On January 5, 1994, the POEA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of
[G.R. No. 118943. September 10, 2001] which reads:
MARIO HORNALES, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
JOSE CAYANAN AND JEAC INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONTRACTOR
SERVICES, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
It is sad enough that poverty has impelled many of our countrymen to seek greener pastures in
foreign lands. But what is more lamentable is when a Filipino recruiter, after sending his unlettered
countrymen to a foreign land and letting them suffer inhuman treatment in the hands of an abusive
employer, connives with the foreign employer in denying them their rightful compensation. Surely, there
shall be a day of reckoning for such a recruiter whose insatiable love for money made him a tyrant to his
own race.
At bench is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the (a) Decision[1] dated July 28,
1994 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the Decision[2] of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in POEA Case No. (L) 92-07-
939,[3] and (b) Resolution[4] dated October 6, 1994 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts as shown by the records are:
On July 15, 1992, Mario Hornales (herein petitioner) filed with the POEA a complaint[5] for non-
payment of wages and recovery of damages against JEAC International Management & Contractor
Services (JEAC) and its owner, Jose Cayanan (herein private respondents). As private respondents surety,
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) was later on impleaded by petitioner. The
complaint alleged that on October 8, 1991, private respondents sent petitioner, together with other
Filipinos, to Singapore. At their departure, they were advised that someone would meet them in
Singapore.True enough, they were welcomed by Victor Lim, the owner of Step-Up Employment Agency
(Step-Up Agency).[6] He informed them that they would be working as fishermen with a monthly salary of
US $200.00 each. Thereafter, they boarded Ruey Horn #3, a vessel owned by Min Fu Fishery Co. Ltd. of
Taiwan.
On board the vessel, petitioner was subjected to inhumane work conditions, like inadequate supply
of food and water, maltreatment by the ship captain, and lack of medical attendance. He was also required
to work for twenty-two hours a day without pay. Unable to bear his situation any longer, he joined the
other Filipino workers in leaving the vessel while it was docked at Mauritius Islands on July 15, 1992.
Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner asked private respondents to pay his salaries. Instead
of doing so, they required him to surrender his passport promising that they would procure another job for
him. Later, private respondents gave him the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00).
Private respondents filed an answer[7] claiming that, petitioner, Victor Lim and Min Fee Fishery Co.
Ltd are all total strangers to them. To bolster the claim, they offered in evidence the Joint Affidavit [8] of
Efren B. Balucas and Alexander C. Natura, petitioners co-workers in Singapore, stating that while they
were in Singapore, petitioner admitted to them that he did not apply in any agency in the Philippines; that
he came to Singapore merely as a tourist; and that, he applied directly and personally with Step-Up
Agency. These statements were corroborated by the Certification[9] issued by Step-Up Agency.
On January 23, 1993, petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit[10] claiming that he was not a total
stranger to private respondents, and that, as a matter of fact, he knew respondent Cayanan since 1990,
when they used to go to the San Lazaro Hippodrome to watch horse races. He also averred that while the
vessel was docked at Mauritius Islands on June 1992, respondent Cayanan reminded him and his co-
workers of their loan obligations by sending them photocopies of the PNB checks he (respondent
Cayanan) issued in favor of their relatives, and the agreements whereby they authorized Victor Lim to
deduct from their salaries the amount of their loan obligations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents JEAC International Management and Contractor
Services, Jose E. Cayanan and Travellers Insurance Corp. are hereby ordered, jointly and severally to pay
complainant the amount of US DOLLARS: ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY SIX AND
66/100 (US$1,646.66) representing his unpaid salaries and US$164.66 as and by way of attorneys
fees.Payment shall be made in Philippine Currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of
payment.
For want of jurisdiction, the claim for moral and exemplary damages is denied.
All other claims and counterclaims are denied.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Incidentally, the POEA dismissed petitioners claim against Country Bankers on the ground that the
surety bond which was effective at the time of petitioners deployment was that of Travelers Insurance
Corporation.
On appeal, respondent NLRC vacated the decision of the POEA and dismissed petitioners
complaint mainly on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between the
parties. The NLRC ratiocinated as follows:
At the outset, we note that the record is bereft of any showing that complainant applied with the
respondent agency as a job applicant and subsequently entered into an overseas contract with the latter
which was later processed and approved by the POEA. X x x What appears is that complainant used the
agency as a stepping stone to enter Singapore as a tourist and obtain employment thereat on his own. This
is evidenced by Annexes A-1 to H of Complainants Reply (See pp. 65-72, record) which purports to show
that the batch of complainant was obligated to pay back respondent Jose Cayanan the expenses for their
deployment. No less than the POEA noted that the respondent agency is a service contractor and is not
authorized to deploy fishermen. Based on this fact, the respondent agency could not have deployed
complainant as an overseas contract worker. What is apparent is that it obtained a tourist passport and
plane ticket for complainant as a travel agent on a clearly fly now pay later plan.
We cannot rely on the employment agreements and checks (See pp. 66-67, record) presented by
complainant to show proof of employment relations considering that his name does not appear in any of
the documents, hence they are merely hearsay.[12]
In reversing the POEAs finding, respondent NLRC gave considerable weight to the Joint
Affidavit of Natura and Balucas.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion
to public respondent NLRC. He asserts that private respondents were the ones who deployed him to
Singapore to work as fisherman; and that, respondent NLRCs conclusion that respondent JEAC was a
mere travel agency and petitioner, a mere tourist, has no basis in fact and in law.
For their part, private respondents maintain that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it set aside the decision of the POEA, since petitioner failed to show any POEA record or
document to prove that they deployed him to work in Singapore. Neither did he present a Special Power of
Attorney to prove that Step-Up Agency authorized private respondents to recruit and deploy contract
workers in its behalf nor an Affidavit of Responsibility to show that they (private respondents and Step-Up
Agency) assumed solidary liability to petitioner.[13] Private respondents likewise insist that the photocopies
of the PNB checks and agreements are hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
The Solicitor General, in his comment,[14] joins petitioner in assailing the decision of respondent
NLRC as baseless and erroneous. According to him, the conclusion of respondent NLRC directly
contradicts private respondents defense that petitioner was a total stranger. Further, he contends that
the Joint Affidavit of Balucas and Natura are hearsay.
The cardinal issue in this case hinges on the question - Are private respondents responsible for
petitioners recruitment and deployment to Singapore?
Let us take a closer look at the scale of evidence.
On one arm of the scale are petitioners evidence consisting of photocopies of the PNB
checks and agreements which were intended to disprove private respondents claim that petitioner, Victor
Lim and Step-Up Agency are total strangers. The PNB checks represent the payments made by
respondent Cayanan to the relatives of petitioners co-workers (including Balucas and Natura). The checks
show the name of LIM Chang Koo &/or Jose Cayanan, as drawers. While
the agreements, denominated For Fisherman Deployed For Work To Singapore, constitute authorization
to Victor Lim to deduct from the monthly salaries of the workers the amounts of their obligations to
private respondents. Petitioners own undertaking to private respondents reads:
I hereby certify that my expenses abroad in going to Singapore as fisherman amounting to SIXTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P16,000.00) shall be temporarily shouldered by JEAC INTL MGT & CONT.
SERVICES and as soon as I arrive in Singapore, said amount will be charged by MR. VICTOR LIM and
will be remitted to Eng. Jose E. Cayanan.
(Sgd.) Mario Hornales
F. CREW[15]
On the other side of the scale are the Joint Affidavit secured by private respondents from
petitioners co-workers, Balucas and Natura, and a Certification issued by Step-Up Agency. These
evidence were intended to prove the alleged admission of petitioner to Balucas and Natura that he went as
a tourist to Singapore and that he applied directly with Step-Up Agency. The Certification of Step-Up
Agency re-echoes the allegations in the Joint Affidavit.
The scale of evidence must tilt in favor of petitioner.
In a catena of labor cases, this Court has consistently held that where the adverse party is deprived
of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. [16] Private respondents Joint
Affidavit has no probative value. It suffers from two infirmities, first, petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the two affiants regarding the contents thereof, and second, the two affiants
merely swore as to what petitioner told them but not as to the truth of the statements uttered.[17]
In the same vein, the Certification must not be given weight. Private respondents not only failed to
present Victor Lim before the POEA to be cross-examined by petitioner, but the Certification was also not
verified or under oath.[18] To our mind, it is just a last-ditch attempt on the part of Step-Up Agency to help
private respondents free themselves from liability to petitioner. It bears noting that private respondents,
Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency, as shown by petitioners evidence, acted in concert in his deployment to
Singapore. Hence, such certification is, at most, self-serving.
On the other hand, the PNB Checks and the agreements presented by petitioner strongly disprove
private respondents total strangers theory. It may be observed that, in their attempt to exculpate
themselves from monetary liability, private respondents adopted an extreme position, i.e., that they have
nothing to do with petitioner, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency. Such strategy proved to be disastrous to
them. The mere presentation of documents bearing private respondents names and that of Step-Up Agency
and Victor Lim is enough to defeat their theory. More so, when the documetary evidence consist of bank
checks showing the existence of a joint account, and authorization agreements revealing a contract of
agency.
Private respondents argument that petitioners evidence are mere photocopies and therefore cannot
be considered as the best evidence on the issue does not persuade us. The best evidence rule enshrined in
the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that when the subject of an inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. [19] This rule is not without
exception. Some of the exception are when the original has been lost or destroyed; cannot be produced in
court without bad faith on the part of the offeror; or when the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice.[20] It would be unreasonable to demand from petitioner the presentation of the original PNB
Checks considering that it is a banking practice that for a check to be encashed, the same must be
surrendered to the bank first. These checks are, therefore, most likely in the possession of the bank. As to
the agreements, it is reasonable to conclude that respondent Cayanan was the one in possession of the
originals thereof. It maybe recalled that these agreements were executed by the workers for his security
and benefit. At any rate, it is worthy to note that private respondents did not disown the PNB checks nor
deny the existence of the agreements.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be emphasized that the proceedings before the POEA is
non-litigious in nature. The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law
shall not strictly apply thereto and a hearing officer may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts of the case.[21] On the applicability of the Rules of Court to labor cases, the Supreme Court has
ruled in Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[22]:
The argument cannot be sustained. Whatever merit it might have in the context of ordinary civil actions,
where the rules of evidence apply with more or less strictness, disappears when adduced in connection
with proceedings before Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission; for in said
proceedings, the law is explicit that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the (laws) spirit and intention that the Commission and its members and the Labor
Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Indeed, it is not the Rules of Court enacted by the Supreme Court but rather the regulations promulgated
by the National Labor Relations Commission which govern the hearing and disposition of cases before it
and its regional branches**. The Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and prevailing jurisprudence,
the law says, may be applied to labor cases only under quite stringent limits, i.e., in the absence of any
applicable provision (in the Rules of the Commission), and in order to effectuate the objectives of the
Labor Code**, in the interest of expeditious labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Under these rules, the proceedings before a Labor Arbiter
are non-litigious in nature in which, subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law
and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law ** (do not) strictly apply.
Undoutedly, the factual and legal bases of respondent NLRCs conclusions are bereft of substantial
evidence the quantum of proof in labor cases. As aptly said by the Solicitor General, its decision is
baseless and erroneous. Its disposition is manifestly a grave abuse of discretion.[23]
In concluding that respondent JEAC was a mere travel agency and petitioner, a mere tourist,
respondent NLRC came up with a new theory which find no support even from the evidence of private
respondents, the party in whose favor the decision was rendered. First, there is nothing in the record
which shows that respondent JEAC is a mere travel agency. Even private respondents consistently plead
that respondent JEAC is a licensed recruitment agency authorized to recruit and deploy overseas Filipino
contract workers.
Second, the evidence upon which respondent NLRC based its findings consist
of agreements authorizing Victor Lim to deduct from the salaries of petitioner and his co-workers the
amount of their obligations to respondent Cayanan. It would be too much of a coincidence to say that
petitioner and his co-workers are all mere tourists who allowed a certain Victor Lim to deduct from their
salaries the amount of their obligations to respondent Cayanan. What is evident here is that there is an
internal arrangement between respondent Cayanan and Victor Lim brought about by the fact that the
former deployed these workers to serve the latter. As correctly pointed out by the POEA, there must be a
previous arrangement between private respondents and Victor Lim.
Significantly, from these pieces of evidence respondent NLRC could already see the falsity in
private respondents total strangers theory. How could there be an arrangement between two persons who
do not know each other? Note how respondent NLRC conveniently closed its eye to the name of Victor
Lim, as mentioned in the agreements, when it ruled that Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency are indeed total
strangers to private respondents. We sustain the findings of the POEA, being more convincing and
supported by substantial evidence, thus:
[C]omplainant applied at the office of respondent agency and was able to seek employment in Singapore
through Engineer Jose Cayanan, owner of respondent agency. Complainants allegations are supported by
the Annexes he attached to his Reply (Annexes A to H). These documents readily show that it was not
only complainant who was recruited by respondent agency through Engr. Cayanan and as agreed upon, the
expenses in going to Singapore shall be advanced by respondents. Thus their loans payable to Engr.
Cayanan and charged against their salaries. The checks representing the salaries of the complainant
and his co-workers show that they are drawn from the account of Lim Chang Khoo and/or Jose
Cayanan. From the foregoing, it is properly noted that complainants salaries were taken from the
funds of respondents which means that the latter had a hand or participated in his recruitment and
deployment.
We cannot give credence to respondents contentions that complainant is a total stranger to them and that
MIN Fee Fishery Co. Ltd. is not its principal, neither do we believe that respondents do not know Mr.
Victor Lim who met complainant in Singapore. Annex B in respondents position paper belies respondents
contentions. How could respondents write to a certain Step Up Employment Agency in Singapore,
complainants employer, when the latter is not even mentioned in his complaint? We wonder where
respondents got the name of this employer if the same is really not known to them.
It is very unlikely for complainant to proceed to Singapore as a tourist without knowing anybody at
the site and just to apply for work. Had there not been previous arrangements with respondents, it
is not all possible for complainant to land on a job in Singapore because he is only a tourist.
Respondents had to resort to this misrepresentation of allowing its recruits to leave as tourist because it is
a service contractor and it is not authorized to deploy fishermen.[24]
Private respondents further argue that they cannot be held liable by petitioner because no
employment contract between him and Step-Up Agency had been approved by the POEA. They also
claim that the absence of a Special Power of Attorney and an Affidavit of Responsibility, as required under
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 1, Book III of the POEA Rules and Regulations [25] only proves that they did not
deploy petitioner to Singapore.
Their argument is far from persuasive. Surely, they cannot expect us to utilize their non-compliance
with the POEA Rules and Regulations as a basis in absolving them. To do so would be tantamount to
giving premium to acts done in violation of established rules. At most, private respondents act of
deploying petitioner to Singapore without complying with the POEA requirements only made them
susceptible to cancellation or suspension of license as provided by Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of POEA
Rules and Regulations:
SEC. 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
xxxxxx
m. Deploying workers whose employment and travel documents were not processed by the
Administration;
n. Deploying workers workers or seafarers to vessels or principals not accredited by the Administration;
But of course, such violations should be threshed out in a proper administrative proceeding for suspension
or cancellation of license.
Meantime, we just uphold POEAs Decision holding private respondents and Travelers Insurance
Corporation jointly and severally liable to petitioner. Section 2 (e), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code requires a private employment agency to assume all responsibilities for the
implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker. [26] This provision is substantially
reiterated in Section 1 (f) (3) of Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations which provides:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License Every applicant for license to operate a private
employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application together with the following
requirements:
xxxxxx
f) a verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
xxx
(3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract, including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability
compensation and repatriation.
With respect to private respondents surety, its liability is founded on Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules and Regulations. Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA from recruitment and
employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such
companies when held liable for applicants or workers claims. The cash and surety bonds shall answer for
all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditations and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with
the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and
placement, the POEA Rules and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the POEA
may impose.[27]
Accordingly, we find it proper to reinstate the Decision dated January 5, 1994 of the POEA subject
to the modification that the amount of P16,000, the amount which petitioner admitted to have been
advanced by respondent JEAC for his expenses in going to Singapore[28] be deducted from the total
amount to be awarded to him which includes a) US$1,646.66 corresponding to his unpaid salaries
and b)attorneys fees. The award of attorneys fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total award is
justified under Article 111 (a) of the Labor Code. The solidary liability of Travelers Insurance Corp., as
surety of respondent JEAC, is maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the respondent NLRCs a) Decision dated
July 28, 1994, and b) Resolution dated Octobger 6, 1994 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of POEA
Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson in POEA Case No. (L) 92-07-939 is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that the sum of P16,000.00 be deducted from the total amount to be awarded to
petitioner.
Payment should be made in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of
payment.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 184343
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,*
CARPIO,**
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,***
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA, JJ.
JESUS DOMINGO, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
March 2, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision[2] dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal
Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000,
and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.
On 7 March 2003, six Informations[3] were filed before the RTC charging appellant with the following
offenses:
Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000 for Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw
driver and with intent to kill one Marvin G. Indon, with evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the kitchen knife and
screw driver said Marvin G. Indon, hitting him on his body thereby inflicting
thereon mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000 for Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw
driver and with intent to kill one Melissa G. Indon, with evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the kitchen knife and
screw driver said Melissa G. Indon, hitting her on different parts of her body
thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with kitchen knife and screw
driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery attack, assault and hit with the said screw driver one
Michelle G. Indon, a minor of 9 years old, hitting her on her back and buttocks,
thereby inflicting on her serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused the death of the said Michelle G. Indon, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, this is,
by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Michelle G. Indon.
Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw
driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, stab and hit with the said kitchen knife
and screw driver one Ronaldo Galvez, hitting him on different part of his body,
thereby inflicting on him serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused the death of Ronaldo Galvez, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ronaldo Galvez.
Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw
driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, stab and hit with the said kitchen knife
and screw driver one Raquel Gatpandan Indon, hitting her on the different parts of
her body, thereby inflicting on her serious physical injuries which ordinarily would
have caused the death of the said Raquel Gatpandan Indon, thus performing all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Raquel
Gatpandan Indon.
Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000 for Attempted Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kettle and with intent to
kill one Jeffer G. Indon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with evident premeditation and treachery, commence the commission of murder
directly by overt acts, that is by attacking, assaulting, and hitting the said Jeffer G.
Indon, a 2 year old boy, with the kettle, hitting the latter on his head, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries and if the accused was not able to accomplish
his purpose, that is to kill the said Jeffer G. Indon, it was not because of his
voluntary desistance but due to the timely intervention of third persons.
On 7 September 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned and he entered
separate pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held, and trial
ensued accordingly.[4]
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of complainants Raquel Indon, Jeffer Indon, and
Michelle Indon; Dr. Jacinto Caluag; Police Officer (PO) 3 Asher Villegas and PO2 Rogelio Santos.
Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. of 29 March 2000, she and her
minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house in Caingin, San
Rafael, Bulacan, when she was awakened by the sound of appellant kicking their door open. Raquel
narrated that she immediately recognized the accused, since the kitchen light illuminated his face. Armed
with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed
her, using the six-inch screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times. She screamed and was heard by her
sister-in-law, whose house was contiguous to theirs. When her sister-in-law asked her for the identity of
the assailant, she immediately identified herein appellant as Doser, a name by which he is known in the
community. Appellant was angered by her reply and said, Anong Doser? and thereafter pulled a kitchen
knife from his right side and stabbed her on the stomach. When she tried to escape from the room, four-
year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran towards the gate. However, before
reaching the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then proceeded to stab
Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a
result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back to the house, towards Raquels two
daughters Michelle and Melissa. When Raquel pleaded that the appellant spare her daughters lives, he
retorted: Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted
on her; while Michelle, who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious physical
injuries. The appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the screwdriver,
but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquels sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the
appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue the
appellant. Raquel, thereafter, lost consciousness. She also relayed that she was later informed that a
struggle ensued between appellant and Galvez. Appellant inflicted wounds on Galvezs upper left chest and
arms, after which Galvez was able to hit appellant with a piece of wood, which rendered the latter
unconscious. Raquel, Melissa, Marvin, Jeffer, Galvez and the appellant were taken to the hospital. [5]
Raquel also testified that she spent P15,000.00 for the casket of Melissa Indon, P27,000.00 for
the burial expenses of Melissa Indon and Marvin Indon, and approximately P30,000.00 for the food
served during their wake. She also stated that because of her stab wounds, she spent P90,000.00 for
hospitalization expenses and medicines. However, the receipts were lost except those issued
by Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital. [6]
Jeffer Indon, who was five years old at the time he testified, stated that the scar on his forehead
was the result of the stab wound inflicted by Doser. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that he
did not know who stabbed him.[7]
Michelle Indon identified the appellant as the man who stabbed her mother, her brother Marvin
and her sister Melissa. She testified that the appellant stabbed her in the back once. Thereafter, she hid
under the papag. She related that she did not go to the hospital anymore, because a certain Nanang Ella
had already seen to her stab wound.[8]
Dr. Jacinto Caluag stated under oath that he treated Raquel Indon for multiple stab wounds. He
testified that he also assisted in the operation on Raquel to repair her liver and gallbladder, which were
damaged. He also disclosed that Raquel would have gone into shock and died had she not been given
medical attention.[9]
Police officers Asher Villegas and Rogelio Santos testified that they proceeded to the scene of
the crime after the neighbors of the complainant reported the incident. When they arrived at the crime
scene, appellant was already tied up. They took pictures of the victims, while the kitchen knife and the
screwdriver allegedly used by the appellant were turned over to Police Officer Villegas. The complainants
and the appellant were then brought to the hospital. They recorded the incident in the Police Blotter and
prepared the statements of the witnesses. After the accused was treated for injuries, he was brought to the
police station and detained. When asked why he committed the crime, accused denied knowledge of what
happened.[10]
In an Order dated 10 July 2003, the trial court ordered that Ronaldo Galvezs testimony during
his direct examination be stricken off the records due to his absences on the days he was scheduled to be
cross-examined.[11]
The documentary evidence offered by the prosecution included the following: (1) the sketches
of Raquel Indons house, to prove that the light from the kitchen allowed her to identify the appellant,
marked as Exhibits A to A-6; (2) the Death Certificate of Marvin Indon marked as Exhibit D; (3) the
Medico-Legal Certificates of Raquel Indon, Marvin Indon, Jeffer Indon, and Ronaldo Galvez marked as
Exhibits E, F, H, and L, respectively; (4) the Birth Certificates of Marvin Indon and Michelle Indon
marked as Exhibits B and N; (5) pictures of Melissa Indons lifeless body marked as Exhibits G and O; (6)
Sworn Statements of Ronaldo Galvez and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits K and M; (7) Statement of
Account of the Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon, issued by Sagrada Familia Hospital in the
amount of P38,500.00, marked as Exhibit I; and (8) Statement of Account of the Medical Expenses
incurred by Raquel Indon, issued by the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, in the amount of P7,843.00, marked
as Exhibit J.[12]
In his defense, appellant testified that prior to the incident, he was in good terms with the Indon
family and that he had no record of mental illness. However on 20 March 2000, he went to East Avenue
Medical Center for a medical check-up, and he was advised to have an operation. He suffered from
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness.Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. He averred
that when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he was already
detained. He only came to know of the incidents from his sister and his children who visited him. On
cross-examination he admitted that when he regained his memory, he did not even ask the police officers
why he was incarcerated.[13]
Dr. Regienald Afroilan, a witness for the defense, also testified that appellant was first brought
to the National Center for Mental Health (Center) in August 2004 for a psychiatric evaluation,
psychological examination and final testing to determine if he could stand trial. Dr. Afroilan stated that
based on his evaluation, appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the
presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and
low frustration tolerance. He could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the
symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the
illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. On cross-examination, he clarified that the
evaluation finding that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia covered the period when the appellant
submitted himself to examination.[14]
In a Decision dated 13 November 2006, the RTC decreed that the appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-00 and No. 1497-M-00, frustrated homicide
in Criminal Cases No. 1499-M-00 and No. 1500-M-00, and attempted homicide in Criminal Cases No.
1498-M-00 and No. 1501-M-00. The RTC gave credence to the principal eyewitness, Raquel Indon,
whose testimony was corroborated by Michelle Indon, regarding appellants attack on 29 March 2000. The
trial court found the appellants defense of insanity unmeritorious, since what was presented was proof of
appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the time the crimes were
committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to
Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. It also noted that
based on the psychiatrists findings, the appellant was competent to stand trial. However, the trial court
declared that there were no qualifying circumstances to support the charges of Murder, Frustrated Murder
or Attempted Murder.[15] The dispositive part of the Decision dated 13 November 2006reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of:
a) In Crim. Case No. 1496-M-00, Homicide, for the death of Marvin G. Indon,
minor and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7)
years of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000.00.
b) In Crim. Case No. 1497-M-00, Homicide, for the death of Melissa Indon, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years
of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000.00.
 c) In Crim. Case No. 1498-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to
five (5) years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P10,000.00.
d) In Crim. Case No. 1499-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify
the private complainant Ronaldo Galvez in the amount of P30,000.00.
e) In Crim. Case No. 1500-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify
the private complainant Raquel Gatpandan Indon in the amount
of P30,000.00. Likewise, accused is further directed to pay to the private
complainant herein the sum of P90,000.00 to cover hospitalization and medical
expenses; P42,000.00 to cover the casket and burial expenses for Melissa and
Marvin, and P30,000.00 for food expenses, all by way of actual damages.
f) In Crim. Case No. 1501-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto
mayor as minimum to five (5) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P10,000.00.[16]
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30511,
wherein he faulted the RTC for not taking note of the inconsistencies in Raquel Indons testimony and for
not giving due weight to his defense of insanity.[17] In a Decision dated 30 April 2008, the appellate court
adjudged that Raquel Indons testimony was credible, and that the inconsistency pointed out by
appellantwhether or not Raquel was standing up or lying down when appellant stabbed her legsreferred to
minor details. Moreover, insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers to
appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the crime. This
was not the case when appellant was first medically examined more than four years after the commission
of the crimes. Appellants response to Raquel Indons pleas also proved that his faculties of reasoning were
unimpaired at the time of the attack against Raquels children.[18]
The Court of Appeals nevertheless modified the RTCs Decision dated 13 November 2006 and
declared that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which was alleged in the six Informations along
with evident pre-meditation, was adequately proven by the prosecution. Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon,
Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not
even given the slightest provocation when appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the
killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves
against an adult, was considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder.The penalties
imposed were adjusted accordingly. Appellants conviction for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No.
1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to prove appellants treachery or evident
premeditation in his assault against Rolando Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the
appellant.[19]
The Court of Appeals also modified the trial courts award of damages. It reduced the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 awarded by the trial court, occasioned by the deaths of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon,
to P50,000.00 and awarded the heirs of each murder victim moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00. The awards for funeral expenses of P42,000.00 and food expenses of P30,000.00 were
deleted by the appellate court for lack of sufficient evidence to support the same. The appellate court
awarded Raquel Indon civil indemnity of P30,000.00 and moral damages of P25,000.00, but reduced the
actual damages of P90,000.00 awarded by the RTC to P46,343.00, in accordance with the Statement of
Accounts from Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital. It affirmed the trial courts
award for moral damages of P10,000.00 in favor of Michelle Indon and P10,000.00 in favor of Jeffer
Indon. Moral damages of P25,000.00 were also awarded by the appellate court in favor of Ronaldo
Galvez. [20]
In the Decision dated 30 April 2008, the fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 13, 2006 of the trial court
is modified as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, accused-appellant Jesus
Domingo is convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marvin Indon the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The
trial courts award of funeral and food expenses of P42,000.00 and P30,000.00
respectively, are hereby deleted.
2) In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, accused-appellant Jesus
Domingo is convicted of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Melissa Indon the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo
is convicted of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay
Michelle Indon P10,000.00 as moral damages.
4) In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo
is convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years of prision mayor as maximum and to pay Ronaldo Galvez P25,000.00 as
moral damages.
5) In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo
is convicted of the crime of frustrated murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as the
maximum penalty and to pay Raquel Indon the amount of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P46, 343.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
6) In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo
is convicted of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as the maximum penalty and to
pay Jefferson (sic) Indon P10,000.00 as moral damages.[21]
Hence, the present petition where the appellant reiterates the assignment of errors that were
raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; and

II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED THE
CRIMES CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
EXEMPTING HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN VIEW OF HIS
INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME. [22]
This Court affirms the judgment of conviction.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Raquel Indon, is assailed by
appellant for not being credible due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of conformity with the
experience of ordinary men.
Appellant refers to Raquels testimony during cross-examination wherein she narrated that after
the appellant entered her bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who lived next door, responded by
asking Raquel who her assailant was, and the latter identified the appellant. Appellant claims that the
conversation between Raquel and her sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary course of things, and that
the initial reaction of people in such a situation would be to ask for help from other people in order to save
those who are in danger. Secondly, Raquel also testified during cross-examination that the appellant
stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. It is also argued that the appellant could not have stabbed
the front of her legs, since she would be lying on front of her legs when she fell down.
This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with, there was nothing out of the
ordinary as regards Raquels testimony on these two matters. First, there was nothing unusual about the
sister-in-laws query as to who was attacking Raquel. Considering that the exchange merely consisted of
this question and the reply to it, it would not even be accurate to refer to it as a conversation. Secondly, it
was not impossible for the appellant to stab the front of Raquels legs, had her legs been positioned
sideways when she fell. But more importantly, these are peripheral details that do not affect the substantial
aspects of the incident. Raquel clearly and positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin when
she rushed to the gate and fell down, and the appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter proceeded to stab
Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her testimony was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports
marked as Exhibits E and F. Any inconsistencies in such peripheral details would not exculpate the
appellant.
Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the
commission of the alleged crimes, and therefore should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance
with Article 12, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code. [23] However, this claim is not supported by
evidence.
Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the time
he committed the crime. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime, he suffered from lack
of appetite, sleeplessness, and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering him to kill bad
people. He claims that he does not remember anything that happened on 29 March 2000, when the crimes
were committed, and that he was already detained when he became conscious of his surroundings.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all
acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person
accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was
committed.[24]
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the
act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there
is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. [25]
Even assuming that appellants testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack of appetite,
nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot
be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word crazy is used to
describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or
deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally
insane and will not grant him or her absolution.[26]
Raquel Indons narration of the events presents evidence that is more revealing of appellants
mental state at the time the crime was committed. Appellants reply to her pleas that her daughters lives be
spared, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na, was a positive sign that he was aware of what he was doing, and that
his reasoning faculties were unimpaired.
The trial court found the testimony of Raquel Indon more credible than that of the accused, and
its findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court. This Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court because it is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the
stand. Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances that might alter
the result of the case, the findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and even accorded
finality by this Court.[27]
It is also remarkable that appellants testimony is not supported by his familys or intimate
friends accounts of his purported insanity. Appellant testified that he had been suffering from symptoms
of insanity nine days before the incident. Insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the allegedly deranged persons general conduct and
appearance, his conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as
well as his improvident bargains.[28] It is difficult to believe that appellants behavior, conduct and
appearance, which would denote mental disturbance, escaped the notice of his family and friends.
Appellant draws attention to the results of the medical examination conducted by Dr.
Regienald Afroilan in 2004, showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. It should be noted
however that the examination was taken four years after the crimes were committed, and that Dr. Afroilan
admitted that his findings did not include the mental state of petitioner four years before. The alleged
insanity of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed, not at any time thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder, referring to a period after the
time the crime was committed, will not exempt him from criminal liability. [29]
Appellant emphasizes the fact that he was a friend of the Indon family and would not have
committed such atrocities against them, unless he was totally deprived of reason.In People v.
[30]
Madarang, this Court ruled that the fact that the accused had no quarrel with his victim prior to the
killing does not prove the unstable mental condition of the accused. Jurisprudence is replete with cases in
which lives have been terminated for the flimsiest reasons.
This Court will now discuss the imposition of penalties and modify those imposed by the Court of
Appeals. Appellant is guilty of Murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000. The
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period, or reclusion
perpetua.[31] Thus, for the murder of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, the penalty imposed on appellant is
two sentences of reclusion perpetua.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages.[32]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.[33] Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the
victim as civil indemnity is in order.[34] Thus, P50,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Marvin Indon
and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
The heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are not entitled to actual damages, because said damages
were not adequately proved. The party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor. [35] The funeral expenses, to which
Raquel Indon referred in her testimony, were not supported by receipts. Nevertheless, the award
of P25,000.00 in temperate damages for homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial or
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[36] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved.[37] Thus, the heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are
entitled to temperate damages of P25,000.00 for each death.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511 is MODIFIED in accordance with the hereinabove
discussion on penalties and award of damages, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, this Court additionally awards P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Marvin
Indon.
2. In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, this Court additionally awards P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Melissa
Indon.
3. In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, the Court additionally awards civil indemnity
of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to Michelle Indon.

In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation 4. In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, the appellant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate
and proof other than the death of the victim.[38] The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is in order for penalty of five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
the death for Marvin Indon, and likewise for that of Melissa Indon. of prision mayor as maximum.

Exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should also be awarded, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery 5.
was firmly established.[39] Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon were both minors when they were killed by
the appellant. The killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous.[40] Moreover, the victims in this case
were asleep when appellant barged into their house and attacked their family. The attack was clearly 6.
unprovoked, and they were defenseless against him.
In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, this Court additionally awards exemplary damages
of P25,000.00 to Raquel Indon.
In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, this Court additionally awards civil indemnity
of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to Jeffer Indon.

In Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, appellant is guilty of the Attempted Murder No costs.
of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. The penalty for Attempted Murder is prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor medium. Thus, the penalty imposed on the appellant is two sentences of six years SO ORDERED.
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor medium, as maximum, for the
attempted murder of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. In addition to the moral damages of P10,000.00 for
each victim, which the Court of Appeals imposed, appellant is also ordered to pay civil indemnity
of P20,000.00[41] and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.[42]

In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, appellant is convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide of Ronaldo
Galvez. The penalty for frustrated homicide, there being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the same, is five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum. Moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00, awarded by the Court of Appeals, are
affirmed.

Appellant is guilty of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000. The penalty for
Frustrated Murder is reclusion temporal, which must be imposed in its medium period, considering that
there were neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that were proven in this case. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum
penalty. This Court affirms the award by the Court of Appeals of (1) Civil Indemnity in the amount
of P30,000.00;[43] (2) actual damages of P46,343.00 for medical expenses, which are supported by receipts
marked as Exhibits I and J; and (3) moral damages of P25,000.00. Appellant is also ordered to pay
exemplary damages of P25,000.00 based on the finding that the assault against Raquel Indon was attended
by treachery.[44] The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a
swift and unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape.[45] At the time Raquel was attacked, she was in her home, unarmed and sleeping with her
children. She was undoubtedly unprepared and defenseless to resist appellants attack on her and her young
children.

All the sums of money awarded to the victims and their heirs will accrue a 6% interest from the time of
this Decision until fully paid.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187730
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT,
PEREZ, JJ.
Accused-Appellant,
Promulgated:
FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y
June 29, 2010
DUNGO,
Accused.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-
appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta y Dungo (accused), which affirmed the
Decision[2] dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 in Manila which
convicted the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant) of syndicated illegal
recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.
The Facts
Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (Pacardo) and Pilar Manta
(Manta), together with Mardeolyn Martir (Mardeolyn) and nine (9) others, were charged with syndicated
illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants, including
Edgardo V. Dela Caza (Dela Caza), Sandy Guantero (Guantero) and Danilo Sare (Sare). The cases were
respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal that only
Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for
syndicated illegal recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which
were filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due to the fact
that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 02-206294 to
02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02-206309 to 02-206311 were
likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and accused-appellant for failure of the
respective complainants in said cases to appear and testify during trial.
It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal Case Nos.
02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, accused-
appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the case filed by Guantero, and
02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal
recruitment and estafa, respectively.
Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for syndicated illegal
recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.
In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant, together with
the others, as follows:
The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL
GALANZA, NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR,
NELSON MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES
PACARDO y JUNGCO, RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y
DUNGO, ELEONOR PANUNCIO and YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section
6(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a syndicate and in large
scale, as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between November
2000 and December, 2001, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO
V. DELA CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V.
HUFALAR, ELENA JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR,
ROGELIO S. MORON, FEDILA G. NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L.
SABALDAN, DANILO SARE, MARY BETH SARDON, JOHNNY SOLATORIO
and JOEL TINIO in Korea as factory workers and charge or accept directly or
indirectly from said FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE
BRENDO P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA
CAZA P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO
P35,000.00; RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO P30,000.00;
LUPO A. MANALO P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO S.
MORON P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ
P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN P75,000.00; DANILO SARE
P100,000.00; MARY BETH SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO
P35,000.00; and JOEL TINIO P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with
their overseas employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than those
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board
Resolution No. 02, Series 1998, and without valid reasons and without the fault of
the said complainants failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the
expenses incurred by the said complainants in connection with their documentation
and processing for purposes of their deployment.[3] (Emphasis supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:
That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with [sic] one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
 EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to
the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the
effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said EDGARDO
V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the processing of
the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof;
induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and
deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00
on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well
knowing that the same were false and untrue and were made [solely] for the
purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of P45,000.00
which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud said [EDGARDO] V.
DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount of P45,000.00 to their own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA
in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not guilty to all
charges.
On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines Roa, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) representative and private complainants Dela
Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses, accused-appellant
Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.
Version of the Prosecution
On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant Gallo,
Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office of
MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency (MPM Agency) located in Malate, Manila.
Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar Martir
was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir and Ma. Cecilia
Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and accountant, while Pacardo acted
as the agencys employee who was in charge of the records of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand,
was also an employee who was tasked to deliver documents to the Korean embassy.
Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela
Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also
told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down
payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the balance to be paid through salary deduction.
Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing
of their application papers for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and their possible salary.
Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company and
the salary.
With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as the
presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the deployed
workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five
Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant Gallo who, while in the
presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt No. 401.
Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in
Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street, Brgy. San
Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the agency was renamed to New
Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (New Filipino). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo,
Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was
done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing the name of the agency.
Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but Mardeolyn,
Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On the other hand,
accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money.
After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other
applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to
another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Seeres and the Western Police
District, they were able to locate the new address at 500 Prudential Building, Carriedo, Manila. The
agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are applying as entertainers from
those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and Manta, were then
arrested.
The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was
dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of the following
documents:
1. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the
POEA to the effect that New Filipino Manpower Development & Services,
Inc., with office address at 1256 Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City,
was a licensed landbased agency whose license expired on December 10,
2001 and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on December 14,
2001. It further certified that Fides J. Pacardo was the agencys Recruitment
Officer;
2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect that MPM
International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment;
3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999
regarding placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.
 4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on the
placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets, and
5. Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.
Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in
all the criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.
The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is
hereby ordered unless detained for other lawful cause or charge.

Version of the Defense SO ORDERED.[5]

For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In Ruling of the Appellate Court
fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker.
According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he
was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate
the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as follows:
of the visa and passport of applicants, running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him,
without salary except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agencys
office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never
materialized. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15,
2007, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-
206297, for estafa, appellant is sentenced to four (4) years of prision
Ruling of the Trial Court correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor.

On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal
recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that the accused-appellant, together with
others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly
be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy.

I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR

MANTA y DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage having been committed
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02- by more than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo
206300 and 02-206308; Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal found guilty of illegal recruitment may also be convicted
of estafa.[7] The same evidence proving accused-appellants commission of the crime of illegal recruitment
II. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty in large scale also establishes his liability for estafa under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of Penal Code (RPC).
the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.
(Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also ordered to indemnify
EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal interest
from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002 The Issues
until fully paid.

III. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:
No. 02-206297 is likewise found guilty and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
years of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years
of prision mayor as maximum. I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby
the same beyond reasonable doubt.
ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
02-206300 and 02-206308.
II
 The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
of estafa despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Evidence supports
conviction of the crime of
Syndicated Illegal
Recruitment
Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment because
he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial court erred in
adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed an employee because such was
not duly supported by competent evidence. According to him, even assuming that he was an employee,
such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of
the agency.
We disagree.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender
undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article
13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another.[9] When illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large
scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered
an offense involving economic sabotage.[10]
Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish
the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never
licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, viz:
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall
mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of
the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons
shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than
that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection
with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault.
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.
In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042.
Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of
foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When
accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys purported power and authority to
recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the guise of placement fees, the
former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.[11] Such acts were accurately described in
the testimony of prosecution witness, Dela Caza, to wit:
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: How about this Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He was the one who received my money.
Q: Aside from receiving your money, was there any other
representations or acts made by Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and he
even intimated to me that their agency has sent so many
workers abroad.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application
at the agency. Was there any instance that you were able to
talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo Gallo and Pilar Manta?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What was the conversation that transpired among you before you
demanded the return of your money and documents?
A: When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr.
Gallo told me I know nothing about your money while Pilar
Manta and Fides Pacardo told me, why should I withdraw my
application and my money when I was about to be [deployed]
or I was about to leave.
xxxx
Q: And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced you
to those persons whom you just mentioned?
A: The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the
placement fee in that agency is Php 150,000.00 and then I
should deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have
deposited said amount, I would just wait for few days
xxxx
Q: They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php
45,000.00 for deposit only?
A: Yes, maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and then I
would pay the remaining balance of Php105,000.00, payment
of it would be through salary deduction.
Q: That is for what Mr. Witness again?
A: For placement fee.
Q: Now did you believe to (sic) them?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Why, why did you believe?
A: Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they keep
on telling me that they have sent abroad several workers and
they even showed visas of the records that they have already
deployed abroad.
Q: Aside from that, was there any other representations which have been
made upon you or make you believe that they can deploy
you?
A: At first I was adamant but they told me If you do not want to believe
us, then we could do nothing. But once they showed me the
[visas] of the people whom they have deployed abroad, that
was the time I believe them.
Q: So after believing on the representations, what did you do next Mr.
Witness?
A: That was the time that I decided to give the money.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Do you have proof that you gave the money?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Where is your proof that you gave the money?
A: I have it here.
PROS. MAGABLIN:
Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in the
amount of Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record Your Honor, may
I request that the same be marked in the evidence as our Exhibit F.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion of this
receipt. Do you know whose signature is this?
A: Yes, maam, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Why do you say that that is his signature?
A: Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one who
received the money and he was the one who filled up this
O.R. and while he was doing it, he was flanked by Fides
Pacardo, Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.
xxxx
Q: So it was Gallo who received your money?
A: Yes, maam.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your money?
A: They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with our
agency.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused, what
happened with the application, with the promise of
employment that he promised?
A: Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new
office in Makati, Brgy. San Isidro.
xxxx
 Q: And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?
[12]
A: No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad.
Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying accused-
appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their money. His
testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and promises in assuring them
that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were waiting for them and that
they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him the
money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-
appellants actions constituted illegal recruitment.
Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was
indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal
recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies
his profession of innocence.
This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the
other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of
syndicated illegal recruitment.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the
rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the
active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose to divest
complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution
evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their papers for a
possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean
national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company. Then, here comes
accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the
fact that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers
visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed and issued an
official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of
the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of
action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.
In People v. Gamboa,[13] this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context of illegal
recruitment, viz:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident
from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united
in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such, all the accused,
including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment
since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the
conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.[14]
Estafa
The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa as
defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any means mentioned hereinbelow
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.[15] Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to
his legal injury.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other
accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to
send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers;
that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment
of the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into
hiding by changing their office locations without informing complainants; and that complainants were
never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail
over Positive Identification
Indubitably, accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the
positive identification made by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of the crimes
charged. As enunciated by this Court in People v. Abolidor,[16] [p]ositive identification where categorical
and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter
prevails over alibi and denial.
 The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him.

Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand,
and bare denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail. [17]

Moreover, this Court accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in
the absence of any compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the
outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant.
FLOURISH MARITIME SHIPPING and LOLITA UY, G.R. No. 177948 Respondent Donato A. Almanzor entered into a two-year employment contract with Flourish
Maritime Shipping as fisherman, with a monthly salary of NT15,840.00 with free meals every day. It was,
Petitioners, likewise, agreed that respondent would be provided with suitable accommodations.[5]

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., On October 1, 2004, respondent was deployed to Taipei, Taiwan as part of the crew of a
fishing vessel known as FV Tsang Cheng 66. Respondent was surprised to learn that there were only five
Chairperson, (5) crew members on board and he had to buy his own food, contrary to the agreed stipulation of free
food and accommodation.[6]
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
While on board, the master of the vessel gave respondent orders which he could not
NACHURA, and understand; thus, he failed to obey him. Consequently, enraged at not being obeyed, the master struck
him, hitting the right dorsal part of his body. He then requested medical assistance, but the master
REYES, JJ. refused.[7] Hence, he sought the help of petitioner Lolita Uy (the manning agency owner), who then
talked to the master of the vessel.
DONATO A. ALMANZOR,

Respondent.
While the vessel was docked at the Taipei port, respondent was informed that he would be
Promulgated: repatriated. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he reported to petitioners and sought medical assistance
after which he was declared fit to work. Petitioners promised that he would be redeployed, but it turned
out that it was no longer possible because of hisage, for then he was already 49 years old.

March 14, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Thus, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract, earned wages, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.

DECISION
Petitioners countered that respondent voluntarily resigned[8] from his employment and
returned to the Philippines on the same day. They, likewise, sought the dismissal of the complaint for
NACHURA, J.: failure of respondent to comply with the grievance machinery and arbitration clause embodied in the
contract of employment. Lastly, they insisted that respondent failed to discharge the burden to prove
that he was illegally dismissed.[9]

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 27, 2007 and its Resolution[2] dated May 18, 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 95056. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Decision[3] of the National On October 7, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of respondent, the
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated April 28, 2006 in NLRC NCR CA NO. 046596-05 which, in turn, dispositive portion of which reads:
affirmed the Decision[4] of Labor Arbiter Lutricia F. Quitevis-Alconcel, dated October 7, 2005in OFW NLRC
CASE NO. (M) 05-01-0243-00.

WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondents Flourish Maritime Shipping and Wang Yung Chin are

hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily pay complainant Donato A. Almanzor the
amount of NT15,840.00 times six (6) months or a total of NT Ninety-Five Thousand
 Forty (NT95,040.00). Respondents shall pay the total amount in its peso equivalent
at the time of actual payment plus legal interest.
All other claims herein sought and prayed for are hereby denied for lack
of legal and factual bases.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters findings.
Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari.[11] The
appellate court agreed with the Labor Arbiters conclusion (as affirmed by the NLRC) that respondent was
illegally dismissed from employment. It, however, modified the NLRC decision by increasing the
monetary award due respondent in accordance with its interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act
(R.A.) 8042.[12]
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC Board of Commissioners awarded such amount
equivalent to respondents salary for six (6) months (3 months for every year of the unexpired term)
considering that respondents employment contract covered a two-year period and he was dismissed
from employment after only 26 days of actual work. The CA, however, disagreed with such
interpretation. According to the CA, since respondent actually worked for 26 days and was thereafter
dismissed from employment, the unexpired portion of the contract is one (1) year, eleven (11) months
and four (4) days. For the unexpired one (second) whole year, the court awarded three months salary. As
to the 11 months and 4 days of the first year, the appellate court refused to apply the three-month
rule. Instead, in addition to three months (for the unexpired second year), it awarded full compensation
corresponding to the whole unexpired term of 11 months and 4 days. Thus, the CA deemed it proper to
award a total amount equivalent to the respondents salary for 14 months and 4 days.[13]
Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE THREE LETTERS ARE RESIGNATION LETTERS
OR QUITCLAIMS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MODIFICATION OF THE NLRC DECISION BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[14]
Simply stated, petitioners want this Court to resolve the issue of whether respondent was
illegally dismissed from employment and if so, to determine the correct award of compensation due
respondent.
The Labor Arbiter concluded that petitioners, who had the burden of proof, failed to adduce
any convincing evidence to establish and substantiate its claim that respondent voluntarily resigned from
employment.[15] Likewise, the NLRC held that petitioners failed to show that respondent was not
physically fit to perform work due to his old age.Moreover, the labor tribunal said that petitioners failed
to prove that the employment contract indeed provided a grievance machinery.[16] Clearly, both labor
tribunals correctly concluded, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that respondent was not redeployed
for work, in violation of their employment contract. Perforce, the termination of respondents services is
without just or valid cause.
We reiterate the dictum that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with
greater force in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve. In this case, the
factual issues were resolved by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Their findings were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[17]
On the amount of the award due respondent, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides:
SECTION 10. Money Claims. x x x
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
x x x x.
The correct interpretation of this provision was settled in Marsaman Manning Agency Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[18] where this Court held that the choice of which amount to award
an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract, or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less,
comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or
more.[19]

The employment contract involved in the instant case covers a two-year period but the
overseas contract worker actually worked for only 26 days prior to his illegal dismissal. Thus, the three
months salary rule applies. There is a similar factual milieu between the case at bench and Olarte v.
Nayona.[20] The only difference lies in the length of the subject employment contract: Olarte involved a
one-year contract; while the employment in this case covers a two-year period. However, they both fall
under the three months salary rule since the term of the contract is at least one year or
more. In Olarte, as well as in JSS Indochina Corporation v. Ferrer,[21] we ordered the employer of an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker to pay an amount equivalent to three (3) months salary.

We are not in accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent should be paid
his salaries for 14 months and 4 days. Records show that his actual employment lasted only for 26
days. Applying the above provision, and considering that the employment contract covers a two-year
period, we agree with the Labor Arbiters disposition, as affirmed by the NLRC, that respondent is entitled
to six (6) months salary. This is obviously what the law provides.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 27, 2007, and its Resolution dated May 18, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95056,
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the monetary award to be paid the respondent shall be the
amount set forth in the decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the
facts and the law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’
decision2 dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor
RelationsCommission’s resolution dated March 31, 2004,3declaring respondent’s dismissal
illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondent’s three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan
Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent,
and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s fees.4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
application for a quality control job in Taiwan.6
Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to
pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. 10 She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. 11 In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport." 13 She was asked to "prepare
for immediate repatriation."14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. 16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations Commission
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. 18 She asked for the
return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for
23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of]
her foreign [employer]."21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of
₱70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing
the amount of ₱20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had
already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of
August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. 26 It alleged that there
was no employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were
outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment
contract should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be
identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Pedro C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mereallegations.32 The Labor Arbiter
found that there was no excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt
presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on petitioner’s
transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and considered the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal
of respondent’s complaint.35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that
Joy was illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the
dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer. 39 It found that Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination.40 There
was no sufficient proofto show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to
comply with company requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural dueprocess was not observed in
terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of
placement fees for lack of jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of
obligations to Pacific.44 It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule on the matter. 45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of
salaryin the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and
attorney’s fees of NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004 through
a resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition49 for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commission’s
resolutions dated March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with
respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months
worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.51 The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address the
validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held, thus: Although the
public respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we should point out
that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the amount of
NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that she was dismissed without due process, a
finding that we uphold, given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile discussion upon the same in the
proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC’s finding in regard to the
reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of
attorney’s fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution. 64
proceedings, for the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-party
complaint against the transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc.
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different
and Lea G. Manabat. We should emphasize that as far as the decision of the NLRC on the
jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex
claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold
loci contractus.Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 65 this court noted:
petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further hearings on its third party complaint
against Pacific for reimbursement.
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that
since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in
country. Apparently, petitioner hopes tomake it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not
accordance with the foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied inthe last
require any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due
sentence. No costs.
to illness.

SO ORDERED.53
54
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her
three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and attorney’s
fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of
Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her work.55
Therefore, it claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid.56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at
the time respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume
responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by
petitioner.57
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this
case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules
and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.Furthermore, settled is the rule
that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy. Herein the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
Theyshall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.

....
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’spetition is without merit. We find for respondent.

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to
I
determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the
ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of employment
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,67 to wit:
work.58 They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these
standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers
Petitioners admit that they did notinform private respondent in writing of the charges against him
cannot be compelled to retain the services of anemployee who is guilty of acts that are inimical
and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side.
to the interest of the employer.61 While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of
However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements ofnotice and hearing applies strictly only
workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in
employer."62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.
cases of international maritime or overseas employment.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
security of tenure."63Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as
abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.
made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here
in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other
laws affecting labor apply in this case.68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized
cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondentwas inefficient in her work and negligent in her
duties69 may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if
petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer
must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause."70 Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was illegal.71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated tothe
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow termination
ofthe employee only when there is "just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement."72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary
employment. That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are
guaranteed to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the
probationary employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee.
Due process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time
of his or her engagement so he or she can adjusthis or her character or workmanship
accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the employee’s qualifications will
be evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively assessed for regularization by his or
her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer, on
a regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work
standards. Based on that determination, and after complying with the due process requirements
of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its management prerogative of terminating the
employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantlyattempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she
meets all the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for
the purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet
any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were not communicated to him or
her. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to communicatework
standards that would govern one’s employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their]
duty to adjudicate."73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. 74 No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against
which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position
held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day
show not onlyfailure on the partof petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of
just cause for termination. They patently show that the employersdid not comply with the due
process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of
dismissal.75 The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices
before termination.76 One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts
that may cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the
employer’s decision."78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an
opportunity to be heard."79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started
working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on
the same day and barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same
day that she was informed of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any
finding that she was properly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional
right to due process of law was violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion ofthe employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of1995, states thatoverseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."
solely to the fault of the worker,"80 which as we have established, is not the case. It reads: SEC.
15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The repatriation
of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of
the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation
shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the
repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all
costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local agency. However, in cases
where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the
principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the
former and/or his belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as
attorney’s feeswhen the withholding is unlawful.

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to award
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
respondent NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the
NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
repatriation.
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-
month equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in
the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as provided by law, shall be In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and less"83 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. 84
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and been passed at all."85
shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign
country of the said contract.
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less"was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the
settlement by the appropriate authority.
Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined
by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
SEC. 10. Money Claims.– Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
less.
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
.... exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor
to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.
(Emphasis supplied)
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited
performance bond to de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law,
or deployed the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is due
shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and
shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign
country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of
damages under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement
by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined
by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the worker
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be
automatically disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine
Overseas Employment Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it
fully satisfies the judgement award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case providedunder this section
shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within
the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office
for five (5) years.
Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability
which any such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations
as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement
of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s
termination from work in 1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act
No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in
their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact
clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the
circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court
of Appeals.At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the
judgment in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights."87 When cases become mootand
academic, we do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the
same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where
there are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection
because of the restoration of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as
unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence
of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All
laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so
changed so as to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these
cases. The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were
prior to Serrano. Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same
untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we
cannot countenance added expenses for further litigation thatwill reduce their hardearned wages
as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply
because our precedents have not been followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that causes
injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties. Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is
never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the
Solicitor General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No.
10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.90 The legislators intended
a balance between the employers’ and the employees’ rights by not unduly burdening the local
recruitment agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already declared as
constitutional in Serrano.92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and
constitutional.93 However, since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the
clause asreinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond judicial review. 94
On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed
on workers’ right to contract.95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General have failed to show any compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us
to revisit the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due
process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced."97 It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications." 99
In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion. 100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power. 101 A law is void on this
basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection
clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall within
the class.103 A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribesa reasonable
classification.104
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class."105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished
between fixed-period overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers.106 It also distinguished
between overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas
workers with employment contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class of overseas workers
with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least
a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they were
illegally dismissed.108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a
"legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." 109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection. 110 Thus, this court in Serrano,
"[i]mbued with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs."111
We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of
illegally terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in the
same manner.112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired portions of their
contracts."113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the
money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year
to a cap of three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money
claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term
of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment
terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the
unexpired portions of their contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a
sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year:
those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with
one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their
monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only."118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or
substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of
money claims resulting from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for
the period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the
end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers’
right to security of tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither
greater than norless than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally
terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers withoutqualification as to the place of
employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which they
could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation
translates to economic insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between
overseas workers with an employment contract of less than one year and overseas workers with
at least one year of employment contract, and between overseas workers with at least a year left
in their contracts and overseas workers with less than a year left in their contracts when they
were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas workers] are contractual
employeeswho can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers" 121 because it
already justifies differentiated treatment in terms ofthe computation of money claims.122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers’ money claims do not
justify a differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims.123 If anything, these
issues justify an equal, if not greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who
generally are more prone to exploitation given their physical distance from our government.
We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to
"establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their
families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes."124 Further, we find specious
the argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to the benefit of the
[overseas] workers."125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard
of protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby the
reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility
to violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers
is decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these
overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer
contract period disregard other opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with
claims that are less than what others in the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause,
therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to protect them makes violation of rights
easier and simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a
hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to
recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in
wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including
the principal/employer – the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this
sense, Section 10 – read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps
what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign
principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows
that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of
this hidden twist, the limitation ofliability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive,
to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its
purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that,
to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law
simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is
effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the
law’s intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,from a more practical
and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for
purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs — the benefits
accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the pockets of
the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong.
Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their
violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser
protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her
by operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal
easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always bea
consideration a foreign employer will take into account in termination of employment decisions. .
. .126
Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the
burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses suchas placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. The idea thatprivate business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling
state interest is odious."127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary
as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid
purpose.128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in
accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on
June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from
July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other
OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment
contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision
of law."129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which
revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of
stipulation,applies in this case. The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rateof interest, shall
be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in
computing legal interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
 finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein.131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only
applicable if the judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013. 132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates, 133 these interest rates
do not apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. "[A] Central
Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law."134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas
workers are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per
annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannotrepeal Republic Act No. 8042, the
issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing the interest on awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799,
which provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting parties need not repeat
them. They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has
been explicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the
matter."135 There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between the placement agency
and the overseasworker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to
reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per
annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because
the law does not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no
stipulation in the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in
accordance with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims
from the finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency
that facilitated respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign
employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims
including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section
also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such
money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating
workers’ plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is attended by
practical and legal complications.1âwphi1 The distance of the foreign employer alonemakes it
difficult for an overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code.
There are also possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may be
raised to frustrate an overseas worker’sattempt to advance his or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the complaint as
an indispensable party without which no final determination can be had of an action. 137
The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 assures overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these complications.
The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that "each of the debtors is liable for the
entire obligation."138 A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only oneof the joint
and several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas employment,
either the local agency or the foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising from the
foreign employer’s labor law violations. This way, the overseas workers are assured that
someone — the foreign employer’s local agent — may be made to answer for violationsthat the
foreign employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have
recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of
the foreign employer may be "enforced to the full extent"139 against the local agent,the overseas
worker is assured of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due them. 140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several
liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going
after the foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local employment agency. However,
it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker’s
money claims is not leftwithout remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the foreign
employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the
money claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making localagencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign
employer is thatan additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies,
which are businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout
against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their reputation or
finances, local agenciesmust already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous
foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was indeed
a transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the
respondent overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is
possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its rights
against Pacific, if any.
 V

Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the
farthest and mostdifficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC: 141

The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign
land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future.
Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults
and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts towhich they are subjected
by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their own country.
Whilethese workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are
abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own
territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their very own land, the
protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their
grievances.142

But it seems that we have not said enough.

We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times over;
each of their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the
heartbreak of families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days, months, and
years yearning to see their sons and daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they
come home to see them all grown up and, being so, they remember what their work has cost
them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and many other gadgets and online applications will never
substitute for their lost physical presence.

Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and
economic crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience,
and creativity of our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the provision of
material creations of this world.

This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default
by limiting the contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are
breached by the foreign employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward
our overseas workers with what they deserve: their dignity.

Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent
Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment
contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also
ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent
attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993
FARLE P. ALMODIEL, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS.,
INC., respondents.
Apolinario Lomabao, Jr. for petitioner.
Vicente A. Cruz, Jr., for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Subject of this petition for certiorari is the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC Case No.
00-00645-89 which reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision dated September 27,
1989 and ordered instead the payment of separation pay and financial assistance of
P100,000.00. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission and
prays for the reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter's decision which declared his termination on the
ground of redundancy illegal.
Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was hired in October, 1987 as
Cost Accounting Manager of respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable
placement firm, John Clements Consultants, Inc. with a starting monthly salary of P18,000.00.
Before said employment, he was the accounts executive of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. for
several years. He left his lucrative job therein in view of the promising career offered by
Raytheon. He started as a probationary or temporary employee. As Cost Accounting Manager,
his major duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out year and physical inventory; (2)
formulate and issue out hard copies of Standard Product costing and other cost/pricing analysis
if needed and required and (3) set up the written Cost Accounting System for the whole
company. After a few months, he was given a regularization increase of P1,600.00 a month. Not
long thereafter, his salary was increased to P21,600.00 a month.
On August 17, 1988, he recommended and submitted a Cost Accounting/Finance
Reorganization, affecting the whole finance group but the same was disapproved by the
Controller. However, he was assured by the Controller that should his position or department
which was apparently a one-man department with no staff becomes untenable or unable to
deliver the needed service due to manpower constraint, he would be given a three (3) year
advance notice.
In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was installed and used at the Raytheon
plants and subsidiaries worldwide. It was likewise adopted and installed in the Philippine
operations. As a consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting Manager allegedly entailed
only the submission of periodic reports that would use computerized forms prescribed and
designed by the international head office of the Raytheon Company in California, USA.
On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence of
IRD Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of
redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another
department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the same has
been conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he was constrained to file
the complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region,
NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment.
On September 27, 1989, Labor Arbiter Daisy Cauton-Barcelona rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainant's
termination on the ground of redundancy is highly irregular and without legal
and factual basis, thus ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant to
his former position with full backwages without lost of seniority rights and
other benefits. Respondents are further ordered to pay complainant
P200,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney's fees.1
Raytheon appealed therefrom on the grounds that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying its rights to dismiss petitioner on the ground of redundancy, in relying on
baseless surmises and self-serving assertions of the petitioner that its act was tainted with
malice and bad faith and in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On March 21, 1991, the NLRC reversed the decision and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner the
total sum of P100,000.00 as separation pay/financial assistance. The dispositive portion of which
is hereby quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. In its stead,
Order is hereby issued directing respondent to pay complainant the total
separation pay/financial assistance of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.2
From this decision, petitioner filed the instant petition averring that:
The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
(lack of) or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid and justified the
termination of petitioner on the ground of redundancy in the face of clearly
established finding that petitioner's termination was tainted with malice, bad
faith and irregularity.3
Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is governed by Article 283 of the
Labor Code which provides as follows:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. In case of termination due to installation of labor-
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled
to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or
 undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, one (1) month before, of the termination of
his employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate superior, Mrs.
Magdalena B.D. Lopez sometime in the afternoon of January 27, 1989. He was issued a check
for P54,863.00 representing separation pay but in view of his refusal to acknowledge the notice
and the check, they were sent to him thru registered mail on January 30, 1989. The Department
of Labor and Employment was served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and the implementing rules.
The crux of the controversy lies on whether bad faith, malice and irregularity crept in the
abolition of petitioner's position of Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy.
Petitioner claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance
Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any
working permit from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law. Petitioner
relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect that corollary functions appertaining to
cost accounting were dispersed to other units in the Finance Department. And granting that his
department has to be declared redundant, he claims that he should have been the Manager of
the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general accounting, payroll and encoding.
As a B. S. Accounting graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units, 21 years of work experience, and a
natural born Filipino, he claims that he is better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial
Engineer, hired merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its equivalent in early 1987,
promoted as MIS Manager only during the middle part of 1988 and a resident alien.
On the other hand, Raytheon insists that petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager had
not been absorbed by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this country. It claims to have
established below that Ang Tan Chai did not displace petitioner or absorb his functions and
duties as they were occupying entirely different and distinct positions requiring different sets of
expertise or qualifications and discharging functions altogether different and foreign from that of
petitioner's abolished position. Raytheon debunks petitioner's reliance on the testimony of Mr.
Estrada saying that the same witness testified under oath that the functions of the Cost
Accounting Manager had been completely dispensed with and the position itself had been totally
abolished.
Whether petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager have been dispensed with or merely
absorbed by another is however immaterial. Thus, notwithstanding the dearth of evidence on the
said question, a resolution of this case can be arrived at without delving into this matter. For
even conceding that the functions of petitioner's position were merely transferred, no malice or
bad faith can be imputed from said act. A survey of existing case law will disclose that
in Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC,4 the position of Sales Manager was abolished on the ground
of redundancy as the duties previously discharged by the Sales Manager simply added to the
duties of the General Manager to whom the Sales Manager used to report. In adjudging said
termination as legal, this Court said that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists
where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. The characterization of an employee's services as no longer
necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an exercise of business
judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or
decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC
so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown.
In the case of International Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,5 this Court also
considered the position of Government Relations Officer to have become redundant in view of
the appointment of the International Heavy Equipment Corporation as the company's dealer with
the government. It held therein that the determination of the need for the phasing out of a
department as a labor and cost saving device because it was no longer economical to retain
said services is a management prerogative and the courts will not interfere with the exercise
thereof as long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of
management is shown.
In the same vein, this Court ruled in Bondoc v. People's Bank and Trust Co.,6 that the bank's
board of directors possessed the power to remove a department manager whose position
depended on the retention of the trust and confidence of management and whether there was
need for his services. Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the abolition of
his position, this Court expounded that it is undeniable that the bank's board of directors
possessed the power to remove him and to determine whether the interest of the bank justified
the existence of his department.
Indeed, an employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the
operation of its business. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that a cost accounting system was
installed and used at Raytheon subsidiaries and plants worldwide; and that the functions of his
position involve the submission of periodic reports utilizing computerized forms designed and
prescribed by the head office with the installation of said accounting system. Petitioner attempts
to controvert these realities by alleging that some of the functions of his position were still
indispensable and were actually dispersed to another department. What these indispensable
functions that were dispersed, he failed however, to specify and point out. Besides, the fact that
the functions of a position were simply added to the duties of another does not affect the
legitimacy of the employer's right to abolish a position when done in the normal exercise of its
prerogative to adopt sound business practices in the management of its affairs.
Considering further that petitioner herein held a position which was definitely managerial in
character, Raytheon had a broad latitude of discretion in abolishing his position. An employer
has a much wider discretion in terminating employment relationship of managerial personnel
compared to rank and file employees.7 The reason obviously is that officers in such key
positions perform not only functions which by nature require the employer's full trust and
confidence but also functions that spell the success or failure of an enterprise.
Likewise destitute of merit is petitioner's imputation of unlawful discrimination when Raytheon
caused corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by Danny Ang Tan
Chai, a resident alien without a working permit. Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires
employment permit refers to non-resident aliens. The employment permit is required for entry
into the country for employment purposes and is issued after determination of the non-
availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of
application to perform the services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang Tan Chai is a
resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.
Petitioner also assails Raytheon's choice of Ang Tan Chai to head the Payroll/Mis/Finance
Department, claiming that he is better qualified for the position. It should be noted, however, that
Ang Tan Chai was promoted to the position during the middle part of 1988 or before the abolition
of petitioner's position in early 1989. Besides the fact that Ang Tan Chai's promotion thereto is a
settled matter, it has been consistently held that an objection founded on the ground that one
has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the
minimum qualifications for the position. In the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that
Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the Court cannot substitute its discretion and
judgment for that which is clearly and exclusively management prerogative. To do so would take
away from the employer what rightly belongs to him as aptly explained in National Federation of
Labor Unions v. NLRC:8
 It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the
employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of
the qualification and fitness of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or
reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code
and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the
different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The
employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business
judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases
of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. There is
none in the instant case.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission in
reversing and annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the contrary, the
termination of petitioner's employment was anchored on a valid and authorized cause under
Article 283 of the Labor Code, the instant petition for certiorari must fail.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and BASKETBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon Law Office for petitioners.
Rodrigo, Cuevas & De Borja for respondent BCAP.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued
Alien Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United
States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling
Corporation ("GMC").
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment
whereby the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.
On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from
temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment
permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE
Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February 1990.
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December
1990, was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the
issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April
1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the
ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent,
able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would
redound to the national interest.
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for
Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
Laguesma in an Order dated 8 June 1990.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging
that:
1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked
petitioner Cone's alien employment permit; and
2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not
empower respondent Secretary to determine if the employment of an alien would
redound to national interest.
Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have failed
to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23 April 1990, revoking
petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.
The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed by private respondent BCAP was
cured when petitioners were allowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration before respondent
Secretary of Labor.1
Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal
basis at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien
must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to
choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien
employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed out
by the Solicitor-General, no comparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman
Black as the latter is "a long time resident of the country," and thus, not subject to the provisions
of Article 40 of the Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In any case, the term
"non-resident alien" and its obverse "resident alien," here must be given their technical
connotation under our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision
would amount to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in
existence long before petitioners entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly settled
that provisions of applicable laws, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into contracts.2 Private parties cannot constitutionally contract away
the otherwise applicable provisions of law.
Petitioners' contention that respondent Secretary of Labor should have deferred to the findings
of Commission on Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing petitioner Cone,
is, again, bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent
Secretary to make a determination as to the availability of the services of a "person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services
for which an alien is desired."3
In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question
of availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such
jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out
the duties of the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations,
specifically Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition
not found in the Labor Code itself. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules,
provides as follows:
 Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit –– the Secretary of Labor may issue an Labor should, and indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction
employment permit to the applicant based on: granted by the Labor Code,

a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. –– It is the policy of the State:
hereof;
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person training, allocation and utilization;
in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for which the services of
the applicant are desired.
xxx xxx xxx

(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound
c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in
to the national interest;
conformity with the national interest;

(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and

d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national
Deportation;
interest;

(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government

e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration
agencies if the applicant will be employed in preferred areas of investments or in
and/or work permit system;
accordance with the imperative of economic development;

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial to
(Emphasis supplied)
require further consideration.1avvphi1

Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:

Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of Labor
has reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner Cone.
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. –– Any alien seeking admission to Petitioners seek to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot
the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who and academic.
desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor.
While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become moot
and academic, the circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant petitioners are such that we do not feel justified in leaving those questions unanswered.4
employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines
who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for
Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner Cone,
which the alien is desired.
the basis of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not appear in the
record. If such reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or labor law different from
For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment those here set out, then such employment permit, if one has been issued, would appear open to
permit may be issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged with serious legal objections.
the supervision of said registered enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account Costs against petitioners.
the question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national
interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which
seems impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest
is tenuous and unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40
says: "[t]he employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant
employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien
is desired." The permissive language employed in the Labor Code indicates that the authority
granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second
place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of
G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995
NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
decision1 rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker
as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990
to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable
minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which
he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at
a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office
premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines
without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of
P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter3 which reads:
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa
kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang
desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang
sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng
hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho.
Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang
sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang
matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at
ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng
kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang
resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat
sa itaas ay totoo.
Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking
pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner
for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private
respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of
the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause,
and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of
P500.00 as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED.5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto
Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms
of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself
but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the
proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper
training.6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent
is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with
backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time
he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further
hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law
and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED.7
 The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of
petitioner by ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an
apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June
7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that
the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28,
1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular
employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990,
who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII
of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves
upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon
vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to
prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such
proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed.8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private
respondent's representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for
Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the
premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l 74
Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places
where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein
[private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the
respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his
backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such
amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition — for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT
ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN
TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be
considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at
the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already
established an employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. — Apprenticeship agreements,
including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by
the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall
not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates
below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per
cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in
accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model
programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
"care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner
and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship
Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it
was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be
entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship
program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government
agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To
translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship
program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management
is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990];
National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182
SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three
days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not
voluntary and deliberate.

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral ("kargador" or "pahinante").
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the
is for the duration of the season. latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious
examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)

and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare."9

Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.

There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal
exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.
This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
11
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be
dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee can
be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the
requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is
 [G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999]
MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P.
PASCUAL, RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ,
JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G.
CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C.
DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F.
TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA
CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E.
SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY
V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ,
MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL
PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE
CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA,
ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, petitioners vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the
same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained
the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding
written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or
accommodation, but on justice for all.
The Case
Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari[1] before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision[2] of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),[3] which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter
Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.
Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution[5] of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:[6]
Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from
1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a
uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69,
Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted below:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building,
Muralla, Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G.
MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the BANK);
- and -
________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at
__________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide
disabled and handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift
their socio-economic well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to
enable them to fully integrate in the mainstream of society;
WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped
persons, particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and
authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these
positions;
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible
employment with the BANK;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article
80 of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into
this Employment Contract as follows:
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and
faithfully work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:
i Sort out bills according to color;
ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;
iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;
iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall
determine whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.
4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment
in the sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru
Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as
circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of
125% of his daily rate if performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a]
rest day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:
i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.
ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.
iii. SSS premium payment.
7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and
Regulations and Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the
BANK.
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment
program of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied
in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and
conditions of the employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular
employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the
EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and
by the applicable rules and regulations that the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in
connection with the employment of disabled and handicapped workers. More specifically, the
EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor Code of the Philippines
as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to him/her.
9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier
terminated by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract
shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless
renewed in writing by the BANK.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of
_________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen
(19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed
every six months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were
employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who
was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993.
xxxxxxxxx
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were
hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by
some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to
pakiusap which must be considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate
philosophy as well as its career and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of
professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders
from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to
this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring
handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted the
special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the
complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting of
bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and sorting
of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the tellers
normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank
plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a
regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo
Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without
creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the
Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.
Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:[7]
NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed
1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94
3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93
4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94
5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94
6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94
7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93
8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94
10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93
17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93
18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 93[8] 1 AUG 93
22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93
23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93
24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93
25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94
26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93
27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93
28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93
29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93
30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93
31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94
32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93
33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93
34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94
36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93
38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93
39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93
40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93
41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC]
42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94
43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93
As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence,
this recourse to this Court.[9]
The Ruling of the NLRC
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as
follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants
were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose
employment[s] were covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of
contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the
contract shall be the law between the parties.[10]
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable,
considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money
sorters and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.
II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment
contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were
valid.
III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the
Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against
disabled persons.[11]
In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.
This Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months
and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was
illegal.
Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari
Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the
NLRC is not allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon
the findings of public respondents that petitioners were not regular employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in
a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not
change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the
assailed Decision.
Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money
sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege
that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from
becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers
and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.[12] Rather, they
were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never
solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to the
requests of government officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the
assistance of government representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there
were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts
were renewed several times, not because of need but merely for humanitarian reasons. Respondent
submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in
private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment
contracts.
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to
provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of
society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now
deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular
employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold,
not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to
finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time
for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall
automatically expire at the end of the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with
Article 80 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an
employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent
of the applicable legal minimum wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited
provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons),[13]however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal
of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks
were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to
perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them
unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5
of the Magna Carta provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities
for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions
of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances
as a qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-
bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,[14] in which this
Court held:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent,
the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if
not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only
with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than
six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites
Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare,
Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel
Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera,
Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette
Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.
As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice
of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them
probationary appointments, ad infinitum.[15] The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary
employment, during which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed
the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular
employees.[16] No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their
services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such
cause,[17] these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back
wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. [18] Considering the allegation
of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the
tellers to whom it originally belonged,[19] petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.[20]
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and
hence not entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling
Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora[21] in which the Court upheld the validity of an
employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It
adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary
Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners
were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based
on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to
be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and
conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply
because petitioners are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts,
imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed
by the new law.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public
interest.[22] Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at
liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by
simply contracting with each other.[23] Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of
employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate
that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees.
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during
business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of
money. Thus, it reasons that this task could not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical
limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night.[24] We find no basis for this argument. Travelling
at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the
termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not
change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of
work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit
petitioners, and that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,[25] the Court held
that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of
the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the
employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its continued existence.
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not
become regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract
regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment
is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work performed. [26] Otherwise, no
employee can become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of
employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:[27]
Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be
secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements
inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure
notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment.
 xxxxxxxxx

At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in
subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive
determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform
but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment
relationship. But this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the
periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be
struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.

In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the
working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and
the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners
(deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal
of their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically
impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should
be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.

In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause. [28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995
Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Far East Bank and Trust Company is hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of
the following twenty-seven (27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E.
David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George
P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson,
Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion,
Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual,
Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to compute the exact
amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days from
the finality of this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988,
of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING
THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the
measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is
violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed
in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in
the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only
question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare
of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does
not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to
the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is
a clear misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly
with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic
notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and
not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The
Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in
this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court.
Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the
courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is
implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief
Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them
enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no
gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department
Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be
noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that
prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where
there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by
A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the
Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A
and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract
and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on
such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women,
and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is
made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult
to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order
clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot
been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and
workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of
Heads of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other
senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps
and duly accredited international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or
understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR
SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall
be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are
returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served
employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new
employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these
guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where
there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
 2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief
Filipino workers. 24 prayed for.

xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The SO ORDERED.
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the
Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof. 28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's
power of regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. 30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has
evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.

The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain
countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never
been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The
 [G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,* petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That
employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she
was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being
outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991
vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she
signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as reliever were again engaged by
petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both
periods.[2] After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were
terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job
application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the
portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3]
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When
petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia
M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to
explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of
not accepting married women for employment.[4]
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not
aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not
deliberately hidden her true civil status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her
explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a
claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent
volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the
parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then
executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a
formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was
illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back
wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed
view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly
insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent
upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent
had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer,
PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace
de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her
acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the
labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment
with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent
NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the
aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution
of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with
love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference,
on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice
against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal
employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally
been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be
safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and
exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the
primordial ones, Section 14, Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at
all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section
3 of Article XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution)
pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial
security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII[10] mandates that the State shall
protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach
their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential
Decree No. 442, largely due to our countrys commitment as a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). [11]
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727[12] which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion,
and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955[13] which bans the mail-order-bride practice for
a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of
women workers; Republic Act No. 7192,[14] also known as the Women in Development and
Nation Building Act, which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into
contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military
or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police;
Republic Act No. 7322[15] increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private
sector; Republic Act No. 7877[16] which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the
workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, [17] or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which prescribes as a matter of
policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries
where their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family
Code,[18] womens rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles
130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while
Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the
Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and
social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other
similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the
other hand, recognizes a womans right against discrimination with respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at
hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female
employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine
qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to
convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in
dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor being regarded as constitutionally
protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls
within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of
hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as
regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and
recall of employees.[19] As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in
cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by
Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the
latter, that youre fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic),
as it was verbally instructed to you.[21] Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same
branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the
service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of
that, was her violation of the companys policy against marriage (and even told you that married
women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.)[22] Parenthetically, this
seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that
petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking
officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.[23]
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could
not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did
mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated.[24] It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices.[25] Furthermore, it should never
be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed private respondent,
not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow
ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of
confidence in her which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while
it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that
fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private
respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other
way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy
against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was
inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the
same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In
other words, PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage,
despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there
will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the
confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its
true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over
the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification
and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was,
however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondents secretive conduct
now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from
employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted
in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an
altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment
of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds.That
the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioners submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a
mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of
experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately
misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence
and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed
that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the
matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to
complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary
employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in
order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. [27] On the other hand, her earlier stints with
the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were
for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual
trade and business of PT&T.[28] The primary standard of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the
business or trade of the employer.[29]
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent.[30] However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her
status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month
suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or
inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to
return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified.Thus,
her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was
withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the
amount corresponding to her three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted
by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 148,[31] better known as the Women and Child Labor Law, which amended
paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which
became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children in
shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of labor
in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al.
vs. Philippine Air Lines,[33] a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a
policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that
they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it being
violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination
against married women. Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents policy or regulation with the codal provision
of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women
employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in
extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of
their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the
controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No.
148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those
affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a
momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12
of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136
of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on
November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies
and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of
Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate
cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination
in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates
against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first
paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be
established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of
the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work x x x.
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that termination from employment of flight
attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety,
protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is
not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as
observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent
discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the
course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately
explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of
Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage.
In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of
time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions,
considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place
to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives
to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have
categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations,
is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the
employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to
consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get
married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant
was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated
when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of discriminatory
chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account
of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its
repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or
conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a sex-plus
discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be
evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected
by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of
married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the
United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination
against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. [35]
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against
married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not against
married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful.[36] Upon the other hand, a
requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a bona fide
occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify
the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work
in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent
quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage
rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the
restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants.[37]

5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending
as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all
accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.[38] Hence, while it is true
that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may
deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.[39] Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy
against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations
between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they
are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. [40] It goes on to
intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair
the interest or convenience of the public.[41] In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a
policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation.[42] That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised
or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in
order but imperatively required.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone

Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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