G.R. No.
L-13109 March 6, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DALMACEO ANTIPOLO, defendant-appellant.
FISHER, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Batangas, charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted
him of homicide and from that decision he was appealed. One of the errors assigned
is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of
the man whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on
behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. The witness was
called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was
asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected
upon the following ground:
I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is the
widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she
is not competent to testify under the rules and procedure in either civil or
criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is
dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is
disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured
party.
Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the
disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which
a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the
parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the accused;
that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the
death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any
disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
These propositions were rejected by the trial judge, and the objection of the fiscal as
to the testimony of the woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this objection counsel
took exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which
he expected to establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is sufficient at
this time to say that some of them would be both material and relevant, to such a
degree that if proven to the satisfaction of the court, they might have lead to the
acquittal of the accused, as they purported to relate to the dying declarations of the
deceased, concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being that his
injuries were due to fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by
one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness
for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or
both shall be parties.
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in Underhill's work on Criminal Evidence
(second edition) on page 346:
At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a competent witness for
or against the other in any judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, to which
the other was a party. . . . If either were recognized as a competent witness
against the other who was accused of crime, . . . a very serious injury would
be done to the harmony and happiness of husband and wife and the
confidence which should exist between them.
In Greenleaf's classical work on evidence, in section 337 [vol. I], the author says, in
stating the reasons for the rule at common law:
The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by placing the
protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications between
husband and wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by
means of the hallowed confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be
afterwards divulged in testimony even though the other party be no longer
living.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is
based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements
made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the
husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made
from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered
makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a
communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after
the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of
his death.
The same theory as that upon which section 58 of General Orders No. 58 is based,
underlies section 383, paragraph 3 of Act No. 190, which reads as follows:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent; nor can either,
during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the consent of the other,
examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the
marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding
 by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other.
The only doubt which can arise from a reading of this provision relates to the
meaning of the words "during the marriage or afterwards," and this doubt can arise
only by a consideration of this phrase separately from the rest of the paragraph.
Construed as a whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in which the testimony
of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the other is a
party. The use of the word "afterwards" in the phrase "during the marriage or
afterwards" was intended to cover cases in which a marriage has been dissolved
otherwise than by death of one of the spouses — as, for instance, by decree of
annulment or divorce.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending
death, concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a
prosecution of the person charged with killing the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil.,
Rep., 530.) Such dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well
as against him. (Mattox vs. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in
several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the deceased may testify
regarding his dying declarations. In the case of the State vs. Ryan (30 La. Ann.,
1176), cited by appellant in his brief, the court said:
The next bill is as to the competency of the widow of the deceased to prove
his dying declarations. We see no possible reason for excluding her . . . after
the husband's death she is no longer his wife, and the rules of evidence, as
between husbands and wives, are no longer applicable.
In the case of Arnett vs. Commonwealth (114 Ky., 593, 596), the testimony of the
widow of the deceased as to his dying declarations made to her was objected to upon
the express ground that under the terms of the Kentucky Code, "the wife was
incompetent to testify even after the cessation of the marriage relation, to any
communication made by her by her husband during the marriage."
This contention was rejected, the court saying:
On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as
to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage
relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the
husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration
of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and
this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement.
The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other
fact known to her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying declaration
testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her;
on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the
express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the
defendant.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the testimony
of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused
was deprived of one of his essential rights. That being the case, a new trial must be
granted.
For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and a new
trial is granted at which the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be
admitted, together with any additional evidence which may be offered on the part of
the prosecution or the defense. At the new trial granted the accused, the testimony
taken at the former hearing shall be considered. The costs of this appeal shall be de
officio. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D.
VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and
JUAN SIM, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL
BEHIND THE RULE. — This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to
facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the
end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest
of the community.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — Since the object of the
privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to
the physician’s testimony.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — In order that the privilege may be
successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is
claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired
the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4.
the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the
information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. — These requisites conform with the four (4)
fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of certain communications, to wit: "1. The communications must originate
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. — The
physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized
that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO
CLAIMS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE REQUISITES
THEREOF. — One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD
PARTIES, NOT PRIVILEGED. — There is authority to the effect that information
elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes
such information from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have held that the
casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that
under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a
contrary result."cralaw virtua1aw library
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. — while it
may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance
of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner
makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question
asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the
privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of
the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s
Petition and Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at
all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the
testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to
seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the
resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991
denying due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial court allowing a
Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as
an attending physician of petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground
that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia
"before, during and after the marriage and until the present." After the issues were
joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent
presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his
own behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he
would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s
counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited
from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash
the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard
this urgent motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel for private respondent
contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and
would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a
professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and
allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was
qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the
illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her
examination and the medicines she had prescribed.
Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be
reduced to writing, respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same
date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989,
petitioner seeks to prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and
examined respondent Nelly Lim in her professional capacity perforce her testimony
is covered by the privileged (sic) communication rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and
that she will not testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly
Lim in her professional capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the
respondent’s motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the
Court advised counsel for respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes
apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her
as an expert in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of
illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a
(sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of a person; and finally she
admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness she
examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim,
nor (sic) the medicines she prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a
petition 2 for certiorariand prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991,
to annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to
prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado’s
testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying
due course to the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the
confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when
she testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court discussed the conditions
which would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence between a physician and
his patient under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
and made the following findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose
testimony is sought to be stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who
was summoned by the patient in her professional capacity for curative remedy or
treatment. The divergence in views is whether the information given by the physician
in her testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged communication.
We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged
communication because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient
while attending her in her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the
information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the
patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained from the physician
tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach.
Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of
the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist
Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was
summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of
petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no
declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired
from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a
professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined and interviewed the
patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical
question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of
the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged
in the hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A
physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment,
when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make
answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v. Role, 242
Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician
based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has
attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony tending to
disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while
attending to the patient. (Crago v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on
Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient
proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve
protection must be confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly
implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be implied
according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the
ailment and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the
burden of establishing in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege,
including the confidential nature of the information given." 4
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of
Appeals "seriously erred" :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I.
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient
privileged communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section
24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar.
II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned as an expert witness and not as
an attending physician of petitioner.’
III.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no declaration that touched (sic) or
disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim,
during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity.’
IV.
. . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of
the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado.’" 5
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda 6 after the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner
submitted her reply 8 thereto. The parties subsequently filed their separate
Memoranda.
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in its challenged resolution.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil
case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such
patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase
"advice or treatment given by him," and (b) substitution of the word reputation for
the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section
26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change
of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9
Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the
patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was
imperative that the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the
substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a distinction
between these two concepts." ‘Character’ is what a man is, and ‘reputation’ is what
he is supposed to be in what people say he is.’Character’ depends on attributes
possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one to possess. The
former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at
present." 10
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe
full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and
enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community. 12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no
timely objection is made to the physician’s testimony. 13
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient." 14
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation." 15
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The
mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the
number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated." 17
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of
action but to agree with the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed
to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and
qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not
disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment
of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the
doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr.
Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical
problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise
stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had
about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient
relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the
trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is summarized as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory
physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a
physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical
question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient whom he
has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical
facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may
have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient
privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion
solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his
personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient
relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal
professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to
testify as to his expert opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was
never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a
third party, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?
A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I
interviewed the patient, Nelly.
Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the
month of April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that,
since July of 1987, it was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me
until November of 1987.
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could
not get anything from Dr. Lim.
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor
who was also present during that interview?
A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle
of the privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the
confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus
destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify.
Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21
Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given
by Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely
making it appear in the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was
suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which caused, and
continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her
family," 22 — which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was
offered to show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would
blacken the former’s "character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed
any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and the
treatment recommended therefor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal
motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify,
the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to
any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would
violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose
his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought
to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular
portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the
petitioner’s Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondent’s
Memorandum, 25 do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even
granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the
privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the
trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological
incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her
husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial
court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a petition for review
on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint
Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three
children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings
notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In
1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in
fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on
Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2
November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila
nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the
wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and
pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with
Ma. Paz before the trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded
or irrelevant." 4
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on
the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to
on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between
physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her
"continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the
physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a
Statement for the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal
basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul
their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and merely an
afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their
separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and
pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma.
Paz' Statement for the Record. 8
On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that —
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the
Opposition to the respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue
in this case is whether or not the respondent had been suffering
from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said
psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent
did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged
communication between patient and physician. What was raised by
the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was irrelevant.
So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose
of determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition
was suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric
report is very material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar
Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the respondent to
dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner
and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be
presented. 9
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated
June 4, 1991, and directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be
stricken off the record. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel
was likewise denied.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition
for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was
likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the
psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to
form part of the records of the case. She argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a
professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person (like
respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical
report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired
as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says that
the reason behind the prohibition is —
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a
patient to his physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced
disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the
psychiatric evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it
abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and
confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what
cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath
what she asserted in her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for
Spain when her Answer was filed. She maintains that her "Statement for the Record
is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never been intended to take the
place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to
expunge it from the records.
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very
explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to
testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from
testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of
the petitioner." 16In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony
considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one
against the other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived
by the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her
unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was
presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account
among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she
failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she
merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any
rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence
presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent
posits that this in reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply
with pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records
for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication
between physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted.
Indeed, statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged
are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full
disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this
prevents the physician from making public information that will result in
humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest
assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege
creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may
follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information
communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping
his mental health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of
antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for
emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of
Appeals 22 clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's
husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial
court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but
never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to
object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to
make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this
Court. The allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations
of private respondent's declarations which may be denied or disproved during the
trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have
already lapsed and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has
yet to conclude his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties'
respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and
avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are
allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and
include in their appeals depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the
docket of appellate courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence,
counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise only
legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point
in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of
the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a
renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992
is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 120769 February 12, 1997
STANLEY J. FORTICH, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FELIX T. GALLERON, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
For over five years since August 1973, petitioner Stanley J. Fortich was employed as
an area salesman of the soft drinks division of the San Miguel Corporation in
Dipolog City, a job which required him to collect various sums of money from the
retailers and buyers of the company along his designated route.
On June 5, 1979, petitioner received a Memorandum ordering him to stop
plying his route and collecting the sums owed by customers to the company
for the stated reason of his alleged "NONISSUANCE (SIC) OF EITHER
CHANGE REFUND NOR OFFICIAL RECEIPT FOR EMPTIES
RETRIEVED FROM OUTLETS WITH TEMPORARY CREDIT
SALES." 1 The order grounding petitioner, signed by herein respondent
Felipe T. Carreon in his capacity as District Sales Supervisor, likewise
directed petitioner to instead report directly "to the sales office every
working day at the prescribed company time." 2
Following up on his first memorandum and alleging that petitioner misappropriated
the amount of P1,605.00 from his collections (through non-issuance of invoices to
several customers) private respondent, on June 11, 1975, submitted a second inter-
office memorandum addressed to the Regional Sales Manager summarizing the
findings of an initial investigation he conducted on the matter, which he concluded
with the following paragraph:
In addition, I would like to further inform management that S/M
Stanley Fortich is an avid mahjong player and a cockfighting
enthusiast. Inspite of several advices, there seems to be no change
in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had a similar case last September
11, 1978. 3
After further investigation by the company which found petitioner guilty of
misappropriating company funds, petitioner was preventively suspended from his
job. The order suspending petitioner also decreed his dismissal "upon receipt of
clearance from the Ministry of Labor." 4
Claiming that the above-quoted second memorandum issued by the private
respondent was "wilfull, malicious and done in gross bad faith," 5 petitioner, on
September 28, 1979 filed a complaint for "Damages Arising from Libel" with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga Del Norte. In his
complaint, he alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he defendant has pictured the plaintiff in his report (Annex "B")
as a thief, corrupt or dishonest man and even going to the extent of
exposing in public the alleged vices of the plaintiff such as
mahjong and cockfighting.
[T]he defendant is guilty of gross bad faith and malice in the
highest degree for making and publishing a false, and libelous
report for the purpose of putting down the good name and
reputation of the plaintiff and his family.
xxx xxx xxx 6
Petitioner then prayed that the trial court grant the total amount of P171,000.00 to
him as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On November 5, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision 7 in favor of
herein petitioner, the dispositive portion of which states the following:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby renders judgment
—
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following
sums: (a) P150,000.00 for moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages; (c) P20.000.00 for attorney's fees and (d)
P1,000.00 for litigation expenses;
2. Dismissing the defendant's counterclaim for lack of merit; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs. 8
Principally contending in his assignment of errors that no actual malice existed or
had been shown in respect to the questioned (second) memorandum and that in any
case, the assailed letter was protected by the privileged communication rule, the
private respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals.
On February 21, 1995, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision on the
ground that the memorandum was not libelous being "within the ambit of privileged
communications." Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals
on May 31, 1995, hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The provisions of law applicable to the case at bar are embodied in Articles 353 and
354 of the Revised Penal Code which state the following:
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. — A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
 cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Nothing in the evidence on record would suggest that the key elements of publicity
found in the definition of libel in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are present
in the case before us.
Firstly, the assailed letter was obviously part and parcel of the initial investigation
surrounding the non-remittance of collections by petitioner. The right hand caption
of the memorandum clearly shows the phrase "Inter-office
Memorandum," 9 implying confidentiality. Secondly, petitioner was unable to prove
that the letter was circulated or publicized, much less read by officers of the
corporation other than those involved in the investigation or those directly
supervising the petitioner's work. While imputation of a vice or defect on the
petitioner's character might have been apparent from the second to the last paragraph
of the memorandum, the imputation was never really made publicly.
More importantly, petitioner in the court below was not able to establish
satisfactorily that the issuance of the letter and its offending paragraph was motivated
by malice. As respondent Court of Appeals correctly held:
Neither does this Court find positive proof that the appellant was
motivated by malice in the issuance of the memorandum claimed
to be libelous, addressed to the proper officials of San Miguel
Corporation. In other words, the onus of proving actual malice is
placed on the plaintiff-appellee who must convince the Court that
the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is
accomplished, the defense of privilege is unavailing. (Nanerico D.
Santos vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., 203 SCRA 110, 114.) Our
ruling is buttressed by the fact that no proof has been adduced to
show that the subject Memorandum was released to persons other
than the officials concerned. . . . 10
Malice exists when there is an intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause.
An imputation is legally malicious if done without any reason that would justify a
normally conscientious man in so making the imputation. 11While the law presumes
every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to this rule. The
record indicates that this case falls under the settled exceptions to the rule: the private
respondent's inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit of privileged
communication rule.
A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a
duty. 12 Discussing the scope of this rule, former Chief Justice Fernando, in Mercado
v. CFI of Rizal, 13 explained that:
. . . . Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the
mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under
an honest sense of duty;
....
In the instant case, it is well-worth stressing that the private respondent was, as the
District Sales Supervisor of the corporation's Dipolog office, the immediate
supervisor of petitioner. In this capacity, respondent was charged with the duty to
carry out and enforce company rules and policies, including the duty to undertake
initial investigation of possible irregularities in customer accounts in order to suggest
further action which could be taken by the company. In fact, the communications
initially submitted by the private respondent to his superiors prompted the
investigation which eventually led to petitioner's preventive suspension and to the
decision by the company's proper officers to terminate the latter's employment. In
making his earlier recommendation, the private respondent relied on the affidavits
submitted by at least three of the company's clients (all attesting to
irregularities) 14 and his initial though yet-unsubstantiated findings that respondent
was an "avid mahjong player and a cockfight enthusiast." That the affidavits were
subsequently found to have been gathered by the private respondent himself did not
diminish their quality. Investigation necessarily includes the gathering and
solicitation of information.
Even granting that the questioned memorandum — particularly the above
quoted paragraph — contains statements which could be slanderous and
therefore actionable were they not protected by the rule on privileged
communications, still as no malice was shown, we agree with the
respondent court's conclusion that the assailed memorandum report was an
official act done in good faith, an honest innocent statement arising from a
moral and legal obligation which the private respondent certainly owed to
the company in the performance of his duties. The opinion which the private
respondent expressed in the discharge of his duty might have skirted the
 boundary which usually separates innocent opinion from actionable
defamation. Paradoxically, however, if he did not hazard the warning,
though it might have subsequently turned out to be a reckless one, he would
have been remiss in his responsibilities to the company. The rule on
privileged communications allows the latitude of expression embodied in
the private respondent's second memorandum.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed,
the petition is hereby DENIED.
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL
"JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME
"JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-
R, and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The
crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted
in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the
wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy
and alleged the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price. 1
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño
could be arraigned, he escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the
Philippine Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet.2 The cases, which were consolidated and jointly tried, proceeded only
against the appellant.
After the appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 4 September 1987, trial
on the merits was held on various dates from 11 May 1988 until 10 January 1990.
On 30 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision3 in the consolidated cases
acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 4649-R (frustrated murder) and
Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R (attempted murder) for insufficiency of
evidence but convicting him in the two murder cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R
and 4648-R, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.4 It also ruled that the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price had been duly
established. It then sentenced the appellant as follows:
Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY
of two (2) counts of murder, the prosecution having proven his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In each of the criminal cases
aforesaid, he should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of
Death, there being two aggravating circumstances. However, since
the death penalty is not imposable at this time, the accused is
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna Theresa Francisco the
sum of sixty Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) as actual
damages (Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and Dr. Napoleon Bayquen,
the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs against
the accused, Jaime Agustin.
SO ORDERED.5
The version of the prosecution is based on the testimonies of (1) Isidoro Magpantay,
a member of the Baguio City Police Force, who identified the initial report (Exhibit
"A"); (2) Christie Napeñas, a stenographic reporter in the Office of the City Fiscal of
Baguio City, who took down the stenographic notes of City Fiscal Erdolfo
Balajadia's investigations of accused Wilfredo Quiaño (Exhibit "D") on 30 January
1987 and of the appellant on 10 February 1987, and who identified her stenographic
notes containing the statement of the appellant (Exhibit "B") and the transcript of
said stenographic notes (Exhibit "C"); (3) Dominic Bayquen, the victim in Criminal
Case No. 4650-R, who testified on how they were shot; (5) Eulogio Francisco, the
father of Anna Theresa Francisco, who identified her death certificate (Exhibit "I")
and testified on the list of expenses (Exhibit "G"); (6) Rogelio Mumar, a supervising
ballistics expert, who declared that the fourteen shell recovered from the scene of the
crime were not fired from any of the three armalite rifles submitted to him; (7) Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom, who testified that he was the lawyer who assisted the appellant
and accused Wilfredo Quiaño while they were being investigated by City Fiscal
Balajadia; and (8) Lilian San Luis Bayquen, wife of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and
mother of Dominic Bayquen, who testified on what she did after Dominic informed
her by telephone about the shooting incident.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts. At past 7:30 p.m. of
6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with
his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their
Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City,
from his driving the car. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing
the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two
meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle
through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a
fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.
All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr.
Bayquen's head was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to
the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened.
Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. 6 Danny
Ancheta went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for
treatment.7 Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor.8 The police
later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation. they recovered some
empty shells of an armalite rifle.9
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military
agent or "asset" who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities,
confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo
Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr.
Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr.,
allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr.
Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain
"Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom, a representative of the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie
Napeñas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation. 10 Thereafter, she transcribed the notes and the transcription became
the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiaño which he signed, with the assistance of
Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. 11
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime
Agustin, was picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and
brought to Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City
Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he was investigated in connection with the crime.
Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms. Christie
Napeñas took down stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation.
The stenographic notes consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was
signed afterwards by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas subsequently
transcribed these notes which the prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant
narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the
identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days later, he identified
Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.
The defense presented the appellant and his wife, Elizabeth Agustin. The appellant,
who is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned
the validity of his extrajudicial statement. he alleged that in the morning of 10
February 1987, he went to Carmen, Pangasinan, to buy some fertilizer and upon his
return he was met by two armed men who took him to their car where two other
companions, armed with armalites, were waiting. They then brought him out of
Pangasinan. He later learned that they were on their way to Baguio City.
Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered that he did
not. Along Kennon Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they
would reach a toll booth, and then brought out three times near the ravines and made
to kneel at gunpoint in order to force him to admit his involvement in the shooting,
which he finally did out of fear. Then he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal
of Baguio City.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with
him and their presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was
being threatened. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a
lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two
minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Then
later, at Camp Dangwa to where he was taken, he told his wife to get in touch and
talk with Atty. Tabin. Finally, he asserted that he was promised by his captors that he
would be discharged as a state witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not push
through because his co-accused, Quiaño, escaped. 12
Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband's story that he went to Carmen in the
morning of 10 February 1987 to buy some fertilizer and that he failed to return. Her
efforts to locate him proved futile until days later when she finally learned that he
was detained at Camp Dangwa. 13
The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant
consideration to his claim of force, intimidation, and other irregularities because of
the following reasons: (a) the presence of material improbabilities in his tale of when
and how he was allegedly taken at gunpoint from his hometown in Pangasinan; (b) it
was improbable that he was made to kneel thrice at gunpoint along Kennon Road
considering the vehicles which were passing along that road; (c) it was unbelievable
that when he was in the Fiscal's Office he asked for his uncle, Atty. Tabin if he could
not go home for a period of one month; (d) no less than the city Fiscal of Baguio City
interrogated him and yet he did not tell the fiscal that he was being forced to give a
statement; (e) the fiscal even provided him with a lawyer who conferred with him
and apprised him of his rights; (f) he signed each and every page of the stenographic
notes of his statement and this was witnessed by no less than the City Fiscal of
Baguio and the lawyer who assisted him; and (g) he disclosed in his statement that he
voluntarily gave it because of his ill feeling against his co-accused who did not give
him any money.
The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a
direct participant in the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability,
his "extrajudicial confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected
to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only
when he was not given the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the prosecution's
evidence, it found his conviction for murder inevitable.
The appellant filed a notice of appeal. In this brief, he imputes upon the trial court
the commission of this lone error:
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN CONSIDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION AS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 14
The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his
rights under Section 11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who
assisted him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was not of his own choice but was foisted
upon him by the city Fiscal. Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private
prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog
although he understood only Ilocano. Moreover, when Atty. Cajucom briefly
conferred with him and when the city Fiscal interrogated him, his military escorts
were present.
He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation
should be of the latter's choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or
other parties," 15 and that where there are serious doubts on the voluntariness of the
extrajudicial confession, the doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. 16 He
then concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible and his conviction
cannot stand, there being no other evidence linking him to the crimes charged.
In its brief, 17 the appellee, reiterating the reasons of the trial court in upholding the
validity of the confession, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision.
After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a
painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with
merit. Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the
appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the
commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a
blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was
unlawfully arrested.
Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the
pronouncement of the trial court and the characterization given by the appellant
himself, the assailed extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only
an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once more distinguish one
from the other. Sections 26 and 33, rule 30 of the Rules of
Court 18 clearly show such a distinction.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 19 Wharton 20 defines a
confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in
a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.
We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are
satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he
merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because
Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of
Rights) of the 1973 Constitution which read:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
 against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have
broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means
not just any counsel, but a "competent and independent counsel, preferably of his
own choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived in
writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility expressly
includes admissions, not just confessions.
In Morales vs. Enrile, 21 this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation
and ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel would not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory of inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit, 22 People vs. Lumayok, 23 People
vs. Albofera, 24 People vs. Marquez, 25 People vs. Penillos, 26 and People vs.
Basay, 27 among other cases.
The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates
"the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." 28 It is not enough for
the investigator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the
present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in
practical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do, and in
language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a
correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates
effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is
conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence,
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed
of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be
told that he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his
request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be
provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver,
to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel
must be a lawyer. 29
The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. 30 Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if
it was made without the assistance off counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 31
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, 32 contained in twenty-two pages of
yellow pad, does, indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom.
what we find in these yellow pads are stenographic notes. these were transcribed by
the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes, but for reasons not
explained in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of
twelve pages, 33 was not signed by the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat.
On the other hand, the same stenographic reporter, who took down the stenographic
notes when accused Wilfredo Quiaño was being investigated by City Fiscal
Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the transcription 34 was subscribed and sworn to
by the accused before City Fiscal Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom, who
represented the accused in the investigation.
Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads,
we cannot expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth
grade, to read or decipher its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and
presume its accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us that the appellant was
not given a fair deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The
transcript (Exhibit "C") shows the following preliminary questions of the City Fiscal
and the answers of the appellant:
01. QUESTION — Mr. Jaime Agustin, I am informing you that you are under
investigation in connection with the death of Dr. Nap Bayquen of which you are
one of the principal suspects. I am informing you of your constitutional rights
before you give any statement. First, you have the right to remain silent meaning,
you may give a statement or you may not give any statement. If you will not give a
statement, you will not be forced to do so, do you understand this right?
ANSWER — I understand, sir.
02. Q — If you will give a statement, you have the right to be assisted by a lawyer
of your own choice, if you cannot afford to secure the services of a lawyer the
government will provide a lawyer for you, do you understand this right?
A — I understand, sir.
03. Q — Now, do you want to be assisted by a
lawyer?
A — Yes, sir.
04. Q — I am now informing you that a lawyer in the person of Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom is now present in this investigation room, do you wish to avail of his
assistance in connection with this investigation?
A — I want, sir.
05. Q — I am also informing you that whatever you say in this investigation can be
used as evidence in your favor and it can also be used as evidence against you in
any criminal or civil case, do you understand that?
A — Yes, sir, I understand.
06. Q — After informing you of your constitutional rights, are you now willing to
give a statement?
A — Yes, sir, I agree.
Investigator — Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, the witness or respondent Jaime Agustin
has chosen you to give him assistance in this investigation, are you willing to assist
him?
Answer — I am willing, fiscal, to assist the witness.
Investigator — Have you appraised [sic] him of his
constitutional rights?
Answer — Yes, fiscal.
Investigator — Do you know after examining him whether or not he is giving a free
and voluntary statement of his own volition without any intimidation or force
exerted on him?
A — As stated by him, fiscal, he is willing to give
a free and voluntary statement in relation to
what really happened.
It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in
mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if
he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him.
He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and
to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel.
He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet,
no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent
evidence was offered to prove its existence.
Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and
intelligently "accepted" by the appellant as his counsel to assist him in the
investigation. Atty. Cajucom's presence in the Office of the City fiscal at the time the
appellant was brought there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two
possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense that he happened
to be attending to some professional matter, or he was earlier called by the City
Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal aid to the appellant. These possibilities are
not remote but whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that Atty. Cajucom
was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the above-quoted portion of
Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom
without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and
if he had one, whether he could hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether he
would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel. In short, after the
appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through
suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to
assist him.
While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated has the
final choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator
and ask for another one, 35 the circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation
of the appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. For as earlier
stated, he was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice and whether he
could afford to hire such lawyer; on the other hand, the city Fiscal clearly suggested
the availability of Atty. Cajucom. then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio
Ayat and Sgt. Roberto Rambac, military officers of RUC I, who brought him to the
City Fiscal's Office for investigation in the afternoon of the day when he was
unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan. Along Kennon road, on the way to
Baguio City, he was coerced and threatened with death if he would not admit
knowing "Jun" and "Sonny" and hi participation in the crime. This testimony was
unrebutted by the prosecution. The presence of the military officers and the
continuing fear that if he did not cooperate, something would happen to him, was
like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free will.
Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the custodial investigation is beyond
us. Nothing in the records shows that at that time the criminal cases against the
culprits had already been filed with the City Fiscal's Office for preliminary
investigation and had, therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they had been so
filed, then the City Fiscal should have followed the usual course of procedure in
preliminary investigations. It appears, however, from the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4647-R and 46648-R that it was Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta
who conducted the preliminary investigation and who prepared, signed, and certified
the informations. city Fiscal Balajadia merely approved them and administered
the jurat in the certification. the conclusion then is inevitable that he did not conduct
the preliminary investigation.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be
assisted by Atty. Cajucom, we doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel.
While we wish to give him the benefit of the doubt because he is an officer of the
court upon whose shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that protection be
accorded the appellant and that no injustice be committed to him, 36 and, moreover,
he generally has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties, 37 there are special circumstances in these cases which convince us that he
was unable to assist the appellant in a satisfactory manner. For one, he admitted on
cross-examination that at that time, and even until the time he took the witness stand,
he was an associate of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, in these and the
companion cases. Thus:
Q Mr. Witness, at the time you assisted the accused you belonged to the office of
Atty. Galace, you were an associate at the time when you assisted the accused?
A I was represented [sic] then as IBP Legal Aid.
Q The question is not answered, we are only requesting him if he was an associate of
Atty. Galace up to the present?
A Yes. 38
Then we have misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the
appellant when the former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in
English and Tagalog considering that the appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer,
could only understand Ilocano. Thus:
ATTY. TABIN: So in other words when you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional
rights using English Language and Tagalog Dialect you did not have any Ilocano
dialect Interpreter. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS: As far as I can remember, I explained it in Tagalog and English. 39
And when asked whether he was sure if the appellant understood him, Atty. Cajucom
merely answered:
A At least I put everything as far as I could give to him to appraise [sic] him of his
constitutional rights. 40
Then too, even if he were fully understood by the appellant, we are not satisfied that
his explanations were adequate. On direct examination, he gave the following
answers:
Q — Did you explain the constitutional rights of the accused to
caution him of the consequences of his statement?
A — I explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, to
confront in person the witnesses against him and that he has
the right to choose a counsel to assist him in the hearing of
the case which was being investigated then.
Q — And what was his reply regarding the consequences of this
statement?
A — He told me that he is willing to give a truthful statement and
in order to shed light. 41
It appears to us that Atty. Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that
he was one of the accused; rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he
was only a witness. Thus:
Q [by the prosecutor]
— But, nevertheless, you gave the precautionary measure
entitled to any witness?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Why do you say that it was given voluntarily?
A — Before presenting him to the investigation we were given
time to talk personally without any other people and that
was the time that I explained to him all his rights and
consequences pertaining to him as witness to this case. 42
On cross-examination, Atty. Cajucom also declared:
ATTY. TABIN: That is why I am requesting him how he explained in that language,
Your Honor.
WITNESS: I told him that this is a grave case which he would be giving some
narrations as a witness and his involvement would mean the most grievous offense
and if found guilty will bring him for some years in jail and I told him that I could
help him if he will be presenting the truth and narrate is the truth. This is in
combination, English and Tagalog, and most of the time, I made it in Tagalog. 43
Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has
serious doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his
constitutional rights since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog.
Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-examination, that the
appellant was picked up on 10 February 1987 by military men in Pangasinan without
a warrant for his arrest. 44 Since the crimes with which the appellant was charged
were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five months earlier, no
arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected. a warrantless
arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Section 5, rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Said section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of these exceptional circumstances were present at the time the appellant was
arrested on 10 February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the crimes
were committed in the presence of the arresting officers (for otherwise they could
have arrested the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet) or that the appellant was a
prisoner who had escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes
had just been committed for they were in fact committed more than five months
earlier. Atty. Cajucom knew or ought to have known that the arrest was unlawful. If
he were then truly moved by his duty to fully assist the appellant, he should have
forthwith taken the appropriate measures for the immediate release of the appellant
instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him. Needless to say, the conduct of
Atty. Cajucom under the circumstances only strengthen our belief that the appellant
had all the cards stacked against him.
Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement
inadmissible in evidence because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1),
Article III of the Constitution. since it is the only evidence which links him to the
crimes of which he was convicted, he must then be acquitted.
His acquittal must not write finis to these murder cases. These crimes must be solved
and the triggerman and the mastermind apprehended. We see in these cases the
failure of the Government to exert the necessary efforts to bring the guilty parties to
the bar of justice. Until now, the accused, who were implicated by the triggerman as
having ordered for a price the murder of Dr. Bayquen, remain at large and the
records do not show any diligent effort to effect their arrest. The triggerman escaped
while in the custody of the PC/INP at Camp Dangwa. The City Prosecutor's Office of
Baguio City should then use all the resources at its command, in coordination with
the law-enforcement agencies of the Government, such as the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police, to immediately arrest the other
accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and
Criminal Case No. 4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY"
AGUSTIN. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ORDERED unless
for some other lawful cause his continued detention is warranted.
G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of
the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without
proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt there can be no conviction.
In the case at bench, the identification of the petitioner cannot rest on an assured
conscience. We rule that petitioner is entitled to a mandatory acquittal.
Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were
charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City1 with Robbery2 (Article 294,
paragraph 5 of the Revised penal Code) and Carnapping3(republic Act No. 6539).
Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. The other three (3) are still
at-large.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried.
We come to the facts.
Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public school teacher of Kaligayahan
Elementary School, Novaliches. Her work requires her to leave her maid, JOVINA
MADARAOG TORRES, alone in her house at Block 45, Lot 28, Lagro Subdivision,
Novaliches, Quezon City. Her husband is in Australia while her children go to
school.
The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the morning of July 19, 1988. Somebody
knocked at the gate of the Torres residence pretending to buy ice. As the maid
Madaraog handed the ice to the buyer, one of the robbers jumped over the fence,
poked a gun at her, covered her mouth, and opened the gate of their house. 4 The ice
buyer and his companions barged in. Numbering four (4), they pushed her inside
Torres' house and demanded the keys to the car and the safety vault.5 She told them
she did not know where the keys were hidden.6 They tied up her hands and dragged
her to the second floor of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left downstairs as their
lookout.7
On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom
door with her back on the vault. They also gagged her mouth and ransacked Torres'
room. One of the accused stumbled upon a box containing keys. They used the keys
to open drawers and in the process found the car key. Petitioner was then summoned
upstairs and given the car key. He tried it on the car and succeeded in starting its
engine.
In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to loot the vault and other valuable items
in the house. They then tied Madaraog's hands and feet to the bed's headboard and
escaped using Torres' car.
Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her ties with her fingers, hopped to the
stairs and cried for help.8 Her neighbor Semia Quintal responded and untied her.
They also sought the help of Angelina Garcia, another neighbor. It was Garcia who
informed Torres that her house was burglarized.
Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal
described the physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer.
One of those drawn by the artist was a person with a large mole between his
eyebrows.9 On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next
day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other
prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench.
SEMIA QUINTAL 10 averred that she saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3)
men whiling away their time in front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes
were committed. Quintal is a neighboring maid.
MARY BARBIETO 11 likewise declared that she saw petitioner allegedly with
several companions standing-by at Torres' house that morning of July 19, 1988. She
is a teacher and lives within the block where the crimes were committed.
Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and
insufficient identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of
the Torres family since 1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough
and rushing cake orders from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon at his sisters' TipTop bakeshop in Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes
him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.
He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. On August 30, 1988 at
about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was in their house watching a basketball game
on T.V. and went out to buy a cigarette. On his way back, a person accosted him and
asked his name. After he identified himself, 13 a gun was poked at his right side, a
shot was fired upward, and five (5) men swooped on him without any warrant of
arrest. He asked them if he could wear t-shirt as he was naked from waist up. They
refused. They turned out to be NBI agents of one of whom a certain Atty. Harwin
who lived in Lagro, Novaliches. He was shoved into the car and brought to the NBI
headquarters. 14 He was surprised when an NBI agent, whose identity was unknown
to him, pointed to him as one of the suspects in the robbery in the presence of
Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses.
Petitioner's sister ANGELI TUASON, 15 part-owner of TipTop Bakeshop
corroborated his story. She testified that on July 17, 1988 she asked her sister Mary
Ann to remind petitioner to work early on July 19, 1988 since Mondays, Tuesdays,
and Wednesdays are busy days as she caters to schools.
The trial court in a Joint Decision convicted petitioner of the crimes charged and
sentenced him as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In Q-88-396 (carnapping) or an indeterminate term of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS as minimum and TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum;
and in Q-88-397 (robbery) for a term of ONE (1) YEAR, SEVEN (7) MONTHS and
ELEVEN (11) DAYS as minimum and TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS as maximum.
On the civil aspect, the court hereby orders Alvin Tuason y Ochoa as follows:
1. In Q-88-396 (carnapping) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the
carnapped Toyota Corona Sedan, Model 1980 with Plate No. NPZ 159 or to pay its
value of P180,000.00 which the court finds to be the reasonable value of the said car;
and
2. In Q-88-397 (robbery) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the
stolen items mentioned in the information filed in said case and hereinabove stated or
pay the corresponding values thereon or a total of P280,550.00 which the court finds
to be the reasonable values.
The civil liability is joint and solidary with the co-conspirators of accused Alvin
Tuason.
In case of appeal, the bail bonds are fixed at TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P280,000.00) fro criminal case No. Q-88-396 and ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for criminal case No. Q-88-397.
Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On December 16, 1993, the
Eleventh Division of the appellate court gave no credence to
the exculpatory allegations of petitioner and affirmed in toto the assailed
Decisions.17 On February 4, 1994, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.18
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court
erred:
A.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE THAT
FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURTS ARE GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON
APPEAL, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE ARE BASED ON CERTAIN REFUTABLE
REASONS EXPRESSLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
B.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER
THE CONCEPT AND ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "SELF-SERVING
EVIDENCE."
C.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER
THE CONCEPT AND ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "NEGATIVE EVIDENCE."
D.
[F]OR IGNORING OR DISREGARDING THE GLARING AND FATAL
INFIRMITIES OF THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES,
SPECIALLY AS IDENTIFICATION, AS WELL AS TO THE PALPABLE
IMPROBABILITY OF HEREIN PETITIONER HAVING BEEN A SUPPOSED
PARTICIPANT IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED, THE ERROR BEING
TANTAMOUNT TO GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF THE RECORD.
E.
[I]N AFFIRMING THE CLEARLY REVERSIBLE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT.
We reverse.
Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed, must proceed not
only from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in
itself. 19 The trial court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony
of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the
bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery. After a
careful review of the evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner made by
Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of
petitioner.
Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the
maid Madaraog actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench.
Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of
the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious doubt whether
Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI headquarters,
Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his
eyebrows.20 While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole
between his eyebrows. 21 On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer
made a drawing of petitioner showing a dominant mole between his eyes. 22 As it
turned out, petitioner has no mole but only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is
5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference between a mole and a scar. A scar
is a mark left in the skin by a new connective tissue that replaces tissue injured. 23 On
the other hand, a mole is a small often pigmented spot or protuberance on the
skin. 24 If indeed Madaraog and Quintal had a good look at petitioner during the
robbery, they could not have erroneously described petitioner. Worthy to note,
petitioner was not wearing any mask in the occasion. Madaraog's attempt to explain A I was not able to call the attention of the NBI (sic) because there were four of us
her erroneous description does not at all convince, viz.: who made the description.27

xxx xxx xxx Secondly, the trial court and the respondent appellate court unduly minimized the
importance of this glaring discrepancy in the identification of the petitioner. The trial
Q We come now to the third person "iyong namang isa ay mga 28 o 29 ang edad, court resorted to wild guesswork. It ruled:
mga 5'2" o 5'3" ang taas, payat, medyo kulot ang buhok at maiksi at mayroong
malaking bilog na nunal sa pagitan ng kilay sa noo. Mahaba at malantik ang xxx xxx xxx
pilikmata," who is that?
[T]he court has observed that Alvin has a prominent scar in between his two (2)
Interpreter: Witness referring to Exhibit "J-3." eyebrows. It is not within the realm of improbability that Alvin covered up that scar
with a black coloring to make it appear that he has a "nunal" which was therefore the
Q Madam witness where is that round mole that appears in the two eyebrows of the one described by Jovina and, which reinforces her testimony that she had a good eye
person? view of Alvin from the start of the robbery to its conclusion. 28

A It is probably the cartographer that made a mistake. This is a grave error. The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a
deduction that is irrational because it is not derived from an established fact. The
records do not show any fact from which the trial court can logically deduce the
Q I am referring to you now Exhibit "J". I call your attention to that black rounded
conclusion that petitioner covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear
figure at the middle of the bridge of the nose between the two eyebrows, what was
as a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of guilt beyond
that represent?
reasonable doubt. This palpable error was perpetrated by respondent appellate court
when it relied on the theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because
A A mole, sir. 25 the trial court had a better opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution
witnesses during the hearing. This is a misapplication of the rule in calibrating the
xxx xxx xxx credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of the trial court was not based on the
demeanor of any witnesses which it had a better opportunity to observe. Rather, it
Q Among the four drawings prepared by the cartographer section of the NBI, you was a mere surmise, an illogical one at that. By no means can it be categorized as a
will agree ith me Madam Witness that it is only on Exhibit "J" when that rounded fact properly established by evidence.
mole appear?
And thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has serious lapses in her testimony that
A No sir, it is the third one.26 diluted her credibility, thus:

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Q You did not call the attention of the NBI that the third one whom you just Q I am showing to you Exhibit "M" and please point to this Honorable Court that
identified as Exhibit "J-3" did not bear that rounded mole as mentioned by you, did portion where the accused (Alvin Tuason) allegedly asked from you the price of that
you? plastic pack of ice.

A I did not remember. A I did not state it in my statement.

Q Why did you not remember having called the attention of the NBI to that Q Why did you say a moment ago that you place it there (Sinumpaang Salaysay)?
deficiency in the drawing?
A But that is the truth, sir.
Q I am not asking you the truth or falsehood . . . I am only asking you why you said a
moment ago that the portion of your testimony now is incorporated in Exhibit "M".
A [B]ecause they asked the price of the ice. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Q After reading Exhibit "M", did you or did you not call the attention of the
investigator that some of your narrations were not incorporated therein?
A No, I did not because he did not ask me.
Q [Y]ou did not come forward to volunteer that some portions of your narration were
not incorporated therein?
A [T]he investigator knew it.
Q You mean to tell the Honorable Court that after reading Exhibit "M", the NBI
investigator knew that there were some lapses or omissions in your statement?
A It's up to the investigator. 30
Barbieto is a school teacher and the kind of excuses she proffered does not enhance
her credibility. However, she and Quintal merely testified they saw petitioner within
the vicinity where the crimes were committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot
lead to the conclusion that petitioner truly committed the crimes at bench. Petitioner,
we note, lives in the same vicinity as the victim. To use his words, he lives some six
(6) posts from the house of Torres. His presence in the said vicinity is thus not
unnatural.
The doubtful identification of petitioner was not at all cured by the process followed
by the NBI agents when petitioner was pointed to by Madaraog and the other
prosecution witnesses in their headquarters. Madaraog's identification of petitioner
from a line-up at the NBI was not spontaneous and independent. An NBI agent
improperly suggested to them petitioner's person. Petitioner thus testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Witness (Alvin Tuason) do you know of any reason why these two witnesses
in the persons of Jovina Madaraog Torres and Mary Barbieto would be testifying in
the manner that they did against you?
A At the NBI, I saw them with the NBI agent. After the agent pointed at me, later on
they also pointed at me.31
On cross-examination, he declared:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you know the reason why they testified and pointed to you as one of the
robbers of July 19, 1988?
A Because when I was at the NBI, the NBI agent pointed at me.
Q Did you see them at the NBI when they pointed at you?
A They were outside a room where there was a glass window.
Q So you can see those persons outside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q When they pointed you and identified you where there other person with you when
you were lined up during that time?
A In the second line I was in the line-up.
Q When was the first time they pointed you as one of the suspects?
32
A In the Office of the Chief Unit there, to the third floor of the NBI building.
This damaging testimony of the petitioner was not rebutted by the
prosecution. The NBI agent present during the identification of petitioner
was not presented to belie petitioner's testimony. Consequently, the
identification of the petitioner in the NBI headquarters is seriously flawed.
According to writer Wall, the mode of identification other than an
identification parade is a show-up, the presentation of a single suspect to a
witness for purposes of identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it
constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever
used by the police.33
The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-
serving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-
serving evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish
interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out
of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is
excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity
for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its
admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other
hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity
for cross-examination.34 Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how he was
identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is not self-serving.
Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing
dough at TipTop Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. With the usual traffic jam, it takes him two (2) hours to commute from
Lagro to Tondo. It was thus physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis.
He said he learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3) days thereafter. He
did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1) month after the
crimes were perpetrated.
Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony established that her brother had an eye
examination on July 17, 1988 35and she reminded him to work early on July 19, 1988
which he did.
Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be
considered in light of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in
favor of the accused. 36 In People vs. Omega,37 we held:
Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, nevertheless, where the
evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of
concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused
committed the crime charged, the defense of alibi assumes
importance.
The case at bench reminds us of the warning that judges seem disposed more readily
to credit the veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary
evidence by or on behalf of the accused , whether by way of alibi, insufficient
identification, or other testimony. 38 They are unmindful that in some cases the
emotional balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her experience that her powers
of perception becomes distorted and her identification is frequently more
untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives, not necessarily stimulated
originally by the accused
personally — the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support,
consciously or unconsciously, an identification already made by another. 39
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Decision of December 16, 1993 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and petitioner Alvin Tuason is ACQUITTED.
G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Ramon Chua Uy (hereafter RAMON) appeals from the decision1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, Metro Manila, in Criminal Cases No. 16199-
MN and No. 16200-MN, which decreed him guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of
Article III, R.A. No. 6425,2 as amended, for the illegal sale of 5.8564 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," and possession of 401 grams of the
same drug, respectively.
RAMON was arrested in the evening of 11 September 1995 by the elements of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Philippine National Police in Malabon, Metro-Manila, in
the course of a buy-bust operation3 and a follow-up search of his residence, and was
subsequently charged in three cases, namely, Criminal Case No. 16199-MN,
Criminal Case No. 16200-MN and Criminal Case No. 16201-MN.
The accusatory portion of the Information4 in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN alleges:
That on or about the 11th day of September 1995 in the Municipality of Malabon,
Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being a private person and without authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver for and in
consideration of the amount of P5,000.00 to SPO1 Alberto Nepomuceno, Jr. who
acted as poseur buyer white crystalline substance contained in a sealed plastic bag
with markings with net weight of 5.8564 grams which substance when subjected to
chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
otherwise known as "Shabu" which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accusatory portion of the Information5 in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN charges:
That on or about the 11th day of September 1995 in the Municipality of Malabon,
Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being a private person and without authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control white crystalline substance separately contained in five (5) sealed plastic
bags all with markings with total net weight 401 grams which substance when
subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride otherwise known as 'shabu' which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 16201-MN, RAMON was charged with the illegal possession
of "traces" of shabu found on three (3) plastic scoops and other drug paraphernalia
which were seized from his supposed residence in a follow-up search.
No bail was recommended. When arraigned, RAMON pleaded not guilty in each
case.6 During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on a joint trial and to dispense with the
testimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo.7 They also agreed on the marking of
the exhibits for the prosecution.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno,
Jr., who acted as the poseur-buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of
the buy-bust team, as rebuttal witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess
Puno.
The trial court summarized the prosecution's evidence, thus:
The evidence on record shows that at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
September 11, 1995, a female confidential informant personally informed the
members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station, which was then
holding office at Barangay Concepcion, Malabon, Metro-Manila, that accused
Ramon Chua Uy "alias Chekwa" had asked her to look for a buyer of shabu at a
price of P1,000.00 per gram. Acting on the given information, the members of the
unit subsequently planned a buy-bust operation against the accused.
SPO4 Eddie Regalado instructed the confidential informant to consum[m]ate a deal
with the accused by telling him that a prospective buyer is willing to purchase five
(5) grams of the illicit drug to be delivered in front of the Justice Hall of Malabon
located along Sanciangco Street, Barangay Catmon. At 6:30 p.m., the confidential
informant called up and informed the police officers that accused Chua Uy already
agreed on the transaction as well as to the place of delivery. P/Insp. Ricardo Aquino,
Chief of the Narcotics Unit, at once formed the buy-bust team composed of SPO4
Federico Ortiz and PO1 Joel Borda. After securing five (5) P1,000.00-peso bills to be
used in the operation from P/Inp. Aquino, SPO4 Regalado have (sic) them
photocopied, after which, [he] affixed his signatures (sic) on each of the xerox copies
although the serial number of the bills were previously recorded.1âwphi1.nêt
The group then proceeded to Barangay Catmon at about 7:00 p.m., with SPO1
Nepomuceno designated to act as the poseur buyer. When they reached the place,
SPO1 Nepomuceno first went to a store near the tennis court while the rest of the
team positioned themselves in strategic locations. At 8:20 of the same evening, SPO1
Nepomuceno saw a white Toyota car came to a stop. Their confidential informant
immediately stepped out of the car and approached SPO1 Nepomuceno and ordered
him to board the vehicle. Once inside, SPO1 Nepomuceno caught sight of the driver
and the other male companion of accused Chua Uy through the back seat where he
and the accused together with the confidential informant were seated. After a few
minutes conversation, accused Chua Uy opened up his brown attaché case and
ensuingly handed over to SPO1 Nepomuceno five (5) grams of 'shabu' placed in a
transparent plastic packet. In exchange for the substance, SPO1 Nepomuceno
delivered the five (5) P1,000-peso bills which accused Chua Uy put in his right front
pocket. SPO1 Nepomuceno then simply opened the rear right door of the car and
lighted a cigarette as pre-arranged signal. SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz
consequently closed in on the vehicle. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced
himself and informed the accused of his constitutional rights before placing him
under arrest. He later turned over to SPO1 Regalado the five (5) grams of 'shabu'
(Exh. "E"- Crim. Case No. 16199-MN). Thereafter, SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz
seized the brown attaché case from accused Chua Uy which yielded five (5) more
plastic packets of "shabu," (Exhs. "D" to "D-4" — Crim. Case No. 16200-MN),
along with several drug paraphernalia. SPO4 Regalado likewise recovered the buy-
bust money from the accused after the consumated (sic) transaction, (Exhs. "K" to
"K-4"). The one packet of suspected "shabu" which was the subject of the sale
including the five (5) packets of the same substance, taken from the brown attaché
case, bearing the respective initials of SPO4 Regalado and SPO1 Nepomuceno were
brought to the NBI Forensic Division. Laboratory examination of the pieces of
evidence shows positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
(Exh. "C").
The team brought accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2
Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that
there were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the residence of the accused at
No. 402 Gen. Vicente St., San Rafael Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. Forthwith,
SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant before this Court
to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exh. "I"). During the search and in the presence of Bgy. Kagawad
George So and Rodolfo Salvador including Maritess Puno, the alleged owner of the
house and live-in partner of accused Chua Uy, the team was able to confiscate
assorted articles intended for the repacking of the regulated drug (Exh. "I-1"). SPO1
Nepomuceno identified them as follows: one (1) white plastic scoop; one (1) blue
plastic scoop; one (1) tangerine plastic scoop; one (1) Selecta ice cream cup; and one
(1) white plastic container (Exhs. "G," "G-1," "G-2," "H" and "H-1"). All the items
were marked by SPO1 Nepomuceno with his initials "AGN." Along with the
aforesaid articles were three (3) pieces of plastic scoops and two (2) plastic glasses
(sic) with traces of "shabu." Laboratory examination made on them gave positive
result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibit
"F"- Crim. Case No. 16200-MN). These antecedent facts which lead to the filing of
the present cases against accused Chua Uy are embodied in the sworn affidavit of
SPO1 Nepomuceno marked and offered in evidence as Exh. "J."
SPO4 Eddie Regalado corroborated the testimony of SPO Nepomuceno,
claiming that he was positioned fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away
when he saw SPO1 Nepomuceno entered the white Toyota car at the time of
the operation. He further went to say that a caliber 9mm pistol was also
 recovered from accused Chua Uy but considering that up to now they have
not received any certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit,
showing whether accused is authorized to carry firearm, no case has yet
been filed against the latter. Further, SPO4 Regalado said that accused Chua
Uy has admitted to him that he is just a neophyte in the illegal trade. 8
RAMON's version of the incident is also faithfully summarized by the trial court,
thus:
Accused Chua Uy claimed his innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit
drug allegedly seized from him were merely "planted" by the police officers.
He stated that he has been in the business of manufacturing t-shirts and selling them
in different places for almost fifteen (15) years already. That on the date of the
incident at issue, it took him up to 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening to return home because
he had made deliveries and had collected bigger amount of money. On board his
L300 delivery van together with his driver and while they were about to enter the
house, he saw a white Toyota Corolla car parked in front of the gate. A man, whom
he identified as a certain Arnold, alighted from the car and approached them. Arnold
was offering the said car for sale to him at a cheaper price but he declined the offer
inasmuch as he already owns a van. Due to the persistence of Arnold, he agreed to
test drive the vehicle bringing along with him his attache case containing the day's
collection. With Arnold on the wheel, they traversed the interior alley of Dela Cruz
then came out at M.H. del Pilar and proceeded to J. Alex Compound before turning
to Gov. Pascual Ave., on their way back to his house. At the junction of Justice Hall
Street and Gov. Pascual Ave., somebody blocked their car. Arnold lowered his side
window and inquired what was it all about. Although he did not quite understand the
conversation, he overheard that it was a "police bakal." When Arnold informed him
that they will have to go along with the man to the police headquarters, two other
men boarded their car while an owner jeep followed them from behind.
Reaching the headquarters, Arnold and the two men went inside while he was left
behind inside the car. Soon after, one of the two returned to him and insisted in
getting his attache case. He refused at first to surrender the same but had to give up
on account of the persistence exerted on him. Ten minutes later, a man ordered him
to go inside the headquarters and likewise asked him why there was "shabu" in his
attache case. He denied owning the "shabu" and tried to look for Arnold who was no
longer around. He even inquired how his attache case was opened considering that
the key was still with him. Finally, he was dragged inside the headquarters where he
saw his attache case already thrown wide. He again reiterated his earlier query and
tried to look for his money but instead he was informed about the "shabu" found
inside his attache case which he, nonetheless, denied ownership. The man who
earlier stopped them and those inside the headquarters, who were forcing him to
admit ownership of the "shabu" told him that they were policemen. Furthermore, he
recalls that aside from some documents, list of collections, checks, check booklets
and 9 mm pistol, his attache case contained P132,000.00 which he was able to collect
from different persons. Only a bundle consisting of P20.00 peso bills was left while
the rest of his money comprising of bundles of P10, P20, P100, P500 and P1,000
peso bills were already missing.9
Maritess Puno, the other defense witness, testified on the events which transpired
during the follow-up search by the police of RAMON's suspected house at No. 402
Gen. Vicente Street, San Rafael Village, Navotas, and on the fact that she knew
RAMON. 10
On rebuttal, SPO4 Regalado reiterated that the five (5) transparent plastic bags of
"shabu" were indeed found inside RAMON's confiscated attache case and that they
recovered therefrom only P20-peso bills amounting to P2,200 and not P1,000-peso
bills as RAMON claims. 11
In its decision, 12 dated 10 December 1996, the trial court found credible the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and its evidence to have established
beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of RAMON in Criminal Cases Nos. 16199-
MN and 16200-MN. It acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 16201-MN. It then
decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, the Court finds accused RAMON CHUA UY
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of [v]iolation of Section 15, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as maximum plus the cost
of the suit;
2. In Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, [t]he Court finds accused RAMON CHUA UY
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of [v]iolation of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and considering that the quantity
of methamphetamine hydrochloride is more than 200 grams, there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), plus the cost of the suit; and
3. In Criminal Case No. 16201-MN, accused RAMON CHUA UY is hereby
ACQUITTED for lack of sufficient evidence.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's story of a legitimate buy-bust
operation; declared that poseur-buyer SPO1 Nepomuceno creditably testified as to
how the sale took place inside the white Toyota car of RAMON and that his
testimony "was amply corroborated" by SPO4 Regalado. It held that RAMON's
entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way with the police
undertaking "the rigors of planning" the buy-bust operation. The presumption that
they regularly performed their duty was not rebutted by proof of any ulterior motive.
It concluded that the prosecution has proved with certainty all the elements necessary
for the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and since RAMON
was caught in flagrante delicto selling a regulated drug, his warrantless arrest was
valid and the seizure of five (5) more packets of shabu weighing 401 grams (Exhibits
"D" to "D-4") from the confiscated attache case of RAMON was justified and legal
in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime. The trial court also cited the confirmation by the NBI's
Forensic Division Chemist, Loreto F. Bravo, that the packets of shabu bought and
seized from RAMON, was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug (Exhibit "C").
The trial court was not convinced of RAMON's claim of innocence and frame up. It
doubted his tale that when arrested, he was just test-driving the car of a certain
Arnold, and that he was carrying P132,000 in various denominations inside his
attache case which the police did not account for. It also dismissed as trivialities
RAMON's attack on the existence and preparation of the buy-bust money and lack of
prior surveillance, since a police report listing the names of the donors of the money
used by the police to finance its anti-drug operation, the marking of the buy-bust
money itself, and prior surveillance are not indispensable to the conduct of a buy-
bust operation, as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven.
Unsatisfied, RAMON appealed from the decision. In view of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, the appeal is now before us.
In his Appellant's Brief, RAMON submits that the trial court erred (1) in giving
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the
evidence for the defense; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of drug pushing and drug possession. He assails the credibility of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust operation, contending that the
price of P1,000 for a gram of shabu is "so exorbitant" 13 as to be in credible and
claims that the police officers only made it to appear that the price was exactly
P1,000 per gram because there were P1,000-peso bills among the P132,000 which
they got from his attache case. He insists that he is a legitimate garments
businessman who need not resort to selling illicit drugs to make money; in fact, he
was carrying his day's collection amounting to P132,000 when accosted by the police
in the evening of 11 September 1995. Thus, the female confidential agent/police
informer should have testified in court to prove her claims against him.
Finally RAMON submits that without the testimony of NBI Forensic Chemist, the
prosecution's case "falls to pieces." Bravo's testimony cannot be waived since only
he could say whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and also
determine its actual weight upon which depends the penalty to be imposed. Thus,
whatever he said in his report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, has no probative value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not waive the
testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's
evidence."
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges us to affirm
RAMON's conviction. It agrees with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses for the prosecution. The price of shabu at P1,000 per gram is not
incredible. It was the price quoted by the informant, prompting the buy-bust team to
prepare five (5) P1,000-peso bills which they actually paid to RAMON but later
recovered. The Tranca and Ong cases 14 cited by RAMON cannot be relied upon
because the price of shabu or any illegal drugs for that matter is determined by the
law of supply and demand, not by law or jurisprudence. Besides, the amount of
shabu sold to the poseur buyer in Tranca for P100 was only 0.06 gram; while in Ong,
the price of P650 per kilo of shabu involved transactions done way back in March,
1993. It is then neither impossible nor improbable for the street price of shabu to
reach P1,000 per gram in 1995 when the illegal sale was committed in this case since
the price of illegal drugs are not fixed, but determined by its availability on the street
and the demand of users. Secondly, RAMON's avowal that he is a legitimate
garments businessman who need not earn money the illegal way is purely self-
serving, since the members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit caught him in
the act of selling shabu to a member of the buy-bust team and further carried 401
grams more of shabu inside his attache case. Finally, the police informer need not be
presented to establish the buy-bust since it was not she but the police who caught
RAMON in the act of selling and possession of shabu. Her presentation is neither
essential nor indispensable for RAMON's conviction, since her testimony would be
merely corroborative and cumulative. 15
On the non-presentation of Loreto Bravo, the NBI forensic chemist, the OSG argues
that Bravo's finding that the drugs seized from RAMON were indeed the regulated
methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu, is not hearsay. Bravo did not testify
anymore because the parties agreed during the pre-trial to dispense with his
testimony. RAMON never objected to the order. Neither did he move to reconsider
it. The facts thus stipulated and incorporated in the pre-trial order bound
him. 16 Moreover, at the trial RAMON never raised the question of the non-
presentation of the forensic chemist; what his counsel objected to was with respect to
the presentation and identification of the shabu wherein defense objected to the
irregular act of showing the confiscated drug to SPO1 Nepomuceno without laying
the basis therefor. 17 The defense counsel did not also object to the direct examination
of SPO4 Regalado concerning the whereabouts and identification of the subject
shabu.
We find no merit in this appeal.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted
for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has
consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers,
and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit. 18 As has been
repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious
crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall
prevail over appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been
framed. 19
We, of course, are aware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. 20 But the defense
of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of
their official duties. 21 Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has
been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. 22
In the cases at bar, our review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses yields
no basis to overturn the trial court's findings on their credibility. As correctly noted
by the trial court, there is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the
police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. RAMON has not even tried to
suggest any ulterior motive.
We are convinced that in the evening of 11 September 1995, an honest- to- goodness
entrapment operation against RAMON was conducted by the team composed of the
local Anti-Narcotics Unit's Chief himself, Police Inspector Ricardo Aquino, OIC,
SPO4 Eddie Regalado, PO Alberto G. Nepomuceno, PO3 Federico Ortiz and PO1
Joel Borda. 23 Nepomuceno, the poseur-buyer had not seen RAMON before, although
he had previous background information about RAMON. Nepomuceno conducted
surveillance on RAMON. 24
The price of P1,000 per gram of shabu paid by the "poseur-buyer" Nepomuceno to
RAMON cannot be considered "so exhorbitant" as to render the account of the buy-
bust improbable. In fact, in a buy-bust operation conducted by the policemen in
Sampaloc, Manila on 5 July 1995, or more than a month earlier, P500 only fetched
0.395 gram of shabu, 25 which meant that the selling price then was already more
than P1,000 for a full gram of shabu.
As to the buy-bust money, Nepomuceno categorically stated that after receiving the
information from their informant, Police Inspector Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the
Anti-Narcotic Unit, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation "and prepared
marked money worth P5,000 in P1,000 denomination and instructed [him] to act as
poseur buyer in the operation." They photocopied (xeroxed) them and "got the serial
numbers." After the operation, they submitted them to the prosecutor's
office. 26 Nepomuceno underwent grueling cross-examination by defense
counsel 27 but he never wavered on his testimony on the conduct of the buy-bust
operation. On cross-examination, Nepomuceno revealed that the source of their buy-
bust money is Mayor Amado S. Vicencio. 28
The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. 29 Their
testimony or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would be
merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the
sale of the illegal drug. 30
On the other hand, RAMON only offered an unsubstantiated tale of frame-up. He did
not even present his own driver named "Lolong" to corroborate his tale.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught
RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of
shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMON's negative testimony must necessarily
fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially
when it comes from the mouth of credible witness. 31
Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the trial court correctly ruled
that his warrantless arrest and the seizure of his attache case containing more shabu
was also valid and lawful. 32 Besides, RAMON never raised, on constitutional
grounds, the issue of inadmissibility of the evidence thus obtained.
We now address RAMON's contention that since the NBI Forensic Chemist did not
testify, his findings that the specimens submitted to him were indeed shabu and
weighed so much, are hearsay and leave the evidence of the prosecution insufficient
to convict. RAMON's premise is that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic
Chemist's testimony but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's
evidence." Indeed, the records disclose that during the pre-trial, conducted
immediately after the arraignment on 21 November 1995, RAMON, duly represented
by counsel de parte Atty. Gerardo Alberto, 33 and the prosecution stipulated on the
markings of the prosecution's exhibits, and agreed to dispense with the testimony of
Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo. Thereafter the trial court issued a Joint Order,
which embodies its ruling granting the motion of the trial prosecutor for the joint trial
of the two cases and the withdrawal of the motion for reinvestigation by RAMON's
counsel; RAMON's plea of not guilty in each case; and the proceedings at the pre-
trial. As to the latter, the Joint Order states:
During the pre-trial, prosecution and defense agreed to stipulate on the markings of
the following prosecution's exhibits, thereby dispensing will the testimony of
Forensic chemist Loreto E. Bravo, to wit:
Exhibit "A" — Letter request;
Exhibit "B" — Preliminary report;
Exhibit "B-1" — Signature of forensic Chemist;
Exhibit "C" — Final Report for Chemical cases Nos. 16199 and
16200;
Exhibit "C-1" — Signature of Forensic Chemist in said Report;
The five (5) plastic bags with markings containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
with a total weight of 401 grams will be marked as follows:
Exhibit "D" — Plastic bag with letter A;
Exhibit "D-1" — Plastic bag with letter B;
Exhibit "D-2" — Plastic bag with letter C;
Exhibit "D-3" — Plastic bag with letter D;
Exhibit "D-4" — Plastic bag with letter E;
Exhibit "E" — One (1) plastic sachet with methamphetamine
hydrochloride with a total weight of 5.8564 grams;
Exhibit "F" — Another Final report for Criminal Case No. 16201;
Exhibit "F-1" — Signature of Chemist in said report;
The three (3) pieces of plastic scoop and two (2) plastic containers with markings
containing residue of methamphetamine hydrochloride will be marked as follows:
Exhibit "G" — Plastic scoop color white;
Exhibit "G-1" — Plastic scoop color blue;
Exhibit "G-2" — Plastic scoop color tangerine;
Exhibit "H" — Selecta ice cream plastic cup;
Exhibit "H-1" — White plastic container;
By agreement of the prosecution and defense, set the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution on January 8, 9, 11 and 15, 1996; whereas evidence for the defense will
be on January 18, 22 and 25, 1996, all at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. 34
It may at once be noted that neither RAMON nor his counsel made express
admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1,"
"D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That
RAMON agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not
be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic
bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the aforequoted portion of the Joint Order, it is clear
that RAMON and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the
clause "thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist Loreto E. Bravo"
must be understood in that context.
Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial
that Exhibits "D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the
Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides:
Sec. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence
against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his counsel. 35
Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by
him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard
the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or
admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he
may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; 36 eliminate any doubt on
the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon. 37
Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsel's
signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence
what it had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, RAMON did not object to the
admission of Bravo's Preliminary Report (Exh. "B"), Final Report (Exh. "C"),
another Final Report (Exh. "F"), and of the plastic bags (Exhibits "D" to "D-4"
inclusive, and "E").
When asked to comment on the exhibits formally offered, RAMON's counsel merely
stated:
 ATTY. DOMINGO:
No objection to these exhibits Your Honor only insofar as to form part of the
testimony of the witness/es who testified and identified said exhibits and only insofar
or in accordance with the stipulations the prosecution and the defense had entered
into during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. 38
In its offer of the exhibits, the prosecution explicitly described what the foregoing
exhibits was and the purposes for which they were offered, thus:
FISCAL ALIPOSA:
We are now offering in evidence the following:
Exhibit "A", is the letter-request;
Exhibit "B", the preliminary report;
Exhibit "B-1", signature of the forensic chemist;
Exhibit "C", final report of Crim. Case Nos. 16199-MN and 16200-MN;
Exhibit "C-1", the signature of forensic chemist;
These exhibits are being offered to establish the fact that after the apprehension of
the accused, the necessary request was prepared and findings in the preliminary and
final reports are both positive for shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2", "D-3", and "D-4", are plastic packs of shabu found
inside the attache case opened while inside the vehicle of the accused together with
the prosecution witness in the course of the buy-bust operation;
Exhibit "E" is the 5.84 grams of shabu which was the subject of the buy-bust
operation;
Exhibit "F" and "F-1", final report and signature of the forensic chemist in Crim.
Case No. 16201-MN, showing the specimen examined to be positive for shabu;
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise offered these exhibits as part of the testimony of the witness or
witnesses who testified thereon Your Honor. 39
In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecution's exhibits, he
likewise never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic
Chemist Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection
to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.
Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal. 40 The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain
documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot,
for the first time, be raised on appeal. 41 In U.S. v. Choa Tong 42 where the defense
counsel did not object to the form or substance of a laboratory report that the
specimen submitted was opium, the Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have
been made at the time the said analysis was presented."
In People v. Dela Cruz, 43 the Court rejected the appellant's contention that the
biology report of the NBI forensic chemist was inadmissible for being hearsay
because the forensic chemist was not presented in court, and held, noting that the
report was not objected to as such in his comments or objections to the prosecution's
formal Offer of Evidence, that "[e]very objections to the admissibility of evidence
shall be made at the time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground
for objection shall have become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered
waived.
Finally, as to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an
NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duty. Besides, by
virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in the performance of
office duty, as in the case of the reports of Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. We are also aware that "the test conducted for the presence of
'shabu' (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be performed by an
average or regular chemistry graduate" and where "there is no evidence. . . to show
that the positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride ('shabu')
are erroneous. . . coupled with the undisputed presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, said results" may "adequately establish" that the specimens
submitted were indeed shabu. 44 1âwphi1
In sum, in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN we are convinced that the prosecution's
evidence more than proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in
every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. 45 The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the "buy-bust" transaction
between the entrapping officers and the accused. 46 What is material in a prosecution
for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. 47
There is also no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case
No. 16200-MN was proven beyond reasonable doubt since RAMON knowingly
carried with him more than 400 grams of shabu without legal authority at the time he
was caught during the buy-bust operation. The penalty imposed, namely, reclusion
perpetuaand fine of P500,000 is in order pursuant to People v. Simon. 48
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon,
Branch 170, in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN and Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, is
hereby affirmed in toto.
G.R. No. 124832 February 1, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For acceding to a request to massage the stomach of a neighbor's wife who was
purportedly suffering abdominal pains, Conchita Mahomoc got raped instead.
Charged for the crime was the neighbor, Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo in an Information
alleging —
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1994, in Barangay Buhang,
Magallanes, Agusan Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused, armed with a knife by, means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of Conchita Mahomoc, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, accused assisted by counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.2 The case proceeded to trial after which the court a quo rendered
judgment,3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
finds accused DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and accordingly sentences him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He shall serve his sentence
entirely at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Panabo, Davao del Norte. In
addition, the accused is ordered to pay the offended party moral damages in
the sum of P50,000.00.4 The accused is entitled to the full benefits of his
preventive imprisonment if he agrees to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, conformably with Article 29 (as
amended) of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is also ordered to pay the
costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, accused interposed this appeal ascribing a lone assignment of error
which asserts that —
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GULTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The trial court summed the versions of both prosecution and defense thus:
On April 4, 1994, Conchita Mahomoc went to the PNP Station of
Magallanes to complain that she was raped by Dante Cepeda. On April 5,
1994, she signed her Complaint and swore to it before MCTC Clerk of
Court Gad B. Curaza. She claims that a about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house at Buhang, Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house to massage (hilot) his
wife who was suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor,
was in her house and she asked her to go with her. Cepeda was at his
kitchen door when they reached his house. He told Gina to leave as his wife,
who was Muslim, would get angry if there were many people in their home.
He insisted on this many times so that Gina had to leave. Cepeda led the
complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a
figure covered by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife. At that
instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her shoulders and
pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not
make any noise, otherwise I will kill you." She elbowed him, stooped and
shouted "Help!" three times but Cepeda covered her mouth then carried her
to the room by her armpits. Shaking herself, free from, his grasp, she hit her
left shin at the edge of the floor of the bedroom. Inside the room, he
threatened her with a knife and ordered her to remove her panty and lie on
the bed. Afraid she did as ordered and the accused also removed his pants
and brief. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs,
inserted his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at
the same time embracing and kissing her. After he was through, she ran
towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing her.
Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the complainant on the aspect that
at [a]bout 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, she was at
Conchita's house to discuss the gift they would give their neighbor who was
getting married. Cepeda arrived and asked Conchita to give his wife a
massage as she was having stomach pains. Conchita had been a masseuse
since 1979. On complainant's requests, she accompanied her to Cepeda's
house. Upon arrival, the accused told her to leave as his Muslim wife gets
angry when there are plenty of people in their house. Both she and Conchita
protested but Cepeda insisted on it several forcing her to leave the house of
the accused.
Veronica Delmiguiz declared that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
April 2, 1994, she hear a shout for help from the house of Cepeda. She
looked and saw that the windows were closed. She did not give it a second
though thinking that it was a family trouble as she has heard Cepeda and his
wife quarrel on previous occasions. Helen Antolijao co-executed an
affidavit with Veronica Delminguiz on April 5, 1994 but was not any more
presented by the prosecution as her testimony would only corroborate that
of Delminguiz.
xxx xxx xxx
This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita are
lovers. He came to know her as he passes by her house in going to his place
of work. He began working with EMCO in the month of February 1994.
The complainant has gone to their house, four times in February 1994, first
to sell Herway cosmetics, the second time to sell "chorizo", the third time to
sell fish arid the fourth time to sell clothing materials. He was present in
their house only on the first occasion that complainant had gone there. He
knew of the other occasions because his wife told him. The fifth time the
complainant went to their house on March 6, he courted her by saying:
"Sing, I knew that you like me and I like you." Then they had sexual
intercourse. The next time Conchita came to see him and had sexual
intercourse with him was on March 13, then March 17, March 29 and
March 27 when on this date, she asked him to leave his wife to elope with
her as she would also leave her husband. He rejected this proposal because
he loved his wife and Conchita had three daughters. Conchita, according to
him, was displeased because he would not elope with her. On April 2, 1994,
Conchita again came to his house and while they were petting, somebody
outside his house said: "You there, what are you doing?" At this Conchita
left his house and went home. At about 10:00 o'clock that evening he was
arrested.
The accused's wife, Dory Cepeda, testified that indeed the complainant has
gone to their house four times in the month of February and on these
occasions her husband was at home. Her husband started working with
EMCO in the month of March while she began working as a baby sitter also
in the month of March, 1994.
On the basis of the foregoing factual summation, the trial court rendered against
accused Dante Cepeda as stated at the outset.
Insisting on his innocence; accused-appellant claims in his defense that he and
private complainant were carrying on an adulterous love affair. According to him, his
request to private complainant that the latter massage his allegedly ill wife "is a pre-
arranged lie between the accused-appellant and private complainant in order to
mislead Regina Carba" the truth being that accused-appellant "purposely went to the
house of private complainant to invite her to his house, their place of rendezvous for
their passionate affair."6 He asserts that the charge if rape was "a contrivance or an
afterthought rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong" 7 because
private complainant "feeling guilty of such an adulterous affair and out of fear that
Regina might have suspected something between her and the accused-appellant,
thought of accusing her paramour of rape in anticipation of the possible retribution
by her husband should he later on discover their relationship." 8
Guided by the three (3) principles in the review of rape cases, namely, that —
1.] An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent to disprove;
2.] In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3.] The evidence of the prosecution stands or fall on its own merits and can
not be allowed to draw strength from weakness of the defense. 9
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to
deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect
scrutiny of the record discloses that the "illicit love affair" angle appears as a
fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged "love affair"
need convincing proof.10 Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the
complainant several times,11 accused-appellant bears the burden of proving his
defense by substantial evidence.12 The record shows that other than his elf-serving
assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and
private complainant were in love.
It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married and
are living together with their respective spouses.13 In this case, other than accused-
appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters, mementos or
pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with private
complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this
pretended illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really the paramour of private
complainant, she would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action
which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of
her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is
allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open
their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention the ire of a
cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were it not the truth.14
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be
credible in itself such as one that the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.15 The Court has taken
judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom
and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is
observed so that their reputation remains untainted.16Such circumspection must have
prompted the victim to request Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of
mercy to accused-appellant's house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by
accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse to
having too many people in their house.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that appellant and private complainant were
indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone will not extricate him from his
predicament. The mere assertion. of a "love relationship" would not necessarily rule
out the use of force to consummate the crime.17 It must be stressed that in rape cases,
the gravemen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will
or without her consent.18 Thus, granting arguendo that the accused and the victim
were really lovers this Court has reiterated time and again that "[A] sweetheart
cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand
sexual gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext
of love. Love is not a license for lust." 19
Succinctly stated, in rape the prosecution must rule out the victim's consent to the
sexual act.20 In the case at bar, the testimony of private complainant was clear: she
did not consent to penile invasion.21 Assuming for argument's sake that accused-
appellant and private complainant were sweethearts, rape was nevertheless
committed because accused-appellant had sex with the victim by force and against
her will.22
Indeed, unless deeply wronged and aggrieved, private complainant would not have
instituted this case at all. That the victim had been married to her husband for
seventeen (17) years and is a mother of four (4) children whose ages at the time
ranged from seventeen (17), sixteen (16), fourteen (14) and ten (10),23 rendered her
exposure to public trial of rape all the more embarrassing and painful.
As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza,24 a married woman with a husband and
three (3) daughters would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused
unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case why a mother of four
(4) would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts25 and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were
other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled
her.26 Thus not surprisingly when she was queried as to how much would she claim
for her defilement in terms of moral damages, she emphatically declared as follows:
Q: If you were to ask for moral damages from the court, how much would
you claim for moral damages?
A: I do not need payment, it is justice that I ask.27
She, likewise, flatly denied the existence of an illicit affair with the accused-
appellant in face of the not too subtle insinuations of defense counsel to this effect on
cross-examination, viz:
Q I will ask you a candid question, Mrs. Marohomoc. Is it not a fact that at
one time you gifted Dante Cepeda with a Herway lotion?
A No, sir.
Q So you will also deny that you gifted him with Mark cigarettes.
A Oh no!28
In a prosecution for rape, the evaluation of evidence presented during trial ultimately
revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness. 29 When a woman says
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been
raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of
credibility needed to convict the accused.30
In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the following
doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the
lower court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand;
and third, a witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.31
Applying these guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the following findings and
conclusion of the trial court:
 From the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, the Court could With regard to the civil liability, however, the trial court's award of damages should
make out this deduction: from the accused's heart sprang this evil desire and be modified. Under controlling case law, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
he contrived a plan to rape the complainant. He made up a story about his (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
wife being in pain and shaped a mat covered with a blanket thus making it rape.37 This is exclusive of the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
appear that his wife was in bed. He closed all the windows of his house so (P50,000.00) without need of further proof. 38 The victim's injury is now recognized
no one could see what happened inside. What the did not expect though was as inherently concomitant with and necessarily proceeds from the appalling crime of
the presence of Regina Carba in the house of the complainant so that he rape which per se warrants an award for moral damages.39
again had to make up another tale about his wife being a Muslim to get rid
of Carba. Without any "illicit relationship" having been established between WHEREFORE, with the sole MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Dante y
the accused and the complainant before April 2, 1994, what is the basis for Sapotalo pay complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
the sexual intercourse on that day? The complainant says "rape" and the indemnity consistent with controlling case law, aside from the award of Fifty
Court agrees. The Court just cannot believe that a mother of four would Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, the decision of the trial court in
demand from a man who became her neighbor for only about one and a half Criminal Case No. 6246 finding accused Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo guilty beyond
months to elope with her. There is no evidence that her relationship with her reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
husband was on the rocks. Rather, as soon as her husband arrive from work, respects.1âwphi1.nêt
she reported to him the abuse she suffered from the hands of the accused
and a commotion ensued because of the husband's anger. From the
SO ORDERED.
accused's own mouth, he had been convicted once for possession of "indian
pana" and had been transferring from one place to another, without a
permanent home, while the complainant has established her home in
Magallanes and is secure therein together with her family. A Filipina
woman, especially a mother of three daughters, would not bring herself, her
family and her husband to embarrassment, to public scrutiny and being the
talk of the community unless what she had testified that she was raped is
true.32 If, in the remote possibility, complainant had voluntarily consisted
not have sex with him, her most natural reaction would have been to
conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor and
reputation, as well as to her family.33

The conscience of the Court will be very much at ease with a finding that
the accused is guilty. It could not decree an acquittal based on lies for
falsehood is the anathema of justice. There can be no justice based on lies.

To restate what had been said earlier, it is highly inconceivable vis-a-vis the
prevailing facts of the case for the victim to conjure a tale of ravishment and, in the
process, subject herself and her family to the disgrace, social humiliation and trauma
attendant to a prosecution for rape as well as the stigma of a lifetime of shame
incident thereto.34Furthermore, the conduct of the victim, immediately following the
alleged assault is of utmost importance so as to establish the truth or falsity of the
charges of rape.35 In this case, we find the private complainant's prompt report of her
defilement to her husband as well as the authorities as convincing indications that
she has been truly wronged. A complainant's act in immediately reporting the
commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor strengthening her
credibility.36