Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REC NSIDERATI NS •
John O. Iatrides is professor emeritus of international politics at Southern Connecticut State University.
Historians disagree on the causes of the critics alike. Thus, for John L. Gaddis, his-
Cold War and differ widely in their assess- torian of the Cold War and Kennan’s biog-
ment of the significance of particular actions rapher-designate, the “long telegram” re-
and policy pronouncements of its principal mains “to this day the single most influen-
U.S. protagonists. However, when it comes tial explanation of postwar Soviet behavior,
to the origins of America’s decision to con- and one which powerfully reinforced the
front the Soviet Union in the aftermath of growing tendency within the United States
the Second World War, they invariably fo- to interpret Moscow’s actions in a sinister
cus on the strategy of containment and its light.”1 Elsewhere Gaddis writes that Ken-
generally acknowledged author, George F. nan’s telegram “would shape American pol-
Kennan, the almost legendary career diplo- icy over the next half century more pro-
mat, historian, and respected authority on foundly than his distant relative’s denuncia-
Russia who died earlier this year at the age tions of tsarist authoritarianism had influ-
of 101. Rarely has a middle-level profes- enced it during the preceding one.”2 For
sional bureaucrat—as was Kennan in the Walter L. Hixson, the University of Akron
late 1940s—received so much acclaim as scholar, Kennan is “one of the most brilliant
this “architect” of a foreign policy strategy and respected diplomats in U.S. history,”
that was to dominate American government and “one of the principal architects of US
perceptions and actions for almost 50 years. foreign policy strategy during the Cold
Best known for his “long telegram” sent War.”3 The presidential adviser Clark Clif-
from Moscow on February 22, 1946, and ford also characterizes Kennan as “brilliant”
its elaboration in the “X” article in Foreign and his famous telegram as “probably the
Affairs of July 1947, Kennan also played a most important, and influential, message
key role in drafting the Marshall Plan and ever sent to Washington by an American
was involved in a variety of major decisions diplomat....”4 Charles E. Bohlen, a fellow
regarding the North Atlantic Treaty, the diplomat, Soviet expert, and friend of long
Korean conflict, the German question, Ra- standing, considered Kennan “the outstand-
dio Free Europe, political warfare, and the ing individual” in the Moscow embassy dur-
East-West arms race. Following short tours ing his earlier tour of duty there, and one
as ambassador to Moscow (1952) and Bel- who “went on to become a brilliant policy
grade (1961–63), he retired to the Institute planner.”5 Forrest C. Pogue, George C.
of Advanced Studies in Princeton to write Marshall’s biographer, refers to Kennan’s
his memoirs and award-winning history “...enormous influence at various levels of
books, lecture on a variety of political top- the administration” and regards him as a
ics, and offer commentary on American for- “prime mover in policy planning” under
eign policy and world affairs. Secretary of State Marshall.6 Daniel Yergin,
Kennan’s impact on early postwar U.S. one of the earliest “revisionist” historians,
foreign policy is recognized by admirers and considered Kennan the “chief ideologue” of