t t10n oancallad by

lYE Bo. 5200.9. effact1va 28 Bov. 58

- .Cm!B!-T ",:".RFOR:::.l;C:: OF ~ R':I'OT!: CONTROL

TUP.!'~TS F B··29 -".IRCRf.FT

, xX B 0 M B [R CO M M AN 0 . A.P.O.4 9 .3

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
 •••••••••••••••
: S:;:CP.E T
: [,UT.:: CG. XXllC :
: Ini tials l''''''' .'-:
•
.........., ....
:Date 10 Feb45:

ClaSSUioat jfrf'
DOD DlRECTI~~~oanoelled by
o. 5200 ~
. . et't'e ct1V'e 28
lfov. 58

OPERATIONS lLNALYSIS REPORT

Issuing Unit: Operetions [illa1ysis Section

XX Bomber Command
Title: COMBAT PERFORlIANCE OF T.IE RE!!OTE
CONTROL TURRETS OF B-Z9 AL~CR!JT
Date: 10 February 1945

Identification: Report No. 14

.. ".. ". '. ~ ,

_ .... ;.. ".: 1 ."

,..::;...! :.' .:' _.J ..... •

 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

A. ABSTRACT
f B. E COUNTERS
C. B-29 COllBAT DAMAGE AND L032ES

D. F.NE!1Y CO~1BAT LOSSES

E. CO!!P~.RISON '11TH AIAMOGORDO. NEW
MEXICO TEST RESULTS

F. DISCUSSION OF "T'i'ENTY-FIVE MISSION

SUHJ.IIL'lY. ENEMY TI.CTICS" - XX BOI-lEER
CO I.il'l.lID BULLE TIN

G. CONCLUSIONS IJID RECO/clllENDI,TIONS

APPENDICES
•
Appendix I I,nalysis of Combat Losses

Appendix II The SorvicoGbility of the Defensive

Arnmmont of tho B-29

Appendix III Discussion on the Use of Strippod

Idrcrnft
Apoondix IV Discussion on Optimum Dispersion
Appendix V I. Suggestion for a High Speed
Nasa Conputor
•

* . .
The vlriter wishes to acknowledg~ his indebtedness
to the Intelligence and Statistical Sections, the
Gunnery and Armmnent Officers of the Command and Groups
for their cooperation in furnishing the information
upon which this study is based. In addition he wishes
to express his approciation to the 948 Engineor Topo
Company (Avn) for their assistance in the preparation
of thi s report •
.. . ..

•
 llITRODUC,TION

( The object of this study is to determine

whether the present B-29 aircraft arc adequately
equipped to protect themselves against fighter
assaults, and if not, what should be done to
strongthen their defenses. This study is based
on information eathorod in combat by the tactical
Groups of this Command. Tho important inform-
ation sources WBro tho crow interrogation reports,
the file of cl3.inlS, the "Enomy Tootics Bulletin".
the J·!ission Reporta, the 1'lelk-Out Reports, the
Gunnery Officer Speeial!l:st Reperts, the Armament
Officer Spec ia list Reports J and personal intGr-
views with combnt personnel.
Frequently the informntion was not evailable
in tho exact form from which conclusions could be
directly dra'm as to the pLrformenee of the gun-
nery system. It was therefore noconsnry to
nnalyze and intorprot the availcble data as they
pertained to the vcrious gunnery questions. In
performing tho an~lysis many instances arose in
which it weS a matter of jUdgment as to the ox~ct
• me~nine of tho datq. FortunntolY,'howcver, the
number of inst2ncos in which n wide renge of
intorprete tioD of the d8. t£l. w~s possibic worD ic
rol,.tively fe\!, so tllnt it is firmly believed thst
any gurmery snclyst Vlorl<ing with the same data
w~uld arrive at conclusions which agree in all
major e.spoets \lith those of this otudy.

lu
;
 COMBAT PERFORIIAl'lCE OF TO·~ REllOTE CONTROL TURRETS OF B-29 :.L'lC?AFT
1.. l,BSTRLCT
The following cue the major conclusions of this study of the
performance of tho remote control turret syst~m of B-Z9 circraft
of the XX Bomber Commend during Missions 1 - 25:
1. The B-29 gunnery systom has been modcr~tely effcctivp- again"
frm.talattaoks, Where?-.s enemy attacks from this directfon have
beeD very e~fective.
2. The B-29 gunnery system hes beGn least effective against
side attaoks, however enemy attacks from this direction ho.ve alao
been ineffoctive.
3. The B-29 gunnery systom has been highly effective against
rear attacks whereas rear att2cks by enemy aircraft hcve been inef-
fective.
The following chart presents B-29 losses and enemy losses
(destroyed and prob~bly destroyed) in these ragions.

FRONT SIDE REAR

B-29 losses per
100 encounters 2.3
'-.
.4 .2
Enemy 10 sse s por
100 encounters 7.8 6.3 14.7
Ratio of Enemy
losS€lS to B-29 10SS08 3.4 14.8 70.0
•
4. The B-Z9 gunnery system is satisfectory from the point of
view of serviceability as indiceted by the small numbcr of malfunctio
which occurred durina combat end by the fact that the system was
maintained without ezoessive effort.
5. In comparing the combat performance with the results of
tests of the gunnery system conducted et Alamogordo, New 1~xico, it
is apparent thnt their gun pointing error stUdy is consistent with
combat results. A disagreement does, however, exist between the
conclusion of the Alamogordo Tests that the B-29 is most ·vulnerable
to attacks 30 0 off the teil and the combat results Which indicate
~t to be most vulnerable to nose attacks •

• 6 •. The fact that B-29's have been able to penetrate into the
heart of·the Japanese Empire on very long range missions, ward-off
attacks by enemy combat planes without serious losses of aircraft due
to combat is highly gratifying. The large number of enemy aircraft
-1-
•
•
.- "
destroyod indicates that the a 1 system is one of the most, i
not the most effective airborne gunnery systems developed to date ••
It appears .therefore that our- greatest resourcos and energies
should be devoted to improving f:.nd perfecting tho pro sent ~emote
control turret system rather then to experimenting with alternate
armament urrangemonts.
? . It if) essolltial thClt every effort be mude to improve the
gunnery system, particularly against hiGh and level frontal
attacks. In future oporations the cranter experience with the
pl~esent equipment Rnd t,]~o tmprovod tncticol dGploym~nt of Q},lr
aircraft will largely bo off sot by the greater experience and
increasine aggressiveness of encm:r fightor pilots. This will
be particularly true £IS our OiI"0i'i.."l.ft bOI!lb P.l.ore important and
highly defended targets.
8. In Append'ix III "Discussion on the 'Use of Stripped
Aircraft", it is concluded that seriou:J consideration should be
given to the use of stripped aircraft for daylight bom"b~ng, but
only under the conditions that a wIde angle ta i l turret be
installed and that escort aircraft with flexible guns accompany
the stripped aircraft for defense against frontal attacks.
Basea on the material presented and.,nalyzed in this report,
the following rocomffiundations on oquipment aI'S made:
1. It is recommended thet nrmament improvGments already
developed be rrlado avnilable in 8ui'ficient fUDlbers immodiately
in particular -
" ...
a} The new G.E. 4' gun upper forward turret.

.
b) The now G.E. 4 gun wido nngla tail turret •
.
cl Stollite Gun barrels.
2.It is recoMmonded that armor piorcing incendiary aID-
munition be prQyidod imm0diRtcly in slu'ficient quantities to
replace the armor piercing and ball nmmunition
. '
now used.
3. It is recommendod that highest priority be given to the
following developments:
a) A fastor nose computer •
.
b) A practical nose radar ranging installation.
clAn alternate stadiol1letric rate r,mging mechanism.
d) A !'lOre r"pid firing .50 cal iber machine gun.
4. It is recom~~nded that tho Press Bang Computer not be
installed in the nose or top sighting stetion unless the objections·
to its use against nose e.ttucks"are answered. .
5. It is recommended tha"t guns in the various turrets,
particularly in t~8 upper forward 4 gun turrets, be diverged to
daubl!;:) li11.1:: ::ii~~ vi Lho d1.spersion pattern until such time as gun
pointing errors are reduce -,ucril;s>< •...
ff!m i
.. __ (If; f
_
.
,.; .. ·J.!_l· "~ -
_.. -
 f

B. ENCOUNTERS

The distribution of encounters vs direction was obtained from

Mission reports. These data were tabulated by the Intelligence
Section after a c8reful screening to elininate duplications in
reporting encoQ~ters. The conposit r date on encounters for Misslor
1-25 are given on Figure 3. Those numbsTs, unfortunately, represer
the direction of approach rather than tnc diroction at midpoint
of the defensiv0 action by our gunncrs. Tho distribution of ettac~
by direction at thc midpoint is tho i.r.lporknt ono in an analysis
of the perfornance of the gunnory equipnent. Several factors
enter that causo a difference between the direction of approach
and the direction of combnt. For example, frequently un encounter
re~~rted approaching from ana diroction is followed by ~ maneuver
whioh brings tho aotual attaok f:om a cOr.lpletely different
direction. The f:lOst common ins'cu:co is a pursuit curve in which
the "in position" phase [,light place the encounter at 2-4 or 8-10
o'clock, but in which the actual pursuit curve develops somewhere
botween 4 and 8 o'clocki This is also true of a frontal attack
which might be reported as slightly off the nose but which falls
beck to 11 or 1 o'clock when the attack. is pressed hO[,le. However,
in the caso of frontal attQcksj an attack is often reported fiS
originating atOll or 1 o'clook Which Gctually devalops into a near
head-on attackl This occurs if the attack is reported while the
enemy aircraft- :Ls still in the "turn iIi." phase of the attack and "
has not yet brought his guns to bear on the B~29.
In an effort to correct the distribution of the approaohes
of all encounters to obtain the di.stribution of attaoks at the
midpoint of the aotion by our gunners, 350 encounters were tabulate
both as to direction of approach end direction at midpoint. These
cases were approved claims of ene[,ly aircraft destroyed, probably
destroyed, end damaged made by B-29 gunners on Missions 1-25. They
were used as they were the only encounters descri.bed in sufficient
detail so that it was possible to assign the direction of the
midpoint of tho engagements. Tho folloWing were the main clues
used in determining the midpoint of th~ encounter,
1. The direction of the approach. "
2. The position of the E/A at the breakaway.
3. The gunner or gunners who fired.
4. The guns employed.
5; The approxirll'l te nunber of rounds expended."
5. The range at which the gunners opened fire.
7. The range at which the damage to the onemy airoraft
was acco[,lplished.
8. The range and position ~t which the onemy aircraft
opened fire.
The formation.
The nC[,lber of the forI~"tion under attack.
The description of the en a •

-3-
 Thus if an E/A reported as or ating his pursuit curve from
9 o'clock was claimed damaged by a Tail Gunner who fired 200 rounds
at the E/A and observed it to breakaway at 6 o'clock, then the mid-
polnt of the cngagec~nt was usually listed at 6:30. If an atteck
was reported by e bombardier as orieinating at 2 o'clock but which
broke away directly under the B-29, ,then the midpoint of the engage-
ment was moved towurds 1 o'clock to an extent depending upon the
remainder of the deccription. Of' the 360 encounters considered,
300 were similar enough to pursuit curves at the midpoint of the
action to have the main charaeteriatics of such attacks. 60 of th
engagements at the midpoint of tho action of our gunners Vlere of
other types, rectilinear passes, opposite parallel passes, and in
particUlar encounters involving slitiht rvletivc motion such as
frequently occur during the in rj~~tion, the turn in, and the break-
away phases of the attucks.
The folloViing process Vias employed to compute the numbers of
encounters at the directions of the midpoint of the defensive actior
taken by our gunners: The numbers of encounters listed by directio,
of approach and by direction of midpoint for t,he 360 carefully ,
studied claim encounters were tabulated. (See Fig. 1) The ratios
of these numbers were then plotted. A smooth correction ratio
graph waS drawn in a consorvative manner to reduce the extreme
variationa of the direct ratios. The numbers of encounters at
various directions of approach of the 2042 encountors between
Missions 1-25 were then multiplied by the final correction ratios
to obtain the total nmnbors of encounters at varinus midpoint
directions. (See Fig. 3) The correction ratios :hlId been normalized
to yield the same number of encounters. Note that although the
correcting process decs modify the distribution it does not change
its essential nature. For the sake of expediency the elevation of
the attack is ignored. The fact that practically all of the attackr
listed as hign or low were at relatively small elevation angles is
a measure of justificetion for doing so •

•
 ENCOUNTERS GIVEN BY DIRECTION OF APPROACH AND
DIRECTION OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT ITS MIDPOINT
.
70
• ,
60

50

40 - -

30 - l- I- f--- I- -

20 - I- - I- ~ I- -
10 r- - - l- I- I- r- l- I- - I- -

o, CLOCK 0
9
I- L
10 II - 12
L- L- I-
23456
L- l- I- -
7
~

8
-
9

ENCOUNTERS
8Y MIDPOINT 10 7 36 63 34 22 10 19 37 69 39 14 360
8Y APPROACH 19 16 47 45 38 36 32 16 27 33 30 21 360
FIG. I
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION XX BOMBER COMMAND

RATIOS OF 360 ENCOUNTERS BY DIRECTION AT MIDPOINT

TO DIRECTION OF APPROACH
2.50,------------------------,

2.00+-------------------i f--------j

1.50+-------------------i
•
1.0 0 t - - - - - - j

50

O'CLDCK __~_ 9 10 II 12 234 567 8 9

RATIOS
DIRECT .53 .43 .77 1.40.89 .61 .31 1.13 1.37 2.10 130 .67 1.00
SMOOTHED .65 .75 .95 1.40 .95 .75 . .65 .90 1.25 1.85 1.25 .90 1.00
• FIG. 2
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS S~CTlO BOMBER COMMAND
•
.. _- .. _- ... _-_ ... _- .. _- ._- "-_.
 .~ ~
ENCOUNTERS ON MIS~ ~_ . BY DIRECTION OF
APPROACH AND 01 RECTION 'AT Mlb fNT OF ENGAGEMENT
400 I ,

300 I ~

200 I ~

100~

0
O'CLOCK 9 10 II 12 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TOTALS
APPROACH HIGH 1 4 3 109 211 148 110 131 78 25 31 27 20 20 953

=-
APPROACH LEVEL 47
-
27 50 51 40 35 43 16 26 33 17 14 399
APPROACH LOW.', 36 23 84 75 58 83 91 38 50 56 56 40
--
690
APPROACH TOTAL 126 159 345 274 208 249 212 79 107 116 93 74 2042
MIDPOI NT TOTAL 83 119 327 384 198 186 138 71 139 215 116 66 2042
FIG.3
OPERATIONS ANALYSI S SECTION ... s madl ~ XX BOMBER COMMAND
C. B-~ COMB/.T LOSSES AND DAMAGE
1. The data Dn 1>1>e 24 cDmbat lDsses ascribable either tDtally
Dr partially tD actiDn b Gnemy aircraft were obtained from Intelli-
gence Reports, ~~lkout repo~ts, ~nd intorvie~s with crow nembors
whD witnessDd the attRck. (S~Q Ap~cndix I)
2. Chart I prDsents the dir~ctiDn of attacks which resulted
in the loss of B-29 aircraft or wore contributing factors to the
loss Df the p.ircraft. Tho directiDns Df attack for four losses
are not known.
CHl.RT I
Position
(o'clock) 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

B-29's lost: 0 0 6 9 2 2 o o o 1 o o

3. Causes of B-29 Combat Losses:

Ten of our aircraft were lost over or ncar the target
area due to the following Causes:
Collisi.ons with E/A 5
Aerial Bc...mbs 2
Aerial Guns
(hoth lost 2 engincs) 2
Un1:nown 1

Fourtcon dalnegad aircraft which managcd to flyaway from the

terget aree were subsequently lost due to the following causes:

En"'ine fires :3
Eneines out 2
DrT:o:.\f;od Cor. trols 2
Instruments
D~;De;c(l
and controls 2
Failure of Propellor
to feathor 1
Mi3calculation of ~&s
supply ?
Ur::n';"'~7: 2
4. Detailed information on combat dame.ge to B-29 aircraft
is avcilable only for Missions aftar h o • 18. This informatiDn
was recorded on ~attl~ D~mnge Forns on which the position of each
hit end the direction from which it came ara recorded. The
following Chart presents the direc tion of the hits by enemy air-
oraft on B-29's for which such infDrl'1ntion is available. The data
for missions 26-33 follow the dashes.
FRom SIDE REAR
B-29's Damaged - - - - - - - 26-7 11-2 2-2
 5. There have beon~7 instences of self inflicted
damage on !.!issions 1-25. In practically all cases these
were confined to bomb bay doors whioh were riddled on the
bomb run. The caroful indoctrinc:tion of gunners in this •
metter by the Gunnery Offie"rs is undoubtedly responsible
for the smallnoss of tho numb~r of instances of self
inflictEd damage.
D. ~lEL'Y COHBI.T I.OS~S

The source of data on e""m;T corn,bat losses was the file of :>
approved claims prepared by tho special claims board in ae- '
cardenae with Lir Forue reguJotions. The regulations specify
the standnrds to be used in determining the category nnd
velidity ef the eleims. 'rile fact tll",t the Intelligence
Section and Claims Board of tllis Comin.end Ilave taken partic-
ul",rly great pains in the screening process to eliminate
duplications end invalid claims insures tllat the list of
approved claims is a reliable source of data for a study of
enemy losses inflicted by gunners of the ::x Bomber Command.
The form submitted for each claim preeents the following
._.pertinent inforPlf,tion: the type of E/A; the direotion of the
approach; the range ",t which the enemy a/c was hit; the nature
of the damage or tile observations which form the basis of the
cleim; the number of rounds fired; and a narrative of the
action accompanied by a skEtch showing the formation and the
course of the E/h. This lotter item was the richest source
of information. While it is ,~ll recognized that the obser- ~
vations of even tho kaon~st obsorvers during the brief moments:
of an attflck nre frequently im.'.ccur3to, it vms possiiJle by
considering the datI'! in the light of such clues as the known •
limits of the fiold of firo of the various turrets, the fields
of visibility of tho various sighting stations, the nature of
aircraft trajectories rolativo to each other, the nuw~er of
guns and rounds fired, the gun rate, the positien of the air-
craft at breakaway, and other key facts, to obtain a surprising-
ly consistent andreasonable picture of almost every action.
This was particularly true sinco a grent majority of the claim
8ncountors hod reth0r slow rel~tivc motion nnd it wes thus
possible to plece the cction within narrow limits.
Figure 4 presents tho number of eircraft destroyed prob-
ably destroyed, or dnwE.ged per hundred encou.~ters at th~ various
o'clock positions ~t the midpoint of the action by our gunners.
h detailed breakdown of the d~t", i3 given on Chart II which
includes information 8S to the ranges ~t the midpoint of the
ection flnd the actu?l numbers of aire~ft destroyed probably
destroyed, or damnged. Despito the someWhat irreguiar neture
of the graph on Fig. 4, certain trends e.re anp~rcnt. It is
obvious that for each llundr0d encounters in the rear hemisphere
,more enemy planes were shot down than are destroyed per hundred
encounters in tho front region. The eu ves of the destroyed
 ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED, PR _ ED OR DAMAGED PER
HUNDRED ENCOUNTERS AT VARIOUS DIRECTIONS
20 I l'0i I
FIG. 4

10 I

5---+--

0
O'CLOCK 9 10 II 12----1--2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

DESTROYED 1.8 2.1 3.5 6.0 6.6 4.0 2.9 9.9 II. 5 11.6 6.4 6.8 1.8
PROS. DESTROYED 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.7 3.0 .5 0 6.3 4.3 5. I 5.2 .8 1.2
DAMAGED 9.0 3.4 6.0 7.3 7.6 6.5 3.3 9.8 II. 2 16.0 20.0 13.7 9.0
TOTAL ENCOUNTERS 83 119 327 384 198 186 138 71 139 215 116 66 2042
I

OPERATIONS ANALYSI S SECTION 'll1""'~

t. ,,/f" _ XX BOMBER COMMAND
 · ..,.
-. --_._-- __ . . ._. -
.
---

ZNEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED, PROBABLY DESTROYED, OR ER HUNDRED ENCOUNTERS AT

VARIOUS I'IDPOINT DIRECTIONS AND RANGE INTERVALS (IN YARDS)

POSITION (O'CLOCE) 9 10 11 12 1 11 3 4 5 5 7 8 TOTAL

TOT:.l. B~:COUN'.'l::RS 83 119 327 384 198 185 138 ?l 139 215 115 55 2042
DZSTROYED F~r.
100 ENCOUNTEr.S 1.8 2.1 3.5 6.0 5.5 4.0 2.9 9.9 11.5 11.6 6.4 5.8
TOT:.I. D~:J1'!l.O~D 1.5 2.5 11.5 23.0 13.0 7.5 4.0 7.0 16.0 25.0 7.5 4.5 J.23
DZSTROYED: 0-250 0 0 2 2.5 .5 1.0 2.5 1.5 2.0 6.0 1.5 1.5 21
250-450 0 0 7 15.0 7.0 2 1.5 2.0 5.0 11.5 2.0 1 54
450-550 0 1 2.5 4.5 5.5 2.5 0 1;0 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 26
over 550 1.5 1.5 0 1.0 0 2.0 0 2.5 6.0 5.0 2.0 .5 22 I,
I
PROE:.BLY Dr.STROYED
P~R 100 ENCO~:~.RS 1.2 1;3 1.4 2.7 3.0 .5, 0 5.3
4.5
4.3 5.1 5.2
5."0 11.0'6.0
.8
.5 52
I
TOT. PROB. D~STRC"'1ED 1 1.5 4.5 10 6 1.0 0
PROE. D~3T. 0-250
250-450
0
1
O'
1.5
1
2
1
7.5
2
3
0
0
0
0
1
1.5
.5 2.5 1;5
2.0 3.0 1.5 0
.5 10
23 I
0 0 0 1 0 0 .5 3.0 2 1;5 0 8 I
450-550 0 I
over 550 0 0 1.5 1.5 0 1.0 0 1.5 .5 3.5 1.5 0 11 !
I
DA!'.~_GEDPER
100 ;;:NCOUNTERS 9.0 3.4 5.0 7.3 7.5 5.5 3.3 9.8 11;2 15.0 20.0 13.7
TOT:\L DAM/.OED 7.5 4.0 19.5 28.0 15.0 12.0 4.5 7.0 15.5 34.5 23.0 9,0 17.
~~GED 0-250 1 0 4 5.5 2.5 2.0 0 0 2 5 4 0 27
250-450 3.5 1.5 6.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 10.5 6.0 1.5 48
450-650 2.5 2.5 5.5 9.5 5.5 4.0 1.5 3.0 7.0 10.5 4.0 2.5 59
over 550 1.00 3 5 3 3 1 1 4.5 8.5 9.0 5.0 45

OP!':R..TIO:S A~:ALYSIS SECTION XX BOMBER COMl.IAND

 and probably destroyed show minima a't the beam posi'Uons, a
small maximum at the nose, and a larger maximum at the tail.
Chart III presents the same data averaged over larger
divisions.
CHART III

FRONT SIDE REAR

f DEST;lOYED 5.4 4.6 9.8

PROBJ..ELY DEST;lOYED 2.4 1.7 4.9

DAMAGED 7.0 8.9 15.7

On the basis of this chart we may draw the following

conclusions. On frontal and side attacks gtmners have
succeeded in destroying, probably destroying or damaging
approximately 15 out of every hundred attacking aircraft
whereas on rear attacl(s they have succeeded in destroying,
probably destroying or damaging approximately 30 enemy
aircraft out of every 100 encounters.
The fact that the distribution of enemy aircraft
destroyed or ,robably destroyed has a fairly sharp maximum
in the range interval 250-450 yards while the distribution
of enemy aircraft damaged has a broad peak in the range
interval 450-650 yards is noteworthy.
During the course of the Missions apprOXimately 430
thousand rounds of ammunItion wore fired in combat. The
number of rounds fired per 8nemy aircraft lost was therefore
3300 rds per e/a destroyed
2400 rds per e/a destroyod,or probably destroyed
1200 rds per e/a destroyed, probebly destroyed,
.
I
or damaged
Claims/Turret
Figure 5 presents the number of anemy aircraft destroyod
or probably destroyed by tho various turrets. Certain noteworthy
facts emerge from these data.
1. The tail turret has been very effective in the region
covered by its fiold of fir~ Unfortunately its restricted
area of coverage haa spare~he enemy many destroyed and damaged
aircraft.
 •
',21 The lower aft turr'ct has the highest score, it haTing
been solely responsible for 4? kills and probable kills. ' Note
that 41 of these were in the, rear hemisphere.
3. The upper aft turret has also been very effective in
that it has made 3? kills and probable kills. The fact that
the upper aft turret has been as effoctive as the upper forward
turret in countGring high frontal attacks is of significance.
Thc1 oX~lp,n"tion for thi,s !MY lie in the better visibility from,
and ease of manipulation of"the top sighting station.
4.' The lower forward turret has been quite successful
against low and levtl frontal attacks, it having been respon-
sible for 26 kills and probables. The fact that control of the
lower forward, turret has rarely been transferred from bomb-
ardier to a blister gunner explains the absence of kills in
the lovler rear region.
5. The performance of 'the upper forward turret, partic-
ularly in view of the great number of high and level frontal
attacks, is somewhat disappointing. It must be romemberd that
two gun forward'turrets werG used on missions 9 to 25.
Perhaps the real explanations are the reletively poor visi-
,,
bility and the difficulty of sight manipulation that are
characteristic of t~v3 nose posi tioD for high frontal attacks.
It is believed that the present practice of giving initial
control of the forward turret to the top gunner will enhance
its effectiveness.
Claims/Gunner
Figure 6 presents the number of enemy aircraft destroyed
or probably destroyed by the various gunners. The following
observations are worthy of rewerk:
1. The top gunner and bombardier are almost equal in
the number of aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed. Since
two turrets were generally under control of the bombardJp~
and since the majority of the attacks were from the front,
this indicates that the top gu.rmcr probably rates as the' ~,'I
more efficient.
2. The low SGore of the loft gunner is undoubtedly the
result of the infrequent encounters in his field of fire.
3. The tail gunner is particularly lethal in his narrow
cone of fire.
4. Undoubtedly the initial llocation of turrets, the
type of formation, and the field f search and cover.
influenced the distribution of af raft destroyod by various
gunners.
 ~.
ENEMY AIRCRAFT PROBABLY
DESTROYED RETS
30 I FIG.S I

25...j 1:::1 I

20-1 [-:1 I

15--1-----------------

10---l--r'Jll i

5 I v.:l
 •
;- '=,.,L- ---"

ENEMY AIRCRAFT PROBABLY

30
DESTROYED a- ERS
FIG.6

25

20

15

10
·
·· ..
· .
5 .. :1- ::. .
· .

o
POSITION - O'CLOCK
~U 'lL :c- ::l: l-
9 10 II 12 2 3
G
4.
r5
1lI ~ :La
6 7 8 9
TOTA
80M8ARDIER 0 I 10 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 43
TOP GUNNER I 0 6 II 3 2 2 2 I 3 44
RIGHT GUNNER
LEFT GUNNER
0
I
0
3
I
I
0
0
2
0
9
0
12
0
S
4
I
5 ..-
0 32
11
TAIL GUNNER 0 0 0 0 6 27 6 0 39
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION XX BOMBER COMMAND 175
 ,

Causes of Enemy Losses

Chart IV shows the cauoes of the destruction of enemy
aircraft as given in the narrative of the approved claims.
CHART IV

I
Fire 54%
Pilot killed or Vlounded 23%*
Explosion B%
Broke Apart and ·FiT8 7%
Broke Apart 4%
Controls Damaged or Engine
Failure 4%**
*This wes deduced from the. fact tlwt the planes crashed
without visible signs of damage without the pilots
bailing out.
**ThIs Vias deduced from the fect that the pilots bailed
out although there wes ne visible dame e to the aircraft.

Chart V shows the causes given In the nerretive for enemy

aircraft probably destroyed:
••
CHART V
Intense Smoke 5c%
Fire 27%
Smoke and
Pieces off 13%
Pieces off 6%
Sectiens eff ~
In practically all instances the enemy aircraft broke
off its attack when the damage was Bustained and went
into a violent spin •
•
Chart VI shows the causes. of the damage of enemy aircraft
as givan in the narrative of ap9roved claims.

-9-
 Smoke 68%
Piecos Off 14%
Smoke and Pieces Off 6%
Fire 5%
Tracor Observation 5%
Violent Sp.in 2%
In most instances, port::'c··:J.::.::..rly on rear attacks,
the enemy aircraft bi'OK0 uff its attack when the
damage was sustained
Discussion:
The observation of explosions or fire was the basis of
92% of the claims for enemy aircraft destroyed. Tho obser-
vation of fire or intense smoke was the basis of ?7% of the
claims for enemy aircraft probably destroyed. The obser-
vation of fire end smoke waS the basis of ?3% of the claims
for enemy aircreft damaged. These large percentages in-
dicate the effectiveness of incendiary or armor piercing
incendiary ammunition, and suggest that their loading in
the belt be increased. Standard loading during Missions 1-25
was two armor piercing, two incendiary, and one tracer.
The data on causes of enemy losses might bear upon the
question as to the optimun bullet dispersion which should be
employed. 85% of the dostroyed, ??% of the probably destroyed,
."
and ?3% of the damaged (pilot killed, explosion, fire or
smoke) were probably due to singla strikes by .50 oaliber:
projectiles in a vulnerable region, who"""s only 15% of the
destroyed enemy aircraft, 23% of tho prohnbly destroyed and
27% of the damaged (sections and pioces ~f) were probably
the result of multiple strikes by ;50 caliber projectiles.
Tbis appears to indicate that the vulnerability of
enemy aircraft can be regarded as unoonditional, that is the
projectile which ~ctually did the destructive work did not
require a previous projectile to render the aircraft vulnerable.
Assuming the enemy aircraft to be unconditionally vulnerabl'
then the dispersion of the .50 caliber guns should be adjusted '
to give the greatest chance of obtaini~ a single projectile
in the vulnerable region for a given standard aiming error. A
detailed discussion of optimum bullet dispersion is given in
the appendix. In general the conclusion is that the present
dispersion is to sTooll a~that ..the gunnor is now in a
,.' .
_.~_._,

.. ,,'. > • : •• ,' L

"r"':~ "t h. : ";"':~\1\::;f:f{£~~~
 situation similar to a hunter shooting ducks with a rifle rather
than with a shotgun. A "shot gun" pattern is necessary because .
the aiming errors are rather large compared with the target size.
We can afford to use a "shot gtm" pattern since it appears that
most enemy aircr&ft are now being destroyed or.damagod by the
strike of a single projectile in a vulnerable spot.
E. COMPARISON 'NITH ALAMOGORDO RFoSULTS
1. The gunnery tests at Alamogordo presented in a report
entitled "Tests Related to the Defense and Tactical ·Use of the B-29!
dated 15 Novembor 1944, must be cor.mended as an excellent and
scientific effort to evaluQte the eunnery system. In order to
ob~ain combat data which lOOy be co~perod with those results, every
claim was studied, and a value of the gun lead (approximately
the angular rate of the target nJUlGiplied hy the time of flight
of the projectile) at the midpoint of tho attacl( was assigned
for each engagement which resulted in the destruction, probable
destruction, or damage of the enemy aircraft. To facilitate
this study it was neoessary to detorminG tho nature of each
pass by enemy aircraft. By use of the information in tho cla~
narrative it was possible to determine wh8thor tho encounter at
the midpoint of the action tal<.en by our gunners was a pursuit
curve, a strafing sttack, an attack on edjr.cent aircraft, an
attack on a distant aircraft in the formation, an opposite
parallel pass, a manouver involving small relative motion. or
one involving high relative movement.
If the enemy aircraft was on a pur sui t curve the following
rUle was eTIployed to assign gun lead for a given position of the
enemy alc at the midpoint of the encounter. This represents
approximately 85% of the ovm speed deflection for the true air
speed~.which wore predominant during combat.

Pc.un lead in mils

12:00 lie 5:00 0
11:30 lie12:30· 5:30 lie 5:30 35
11:00 II<:1:00 5: 00 lie ?:OO ?O
10:30 &. 1:30 4:30 lie ?:30 100
(W( 10:00 lie 2:00 4:00 lie 8:00 120
- 9:00 lie 3:00 150
If it WaS apparent from the description that the enemy alc
departed from a pursuit curve, or was attacking another air-
craft, then an estimate was made of the additional target
motion allowance. The no relative motion ·end sl ight relative
motion non-pursuit curve encounters, Which were generally
sorted out by the description of the encounters were assigned
small· leads. Opposite parallel passos wero assigned double P~8-
I ition firing leads. Additional defleotion allowanoeg wore .
made in the few instanoos of passes at high angles of elevation.
The olaims were divided into classes using the lead intervals
and range intervals employed in the- . AlamogPrdo
.. . Study.

----"'-._- --_.... - .~.'" - .... - .

 Cha~t VIII presents the ene~y losses for various lead and
range intoFvals. Tho numb0rs following the dashes represent
the number of non-pursuit passes.
In this tabulation the nttacl.::s wore considered either in
the pursuit curve C183S or non-pul'sui t curve class. Attacks
were placed into a broad pur~ui t curve class if they v.'Cre true
pursuit curves, pursuit curves on en adjacent aircraft, (except· f)
at close ranges) or strafing ett':'1cl:s when near tho firing phase.
In brief they worD consj.derod in the broader pur sui t curve
class if at the midpoint of the nction by the gUlmer they pre-_
sauted an almost hoed on aspuct. All athol' attacks were con-
sidered in the non-pursuit curve class. Also included on
these charts are estilJ'][~t(;s at' thO} nwnber of opportunities or
encounters within the variouH :::''':.1.] i'1i:.ervals. The following
rules were employed in obtainins theso numbers:
0-25 mils Encounters between 11:45 & 12:1,5
5: 45 & 6:15
... --.
,,"4~

25-55 mils Encounters between 11:15 & 11:45 12:15 & 12:45 .- ,
5:15 & 5:45 6:15 & 6:45
55-80 mils Encounters betweon 11:15 & 10:45 12:45 & 1:15
5: 15 & 4:45 6: 45 & 7:15
80-110 mils EncOlmters betWG8n 10: 45 & 10:15 1:15 & 1:45
4:45 & 4:15 7:15 & 7:45 ~

110-over mils Encounters between 10:15 & 7:45 1:45 & 4:15
SUbdiViding the encounters in this fashion assumes essentially
that all the encounters were pursuit .curves, or similar to
pursuit curves, and were at small elevation anglos. Tho facts
that non-pursuit encounters were only e small portion of the whole,
and that almost illl attacks ""ore at small elevation angles jUstif",O
this subdivision.
Fig. 7 presents the enemy aircrp.ft lost for each 100 en-
counters in the various lead intervals. The ma.rked decline at
the 80-110 lead intorval is in agreoment with the gun pointing
error study at Alamogordo.
The very sharp decline of claims in the rear in going from
the 0-25 mil class to the 55-80 mil class is tho combined effect
of the increasing gilll pointing error and the limited field of
fire of the tail guns. •

-12-
 •

ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED, P

ENCOUNTERS IN ,... o
25,',-------------------------l
FIG. 7
'.
.
..~. , I
YEO OR DAMAGED PER HUNDRED
TION INTERVALS

20~
go
,,:::'
I
r
:1':::
~tj

1 ~
15

m
m
i~N

10--4f---1'1 '
i~l
:~ti N In
il~
:.:~"
ffi ~,
;%
5 I I J f~lJ--..f!N----i
& :,:,:

0
FRONT REAR
DEFLECTION IN M I L . 0-25 25- 55 55-80 80-110 OVER 110 OVER lie 110 - 80 80-55 55-25 25-0
DESTROYED 5.5 8.0 6. I 1.0 2.1 3.8 4.0 7.0 12.2 18.3
PROBABLE DEST.Wk 3.9 3.7 I. I 0.5 0.6 1.9 4.0 3.1 5.4 7.3
DAMAGED _'\. 9.4 7.4 6.8 4.3 4.5 6.2 9.1 19.1 17.9 22.0
TOTAL ENCOUNTERS 193 326 263 208 333 210 99
_.128 173 109

~ OPERATIONS ANALYSIS SECTION I~.!1!:·,.f

.&
. • 'i
.. ~~."
.. ,ld• 4<~ ' .. _'
.!,-_~. _;:';'4'
~
"
_."... '.:-1
• ~:1"·ii~'C.O •t .~~t ......
XX BOMBER COMMAND
 •
'-
-
"
;
r • ,-, ':.
..
.', ( '. I :'11".- ',':>,
.~ .~.-:.., ;' " r__• J~ ~'!,''I:~'i,. i'·':;

E:lID~ AIP.CR.:FT DESTROYED :'ROBABLY DESTROYED, eR DAMAGED IN VARIOUS D":Fr.::crION INTERVALS

(IN IIILS) J.JirJ VARIOUS RANGE INTERVALS (IN YARDS)
,
FRONT over over re':!.R I'
0-25 25-55 55-80 80-110 110 II 110 110-80 80-55 55-25 25-0 FRONT REAR TOTAL
TO~AL TOT.

TOT. ENCOUNTERL 193

f.NGIE lRO!.: .'OST. 00

(for pursuit c\ rves)
DESTROYED per
i1- 100 Encounters 5.5
TOT.- DESnlQYE1L :1.0
8.0
26
6.1
16
1.0
2
2.1
7
,I 2
3.8
8
4.0
4
7.0
9
12.2
21
18.3
20 61 62 ill. I
DEST. 0-250 0 2-1 1-2 0 1 , o o 4-2 4-2 7 14 21
I
IH' 2
250-450 8 12-2 8 0 2 2-1 1 2 7-1 7-2 32 23 55
450-650 0 8 3-2 1 2 1 3 3 1 16 25
over 650 1-1 0-1 o 1 2
:1

II
2 4 4 2-2 6
9
16 22 I
,,
PROBABLY !):;';STRC YEn l'
per 100 Enc. , 3.9 3.7 1.1 .5 .6 " 1.9 4.0 3.1 5.4 7.3 I
TOT PROB.DEST. 5
PROB. OJ ST. 0-2[ 0 1-1
12
o
3
1-1
1
0 o ~:'
2 4
1
4
1
4
o
9
1-1
8
1-1
23
4
29
6
J2.g.
10 I,
"tiO-4[0 Z-l 7-1 1- 1 1 I' 2 1 2 1 2-1 14 9 23
450-6[,0 0
over 6~O 0
0-1
1-2
o
o
1;, ·..,0
0
o :1
1
I:
0

1
1
1
2
o
2-1
3
1
2
1
4
7
.,
8
11 I
I
I
D!c1!AGED per 100 ,
Encounters 9.4 7.4 6.8 4.3 4.5 I 6.2 9.1 14.1 17.9 22,0
TOTfu. DA!!iAGED 18 24 18 9 15 13 9 18 31 24 84 95 m
D!~,G~D 0-250 4 5 3 2 1 1 o 1 3-3 2-2 15 12 27
250-450 4 4-2 3-1 3-1 4-1 3 3-1 3-1 5-1 8 23 25 48
I~
450-650 5-1 9 6 3 5-1 1 7 7-1 5-1 30 29 59
over 650 4 2-2 3-2 0 3 , 4 4-2 10-1 2-4 16 29 45
- --rr~i'
---fii"rF.''6 "'T("",T~-~~~-""'-r.'tl'''''''''''''''',",lIT·-··_- he' --------. "V'V' T)"~"T"'''''T"\ """"""~'lI.m
 Discussion of Chart VII
When examining the nun\:;o""s of enemy losses in various lead
intervals, the true f~cts stand out more clearly than when
examining the onemy 10s3es ~t various directions. Apparently the
non-pursuit curve encounters thnt wero in the low deflection cotegor
tend to smooth out the lattor distribution. Thus a low relative
motion shot at 3 o'clock which has essontially the same deflection
end duration charccteristics e.s a te.il attaok might appear as a
successful instanco of a hieh deflection shot when listed by
direction, The curvo for dostroycd and probably destroyed has
fairly regular and ronsonable ch"r(.ct",ristics. The slight dip
at the 0-25 front deflection interval is probably not signif-
icant but rather the result of a tendency to pl~ce borderl12e
caSes in the 25-55 mil deflection class. It is also possib~e
that several of the claims listed in the h"gh doflection categories
ehould really belong in a lower deflection class. The claims
which the deflection rules plEced in the hir,h defloction class
v~ro frequently less consistent in such matters as n~bcr of rounds
fired and ranges of fire than were tho other claims. The fact
that the curve for the dame.ged claims shows slightly loss definition
than does the destroyod and probably destroyed claims is believed
due to the greator exactness of the descriptions of the destroyed
and probably destroyed cloims.
A polar plot of Figure VII in which the deflection intervals
are replaced by tho corraspondin6 angles assuming all the attacks
to bo pursuit curves, yields a figure similar to Fig 11-8 given
in the Alamogordq Report. The combat reSUlts, however, indicate
the l.bes to bo broader and the forvlard lobe to be larger.
As is well recognizod, gun camera results cannot be directly
interpreted in terms of enomy eire reSt and E-29 lossos unless
information as to the vulnerablo areas of th0 E-29 and enemy air-
craft at various directions is availablo. It is appa~ent that
therein lies the source of tho discrepancy b~tvroen tho,conclusion
of the Alamogordo Study which is that the standard B-29 is most
vulnerab~o to a fighter attack 30 0 off the tail and the results of
the XX Bomber Command which indicate that the utandard B-29 is
most vulnerable to frontal attacks. (See Chart on Page 1).
J
Despite the scant and possibly inexact data on our losses,
the conclusion that we are more vulnereble to frontal attacks than
to rear attacks in an absolute sense (i.e. B-29's lost per 100
encounters) and even more so in a relative sense (i.e. B-29's
lost per enemy aircraft lost) is inescapable. This notable
vulnerability to nose attacks relative to tail attacks is probably
the effect of the following factors:

• -13-
 1. Projectiles striking the B-29 aircraft from the front
are'considerahly more destructive than projectiles coming from
I
the rear. Note for exaffiole the instances of B-29 control and
instrum~nt damage, engine difficulties and the two instances
of miscalculations of gas supply which occured after members
of the cockpit crew we,€'killed or wounded.
2. Four of the five collisions with E/A came from the
front.
3. The two successful aerial bombing assaults were from
the front.
4. The rapid ranging rates, the somewhat larger tracking
rates and the very short leneth of combat of nose attacks seem
to favor the fighter. As the ag~ressor he ,cen choose his,
condition and think out his deflection problem well in advance
whereas the gunner has a difficult coordination problem and bas
very little time to react to the attack. Also the e~tacking
fighter can generally penetrate to closer ranges on nose attacks
5.Tbe slow ranging rates, tho relatively slow tracking
rates Bnd the considerable length of time of rear attacks seem
to favor the defcndin~ gunners rather then the ageressor. The
gunner can generally hold the Jap figbter at a respectful
distance on rear attacks.
,JUdging from enemy figbter tactics the Japanese seem to
be, aware of the above facts. ",
Summarizing it appears tbat tbe gun point error stUdy
made at Alamogordo is consistent with combat results. A,dis-
agreement does exist between thO interpretation of; the test,
results and the combat results in that the A~amogordo study
concludes that the B-29 is most VUlnerable to attacks slightly
off the tai~. whoreas combat results indicate it to, be moat
vulnerable to nose ettacks. ' ,,' "
.

.
,
. ,

" . !

•
 F. DISCUSSIO~: CF "25 1!ISSIO!: ~U!'::":.P.Y. ENEMY TACTICS" BULLETIN
1. The bulletin entiGled ?t25 Mission Summary, Enemy 'ractics n
prepared by the Intelligence Section of this Command is probably
the most accurate and thorough report on onemy fighter tactics
against bombardment aircraft ever mado. This report presents
in considerable detail the data on encounters with enemy aircraft,
which were obtained by careful interrogation of combat crews.
These date '~re tabulated and summarized directly, without anelysis
from the information gathered in Qach mission.
\ 2. It is considered highly significant thet the conclusions of
this report ,on the perforMance of the RCT system which were
errived at after considerable interpretation and analysis of the
basic data, are in esstlntial sg:-:n<jment on matters of tml,tua1 concern
with the data given in the independent Intelligence Report.
The following e>:tracts are from the "Twenty-Five Mission
Suwary, Enemy Tactics":
II. "The percentage of all encounters from this quarter (front)
based on total individual encounters for day missions is 41 per
cent, and of the total which resulted in damage 51% was indicated
in comparison, an incre.ase of 10 per cent."

b. "Tn genera), it was found that the statistics for claims

closely ,p~ralle16d the norm of direction and level percentages
for all enCOl.ll1teI't, ,XC6pt for minor dlscre.rancies. In regard to
the discrepancies the percentage for enerlY aircraft approaching
from the rear quarter for example was 25~ of total claims and the
summary of total ancounters indicated that only 16 per cent of
all encounters approaohed from this quarter".
o. "Claims for enemy aircraft attack in:; from the frontal
quarter were 35 per cent of the total, and tho records indicate
that 41 per cent of all encounters approached from this quarter".
The conclusion that frontal attocks mado by enemy aircraft
are more effec~ive than attacks from other directions is in agreemen
with statement a.
The conclusion that the gunnery system is relatively less
effective against nose e.ttac1:s than tail attac!,s is in agreement
with the statements band o.
These trends appear more strongly in this report on the perfor-
mance of the R.C.T. System chiefly because the sutdy Wes made with
respect to the directions at the midpoint of the encounters rabher
tha~ at the approach.

~. ~re ere several minor discrepancies between the numbers given

in the'Intelligence Section report and in this report. The graphs
in this report were prepared before it was realized that the '2042
encoun~er~ repre~ent ~hooc for whioh the directions or the ap~roA~h
are" knOwn rathor than the tot f 2~28 for daylight missions. "
 Thus the absolute values of all figures given in this report
which are weighted by the number of encounters, should be
reduced by a~proximately 7 per cent. However the absolute
values involved arc not considered highly significant and are
sUbj eet to some degree of inaccuracy; It is questionable I for
e~:ample. whether a good many encounters, particularly on the
earlier missions, can truly be called att~cks when they were '.
made at long ranges and without firing. Tho relotivQ valuos
whioh ere the basis for the conclusions of this report are
unaffected by this small discrepancy.
The Intelligence report lists enemy losses as follows: 130
destroyed, 52 probably destroyed, and 176 damaged. This report
lists 123 destroy~d, 52 probcbly destroyed, and l7a damaged.
Four enemy aircraft destroyed as a result of mid-air collisions
with B-29 t s, one enemy aircraft struck by a bomb from a B-Z9,
and two instancus in which data as to direction wore unavailable
a~e ignored in this enalysis. The three extra damaged aircraft
were oleimed on a photo mission and thus should have been omitted.
The Intelligence report lists 18 B-29's destroyed due to enomy
action, 11 by gunfire, 2 by aerial bombs and 5 by mid-air col-
lisions. The present report lists 24 destroyed due to enemy
action, 17 by gun ire, 2 oy aerial bombs, 5 by mid-air col-
lisions. This report includes tho two instances in which anti-
aircraft shared with enemy aircrrft is causing the loss of B-29's
and the instances in which operetioDel feilures shared with
enemy aircrcft in causing the loss of the B-29. (See Appendix I.)
4. In the "25 Mission Summnry, Enomy· T~)ctics", it is
indicated that Japanese pilots prefer to come in high on
frontal attecks ffild low on re~r ettnc~s. Perhaps the explan-
ation for this tendency is as follows: On both high frontal
and low rear pursuit curve attocks the force due to the curved
pa th is upward opnosinf; the force of grovity. The f igllter
pilot will thus heve less of 2 tendency to bleek out or go into
a stall than On low frontal attacks or high rear attacks in
which the two forcos add. This tendency should become more
marked if operations Rre carried out at higher true airspeeds
or higher altitudes.
5. In the "25 Mission SUDlmarYJ Enemy Te.ctics",. the
tendency of Japanese pilots towards more ~essive attacks
is brought forth. It is important th~t this be kept in" mind
in consideri.ng defense measures on future missions, partic-
ularly over targets near the industrial heart of Japan. We
cannot assume that equipment and tactics which provided satis-
factory defense against opposition which mU6t g~nerally be
characterized as weak to moderate will necessarily provide
adequate defense a gainst heavy oppositon •

•
 G. CWCV}SImIS MfD P<;COM~

1. The present armament system has done remsrkably'well,

in defending B-29 aircraft of the XX Bomber Commsnd on bombing
missions Over the Japanese Empire. This is especiallY true when
viewed in the light of the speed in which the armame~t system
was developed and the radical innovations that were lncorporated
into the SYSt8~. However in view of the incroasing aggressive-
ness of Japanese pilots, it will be necessary to improve the
.system, particularly its defenses against frontal attacke. if
our losses on future operations over more important and highly
r defended targets are to be held to a small peroentage of the
striking force.
2. To a great extent most improvements should be based
upon the present system of turr8ts and sighting stations. They
should attempt mainly to reducc the gun pointing errors by
festor and more accurate computers, and sighting aids stich as
auto~tic ranging by radar or e stadiometric rate ranging
mechanism. It is particularly suggosted that ElutoI!lEltic radar
ranGing units be insta11ed with each sighting station as a means
of decreasing gun pointing errors. In conjunction with this
it is highly important thot a stadiometric device similar to
the present expanding dotted circle arrangement be coupled
directly to the output of the automatic renging unit to pro-
vide a check as to v/hothor the radar sot is ranging on the
correct target. The stadiomotric device should have an cl-
tcrnate motor drive with rete control to serve in the event
of jamming, the use of othor countermeasures, or of radar set
failure. The comDutors should be improved to take full ad-
vantage of the smoother ond more accurate ranging and tracking
date which will bo obtained if automatic ranging is used.
3. It is well to consider means of improvinG the guns to
obtain a higher firing rate and to withstand longer bursts
so that enough bUllets can be thro\vn out during the short
durstion of a nose attack to guarantee the destruction of the
enemy aircraft.
4. While the narro.. ., cone of fire of present tail turrets
has not been directly responsible for more than one of our losses,
it has spared- the enemy many losses. Although it is not the
purpose of bombar<iJrent aircraft to shoot down enemy planes,
nevertheless any planes shot dovm will not return for another
attack te hinder the bombardnent sircraft in tho accomplish-
ment of their ~rimary function.
5, Ir~oTmation is not available here as to the intentions
of the P~r Forces with respect to the neWly developed Press Bang
Computer. It must be rGcognizod that While thc press Bang Computer
or any oth_r memory point device may be admirably suited to rear
attacYs which involve a relatively slow rate of change of def-
lection, it is sinGularly unsuited to nose attacks which frequently
involve a rapid rate or cnengo or do£lecLlun. In addition,
against nose attacks we cannot afford to wait the time of flight
 . .._':7':!:;:~:,_:. . .
. ,

of tho projectile to allow the load to build up before tho guns

are fired. It is rocommendod that tho Pross Bang computor not be
installed in connection with the nose or top sighting stations
unless these objections are answored.
e. From the combat experienco of this Bomber Command to
date there is no indication that tho Japanese have made largo
scale efforts to destroy our aircraft by ramming. It is essential;
however; that we gcar our defenses to moot tho worst possibilitias.
The following measuros should foro stall the possibility of large
scale ramming. . .
a. Our Navy and Army Air Forcos should continue pressing
thcir attack on Japanesc Air instelletions to maintain tho present
attrition rate of the Jap8neso hi~ Yoroe.
b. Our defcnsive armament should be improved to guarantee'
the destruction of Aircrnft prossing thoir attack to close quarters.
This is alraady practically true for roar "ttacks but not as yet
true for frontel attaoks.
c. Our formations should be constructod in such a
manner as to maximizo the forward dofenses and to minimizc' the
probability of successful ramming. This may be accomplished
by stacking successive flights upward with considerable altitude
differences and by providing B-29 pilots with ample room to
take last second evasive action against an enemy aircraft on a
collision course.
The first measure will serve to enhance to the Japanese the
value of their remaining aircraft. The second and third measures
will make ramming attempts costly and will prevent the consummation
of a large percentage of these attompts, , If for every successful
ramming effort we can destroy at least 3 Japanoso aircraft
attempting to ram, and if at tho same time tho Japanese valuo
their remaining aircraft very highly, then wo nood not fear
ramming on e largo scele.
In conclusion it can be st,ted that the B-29 aircraft hes
without question gruotor dGfensive cepc.bilitics against assaults
by enemy aircrdt thr..n bas eny other bombardment nircratt now in
existence. This fact is a tributo to thoso who designed and
enginoored the aircrnft and its defensive armament. If 1rnr~~iate
action is taken to further strengthn its defenses according to
the needs revealed in combat, then the B-29 may shortly be the
first true realizetion of a long range bomber completely capa~le
of defending itself while carrying out its strategic f~ction.
•.
, .<, .•' 1

ALEX E. S. GREEN
APPROVED: Oper~tions Analyst
J-IA/i ,.Jk n . 'If If"
HAlriLTON M. nlF'I'-ERS
Chief, Operetions lillalysis Section
....-....~'~1&i
• .• '''''''J. ''0.
., . ~
.-.
---~"'---_.~ --.. _~-
 \

\\ APPENDIX I

OPERATIONS ANALYStS REPORT

Issuing Unit: Operations Analysis Section

XX Bomber Command
Title: AlUiLYSIS O~ COMBAT LOSSES

Date: 5 January 1945

Identific"tion: Report No. 10

Q)

•
',PPEhDIX I
l\lli.LYSIS OF COMBAT LOSSES
Abstraot:
This report presents data on oombat losses for study by
those responsible for initiflting action to minimize losses. It
also presents measures which may be tat.en immediately to achieve
this end. The data on combct lo~ses ~re given on three chart3.
Chart I prosents the datn on all uiroreft lost in 1'Thioh
enemy action wns the priMary cause of the loss.
Chart II present8 the d?t? on missing aircraft whose
fate is uncertain nnd on circrrft lost due to operctional
failures but which h~~d suffor(>I':' some dama.gc due to
enemy action.
Chart III gives the direction of ett&oks by onemy air-
craft which r08ultod in eOffibat lassos.
It is evident from Chnrt III that prnotically all of our losses
wero oaused by high and level frontal nttnoks. '
1. ;~ile the losses of B-29 aircraft of the XX Bomber Command
due to 'enemy' nction nrJ not excessive, it appE:lcrs that they may
be reduced or at lee-st hold to a minimum by taking Curtain
measures to improve tho doploymcnt of the ~iTcrnft end to improve
the gunnery. Such steps must be designed mainly to counter high
and level frontal ett~cks. The following measures will serve to
improve our defenses in the immodiato futuro. Long r~nge mensures
such as changing the 8r~munt or stripping tho airplane are not
discussed. '
(0) Improve forflC.tion to rJduco vulnerebility to frontel
ettacks find incrcf~se fire power fgairst frontel 8ttacks.
(b) Send successive forr,,('tions 'Over the tOJ:"gct in r~pid
succession with the lowest for~tion over first.
(e) Solve problem of dofrosting front windows.
(d) Install four guns in ell four gun turrets.
(e) Devolop teem funnery tcctics to counter coordinated
frontal attacks.
(f) Troin crew ~omb0rs on best siCht opornting nrocedures
ageinst frontal rtt::lcl:s. .
(g) Have gunners opon fire on frontal ettccks at 1500 yards
range.
(h) IncorporRte sli~ht divergence in forwn~d guns to enlarge
bullot pattorn ..
 .-,--- r"~'

.......' .......
;: "}-t.".
~
>., ""S!l'-
...·t.·.· " '" .;trl',~·~.
.·,ft-itl•.
~
·.I'P:':tT!lIX I .. :;.. --
,~......"
~.

(i) Improvo maintenanco of gunnory oquipmcnt especially during

cold woa thor.
2. Tho rocommended sishting procodure ng~inst frontal
attacks is ps fellows. The sight should bo held in a stationary
position pointine; forvlCrd wi th the r"nga handle sot at 1500
yards. As soon 8S an atteckinG ~ircrnft is observed, tho
retiCUle dot should bo very quickly slowod onto the tvrget.
If the targot is c single engine oircrcft it should be trccked
smoothly without firing until the 2 ~il roticulu dot covers
1/4 of its wing span. If th~ tni'gat is e. twin cngine "ircreft,
it should be trr.ckcd smootn'l'.·· until tho 2 mil rcticule dot
covcrs 1/2 tho dist~ncc from pror hub to prop hub. At this moment
tho gunncr should quickly turn ti: renge hcndlc te the 250 yards
minil'lum re.nge (largcst dotted chole). He should coomenco firing
imm0dintely upon stu~dying his aim with ~~proxirn?toly a one sec-
ond burst. He should thon fire nnother burst, holding it ~s
long AS tho Jap fightvr continuos to co~o in. As soon as the
pttack is ever the gunner should quicYly return the range h"ndle
to tho 1500 yard position in properntion for the next attack.
3. There is no airborne gl1Jlnery system in existence today
which will destroy evcry aircr<::ft l'la!.:ing " frontal !:tteck at
a clesing rate of 600 to 800 l'lph bcfore the attacking aircrnft
reaches tho defendinG bonh~r or fornation, or cun concentrcte
effective fire on tho bel'lh0r or for:'lation. It is thus prob, bly
the CGSO thst inproving the duylo~cnt of the r.ircrnft in
fornation will be ~s affuctive in roducing the lossos as will
improving tho gWL~ory_ This ruport corJines itself principclly
to R discussion of thG influence of thu forrmtion on lo~scs.
4. The data avoilablc en the size of for~tien eno ~he
position of the eircreft in ferrlll tien when losses were S!J'St~ined
ere not sufficivntly cccur~te to draw ~ny definite conclusions
as to which pesition is .1OSt d~fu~crous er e.s to the optimum size
of the fora: tiqn. I t nP:'e<·rs, hc.w0v~r, fro" fl stUdy of tho data
end fran obvious cODsiderctions of the VUlnerability end tho
firo power of tho for"~tion thnt the gro"test flaw ef the form-
fitions as flown at present is the positioning of Fircr&ft to the
reor of othe;r e.ircr, ft. Not enly is the enemy presented fl
greater chence ef hittin~ one ef our B-29's but in most in-
stences th0 roar B-29' s callnet use their guns to counter the
attacks.
5. The following aro the disadvantages of positioning
aircraft bohind and 10wor then other aircraft:
(fll The probobility of hits on B-29 '.ircr"ft by cneny
gun fire, aerial bombs, rOCkets, anti-aircre.ft, uncontrolled
eneny aircraft, friendly ~un fire, shell cases, and bombs from
the forward ships is incroesed.
 (b) The fire power for the formRtion against high frontal
attncks is reduced.

(c) A simple universal search find fire procedure is

practically impossible.
6. In ViBW of this the following reco~~endntions are made:
(a) No four plane alements should be employed.
(b) Steps 4 5, and 5 of th0 present tactical doctrine
should be revised) ei.ther to plp..cG tho planes inlmadiatoly into
tho B clcmunt positi.on or 8rlit thom to grow into the sovan
ple-ne fOI"IllC.tion givon in tho prcsont doctrine.

(c) If flyoble tho wing olomonts of tho nine plano formotion

should advance fo~~rrd so th~t tho lordcr of Band D clements
arc ebrcDst of the ~~ng mon of A.
(d)
'fuun the 4th olcment arrives it should fly a position
300 ft. above olemont A, ~nd hnve its lopd pInna nose to tail with
the wing pl~ne of B. If this position is difficult to fly from
tho point of view of Visibility, tho lOR.d pinna should move
further beck until its pilot c~n fly on the form~tion lepder
.~ wi thout strain.
(el Tho 5th clement and 5th olclOent should trke positions
on C corresponding to the positions B nnd D trkc on A .
•
(fl When six or more plf''.llcs Fro ~~v<'1ilt~ble in tho upper
forme tion thon it should split off by climbing sover~l
hundred
f~ot. I t should follow the 10' er fornr., tion over the tQrget.

Sl.llll1iJa r y :

ThD d~ttn on comb~t 1088(;8 vs direction of 'ltt:;.cks conclusively

dcmonstroto the nOLd for improvod defense ~gpinst frontRl attacks.
The dat~ on fvr~2tions which sustnincd co~blt losses erc too
Gc£'nt E:nd inr:ccurnto tG droYl definite concluslons. However they
do indic8to thr-t the form2tions flown pt prosont are inadequate
~geinst heavy frontcl rttecks and th~t rcvisicn of the formctjons
to i~provo tho dufanso ngainat such 2ttacks is nuoossnry. Any
such improvn~nt should attompt (nl to roduco th~ vUlnerebility of
the forn:otion to front"l "ttacks, end (b) to increF:so the
form."tion fire pm:Jcr age-inst fl~ontD.l nttr.cks. SeverEd methods
for nchiaving this end ~rc presonted in this report. It is
suggested th£.t oxporicnced comb-t personnel tost thoSG proposals
to detcrnine their pr~cticfllity.

_ Op"r~tions -'..J1&lysis Soctior.

• Boober Cocrmend
 .PP~\!)I~ I
CHART I

i<:
..... ..,Q ~

......,, ct-0 r>0 '"0 Z 'd

..,....
tJ

.., '" to" ~

0 0
tn
....0to
0
.g 0 <1l ....ct-to <1l
Remarks
<1l ". 0

"...,ct- ""'<.., ...,0 ...,0

0
0 <1l '- ..... ....""0
"~ 0
....
0

"....
...,
0 t-<'
" "...,
•
f
..,
<1l
t-<
0
0
to
to
H
i:';
..,0
0
"J
.., "..,
0
"J
0

".
cr
~
tn
~
tn ct-
~ ....cr0
r cr cr '"
0

• .....
0

" "
.....
0

"
?;"

2 468 6230 Ap cmr One plRne seen go down

over te.rget.
2 444 6293 G bg st Bombed on ground at
Advanced BRse.
4 468 6274 B ag Wor 1 3 engines out due to E/A
an and AA above last resort
ctllrget.
7 40 6308 B aa Wor 3 2L Hit by flek, then by 2
ag · " engine E/A. Control cable
& instruments out.
l(
7 462 24474 A ag cmr 4 12H E/A attacked from below
ab with guns, then hit 474
with eerial bombs •
.• 7
7
468
468
6334 A r
6368 A r* cmr
cmr
:} , l(
"
12TO Rammed
12-0 Hit by parts of 334
7 468 6408 A nS wor 4 • ,X Flak strike over target.
B 462 6360 B ag cmr 4 • 11 SEF 11 oclock hit #3 eng-
"· • ine - later lost engine an
#4 engine., Cracked up at
Laohokow.
,
13 40 6281 C ug pi 21~ . '" ill DamAge from 1:00 oclock
high and high. Engineer
• • • killed. Loss due to lack
of gas.
16 40 6237 B cmr No. 4 engine on fire over
target. Crew members safe-
walking out •.
•
17 444 65204 B ag pi 9 .• 12? 1 Tojo pl~ne made frontal
• attack causing considerabl
)/ • • • damage. .
.
. . .: "~., ~
.'.
 --_.-
.PPJ;:ND IX I (Cont'd.)
CHART
- -I
....tos:: .,
<;)

0 .,....:.-. " '" .,en "

n n
0 0 0
'1J
.,....
t;j

....0to '"
'0 .," '" ''"" "'"
<'
to ....<'
to
'"
...,'" '"., ..., '" '-
0
~-
....0 ....0"<'
"Z <' '<
0
...,0
n
....
0
Z ...,
0 t"' ".... "..., Remarks
•
"
.,'~"
0 H ::l 0
t"'
Ul
to
g, ."
."
0
to
to
.,S
0
0
~
0 ;.-
<'

"....
<'
"....<' &
<'
<'
""x-
0
0 ....
I 0

" " "

17 444 6321 B ag st 9 • • 2H Controls damaged by E/A
crashed into 290 at Ankang.
• • Aerial bomb and gunfire.
17 444 29510 B cmr 10 .. lLH Straggling, attacked and
damaged 11 oclock high to
• belly, then other attacks •
#4 engine shot out. Control
cables broken.
17 462 6278 A ag cmr 9 .
.. •
12H' 2 Jack II from 12 oclook
high. Lost two engines.
17 40 6275 C ag pi 10 ",', llL Miscalculations caused by
"
injuries led to loss for
lack of gas.
17 468 6359 H' ag st 8 " lLH Attacked E/A over target _
engine out and feathered,
crew safe.
17 40 6290 pi Landed at Ankang to refuel-
hit by 510 on runway.
7 462 93848 B ag wor 1 12H Nose attack by E/A killed
No. 2 engine. Engine fire
18 40 24452 B ag cmr 14
.. llH Single fighter plane shot
~ . up 3 aircraft in 12 plane
formation. 452 refused
escort - lost 1 hr. out of
Chittagong. Wounded men
aboerd •

•. •
•
19 40 63363 B fig cmr 11
• Men safe- walking out. E/A
shot engine out - unable to
• fea ther prop •
19 4:62 6299 r 18 . . 11-0 Rammed by Tojo 4amaged on
CUll'
...
~ '.
way in from 11 oclock.
A parently Tojo couldn't I
id collision. c -..L I ~ ~_ _
 -- (Cont'd.)
~~m:c: I

--
Eo: <> > 0 Z t:l
>-
''""
'i
0
.g
>-
'i 'n-"
0
0>
C '"
0
~
0
•
0
'"<1,

....'"n-,
,.,-
'i
,.,- "
'i '" '"'" "
(Ill > ,.,,,
(\)

0
'n-" 0 (\)
'- ",.,-n-
"2: t1> 'i
'<
0
H, 0
H,
0 0

" 0

...,"
>- Remarks
0 Z 0 t-' ,.,-
• 0
•
-,
t-'
u
'"
H
g, """ P u

0
til
til
0
'i
0
'i
S
""
0 >
n-
'" S ElO> n-
'"
n- ....'"
n-
,.,-n- '""
'"
,." 0
0

" " 8•
19 468 6390 A r cmr 10 • 6H RalJlr.led by Nick from rear
- - shearing stabilizer.
- - - • Apparently intentional
after aircrDft Was dam-
aged and pilot wounded.
19 444 6262 B ag cmr 13, - - 1H Straggling - hit by E/A
• from High right, raked
nose and 1 &; 2 engines o
Vlent into flat spin. Then
" subjected to further
attacks •
• 23 468 715 A r cmr 10
-
-
•-
~
12H Rammed by Val or Tojo
3 bombers had fired at
-
Val but no indication of
their disabling it.
23 462 4505 A ab cmr 9 - x 12H 2 Tojo head on coordinated
ag
-
. attacks with aerial bombs.
Followed by 2 more head
on attacks by E/A with /.:: 1~
guns after it had left
formation.
~
25 462 254 A; ag.:- omr 5. ,. ~
12H Jack and Tojo head on
12-0 coordinated attack '-
#3 and 4 engines out.
Ditched 1/2 hour later.·
1 -- - - -- - -- - - --- -- - - - -- - - --- -- - - - -- -

(SEE GLOSS:JlY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ON CHART II)
 ---_....._-------
CH;JlT II
~ UNKNOVIN

:> () () en 2: tJ
...
>-"

...'"
.rt'"...
.....''""
o
rt
"'''"""
....o
o
..."
'"'"
o
• ...
f-'o

''""
rt
f-'o
'<
...
o o
t:l Remarks
....o
•
•
2:
o
t-'
o
SO
oJ>

'"
o
'.
''""

2 458 93825 Unknown - operetionel prob.

4 452 5255 H Probebly EI A
7 458 6254 Dpe wor Slight damage by E/A - hole
in tail - later operational
difficulty.
7 40 5301 Unknown - navigational prob.
7 40 93829 H Unknown - low on gas
8 444 5234 D pi Prop governor trouble
• before attacks by 2 E/A
later engine ran away and
fire.
10 444 5280 Received YY probable opera-
tional.
15 458 5355 H cmr Possible EI A
19 452 5359 Unknown - had hit target
19 468 5389 Unknown

Category of Loss Cause of Loss

~~l
lost over target due to enemy action. aa anti aircraft
lost later due to troubles caused by ag enemy aircraft guns
enemy action ab enemy aircraft bombs
(C) lost later due to operational dif- bg bombed on ground
ficulties which would not have caused r rammed
the loss of the plane were it not
damaged by enemy action. Source of Information
(D) lost later due to operational dif-
ficulties which had no relation to cmr consolidated mission
the enemy action and in which E/A repert.
had no influence. pi personal interview.
I wor walkout report
. (Gl
I(Ap
Bombed on ground at advance base.
l.oet over targot - enemy ectluu 'pl'ob.
st statistical summary

-_
,, (H Headed to Russia
H - high 0 - level L-- Low.
.. --------~
 1.PP8'Elll I

Clif.RT III

COI.13:.T· LOSSES vs DIHEC'rlm: OF ATTACK.,

Front Right Side HeRr Left Side. Total

il 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
( High 3 6 2 1 1 13
Level 1 2 3
Low 1 1 2
Uncer-
tain 1 1 2
- -- -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
Total 6 9 2 2 1
20
Direction of AttAck unknown ...... 4
24
Note :. It is probnble thF't nttRcks reported AS being from
2 o'clock were initnted from 12-1 but fell back to 2
o'clock when pressed home •

•• • -, ~.: • ~~ • i- '::-;i',; '0'

r _ '. . . . "::'"'t'~.: ••:

I' ' '~"'''.~~_,.<:',
 APPEND Ix: II

OPERATIONS ANAI;:§J.fLBP'ORT

Issuing Unit: Operations Analysis Section

XX Bomber Command
Title: TEE EB"trn:::r;A3I:.IT":l" OF THE
DEFE.."Sl'ilC i,'!.id:iENT OF 1m: B-29
Date: 16 January 1945
Identification: Report No. 11

. .. .
~;'. .".
.
':.~,
 APFTDIX II
T2 SSRVICEABI:.IT"! OF 1'0::;' !J:'::'3NSrv:: ARMAMENT OF 'I'!E B-29
. . .
Abstract:
.
The following teport is an evaluation of the service-
ability of the defensive arma~ent of the B-29 based on a
study of the malfunctions of the equipment occurring on
1lissions 1 to 26. .ill effort is made to present the data
and the manner in which the dat~ were accumulated in suf-
ficient detail so that gunnery enalysts might compere these
combat results '.,rith the results of vElrious service tests
of the equipment which havo beQ~ wBde and are being made
in the United States.
The report e:180 inc:"uQ',:::"; ~. ~:c·;ussion of the data as
they bear unan several iIilport&nt gunnery problems. Its
main conclusion is that the re~to control system of turrets
is satisfactory from the point of view of serviceability.
The data on lIissions 1-8 '.ere obtained from the bri&f
discussion of malfunctions given in the Gunnery Officers r
specia11st report. An improved reporting system was in-
stituted after Mission 9. For the purpose of quantitative
analysis, only Missions after 13 should be considered, for
the following reesons: (1) Tho new reporting system had
.
•
just become affective) (2) ThQ 20 mID cannon had been removed,
(3) The groups had just instituted certain common gunnery
procedures, procedures which to n large extent ure still
in effect, and (4) the groups had ~ained sufficient ex-
perience so th~t performance ufter Mission 13 can be con-
sidered typical of futuro combat perf.ormance.
.
Despite the cere taken to keep an exact record of
.
all malfunctions, some errors in reporting inevitably
occurred. It is believed however that these inaccuracies
were relatively small and were not significant enough to
alter any of the conclusions or cOl'\ments presented in this
report.
Discussion:
1. (Reference Ghart VII) On Missions 13-26, 380 guns
were unusable for self defense, 278 because of gun, charger,
and compressor malfunctions and 102 because of G.F.G. mal-
functions. During thase missions a total of 428.8 thousand
rounds Vlere fired in combat and in testing by approximately
•
8970 guns. Goefficiants which might be useful in comparing
this combat performanca with the performance of machine gun
equipment in other Air Forces or during service tcsts of
the B-29 equipment in the United States are as follows:
 2;71% guns out due to machine gun malfunctions
.39% charger an~ compresser malfunctions
l.l~ guns out due to C.F.C. malfunctions
4.23% guns out d-u;'-to ell causes
1130 rounds fired for each malfunction
The exact significance of this last coeff~c ien~ Is .
uncertain. In g0nerel it appears that on miSSlons lD WhlCh
considerable emmunition WaS expended, that a greater number
of" rounds per mal1'uDctiop W~8 obtained then on missions in
which little ammunitio:l vias Ecp0ncled._ This would tend to
indicate that if a gun te~t f~r6J ~ll right than there is
reasonable DssuraDce that It:. 7.: 1.j_ ,,;ont::nt~c to fire for
several hundr€ld rounds. 7:10 C:a ta bre too scant, however,
to make this e positive conclusion. Also it is known
that certain malfunctions only appeer after several hun-
dred rounds have been fired by the gun. The nurebar of rounds
fired before each mPlfunction occured, unfortunately, waS
not recorded.
2. (Reference Chart I) Of the 278 BBchine gun, charger
and compressor malfunctions, th~ largest cause was the ex-
treme low temperature encountered on tho 19th and G3rd Mis-
sions to Uukden. A reduction in such malfunctions in the
future is anticipated, however, now that more 9tri~gent
measures are being taken to insurt proper lubrication and
adjustment of the gun. Although thG 134 machine guns out
on these two missions constituted a serious loss to our •
defensGs, they were scercely significant compared to the
effect of the frost on tho gunnerf' windows. You can't
shoot any planes dovm if you can't soe them.
3. (Reference Chart I) Obvious Personnel Failures were
the next greetcst Cause for ·1088 of guns. This source can
be reduced by ~re~tcr vigilence but it is probable that a
few such malfunctions will always be with us at least until
perfect burnen bein0s corne along.
4. (Referencc Chart V) There is no obvious trend in
the number of machine gun, charger, and co~pressor malfunc-
tio"ns othar than those ment;ioned above. The installation
of new link ~jcction chutes, new ammunition feedguides,
and the relocation of tho ammwlition feed deflectors after
the 13th mission has not eli~inated ~,unition and link jams.
The absencc of a trond and the fact that thc four Groups
all report a similc:r number of malfunctions despite dif~'?" ,'. __
ferences in maintenance mothods indicetes that we are '
approaching the minimum percentage of malfunctions in-
herent to remotcly operatod 50 calibre machine guns.

_. --'-'"'' , _ _------~
!\-"CT :,~: U I ( II

5. (Reforence Charts II &V) The C.F.C. System

hes been resDonsible for only 2~ of the guns out during
Missions after No. 13. Thi9 is e connidcrable decreaso
from tho earlier missions during 'hich C.F.C. Mal-
function, were responsible for about 45~: of tho guns
out. It indicates that the gre~tost efforts to de- ,
crease defensive arnament ~8lfw1ctions should be directed
towards improving the mcintcnance of m£chine guns and
associated bquipncnt.
O. (Reference Ch0rt IV) The nUmber of instcnces
of renairs to both the ~a0hino ~lms and the C.F.C.
System accompiLisr.ed (luring i'li~lllj 8ppoer to ju'stify
the presence of u gu..'11Jer t':·F'i:]":"'l.l. a~ a maintenance men
as a f!le!!lber of the cOr:lbet t.~·e\'"
7. (Reference Chert I;I::.:) Thb instcnces ef fa "lty
computers or sights which required e~thGr n transfer
of control or the use of the sight without the computer
appe~rs to justify the toacning of (In emorgency sighting
system. The fact that these instanc.es have ,been rel-
atively few, however, must be considered in training end
considerably gr~ater emphasis should be given to training
in the uso of tho sight with the coaputer than without
the computer.
8. Now thet supplies are cvailable, the cOMputer
shops aro able to ~eintain tho computers without the
frantic offort raquired durinG the eerlier de.ys. In the
past sone particuler component of tho cOl!1puter WQS the
source of a bulk of the malfunctIons. FOIl example there
was u wave of sticky gyro contacts, W60k motors, end
more recently rusted axis convertors. Action taken on
the unsetisfactory reports turned in by the Computer
Officers combined with the efforts of the General Electric
Technical Reprosentetives h~vc sJrved to bring about
most of the necesssry nodificetions. The computers
are now kept withfn thd tolerances specified in the G.E.
Computor M2nUGl without much difficulty.
9. The oircrGft have been holding thoir harmonization
vory well, Unless sonetlling violent happens to the sight
such as attends a blown blister or e. severe jur, it is
r~re tlwt the hQrmonizution chengcs more than two or three
mils. Similerly the turret levels have been holding satis-
fe.ctorily. Ono squadron reports but two inst€lnces in which
turret leveling was nocessary F.nd in both cases the shifts
were only of tho ordor of 3 Cl11s. Ilost squadrons check
harmonization at least onco a month. The middle distance
target procedure is employed by nmst squadrons but several
squadrons use and prefer the .distent target !'lethod. An
effort will be modo to ooouro moro Quantitiativo data on
harmonization end level cheng~~. -
 ,

( 10. 'l;'he. discussion in ~his report pertuins only to

tho mechanical' operction of tho C.F.O. system and tho COI:l~
puters end do not in coy \~y becr on tho qU8stion of the"
c.ccurecy or effectiveness of the complete gunnery system.
An overall BV llw."tion of the accuracy or effectiveness of
the equipncnt including tho coe.putcrs as compo.rod with other
gunnery s)'sterls might possibly be made en the basis of enemy
planes destroyed in conbnt but reliable absolute measurements
of accur.ncy would roquire fecilities end I!lf±npower not avail-
able in this theatre.
Conclusion:
In view of the rc12tively small number of n~lfunetiens
occuring during cornbet use of the defensive armament oquip-
rr.ent and in vim', of the fact that tho e,quipnent has baen
rnainteined without excessive effort, it is concluded that
the renote control turret system of the B-29 is satisfactory
from the point of view of scrvicufibility.

(:t (Jv'1I t --F (t.... J....ulA./

ALEX E. S. GREEN
Oporstions Analyst
f.PP20VED:
-,
t./,vVl«j..:~ i.. . r/I("~
~!AlaLWN M. JEFF'l:.:RS
Chief, Operations Analysis Section

-iv-
 !2JP~:NDI!: II

l!OTE

This renort on the 3erviceebility of the

Defensive Araament of the B-29 was distributed
to ell Gunnery, Itrmament Officers, C.F.C. and
. .
ComJuter ShOD Officers of this Command for
comment.
~6 above ~ntioned officers of the Bomber
Command, of the 40th GrOll, ths 452nd Group, end
the 458th Group heve read the contents of this
report and in ell ceses have indicated thet
they concur with the conclusions and discussion
therein. The following comments were made by
the 444th Group:

"This Group agreds with all· the conclusions

and discussion in this report, but desires
to make the following commonts:
(1) Guns in this Group are loaded "het".
There exists. the possibility, therofore, of
more thun .39% charger and compressor mal-
functions.
(2) The greatest source of machine gun
malfunctions is the feading process.
(3) It is agreed th1\t the emergency
sighting methods arc excellent, but their use is
bec0~inB very rare due to good computer main-
tenance. Very little tine should be snont in
giving this training to gunners." -

•
 C!Ii·.RT I

FREQ,UEl·:CY OF VARIOUS TYP"S OF HJ.CHllr-<: GUN "

C:lA!lGE R AND COMPRESSOR 1lALFUNCTIOl:S
TyPe Remarks
57 Cold Weather Improper lUbrication, oil buffer
Malfunctions setting
51 arsonnel Failures Improper assembly, omitted parts,
faulty head space adjustoont
and timing. and fa ilure to aet re-
aet buttons.
36 Ammunition Jams ~minly connected with feed chutes -
included three jams caused by evasive
action.
32 Compressor Mainly compressor motor difficulties
but includes faulty pressure switChes,
and leaky pressure lines.
27 Link Jams Mainly link chutes and link stripper
26 Charger l:ainly electrical connections to timer
motor and solenoids - includes instances.
.' of gas port Obstructions, piston disen-
ga ed from springs and malaligned
chargers ..
22 Faulty Ammunition Rusted amnunition, burst cartridges, and
short rounds before short round elimin-
ators were installed.
16 Extractors Broken extra c tora
11 Faulty Links Broken and be'lt
t
MISCELLANEOUS :
15 20 mm cannon Includes all r~lfunctions of 20 mm,
failures missions 1-6, mostly due to M1 feed
mechanism and small gas ports.
,
14 Firing airouit Relays and trigger switches
., Booster Motor Primarily caused by smmunition jams
and vibration of ammunition in tail
mount in conjunction with incorrect
switch settings on booster motor.
L-_. =_- ._
.._
(Chart I, oont'd)
!i2... Typa Romarks
3 Short Round Eliminator Includes two improperly installed
short round eliminators.
3 Firing Solenoids Inoludes two frozen firing solenoids.
3 oover latches ,
2 Driving Springs
2 Firing Pins
2 Eelt feed levers
1 ~orn cocking liner
1 :fuak belt holding pawl
1 Broken bolt stud
1 Certridge stop
1 Broken barrel extension
1 Burred T slot ..
1 Runswey gun
1 I~o Jam ce~sed by protruding bolt
1 Bgund stuck in barrel
40 Unknown - no cause for malfunction determinable
17 Unknown - Anelysis not recorded
 ._- .- ~ .

.
CHAR'lI :1;,1
I
FRE~u"rcY OF V ',P.IOU3 TYP3S OF C .~.• C. IJALFU11dTIONS

No, Type R€!ill§.r.£l

14 Dynamotors Burned Qut bearinr,s, shortod and open

coils, faulty grou.nds.
13. Selsyns Loose caps,\ faulty contects, leads, and
shol'teG and open coils.
12 Limit switches Loose ccm~ec t:or and corroded contacts
and connectors
10 ,'rnlplidynes Fa.ulty bearings t brushes, aoj,l failures
and faulty gro~nds.
7 Control Box Faulty switches, relays and capacitors.

6 Well Switches Failure of actuator \0 close microswi tohes

and loose cop-nections.
3 Drive Kotara Foulty bearings and brushes
·'
3 Cannon plugs Loosa pins und retaini!lg rings, bra.ken
and connectors solder joints.
3 Servo Tubes, "burned out resistors, capacitors
3 Latching Bent pJ.ungers and faulty solenoids
Mechanism

3 Cables and Broker. cables

Wires
5 Improperly operated

15 Unknm4ffi no cause for malfunctions determinable.

 os "

CHi.P.T III
COIM?U:r.ERGYf'.O ...J]U?IGHT .vW.J'UNCTJ~

NOI Type Remarks

14 Computer A~inly obvious malfunctions revealed by
hunting of turrets or gross malalignments
observable by tracers. Thr&8 instances of
low te~p~r&tura malfunctions.
(1.
! 9 Sight Alainly stic~y discs causing target dimension
dial to movf. Many of these malfunctions
were later- ~(,::,:,"r;uted by increasing friction
on target d~illJnsion diel .
; ., Gyro ~ainly broken sprinss or other faults which
cause hunting.

; Comments: In each of these instancas transfer of control, use of

position firing, or tracer sight ins was necessary.

It
It $ • ..... 4j. ,

,,
 -_.
Crl.'llI' IV

P.EP
__ _ ,IRS
__ ACbOW?LISllED
__ ~
IN__FLIGHT
--. ~• __ _A
.~

Connnents: ReAdily accomplished repairs of CFC System are

frequently not recordod.
_____-=..::..:...:-.:...:.:..~_=.:.:_.....::...::..:.:.:..:.:,..:.:--~--------.--~"~,
_-11

•
 GH:.I,T V
I'"f....., .... 'r'lT""
' -.. II - ---
MACHDJT; CUN C!lAP.GER f.ND COMPR:::SSOR
!'..'.LF:Tl:CTI01:S ?O!': russ IONS 1-26
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- .---r---'--- - - - - -
1 ' 3 18 27
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1 2 2 3 7 3 24
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5
6 15
2 3 2 1 7
7 2 18
8 1 3 3 2 2 0 4 0 1

2 1 1 8 2 1 1 1 1 19
9 1
1 1 2 1 4 2 11
10
1 2 1 1 2 7
11'013-
12
,
5 6 2 2 3 1 1 2 22
13
4 1 5 4 14
14 3 3 26
15 4 2 4 1 2 3 2 2
3 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 13
16
4 2 2 2 2 1 1 13 27
17
18
19
-28 8
4
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4 3 1 2 1 6 ~ 52
23 29 3
24 1 2 1 2 ~
6

25 3 3 0 1 4 11
26 1 1 2

13-26'.57 39 23 23 14 18 17 14 8 36 29 278
Total'

1-26 , 57 399
. Tota1'57 51 27 38 18 32 26 22 11 60

_.-
•
 --I
,
APl"':"lJIX II
C.F •.9_'__ I!AI1W1Cl'IONS
OJ

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7 1 2 1 ]. 5 1
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9 1 1 2 6 1 11 3
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18 2 1 3 1
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20 2 2
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22 1 1 2 1
23 1 4 5 1
24 1 1
25 1 a 3
215 0 J.

Total 7 5 6 6 4 13 10
13-215 51 19
Total
1-26 13 14 10 7 12 26 15 97 30
 Sutr'ARY -",!!:!=~",,-,=.o.::,,-,"..!i<j",-

-CH.ART VII.
•
~ 11
'" "
,..., 00
• -"g
~ w"'"
r:>,m
'"
CJ
.....•• .....'"...
"
I-<
§ ;4.0
..... wa
o
....
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""
S1 j~ ~ g"
1 93 ,,
2 (\3 27 4 31
3 18 .
4 93 23.9 1.2 25.1 - 24 16 40
5 53
6 19.9 1.2 12
28
7 74 10.7 33 43.7 - 15 12 27
8 103 19.0 25.6 44.6 - 19 16 35
9 109 (46.5) 46.5 22 20 42
10 128 11.4 11.4 7 14 21
11 71 (17.8 ) 17.8 8 16 24
12 29 ( 7.9) 7.9
13 75 10.8 53.4 64.2 740 463 750 22 10 32
14 48 8,4 3.6 12.0 356 96 400 14 2 16
15 74 19.7 8.5 28.2 576 268 740 26 10 36
16 90 11.8 10.8 22.6 766 188 900 13 6 19
17 93 7.8 51.5 59.1 804 578 930 27 14 41
18 58 8.6 7.8 16.4 528 200 580 19 !'> 25
19 95 7.5 81.1 88.6 850 751 950 52 20 72
20 48 5.5 .5 .5 408 14 420 2 4 6

21 89 6.7 15.7 22.4 842 526 940 22 8 30

22 45 4.4 13.9 18.3 358 228 490 10 4 14
23 49 4.8 42.6 47.4 436 400 530 52 10 62
24 47 8.4 6.8 15.2 442 146 442 6 2 o
25 48 4.3 25.1 29.9 482 220 482 11 6 17
26 46"... 3 .• 0... 0 4.0 416 0 416 2 e 2 '.

--------
Total
Missions 428.8 8970 278 102 380
13-26
 JU'YriKi)lX III
-
•
Q!§Q.\iSSIO· 0 -
THE USE OF S1'RIPPED AJRORAFT
--
Acoording to information available here, the 315th
Wing vlill s!lo:'tl] be reac.y for 'J:)PJbat. ';:lhe aircraft of this
Wing will have as sale cf':fcnsiv8 a:;"fll'lnlOnt teil turrets equip-
ped with AN/;~G-l~ radar tail gl~ signt. They will be used
for night bombing missions ~n Japan. .
It has been su~-'csted th~t consideration also be given to
the use of such stri~n€ld ai:~cr':!.'f)u for dayliBht bombing at
higher siti tudes. Tile I'oa ,nr. in'; behind thiE sugGestion is
as follO-rIS: The teil tu7T . .·r. \.~.1_}_ .!)fcnd tho aircraft
against rear attr.cl"G<, B~ln~ he.i.... . . 5:".10 guns \":ill defend the
B-29 t s w~o.inst UIlCo~nt.:;"onu:. !.;.~··.I:?Gl~O by enomy aircraft vii th
offset cuns Cr floxin~o g~'s. Evasi7~ action will be used
egainst frontal c: ttac l -: and be&r,{ pt:Xsui t curves. The in-
e·rea sed speed will really provide the r'.ai:q. protec tion (a)
by reducir"'.£. th0 toto.l nU'1bor of £tt.J.cks, t b) by foroin
the 'Jursuit curve att(:cl:s towe.rc1s t118 rear quarter due to
the. higher ecccl€)r~tions, (c) by ~.18J-:ing Qvnsivo action
more effective.
In eddi tiol.i. t:10 f'ollo\'Jinc rey bo edv(:).nced to support
the use of stril~n0d hombors. The bomb lO::.ld 'lJhich may be
carried by a strlp-}cd aircreft on a long nission is about
three tiflCS as groat ciS t.h~:t c~rriod by a ste.ndr,rd aircraft.
Thu!3 the cffect~_ve strildng pO'l,'er of the forco on each wis-
sion is increas0d anproJ:L"12.t01~r tl1roe-fold.'l A greater than
• Ithree-fold reduction of operational losses (Which a~e res-
ponsible for a l~rgc portion of prvsent losses) :'o!' a given
tonnage of bombs may be anticipated~ sinCE the stri~Ded
aircraft may often suoceed in rct~rTIing to their base after
certein operational failures which will cause the loss of a
standard aircraft~ !n vic~ o~ the ebove, the attacking
force can effard to sustaIn ~onsidor2bly [reater combat
losses per mission then ere pr£scntly sustained. (It is
assumed thet the to~r of duty of conbat personnel is re~
duced to ~ompens8ce for the Brcatc~ hazards of a mission.)
The considercble experience of this Commend with
standard aircreft should be of gre~t value in estimatine the
advantage to be gcined by the opar~~ional use of stripped
B-29's. For 8xanple i t can be dcnonstrated that the present
tail turret alone will not provide sufficient protection
against rG8r e tt<:..cLs. Durin£, i'.:issions 1-25 of the "IX Bomber
Command the bulk of the protection agniust roar attacks waS
afforded by the si.ele and top gunners vlho d"stroyed, probably
destroyed or daneGed 105 of the 557 aircraft attacking from
4-8 o'clock. The tail ·unner destroyed, probably deRtroyed
 .
.
I" ' . " .

.' .
..,-.;
'
" -\
...
'
.~
,. .
..
F·"'~;:'.:"~
....
, - •
or damaged 71 of the enemy aircref~. The characteristics •
of rear quarter attacks by first line Japanese aircraft
will not be changed very £reatly by the additional operating
speed and altitude of the stripped aircraft. Thus a marked
increase in the number and aggressiveness of attacks between
8-7 o'clock and 4-5 o'clock will probably be the consequence
of the use of striDped aircraft with the present tail tur-
rets.
:Sven if striryped aircraft t.lith wide angle tail turrets
are employed it would be 0:r.trerflely danGerous to bomb singly
as a coordinatod Dttack by two or three enemy fighters would
al~ost certainly rosult in considerable damage to our air-
craft. HOl-;evar a three or norc plane formation or such air-
craft, properl? flQ1.vn, would 1:1;) protected ar;ainst rear attack
as adequately as a sinilar for.",.tion of the present fully
armed e.ircraft. AssuminG therefore that these strippod air-
craft with well designed tail turrets do go over in formation
at higher altitude and greater speed, we may ask the question,
will they not be just as vulnerable to nose attaCkS, r~w the
most dangerous, as are the present aircraft? Tre answer.is
that they will probably be even more vulnerable than are the
present planes, for the reasons that follow:
1. ' The characteristics of nose attacks will not be
changed very much by an altoration of the closing speed from
600 to about 700 mph.
2. Without effective frontal opposition tho Jan ~ilotQ
will come in on a do~d ahead course and nanage to fire eff~t~
ivaly at our aircraft for about three seconds. Tl,ey'will have
a better opportunity to use aerial bo~bs and rockets.
3. It is doubtful whother evasive action will be succes-
sful against certain coordinated frontal attacks. On the
bombihg run evasivo action can not be used.
4. If small fornations are employed then enemy aircraft
making a frontal attack will not attempt to turn and oake
another pass but will merely wait !or the next formation over,
the target. Thus even second rete enemy aircreft which managt:""
to climb to altitude prior to the arrival of the bombers will
be able to make sevaral passes at our aircraft. The advantage
therefore of reducing the total nunber of exposures to enemy
attacks on a basis of total bomb tonnage hy the use of
stripped aircraft is largely lost inasmuch as enemy aircraft
can nake many Bore passes por missions on small formations.
The present tactic of the ];X B·,,'ber Connand cf getting all
the aircraft over the targot in a short space of time with
the lm'18st form..ation over first is ref,arded as one of "the
most effective single measurGS in reducing our losses.

-i1-

,
 .' .... •. ,.." . ":':!' 'J);'.
, - fi ~ Ex-en if lar.gc'for1!l8 tions of -s tripped.·.aircr~r.t,· arc
employed &pd' ~ol)t ov;er·. the _targa~. in rapid succession" our
aircraft"are $1;ill vll~nerabla to v'ell p~an!',ed f"ontal' " '
attacks, '\'Q.tlt'Jgvns,. ro·clc.ets, hOIJ;Lbs or a~rcreft 'int~n,t';upon
collision. E~asive' action \;'111. bEl j..r.lpractical •. H~~ever
the total nunbor of exposures to such attacks will be re-
duced.
. Desnite the above nCGLtive conclusions dra\Vll from the
combat';experi~nc() of this Come.18.nd, the advantElges of stripping
n o~ur airc'raft ifl terns of Qxtra banh load as judGed from the
Alamo&ordo tests apgears so intriguing that certain dom-
p~ornise measures of that nature should be considered. The
fqllO\ving are some possible cC)j'1proI!lisG mGas]lres~ ..
, ,
1; "The airoraft shadd be stri.pped of the upper and
lorwr rear turrets and Q vell G.0signed fotJ.r gun tai1 turret
should 'be installed in ~luco of tho prasent one. ~ne two
side blister positions should un rc~oved. T~c top position
should be rotained with pr~~£ry control of thA four gun
upper forward tursot and secondary control of the tail tur-
ret. T,is change could be eccooplished in the near future.
It vlOuld clenn the -acrodynamics of the airplane by the
re~val of four bunps, save a fnir a~ount of neight without
sacrificing the defensibj.lity of the aircraft.
2. Ar_ n]t~rn6te more dra~tic comnronise neasure would
b~ to send over ~trippod e.ir91e.nes 'with a vlide angle tail
turret accof'1pr.nied by fully "rned 13-29'0 or long range
escort f~Ghters dis~osed in such a nenner 8S to afford the
full weiGht of their,~rotection against frontal attacks.
This idc~ of h.&vin:; .l].~,?YJ.+Y €n;r1ed eSc~9rt bonbers carr¥ing
only 8 llght bO!"lh' lotld or none at all pr<;>ved unsuccessful
over Gcr1!lany unj.!lg YB-40 f s. The high S90ed of the :?_gg,
its improved gunnery system and the fact that the rear bombers
will be able to defcnd thcrmelvcs against rea!' attacks ?re
probably Guffi6i€nt factors to euarnntea the succeso'of the
escort aircraft principle to the B-29's.
, ."
Let uS ansu..rue the ene.:~y aircraft intends to, Make a' ,
SrOP.tel assault a~ainst the stripped fornation by ov~rtaking
, it ~.nd ·'turning int'o e head on attac:;. In order to maneuver
into a direct heed on attack it vdll be n"ecessarv for the
fighter to mako his turn in SOma 4000 to 6000 ya~ds in front
of th~'st~ipped forgetion. tf the arned escort aircraft are
disposed,about 1000 rds in front of. the stripped formation
the enany eircraft will of necessi.ty'comc into_tile field of
tlleir guns bef?re rel:ching the s,tripped ai)?crsf:t., .,:rho·
armed escort wlll frctluenu!y" have lou 'relativo matI'on shots
at the enomy aircraft When ~t ~s ~~ni~g~into its attack.
-,

L- ~_~ _
 "

The stripped aircraft following the escort aircraft

should be deployed in such u nanuer 8S to afford a ninimum •
number of tArgets to any fighter than nanages to pass t~e
front line of defense. The following exaBple of a posslble
formation of escort and stripped aircraft is suggested bere •
merely 85 a bas1s for discussion!
TOP VJ3W
----'--
X X X X X
X X X
X X X X X
X X X
X J( -- X
X X
X X X
X X X X X
X X X
x X X X X

1st Escort 2nd Escort Flight A Flight B Flight C

Flight Flight
SIDE VIEW
---~

" 1200 ' > l'lMIt ,

300" •
, :!.- 600' > JIOO[
I 300'~
, - - - 2400' t>'T '1800' ~-- JIlMN
,

The theory behind this array is as follows:

1. I f a fighter aanages to get through the escort aircraft
undamaged he then Dust quickly select an aircraft in one of the
flights on which to line his guns. If he does not succeed in
da~ging thet aircraft he has no further opportunity to fire at
another aircraft.
2. If an enemy pilot, wounded in getting through the front
defenses; decides to ram, he Dust again select a single aircraft
to attack. If he misjudges his course or the B-29 pilot succeeds
in taking effective evasive action, he will have no further
opportunity to ram another aircraft.
•
3. If an eneny fighter is knocked out of control by the
escort aircraft. the rear formation is open enough to keep the
probability of collision relatively small.
 Assuning for R nonent that no ~ecial long range escort
• aircraft are now available, let us consider how an arnad esoort
B-29 should be equipped to protect stripped formations agRinst
frontal assaults. The simplest system which should provide as
adequate protection as possible is as follows:
1. 4 Gun Wide angle Nose turret controlled by Nose gunner.
2. 4 Gun Tail turret controlled by TGil gunner and Top
gunner.
3. 4 GlL' Upper Forwcrd turret controlled by Top gunner and
Nose gunner (
If a nose turret is u.na-;ra:laole the following arrangment whic·
can be acconplished in the near future will probably serve well:
1. 4 Gun upper forward turret oontrolled by Nose or Top
gunner.
2. 4 Gun upper aft turret controlled by Top gunner.

3. 2 Gun lower forward controlled by nose gunner.

4. Wide angle 4 gun tail turret controlled by Tail gunner.
Standard B-29's with a 4 gun upper forward turret, an improved
Wide angle tail turret and stripped of the lower aft turret and
·
• blister sighting positions would serve Qoderately well as escort
aircraft to prevent the Japanese from enhancing markedly the
effectiveness of their frontal attacks against the stripped air-
craft 0

·Perhaps the above steps are too mild and we should really go
all out in the matter of making B-29's into heavily armed escort
aircraft. In that event the present standard arQed B-29 is a very

, good start. All the present sighting stations should be retained

but the turrets should all be changed to 4 gun turrets. A wide
angle tail turret should replace the present one. In addition
a wide angle nose turret shOUld be installed. It probably would
be necessary to strip the aircraft of all its bombing equipment.
If special long range escort fighter aircraft are available
then in addition to fixed guns it is highly important that they
have strong fire power in the forn of flexible guns. These are
• necessary as in most frontal attacks it would be impossible for
the escort fighter to point at the attacking fighter for a
effective length of time without stalling or breaking out of
formation. Perhaps P61's or the new /.25's can be quickly modified
to serve this purpose 0

-v-
 ,

DISC..!L::;§ION ON DISPllRS..lQll '

From the data on the causes of enemy losses it appears safe

to make the assumption that enemy pianos are uncondi.tionally
Vulnerable. The dispersion of the gems of the B-29 should
be therefore ad,iusted to maximize tho probability of a siJl!~le
hit in the vulnerable region, and it will, depend both on the
standard aiming error and the angle subtended by the vulnerable
region of the enemy aircraft.
,
A very smell pattern is undesirable ao the chance that the
stream of projectiles will entirely miss the target is large.
On the other hand a very large· pattern is also undesirable since
the chance that the t~rget will be missed because of the wide
dispersion of bullets is Inrge. Between the two extremes is an
optimum Value for the bullet dispersion which depends on the
size or the vulnerable portion of the targot and the gun aiming
errors.
The follawi.ng 8pproxiJnate formula for optimum dispersion
is applicable for bursts of from 20-80 rounds providing, as is
penerally the cese, that the angle subtended by the vulnerable
lJlortions of the target is small compared vil.th the standard aiming
error. It was deduced from an empirical formula presented in
a bombing study "AMP Report 10.2R" ontitled "Scatter Bombing of
a Circular Ta!get ';.

Where d is the diameter in feet of the VUlnerable portion of the

enemy aircraft (assumed to be circular)
D is the range of the enemy aircraft in thousands of feet
at midpoint of the burst.
, <:/',. is standard aiming error in mils.
s is standard gun dispersion error in mils.
This formula assumes a circular Gaussian distribution of the
aiming and dispersion errors.
According to studies made at Alamogordo, the standard
cirCUlar gun pointing error in the nose cone is approximately 25
mils. Assuming the eqUivalent vulnerable circular area presented
by a Jap fighter to have a diameter of 4 feet and assuming that it
is essential to stop a Jap fighter making a nose attack at· about
1.5 thousand feet, then the optimum dispersion is calculated to be
approximately 9 mils. The present two gun turrets have standard
gun dispersion of approximately 2.5 mils or only 28% of the
optimum value. The values used in th~ above sample calculation
I, , .......
APPENDIX rl (Cont' d)

were ohosen oonservatively to indica to the trend. It appears

definitely to be the case th6t we have oarried the oonoept of
ooncentration of fire too far and that we are now in the
position of a hunter using,a rifle rather than a shot gun ,
to shoot at ducks. It is worth remarking hore that tho use of
a 4 gun turret more tha11 doubles t~he effectiveness of the front
turret since not only CGn twice as many bullets bo thro;<ll out
but the dispersion pattern is larger and closer to the optimum
one.

'.

'.
 f...PPENDIX V

SU<;GESTIC'N
. - FOR
- - -i,-SIGH SPEED NOSE CC! iPUTER
•
In a ~rlcntioth Air Force Operations Analysis Report, dAted
23 Octobur 1944 entitlod "A L1.('htweight Radar Computar Com-
bination for the B-29 R.C.T. System'·', a cOf.'!puter is suggested
Which would olimincte nPDroxime~oly 4/5 of the mechanism of
the present computer by the use of a simple cam assembly to
insert the ballistic and parallax correctionS. No information
is available here BS to what &ction h~s been t2ken with
reg~rd to that proposal.

~ very peculiar coincidence concerning the relative

magnitudes and directions of the bullet trail and parallax
corrections for the two for~3rd turrets wben controlled by
the nose sighting station provides a me"ns of drastically
simplifying tho proponod simplified comput8r. ~ ball mounted
on a screw replaces the bnllistic parallax cam assembly.
The besis for this latter stmplification is the fact that
for this sight-turret co~bination over the entire tactical renge
of operating speeds and altitudes of the prose~t B-29, and for
ell ranees which ~e no~ ~andled by the present gunnery equip-
ment, the sum of the bul16t trail and parall~x corrections P1e.y
be viri tten -as
22 sin A (mils)
where A is the angle of tile tc:rGGt 'with respect to the line
.' of flir.ht of the aircrnft •
The proof of this fact folloVls:
The approxi' ete formula for the parallax correction for
the forward turrets ~hen cor-trolled by the nose sighting station
is:
15
I i sin A (mils)
where D is the future range 'in units of a thousand feet.
By insarting ballistic constants for .50 caliber aQffiunition
in a formula for bullet trail given in Research BUlletin 106
Research Division, Laredo Ar~y Air Field, or fJ4P Memo l04-2M'
and aoproxirMting the higher order terms by the use of average
val~~sJ the formula for bullet trail r.my be written es .
• !l.O ".VID sin A (mils). Where VI is the indicated air speed
in un1tS of hundred aules per hov~ and f· is the relative
ai~ density.
 The sum of the bullet trail and the parallax correction
may be written as: 4

15
- ..-I;';~';
'. "rj VI D) sin A
D+ .

Over a great variet.y.of cirCll.r.lstances the quantity Y? VI

is rolatively constant. Consider for eXA~?le two v~ry extreme
values for this product anu 811 average .value.

Vi • 1.75 and .
", - .!:'7 (35000 ft • elt) rare, in
combat.
., . . •67 (25000 ft • alt) typical in
Vi • 2.00 and ~

combat.
,...
Vi - 2.25 and - •80 (14000 ft • alt) rare in
combat.
In the 1st instance (minimum trail) the correction formula may
15 + 5.0D) sin A
be written as (-1i
In the 2nd instence (average trail). it may be written as
-n
( 15 ~ 6,7D) sin A
In' the 3rd instance (maximum trail) it nay be written as

-n + 9.0D)
( 15
sin A

The range of interost on nos~ Dttacks is from D = 1000 "

yards to D • 250 yards. The upper limit is a:)proximatel.y the
future range if the gunner opens fire at 1500 yards on a
targe t clo sing a tara te of 650 fj1ile s per hour true air
speed (Le. the bullets i.f aimed correctly will. strike the '.
target at approximately 1000 yards away from the bomber. )
The lower limit if; set by the li''':'li tations of certain components
of the present computer which will still be necessary in the
proposed computer. .
BAlLISTIC CODW.CTIO~T AND PAP AUJJ. CO,"RECTION
(m nLS 1 E'OR 1JJ.RI0US RANGES

RAl-:C'::S IF TlTtT-Sb.ND FEET .75 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

PARALIJ.X CO"R":CTION 20 15 10 7.5 6.0 5.0
TRAn, Un:";R LI1.HT 3.8 5.0 7.6 10.1 12.6 15.2
TRAIL AVF.RAGE 5.0 6.7 10,,0 13.4 16.8 20.1
'!'RAn UPP~R LIED' 6.7 9.0 13.5 18.0 22.5 27.0
SUll ~L!:L AND PA...~ALLAX AVY:
LO"'ER LIMIT 23.8 20.0 17.6 17.6 18.6 20.220
l:VERAGE 25.0 21.7 20.0· . 20,9 22.8 25.0 22
UPP~R LlHIT 26.7 24.0 23.5 25.5 28.5 32.0 26
_.~-.....--_. --_. --_.. ---_._ .. -----
----.- -- ."--- ._- .
 The above swns represent the bel ',stH) and parallax correction
when A is 900. As practically all frontal attacks are confined
within a 300 cone of the nose, .t.he actual values of the total
correction are generally less than half the values given in
• the table and the~etore the d0vietio~s from the average values
are less than half the deviations at 90 0 1
Although for extreme precision it v,Jould be v'mll to have
the mechanism which Inserts the deflection slightly adjustable
for altitude and indicated airspeed, in actual practice the
extremes given as eX8.D1:)los will rarely be met s6 that a fixed
coefficient could be used with negligible error.
It is necessary in addition to the above mentioned cor-
rections to insert compensation for bullet drop which over the
ranges of interest mny be given by the formula
2.5 D sin ~ where Z is the zenith angle.
The three corrections, bullet trnil, parallax, and gr8vity drop
may be inserted by the offset point method in the manner sug-
gested in the Operations Analysis £\Iemorandwn dated 23 .October
1944. However in place of the Ballistic Parallax Computer
controlling the position of the ball of the universal joint,
a vertical screw will raise and lo~er the oa11 according to th~
range for gravity drop correction. A fixed or slightly adjust-
able offset along the line of flight will automatically insert·
the bullet trail and parallax correction. The screw assembly
mounting the ball should be maintained invariant by the use of
•• a stationary shaft alonG the vertical axis of the sight yoke,
An alternate arrangen~nt would be to mount the screw assembly on
the eight yoke and use couplin" with an azimuth gear to Iilainta'i'
the offset parallel to the line of flight of the aircraft.

In all othor r8spects the details given in the Operations

~'.nalysis Memorandum can be followed. All advantages inclUding
weight reduction, quick action, and an emergency sighting sys-
tem, obta inable by use of the other computar would be obtained

•
with this more si".lplified vors.ton, which is however applicable
only to the nose sighting station. '
~~ny other arrang~nts may be used for inserting the Bul-
let Trail ~arallax correction given by 22 sin A. For example
a mechanism similar to the K13 sight might be employed. How-
ever another method for inserting the erevity drop deflection
must then bo devIsod.
It is suggested that the above computer be used in coo-
jWlction with automatic ranginr. by radar. A simple rate ranging
• stadio~etric device mi~ht however be used in the immediate
future with consideraole effectiveness or as an emergency
mechanism with tho ARD equipment.
 A proposed method of stadiometrie ranging is as
follows. The sight should have two fixed retioule circles, •
one of 8 mils diameter and a second of 15 mils diameter.
The gunner should use the inner circle to estimate when
the enemy aircraft is at 1500 yards Ifor a 36 ft. fighter •
the wing tips vrould just »ouch this oircle.) He should press
his trigger at this point. The action of pressing the
trigger in addition to firing the guns would at the same
time start a rate ~tor to turn out range to the time of
flight network potentiometers and to the gravity correct~on
screw. The rate should be in 0X08SS of antic.ipated closl.ng
rates so that the range output will reach the 800 yard
position just slightly before tho enemy aircraft comes to
800 yards as indicated by its filling the 15 mil circle.
T!lO r:-:'..'; .. \.'.It·':ut \'i0uld c.utomnticully stop at 800 yards
until the gunner ~oloas0s and again presses the trigger.
U")0r.. t:',; B,lC.j:;,d cIGsing of the trigger switch the range
motor'should start agein end turn tho range output to 250
yards. A convanient reversing switch should bo provided
to return the range output to 1500 yards at the end of an
attack. The operation of the sight would thus proceed as
follows:
On a frontal attack the gunner will track the target
smoothly until it reaches 1500 yards. The Runner will
then open fire holding hie trigger down until the target
grows to the size of the inner circle (at 800 yards ap-
proximately 2 seconds leter). At this time he will release
the trigger for an instant and press it again holding it
as long as the fighter continues to come in. .,
The ndvantaees of this ~vo stage mathod of rate ranging
by anticipating an avarage rate are as follows: ..
1) If the judGement of the gunner is good he will have
approximately the correct range input at all tiLles. If the
jUdgement of the gunner at the first circle is bad then the
range motor will be WHiting for him at 800 yards to match
range again.
2) The gunner haS a relatively simple and specific
problem, namely to determine the two instants when to press
his trigger and to track the target.
Although the above proposals are appli~e only to
.- this special turret-sight eombinetion for the special
operating conditions of a B-29 aircraft and gunnery eQuip- •
ment, the fact that they might be tho "quick and dirty"
solution to a very pressing problem,should warrant their
being given serious And Urraediete consideration.
•