Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MEMORANDUM
JS6
Date 2-9-18
Case No. CV 16-8422 DSF (PLAx)
Title Krishna Lunch of Southern California, Inc., et al. v. Monroe Gordon Jr.
Present:
DALE S. FISCHER, United States District Judge
The Honorable
I. INTRODUCTION
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MEMORANDUM
Hinduism. TAC ¶ 15. A core tenet of Krishna consciousness requires followers to
approach people to proselytize, disseminate materials, and propagate the teachings
of the religion to educate the general public about global warming, climate change,
animal protection, God-centered ecology, the relationship between science and
religion, and the origin of life and the universe. Id. ¶ 16. A core practice of the
religion is the consumption of sanctified, vegetarian and vegan food, known as
prasada. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. Because the religion attaches significance to consuming
prasada (e.g., those who partake in prasada are believed to be protected from the
material world), the distribution and sharing of prasada is an important spiritual
practice and a “cornerstone of the religion.” Id. ¶ 20.
1
“Generally, the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
limited to the contents of the complaint. A court may consider evidence on which the
complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the
document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of
the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion. The court may treat such a document as part of
the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A court may consider the full text of
documents only partially quoted in the complaint. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623
(9th Cir. 1998).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs allege UCLA’s four-days-per-year limitation on the lunch program
violates their First Amendment rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, and
free assembly and association.
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts
are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (ellipsis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). But
Rule 8 “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (alteration in original; internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment bars laws “prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion.]” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Under the Free Exercise
Clause, “a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
For the third time, Plaintiffs fail to state a Free Exercise claim. Plaintiffs
add several allegations to the TAC regarding the importance of prasada to their
religious message. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 28. However, Plaintiffs continue to concede
that because UCLA’s restriction limiting the number of events in which off-
campus organizations may serve prepared food is both facially neutral and
generally applicable, it need only survive rational basis review. See Stormans, Inc.
v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009) (“When a law is neutral and
generally applicable, the rational basis test applies.”). As set out in the Court’s
first Order, Plaintiffs’ allegations are fully consistent with UCLA’s legitimate
reasons for limiting how often off-campus groups may distribute food:
Defendants’ reasons for limiting the regularity with which both off
campus groups and student organizations may distribute food are
supported by Plaintiffs’ own allegations and arguments. Compare
[Dkt.] 17, Ex. C and FAC, ¶¶ 31, 34 (allocating limited campus
venues and facilities among numerous students and organizations
seeking to use them; managing administrative burdens of monitoring
food service events), with FAC at ¶¶ 24-26 (over 90,000 students,
faculty members, and employees; pedestrian walkways and lawns
open to general public; commitment to assure opportunity for a
variety of viewpoints), and Dkt. 26 at 8-12, 22-23 (import of food
across myriad groups, cultures, and religions).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Dkt. 31 at 8. Plaintiffs plead no facts to support their contention that UCLA’s
restriction is “fabricated,” see Dkt. 49 (Opp’n) at 9-10, especially given that the
restriction was in place (and applied to all off-campus organizations) prior to
Krishna Lunch’s request. Because Plaintiffs have failed to negate every
conceivable rational basis for the challenged restriction, Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim is GRANTED.
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succinctly articulable message’ is not required.” Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d
789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).3 The Court previously
concluded that Plaintiffs failed to allege a great likelihood their pro-animal/anti-
meat message would easily be understood by those who view it.
They still have not done so. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ only significant addition is to
allege their lunch program “is sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication,” TAC ¶ 52—a legal conclusion insufficient to state a First
Amendment claim. Otherwise, Plaintiffs continue to stress the context of the lunch
program as a whole, all the while relying on their own pure speech activities to
provide the relevant context (i.e., literature and conversations that would impart the
meaning of sanctified vegetarian and vegan food), which is “strong evidence that
the conduct at issue . . . is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection”
under the First Amendment. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). And Plaintiffs do not explain why other contextual
factors they identify—such as the location of the lunch program on UCLA’s
campus—are sufficient to transform Plaintiffs’ behavior into conduct that “the
great majority of citizens” would understand “the drift of.” Spence, 418 U.S. at
411. If anything, the fact that the Assigned Area (the location where Plaintiffs
would conduct prasada) is regularly used by groups for which food distribution is
common, see TAC ¶ 31, makes it highly unlikely that the ordinary viewer would
glean a particularized message from Plaintiffs’ lunch program.
3
Some Circuits have concluded that Hurley liberalized the Spence requirements, such
that the observer need not understand a plaintiff’s particular message. See, e.g.,
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (looking to
whether “the reasonable person would interpret [a display] as some sort of message, not
whether an observer would necessarily infer a specific message”). The Ninth Circuit has
not gone this far. See Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 798 (citing Hurley for the proposition that
a “narrow, succinctly articulable message is not required,” but otherwise leaving the
Spence requirements intact).
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is easy to discern”). Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ free speech claim is
GRANTED.
C. Expressive Association
The Supreme Court has noted that protected First Amendment associational
activity shields two distinct types of association: “expressive association” and
“intimate association.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984). Plaintiffs’ desire to associate with “like-minded persons,” TAC ¶ 63, does
not touch on intimate association. See id. at 619 (freedom of intimate association
extends to those human relationships that attend the creation and sustenance of a
family-marriage; childbirth; the raising and education of children; and cohabitation
with one’s relatives.).
The right to expressive association is a derivative right that has been implied
from the First Amendment in order to assure those rights expressly secured by that
amendment can be meaningfully exercised. See id. at 618 (“The Constitution
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of
preserving other individual liberties.”).
There are no new allegations that would lead the Court to sustain Plaintiffs’
expressive association claim. As discussed above, UCLA’s restriction on Krishna
Lunch’s proposed program does not run afoul of Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of
speech or freedom of religion, and so the restriction does not burden Plaintiffs’
associational rights. Significantly, whatever constitutionally protected expression
that might occur on the UCLA campus (e.g., chanting, literature distribution, and
speaking) would not be impermissibly infringed by the restriction, which imposes
no limits on Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in protected speech regarding their beliefs.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ free association claim is GRANTED.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have had three opportunities to amend, adding little each time:
they do not suggest that allowing further amendment would assist them in stating a
claim. The Third Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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