was actually
dismissed on December 13, 1991. Further, on August 27, 1989, the Department of Justice affirmed
the dismissal of the criminal charges filed by Mrs. Wells against Edward, etc. in I.S. No. 88-5279
involving the same voting trust agreements. The flip-flopping of the Department of Justice in the
light of its earlier resolution in the first case (Wells) leaves much to be desired. The re- filing of the
same Information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104
in Branch 101 of the RTC, Quezon City was unwarranted reprobation and reversal of Judge
Bersamin’s order dismissing the Information in the second case, which the Secretary of Justice has
no authority whatsoever to do. From the time Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the second case and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, thereafter ordered the
dismissal thereof for lack or insufficiency of evidence, the Secretary of Justice was divested of any
authority to overturn such dismissal or to direct the re-filing of another information involving the
same charges and the same voting trust agreements, in the absence, if it must be added, of new
evidence.

ROMERO, J., dissenting: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
COMMITTED WHERE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE REFILED AN INFORMATION AFTER THE TRIAL COURT
HAD GRANTED A MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE; CASE AT BAR. — Where before petitioners could
be arraigned, they filed a petition for review before the Review Committee which reversed the
recommendation of Prosecutor Israel finding probable cause, and thereafter, the prosecution filed a
motion to withdraw and the defense, a motion to dismiss which were granted by Judge Bersamin, .
. . we hold that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction when he reviewed the appeal and ordered the re-filing of the information against
petitioners. The ultimate consequence of the Secretary of Justice’s act of reviewing the findings of
the Review Committee is the indirect reversal of the order of Judge Bersamin who is the "best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it." Such act of the Secretary of Justice is an
unmitigated reprobation and reversal of Judge Bersamin’s order over which the former has no
authority whatsoever. Therefore, the information docketed as Q-92-28104 is susceptible to
quashal.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issue in this case is whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court,
which relied on the reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the
investigating prosecutor’s resolution to file the information, bars the filing of a new information for
the same offense after the Secretary of Justice reverse d the resolution of the review committee.

This case was originally assigned to the Third Division but was referred to the Court en banc in
view of the novelty and importance of the issue.

The procedural antecedents of this case, as disclosed by the original records of Criminal Case No.
Q-91-21285 1 and Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, which we required to be transmitted to this
Court, as well as that of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681, are herein set forth. chanroble s law lib ra ry

In a complaint-affidavit sworn to on 18 March 1991 and filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City, Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents
committed by forging the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements (VTA’s). 2
Submitted in support of the affidavit-complaint were the findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory that the signature on the VTA’s purporting
to be that of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. and the specimen or standard signature of the latter were not
written by one and the same person. The VTA’s 3 were purportedly executed in Quezon city and
acknowledged before petitioner Dionilo Marfil, a notary public.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo Israel found "more
than sufficient evidence" of the forgery of the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as "found and
concluded by two (2) national police agencies, the NBI and PCCL, and recommended the filing of
the case in court. 4

On 30 May 1991, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, and raffled to Branch
96 5 thereof (hereinafter Bersamin court).

On 6 June 1991, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a Motion
for Review seeking the deferment of the filing of the information — or if one had been filed, the
suspension of the criminal proceedings — and the reversal of the Israel resolution. 6

On 10 June 1991, warrants for the arrest of the petitioners were issued, 7 and all of them except
Edward Marcelo posted bail. 8 Marcelo surrendered to the court and posted bail on 29 July 1991. 9

On 13 June 1991, the petitioners, in a Manifestation and Motion, informed the Bersamin court of
filing of their Motion for Review and prayed that further proceedings in the case be suspended until
the resolution of the Motion for Review. 10

On 14 June 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico Bringas, the prosecutor assigned to the case,
filed a motion to defer the arraignment until the resolution of the Motion for Review, 11 which the
Bersamin court granted in its Order of 10 July 1991. The Bersamin court, however, reset the
arraignment to 28 August 1991. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

Then, on 27 August 1991, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to defer the arraignment on 28
August 1991 until the resolution of their Motion for Review. 12 Acting thereon, and over the
vigorous opposition of the private prosecutor, Judge Bersamin issued an order on 28 August 1991
13 resetting the arraignment to 8 October 1991 and directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
"to conclude the pending review of the resolution of the filing Prosecutor Domingo Israel and to
render a report of the results of the review on or before" 8 October 1991.

Believing that no resolution on the Motion for Review would be released before 8 October 1991 and
considering that petitioner Marcelo was abroad, the petitioners filed on 3 October 1991 a motion
for the cancellation of the arraignment on 8 October 1991 and for its resetting to "early November
1991." 14

There is no showing that this motion was acted upon. The records of Criminal Case No. Q-91-
21285 were thereafter destroyed by a fire on 16 October 1991 but were subsequently
reconstituted on 9 December 1991. 15

On 15 November 1991, the Review Committee handed down a resolution, 16 approved by Acting
City Prosecutor Lydia Navarro on 29 November 1991, recommending the reversal of the Israel
resolution and the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. Then on 5
December 1991, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the Bersamin court of
the reversal and praying for the dismissal of the case. 17 This was followed on 10 December 1991
by the motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Conrado M. Jamolin which prayed for the withdrawal of
the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because of the resolution of the review
committee. 18 The private prosecutor opposed this motion. 19

In the meantime too, specifically on 10 December 1991, the private complainant filed with the
Secretary of Justice an appeal from the 15 November 1991 resolution of the Review Committee.
20

On 13 December 1991, Judge Bersamin, agreeing with the findings and conclusions of the Review
Committee, issued an order, 21 the dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Dismiss of the accused and the motion to Withdraw Information of
the public prosecutor are hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed without costs." cralaw virtua1aw lib rary

On 27 January 1992, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre R. Bello III handed down a resolution
granting the complainant’s appeal, reversing the 15 November 1991 Resolution of the Review
Committee, and ordering the filing of a new information. 22

The new information, 23 signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph Lee, was filed on 5 February
1992 pursuant to the resolution of Secretary Bello, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104,
and then raffled to Branch 101 presided over by Judge Pedro Santiago (hereinafter Santiago court)
of the RTC of Quezon City. The petitioners posted bill. 24 Thereafter, the following incidents took
place in the said case:
chanro bles vi rtua l lawlib ra ry

1. On 3 March 1992, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 was already final and that the appeal subsequently
taken by the private prosecutor to and the resolution thereon by the Secretary of Justice are null
and void and cannot be a valid basis for any authority to file the new information or for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.25 cralaw:red

2. On 20 March 1992, Judge Santiago issued an order denying the motion to quash on the principal
ground that it was not based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court. 26

3. On 1 April 1992, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the 20 March 1992 Order alleging
therein that their motion to quash was based on the ground that the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so and had acted pursuant to an order of the Secretary of
Justice which is void for having been given without or in excess of jurisdiction under the doctrine
laid down in Crespo v. Mogul 27 that the Secretary of Justice cannot interfere with the trial court’s
disposition of a criminal case after it had taken cognizance thereof. 28

4. On 2 April 1992, Judge Santiago denied the motion to reconsider and reset the arraignment to 7
April 1992. 29

Thus, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals on 3 April 1992 a special civil action
for certiorari to set aside the order of the Santiago court denying the motion to quash, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27681. They alleged therein that the "respondent Judge evaded his
positive legal duty when he disregarded the consistent rulings of the Honorable Supreme Court
that once an information has already been filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction
over the case and the Secretary of Justice may no longer interfere with the court’s disposition of
the case." 30

In its decision of 11 June 1992, 31 the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition. It found
it to be "devoid of merit" because.

" certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to
quash. The defendant should instead, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law." 32
In the meantime, however, the Santiago court, not having been enjoined by the Court of Appeals,
continued with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104. On 7 April 1992, it arraigned
petitioners Caburnay, Pascual, and Marfil, entered a plea of not guilty for them, and reset the
arraignment of petitioner Edward T. Marcelo, who was then abroad, to 28 April 1992. 33 On the
latter date, Marcelo was arraigned and a plea of not guilty was entered for him. 34 Subsequently,
the court received the testimonies of the following witnesses for the prosecution: Jose Marcelo, Jr.,
who testified on direct examination and cross-examination on 9 June 1992, 16 June 1992, and 14
July 1992; Emmanuel Guzman, who testified on 23 July 1992, 10 August 1992, and 20 August
1992; Aida Gaetos, who testified on 10 August 1992; and Francisco Cruz, Lita Wells, Evelyn M.
Eugenio, and Helier Penaranda, who testified on 13 August 1992. chanroble s virtual lawlib rary

On 31 August 1992, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ motion to reconsider the decision
of 11 June 1992. 35

Hence, the instant petition which reiterates the grounds and the arguments raised before the Court
of Appeals.

The petition is without merit.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari not
necessarily for the reason it relied upon, i.e.," certiorari and prohibition are not the correct
remedies against an order denying a motion to quash," but because the Santiago court did not act
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash. It is settled that if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a motion to dismiss), acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or prohibition lies.
36

The denial by the Santiago court of the motion to quash suffers from no fatal infirmity. The
petitioners’ contention that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file the information
because he acted upon an order of the Secretary of Justice which is void in the light of Crespo v.
Mogul 37 is untenable. In the Crespo case, this Court ruled: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph

"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor[e] to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the court." 38

Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain
as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.
chan robles .com : virtual law lib rary

Insofar as this case is concerned, the procedure on appeals from the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor (which was duly approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City) as well
as that from the resolution of the Review Committee was governed by Department Circular No. 7,
dated 25 January 1990, of the Department of Justice. This was superseded by Department Order
No. 223, dated 30 June 1993. Pursuant to Section 1 of Department Circular No. 7, only resolutions
of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Regional State Prosecutor, and the Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice, except as otherwise
provided in Section 4 thereof. Under the latter, a resolution of the aforesaid prosecutors finding
probable cause may be appealed only upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion; however, even with such showing, the appeal shall not be entertained if the appellant
had already been arraigned, and if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal,
the appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

In this case, the petitioners did not at once appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the resolution of
Assistant Prosecutor Israel. Instead, they initially filed the Motion for Review.

From the foregoing antecedents, it is clear that the Bersamin court knew and took cognizance of
the Motion for Review, deferred the arraignment of the accused until the resolution of the said
motion, and even directed the Office of the City Prosecutor "to conclude the pending review . . .
and to render a report of the results of the review on or before" 8 October 1991. In thus
recognizing and allowing the Motion for Review, the Bersamin court deferred to the authority of the
prosecution arm of the government to resolve with finality the issue of whether or not the
information should have been filed. The Review Committee’s resolution was of course not final
because under Department Circular No. 7 both the offended party and the petitioners could still
appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice under Section 1 and Section 4 thereof. The Bersamin
court knew or was expected to know, since it had to take judicial notice of Department Circular No.
7, that the resolution of the Review Committee was not final. The offended party had, in fact,
appealed from the said resolution to the Secretary of Justice on 10 December 1991.

Consequently, the 5 December 1991 Manifestation and Motion of the petitioners praying for the
dismissal of the case and the 10 December 1991 motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin
asking for the withdrawal of the information were prematurely filed, because as to the first, the
period of the offended party to appeal from the resolution to the Secretary of Justice had not yet
lapsed or even begun, there being no showing of the date the offended party received a copy
thereof; and, as to the second, an appeal had in fact been filed on 10 December 1991. Prudence, if
not wisdom or at the very least respect for the authority of the prosecution agency to which the
Bersamin court deferred, dictated against a favorable action on the Review Committee’s resolution
until the denial of the appeal or the affirmance of the resolution by the Secretary of Justice. The
Bersamin court acted then with precipitate or undue haste in issuing the 13 December 1991 Order
granting the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and Prosecutor Jamolin’s motion to withdraw the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. chanrob les.co m.ph : virtual law lib rary

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s
motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers
the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that
such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.

It may be observed that the granting of both motions is a serious contradiction in that upon
withdrawal of the information, which is the logical consequence of the grant of the motion to
withdraw, there no longer remained any case to dismiss. In fine, the withdrawal of the information
rendered moot the motion to dismiss.

The withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, or even the dismissal of the
said case as decreed by the Bersamin court, did not bar the filing of a new information as directed
by the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of 27 January 1992. No jeopardy had attached as a
result of the earlier termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because the petitioners therein
had not been arraigned and had, in fact, asked for its dismissal for a cause other than that which
would constitute double jeopardy. On the contrary, the filing of the new information in Criminal
Case No. Q-92-28104 straightened the course of criminal justice which had earlier gone awry due
to the precipitate action of the Bersamin court. Nor may it be said that the prosecutor who filed the
information had no authority to do so.

The Santiago court, therefore, correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to quash in Criminal Case
No. Q-92-28104 and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681.

It must also be noted that the petitioners had already been arraigned in Criminal Case No. Q-92-
28104 and had participated in the trial on the merits by attending the reception of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and even terminating the cross-examination of some of them.

Before we end, a few words are in order by way of comment on the emphasis placed by our
brother, Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo, in his dissenting opinion, on the filing with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal in July 1988 by Mrs. Lilia S. Wells, first cousin of Edward Marcelo and Jose
Marcelo, Jr., of a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents involving the same VTA’s
against petitioners Marcelo and Marfil, the dismissal thereof on 29 March 1989 by the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence, 39 and the resolution of the Department of
Justice of 27 August 1989 dismissing the petition for review of the dismissal. The clear suggestion
is that the filing of the second criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City is persecutive and should not be countenanced by this Court. chanroble s.com : vi rtual law lib rary

Our reading of the petitioners’ Position Paper in the criminal complaint filed against them by Jose
Marcelo, Jr. with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City (I.S. No. 91-3069) 40 , the motion for
review, the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, the petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 27681, and the petition in this case does not disclose any claim by the petitioners that
they are the victims of a vexatious or persecutive action. In the first mentioned pleading, they
simply stated that the "sole issue in this case [is] whether or not, on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the parties, there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Use thereof have been committed and that
Respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial." 41 The first complaint was
filed by Mrs. Wells alone who was unable to present the findings of the questioned documents
examiner of the NBI and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory on the alleged forgery of the signatures
of Jose Marcelo, Sr. on the questioned VTA’s. The latter and the specimen or standard signature of
Jose Marcelo, Sr. were submitted to these agencies only in January and February 1991,
respectively. 42 The second complaint was filed by Jose Marcelo, Jr. who, by then, had already
obtained the findings of the said agencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 27681 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., dissenting: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

I vote to grant the petition.

The records show that the information for falsification of public document docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-92-28104 involves the same charges which had been twice investigated and dismissed.
The first charge filed by Mrs. Wells was dismissed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and affirmed by
the Department of Justice. On the other hand, the second charge filed by Jose T. Marcelo was the
one where the Review Committee of Quezon City reversed the earlier recommendation finding
probable cause. These dismissals were based on a positive finding of the genuineness and due
execution by Jose T. Marcelo Sr. of the subject voting trust agreements in favor of Edward Marcelo.

The resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the filing of the information for falsification of
the VTAs was issued after it found merit in the appeal from the Review Committee’s resolution. The
Secretary of Justice may, upon petition by a proper party, reverse the resolution of the provincial
or city fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation or dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information. 1 In
this case, what is of consequence is the resolution of the Secretary of Justice which came after the
lower court had already granted the motion to dismiss and the motion to withdraw information. chanroble s virtual law lib rary

The rule regarding motions for reinvestigation once an information has already been filed in court
is now settled. 2 In the case of Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already
been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People
to due process of law.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that
the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

x x x

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation." 3

According to the records, before petitioners could be arraigned, they filed a petition for review
before the Review Committee which reversed the finding of Prosecutor Israel. Thereafter, the
prosecution filed a motion to withdraw and the defense, a motion to dismiss which were granted by
Judge Bersamin. This is in accord with Crespo where we said that" [a]fter such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendation of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 4
Later, the Secretary of Justice reversed the Review Committee. Even conceding the power of the
Secretary of Justice to review the action of the prosecutors, the Court has already cautioned him
on the propriety of the appeals to him after an information or complaint has been filed in court in
this manner: chanrob les vi rtua l lawlib rary

". . . the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court." 5

It bears stressing that if the Court is encouraging the Secretary of Justice to refrain from
entertaining petitions for review or appeal once an information or complaint has been filed, there is
greater reason for him to do so in this case where the lower court has already exercised its
discretion based on the results of the reinvestigation. If the Secretary of Justice may no longer
interfere once the case is pending before the trial court, with more reason should he avoid another
review or appeal after the court has dismissed the same. Thus, in this case, we hold that the
Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction when he
reviewed the appeal and ordered the re-filing of the information against petitioners. The ultimate
consequence of the Secretary of Justice’s act of reviewing the findings of the Review Committee is
the indirect reversal of the of the order of Judge Bersamin who is the "best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Such act of the Secretary of Justice is an unmitigated reprobation and reversal of Judge Bersamin’s
order over which the former has no authority whatsoever. Therefore, the information docketed as
Q-92-28104 is susceptible to quashal.

MELO, J., dissenting: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

I have to express dissent, regrettably, to the majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., and would rather concur wholeheartedly in the opinion penned by Mme. Justice Flerida
R. Pineda-Romero. The highest traditions of this Court are best expressed in those cases where,
without deviating from time-tested procedures in the prosecution of criminal cases, its
latitudinarian approach in the protection of civil rights is manifested.

I agree that a stereotyped, mechanical, and unvarying invocation of the doctrine that appeal,
not certiorari or prohibition, is the correct remedy to the denial of a motion to quash ignores
fundamental principles of fairness and justice. Rules of procedure are intended to safeguard the
interests of justice. Whether or not the prosecution of a criminal case should proceed should not be
determined purely on procedural points.

This Court in Acebedo v. Sarmiento (36 SCRA 247 [1970]) stated that "the right to a speedy trial
means one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation . . ."
It is not alone the right of an accused to have his guilt determined by a court of justice within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of legitimate defenses.
Equally important is not to be brought to court at all, to be spared the embarrassment, anxiety,
and expense of court litigation in proper cases. We stated in Acebedo that the remedy for the non-
observance of the above rule is habeas corpus where the accused is already incarcerated or
by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. This is precisely what the
decision is all about. chan rob les law li bra ry

When a case like the instant petition, with all its attendant facts and circumstances, reaches us, it
is not in the best traditions of the Supreme Court to automatically approach it in the impulsive and
unvarying methodology of a criminal trial court and declare that the issues raised are matters of
defense to be interposed only at the trial.

Indeed, not infrequently, this court has departed from the general rule and, taking cognizance of
petitions for certiorari involving orders denying motions to quash on the ground that it would be
unfair and unjust, and violative of the constitutional rights of an accused, to require him to
undergo trial under an information which is legally flawed (Yap v. Inciso, 105 Phil. 1307 [1959];
Pineda v. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930 [1954]; Villa v. Ibanez, 88 Phil. 402 [1951]; Mead v. Angel, 115
SCRA 256 [1982]), and so as to spare the courts from unnecessarily spending precious time and
energy and to save the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety, and embarrassment, let alone
the expenditure of effort and money in undergoing a trial for a case the proceedings in which could
possibly be annulled for want of, or excess in, or with grave abuse of, jurisdiction (Villa v. Ibanez,
supra, and Mead v. Angel, supra).

The inhibiting circumstances to the application of the doctrine that certiorari and prohibition will not
lie against an order denying a motion to quash appear on record in this case as follows: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

As stated, the criminal information for alleged falsification of public documents against petitioners
involves the same charges which had been twice investigated, passed upon, and twice dismissed,
for lack of insufficiency of evidence, and based on a positive finding of the genuineness and due
execution by Jose Marcelo, Sr. of the Voting Trust Agreements in favor of Edward.

The First case (I.S. No. 88-5729)

In July 1988, a criminal complaint against Edward and Marfil (I.S. No. 88-5729) for falsification of
public documents and use thereof was filed by Mrs. Lilia S. Wells, a first cousin of both Jose, Jr.
and Edward Marcelo. The documents alleged to have been falsified and involved were the six (6)
Voting Trust Agreements executed by Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in favor of Edward.

In a resolution dated March 29, 1989, Rizal Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro, dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence I.S. No. 88-5729 (Annex "C", Petition). The Provincial Prosecutor found
that Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. actually did sign the Voting Trust Agreements. The Resolution, in part,
reads:chan robles v irt ual lawl ibra ry

And so this Office does not find any prima facie case for falsification or use of falsified documents
nor that respondents are probably guilty of the crimes charged. For, while complainant relies on
her own perception of a difference between signatures, respondents have presented witnesses, not
just two, but three at the very least, who stated under oath that they had personally seen the late
Marcelo sign the questioned VTAs. In the absence of any evidence showing that these witnesses
are biased to the extent of perjury their statements are entitled to full faith and credit. (Annex C,
Petition; p. 51, Rollo; Underscoring supplied.)

Wells then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice. In a resolution dated August
27, 1989 (Annex D, Petition; p. 53-55, Rollo), the Department dismissed the Wells petition on the
following grounds.

. . . The fact that the late Marcelo had the intention to execute the VTAs, as he did actually sign the
same in favor of his son, Edward, has been substantially proven. Edward at the time, was already
entrusted with such responsible positions as Secretary, Director, Vice President, Vice-Chairman,
etc. and his being "the favorite son", is acknowledged by complainant. In their respective
affidavits, Daniel T. Pascual and Celia Caburnay, Director and Asst. Corporate Secretary,
respectively, of several Marcelo corporations, who both signed as witnesses to the VTAs attest to
the fact that the directors gave their consent to resolutions authorizing the late Marcelo to execute
VTAs in favor of Edward. Danilo Ibay, Chief Executive Officer of Marcelo Investment and
Management Corporation also attests to the same fact. Magdaleno Cortez and Wilfredo Ersando,
both directors of the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation likewise swore to the truth that on
February 21, 1987, the board in a regular meeting, unanimously passed a resolution authorizing
Jose P. Marcelo to execute a Voting Trust Agreement in favor of Edward. The letter of George T.
Marcelo (Annex 1 of Supplemental Affidavit, Edward Marcelo) who is residing in Australia confirms
that the voting trust given to Edward by their father is genuine, his father having discussed the
matter with him. Atty. Clarisa Penalosa of the Far East Bank and Trust Company also confirms that
the late Marcelo had inquired on how to preserve the companies’ assets and in her reply, dated
November 27, 1985, she delineated schemes, among them, the execution of VTAs.

x x x

Petitioner’s (Wells’s) observation as to the difference between the contemporary and questioned
signatures of the late Marcelo, the allegations of bias of respondent’s witnesses and the issue as to
the authenticity of the minutes of the board meetings showing the grant of authority to the late
Marcelo to execute the VTAs, are nonetheless inconclusive to prove the alleged falsification. They
are insufficient in the light of the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses to the actual signing of the
VTAs by the late Marcelo and the uncontroverted proof of his prior intention to execute the same.
(pp. 54-55, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)

The Second Case (I.S. No. 91-3049)Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285RTC-Quezon City, Branch 96.

After the Department of Justice dismissed the Wells complaint (I.S. No. 88-5729), Jose Marcelo
filed a similar criminal complaint against Edward Marcelo, Marfil, Caburnay and Pascual involving
the same voting trust agreements. This second complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 91-3049 of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. We quote once again the narration by respondent
Court of Appeals of the background facts, to wit: chanroble s virt ual lawl ibra ry

On the basis of the investigating prosecutor’s finding of a prima facie case (Annex "F", hereof), an
Information for falsification against Edward, Marfil, Caburnay and Pascual was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 (Annex "G" hereof). This criminal case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285.

Petitioners moved for a review of the prima facie finding of the investigating prosecutor (Annex "H"
hereof). The review was conducted by the Review Division ("the Review Division") of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, upon motion of
the prosecution and petitioners citing the pending Motion for Review, deferred the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285.

On 15 November 1991, the Review Division recommended that the Information in Criminal Case Q-
91-21285 be withdrawn (Annex "I" hereof).

The prosecution then moved to withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 (Annex
"J" hereof). Petitioners, on the other hand, filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that Criminal
Case No. Q-91-21285 be dismissed (Annex "K" hereof).

On 13 December 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 dismissed Criminal Case
No. Q-91-21285 (Annex "L" hereof). (Annex A, Petition, p. 39, Rollo.)

In dismissing the Information against petitioners in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, the Honorable
Lucas P. Bersamin, Presiding Judge of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, ruled:
virtua l 1aw lib rary
chan rob1es

The Court accords great respect to the findings of the Review Division which it finds to be based on
substantial grounds and are highly persuasive. Therein, the Review Division squarely resolved the
issue of whether or not the signatures of the late Jose Marcelo, Sr. in the six voting trust
agreements (VTAs) were genuine. The Division reasonably concluded that there was no probable
cause to hold the accused liable for falsification of the VTAs after agreeing with and adopting the
conclusions of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in a case involving the same documents. (I.S. No.
88-5279).

In particular, the Division noted that the late elder Marcelo had intended to execute the VTA’s in
favor of his son Edward who was at the time already holding responsible positions in their business
aside from being "the favorite son" ; that Daniel Pascual and Celia Caburnay, Accused herein, who
were then a director and an assistant corporate secretary, respectively, of several Marcelo
corporations and whose signatures were found on the VTAs in their capacities as witnesses,
attested to the fact that the directors of the corporation had given their consent to the resolution
authorizing the late elder Marcelo to execute the VTA’s in favor of Edward; that Danilo Ibay, Chief
Executive Officer of Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation, attested to the same facts,
that Magdalena Cortez and Wilfredo Irsendo, Directors of the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation,
likewise attested that on February 21, 1987, the Board of Directors had unanimously passed during
a regular meeting a resolution authorizing the elder Marcelo to execute a VTA in favor of Edward;
that even George Marcelo, now a resident of Australia, and brother of complainant and accused
Edward Marcelo, had confirmed by letter the genuineness of the voting trust agreements executed
by their father in favor of Edward. For the Court to close its eyes to these circumstances relied
upon by the Division in rendering the resolution in question would be unwarranted and
unreasonable in view their persuasiveness.

Since the essence of the crime of falsification is malicious falsehood, the existence and concurrence
of all the circumstances set forth in the questioned resolution absolutely exclude falsification.

x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Dismiss of the accused and the Motion to Withdraw Information of
public prosecutor are hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed without costs. (Annex Y,
Petition, pp. 80-81, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)

The Third Case (Crim. Case No. Q-92-28104, RTC Quezon City, Branch 101).

As further disclosed in the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals —

Despite the Regional Trial court’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, Jose Jr. appealed the
resolution of the Review Division of the DOJ (Annex "M" hereof).

On 31 January 1992, the DOJ reversed the resolution of the Review Division and ordered the re-
filing of an Information against petitioners (Annex "N").

An Information for falsification of public documents was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, against the petitioners docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104.
(Annex A, Petition, p. 40, Rollo.)

Petitioners contend in their instant petition, as they did in their motion to quash (Annex H, Petition,
pp. 82-91, Rollo) the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, RTC Quezon City Branch 101
presided by Judge Pedro Santiago, and in their petition in CA-G.R. No. 27681 (Annex K, Petition,
pp. 103-127, Rollo) that: chan rob les.com : vi rtua l law l ibra ry

When the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 96, through Honorable Judge Bersamin, took
cognizance of the Resolution of the Review Division of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and on
the basis thereof dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, it did so in the exercise of its discretion
and within the limits of its jurisdiction. The Prosecution can no longer question the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because in its order, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City Branch
96, made findings of fact and law that the evidence against the petitioners are insufficient to justify
continuing with the criminal proceedings against them.

The appeal taken by Jose Jr. to the Secretary of Justice and the latter’s review and reversal of the
resolution of the Review Division of the Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City are, therefore, null and
void. The Secretary of Justice cannot interfere with Honorable Judge Bersamin’s relative to the
disposition of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. By taking cognizance of the appeal and issuing the
Resolution, the Secretary of Justice usurped the power and authority of the Regional Trial Court to
determine whether to continue with, or dismiss, the case.

x x x

. . . respondent Judge should have granted the motion to quash or the Court of Appeals should
have reversed the denial thereof through the writ of certiorari. By refusing to do so, respondent
Judge and the Court of Appeals violated said rulings. (pp. 23 & 25, Rollo.)

Earlier cases decided by this Court persuade me that premised on the peculiar contextual
background of the case at bench, the conclusions and opinion of Mme. Justice Romero are correct.
In said cases (Velasquez v. Undersecretary of Justice, 182 SCRA 388 [1990]; Balgos Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287 [1989]; Dungog v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 145 [1988]; Sta.
Mining v. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367 [1987]; Marquez v. Alejo, 154 SCRA 302 [1987]), this Court laid
down the rule that once an Information has already been filed in court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over the case and the investigating fiscal or the Secretary of Justice should no longer
entertain motions for reinvestigation.

I believe that the doctrine in Crespo v. Mogul (151 SCRA 462 [1987] should be followed in this
case.

The Court ruled in Crespo v. Mogul that: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused in court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendation of the fiscal should submitted to the court for
appropriate action. (p. 463, Ibid; Emphasis supplied).

x x x

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
court, the court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion . . . (p. 463, Ibid; Emphasis
supplied).

x x x

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence . . .(p.
471, Ibid; Emphasis supplied).

x x x

In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the court. (at p. 47; Emphasis supplied.)

It is not so much the observance of what to me are mere technicalities of procedure and not
substantial justice which should be emphasized. It should be the compliance with the principles of
fairness and justice underlying the Crespo v. Mogul and other similar decisions that must concern
us. Under the circumstances of this case, we should not be overly apprehensive about the exact
time when the trial court acted on a case clearly within its jurisdiction, whether or not petitioners
should have withheld their motion to dismiss, whether or not the public prosecutor should have
deferred his motion to withdraw the information while the period to appeal from the committee on
review had not lapsed, whether or not express permission from the trial court for a reinvestigation
is absolutely necessary or it may be impliedly waived if the court knowingly allows such a
procedure to be followed and similar questions all revolving around technical rules of procedure. To
me, whether or Not Crespo v. Mogul applies, the facts clearly show that to deny this petition would
be to deny substantial justice. There is no new evidence in the records. The evidence twice
dismissed by state prosecutors remains as inadequate as ever. The important point is not to allow
the strong arm of the law to be used in an oppressive manner in such cases as the one before us.
virtua lawlib rary chan robles .com:cha nro bles.c om.ph
chanrobles
I also respectfully submit that Judge Bersamin did not act hastily in dismissing the case and
granting the prosecutor’s motion to withdraw the information. I understand that the records of this
case are around 400 pages. Judge Bersamin must have gone over the records. He had strong
factual and legal grounds to conclude that the signature appearing in the questioned document is
genuine.

The trial court had more than ample evidence to act as it did. I also submit with all due respect
that even in a case before the Supreme Court, there may be instances when we should not only
grant a motion to withdraw a petition but we may emphasize that the withdrawal be with prejudice
on the ground that the petition has no merit and warrants dismissal. Indeed, it is not only the
adjudicative function but also the more important role of emphasizing legal principles that leads us
to decide cases which are technically moot and academic. In this respect Judge Bersamin did not
really err.

In this case, whatever the Secretary of Justice says is only advisory and suggestive. The discretion
to allow the withdrawal of the information and dismissal of the action is vested in the court. It is a
discretion, a function of trial courts which we should honor and respect.

The Secretary of Justice thus, to my mind, exceeded his jurisdictional competence and acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the re-filing of the same criminal information against
petitioners involving the same voting trust agreements notwithstanding the fact that Judge
Bersamin in the second case (I.S. No. 91-3049; Civil Case No. Q-91-21285, RTC Quezon City,
Branch 96) had already ordered its dismissal, as it was actually dismissed on December 13, 1991.

Further, on August 27, 1989, the Department of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the criminal
charges filed by Mrs. Wells against Edward, etc. in I.S. No. 88-5279 involving the same voting trust
agreements. The flip-flopping of the Department of Justice in the light of its earlier resolution in the
first case (Wells) leaves much to be desired. cha nrob les vi rtua lawlib rary c han robles. com:cha nrob les.co m.ph

The re-filing of the same Information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-92-28104 in Branch 101 of the RTC, Quezon City was unwarranted reprobation and
reversal of Judge Bersamin’s order dismissing the Information in the second case, which the
Secretary of Justice has no authority whatsoever to do. From the time Branch 96 of the Quezon
City RTC acquired jurisdiction over the second case and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
thereafter ordered the dismissal thereof for lack or insufficiency of evidence, the Secretary of
Justice was divested of any authority to overturn such dismissal or to direct the re-filing of another
information involving the same charges and the same voting trust agreements, in the absence, if it
must be added, of new evidence. In Peralta v. CFI (157 SCRA 476 [1988]), we held: c hanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

This Court finds no reason to reverse the action taken by the trial court. Once an information or
complaint is filed in court, the matter of disposition of the case is left to the sound discretion of the
court. When the trial court in the instant case granted the fiscal’s motion to dismiss, it was within
its prerogative to do so.

On the matter of propriety of appeals to Secretary of Justice for reinvestigation after the
information or complaint has been filed in court, the pronouncement made by this Court in the
Crespo case is applicable. In that case, the Court, although not entirely disregarding the power of
review of the Secretary of Justice over the action of fiscals, imposed a limit on the exercise of such
power, thus: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

In order therefor(e) to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court; such a review of or appeal
should no longer be entertained by the Secretary of Justice when the complaint or information had
already been filed in court. The matter should be left entirely for determination of the court. (at p.
480).

In Velasquez v. Undersecretary of Justice (182 SCRA 388 [1990]), we held: c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

The petition is meritorious. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA
462, where we ruled that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired jurisdiction
over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice,
the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge’s disposition of the case, much
less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the
court is the sole judge of that . . . (at p. 391.)

The re-filing, therefore, of the Information with Branch 101 of the Quezon City RTC against
petitioners by the Quezon City Prosecutor upon orders of the Secretary of Justice long after Branch
96 of the same court ordered the dismissal of the Information in the second case involving the
same documents, was flawed and suffered from jurisdictional infirmity. The Information is thus
susceptible to quashal. Acts done with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction must be
struck down. The Information must be quashed. The peculiar circumstances of this case require no
less than the issuance of the privileged writ of certiorari and prohibition to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of
justice (Lopez v. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616 [1966]). Petitioners have no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the course of law. Appeal is neither a speedy nor an adequate remedy, given
the factual milieu in the case.
chanro bles vi rt ual lawli bra ry

To require petitioners to undergo the rigors of trial under an information which is tainted with
jurisdictional infirmity, without prejudice to presenting the special defense they had invoked in
their motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal, therefrom,
which course of action was laid down by Judge Santiago and affirmed by respondent Court of
Appeals when it denied the petition in CA-G.R. No. 27681, would indeed be oppressive. Further,
the trial court would be unnecessarily dragged into spending its precious time and energy , and
petitioners exposed to the inconvenience, anxiety, and embarrassment, not to speak of the
expenditure of time and money on a case which had been twice the subject of preliminary
investigation, passed upon and twice dismissed for lack or insufficiency of evidence and absence of
probable cause.

I, therefore, with the highest respect for the majority, must express my dissent and vote to give
due course to the petition.

Bidin, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., join in the dissent.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-112387 October 13, 1994

MANUEL P. MARTINEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and SALVADOR H.
LAUREL, respondent.

Eriberto Ignacio for petitioner.

Laurel Law Offices for private respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

This petition for review prays for the reversal of the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated July 16, 1993 and October 25, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. 13429,
entitled "The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Manuel P. Martinez,
Accused-Appellee, and Salvador H. Laurel, Private Complainant and Appellant." What
petitioner Manuel P. Martinez actually seeks is the dismissal of the information for libel filed
against him in the Trial Court. On the basis of the facts hereunder set forth, the Court denies
his plea.

On complaint of then Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel,1 an Information dated March 23,

19902 was filed before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Manila by Assistant Prosecutor
Antonio J. Ballena, charging Manuel F. Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly
derogatory and scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez'
article entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 in his Manila Times
column Narrow Gate. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-82891 and
assigned to Branch XI.

Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation"3 which, was denied by Judge Manuel E. Yuzon
in an Order dated June 21, 1990.4 The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference
on July 31, 1990, but this setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement.

On October 8, 1990, complainant Laurel filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and
pre-trial. Action on the motion was held in abeyance by the pairing judge, Hon. Gerardo
Pepito, pending assumption of duty of Judge Yuzon's successor.

In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking
review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him.
Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed before the trial court on
October 26, 1990, a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of
Martinez' petition for review, which was granted by Judge Pepito on November 6, 1990.

On February 6, 1991, complainant Laurel attempted once more to have the case set for
arraignment and trial. No action was taken on his said motion, and a subsequent motion
dated July 16, 1991 praying for the resolution of the February 6, 1991 motion met the same
fate.

By letter dated August 16, 1991 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Manila,5 then Acting
Justice Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter alia that while the language used in the
article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as
libel, as if embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the
City Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal of the information filed against Manuel
F. Martinez. Consequently, a motion to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 90-82891 was filed on August 26, 1991 and set for hearing on December 17, 1991.
At the hearing, upon manifestation of complainant's counsel, as private prosecutor, that he
had received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to
furnish said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter ten (10) days to respond thereto.

It does not appear that the case prosecutor complied with the trial court's order; this
notwithstanding, said court, through Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued on February
18, 1992 and Order6 reading:

Before arraignment was had, the Department of Justice conducted & since
concluded review and reinvestigation of the charges, the Resolution of which
is Annex "A" of the prosecution's motion to dismiss. The prosecution's fresh
stand is that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said accused to
sustain the allegation in the information." Coming as it does from the officials
having control of the prosecution and at this stage of the proceedings, and
there being no objection, the motion to dismiss is granted.

WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed. The office/officer having custody of it

is directed to forthwith release to the accused his cash bond submitted under
O.R. NO. 46865.

SO ORDERED.

Complainant Laurel having sought and been denied a reconsideration of said Order, he went
to the Court of Appeals, ascribing error to the lower court in (a) recognizing the regularity and
validity of the petition for review filed by Martinez with the DOJ and the DOJ's giving due
course thereto, and (b) granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of notice thereof to
complainant Laurel, and basing said dismissal not on evidence on record but on the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice, to whom the judge completely subordinated his judgment and
whose opinion, on its face, was clearly puerile and flimsy and violated or disregarded
numerous Supreme Court decisions.

Martinez, on his part, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies from the
dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the private complainant, particularly where
dismissal was at the instance of the City Prosecutor upon orders of the Department of
Justice. He contended that if any remedy was available to private complainant, it was a
petition for certiorari, not an appeal. Said motion notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals
ordered complainant to file his brief. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief recommending that the Order dated February 18,
1992 of the lower court granting the prosecution's motion to dismiss, be set aside and the
case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

On July 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, issued a Resolution7 granting the
appeal and remanding the case for arraignment of the accused and trial on the merits. The
Appellate Court ruled that private complainant had "sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against the order of dismissal before arraignment" and that the remedy of appeal
was properly available because the order of dismissal was a final order which terminated all
proceedings in the case. Quoting extensively from the People's Manifestation, the Court
found the review by then Acting Justice Secretary Bello to run counter to prevailing
jurisprudence and DOJ Circulars. It further ruled that the trial court completely abdicated its
jurisdiction in favor of the Justice Department when it dismissed the case on the mere say-so
of the prosecutor, without requiring the latter to present evidence to enable the court to arrive
at its own judgment.

Martinez sought, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration of the above Resolution.8 Hence, the
present recourse. His arguments in support thereof do no warrant reversal of the challenged
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Appeal against the order of dismissal of February 18, 1992 was not foreclosed by the rule of
double jeopardy, said order having issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.9

Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from
a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the
accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. 10

In People vs. Guido,11 this Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not
only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been
held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right
to demand civil liability arising from the offense. 12 The right of the offended party to file a
special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an order rendered in a criminal case was
likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes vs. Gopengco 13 and People vs. Calo, Jr.,14 which
held that "offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as
'person(s) aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections
1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their object . . . ." 15

In People vs. Nano16, the Court, while declaring the petition filed before it by the private
counsel for the offended parties to be defective in form, nevertheless took cognizance
thereof in view of the gravity of error allegedly committed by the respondent judge against
the prosecution — denial of due process — as well as the manifestation and motion filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General praying that the petition be treated as if filed by the said
office. The same exceptional circumstances obtaining in the Nano, case justified the Court of
Appeals' taking cognizance of the appeal filed by private complainant Laurel, i.e.: denial of
due process consisting in the failure of the prosecution to furnish counsel for private
complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss despite being ordered to do so, as well as of the
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief 17 filed by the Solicitor General in the appellate
court, recommending the setting aside of the Order of the lower court dated February 18,
1992 and the remand of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.

It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to the People or the
prosecution. The reason, as explained by the Court in Orbos vs. Civil Service
Commission,18 is that as the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, the
Solicitor General has the duty to "see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld
within the limits set by
law. . . . It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position."
When that happens, as the Court observed in Orbos:

. . . the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his opinion and

recommendation to the Court which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of
the case. On some occasions he begs leave to be excused from intervening
in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own comment
different from the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds
the contention of a private party tenable as against that of the government or
any of its agencies. The Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of
the accused in appealed criminal cases.

The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is correct because
the order of dismissal was a final order. It finally disposed
of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. 19 In Bell
Carpets International Trading Corp. vs. Court Appeals, 20 this Court held that "(t)he remedy
against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on
appeal, whether of fact, or of
law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he
party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the
existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special
civil action of certiorari."
The rule with respect to the disposition of motions to dismiss filed by the fiscal was laid down
by the Court in Crespo vs. Mogul, 21 where it was held that:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complainant or information

is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal even cases while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

Petitioner maintains that it is precisely in recognition of the above-cited rule that the
prosecutor left the disposition of the case to the discretion of the lower court by filing the
appropriate motion to dismiss; and that it was neither the Justice Secretary nor the fiscal who
dismissed the information, but the trial judge himself, who exercised his discretion by
approving the stand taken by the prosecution.

The fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to
observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. Other
procedural lapses that must be pointed out are attributable to petitioner Martinez, who filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice despite the denial by Judge Yuzon of his
motion for reinvestigation, and to the Justice Secretary, who took cognizance of the petition
for review despite the fact that an information had been filed in court. But that is water under
the bridge.

What now concerns the Court here with is how the trial judge acted in relation to the motion
to dismiss. First, he granted the same without the prosecution having furnished private
complainant a copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively
depriving private complainant of his day in court.

Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of
Justice that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the
conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said
accused to sustain the allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of
objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the
prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the
motion to dismiss.

In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations
other than the judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case
against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the
prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge
must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required ws the
trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and
proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its
supposed insufficiency.

As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent
finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position
of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise.
In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do
and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling
in Crespo v. Mogul. 22
The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainant's right to due
process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did
not err in setting aside said dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for
arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

#Footnotes

1 Annex "A", Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-23.

2 Annex "B", Petition, Rollo, pp. 24-25.

3 Annex "2", Motion to Dismiss of Private Respondent, Rollo, pp. 125-128.

4 Annex "2-A", IbId., Id., p. 130.

5 Annex "C", Petition, Rollo, pp. 26-31.

6 Annex "D", Petition, Rollo, pp. 33.

7 Annex "H", Petition, pp. 77-86, Rollo. Penned by Associate Justice

Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Asaali S.
Isnani and Lourdez K. Tayao-Jaguros.

8 His motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in a resolution
dated October 25, 1993.

9 Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186.

10 Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: "Who
may appeal. — Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except
if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

11 57 Phil. 52, 53.

12 Gonzales vs. Judge of Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et al., G.R. No.
4533,
V L.J. 170, cited in Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
Second Edition, 1969, p. 883.

13 29 SCRA 688 (1969).

14 186 SCRA 620.

15 IbId., at p. 624. See also Calderon vs. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876.

16 205 SCRA 155.

17 Annex "G", Petition, pp. 58-75, Rollo.

18 189 SCRA 459.

 19 De Ocampo vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-19533, October
31, 1963, 9 SCRA 440.

20 185 SCRA 35, emphasis in the original.

21 151 SCRA 462.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113216. September 5, 1997]

RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of

lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the
bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits
of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further
with the trial. While the secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A
trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if
it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on
proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction
over the criminal action.
This principle is explained in this Decision resolving a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on September
14, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 30832 which in effect affirmed an order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City denying the prosecutions withdrawal of a criminal
information against petitioner.

The Antecedent Facts

From the pleadings submitted in this case, the undisputed facts are as
follows:

Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres,
Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-
affidavit to the complaint.

Finding sufficient legal and factual basis, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office
filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. The Information filed by
[3]

Assistant City Prosecutor Augustine A. Vestil reads: [4]

That on or about the 27th day of June 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, acting with malice, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously send a letter addressed to Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral,
Director of Philippine Heart Center, East Avenue, this city, and furnished the
same to other officers of the said hospital, said letter containing slanderous and
defamatory remarks against DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR., which states in part,
to wit:

27June 1991

Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral

Director

Subject: Return of all professional fees due Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, Nuclear
Medicine Specialist/Consultant, Philippine Heart Center, from January 31,
1989 to January 31, 1991.

Respondents: Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr., Chief, Nuclear Medicine Section

Dr. Orestes P. Monzon,

Staff Consultant

Dear Dr. Cabral,

This is to demand the return of all professional fees due me as a consultant in

Nuclear Medicine, this Center, since January 31, 1989 until my resignation
effective January 31, 1991, amounting to at least P100,000.00 for the year 1990
alone.Records in the Nuclear Medicine Section will show that from January
1989 to January 1991, a total of 2,308 patients were seen. Of these, I had
officially supervised, processed, and interpreted approximately a total of 1,551
cases as against approximately 684 and 73 cases done by Dr. Monzon and Dr.
Torres respectively.

Until my resignation I had received a monthly share of professional fees

averaging P1,116.90/month supposedly representing 20% of the total monthly
professional fees. The rest were divided equally between Dr. Monzon and Dr.
Torres. There was never any agreement between us three consultants that this
should be the arrangement and I am certain that this was not with your
approval. The burden of unfairness would have been lesser if there was an
equal distribution of labor and the schedule of duties were strictly followed. As
it was, the schedule of duties submitted monthly to the office of the Asst.
Director for Medical Services was simply a dummy to comply with
administrative requirements rather than a guideline for strict compliance. Both
consultants have complete daily time records even if they did not come
regularly. Dr. Torres came for an hour every week, Dr. Monzon came
sporadically during the week while I was left with everything from training the
residents and supervising the Techs to processing and interpreting the results on
a regular basis. I had a part time appointment just like Dr. Monzon and Dr.
Torres.
In the interest of fairness and to set a precedent for the protection of future PHC
Nuclear Medicine Alumni I am calling your attention to the unfair and inhuman
conditions I went through as a Consultant in that Section. I trust that your sense
of professionalism will put a stop to this corruption.

I suggest that a committee be formed to make an audit of the distribution of

professional fees in this Section. At this point, let me stress that since
professional fees vary according to the type of procedure done and since there
was no equity of labor between us I am not settling for an equal percentage
share. I demand that I be indemnified of all professional fees due me on a case
to case basis.

Let me make clear my intention of pursuing this matter legally should there be
no favorable action in my behalf. Let me state at this point6 that the actions of
Dr. Torres and Dr. Monzon are both unprofessional and unbecoming and are
clearly violating the code of ethics of the medical profession and the Philippine
Civil Service Rules and Regulations related to graft and corruption.

Thank you.

and other words of similar import, when in truth and in fact, as the accused
very well knew, the same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made
for no other purpose than to expose said DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR. to public
ridicule, thereby casting dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of
the said offended party, to his damage and prejudice.

A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was
filed by petitioner before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as
amended by P.D. No. 911.
The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the
Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to
elevate the entire records of the case.[5] Accordingly, a Motion to Defer Arraignment
dated September 7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the
court a quo.[6] On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and
deferred petitioners arraignment until the final termination of the petition for
review.[7]
Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to
Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial.[8]
On January 8, 1993, the trial court issued an Order setting aside its earlier
Order of September 9, 1992 and scheduling petitioners arraignment on January
18, 1993 at two oclock in the afternoon.[9]
In a resolution dated January 27, 1993, then Justice Secretary Franklin M.
Drilon reversed the Quezon City investigating prosecutor. Pertinent portions of
Drilons ruling read:[10]

From the circumstances obtaining, the subject letter was written to bring to the
attention of the Director of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other
responsible authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr. Ledesma was
getting from complainants. Since complainants and respondent are government
employees, and the subject letter is a complaint to higher authorities of the
PHCA on a subject matter in which respondent has an interest and in reference
to which she has a duty to question the same is definitely privileged (US vs.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the
Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that A
communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party
making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is
privileged... although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which,
without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable.

The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a direct
evidence of respondents righteous disposition of following the rule of law and
is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek relief from the proper higher
authority who is the Director of PHCA.

The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative

complaints which respondent filed against complainants. They are mere
manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged
injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and ill-will
in sending the subject communication to the Director of the PHCA, she would
not have sent the second letter and filed the administrative and civil cases
against complainants.

Moreover, it is unbelievable that it took complainants one year to realize that

the questioned letter subjected them to public and malicious imputation of a
vice or omission. It is beyond the ordinary course of human conduct for
complainants to start feeling the effects of the alleged libelous letter - that of
experiencing sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, moral shock
and besmirched reputation - one year after they read the communication in
question.

The claim that the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 is applicable to
the instant case is unfounded. In the first place, the instant cases are not being
reinvestigated. It is the resolutions of the investigating prosecutor that are under
review.Further, the record shows that the court has issued an order suspending
the proceedings pending the resolutions of the petitions for review by this
Office. In the issuance of its order, the court recognizes that the Secretary of
Justice has the powerand authority to review the resolutions of prosecutors who
are under his control and supervision.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed resolutions are hereby reversed. You are
directed to withdraw the Informations which you filed in Court. Inform this
Office of the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

In obedience to the above directive, Quezon City Trial Prosecutor Tirso M.

Gavero filed a Motion to Withdraw Information dated February 17,1993, [11] attaching
thereto the resolution of Secretary Drilon. The trial judge denied this motion in his
Order dated February 22, 1993, as follows:[12]

The motion of the trial prosecutor to withdraw the information in the above-
entitled case is denied. Instead, the trial prosecutor of this court is hereby
directed to prosecute the case following the guidelines and doctrine laid down
by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[13] was denied by the trial judge in the
Order dated March 5, 1993, as follows:[14]

Finding no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration of the ruling of this

Court dated February 22, 1993, the Motion for Reconsideration dated March 1,
1993 filed by the accused through counsel is hereby denied.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated March 31, 1993, this Court referred the case
to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to
Section 9, paragraph 1 of B.P. 129.[15]
Respondent Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that it had
no jurisdiction to overturn the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul -- once a
complaint or information has been filed in court, any disposition of the
case, i.e., dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court.[16]
Hence, this recourse to this Court.

The Issues

For unexplained reasons, petitioner failed to make an assignment of errors

against the appellate court. Her counsel merely repeated the alleged errors of the
trial court: [17]

I. The Orders, dated February 22, 1993 and March 5, 1993, of respondent Judge
Asuncion relied solely on the Crespo vs. Mogul (151 SCRA 462) decision. It is
respectfully submitted that said case is not applicable because:

1. It infringes on the constitutional separation of powers between the executive

and judicial branches of the government;

2. It constitutes or it may lead to misuse or misapplication of judicial power as

defined in the Constitution;

3. It goes against the constitutional proscription that rules of procedure should

not diminish substantive rights;

4. It goes against the principle of non-delegation of powers;

5. It sets aside or disregards substantive and procedural rules;

6. It deprives a person of his constitutional right to procedural due process;

7. Its application may constitute or lead to denial of equal protection of laws;

8. It deprives the secretary of justice or the president of the power to control or

review the acts of a subordinate official;
9. It will lead to, encourage, abet or promote abuse or even corruption among
the ranks of investigating fiscals;

10. It does not subserve the purposes of a preliminary investigation because -

(10.a) It subjects a person to the burdens of an unnecessary trial, specially in

cases where the investigating fiscal recommends no bail for the accused;

(10.b) It subjects the government, both the executive and the judiciary, to
unnecessary time and expenses attendant to an unnecessary trial;

(10.c) It contributes to the clogging of judicial dockets; and

11. It has no statutory or procedural basis or precedent.

II. On the assumption that Crespo vs. Mogul is applicable, it is submitted that -

1. Respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting

to lack of jurisdiction, when he denied the Motion to Withdraw Information
since he had already deferred to, if not recognized, the authority of the
Secretary of Justice; and

2. The facts in Crespo vs. Mogul are different from the instant case. Hence,
respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, when he relied solely on said case in denying the Motion to
Withdraw Information.

In sum, the main issue in this petition is: Did Respondent Court commit any
reversible error in affirming the trial courts denial of the prosecutions Motion to
Withdraw Information?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit. We answer the above question in the
affirmative.

Preliminary Matter

Before discussing the substance of this case, the Court will preliminarily
address a procedural matter. Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on July 1, 1997, Section 2 of Rule 45, which governed appeals from the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, provided:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition.The petition shall contain a concise statement of x

x x the assignment of errors made in the court below x x x.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 requires a concise statement

of the errors committed by the Court of Appeals, not of the trial court. For failure to
follow this Rule, the petition could have been dismissed by this Court motu proprio,
considering that under Section 4 of the same Rule, review is not a matter of right
but of sound discretion.
We take this occasion to stress the need for precision and clarity in the
assignment of errors. Review under this rule is unlike an appeal in a criminal case
where the death penalty, reclusin perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and
where the whole case is opened for review. Under Rule 45, only the issues raised
therein by the petitioner will be passed upon by the Court, such that an erroneous
specification of the issues may cause the dismissal of the petition. We stressed
this in Circular No. 2-90, entitled Guidelines to be Observed in Appeals to the Court
of Appeals and to the Supreme Court, as follows:

4. Erroneous Appeals. x x x x

e) Duty of counsel.It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would

seek review of a judgment or order promulgated against his client to make sure
of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of
law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate
jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal
prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may
well be fatal to his clients cause.

FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.

Be that as it may, the Court noting the importance of the substantial matters
raised decided to overlook petitioners lapse and granted due course to the petition
per Resolution dated July 15, 1996, with a warning that henceforth petitions which
fail to specify an assignment of errors of the proper lower court may be denied due
course motu proprio by this Court.

Determination of Probable Cause Is an Executive Function

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is

judicially recognized as an executive function and is made by the prosecutor. The
primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been
passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer
designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also
protects the state from the burden of unnecessary expense and effort in
prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or
groundless charges.[18]
Such investigation is not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation
of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.[19] By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary
investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a
judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.
In declaring this function to be lodged in the prosecutor, the Court
distinguished the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest or a search warrant from a preliminary investigation proper in this wise:[20]
xxx Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should
be held for trial or released. xxx The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper--
whether xxx there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether xxx he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial--is the function of the prosecutor.

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to

whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for
the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutors
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.

Sound policy supports this distinction. Otherwise, judges would be unduly

laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts. The Separate Opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts,
Jr. vs. Court of Appeals stressed that the determination of the existence of
probable cause properly pertains to the public prosecutor in the established
scheme of things, and that the proceedings therein are essentially preliminary,
prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative judgment of the guilt
or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or a crime. [21]
In Crespo vs. Mogul,[22] the Court emphasized the cardinal principle that the
public prosecutor controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses thus:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by

complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information,
follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether
the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not
only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according
to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a
crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office.They have equally the
legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced
that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

In the same case, the Court added that where there is a clash of views
between a judge who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a
reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor should normally prevail: [23]

x x x x The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of the
criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to
compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an
information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for
conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or
file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere
with the fiscals discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal
who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has
authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal
may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the
re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may
not be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and
the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscals should normally
prevail. x x x x.

Appeal as an Exercise of the Justice Secretarys Power of Control Over

Prosecutors

Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary

of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2,
Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the
Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The
scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to
act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials
or units; xxxx.

Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and

Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:

Section 3. x x x x

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior
State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other
duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of
public service.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding,
whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to
a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as
also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to
act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision
or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.

Supervision and control of a department head over his subordinates have

been defined in administrative law as follows:[24]

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority

of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the
fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial
steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be
corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule,
only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.

Appeal to the Secretary of Justice Is Not Foreclosed by the Ruling

in Crespo

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court clarified that Crespo[26] did not
foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of
his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the action
of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it
may be appealed to the secretary of justice.
The justice secretarys power of review may still be availed of despite the filing
of an information in court. In his discretion, the secretary may affirm, modify or
reverse resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to Republic Act No. 5180, as
amended,[27] specifically in Section 1 (d):

(d) x x x Provided, finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or City
Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary
of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that no prima facie case exists,
authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or
state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he
finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against
the respondent, based on the same sworn statements or
evidence submitted without the necessity of conducting another preliminary
investigation.

Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice promulgated Circular No. 7 dated

January 25, 1990 governing appeals in preliminary investigation. Appeals under
Section 2 are limited to resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint. However,
Section 4 provides an exception: appeals from resolutions finding probable cause
upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion are allowed,
provided the accused has not been arraigned. In the present case, petitioners
appeal to the secretary of justice was given due course on August 26, 1992
pursuant to this Circular.
On June 30, 1993, Circular No. 7 was superseded by Department Order No.
223; however, the scope of appealable cases remained unchanged:

SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed. -- Only resolutions of the Chief State

Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing
a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.

Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the penalty

prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prisin
correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, shall be made to the Regional
State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality, pursuant to
Department Order No. 318 dated August 28, 1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34
dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated August 11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45
dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals shall also be governed by these rules.

SEC. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions.--No appeal may be taken from a

resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or
City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error
or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant
had already been arraigned. If the appellant (is) arraigned during the pendency
of the appeal, x x x appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of
Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause,

however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.

Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative issuances, the power of
review of the secretary of justice is recognized also by Section 4 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.--x x x x

xxx xxx xxx

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the

resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without
conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information.

This appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the secretary of justice arising
from his power of supervision and control over the prosecuting arm of the
government, not on a substantial right on the part of the accused as claimed by
petitioner.

Appeal Did Not Divest the Trial Court of Jurisdiction

 Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an
information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and
further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension,
however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution
of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost
despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to
dismiss the case.

Judicial Review of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice

Judicial power is defined under the 1987 Constitution as the duty of courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. Such power includes the determination of whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.[28] Under this definition, a court is
without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It
may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial review of the acts of other departments is not an assertion of
superiority over them or a derogation of their functions. In the words of Justice
Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission:[29]

x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it

does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument sources and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed judicial
supremacy which properly is the power of the judicial review under the
Constitution. x x x.

It is not the purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the
secretary of justice to review the decisions of the government prosecutors under
him. In Crespo, the secretary was merely advised to restrict such review to
exceptionally meritorious cases. Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which
recognizes such power, does not, however, allow the trial court to automatically
dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of the information upon the resolution of
the secretary of justice. This is precisely the import of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez
vs. Court of Appeals[30] and the recent case of Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, which all required the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits
of the case, because granting the motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information
is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.

The Marcelo and Martinez Cases Are Consistent

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court ruled that, although it is more
prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from
the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw
an information, a trial court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation
of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the secretary. The trial
court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the secretary who reviewed the records of
the investigation; provided that such grant or denial is made from its own
assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion.
In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court overruled the grant of the motion
to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal upon the recommendation of the secretary
of justice because such grant was based upon considerations other than the
judges own assessment of the matter. Relying solely on the conclusion of the
prosecution to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence against the accused
to sustain the allegation in the information, the trial judge did not perform his
function of making an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the
case.
Despite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final resolution of the appeal to
the Department of Justice is necessary, both decisions followed the rule in Crespo
vs. Mogul: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the
court. Trial judges are thus required to make their own assessment of whether the
secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the
appeal, separately and independently of the prosecutions or the secretarys
evaluation that such evidence is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the
accused for trial exists. They should embody such assessment in their written
order disposing of the motion.
The above-mentioned cases depict two extreme cases in complying with this
rule. In Marcelo, the dismissal of the criminal action upon the favorable
recommendation of the Review Committee, Office of the City Prosecutor, was
precipitate in view of the pendency of private complainants appeal to the secretary
of justice. In effect, the secretarys opinion was totally disregarded by the trial
court. In contrast, in Martinez the dismissal of the criminal action was an erroneous
exercise of judicial discretion as the trial court relied hook, line and sinker on the
resolution of the secretary, without making its own independent determination of
the merits of the said resolution.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in theResolution of the Secretary of Justice

In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that
the issue of the correctness of the justice secretarys resolution has been amply
threshed out in petitioners letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of
justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion
for reconsideration all of which were submitted to the court -- the trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the
information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial
courts order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and
competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial
judge was tasked to evaluate the secretarys recommendation finding the absence
of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He
merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding
the secretarys recommendation.
Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that
there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the
information. The documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that there
was no probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for libel.
Under the established scheme of things in criminal prosecutions, this Court
would normally remand the case to the trial judge for his or her independent
assessment of the motion to withdraw the information. However, in order not to
delay the disposition of this case and to afford the parties complete relief, we have
decided to make directly the independent assessment the trial court should have
done. The petitioner has attached as annexes to the present petition for review the
information, which contains a complete and faithful reproduction of the subject
letter, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts Order of February 22, 1993, and even the private
complainants opposition to said motion. The records below have been reproduced
and submitted to this Court for its appreciation. Thus, a remand to the trial court
serves no purpose and will only clog the dockets.
We thus proceed to examine the substance of the resolution of the secretary
of justice. The secretary reversed the finding of probable cause on the grounds
that (1) the subject letter was privileged in nature and (2) the complaint was merely
a countercharge.
In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur:

(a) it must be defamatory;

(b) it must be malicious;

(c) it must be given publicity; and

(d) the victim must be identifiable.

At the preliminary investigation stage, these requisites must show prima

facie a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused
probably committed it. A cursory reading of the information immediately
demonstrates a failure on the part of the complainant to establish the foregoing
elements of libel.
Every defamatory imputation, even if true, is presumed malicious, if no good
intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the
author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to
have been defamed. [33] In this case however, petitioners letter was written to seek
redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of
professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department
of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 354. Requirement of publicity. -- Every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance

of any legal, moral or social duty; and

xxx xxx xxx

 The rule on privileged communication is that a communication made in good
faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or
concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory matter which,
without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable. Petitioners letter was a
private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her
intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to
present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter
overcomes the presumption of malice.There is no malice when justifiable motive
exists; and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information
itself failed to allege the existence of malice.
Thus, we agree with the ruling of the secretary of justice:[34]

x x x (T)he subject letter was written to bring to the attention of the Director of
the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other responsible authorities the unjust
and unfair treatment that Dr. Ledesma was getting from government
employees, and the subject letter is a complaint x x x on a subject matter in
which respondent has an interest and in reference to which she has a duty to
question the same is definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil.
131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court, citing
Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that a communication made in good
faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has
an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged although it contains
incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be
libelous and actionable.

The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a

direct evidence of respondents righteous disposition of following the rule of
law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek relief from the proper
higher authority xxx.

The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative

complaints which respondent filed against complainants. They are mere
manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged
injustice she got fromcomplainants. If she was motivated by malice and ill-will
in sending the subject communication to the Director of the PHCA, she would
not have sent the second letter and filed the administrative and civil cases
against complainants.

In Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public officer, in the discharge of his
or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of
officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication, such communication does not amount to publication within the
meaning of the law on defamation.[35] Publication in libel means making the
defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the
person to whom it has been written.[36] The reason for such rule is that a
communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his
reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A mans reputation is not the good
opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him. [37] In this
case, petitioner submitted the letter to the director of said hospital; she did not
disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons. Hence, there was no
publicity and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph 1 of Article 354 of the
Penal Code.
Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July
27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is
obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a
leverage against petitioners administrative action against him.
Ineluctably, Judge Asuncions denial of the motion to withdraw the information
and the reconsideration thereof was not only precipitate but manifestly
erroneous. This is further compounded by the fact that he did not explain his
grounds for his denial inasmuch as he did not make an independent assessment
of the motion or the arguments in the resolution of the secretary of justice. All in
all, such rash action did not do justice to the sound ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul upon
which, ironically, he supposedly rested his action, or to the directive
in Marcelo and Martinez where this Court required trial courts to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the motion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Motion to Withdraw the Information dated February 17, 1993 filed
before the trial court is GRANTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa C.J., no part: Close relation to a party:

[1]
Rollo, pp. 39-49.
[2]
The Special Eighth Division is composed of JJ. Corona Ibay-Somera, ponente, and Arturo B.
Buena and Buenaventura J. Guerrero.
[3]
Presided by then Judge (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Maximiano C. Asuncion.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 53-55.
[5]
Annex D, rollo, p. 56.
[6]
Annex E, rollo, p. 57
[7]
Annex F, rollo, p. 58.
[8]
Annex G, rollo, pp. 59-62.
[9]
Annex I, rollo, p. 66.
[10]
Annex J, rollo, pp. 68-69.
[11]
Annex K, rollo, p. 71.
[12]
Annex L, rollo, p. 73.
[13]
Annex M, rollo, pp. 74-91.
[14]
Annex O, rollo, p. 97.
[15]
Annex P, rollo, p. 98.
[16]
Rollo, pp.44-49.
[17]
Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 6-8; rollo, pp. 182-184.
[18]
Cf. People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176, 179-180 (1940).
[19]
Ibid.; Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 18 SCRA 1115, 1119, December 17, 1966, per Bengzon, J.
[20]
Ibid., pp. 344-345.
[21]
254 SCRA 307, 349-350, March 5, 1996.
[22]
151 SCRA 462, 467, June 30, 1987, per Gancayco, J.
[23]
Ibid., pp. 468-469.
[24]
Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).
[25]
235 SCRA 39, 48-49, August 4, 1994, per Davide, Jr., J.
[26]
Supra, p. 469.
[27]
Otherwise known as An Act Prescribing a Uniform System of Preliminary Investigation by
Provincial and City Fiscals and Their Assistants, and by State Attorneys or Their
Assistants.
[28]
Article VIII, Section 1, 2nd paragraph.
[29]
63 Phil. 134.
[30]
Infra; see note 32.
[31]
235 SCRA 39, August 4, 1994.
[32]
237 SCRA 575, October 13, 1994, per Narvasa, C.J.
[33]
Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51, 59-60, February 1, 1995.
[34]
Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[35]
Ibid., p. 65, citing 53 C.J.S. 81 (1948).
[36]
Id., p. 60.
[37]
Id., pp. 60-61.

22 Comment, pp. 166-167, Rollo.