You are on page 1of 8

G.R. No.

L-2935 March 23, 1909 LOWER COURT: rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of 265.90 dollars. It found that at the time the
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from the said
appellee, plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in the
vs. GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant. sum of 265.90 dollars.

JOHNSON, J.: ISSUE:

 In April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, United States, the RULING: With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said
defendant, through Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of the
entered into a contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff, by Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by the Acts
which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative
thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act
from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the contract. The
said period of travel. right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224
 Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
terms on the part of the defendant, he should become liable to the amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a
plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and one-half
salary paid during such period. The defendant alleged that he was a minor and therefore the contract
 defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the could not be enforced against him.
30th day of April, 1903, and was paid half-salary from that date until
June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands. - The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in
 That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and
of the plaintiff and refused to make further compliance with the had full authority to contract.
terms of the contract. - The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that,
 plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI of the city of Manila to under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was
recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which amount made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until
the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as expenses they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
 It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that - It is not disputed that at the time and place of the making of the
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract. contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make the
 defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon
special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands had the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined
amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially by the law of the place where the contract is made.
altered the said contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the (Scudder vs. Union National Bank) Matters connected with its
contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
law. performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of
 plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained. suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend
upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the
minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which
the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and
contract, more than a year later, is not tenable. taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
provisions of the latter,8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be
- First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any
affected the terms of the contract in question; and degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by
- Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties
the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed
plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special
enforced. Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of
what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions
with costs. of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed
legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy
for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions
actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the position now
of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court
only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, respondents. admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective
of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the
testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal
Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that
NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein.
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant, vs. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1)
SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of
IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the applicable laws of Texas
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-fourth declared
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general
TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee. appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from
reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their
BARREDO, J.:p pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield,
as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and specific the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that
evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of their the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published
respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from
evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet passed original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was
the first instance. introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia
was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less
than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the
may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have
to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda
here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs.
laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding
amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that
Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous
the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said meantime.
law provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either
the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31,
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. 1967, PCIB states categorically:
After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this stage and
in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and
apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to testamentary successions both with respect to the order of succession and to
make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
in any event be less than that We have fixed above. provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
- It should be borne in mind that, the question of what are the laws of and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", while the
Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas),
of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in this case
be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact Philippine law) governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights
in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare over movables or personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case
exception in instances when the said laws are already within the also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the
actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and applying
generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable
before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31,
- In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held: The laws of a foreign 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the dispositions contained in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both with
laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in the Philippines.
proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts: The subject of successional rights.

The law governing successional rights. Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or
community property of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half
was an American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the
the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal partnership property
her domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not
been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower court, by virtue of any successional rights. There can be no question about this.
pronouncements which are by now res adjudicate.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides: provides:

"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled
country where it is situated. to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the
testator may freely dispose of the other half.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country one-third of the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as
wherein said property may be found." husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of
the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph.
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national
law of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a
governing succession "both with respect to the order of succession and to the fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge,
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in
provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law rules, provides addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal
that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled to one-half
successional rights over movables or personal property, while the law of of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-
the situs governs with respect to immovable property. Such that with fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
respect to both movable property, as well as immovable property situated in
the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines. One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.

Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968,
applied by this Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. the following appears:
L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law
governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will and Testament of Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her
estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines. This is
the Philippines. now a matter of res adjudicate.
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on
law governs the successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the
Linnie Jane Hodges. orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court
had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of
properties pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges. This is not which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and
questioned by the respondents. memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the laws of Texas
would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas
automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court
properties as his legitime. are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict
them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the them."
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse.
Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby
will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and
void. AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the existence of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno,
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of as administratrix thereof is recognized. Costs against petitioner-appellant
the Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion. He in PCIB.
fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of the properties as of
the time of his death. G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918

Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG
in the earlier part of this option. JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,

On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of STREET, J.:
Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should
be one-half of all the conjugal properties. - Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, by which he
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to disposed of an estate
these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the - This document is an holographic instrument. This will, therefore,
corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
succession should control. On that basis, as We have already explained applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and
above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the hence could not have been proved under section 618.
conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is - however, a petition was presented in the CFI of the city of Manila for
no legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of
will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America;
PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that
untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section
Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions, namely: (1) that 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the
executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of
the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as
if executed according to the laws of these Islands. The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in
- The hearing on said application was set and three weeks publication number and may be stated,
of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin."
- Witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and (1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a
thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was
probate. executed;
- Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator. (2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property
in the State of Illinois;
- Johnson was born in Sweden, from which country he emigrated to (3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to
the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. the petitioner; and
- at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and thereafter (4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the
United States. On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the
- As a result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court
daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
marriage. This child was christened in Chicago.
- After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the
United States he continued to live in the Philippine Islands, and on time of the testator's death; and it was impossible, in view of the distance and
November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear and
of divorce from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was
the ground of desertion. nevertheless held that publication in the manner prescribed by statute
- A little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit and constituted due process of law.
procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago.
- When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila,
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
where he prospered in business and continued to live until his death.
- In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with
Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken
- about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a
noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
- the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
and also various other orders in the case.
- this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section
present appeal has been perfected. cited, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing
that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by
conditions over which she had no control. It is no doubt true that six months
was, under the circumstances, a very short period of time within which to from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the
expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be
proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries. presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with
Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such application his status as a citizen of the United States. It would be novel doctrine to
was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they
proved in this case by the circumstance that, she in fact here appeared in lose their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he
admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United
question. States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The acquisition of the new
State citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no
Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the analogy to that which arises when a citizen of an American State comes to
other ground that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship;
and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with
him.
In our opinion the statement that the testator was a citizen of the United
States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing
was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United States. that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as stated in the order
of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with the
The most that is said on this point is he was "never a resident of the State of circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such citizenship
Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city of but only asserts that the testator was a resident of the Philippine Islands,
Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the
citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations of the necessary citizenship on the part of the testator.
petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to contest
citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient. Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity
with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it does not
In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the
first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois
Illinois and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United States on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied
Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these Islands for that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised
sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing Statutes of Illinois; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial
that at the time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil
had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile, and on Procedure.
the contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that time he
claimed to be a resident of Illinois. - If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the
courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of
There is no law in force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we
impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take
judicial notice of the varied laws of the various American States. The
proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of
the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of
the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.

Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking
judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not
now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any
fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what
the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and argument
for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed
error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the
law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside,
even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code
of Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the
conjecture was wrong.

It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought.
The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.

You might also like