CALDER V. BULL, 3 US (3 DALL.) 386
There are acts that exceed both a
(1978)
Brief Fact Summary.
After a probate court disapproved a will in
which Bull (Defendant) was named as a
beneficiary, allowing Calder (Plaintiff)) to
inherit instead, the state legislature passed a
resolution setting aside this decree and
providing for a new trial and right to appeal.
The will was approved in the new proceeding
and Plaintiff argued that the resolution
violated the constitutional prohibition on ex
post facto laws.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Even when not expressly prohibited by a
constitutional provision, a state legislature
may not deprive a citizen of a vested property
right.
Facts.
A state probate court disapproved a will
under which Defendant was to inherit. The
decree allowed for Plaintiff to inherit as an
heir at law. The state legislature then passed
a resolution setting this decree aside and
granting a new hearing. In this second
hearing, the will was approved. The Supreme
Court heard the case on appeal and
determined that this legislative act did not
violate article I, § 10 of the Constitution
because this constitutional provision is
limited to criminal legislation. The Court
then turned to the question of whether the
legislature was authorized to enact legislation
that deprives a citizen of a vested property
right.
Issue.
When not expressly prohibited by a provision
of the Constitution, may a state legislature act
to deprive a citizen of a vested property right?
Held.
(Chase, J.) No. Even when not expressly
prohibited by a constitutional provision, a
state legislature may not deprive a citizen of
a vested property right. In areas where the
Constitution does not expressly limit a state’s
legislative power, those powers are still not
unlimited.
federal and state legislature’s authority. The
government of the United States is based
upon a social contract and legislative acts that
contradict this contract’s fundamental
principles exceed legislative authority. One
of these fundamental principles is the
protection of personal property. A legislature
may not act to transfer property from one
individual to another. Because the original
decree of the probate court did not vest a right
in Plaintiff, the legislature’s act cannot be
said to deprive him of a vested property right.
Affirmed.
Concurrence.
(Iredell, J.) The propriety of legislative acts
must be evaluated under the scope of
legislative power laid out in federal and state
constitutions, not under “natural law” which
is not fixed or defined.
Discussion.
This case continues the evolution of the
vested rights doctrine, a doctrine that had
arisen out of the state courts. Under this
principle, as in this case, not all rights are
considered vested. The mere expectation of
property is not a vested right to that property.
An individual must hold title, either in law or
equity, to the present or future enjoyment of
property, or to the enforcement of a demand,
in order for the right to be vested.
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK, 198 US 48
(1905)
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner,
Lochner (Petitioner), was convicted of a
misdemeanor for violating the New York
state statute that limited the number of hours
a baker could work in a bakery.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may
interfere with a person’s right to contract for
his labor, only if such interference is
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose
such as the protection of public health, safety
or welfare.
Facts. New York passed a statute that limited
the number of hours a baker could work to no
more than 60 per week, or 10 hours per day.
Petitioner worked more than the stipulated
amount and was convicted of a misdemeanor.
Issue. Is the state’s interference with a
baker’s right to make a living by limiting the
number of hours worked in a week or day a
fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of
its police power?
Held. No. There is no reasonable ground for
interfering with the liberty of person or right
to contract, by determining the hours a baker
can work.
The right to purchase or sell labor is part of
the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment
of the United States Constitution
(Constitution).
Baker’s are persons capable of entering into
and making contracts for the sale of their
labor and skills.
The law as it was passed is not within the
police power of the state because it does not
relate to the public health or the health of
bakers.
Dissent. Both dissents see the statute as an
appropriate exercise of the state’s police
power, designed to protect the health of the
delicate manufacturing baker.
Justice Oliver Holmes (J. Holmes) disagrees
with the broad definition of “liberty.” He sees
this statute as the beginnings of labor laws
meant to protect the health of the worker by
prohibiting excessively long workweeks.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan), Justice Byron
White (J. White), and Justice Day (J. Day)
felt that the right to contract may be infringed
upon for the purpose of protecting a person’s
health. The baker is described as a fragile
worker who is susceptible to more health
ailments because of his unusual working
conditions and habits.
Discussion. The majority characterizes the
statute as an interference with a person’s right
to contract and earn a living. The idea that a
baker is an occupation that puts the public at
risk is dismissed as a simple notion. The
position is compared to those who work in a
steel foundry and coal mine. Clearly, those
workers are put in and put others in danger
when extremely fatigued.
PEOPLE V. POMAR
Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of
La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She
was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her
pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of
July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that
time, she was not given the salary due her in
violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071.
Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on
Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the
manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar,
herein defendant. The latter, on the other
hand, claims that the facts in the complaint
did not constitute an offense and further
alleges that the aforementioned provisions of
Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section
13, Act No. 3071 provides that, “Every
person, firm or corporation owning or
managing a factory, shop or place of labor of
any description shall be obliged to grant to
any woman employed by it as laborer who
may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with
pay before and another thirty days after
confinement: Provided, That the employer
shall not discharge such laborer without just
cause, under the penalty of being required to
pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two
months counting from the day of her
discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act
provides for the penalty of any violation of
section 13. The latter was enacted by the
legislature in the exercise of its supposed
Police Power with the purpose of
safeguarding the health of pregnant women
laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of
any description," and of insuring to them, to
a certain extent, reasonable support for one
month before and one month after their
delivery. The trial court rendered a decision
in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant
to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case of
insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
former decision.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Section 13 of Act
No. 3071 is unconstitutional; (2) Whether or
not the promulgation of the questioned
provision was a valid exercise of Police
Power.
Held: The Supreme Court declared Section
13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for
being violative or restrictive of the right of
the people to freely enter into contracts for
their affairs. It has been decided several
times, that the right to contract about one's
affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual,
protected by the "due process of law" clause
of the constitution. The contracting parties
may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions they may deem advisable,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals
or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad

and expanding power. The police power may
encompass every law for the restraint and
punishment of crimes, for the preservation of
the public peace, health, and morals. But that
power cannot grow faster than the
fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or
violate the express inhibition of the
constitution. The Police Power is subject to
and is controlled by the paramount authority
of the constitution of the state, and will not be
permitted to violate rights secured or
guaranteed by the latter.

Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople