1|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
ART. 613 on the ground that it is the HLURB which has
1. G.R. No. 152440. January 31, 2005
FELICITACION B. BORBAJO, petitioner, vs. HIDDEN
VIEW HOMEOWNERS, INC., SPS. MARCELINA A.
SARCON, ELY D. SARCON, ROBERTO ALVAREZ,
CORAZON NOMBRADO, and GILBERT ANDRALES, in
their personal capacities, respondents.
FACTS:
Jose C. Bontuyan (Bontuyan), Lucy Solon,
Georgina Solon, Helen Solon and Vicente Solon, Jr.
(the Solons) were the registered owners of a parcel
of agricultural land (Lot 10183-A), covering an area
of 13,910 square meters as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 73709 of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City. At the instance of Bontuyan,
the property was surveyed on 19 May 1991 to
convert it into a subdivision. Meanwhile, in his own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the Solons and
following the subdivision scheme in the plan,
Bontuyan sold the resulting lots to different
individuals,as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 18 June 1991. Among the lots sold are
the ones which later became the subject of this
case, the three (3) road lots. The road lots were sold
to petitioner Felicitacion B. Borbajo. Using the
advance payments of his lot purchasers, Bontuyan
proceeded to develop a subdivision which was
later named Hidden View Subdivision I by its
residents and homeowners. Later, he applied for
and secured from the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a License to Sell.
The residents and homeowners of Hidden View
Subdivision I heard reports to the effect that Borbajo
had purchased the entire subdivision from
Bontuyan through an oral agreement. They also
heard that they have no right to use the road lots,
since the lots have already been registered in
Borbajos name. As a consequence, the Hidden
View Homeowners, Inc. invited Borbajo to a
meeting. When confronted by the homeowners
about her claim that she had bought the
subdivision from Bontuyan, Borbajo confirmed her
claim of ownership over the subdivision and the
road lots. She also told them that they have no right
regarding the road right-of-way.[12]On 10 August
1997, the homeowners caused the construction of
a guardhouse at the entrance of Hidden View
Subdivision I and hired the services of a security
guard to prevent unauthorized persons and
construction vehicles from passing through their
subdivision. The measures adversely affected the
residents of the subdivisions at the back, as well as
Borbajo herself since her delivery trucks and heavy
equipment used in the construction of her housing
projects then on-going had been effectively
prevented from passing through the road lots.[15]
The trial court issued a TRO effective for seventy-two
(72) hours. After due hearing, it also granted
Borbajos application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It denied respondents motion to dismiss
jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court decision
ISSUE:
Whether respondents may legally prevent Borbajo
from using and passing through the three (3) road
lots within Hidden View Subdivision I
RULING:
No. As a registered co-owner(Petitioner) of the
road lots, Borbajo is entitled to avail of all the
attributes of ownership under the Civil Codejus
utendi, fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et
vindicandi.[32] Article 428 of the New Civil Code is
explicit that the owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. A co-owner, such as
Borbajo, is entitled to use the property owned in
common under Article 486 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, respondents cannot close the road lots
to prevent Borbajo from using the same.
The court is bound by the value in law and the
evidentiary weight of the titles in the name of
Borbajo. As long as the titles are not annulled,
Borbajo remains registered a co-owner and
therefore her right to use the road lots subsists.
Likewise, with Borbajo as a registered co-owner
of the road lots, it is utterly pointless to discuss
whether she is entitled to the easement of right of
way. Both from the text of Article 649[36] of the Civil
Code and the perspective of elementary common
sense, the dominant estate cannot be the servient
estate at the same time. One of the characteristics
of an easement is that it can be imposed only on
the property of another, never on ones own
property. An easement can exist only when the
servient and the dominant estates belong to
different owners.[37]
Borbajo, being a registered co-owner of the
three (3) road lots, is entitled to the injunctive relief.
2. G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in
Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel,
registered in the name of the private respondent
corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
128784.
The private respondent's title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto
reserved as an easement of way. As a
2|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
consequence, an annotation was entered in the
private respondent's title.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well
as other residents of neighboring estates) made use
of the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983,
when, and over its protests, the private respondent
constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced
suit for injunction against the private respondent, to
have the gates removed and to allow full access to
the easement.
The trial court rendered judgment against the
private respondent.
The private respondent appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals held that the
summary judgment was improper and that the
lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up
by the private respondent that the easement in
question had been extinguished. According to the
Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation
on ownership and that it does not impair the private
respondent's title, and that since the private
respondent had acquired title to the property,
"merger" brought about an extinguishment of the
easement.
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale
executed between the private respondent and the
previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley
in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement
notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an easement exists on the
subject property
2. Whether or not the easement had been
extinguished by merger.
RULING:
1. YES. It is true that the sale did include the
alley. On this score, the Court rejects the
petitioner's contention that the deed of sale
"excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it
can not be separated from the tenement and
maintain an independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the
tenements of which they form part.10 Although
they are possessed of a separate juridical
existence, as mere accessories, they can not,
however, be alienated11 from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as
an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is
no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims,
because as an easement precisely, it operates as
a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient
estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the
deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of
the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED
FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had
been converted into a private alley for the
benefit of the neighboring estates. . ."13 and
precisely, the former owner, in conveying the
property, gave the private owner a discount on
account of the easement, thus:
WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the
parties hereto agreed to adjust the purchase
price from THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS
(P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS
(P3,503,240.00)
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private
respondent did acquire ownership over the
property –– including the disputed alley –– as a
result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the
right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary
to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine
merger took place as a consequence of the sale
in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists
when ownership of the dominant and servient
estates is consolidated in the same
person.15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires
full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The
servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is
to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the
benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following
article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for
the benefit of a community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does
not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no
"owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and
the easement pertains to persons without a
dominant estate,17 in this case, the public at
large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of
a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and
the termination of that relation leaves the
easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys
the property in favor of the public –– if that is
possible –– no genuine merger can take place
that would terminate a personal easement.
3|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
2. NO. No genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private
respondent corporation. According to the Civil
Code, a merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in
the same person. Merger requires full ownership of
both estates.
Note that the servitude in question is a personal
servitude (established for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more persons to whom
the encumbered estate does not belong). In a
personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of
a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant
estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus,
merger could not have been possible.
ART. 614
1. G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. (See digest above)
2. G.R. No. 151797 October 11, 2007
SPOUSES MANUEL MEJORADA AND ROSALINDA P.
MEJORADA, petitioners, vs.
GLORIFICACION VERTUDAZO, SOL VERTUDAZO, SPS.
JIMMY GALVIZO and GLOSITA T. GALVIZO, SPS.
FERMIN CABRERA and ELLEN CABRERA, SPS. FELIXTO
ARIATE and RENA ARIATE, and SPS. RAUL ARLALEJO
and ARCILA ARLALEJO, respondents.
FACTS:
Glorificacion and Sol Vertudazo and their co-
respondents established their permanent residence
on a 300-square meter lot located at Telaje,
Tandag, Surigao del Sur. Their property is
landlocked being bordered on all sides by different
lots. As an access route going to Quiñones Street
and the public highway, they utilized a proposed
undeveloped barangay road on the south side of
their property owned by Rosario Quiñones.
In 1988, spouses Manuel and Rosalinda Mejorada,
petitioners, bought Rosario’s 646-square meter lot
adjacent to respondents’ property. Included
therein is an area measuring 55.5 square meters
which serves as an adequate outlet to Quiñones
Street, now the subject of the present controversy.
For several years, respondents and the general
public have been using that area as a passageway
to and from Quiñones Street.
On July 2, 1997, petitioners closed the passageway
by building a new garage for their service jeep.
Hence, respondents brought the matter to
the barangay concerned but no settlement was
reached by the parties. Respondents then filed a
complaint3 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Tandag, Surigao del Sur praying for a grant of
easement of right of way over petitioners’ property
with an application for writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are entitled to the easement
of right of way on the property owned by
petitioners.
RULING:
YES. Easement has been defined as an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner. The immovable in favor of which
the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient
estate.4 In this case, the dominant estate is
respondents’ property, while the servient estate
belongs to petitioners.
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of
a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity. Xxx
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is
constituted by law for public use or for private
interest. Pursuant to the above provisions, the owner
of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right
of way only after he has established the existence
of these four (4) requisites: (a) the estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (d)
the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
Here, these four requisites have been satisfied.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no
other road which respondents could use leading to
Quiñones Street except the passageway on
petitioners’ property.
Second, respondents have offered to pay
petitioners proper indemnity for the easement of
way.
4|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
Third, the Court of Appeals likewise found that the
isolation of respondents’ property was not due to
their acts.
Fourth, the easement is at the point least prejudicial
to petitioners’ property. In fact, the area of the
easement which is 55.5 square meters is located at
the corner of petitioners’ landholding, hence, does
not cause them inconvenience in anyway.
3. G.R. No. L-14116 June 30, 1960
LAUREANA A. CID, petitioner,
vs.
IRENE P. JAVIER, MANUEL P. JAVIER, JOSEFINA P.
JAVIER, FERNANDO P. JAVIER, JOSE P. JAVIER,
GUILLERMO P. JAVIER, ISIDORA P. JAVIER, BENJAMIN
P. JAVIER, and LEONOR CRISOLOGO, respondents.
FACTS:
The windows in question are admittedly in
respondents' own building erected on their own lot.
The easement, if there is any, is therefore a
negative one.1 The alleged prohibition having been
avowedly made in 1913 or 1914, before the present
Civil Code took effect, the applicable legal
provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code
which provides:
Art. 538. In order to acquire by prescription the
easements referred to in the next preceding article,
the time of the possession shall be computed, ... in
negative easements, from the day on which the
owner of the dominant estate has, by a formal act,
forbidden the owner of the servient estate to
perform any act which would be lawful without the
easement. (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be seen, the only question hinges on the
interpretation of the phrase "a formal act". The
lower court and the Court of Appeals considered
any prohibition made by the owner of the
dominant estate, be it oral or written, sufficient
compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals
declared:
In the light of the foregoing decisions, (Cortes vs. Yu
Tibo, 2 Phil., 26 and the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain therein cited), we agree with the trial
court that the "formal act" of prohibition
contemplated by Art. 538 of the old Civil Code may
be either a written or verbal act. The decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain above-quoted do not
at all mention written but merely some act of
prohibition.
ISSUE:
whether the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al.,
owners of a building standing on their lot with
windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had
acquired by prescription an enforceable easement
of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to
obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been
made upon petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as
owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being
covered by Torrens titles.
RULING:
No. . The law is explicit. It requires not any form of
prohibition, but exacts, in a parenthetical
expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a
specific, particular act, but a formal act. The
following definitions are pertinent:
Formal—or pertaining to form, characterized by
one due form or order, done in due form with a
solemnity regular; relating to matters of form. (C.
J. S. vol. 37, p. 115.)
Act—In civil law, a writing which states in legal
form that a thing has been done, said or
agreed. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 150,
citing Marlin Report.)
From these definitions, it would appear that the
phrase "formal act" would require not merely any
writing, but one executed in due form and/or with
solemnity. That this is the intendment of the law
although not expressed in exact language is the
reason for the clarification2 made in Article 621 of
the new Civil Code which specifically requires the
prohibition to be in "an instrument acknowledged
before a notary public". This is as it should be.
Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on
the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of
the dominical right of the owner of the subjected
property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title
and by prescription, in the case of positive
easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion,
apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By
the same token, negative easements can not be
acquired by less formal means. Hence, the
requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent of
the act of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public."
The Court of Appeals found as undisputed the fact
'that plaintiffs' lot (dominant) as well as defendant's
lot (servient) are covered by Original Certificates of
Title Nos. 7225 and 7545, respectively", both issued
by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte, in
pursuance of the decrees of registration issued on
December 27, 1937, in Cadastral Case No. 51,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1212 of Laoag,
Ilocos Norte. Certified copies of these certificates of
title are found as Annexes "A" and "B", pages 77 to
80 inclusive of the Record on Appeal. In both of
them, it does not appear any annotation in respect
to the easement supposedly acquired by
prescription which, counting the twenty (20) years
from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by
1937, date of the decrees of registration.
Consequently, even conceding arguendo that
such an easement has been acquired, it had been
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the
servient estate under the Torrens System without the
easement being annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the
Land Registration Act.3
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is hereby reversed.
4. G.R. No. 175510 July 28, 2008
5|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ,
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO
VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD
TABISULA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez
purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute
Sale1 (the deed) from respondent-spouses
Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a 200
square meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject property)
of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in San
Fernando, La Union, which 380 sq.m. parcel of land.
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on
the western side of the subject property.2 Believing
that that side is the intended road right of way
mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their
representative, reported the matter to the
barangay for mediation and conciliation.
Respondents failed to attend the conferences
scheduled by the barangay, however, drawing
petitioners to file in April 1999 or more than six years
after the execution of the deed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages3 against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando City, La Union.
Petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject
property on the strength of respondents’ assurance
of providing them a road right of way. They thus
prayed that respondents be ordered to provide the
subject property with a 2½-meter wide easement
and to remove the concrete wall blocking the
same.4
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim (for damages and attorney’s
fees),5 averred that the 2 ½-meter easement should
be taken from the western portion of the subject
property and not from theirs;6 and petitioners and
their family are also the owners of two properties
adjoining the subject property, which adjoining
properties have access to two public roads or
highways.
RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners’
complaint and granted respondents’ Counterclaim
by Decision.
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of May 29, 2006,12 affirmed that of the trial
court, it holding that the deed only conveyed
ownership of the subject property to petitioners,
and that the reference therein to an easement in
favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of a
voluntary easement of right of way.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may demand the grant
by respondents of an easement on the western side
of respondents’ lot.
RULING:
NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right
constituted on another’s property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the
same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for
the benefit of another thing or person." 17 The
statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil
Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to
source – by law or by the will of the owners. So
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or
by the will of the owners. The former are called
legal and the latter voluntary easements.
From the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is
clear that what they seek to enforce is an alleged
grant in the deed by respondents of an easement
reading: "they shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide
road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but
which is not included in this sale."
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any
transaction involving the sale or disposition of real
property must be in writing.18 The stipulation harped
upon by petitioners that they "shall be provided a 2
½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western
side of their lot but which is not included in this sale"
is not a disposition of real property. The proviso that
the intended grant of right of way is "not included in
this sale" could only mean that the parties would
have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose.19 The use of the word
"shall," which is imperative or mandatory in its
ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no
public benefit or private right requires it to be given
an imperative meaning.20
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary
easement must be recorded in the Registry of
Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So
Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for, viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object
the inscription or annotation of acts and contracts
relating to the ownership and other rights over
immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights
over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property
shall not prejudice third persons.
6|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or
compulsory easement of right of way. For to be
entitled to such kind of easement, the
preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of
a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons, and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of
the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
(Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
(Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of
way under Article 649, the following requisites must
be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid;
(3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.21 The onus of proving the existence of
these prerequisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate,22 herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, which is
supported by the Sketch23 (Exhibit "B"; Exhibit "1") of
the location of the lots of the parties and those
adjoining them, a common evidence of the parties,
petitioners and their family are also the owners of
two properties adjoining the subject property which
have access to two public roads or highways.24
Since petitioners then have more than adequate
passage to two public roads, they have no right to
demand the grant by respondents of an easement
on the "western side of [respondents’] lot."
5. EDILBERTO ALCANTARA, FLORENCIO VILLARMIA,
POLICARPIO OBREGON,+ RICARDO ROBLE,
ESCOLASTICA ONDONG, ESTEBAN RALLOS, HENRY
SESBINO, SERGIO SESBINO, MANUEL CENTENO,+
RENATO CRUZ, MARCELINO CENEZA, BUENAVENTURA
ONDONG, and BENJAMIN HALASAN, petitioners, vs.
CORNELIO B. RETA, JR. respondent.
FACTS:
Edilberto Alcantara, Florencio Villarmia, Policarpio
Obregon, Ricardo Roble, Escolastica Ondong,
Esteban Rallos, Henry Sesbino, Sergio Sesbino,
Manuel Centeno, Renato Cruz, Marcelo Ceneza,
Buenaventura Ondong and Benjamin Halasan, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14,
a complaint[4] against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the
exercise of the right of right of first refusal under
Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with
preliminary injunction, attorney’s fees and nullity of
amicable settlement.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or
lessees of the land located in Barangay Sasa,
Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-72594, owned by Reta; that the land has been
converted by Reta into a commercial center; and
that Reta is threatening to eject them from the
land. They assert that they have the right of first
refusal to purchase the land in accordance with
Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since
they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.
They also claimed that the amicable settlement
executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was
void ab initio for being violative of Presidential
Decree No. 1517.
On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is
beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1517
since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land
Reform Zone; that the applicable law is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay
the rentals for the use of the land; and that the
amicable settlement between him and Ricardo
Roble was translated to the latter and fully
explained in his own dialect.
On March 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint and ordering the
plaintiffs to pay Reta certain sums representing
rentals that had remained unpaid.[5]
On April 6, 1994, plaintiffs appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals.[6]
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision[7] affirming in toto the
decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal.[8]
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the right of
first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
The area involved has not been proclaimed an
Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners
filed a petition with the National Housing Authority
requesting that the land they were occupying be
declared as an ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request
was referred to Mr. Jose L. Atienza, General
Manager, National Housing Authority, for
appropriate action.[9] The request was further
referred to acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao
City, as per 2nd Indorsement dated July 1, 1986.[10]
Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as
an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was
an ULRZ.
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as
“The Urban Land Reform Act,” pertains to areas
proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones.[11]
Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right
7|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
under the said law since the land involved is not an
ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights
and privileges granted by the said decree, one
must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten
(10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on
the land by contract; and, (3) has resided
continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously,
those who do not fall within the said category
cannot be considered “legitimate tenants” and,
therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to
purchase the property should the owner of the land
decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within
a reasonable time.[12]
Respondent Reta denies that he has lease
agreements with petitioners Edilberto Alcantara
and Ricardo Roble.[13] Edilberto Alcantara, on the
other hand, failed to present proof of a lease
agreement other than his testimony in court that he
bought the house that he is occupying from his
father-in-law.[14]
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble
to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from
where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would
show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct
gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance,
unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides.[15]
Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house
on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a
personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil
Code.[16]
Whether the amicable settlement[17] is valid or not,
the conclusion would still be the same since the
agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease.
Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as
defined by Presidential Decree No. 1517.
As to the other petitioners, respondent Reta
admitted that he had verbal agreements with
them. This notwithstanding, they are still not the
legitimate tenants contemplated by Presidential
Decree No. 1517, who can exercise the right of first
refusal.
A contract has been defined as “a meeting of the
minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something
or to render some service.”[18]
Clearly, from the moment respondent Reta
demanded that the petitioners vacate the
premises, the verbal lease agreements, which were
on a monthly basis since rentals were paid
monthly,[19] ceased to exist as there was
termination of the lease.
Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified to
exercise the right of first refusal under P. D. No. 1517.
Another factor which militates against petitioners’
claim is the fact that there is no intention on the
part of respondent Reta to sell the property. Hence,
even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal,
the situation which would allow the exercise of that
right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land,
has not happened. P. D. No. 1517 applies where
the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third
party.[20]
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The
Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals[21] and the resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.
ARTICLE 615
1. BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO
VALDEZ SR., respondents.
FACTS: The respondents in this case were the heirs of
Magdaleno Valdez Sr., who purchased an
unregistered parcel of land located in Cebu from
Feliciana Santillan (seller). The land was possessed
by decedent who had also paid taxes thereon.
The heirs subsequently inherited the land. However,
a sugar company, Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. was
able to obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot
where the railroad tracks (existent even prior to the
sale to decedent) lay. The lot was likewise declared
for tax purposes under the name of the company.
The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation
and/or Recovery of Possession of the lot claiming
that Bomedco was granted by the seller of the lot a
railroad right of way for a period of 30 years which
had expired sometime in 1959 but that the heirs
allowed Bomedco to continue using the land
because one of them was then an employee of the
company.
Bomedco, on the other hand, claimed that it was
the owner and possessor of the registered lot when
it bought the lot from seller in 1929 and that the
heirs were already barred by prescription and
laches because of Bomedco’s open and
continuous possession of the property for more than
50 years.
The trial court rejected the evidence presented by
Bomedco (as it was only a Xerox copy of an
unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that Bomedco
had already acquired ownership of the property
through acquisitive prescription because it
possessed the property in good faith for more
than10 years.
This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which
ruled that Bomedco only acquired an easement of
right of way by unopposed and continuous use of
the land, but not ownership.
ISSUE:
1) Whether Bomedco had indeed acquired
ownership of the land through extraordinary
acquisitive prescription?
8|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
2) Whether easement was continuous and thus
Bomedco had acquired title over the use of the
land?
RULING:
1. NO. Bomedco only acquired an easement
of right of way by unopposed and
continuous use of the land, but not
ownership, under Article 620 of the Civil
Code.
The appellate court further ruled that
Bomedcos claim of a prior sale to it by Feliciana
Santillan was untrue. Its possession being in bad
faith, the applicable prescriptive period in order to
acquire ownership over the land was 30 years
under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. Adverse
possession of the property started only in 1965 when
Bomedco registered its claim in the cadastral
survey of Medellin. Since only 24 years from 1965
had elapsed when the heirs filed a complaint
against Bomedco in 1989, Bomedcos possession of
the land had not yet ripened into ownership.
And since there was no showing that
respondent heirs or their predecessor-in-interest was
ever paid compensation for the use of the land, the
appellate court awarded compensation to them,
to be computed from the time of discovery of the
adverse acts of Bomedco.
An easement or servitude is a real right,
constituted on the corporeal immovable property
of another, by virtue of which the owner has to
refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of
another thing or person. It exists only when the
servient and dominant estates belong to two
different owners. It gives the holder of the easement
an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no
title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the
easement is an admission that the property belongs
to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an
easement, Bomedco cannot now assert that its
occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an
owner. Neither can it declare that the 30- year
period of extraordinary prescription started from
that year.
Moreover, the mere expiration of the period
of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s
possession into an adverse one. Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title,
unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner.
1. Continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals
both upheld this view for the reason that the
railroad right of way was, according to them,
continuous and apparent in nature. The more or
less permanent railroad tracks were visually
apparent and they continuously occupied the
subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the
easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to
petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-
year prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner
supposedly acquired the easement of right of way
over the subject land.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a
person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land.
Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons,
an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if
and when a train operated by a person passes over
another's property. In other words, the very exercise
of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
Under Article 622 of the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately,
petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over
the use of the railroad right of way whether by law,
donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its
use of the right of way, however long, never
resulted in its acquisition of the easement because,
under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a
railroad right of way can only be acquired by title
and not by prescription.
A party is deemed to acquire title over the
use of the land if:
(a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual
right of way with the heirs for the continued use of
the land under the principles of voluntary
easements; or
(b) it had filed a case against the heirs for
conferment on it of a legal easement of right of
way under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title
over the use of the land is deemed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
2. EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN
LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Respondent
FACTS: Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original
developer of Happy Glen Loop, obtained a loan
from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after
failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to
Marcelo all its rights over several parcels of land in
the Subdivision, as well as receivables from the lots
already sold.
As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to
lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA)and
9|Article 613 – Article 656 – EASEMENTS or SERVITUDES
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) that a water facility is available in the
subdivision. The said water facility has been the only
source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years.
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to
Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No.C-350099 was issued to the latter.
In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife Emeteria
Liwanag of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal of
the overhead water tank over the parcel of land.
The latter refused and filed a case before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T.
P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the
surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent
Association. One of the things it affirmed was the
existence of an easement for water system/facility
or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-
350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank
are situated.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an easement for water facility
exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop
Subdivision.
2. Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen
Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in
P.D. 1216.
RULING:
1. NO. Easements or servitudes are encumbrances
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner,
for the benefit of a community, or for the benefit of
one or more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong.
The law provides that easements may be
continuous or discontinuous and apparent or non-
apparent. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
are quoted below:
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or
discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is
or may be incessant, without the intervention of any
act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used
at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made
known and are continually kept in view by external
signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the
same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no
external indication of their existence.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance
on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit
of the community. It is continuous and apparent,
because it is used incessantly without human
intervention, and because it is continually kept in
view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its
use to the public.
Contrary to petitioners contention that the
existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is
merely tolerated, we find that the easement of
water facility has been voluntarily established either
by Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and developer;
or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and
the original developer of the Subdivision. For more
than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as
the residents sole source of water.[31] The Civil
Code provides that continuous and apparent
easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or
by prescription of 10 years.
It is therefore clear that an easement of water
facility has already been acquired through
prescription.
2.YES. It is considered an “open space.” The
decree makes no specific mention of areas
reserved for water facilities. Therefore, we resort to
statutory construction to determine whether these
areas fall under other similar facilities and amenities.
The basic statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis states that where a general word
or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include or to be
restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the
same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.
Applying that principle, the Court found out Sec. 1
of P.D. 1216 that the enumeration refers to areas
reserved for the common welfare of the
community.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly
established for the benefit of the community. Water
is a basic need in human settlements, without which
the community would not survive. We therefore rule
that, based on the principle of ejusdem generis and
taking into consideration the intention of the law to
create and maintain a healthy environment in
human settlements, the location of the water
facility in the Subdivision must form part of the area
reserved for open space.
3. SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.BIO
HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land
located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of
another parcel, registered under Bio Hong and the
10 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an
easement of way.
There is no question that an easement, as
described in the deed of sale executed between
the private respondent and the seller, had been
constituted on the private respondent's property,
and has been in fact annotated at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically,
the same charged the private respondent as
follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all
times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be
placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on
which the alley has been constructed shall allow
the public to use the same, and allow the City to
lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and
shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof. .
. 8Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across
the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a
violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the
servitude of way.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with
other residents of neighboring estates) made use of
the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983,
when, and over its protests, the private respondent
constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced
suit for injunction against the private respondent, to
have the gates removed and to allow full access to
the easement.
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates
but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the
dominant and servient estates upon the purchase
of the property from its former owner.
CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere
limitation on ownership and that it does not impair
the private respondent's title, and that since the
private respondent had acquired title to the
property, "merger" brought about an
extinguishment of the easement.
Thus, Solid Manila Corporation went to the SC
alleging that the very deed of sale executed
between the Bio Hong and the previous owner of
the property "excluded" the alley in question, and
that in any event, the intent of the parties was to
retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding
the sale.
[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the
RTC to cancel the annotation in question, which it
granted subject to the final outcome of the prior
case.]
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated
(sold) from the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been
extinguished by merger.
RULING:
1. NO. The sale included the alley. The Court rejects
the Solid's contention that the deed of sale
"excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it
cannot be separated from the tenement and
maintain an independent existence.
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate
to which they actively or passively belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements
of which they form part.10 Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they can not, however, be alienated11
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.12
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private
respondent did acquire ownership over the
property –– including the disputed alley –– as a
result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the
right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.
2) NO. No genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private
respondent corporation. According to the Civil
Code, a merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. Merger requires full ownership of both
estates.
One thing ought to be noted here,
however. The servitude in question is a personal
servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor
of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but
rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following
article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner
of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant
estate,17 in this case, the public at large.
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly,
not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because
as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly,
the sale unequivocally preserved the existing
easement. In other words, the answer does not, in
reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact
and cannot militate against the petitioner's clear
cause of action.
ARTICLE 616
1. ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO,
petitioners, vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC., respondent.
11 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
FACTS: Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer
and seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-
spouses a house and lot in the De La Costa Homes,
in Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract
to sell executed between the parties, contained a
Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions,
to wit:
“Easements. For the good of the entire community,
the homeowner must observe a two-meter
easement in front. No structure of any kind (store,
garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front
easement.
“Upward expansion. A second storey is not
prohibited. But the second storey expansion must
be placed above the back portion of the house
and should not extend forward beyond the apex of
the original building.
“Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be
extended in the front beyond the line as designed
and implemented by the developer in the 60 sq. m.
unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in front,
is 6 meters back from the front property line and 4
meters back from the front wall of the house, just as
provided in the 60 sq. m. units.”
The above restrictions were also contained in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering
the lot issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.
The controversy arose when the petitioners despite
repeated demand from the respondent, extended
the roof of their house to the property line and
expanded the second floor of their house to a point
directly above the original front wall. Respondent
filed before the RTC an action to demolish the
unauthorized structures.
The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner
ordering them to immediately demolish and
remove the extension of their expanded housing
unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the
Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch Sheriff
of this Court will execute the this decision at the
expense of the defendants.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the for the lack of a specific
provision, prescribing the penalty of the demolition
in the “Restrictive Covenant” in the event of the
breach thereof, the prayer of the respondent to
demolish the structure should fail.
RULING: The Court held that the argument of the
petitioner-spouses has no merit; Article 1168 of the
New Civil Code states that: “When the obligation
consists in not doing and the obligor does what has
been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his
expense.”
This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala
Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development
Corporation, which has merely adjudged the
payment of damages in lieu of demolition. In the
aforementioned case, however, the elaborate
mathematical formula for the determination of
compensatory damages which takes into account
the current construction cost index during the
immediately preceding 5 years based on the
weighted average of wholesale price and wage
indices of the National Census and Statistics Office
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is explicitly
provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered into
by the parties. This unique and peculiar
circumstance, among other strong justifications
therein mentioned, is not extant in the case at bar.
In sum, the Court holds that since the extension
constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the
Restrictive Covenant, petitioner spouses can be
required to demolish the structure to the extent that
it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
ARTICLE 617
1. SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.BIO
HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
FACTS: Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel
of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register
of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of
another parcel, registered under Bio Hong and the
vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an
easement of way.
There is no question that an easement, as
described in the deed of sale executed between
the private respondent and the seller, had been
constituted on the private respondent's property,
and has been in fact annotated at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically,
the same charged the private respondent as
follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all
times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be
placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on
which the alley has been constructed shall allow
the public to use the same, and allow the City to
lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and
shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof. .
. 8Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across
the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a
violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the
servitude of way.
The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with
other residents of neighboring estates) made use of
the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983,
when, and over its protests, the private respondent
12 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced
suit for injunction against the private respondent, to
have the gates removed and to allow full access to
the easement.
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates
but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the
dominant and servient estates upon the purchase
of the property from its former owner.
CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere
limitation on ownership and that it does not impair
the private respondent's title, and that since the
private respondent had acquired title to the
property, "merger" brought about an
extinguishment of the easement.
Thus, Solid Manila Corporation went to the SC
alleging that the very deed of sale executed
between the Bio Hong and the previous owner of
the property "excluded" the alley in question, and
that in any event, the intent of the parties was to
retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding
the sale.
[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the
RTC to cancel the annotation in question, which it
granted subject to the final outcome of the prior
case.]
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated
(sold) from the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been
extinguished by merger.
RULING:
1. NO. The sale included the alley. The Court rejects
the Solid's contention that the deed of sale
"excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it
cannot be separated from the tenement and
maintain an independent existence.
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate
to which they actively or passively belong.9
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements
of which they form part.10 Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they can not, however, be alienated11
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.12
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private
respondent did acquire ownership over the
property –– including the disputed alley –– as a
result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the
right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.
2) NO. No genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private
respondent corporation. According to the Civil
Code, a merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. Merger requires full ownership of both
estates.
One thing ought to be noted here,
however. The servitude in question is a personal
servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor
of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but
rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following
article of the Civil Code:
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner
of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant
estate,17 in this case, the public at large.
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly,
not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because
as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly,
the sale unequivocally preserved the existing
easement. In other words, the answer does not, in
reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact
and cannot militate against the petitioner's clear
cause of action.
ARTICLE 618
1.) G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015
LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO B.
FRANCISCO, Petitioners, v. STA. LUCIA REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint 4 for
Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent
before the RTC on November 28,2000. They alleged
that they are co-owners and possessors for more
than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered
agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal with
a total area of more or less 10,500 square meters
(subject property). A few years back, however,
respondent acquired the lands surrounding the
subject property, developed the same into a
residential subdivision known as the Binangonan
Metropolis East, and built a concrete perimeter
fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were
denied access from subject property to the nearest
public road and vice versa. They thus prayed for a
right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis East in
order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street,
a public road.
RTC: The RTC granted the easement of right of way
in favor of the petitioners. It then ratiocinated that
based on Article 113724 of the Civil Code,
petitioners and Liza are considered owners of the
subject property through extraordinary prescription.
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Having real right over the same, therefore, they are
entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
under Article 649 of the Civil Code.
The RTC further held that Pablo's testimony
sufficiently established: (1) that the subject property
was surrounded by respondent's property; (2) the
area and location of the right-of-way sought; (3)
the value of the land on which the right-of-way is to
be constituted which was P600.00 per square
meter; and (4) petitioners and Liza's possession of
the subject property up to the present time.
CA: On appeal, respondent argued that petitioners
and Liza were neither able to prove that they were
owners nor that they have any real right over the
subject property intended to be the dominant
estate. In fact, the intended dominant estate was
declared under the name of Juanito Blanco et. al
for taxation purposes. Hence, they are not entitled
to demand an easement of right-of-way. At any
rate, they likewise failed to establish that the only
route available from their property to Col. Guido
Street is through respondent's subdivision. The
decision of the court a quo was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to demand
an easement of right-of-way from respondent. - NO
HELD: NO, the petitioners are not entitled. Under
Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-
of-way may be demanded by the owner of an
immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use the same. It must be
stressed at the outset that contrary to petitioners'
allegations, there is no showing that Carlos filed a
claim of ownership over the subject property with
the DENR. His April 13, 1998 letter35 to the said office
which petitioners assert to be an application for the
registration of such claim is actually just a request
for the issuance of certain documents and nothing
more. Moreover, while Carlos indeed attempted to
declare the subject property for taxation purposes,
his application, as previously mentioned, was
denied because a tax declaration was already
issued to the Blancos.
ARTICLE 619
1.) [G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997.]
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE
MANILA UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO
TIMBOL, EMDEN ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIÑO,
JR., DOMINGO REYES, PEDRO C. MERCADO, MARIO
AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU, JR.,
and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in
behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS,
INC., PHASES I AND II, Respondents.
FACTS: The controversy in this case is regarding the
right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter
wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west,
traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the
north and of the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdMU) and Maryknoll College on the south. The
said road was originally owned by the Tuasons who
sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building
Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5
meters width of the Mangyan road. The said
corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of
the Tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of
Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. AdMU
later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the
land. Tuason developed their land which is now
known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and
La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or
a Mutual right of way wherein the parties would
allow the other to use their half portion of the
Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of
the mangyan road and also the other way around.)
Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid
Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas,
was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also
the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the
easement thus they block the road using 6
cylindrical concrete and some guards over the
entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the
residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc.
filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third
party complaint against AdMU. Some of the
arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola
residents had adequate outlet to a public highway
using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet
finalized the negotiation of the easement.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not there is an easement of
right of way? – YES. 2.) Whether or not an adequate
outlet to a highway can extinguish a voluntary
easement? – NO.
HELD: 1.) Yes, there was an easement of right of
way. A legal or compulsory easement is that which
is constituted by law for public use or for private
interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of
the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may
claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after
he has established the existence of four (4)
requisites, namely: (a) the estate is surrounded by
other immovables and is without adequate outlet
to a public highway; (b) after payment of the
proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to
the proprietor’s own acts; and (d) the right-of-way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be shortest. A voluntary easement on
the other hand is constituted simply by will or
agreement of the parties. Hence, having
established that there was indeed a previous
agreement to constitute an easement, the
easement in the case at bar is a voluntary
easement.
2.) No, an adequate outlet to a highway cannot
extinguish a voluntary easement. The argument of
petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to
LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to
say the least. The opening of an adequate outlet to
a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements like in the
case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant
may have also qualified as an easement of
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necessity does not detract from its permanency as
a property right, which survives the termination of
the necessity.
2.) G.R. No. 125339 June 22, 1998
CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM,
DAMASO MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR
HERMALINO and PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS
MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES
FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and FLORDELIZA
MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE MAKIMKIM
and GINA MAKIMKIM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES
JESUS C. PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Cristobal owned a house and lot
in Visayas Avenue Extension. Respondent Cesar
Ledesma, Inc. on the other hand was the owner of
the adjoining subdivision, which included the
disputed lots 1 and 2. Lots 1 and 2 were originally a
part of the private road. Upon the making of
Visayas Avenue as a public road, respondent Cesar
Ledesma, Inc. petitioned the exclusion of the two
disputed lots from the road. They were granted to
do so. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , Inc., sold
both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor
transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly
issued. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots
to his son and dauhter-in-law, respondent spouses
Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build
a house on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, they
found out that a portion of the lot was being used a
passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas
Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained
about the intrusion into their property to the
Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation
proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use
of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the
Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete
fence.
Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging that
their property was bounded on all sides by
residential houses belonging to different owners
and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas
Avenue except through the property of the
Paciones.
RTC and CA: The trial court dismissed the complaint
holding that one essential requisite of a legal
easement of right of way was not proved, i.e., the
absence of an alternative adequate way or outlet
to a public highway, in this case, Visayas Avenue.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled
to an easement of right of way. – NO. 2.) Whether
or not a path walk that is much longer, circuitous
and inconvenient is an adequate outlet. – YES.
HELD: 1.) No, the petitioners are not entitled to an
easement of right of way. To be entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1)
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been
paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The
burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate.
In the present case, the first element is clearly
absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path
walk located at the left side of petitioners' property
and which is connected to a private road about
five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in
turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5
meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This
outlet was determined by the court a quo to be
sufficient for the needs of the dominants estate,
hence petitioners have no cause to complain that
they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
2.) Yes, a path walk that is much longer, circuitous
and inconvenient can still be considered an
adequate outlet. The petitioners' concept of what is
"adequate outlet" is a complete disregard of the
well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the
imposition of an easement of right of way there
must be a real, not ficititious or artificial, necessity
for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is
not what is required by law as the basis for setting
up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.
3.) [G.R. NO. 173252 : July 17, 2009]
UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT
CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and
Development Corporation is the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 1762534 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila. The title contains a memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has
been carried over from the Original Certificate of
Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico. The easement was
constituted in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y
Magnifico. As Sandico's property was transferred to
several owners, the memorandum of encumbrance
of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M.
Hidalgo was consistently annotated at the back of
every title covering Sandico's property until TCT No.
176253 was issued in petitioner's favor. On the other
hand, Hidalgo's property was eventually transferred
to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and
Cleto Chung.
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On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to
Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of
Right of Way8 on the ground that the dominant
estate has an adequate access to a public road
which is Matienza Street. Thereafter, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In
a Decision dated August 19, 2002, the trial court
ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of
voluntary easement of right of way. It found that
the dominant estate has no more use for the
easement since it has another adequate outlet to a
public road which is Matienza Street.
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. The appellate
court ruled that Article 631(3)13 of the Civil Code,
which was cited by the trial court, is inapplicable
since the presence of an adequate outlet to a
highway extinguishes only legal or compulsory
easements but not voluntary easements like in the
instant case, which can be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner
of the dominant estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement can be
extinguished because of the finding of that there is
another adequate outlet to a public road. – NO.
HELD: No, the petition should not prosper. As
defined, an easement is a real right on another's
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the
owner of the latter must refrain from doing or
allowing somebody else to do or something to be
done on his property, for the benefit of another
person or tenement. Easements are established
either by law or by the will of the owner. The former
are called legal, and the latter, voluntary
easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a
voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of
respondents.
In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of
voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner
alleged that "[t]he easement is personal. It was
voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain
Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the
lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650." It further
stated that "the voluntary easement of the right of
way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was
constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties. It was not a statutory easement and
definitely not an easement created by such court
order because '[the] Court merely declares the
existence of an easement created by the parties."
In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001,
before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that
"[t]he annotation found at the back of the TCT of
Unisource is a voluntary easement."
Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot
now claim that what exists is a legal easement and
that the same should be cancelled since the
dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has
an adequate access to a public road which is
Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the
opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The
fact that an easement by grant may have also
qualified as an easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a property right,
which survives the termination of the necessity. A
voluntary easement of right of way, like any other
contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the
dominant estate.
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is
personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation
merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without
equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs
or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the
annotation does not mean that it is not binding on
them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way
is like any other contract. As such, it is generally
effective between the parties, their heirs and
assigns, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.
4.) [G.R. NO. 149125 : August 9, 2007]
RESURRECCION OBRA, Petitioner, v. SPS.
VICTORIANO BADUA & MYRNA BADUA, SPS.
JUANITO BALTORES & FLORDELIZA BALTORES, SPS.
ISABELO BADUA & PRESCILA BADUA, SPS. JOSE
BALANON & SHIRLEY BALANON, SPS. ORLANDO
BADUA & MARITA BADUA and SPS. LEONCIO BADUA
& JUVY BADUA, Respondents.
FACTS: The case arose from a Complaint for
Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents
against Anacleto and Resurreccion Obra, Donato
and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta
Badua. Respondents alleged that their residential
houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by
them were located west of the properties of the
Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to
the national highway was a pathway traversing the
northern portion of petitioner's property and the
southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases
and Baduas. The pathway was more than one
meter wide and sixteen meters long. They claimed
that this pathway had been established as early as
1955. In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed
a fence on the northern boundary of their property;
thus, blocking respondents' access to the national
highway. Respondents demanded the demolition
of the fence, but petitioner refused.
Petitioner averred that respondents had not
established any easement of right-of-way either by
law or agreement. She claimed that respondents
failed to satisfy the requisites provided in Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code in order to establish an
easement of right-of-way on the northern portion of
her property. Moreover, she alleged that
respondents had another access as ingress and
egress to the public road other than the one
traversing her property.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. It stated in
its decision in Civil Case No. 5033 that "the new
pathway is more than adequate" for respondents'
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use. Thus, the applied easement of right-of-way on
the northern portion of petitioner's property was not
allowed. The case was dismissed.
It must be noted that the "new" pathway used by
respondents, however, traversed the southern
portion of petitioner's property. Sometime in 2001,
petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her
lot, which again restricted the use of respondents'
"new" pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by
petitioner's action, respondents filed on March 6,
2001 a Motion to Enforce the July 7, 2000 Decision
of the RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the
RTC dismissing the case was based on the existence
of a new pathway which they had been using since
1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was
prohibited from closing said passage.
RTC granted the Motion to Enforce and later
clarified its previous decision that the southern
portion was an "agreed pathway," petitioner could
not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered
petitioner to remove the fence blocking the
passage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in
ordering the removal of the fence blocking the
passage in the southern portion of the lot. – NO.
HELD: No the RTC was not correct. Apparently, no
pronouncement was ever made regarding the
nature and legality of this "new" pathway; therefore,
no easement was established by the Court on
petitioner's property in Civil Case No. 5033. Thus,
their claim for a right-of-way on the southern
portion had no basis.
The trial court erred, in clarifying its previous
decision, and in concluding that the said passage
in the southern portion was an agreed or voluntary
easement of right-of-way which petitioner should
respect. It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after
it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to
amend, modify, or alter a final judgment and is left
only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
Any amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of
voluntary easement of right-of-way, subject of the
assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper,
relevant, and material to the issue of right-of-way as
averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5033, still,
the conclusion that there was an agreed or
voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis.
The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal
any agreement executed by the parties on the
claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the
terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon
by the parties, more particularly, the payment of
the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample
enough to support the conclusion that there was a
verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the
southern portion.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the
land, any agreement creating it should be drawn
and executed with the same formalities as a deed
to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in writing. No
written instrument on this agreement was adduced
by respondents.
5.) [G.R. NO. 160725, September 12, 2008]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
PUREFOODS CORPORATION, SOLID DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., SILVESTRE
BAUTISTA, ALFREDO CABANDE, HEIRS OF VICTOR
TRINIDAD, AND MOLDEX REALTY INCORPORATED,
Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner NAPOCOR, in order to construct
and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Project ,
NAPOCOR had to acquire an easement if right-of-
way over certain parcels of land situated in the
towns of Angat, San Rafael and San Ildefonso and
in the city of San Jose del Monte ---- all in the
province of Bulacan.
On November 5, 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special
civil action for eminent domain before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan. The defendants were the vendors
and vendees of the affected parcels of land.
The RTC then appointed commissioners to
determine the valuation of the land. On May 18,
2001, the commissioners who were appointed by
the RTC submitted separate reports to the RTC. The
commissioners recommended that the
compensation due from NAPOCOR be based on
the fair market value of P 600.00/sq.m for the
properties belonging to Moldex and P 400.00/sq.m
for the undeveloped and underdeveloped
properties belonging to the rest of the respondents.
In the December 17, 2001, the RTC rendered its
decision and fixed the amount of just
compensation based on the recommendation of
the commissioners.
NAPOCOR assailed the RTC’s valuations of the
properties. It claimed that only an easement fee,
which should not exceed 10% of the declared
market value, should be paid to the respondents.
NAPOCOR cites Section 3A, R.A. 6395, as
amended and the implementing regulation of R.A.
No. 8974 in support of this argument. On November
7, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
NAPOCOR, through the OSG, elevated the case to
the SC via petition for review of certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not only an easement fee of 10%
of the market value of the expropriated properties
should be the just compensation that should be
paid to the affected owners of the easement of
right-of-way. - NO
HELD: No, the question of just compensation for an
easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that
will be traversed by NAPOCOR's transmission lines
has already been answered in National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation. In that case, the Court
held that because of the nature of the easement,
which will deprive the normal use of the land for an
indefinite period, just compensation must be based
on the full market value of the affected properties.
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While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended,
and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed
state that only 10% of the market value of the
property is due to the owner of the property subject
to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not
binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the
determination of “just compensation” in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The court
reiterated its ruling in Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve
only as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court’s own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the
court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the
decreed compensation.
6. SPA. DE LA CRUZ v. RAMISCAL
G.R. No. 137882
February 4, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner
of a parcel of land. Petitioner, Spa. Elizabeth and
Alfredo De La Cruz are occupants of a parcel of
land located at the back of Ramiscal’s property,
owned by the mother of Alfredo. The subject matter
of this case is a long strip of land owned by
respondent which is being used by petitioners as
their pathway to and from the nearest public
highway from their property.
Respondent leased her property, including the
building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient
Motors also owned a property adjacent to that of
respondent’s. Years later, Phil. Orient Motors sold its
property to San Benito Realty. It was only during the
relocation survey and location plan for both
contiguous properties of respondent and San
Benito Realty that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by
petitioners is part of her property.
Respondent filed a complaint, seeking the
demolition of the structure allegedly illegally
constructed by petitioners on her property.
Respondent asserted in her complaint that
petitioners have an existing right of way to a public
highway other than the current one they are using,
which she owns.
Petitioners claimed that such use was with the
knowledge of respondent. They also alleged that
respondent initiated the construction on her
property of a motor shop known as Phil. Orient
Motors and they, as well as the other occupants of
the property at the back of respondent’s land,
opposed the construction of the perimeter wall as it
would enclose and render their property without
any adequate ingress and egress. They asked
respondent to give them an easement on the
eastern side of her property, which would be
reciprocated with an easement by the owner of
another adjacent estate. Respondent did not want
to give them the easement on the eastern side of
her property but, instead, offered to them the
disputed passageway, which offer they had
accepted.
Issue: W/N Petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or
legal easement of right of way
Ruling:
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted
on the corporeal immovable property of another,
by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from
doing, or must allow someone to do, something on
his property, for the benefit of another thing or
person.
Petitioners herein failed to show by competent
evidence other than their bare claim that they
entered into an agreement with respondents. The
hands of this Court are tied from giving credence to
petitioners’ self-serving claim that such right of way
was voluntarily given them by respondent for the
following reasons:
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred
of document evidencing such agreement. The Civil
Code is clear that any transaction involving the sale
or disposition of real property must be in writing.
Thus, the dearth of corroborative evidence opens
doubts on the veracity of the naked assertion of
petitioners that indeed the subject easement of
right of way was a voluntary grant from respondent.
Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only
the foreman, Mang Puling, who talked with them
regarding said pathway on the northern side of
respondent’s property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de
la Cruz testified that she did not talk to respondent
regarding the arrangement proposed to them by
Mang Puling despite the fact that she often saw
respondent. It is, therefore, foolhardy for petitioners
to believe that the alleged foreman of respondent
had the authority to bind the respondent relating to
the easement of right of way.
Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling
submitted said agreement to the Quezon City
Engineer’s Office, in connection with the
application for a building permit but said office
could no longer produce a copy thereof, does not
inspire belief. Petitioners should have requested a
subpoena duces tecum from said court to compel
the Quezon City Engineer’s Office to produce said
document or to prove that such document is
indeed not available.
18 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on
respondent’s property was constructed at a
distance of 1.10 meters away from the property
line, does not by itself bolster the veracity of
petitioners’ story that there was indeed such an
agreement. Further, as noted by the trial court, it
was Atty. Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil.
Orient Motors, who wrote petitioners on 25 August
1994 advising them that his client would close the
pathway along 18th Avenue, thereby implying that
it was Phil. Orient Motors, respondent’s lessee, which
tolerated petitioners’ use of said pathway.
Likewise futile are petitioners’ attempts to show that
they are legally entitled to the aforesaid pathway
under Article 649 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of
a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons, and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way
under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following
requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is
not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with
the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.31 The first three requisites are not obtaining
in the instant case.
7. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No.
124699 July 31, 2003
NOTE: better if i-read ang fulltext 3 ka topics ang igo
ani na case
Facts:
The respondents in this case were the heirs of
Magdaleno Valdez Sr., who purchased an
unregistered parcel of land located in Cebu from
Feliciana Santillan (seller). The land was possessed
by decedent who had also paid taxes thereon. The
heirs subsequently inherited the land. However, a
sugar company, Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. was
able to obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot
where the railroad tracks (existent even prior to the
sale to decedent) lay. The lot was likewise declared
for tax purposes under the name of the company.
The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation
and/or Recovery of Possession of the lot claiming
that Bomedco was granted by the seller of the lot a
railroad right of way for a period of 30 years which
had expired sometime in 1959 but that the heirs
allowed Bomedco to continue using the land
because one of them was then an employee of the
company. Bomedco, on the other hand, claimed
that it was the owner and possessor of the
registered lot when it bought the lot from seller in
1929 and that the heirs were already barred by
prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s
open and continuous possession of the property for
more than 50 years.
The trial court rejected the evidence presented by
Bomedco (as it was only a Xerox copy of an
unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that Bomedco
had already acquired ownership of the property
through acquisitive prescription because it
possessed the property in good faith for more than
10 years. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals
which ruled that Bomedco only acquired an
easement of right of way by unopposed and
continuous use of the land, but not ownership. .
Issue:

1) whether Bomedco had indeed acquired
ownership of the land through extraordinary
acquisitive prescription?

2) Whether easement was continuous and thus
Bomedco had acquired title over the use of the
land?
Ratio/held:
1. No. Bomedco only had a right of easement over
the land as shown by tax receipts wherein it
declared, for several years, the property to be a
“central railroad right of way” or “sugar railroad
right of way” when it could have declared it to be
“industrial land” as it did for the years 1975 and
1985. Instead of indicating ownership of the lot,
these receipts showed that all petitioner had was
possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it.
X x x A person cannot have an easement on his
own land, since all of the uses of an easement are
fully comprehended in his general right of
ownership.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted
on the corporeal immovable property of another,
by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from
doing, or must allow someone to do something on
his property, for the benefit of another thing or
person. It exists only when the servient and
dominant estates belong to two different owners. It
gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal
interest on the land but grants no title thereto.
Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is
an admission that the property belongs to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an easement,
Bomedco cannot now assert that its occupancy
since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither
can it declare that the 30- year period of
extraordinary prescription started from that year.
Moreover, the mere expiration of the period of
easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s
possession into an adverse one. Mere material
possession of land is not adverse possession as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title,
unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner.
2. An easement is continuous if its use is, or may be,
incessant without the intervention of any act of
man, like the easement of draineage and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends
19 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way.
x x x an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if
and when a train operated by a person passes over
another’s property.
A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of
the land if:
a) it had subsequently entered into a
contractual right of way with the heirs for the
continued use of the land under the principles of
voluntary easements, or
b) it had filed a case
against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal
easement of right of way (see orig case for the
requirements)
The point is, bomedco did not exercise any of the
abovementioned options in order for it to acquire
title over the railroad right of way.
ARTICLE 620
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No.
124699 July 31, 2003
ARTICLE 621
1.LAUREANA A. CID vs. IRENE P. JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14116 ; June 30, 1960
Facts:
Respondents own a building with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, owned by the
petitioners. Allegedly, in 1913 or 1914, before the
New Civil Code took effect, the predecessors-in-
interest of the petitioner were verbally prohibited by
the respondent to obstruct view and light. When
the Court of Appeals adjudicated the case, it
found out that the two estates are covered by
Original Certificates of Title, both issued by the
Register of Deeds. The court further observed that in
both of the title, any annotation does not appear in
respect to the easement supposedly acquired by
prescription which, counting the twenty (20) years
from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by
1937, date of the decrees of registration.
ISSUE: Whether the owners of a building standing on
their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot,
had acquired by prescription an enforceable
easement of light and view arising from a verbal
prohibition to obstruct such view and light, to
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as owner of the
adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by
Torrens titles.
HELD: Inasmuch as the alleged prohibition having
been avowedly made in 1913 or 1914, before the
present Civil Code took effect, the applicable legal
provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code
which provides that negative easements are
acquired, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate has, by a formal act, forbidden
the owner of the servient estate to perform any act
which would be lawful without the easement.
The law requires not any form of prohibition, but
exacts, in a parenthetical expression, for emphasis,
the doing not only of a specific, particular act, but
a formal act. The phrase "formal act" would require
not merely any writing, but one executed in due
form and/or with solemnity. That this is the
intendment of the law although not expressed in
exact language is the reason for the clarification
made in Article 621 of the new Civil Code which
specifically requires the prohibition to be in "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public".
Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on
the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of
the dominical right of the owner of the subjected
property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title
and by prescription, in the case of positive
easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion,
apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By
the same token, negative easements can not be
acquired by less formal means. Hence, the
requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent of
the act of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public."
Conceding arguendo that such an easement has
been acquired by prescription which, counting the
twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have
already ripened by 1937, it had been cut off or
extinguished by the registration of the servient
estate under the Torrens System without the
easement being annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the
Land Registration Act.
2. G.R. No. 97039 April 24, 1992
CONCORDIO ABELLANA, SR., et al., vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, et al.,
Facts: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land
abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right
of way over a subdivision road which, according to
the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which
they and their ancestors had been using since time
immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired,
through prescription, an easement of right of way
therein. The construction of a wall by the
respondents around the subdivision deprived the
petitioners of the use of the subdivision road which
gives the subdivision residents access to the public
highway. They asked that the high concrete walls
enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their
access to the subdivision road be removed and
that the road be opened to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a
pre-existing footpath in the place before it was
developed into a subdivision. They alleged
furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are
not the shortest way to a public road for there is a
more direct route from the petitioners' land to the
public highway.
The RTC decided in favour of petitioners and held
that defendants Orlando P. Naya and Rosendo
Estoye, Jr. and the intervenors are hereby ordered
to demolish the subject fences or enclosures at the
dead ends of Road Lots 1 and 3 of the Nonoc
20 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
Homes Subdivision at their expense and to leave
them open for the use of the plaintiffs and the
general public, within fifteen (15) days from finality
of this judgment. The complaint as against
defendant Municipal Government of Talisay, Cebu
is ordered dismissed. All counterclaims are ordered
dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal the CA rendered decision ordering the
Municipal Government of Talisay, Cebu, at its
option, may institute the proper action for
expropriation.
Issue: WON the contention of the petitioner that the
easement of right of way was acquired by
prescription.
Ruling: NO.
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of
way is continuous and apparent and may be
acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the
Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or
road may be apparent but it is not a continuous
easement because its use is at intervals and
depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised
only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody
else's land (4 Manresa 597; Haffman vs. Shoemaker,
71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed.,
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, a right
of way is not acquirable by prescription
(Cuaycong, et al, vs Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil. 781;
Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al., 103 Phil. 84; Ayala
de Roxas vs. Case, 8 Phil. 197).
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D.
957 which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner
or developer of a subdivision without access to any
existing public road or street must secure a right of
way to a public road or street and such right of way
must be developed and maintained according to
the requirement of the government authorities
concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or
developer of a subdivision (which petitioners are
not) without access to a public highway.
ARTICLE 622
1. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R.
No. 124699 July 31, 2003
2. ) G.R. No. L-33507 July 20, 1981
FE P. VELASCO, represented by ALFREDO
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR. and THE CITY OF
DAVAO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance
of Davao an action against Davao City to quiet title
to her lot known as Lot 77-B-2, a portion of which
she claims to having been occupied illegally as
part of Bolton Street, Davao City. The CFI, presided
over by respondent Judge Hon. Vicente Cusi Jr.,
dismissed the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari
seeking a review of the Order of dismissal.
The complaint alleged that the action is to
quiet title and damages. But the complaint does
not allege any cloud or doubt on the title, 'Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7000 of the Register of
Deeds of the City of Davao, of the plaintiff to Lot
No. 77-B-2. According to the complaint, when
plaintiff bought the said lot 77-B-2 from the original
owner in 1956, the Bolton Street was already
existing; that without ascertaining the monuments
along Bolton Street, she had her house constructed
on her said lot and built fence along said Bolton
Street which she believed to be the boundary
between her lot and said street and in line with
other offences already existing when she bought
said lot. The petitioner has just discovered, after a
relocation of the monuments of her lot, Lot No. 77-
B-2, that the Bolton Street of the defendant has
encroached at least TWENTY-FIVE (25) SQUARE
METERS with dimension of 2.5 meters by 10 meters.
Petitioner also discovered that Bolton Street was
delimited to nine (9) meters wide, but the proposed
width was 15 meters Thus, petitioner filed this
complaint in order to quiet her title to the said
portion of 2.5 meters by 10 meters because the
continued occupation of said portion by the
defendant has cast a cloud of doubt on the title of
the plaintiff over the portion of plaintiff's Lot No. 77-
B-2 now being occupied by Bolton Street.
ISSUE: WON the lot owned by the petitioner is
subject to a legal encumbrance of the public
highway. YES
RULING:
It appears on the face of the complaint that
Bolton Street has been where it is from time
immemorial. When the mother title of petitioner's
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 7000, which is
O.C.T. No. 638, was issued in 1911, it was issued
subject to the provisions of Section 39 of Act 496
which reads:
Section 39. Every person receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree or
registration, and every subsequent purchasers of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for
value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances, except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following encumbrances
which may be subsisting namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way,
... or any government irrigation, canal, or
lateral thereof ...
21 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
From the foregoing provision, Bolton Street
which is a public highway, already subsisting when
O.C.T. No. 638 was issued, as this fact is apparent
too from the face of the complaint itself, is deemed
to have attached as a legal encumbrance to the lot
originally registered lot No. 77, notwithstanding the
lack of an annotation thereof on O.C.T. No. 638.
Petitioner, therefore, cannot rely, as she almost
entirely does for the relief she seeks, on the
aforequoted provision, which she had repeatedly
cited but without making mention, perhaps
conveniently, of the exception as expressly
provided in the later part of the legal provision
invoked.
If from the undisputed fact Chat when Lot -
77 was registered, Bolton Street had already been a
legal encumbrance on said lot, pursuant to Section
39 of Act 496, contrary to petitioner's theory based
on the same legal provision but o committing the
portion pertinent to the instant case, there can be
no gainsaying the fact that petitioner's lot, Lot No.
77-B-2, which admittedly was originally a part of Lot
No. 77, must have to remain subject to the same
legal encumbrance of a public highway.
From her own allegations in her complaint,
Bolton Street cannot be a discontinuous easement
as she claims it to be, which may not be acquired
by prescription. Nonetheless, whether the mode of
acquisition of the easement that Bolton Street is,
would be only by virtue of title, as petitioner
contends, this is not material or of any
consequence, in the present proceedings, once it
indubitably appears as it does, from the allegations
of the complaint itself, that Bolton Street constituted
an easement of public highway on Lot No. 77, from
which petitioner's lot was taken, when the said
bigger lot was original registered. It remained as
such legal encumbrance, as effectively as if it had
been duly noted on the certificate of title, by virtue
of the clear and express provision of Section 39 of
Act 496, it being admitted that at the time of the
registration of Lot 77, the public highway was
already in existence or subsisting.
ARTICLE 624
1.) G.R. No. 172077 October 9, 2009
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS
COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI), Petitioner,
vs.
EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS, VICTOR
BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES,
ROGELIO MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO
RESARI, PILAR GALON, ANTONIO BUISON,
PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR., MARIA VILLAMER and
ROBERTO PADUA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar
Development Corporation (BISUDECO) constructed
a road ("the disputed road") – measuring
approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers
long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in
hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its
mill site and has thus become indispensable to its
sugar milling operations.
On April 19, 1993, BISUDECO filed a
Complaint against respondents (Ricefield owners)
alleging that on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993,
respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed
road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and
stones across it, preventing petitioner’s and the
other sugar planter’s vehicles from passing through
the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage
and prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO
constructed the disputed road pursuant to an
agreement with the owners of the ricefields the
road traversed. The agreement provides that
BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of
the landowners in exchange for the construction of
the road on their properties. Petitioner contends
that through prolonged and continuous use of the
disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way
over the properties of the landowners, which right
of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought
BISUDECO’s assets. Petitioner prayed that
respondents be permanently ordered to restrain
from barricading the disputed road and from
obstructing its free passage.
On the part of the respondents, they denied
having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO
regarding the construction and the use of the
disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO,
surreptitiously and without their knowledge and
consent, constructed the disputed road on their
properties and has since then intermittently and
discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling
sugarcane despite their repeated protests.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement was
established.
RULING: NO.
The easement of right of way – the privilege
of persons or a particular class of persons to pass
over another’s land, usually through one particular
path or linen – is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and
depends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way may only
be acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable law in the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent
easements, and discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of
a title.
22 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
As to Acquisition by Title: Crucial to the
petitioner’s cause was its burden of proving the
existence of the alleged agreement between
BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of
the road. In this regard, the RTC found that
petitioner failed to prove its existence, to wit:
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present
any concrete evidence to prove that there was
such an agreement between BISUDECO and
defendants.
As to Acquisition by Prescription: Continuous
and apparent easements are acquired either by
virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence,
easements are either continuous or discontinuous
according to the manner they are exercised, not
according to the presence of apparent signs or
physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is,
or may be, incessant without the intervention of any
act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends
on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a
person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land.
Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons,
an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if
and when a train operated by a person passes over
another's property. In other words, the very exercise
of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent
railroad tracks does not, in any way, convert the
nature of an easement of right of way to one that is
continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs
or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of
exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement
into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of
physical or visual signs only classifies an easement
into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which
reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
easements, while an easement of not building
beyond a certain height is non-apparent.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks
for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the
existence of an apparent but discontinuous
easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of
the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by title.
The conclusion is inevitable that the road in
dispute is a discontinuous easement
notwithstanding that the same may be apparent.
To reiterate, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications of the
existence of such easements. Hence, even if the
road in dispute has been improved and maintained
over a number of years, it will not change its
discontinuous nature but simply make the same
apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil
Code states that discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of
a title.
On Laches and Estoppel: We hold the same
view on the issue of acquisition of an easement of
right of way by laches. To our mind, settled
jurisprudence on the application of the principle of
estoppel by laches militates against the acquisition
of an easement of right of way by laches.
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts
are basically courts of law and not courts of equity;
equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law;
Aeguetas nunguam contravenit legis. Based on this
principle, we find that the positive mandate of
Article 622 of the Civil Code – the statutory provision
requiring title as basis for the acquisition of an
easement of a right of way – precludes the
application of the equitable principle of laches.
On the other hand, as to the issue of
estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding
of the CA that petitioner did not present any
evidence that would show an admission,
representation or conduct by respondents that will
give rise to estoppel.
2.) G.R. No. 147957 July 22, 2009
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
OFFICE, Petitioner, vs.
LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Caruff Development Corporation owned
several parcels of land along the stretch of Roxas
Boulevard, Manila. Sometime in December 1975,
Caruff obtained a loan from the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) to finance the construction of a 21-
storey condominium along Roxas Boulevard. The
loan accommodation was secured by a real estate
mortgage over three (3) parcels of land, where
Caruff planned to erect the condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-
storey building on the mortgaged parcels of land.
Along with the other appurtenances of the building
constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse
(generating set) and two sump pumps in the
adjacent lot .
After the completion of the condominium
project, it was constituted pursuant to the
Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), as the
Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
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However, for Caruff’s failure to pay its loan
with PNB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and
acquired some of the properties of Caruff at the
sheriff’s auction sale.
Thereafter, Proclamation No. 50 was issued.
It was aimed to promote privatization "for the
prompt disposition of the large number of non-
performing assets of the government financial
institutions, and certain government-owned and
controlled corporations, which have been found
unnecessary or inappropriate for the government
sector to maintain." It also provided for the creation
of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and
the Deed of Transfer executed by PNB, the National
Government, thru the APT, became the assignee
and transferee of all its rights and titles to and
interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the
properties it acquired from the foreclosure of
Caruff’s mortgage.
Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB
for the nullification of PNB’s foreclosure of its
properties. A Compromise Agreement dated
August 31, 1988 was later entered into by Caruff,
PNB, and the National Government thru APT. The
parties agreed, among other things, that Caruff
would transfer and convey in favor of the National
Government, thru the APT, the lot where it built the
generating set and sump pumps.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for
Declaration of the existence of an easement
before the RTC. Respondent alleged that the act of
Caruff of constructing the powerhouse and sump
pumps on its property constituted a voluntary
easement in favor of the respondent. It prayed,
among other things, that judgment be rendered
declaring the existence of an easement over the
portion of the property covered by TCT No. 127649
(now TCT No. 200760) that was being occupied by
the powerhouse and the sump pumps in its favor,
and that the Register of Deeds of Manila annotate
the easement at the back of said certificate of title.
APT alleged that respondent had no cause
of action against it, because it was but a mere
transferee of the land. It acquired absolute
ownership thereof by virtue of the Compromise
Agreement, free from any liens and/or
encumbrances. It was not a privy to any
transaction or agreement entered into by and
between Caruff, respondent, and the bank. It
further alleged that the continued use of the
subject property by respondent and the
condominium owners without its consent was an
encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner
and for which it should be properly compensated.
RTC rendered a Decision declaring the
existence of an easement over the portion of the
land
Subsequently, the term of existence of APT
expired. The Privatization and Management Office
(PMO) substituted APT in its appeal.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner argues that the presence of the
generator set and sump pumps does not constitute
an easement. They are mere improvements and/or
appurtenances complementing the condominium
complex, which has not attained the character of
immovability. They were placed on the subject
property as accessories or improvements for the
general use and comfort of the occupants of the
condominium complex.
Petitioner posits that respondent failed to
present any evidence to prove the existence of the
necessary requisites for the establishment of an
easement. There is no concrete evidence to show
that Caruff had a clear and unequivocal intention
to establish the placing of the generator set and
sump pumps on the subject property as an
easement in favor of respondent.
For its part, respondent argues that it was
the intention of Caruff to have a voluntary
easement in the subject property and for it to
remain as such even after the property was
subsequently assigned to APT. It was Caruff who
constructed the generating set and sump pumps
on its adjacent property for the use and benefit of
the condominium adjoining it. Also, the manner in
which the sump pumps were installed is permanent
in nature, since their removal and transfer to
another location would render the same worthless
and would cut off the supply of electricity and
water to the condominium and its owners.
ISSUE: WON an easement was constituted on the
subject property. NO
RULING:
An easement or servitude is "a real right
constituted on another’s property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the
same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for
the benefit of another thing or person." The
statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is
an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the
easement is established is called the
dominant estate; that which is subject
thereto, the servient estate.
There are two sources of easements: by law
or by the will of the owners. Article 619 of the Civil
Code states:
24 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
Art. 619. Easements are established
either by law or by the will of the owners.
The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of
easement was constituted over the subject
property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that
Caruff constituted a voluntary easement when it
constructed the generating set and sump pumps
over the disputed portion of the subject property for
its benefit. However, it should be noted that when
the appurtenances were constructed on the subject
property, the lands where the condominium was
being erected and the subject property where the
generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the
Civil Code does not apply, since no true easement
was constituted or existed, because both properties
were owned by Caruff.
Also, Article 624 of the Civil Code is
controlling, as it contemplates a situation where
there exists an apparent sign of easement between
two estates established or maintained by the owner
of both. The law provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two
estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both, shall be considered, should
either of them be alienated, as a title in
order that the easement may continue
actively and passively, unless, at the time
the ownership of the two estates is divided,
the contrary should be provided in the title
of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall
also apply in case of the division of a thing
owned in common by two or more
persons.16
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that
when the owner of two properties alienates one of
them and an apparent sign of easement exists
between the two estates, entitlement to it
continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or
the indication that the easement exists is removed
before the execution of the deed.
In relation thereto, the Compromise
Agreement, as approved by the court, clearly
states, among other things, that:
x x x x 2.0 That in consideration of the
covenants hereunder stipulated, plaintiff [Caruff]
Development Corporation (CDC), hereby
terminates the instant case against defendants
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the National
Government/APT, and hereby:
2.1 Assigns, transfers and conveys in favor of
defendant National government thru APT, CDC’s
rights, title and interest in the Maytubig property,
situated at the back of the Legaspi Towers 300
Condominium, consisting of seven (7) contiguous
lots with an aggregate area of 1,504.90 square
meters, covered by the following Transfer
Certificate of Title, viz: TCT No. 23663 – Pasay City
Registry; TCT No. 142497 – Metro Manila 1 Registry;
TCT No. 142141 – Metro Manila 1 Registry; TCT No.
127649 – Metro Manila 1 Registry; x x x; all titles, free
from any and all liens and encumbrances, to be
delivered, and the necessary papers and
documents to be turned over/executed to effect
transfer in favor of the National Government/APT,
upon approval of this Compromise Agreement; x x
x x.
Thus, when the subject property was
assigned to the National Government thru the APT,
no easement arose or was voluntarily created from
the transfer of ownership, considering that the
parties, more particularly, Caruff, pledged that it
was assigning, transferring, and conveying the
subject property in favor of the National
Government thru the APT "free from any and all liens
and encumbrances."
Compromise agreements are contracts,
whereby the parties undertake reciprocal
obligations to resolve their differences, thus,
avoiding litigation, or put an end to one already
commenced. As a contract, when the terms of the
agreement are clear and explicit that they do not
justify an attempt to read into it any alleged
intention of the parties; the terms are to be
understood literally, just as they appear on the face
of the contract. Considering that Caruff never
intended to transfer the subject property to PMO,
burdened by the generating set and sump pumps,
respondent should remove them from the subject
property.
As regards PMO’s claim for rent, respondent
has been enjoying the use of the subject property
for free from the time the rights over the property
were transferred and conveyed by Caruff to the
National Government.
We have held that "[t]here is unjust
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." Article 22 of the Civil Code provides
that "[e]very person who, through an act or
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter, without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." The principle
of unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil
Code requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
(2) that such benefit is derived at another’s
expense or damage.
In the present case, there is no dispute as to
who owns the subject property and as to the fact
that the National Government has been deprived
25 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
of the use thereof for almost two decades. Thus, it is
but just and proper that respondent should pay
reasonable rent for the portion of the subject
property occupied by the generating set and sump
pumps, from the time respondent deprived the
lawful owner of the use thereof up to the present.
To rule otherwise would be unjust enrichment on the
part of respondent at the expense of the
Government.
From the records, APT/PMO submitted, as part
of its evidence, a letter dated June 18, 1992,
wherein it fixed the monthly rental fee per square
meter of the entire property at ₱56.25, or ₱1.81 per
square meter per day. Hence, respondent should
pay the National Government reasonable rent in
the amount of ₱56.25 per square meter per month,
to be reckoned from August 28, 1989 up to the time
when the generating set and sump pumps are
completely removed therefrom.
3.) G.R. No. 185240 : January 20, 2010
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA
SALIMBANGON, Petitioners, v. SPS. SANTOS AND
ERLINDA TAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11,
1951, leaving a parcel of land. Twenty years later
on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo,
Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an
extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition,
adjudicating and dividing the land among
themselves as follows:
1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a
perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m.
wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E,
and D, of the subdivision;
2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual
and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide
along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of
the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a
perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m.
wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E
of the subdivision; and
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual
and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide
along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the
subdivision.1
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city
street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior
lots. To give these interior lots access to the street,
the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition
an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter
wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on
between Lots A and B and on to the street. The
partition that embodied this easement of right of
way was annotated on the individual titles issued to
the heirs.
Realizing that the partition resulted in an
unequal division of the property, the heirs
modified their agreement by eliminating the
easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E,
and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley,
an easement of right of way, that ran
exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot
B from Lots D and E to the street.
Victoria (now petitioner Victoria
Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta
with the result that Victoria became the owner of
Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city
street. Victoria and her husband (the
Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on
this lot and built two garages on it. One garage
abutted the street while the other, located in the
interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of right
of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria
had this alley cemented and gated.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses
Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C,
D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the
easement area. They also closed the gate that the
Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of
way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with
the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For
their part, the Tans filed an action with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against the Salimbangons for the
extinguishment of the easement on Lot B.
RTC rendered judgment, upholding the
Salimbangons easement of right of way over the
alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The
court pointed out that the easement in this case
was established by agreement of the parties for the
benefit of Lots A, D, and E. Consequently, only by
mutual agreement of the parties could such
easement be extinguished.
CA reversed the RTC decision, extinguished
the easement of right of way established on the
alley in Lot B of the Tans, and denied the
Salimbangons claim for damages. The court ruled
that based on the testimony of one of the previous
owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of the
parties was to establish that easement of right of
way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots
D and E. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B,
D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the
easement ceased to have any purpose and
became extinct.
The Salimbangons point out that the
partition agreement among the heirs established in
their favor, as owners of Lot A, an easement of right
of way on Lot B from the interior of their lot to the
city street. Since theirs was an easement
established by agreement of the parties, only by
26 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
mutual agreement could the same be
extinguished.
ISSUE: WON the easement of right of way
established by the partition agreement among the
heirs has been extinguished. -YES
RULING:
The true agreement of the heirs was for the
establishment of an easement of right of way for
the benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct
access to the street, namely Lots D and E.
As originally constituted in that agreement,
each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5
meters between them that when combined formed
a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to
the street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained
the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they
contributed to the establishment of the easement,
the agreement gave their owners the right to use
the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified,
however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots
D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not
need this alley since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and
E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of
right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation
of law. The existence of a dominant estate and a
servient estate is incompatible with the idea that
both estates belong to the same person.
There is no question that when the heirs
realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5
meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the
easement of right of way when these lots were
already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of
Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that cancelled
the easement of right of way they earlier
established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place
imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way
solely on Lot B.
Although the "cancellation" document did
not say so, it was implicit that the changed location
of the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter
strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the
Salimbangons but also their right to use the new 3-
meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B.
Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist that their
right as dominant estate under the original partition
agreement remains, then that would be partly on a
1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the
equivalent 1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not
on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot
B.
The point is that, obviously, in establishing
the new easement of right of way, the heirs
intended to abandon the old one. Since this 3-
meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E
to the street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots
were its intended beneficiary. And, with the
ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a
common owner, namely, the Tans, then the
easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to
have been extinguished by operation of law.
ARTICLE 627
1.) G.R. No. 171072 April 7, 2009
GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CYPRESS GARDENS CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation
(Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a
ten-storey building. Goldcrest executed a Master
Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which
constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium
project and incorporated respondent Cypress
Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to
manage the condominium project and to hold title
to all the common areas. Title to the land on which
the condominium stands was transferred to
Cypress. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the
two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth
floors of the condominium. Goldcrest and its
directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled
the management and administration of the
Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration
and management of the Condominium to the
board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was
discovered that certain common areas pertaining
to Cypress were being occupied and encroached
upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a
complaint with damages against Goldcrest before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the
common areas it allegedly encroached on and to
remove the structures it built thereon. Cypress
sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest
along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors,
as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor
elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone
wire fence on the roof deck.
Goldcrest averred that it was granted the
exclusive use of the roof deck’s limited common
area by Section 4(c) of the condominium’s Master
Deed. It likewise argued that it constructed the
contested doors for privacy and security purposes,
and that, nonetheless, the common areas
occupied by it are unusable and inaccessible to
other condominium unit owners.
The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favour of Cypress.
The Arbiter found that Goldcrest enclosed and
used the common area fronting the two elevators
on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise
discovered that Goldcrest constructed a
permanent structure which encroached 68.01
square meters of the roof deck’s common area. It
was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an
27 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
alteration approval for the said permanent
structure. Thus, he required Goldcrest, among other
things, to: (1) remove the questioned structures,
including all other structures which inhibit the free
ingress to and egress from the condominium’s
limited and unlimited common areas; (2) vacate
the roof deck’s common areas and to pay actual
damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay an
administrative fine for constructing a second
penthouse and for making an unauthorized
alteration of the condominium plan.
The HLURB Special Division modified the
decision of the Arbiter. It held that Cypress has no
cause of action regarding the use of the roof
deck’s limited common area because only
Goldcrest has the right to use the same.
Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office
of the President. The Office of the President
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the
HLURB.
Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals, which partly granted its
appeal. The appellate court noted that the right of
Goldcrest under Section 4(c) of the Master Deed for
the exclusive use of the easement covering the
portion of the roof deck appurtenant to the
penthouse did not include the unrestricted right to
build structures thereon or to lease such area to
third persons. Thus the appellate court ordered the
removal of the permanent structures constructed
on the limited common area of the roof deck.
Goldcrest contended that since the roof
deck’s common limited area is for its exclusive use,
building structures thereon and leasing the same to
third persons do not impair the subject easement.
Cypress insists the said acts impair the
subject easement because the same are already
beyond the contemplation of the easement
granted to Goldcrest.
ISSUE: WON Goldencrest has the right to erect
structures on the limited common areas. - NO
RULING:
The limited common area of the roof deck is
specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master
Deed.
Section 4(c) of the Master Deed, which
reads:
Section 4. Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of
the common areas are to be set aside and
reserved for the exclusive use of certain units and
each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as
exclusive easement for the use of such limited
areas:
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not
shaded red in sheet 10 of Annex "B") by the
Penthouse unit on the roof deck.
In this case, we find no cogent reason to
overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office
of the President and the Court of Appeals that
Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on
the limited common area despite its exclusive right
to use the same. We note that not only did
Goldcrest’s act impair the easement, it also illegally
altered the condominium plan, in violation of
Section 2218 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot
violate any of the following prescribed restrictions
on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can
only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
easement;20 (2) it cannot use the easement except
for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated;21 (3) it cannot exercise the
easement in any other manner than that previously
established;22 (4) it cannot construct anything on it
which is not necessary for the use and preservation
of the easement;23 (5) it cannot alter or make the
easement more burdensome;24 (6) it must notify the
servient estate owner of its intention to make
necessary works on the servient estate;25 and (7) it
should choose the most convenient time and
manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient
estate.26 Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts
shows that it breached a number of the
aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that
the construction and the lease of the office
structure were neither necessary for the use or
preservation of the roof deck’s limited area.
Second, the weight of the office structure
increased the strain on the condominium’s
foundation and on the roof deck’s common limited
area, making the easement more burdensome and
adding unnecessary safety risk to all the
condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction
of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered
the approved condominium project plan and
violated Section 4 of the condominium’s
Declaration of Restrictions.
ARTICLE 633
1.) G.R. No. L-22733 September 25, 1968
SALVADOR BENEDICTO (deceased). ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE A.
HERAS, respondents.
FACTS:
The adjoining properties of the petitioner
and the respondent formerly belonged to one
28 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
owner, MIRIAM R. HEDRICK, consisting of Lots Nos. 8,
9, 10, 22, 23, and 24.
MIRIAM R. HEDRICK sold a portion of the
above described property, particularly Lots Nos. 8,
9, 22 and 23 to CLARO M. RECTO, and retained for
herself Lots Nos. 10 and 24.
At the time of the sale, the following
buildings were located in the respective properties
of Claro M. Recto and Miriam R. Hedrick as
described in the Deed of Purchase-Sale: On the
parcels 2a (Lot No. 9) and 3a (Lot No. 10) two
buildings (Chalets) of equal structure, configuration
and volume are constructed, both constructed of
concrete and other strong materials, and on The
parcels 5a (Lot No. 23) and 6a (Lot No. 24), the
respective dependencies of said properties."
The sale to CLARO M. RECTO as evidenced
by the Purchase-Sale Agreement was subject to the
following conditions:
"SIXTH. That between the portion sold to Claro M.
Recto and that which is in the possession of Miriam
R. Hedrick, there is a passage for vehicles, about
three to four meters wide, which is roughly half or
equal parts on each of These portions and both
parts of this deed are each bound to respect the
right of the other to use all the extension of said
passage for all the time and all the needs of each
of the two properties, the one sold hereby To Claro
M. Recto and the one that is in the possession of
Miriam R. Hedrick, being obligatory this pact for all
those that later acquired by any title the mentioned
farms.
In the light of the irregular form of the property
described in the Certificate of Title mentioned in
paragraph FIRST of this deed, both parties agree to
practice a new measurement of said property in
order that the dividing line between the portion
sold And that it remains in the domain of Miriam R.
Hedrick falls in the middle of the passage described
and alluded in the previous paragraph, and said
line will be perpendicular to the street San
Marcelino.
This agreement of the parties, MIRIAM R. HEDRICK
and CLARO M. RECTO, is annotated on the
respective titles of the petitioner and respondent.
The property purchased by CLARO M.
RECTO from MIRIAM R. HEDRICK became the
subject of a series of transfers : a.) Sold by CLARO
M. RECTO to EMMANUEL CONTY; b.) Sold by
EMMANUEL CONTY TO SALVADOR BENEDICTO (the
petitioner),
The property of MIRIAM R. HEDRICK became
the subject of a series of transfers: a.) Sold by
MIRIAM R. HEDRICK to CHOW KWO HSIEN; b.) Sold
by CHOW KWO HSIEN to GENERAL SECURITY AND
INVESTMENT CO; c.) Sold by GENERAL SECURITY
AND INVESTMENT CO. To VICENTE A. HERAS (the
respondent),
Sometime in 1941, the respondent
demolished the entire building situated on its
property. Petitioner, on the otherhand, enclosed a
portion of the property which prevented
respondent to use the easement of way. Thus, the
respondent filed an action to recover a portion of
land enclosed and walled by the petitioner
Salvador Benedicto, and to demand the reopening
of an easement of way between his real property
and that of the petitioner.
The trial court likewise found that the
easement of way was found entirely within the
property of Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in
the deed of sale between Miriam R. Hedrick and
Claro M. Recto that it should be between their
properties, with each contributing an Equal portion
of his property. According to the court, this was the
reason why Recto, Benedict's predecessor-in-
interest, who had earlier asked to resurvey in
accordance with the deed of sale, subsequently
withdrew his motion, after finding that the
passageway was located entirely within his
property. The court directs both parties to
contribute equally to the maintenance of a three-
four-meter-wide passageway between their
properties, with the property line running at the
middle of the passageway. It rejected Benedict's
claim that the easement had been extinguished by
nonuser and by the cessation of the necessity for a
passageway.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner alleged that the easement
was originally constituted because the buildings
were erected on the respective properties of
Miriam R. Hedrick and Claro M. Recto were
adjoined each other only the back portions of the
properties could be reached by their owners from
San Marcelino street was through the
passageway. He claims that when the respondent
had his building demolished in 1941 the property
gained direct access to San Marcelino street with
the result that since there has been no need for the
passageway. The petitioner argues further that it
could be assumed that since 1941 the passageway
ceased to be used "for certainly [the respondent]
could not be expected to be making 'detours' to
reach San Marcelino Street when the frontage of
his property was now open In its entirety to San
Marcelino Street. "
ISSUE: WON the the easement had been
extinguished by non-user and by the cessation of
the necessity for a passageway. -NO
RULING:
Article 631 of the Civil Code provides in part:
Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
Xxx xxx xxx
29 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
(2) By nonuser for ten years, with respect to
discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased to
be used; And, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary
to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into
such condition that the easement can not be
used; But it shall not be necessary for the use of the
provisions of the preceding paragraph; . . . .
This provision was taken from article 546 of
the Civil Code of 1889, with the modification that
the period of nonuser was reduced from 20 to 10
years.
The petitioner argues at length that this case
is governed by the present Code, and that since 14
years had elapsed from the time the building on
Heras' property was demolished in 1941 to 1955
when this action was begun To be used because
Heras' property had direct access to the street, the
easement must be deemed to have been
extinguished.
For the purposes of this decision we do not
find it necessary to determine whether the
appropriate period of nonuser in this case is 20 or 10
years. For one thing, there is no indubitable proof of
nonuser. The petitioner merely assumes that the
passageway in question had not been in use since
1941 because the property of Heras has since
gained direct access to St. Marcellin's street with
the demolition of his house. For another, even if we
assume that the period of prescription based on
nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the
petitioner Benedicto shows that it was only in 1946
that he had the passageway walled in by
constructing a fence, and since the present action
Was filed in 1955, granting that article 631 of the
Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has
not yet elapsed.
Nor can presumptive renunciation by Heras
of the use of the said passageway be inferred. It
would appear from the record that Heras began
the construction of an apartment building on his
parcel of land after the demolition of his house in
1941, and that although interrupted by World War II,
construction was continued in 1955. Since it is
patent from the Stipuation of facts that the
easement in question is mainly to vehicular
passageway, the obvious need for such
passageway to the rear portion of the projected
apartment building negates any presumptive
renunciation on the part of Heras.
Moreover, the easement in this case is
perpetual in character ("for all the time and all the
necessities of each one of the two properties, the
one sold by the present to Claro M. Recto and the
one that is in the possession of Miriam R. Hedrick ,
This covenant being obligatory for all those who
subsequently acquired for any title the
aforementioned farms ") and was annotated on all
the transfer certificates of title issued in the series of
transfers from Miriam R. Hedrick through to the
respondent Heras, and in the Transfer certificates of
title issued in the series of transfers from Claro M.
Recto through the petitioner Benedicto.Since there
is nothing in the record that would point to a mutual
agreement between any of the predecessors-in-
interest between the petitioner and the respondent
themselves with respect to the discontinuance or
obliteration of the easement annotated on the
titles, the continued existence of The easement
must be upheld and respected.
The fact that the easement here is one of
necessity does not detract from the conclusion we
have reached. For even assuming that with the
demolition of the house on Heras' property the
necessity for the passageway ceased (a point
traversed by Heras who has demolished his house
exactly in order to build an apartment building in its
place), still, as was Held in one case "The fact that
an easement [by grant] may also qualify as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanence as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity." Indeed, when the
easement in this case was established, the parties
unequivocally made provisions for their observance
by all who in the future might succeed them in
dominion, and this is the reason the permanent
character of the easement was annotated on
each and all of the Transfer certificates of title
ARTICLE 635
1. G.R. No. 194336 March 11, 2013
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO
NAVARRO, JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS SANTOS,
ARMANDO TRILLOS, FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL
FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN, PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO
CAGUYONG, GINA GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA,
JOCELYN ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO
VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA,
SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG
DE GUZMAN, ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA DELA
RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON,
RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO MARTINEZ, and PRECY
LOPEZ, Respondents.
Facts: On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a
Complaint4 for accion publiciana with damages
against respondents for allegedly building their
shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its
5,613-square-meter property located at Daisy
Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza,
Las Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land,
which is duly registered in its name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 481436 of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as
an open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended
for village recreational facilities and amenities for
subdivision residents.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents
denied the material allegations of the Complaint
and briefly asserted that it is the local government,
30 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority
over them.
On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed
petitioner’s complaint, finding that the land being
occupied by respondents are situated on the
sloping area going down and leading towards the
Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter
legal easement; thus, considered as public property
and part of public dominion under Article 5027of
the New Civil Code (Code), which could not be
owned by petitioner.
The trial court opined that respondents have a
better right to possess the occupied lot, since they
are in an area reserved for public easement
purposes and that only the local government of Las
Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of
possession or ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated August 21, 2007.9 Consequently, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
on March 5, 2010, sustained the dismissal of the
case.
The appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area
being disputed is located along the creek which, in
turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to
the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not
close its eyes or ignore the fact, which is glaring in
its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed
reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT,
it is then estopped from claiming ownership and
enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court,
however, the CA noted that the proper party
entitled to seek recovery of possession of the
contested portion is not the City of Las Piñas, but
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Section
101 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141
(otherwise known as The Public Land Act).
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied by the CA per Resolution dated
October 29, 2010, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that although the portion of the
subject property occupied by respondents is within
the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still
retains ownership thereof since the strip does not
form part of the public dominion. As the owner of
the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful
possession, hence, the proper party to file an action
for recovery of possession against respondents
conformably with Articles 428 and 539 of Code.
The Court deny such statement. An easement or
servitude is a real right on another's property,
corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of
the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
somebody else to do or something to be done on
his or her property, for the benefit of another person
or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from
the estate to which it actively or passively belongs,
indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property
right, unless extinguished by causes provided by
law.
The Code defines easement as an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner
or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong. There are two kinds of easement according
to source: by law or by will of the owners – the
former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easement.17 A legal easement or compulsory
easement, or an easement by necessity constituted
by law has for its object either public use or the
interest of private persons.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Land in question is
part of public property.
2. Who is the proper party entitled to institute the
case?
Held: 1. Petitioner used Article 630 of the Civil Code
as it provides the general rule that the owner of the
estate retains the ownership of the portion of the
easement established, Article 635 says that
“all matters concerning easements established for
public or communal use shall be governed by the
special laws and regulations relating thereto.” The
applicable special laws are DENR A.O. No. 99 021
dated June 11, 1999 which prescribed the
guidelines for the implementation of P.D. Nos. 705
and 1067 which was issued for biodiversity
preservation, P.D. 1216 and P.D. 1067 or The Water
Code of the Philippines all of which states that such
3 meter allowance is reserved for public use.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that the subject
land is public property.
In relation to this, the Court held that respondents
have no better right to the property as the
petitioners because it is public land.
In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O.
No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which superseded
DENR A.O. No. 97-0519 dated March 6, 1997 and
prescribed the revised guidelines in the
implementation of the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be
doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the
government’s program of biodiversity preservation.
Aside from Section 2.1 above-quoted, Section 2.3 of
which further mandates:
2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:
2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:
The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be
observed as the above. However, when these lands
are to be subdivided, consolidated or
consolidated-subdivided, the strip of three (3)
meters which falls within urban areas shall be
31 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
demarcated and marked on the plan for easement
and bank protection.
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in
the technical description and annotated in the title.
2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation
Subdivision Surveys for Housing/Residential,
Commercial or Industrial Purposes:
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-
subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3)
meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams
shall be observed and be made part of the open
space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.
The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject
to subsequent subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the
allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a
stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is
required and shall be considered as forming part of
the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216
dated October 14, 1977.20 Said law is explicit: open
spaces are "for public use and are, therefore,
beyond the commerce of men" and that "[the]
areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable."
The Court suggests that petitioner should file
an action for mandamus to compel the local
government of Las Piñas City to enforce with
reasonable dispatch the eviction of respondents
under R.A. 7279.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
2, As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled
to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the
Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and
the local government of Las Piñas City, may file an
action depending on the purpose sought to be
achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of
action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter
may also bring an action to enforce the relevant
provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise
known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992).24 Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to
uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of
the communities in urban areas and was envisioned
to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of
squatting in the metropolis,25 all local government
units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish
persons or entities occupying danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such
as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.
ARTICLE 637
1. G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
T. Icasiano, for appellant.
R. Salinas, for appellee.
Facts: On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod,
Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, Fernando
Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura
Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residents of
the town of Bulacan, province of the same name,
filed a written complaint against Higino Meneses,
alleging that they each owned and possessed farm
lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas
and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that
the defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a
strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said
lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other;
that from time immemorial, and consequently for
more than twenty years before 1901, there existed
and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the
plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of
water over the said land in Paraanan, which
easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year
1901 and consisted in that the water collected
upon their lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow
through Paraanan into the Taliptip River.
From that year however, the defendant, without
any right or reason, converted the land in
Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam
and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of
the water through said place into the Taliptip River,
that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff
became flooded and damaged by the stagnant
waters, there being no outlet except through the
land in Paraanan; that their plantation were
destroyed, causing the loss and damages to the
extent of about P1,000, which loss and damage will
continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water
are allowed to remain, preventing its passage
through said land and injuring the rice plantations
of the plaintiffs.
They therefore asked that judgment be entered
against the defendant, declaring that the said tract
of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory
easement permitting the flow of water from the
property of the plaintiffs, and that, without
prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction,
the defendant be ordered to remove and destroy
the obstructions that impede the passage of the
waters through Paraanan, and that in future, and
forever, he abstain from closing in any manner the
aforesaid tract of land; that, upon judgment being
entered, the said injunction be declared to be final
and that the defendant be sentenced to pay to
the plaintiffs an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs
in the proceedings; that they be granted any other
and further equitable or proper remedy in
accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
On the 29th of August, 1904, The defendant filed an
amended answer, denying each and everyone of
the allegations of the complaint, and alleged that
no statutory easement existed nor could exist in
favor of the lands described in the complaint,
permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that
he, together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of
Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were
32 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
stated by him, and which he and his brothers had
inherited from their deceased mother.
The court, on the 13th of March, 1907, entered
judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled
to a decision in their favor, and sentenced the
defendant to remove the dam placed on the east
of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip
River opposite the old dam in the barrio of
Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the
obstacles to the free passage of the waters through
the strip of land in Paraanan; to abstain in future,
and forever, from obstructing or closing in any
manner the course of the waters through the said
strip of land. The request that the defendant be
sentenced to pay an indemnity was denied, and
no ruling was made as to costs.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment
and furthermore asked for a new trial which was
denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval
of the bill of exceptions, the question was submitted
to this court.
Issue: Whether or Not Meneses has a right to block
the passage or to construct works to prevent an
easement. -NO
Held: Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters
which naturally and without the intervention
of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stone or earth which they carry
with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates
construct works preventing this easement,
nor the one of the higher estate works
increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and
conditions of the easements of waters to
which this section refers shall be governed
by the special law relating thereto in
everything not provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August
3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of natural
easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject
to receive the waters that flow naturally,
without the work of man, from the higher
lands together with the stone or earth which
they carry with them.
Owner of the lower lands cannot erect works that
will impede or prevent such an easement or
charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon
his estate for the benefit of the higher lands
belonging to different owners; neither can the latter
do anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an
easement is charge imposed upon one estate for
the benefit of another estate belonging to a
different owner, and the realty in favor of which the
easement is established is called the dominant
estate, and the one charged with it the servient
estate.
It appears to have been clearly proven in this case
that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the
aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake,
named Calalaran, are located in places relatively
higher than the sitio called Paraanan where the
land and fish pond of the defendant are situated,
and which border on the Taliptip River; that during
the rainy season the rain water which falls on he
land of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the
small Calalaran Lake at flood time, has no outlet to
the Taliptip River other than through the low land of
Paraanan: that the border line between Calalaran
and Paraanan there has existed from time
immemorial a dam, constructed by the community
for the purpose of preventing the salt waters from
the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the
land in Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of
Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one of
the residents was designated in his turn by the
lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the sluice
gate in order to let out the water that flooded the
rice fields, through the land of Paraanan to the
above-mentioned river, that since 1901, the
defendant constructed another dam along the
boundary of this fishpond in Paraanan, thereby
impeding the outlet of the waters that flood the
fields of Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the
growing crops.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject
to the easement of receiving and giving passage to
the waters proceeding from the higher lands and
the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not
constituted by agreement between the interested
parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had
imposed it for the common public utility in view of
the difference in the altitude of the lands in the
barrio Bambang.
Higino Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate,
is obliged to give passage to and allow the flow of
the waters descending from the Calalaran Lake
and from the land of the plaintiffs through his lands
in Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip
River; and he is hereby ordered to remove any
obstacle that may obstruct the free passage of the
waters whenever there may be either a small or
large volume of running water through his lands in
the sitio of Paraanan for their discharge into the
Taliptip River; and in future to abstain from
impeding, in any manner, the flow of the waters
coming from the higher lands.
ARTICLE 641
1. G.R. No. L-60219 June 29, 1984
BIENVENIDO AMISTOSO, petitioner,
vs.
SENECIO ONG, EPIFANIA NERI & HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE, ESTEBAN M. LISING OF THE COURT OF FIRST
33 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, BRANCH
VI, respondents.
Facts: On July 27, 1981, petitioner as plaintiff, filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, a conplaint for Recognition of Basement with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages. The complaint
which was docketed in the a resaid Court as Civil
Case No. P-153 among others alleged, that plaintiff
(now petitioner) and defendant Epifania Neri, (one
of the herein private respondents) are the owners of
adjoining parcels of agricultural land situated in
Cauayanan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; that an
irrigation canal traverses the land of defendant Neri
through which irrigation water from the Silmod River
passes and flows to the land of the petitioner for the
latter's beneficial use and that respondent Neri,
owner of the land on which said irrigatrion canal
exists and Senecio Ong, the cultivator of the said
property, despite repeated demands refused to
recognize the rights and title of the petitioner to the
beneficial use of the water passing through the
aforesaid irrigation canal and to have petitioner's
rights and/or claims annotated on the Certificate of
Title of respondent Neri. Hence, the filing of the said
complaint.
In their Answer, private respondents denied the
existence of any right on the part of the petitioner
to the use of the canal mentioned in the complaint
nor any contract, much less any deed or
encumbrance on their property and assert that
they have not performed any act prejudicial to the
petitioner that will warrant the filing of the
complaint against them. By way of affirmative and
special defenses, private respondents alleged that
petitioner's complaint states no cause of action
and that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
same.
After petitioner has rested his case by a formal offer
of his testimonial and documentary evidences,
private respondents instead of presenting their
evidence, filed a motion to dismiss. In the said
motion, respondents contedn that the instant case,
involving as it does development, exploitation,
conservation and utilization of water resources falls
within the exclusive jursidiction of the National
Water Resources Council pursuant to P.D. NO. 424,
Section 2(b) and Section 88 thereof.
Acting on private respondent's motion, respondent
Judge dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of
jurisdiction in an Order dated January 14, 1981.
Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the
Order of dismissal, petitioner now comes before Us
through the instant petition contending:
(1) That the case at bar is not to settle any water
dispute between the parties but a complaint which
calls purely for a determination of the right of the
plaintiff to have an established right amounting to
an easement annotated on the certificate of title of
the defendant, hence the question is judicial which
may be taken cognizance of by the respondent
court;
(2) That since the case was filed on July 26, 1972.
Which was before the effectivity of PD NO. 424,
therefore, even if defendant's contention is correct
— that the case involved water rights dispute — the
old law on water applies and not the present water
code otherwise the Court shall lose jurisdiction
contrary to the well-settled rule that once be lost;
(3) That the herein defendant can no longer raise
the question of plaintiff's right to the beneficial use
of irrigation water since the right to use had already
been determined, decided and laid to rest when
the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications awarded petitioner Water Rights
Grant after complying with all the legal
requirements such as publication, payment of fees,
survey, investigation, etc.; and
(4) That the issue in the case at bar which was
erroneously overlooked by the respondent Judge
does not involve a determination of the right of the
parties to the utilizatio conservation and protection
of the parties' respective water rights, hence it does
not fan within the competence nor jurisdiction of
the National Water Resources Council.
Private respondents contend that the assailed order
of dismissal was in order since a mere cursory
reading of the complaint shows that petitioner
claims for the right to use water coming from the
Silmod River and prays that his right to the utilization
thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or
obstructed by the respondents. On its face then,
the dispute is on the use, conservation and
protection of the right to water either by the
petitioner or by the private respondents.
Since the controversy hinges on the right to use and
protect the water from the Silmod River that passes
on the land of the private respondents to the
petitioner's property, the proper authority to
determine such a controversy is the National Water
Resources Council which is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction over such question pursuant to P.D. NOS.
424 and 1067.
Issue: 1. Whether or Not Amistoso has the right
over the use of the canal. – YES.
2. Whether or Not National Water Resources
Council has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. –
NO.
Held: From the foregoing stipulations, private
respondents admit that petitioner, then plaintiff, has
an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. Private respondents, however,
contend that the said grant does not pertain to the
beneficial use of irrigation water from Silmod River.
The records, however, do not show any other
irrigation water going to petitioner's property
passing thru respondents' lot aside from that
coming from the Silmod River. Respondents'
34 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
controversion of petitioner's right to irrigation water
specifically from Silmod River is undoubtedly a lame
denial.
The record clearly discloses an approved Water
Rights Grant in favor of Amistoso. The grant was
made three (3) years before the promulgation of
P.D. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines). The water
rights grant partakes the nature of a document
known as a water permit recognized under Article
13 of P.D. 1067. the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of
Amistoso does not fall under "claims for a right to
use water existing on or before December 31, 1974"
which under P.D. 1067 are required to be registered
with the National Water Resources Council within
two (2) years from promulgation of P.D. 1067,
otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof
deemed abandoned.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the
respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly entitles
petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod
River. That right is now a. vested one and may no
longer be litigated as to bring petitioner's case
within the jurisdiction of the National Water
Resources Council. To resurrect that issue will be
violative of the rule on res judicata. Amistoso is not
asking the court to grant him the right to use but to
compel Neri to recognize that right and have the
same annotated on the latter’s TCT. The interruption
of the free flow of water caused by the refusal to re-
open the closed irrigation canal constituted
petitioner's cause of action in the court below,
which decidedly do not fall within the domain of
the authority of the National Water Resources
Council.
ARTICLE 646
1. G.R. Nos. L-33868-76 October 18, 1990
NILO LIZARES, NICOLAS LEDESMA, JAIME
CLAPAROLS, CARMITA C. BALCELLS, EDUARDO
CLAPAROLS, EULALIA C. ROSELLO, ENRIQUE YUSAY,
DOMINGO RODRIGUEZ, INC., FIRST FARMERS'
MILLING CO., INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR A. KINTANAR, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, and TALISAY-SILAY
MILLING CO., INC., respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. (Central) is the owner and operator of a sugar
mill located in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, manufacturing centrifugal sugar from
sugarcanes delivered to the mill by petitioners Nilo
Lizares, Nicolas Ledesma, Jaime Claparols ,Carmita
C. Balcells, Eduardo Claparols, Eulalia C. Rogelio,
Enrique Yusay, Domingo Rodriguez, Inc., and First
Farmers' Milling Co., Inc. pursuant to Identical milling
contracts executed between the former and the
latter.
Under the provisions of the milling contracts, Central
was granted, inter alia, an easement of aqueduct
on the parcels of land owned by petitioners for the
passage of water from the Imbang River to its sugar
mill. For this purpose, Central constructed concrete
water canals traversing the parcels of land of
petitioners. The easement of aqueduct was for a
period of fifty (50) years, which began with 1920-21
crop year up to 1969-70 crop year. Prior to the
expiration of this period, Central, by means of
separate letters, offered to lease from petitioners
the areas occupied by the canals. However,
petitioners refused to entertain the offer of Central.
On June 22, 1970, Central filed its complaints
against petitioners before respondent Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. On July 20,1970,
Central filed its complaints against Domingo
Rodriguez, Inc. and First Farmers' Milling Co., Inc.,
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 9472 and 9473,
respectively, before the same court. In all these
cases, Central prayed for the establishment of a
legal easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land
owned by petitioners and for the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the
petitioners and/or their agents, representatives,
assigns, successors-in-interest from removing and/or
destroying the canals or otherwise from obstructing
the passage of water from the Imbang River to its
mill, through the canals, during the pendency of
the litigation.
On June 30, 1970, respondent court ordered the
issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction with
respect to Civil Cases Nos. 9438, 9439, 9441, 9442,
9443, 9445 and 9446.
On July 20, 1970, respondent court ordered the
issuance of the writs of pre injunction as regards
Civil Cases Nos. 9472 and 9473.
On July 27, 1970, petitioners filed a motion to
dissolve the writs of preliminary injunction which was
opposed by Central in a motion dated August 21,
1970. On December 10, 1970, respondent court
denied the motion to dissolve the writs of
preliminary injunction.
On December 19, 1970, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration thereof which was, however,
denied on April 21, 1971 for lack of merit. Hence,
the present petition.
On January 27, 1988, considering the length of time
that these cases have been pending with this
Court, and to determine whether supervening
events have rendered these cases moot and
academic, We resolved to require the parties to
move in the premises. On February 29, 1988 (p.
600, Rollo) and June 23, 1988 (p. 603, Rollo),
petitioners manifested that no supervening events
have rendered these cases moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent court committed
grave abuse of discretion in having issued the
orders dated June 30, 1970 and July 20, 1970
directing the issuance of the writs of preliminary
injunction, the order dated December 10, 1970,
denying the motion to dissolve the writs of
preliminary injunction and the order dated April 21,
1971 denying the motion for reconsideration.
35 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
Held: Petitioners have failed to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent court in issuing
the questioned orders.
Petitioners allege that the cases of Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., et al. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et
al. (G.R. No. L25887, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA
731), Angela Estate, Inc., et al, v. CFI of Negros
Occidental, et al. (G.R. No. L-27084, July 31, 1968, 24
SCRA 500) and Locsin, et al. v. Climaco, etc., et
al. (G.R. No. L-27319, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 816)
constitute the leading jurisprudence in the issuance
of the writs of preliminary injunction in cases of
complaints praying for the declaration of legal
easement. In answer thereto, Central asserts that
the aforementioned decisions are inapplicable in
these, cases because they refer to legal easement
of right of way.
The cases invoked by petitioners may be applied to
this controversy only insofar as the general
principles on the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction reiterated therein are concerned, but not
with regard to the other principles enunciated
therein because they deal with legal easement of
right of way whereas Our concern here is legal
easement of aqueduct.
A preliminary injunction may be granted at any
time after the commencement of the action and
before judgment, when it is established that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained
of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; that the
commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-
performance thereof would probably work injustice
to the plaintiff; or that the defendant is doing,
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act probably in violation
of the plaintiff s rights respecting the subject of the
action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
The purpose of this provisional remedy if to preserve
the status quo 2 of the things subject of the action
and/or the relation between the parties, in order to
protect the right of the plaintiff respecting the
subject of the action during the pendency of the
suit. Because, otherwise or if no preliminary
prohibitory injunction were issued, the defendant
may, before final judgment, do or continue the
doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to
restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final
judgment rendered afterwards granting the relief
sought by the plaintiff.
We agree with respondent court that Central has
sufficiently established the necessity of issuing writs
of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
2. G.R. No. L-21727 May 29, 1970
CRISPINA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ, and DAMASO
MENDOZA, respondents.
Jaime L. Guerrero and Renato B. Bercades for
petitioner.
Judgment was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Bataan in favor of the plaintiff, Crispina
Salazar, now petitioner; on appeal by the
defendants, Guillermo Gutierrez and Damaso
Mendoza, the Court of Appeals reversed and the
plaintiff elevated the case to us for review
by certiorari.
Facts: Crispina Salazar is owner of a piece of land
(Lot 436 of the Cadastral Survey of Balanga)
situated in Tuyo, Balanga, Bataan, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title 1578 issued by the
Register of Deeds of the said province, and
acquired by her from the Municipality of Balanga
on May 4, 1949. The lot is bounded on the northeast
by Lot 361, on the southeast by Sapang Tuyo, on
the southwest by Lot 435, and on the northwest by
Lot 433.
Lot 433 was registered under the Torrens system on
July 23, 1923, with Original Certificate of Title 2162.
Ownership passed to respondent Guillermo
Gutierrez by inheritance in 1927, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1059 was issued in his name
on June 11, 1928. No annotation of any lien or
encumbrance affecting the land appears on either
title.
Before the present controversy arose, Lot 436 and
some of the surrounding estates, including Lot 433,
were irrigated with water from Sapang Tuyo, a
public stream, flowing through a dike that traversed
Lots 431, 434, 433 and 461. The portion of this dike
that passed through Lot 433 branched near the
boundary between this lot and Lot 434 into a canal
which ran across the rest of Lot 433 up to Lot 436. It
was with the water flowing through this canal that
Lot 436 used to be irrigated.
On February 24, 1953 respondent Damaso
Mendoza, a lessee of Lot 433, demolished the said
canal, thereby stopping the flow of the water and
depriving Crispina Salazar's Lot 436 of the irrigation
facilities which it had formerly enjoyed. Her requests
that the canal be rebuilt and the water flow
restored having been turned down, Salazar
commenced the present suit on March 2, 1953,
praying that these reliefs be granted her by the
Court and that the defendants be ordered to pay
her actual damages in the sum of P900, moral
damages in the sum of P5,000, and P1,000 for
attorney's fees, plus costs.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
as prayed for by the plaintiff, ordering the
defendants to restore the demolished portion of the
canal and to refrain from again demolishing the
same pending trial, but the writ was dissolved on
March 9, 1953, upon a counterbond filed by the
defendants.
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After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bataan
rendered judgment on April 10, 1956, ordering the
defendants to restore at their expense the canal in
question, to connect it with the canal found in Lot
436 and to cause the corresponding annotation of
the encumbrance on Transfer Certificate of Title
1059 covering Lot 433; and ordering the defendants
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,360 annually
beginning the agricultural year 1956-1957 until the
restoration of the canal, P4,700 as actual damages,
P5,000 as moral damages and P1,000 as attorney's
fees, plus costs.
However, On July 26, 1963, decision was reversed
on appeal, rendering that easement of aqueduct
over Lot 433 is a voluntary one and that upon
registration, there was no annotation of said
easement as a subsisting encumbrance.
Hence this review by certiorari.
Issue: Whether appellate court erred in holding that
petitioner failed to comply with the requisites laid
down by Article 643 in order to claim legal
easement set forth in Article 642 of the New Civil
Code.
Held: On the first requisite of Article 643 — that the
petitioner must prove that he can dispose of the
water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it
is intended — there is the statement of the trial
court that the disputed canal had been in
existence since the Spanish regime, or at least prior
to the original registration of Lot 433 in 1923, and
that of the Court of Appeals itself confirmatory of
this second alternative finding. If, as thus found, the
petitioner had been using water from Sapang Tuyo
to irrigate Lot 436 since she acquired said lot in
1949, as the Municipality of Balanga had been
doing before her, and that such use had lasted
continuously for at least thirty years, it is a fair
presumption that she had a right to do so and that
the water she could dispose of was sufficient for the
purpose. Indeed it would be a superfluity to require
her to produce a permit from the proper authorities,
for even without it the right had already become
vested both under Article 194 of the Spanish Law of
Waters and under Article 504 of the Civil Code,
which respectively state:
ART. 194. Any person who has enjoyed
the use of public waters for a term of twenty
years without objection on the part of the
authorities or of any third person, shall
continue in its enjoyment, even though he
may not be able to show that he secured
proper permission.
ART. 504. The use of public waters is
acquired:
(1) By administrative concession;
(2) By prescription for ten years.
The extent of the rights and obligations of the use
shall be that established, in the first case, by the
terms of the concession, and, in the second case,
by the manner and form, in which the waters have
been used.
The third requisite of Article 643 of the Civil Code
refers to the matter of indemnity to the owner of the
servient estate. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioner it would be nigh impossible now to
present actual proof that such indemnity has been
paid, considering the number of years that have
elapsed since the easement had first come into
existence and the subsequent changes in
ownership of the lots involved. It stands to reason,
however, that if the easement had continued for so
long in fact, not only before Lot 433 was registered
in 1923 but for thirty years thereafter, until cut off by
the respondents in 1953 the legal requirement in
question must have been complied with.
The other requisite of Article 643 is that "the
proposed right of way is the most convenient and
the least onerous to third persons." The Court of
Appeals stated that the petitioner has not
established this fact, and that "her own evidence
reveals that her lot is abutting Sapang Tuyo on its
southern boundary, where from she can easily and
directly draw the water necessary to irrigate her
land." This statement is an oversimplification.
Proximity or abutment of a piece of land to a
stream does not necessarily carry with it the
conclusion that water may conveniently be drawn
directly therefrom for irrigation.
In the first place, the petitioner has pointed out in
her brief, without contradiction by the respondents,
that the portion of her land which abuts Sapang
Tuyo is precipice. Secondly, the trial court made an
ocular inspection of the premises and observed
that the eastern and northeastern portions of Lot
436 are lower than the southwestern, western and
northwestern (the point where Lot 436 adjoins Lot
433) portions of the same. Finally, it would appear
from the observation made by the same court that
the demolished canal is part of a system of conduits
used to irrigate the lands of the petitioner and the
respondents as well as the surrounding estates
belonging to other owners, and that this system of
conduits is of a permanent nature.
In any case the respondents are hardly in a position
to avail of the registration of Lot 433 in 1923 without
the corresponding registration of the easement on
the title as an excuse to summarily terminate it thirty
years thereafter. The original registered owner
allowed the easement to continue in spite of such
non-registration: the least that can be said is that he
either recognized its existence as a compulsory
servitude on his estate or voluntarily agreed to its
establishment and continuance. And the
respondent Guillermo Gutierrez, as the successor-in-
interest to the, said owner by inheritance, is not an
innocent third person who could plead the
absence of annotation on the title. Not only was he
aware of the existence of the easement when he
inherited the property in 1927, but he likewise
allowed it to continue for twenty-six years after he
acquired title. He is bound both by the act of his
predecessor and by his own.
37 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
ARTICLE 649
1. G.R. No. 180282 April 11, 2011
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ,
and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, Petitioners,
vs.
PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent.
Facts: On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a
Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against
respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint,
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Lot
No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City;
while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As
petitioners had no access to a public road to and
from their property, they claimed to have used a
portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since
1970. Respondent, however, blocked the
passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners
have been granted another passageway by the
spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce),
the owners of another adjacent lot, the former
instituted the complaint before the RTC and prayed
that they be granted a right of way over an area of
54 sqm of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the
amount ofP54,000.00, and that the right be
annotated on defendant’s title. In addition to that,
the defendant will pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P30,000.00 as damages for attorney’s fees and
costs of suit.
In the defendant’s answer, he denied that he
allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway.
Moreover, he stated that petitioners’ claim of right
of way is only due to expediency and not necessity
for there already is an existing easement of right of
way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses
Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another
easement over respondent’s property.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners by finding that they had adequately
established the requisites to justify an easement of
right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code. Also, the trial court declared
petitioners in good faith as they expressed their
willingness to pay proper indemnity. however, the
he CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision
ruling that a right of way had already been granted
by the sevient estate. Thus, there is no need to
establish an easement over the respondent’s
property.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
a grant of legal easement of right of way from their
landlocked property through there is another
passageway for them.
Held: No. The petition is without merit.
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on
the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the
servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of
the dominant estate to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right
of way may be granted.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the
following requisites should be met: first, the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
second, there is payment of proper indemnity; third,
the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; and fourth, the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show
sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the above-
enumerated requirements.
Admittedly, they had been granted a right of way
through the other adjacent lot owned by the
Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said
outlet in going to and coming from the public
highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and
from the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer
and circuitous, and they have to pass through other
lots owned by different owners before they could
get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of
what is “adequate outlet” a complete disregard of
the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify
the imposition of an easement of right of way, there
must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis of setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.
As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right
of way through the adjacent estate of Spouses
Arce before the complaint below was even filed.
[Respondent] alleged that this right of way is being
used by the other estates which are similarly
situated as [petitioners]. [Petitioners] do not dispute
this fact. There is also a reason to believe that this
right of way is Spouses Arce’s outlet to a public
road since their property, as it appears from the
Sketch Map, is also surrounded by other estates. The
fact that Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of
way through respondent’s property, although an
opening on the latter’s property is undoubtedly the
most direct and shortest distance to P. Gomez St.
from the former’s property, bolsters our conviction
that they have adequate outlet to the highway
which they are now likewise making available to
[petitioners].
The convenience of the dominant estate has never
been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of
way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of
the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when there is
already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, as in this
38 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or
another, be inconvenient, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified.
2. G.R. No. 149023 September 27, 2007
LEO WINSTON BRIN LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES AMADEO and ADELAIDA
CARREON, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Amadeo and Adelaida Carreon,
respondents, are the owners of a house and Lots
Nos. 8-B and 8-C located in Cebu City covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 61049 and
56745, respectively, of the Registry of Deeds, same
city.
On the other hand, Anita Linda Rodriguez is the
owner of Lot No. 6213-A-2 covered by TCT No.
93402. It is situated within the vicinity of respondent
spouses’ lots.
As there is no existing way from their property to the
nearest road, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Cebu City a complaint
for easement of right of way against Rodriguez,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-7426. During the
pre-trial, the RTC found that there is another servient
estate, owned by Mr. and Ms. Anselmo Jardin
which could be used by respondents as a right of
way. Respondents then filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Complaint to include spouses
Jardin as co-defendants, the latter being owners of
Lots Nos. 6213-A-3, 6213-A-4 and 8-A located on the
eastern side of respondents’ property. On June 9,
1989, the RTC issued an Order admitting the
Amended Complaint.
However, the lots of spouses Jardin were sold
pendente lite to Leo Winston Brin Lee, petitioner. As
a result, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to
Admit Second Amended Complaint impleading
petitioner as additional defendant. On September
10, 1993, the RTC granted the motion.
RULING OF THE RTC CEBU CITY
After trial, the RTC rendered Judgment in favor of
respondents and against petitioner, ordering Mr.
Leo Winston Brin Lee to grant Sps. Carreon a right of
way on the northern portion of his properties
measuring "one-meter wide and thirteen meters
long; and ordering Mr. Leo Winston Brin Lee to
demolish the fence/structure to the extent
obstructing the right of way hereinabove
constituted.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Decision, affirmed the RTC Judgment.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
of June 21, 2001.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that Sps. Carreon are entitled to an easement of
right of way on petitioner’s property.
RULING: NO.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way
is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code reproduced as follows:
ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of
a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a
manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of
the value of the land occupied and the amount of
the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of
the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the
following requisites should be met:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art.
649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649,
last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest (Art.
650).3
All the above requisites are present here.
WHEREFORE, The Supreme Court DENY the petition.
The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60511 are
AFFIRMED.
3. [G.R. No. 137882. February 04, 2005]
SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. OLGA RAMISCAL
represented by ENRIQUE
MENDOZA, respondent.
39 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
FACTS:
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered
owner of a parcel of land. Petitioner, Spa. Elizabeth
and Alfredo De La Cruz are occupants of a parcel
of land located at the back of Ramiscal’s property,
owned by the mother of Alfredo. The subject matter
of this case is a long strip of land owned by
respondent which is being used by petitioners as
their pathway to and from the nearest public
highway from their property.
Respondent leased her property, including
the building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil.
Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent to
that of respondent’s. Years later, Phil. Orient Motors
sold its property to San Benito Realty. It was only
during the relocation survey and location plan for
both contiguous properties of respondent and San
Benito Realty that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by
petitioners is part of her property.
Respondent filed a complaint, seeking the
demolition of the structure allegedly illegally
constructed by petitioners on her property.
Respondent asserted in her complaint that
petitioners have an existing right of way to a public
highway other than the current one they are using,
which she owns.
Petitioners claimed that such use was with
the knowledge of respondent. They also alleged
that respondent initiated the construction on her
property of a motor shop known as Phil. Orient
Motors and they, as well as the other occupants of
the property at the back of respondent’s land,
opposed the construction of the perimeter wall as it
would enclose and render their property without
any adequate ingress and egress. They asked
respondent to give them an easement on the
eastern side of her property, which would be
reciprocated with an easement by the owner of
another adjacent estate. Respondent did not want
to give them the easement on the eastern side of
her property but, instead, offered to them the
disputed passageway, which offer they had
accepted.
RULING OF THE RTC
On 31 July 1997, the RTC handed down a Decision,
giving probative weight to the evidence adduced
by respondent. Judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of Olga Ramiscal and ordering the
defendants to demolish the structure built by them
along the pathway on the eastern side of plaintiffs
property towards 18th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon
City.
RULING OF CA
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by
petitioners from the RTC decision for failure to file
brief within the reglementary period.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
met the same fate in the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 05 March 1999.
Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a
voluntary or legal easement of right of way.
RULING
NO.
An easement or servitude is a real right,
constituted on the corporeal immovable property
of another, by virtue of which the owner has to
refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit of
another thing or person.[26] The statutory basis for
this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619,
of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or
by the will of the owners. The former are called
legal and the latter voluntary easements.
Petitioners herein failed to show by
competent evidence other than their bare claim
that they and their tenants, spouses Manuel and
Cecilia Bondoc and Carmelino Masangkay,
entered into an agreement with respondent,
through her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the
pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be
reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide
easement by the owner of another adjacent
estate. The hands of this Court are tied from giving
credence to petitioners self-serving claim that such
right of way was voluntarily given them by
respondent Ramiscal.
Likewise futile are petitioners attempts to show
that they are legally entitled to the aforesaid
pathway under Article 649 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of
a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons, and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of
way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the
following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4)
the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
40 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
highway may be the shortest. The first three
requisites are not obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Resolutions dated 11 September 1998 and 5 March
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
68216 are AFFIRMED. The Decision dated 31 July
1997 of the Regional Trial Court is likewise UPHELD.
4. BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO
D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88,
JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY
LORILLA, respondents
[A] legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and
becomes a continuing property right. As a
compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the
estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said
Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites
for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity. has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5)
to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
FACTS
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner
of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific
Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. The bank had acquired it from the
spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public
auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought
the parcel of land there was a small house on its
southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the
two-meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas,
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a
Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the
land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached
upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also
unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil
Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order against the spouses
Gabriel. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and
Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of
easement.
On May 1991, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. On August 1991, it issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the
Gabriels to provide the right of way and to
demolish the small house encroaching on the
easement. On August 1991, the Gabriels filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied.
Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.
On March 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and upheld the RTC's issuances. The
decision became final and executory on July 1992.
On January 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in
Quezon City issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. On
June 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small
house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third
Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of
Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition
could not apply to his property since he was not a
party to the civil case. His Third Party Claim with
prayer to quash the writ of demolition was denied
for lack of merit on August 16, 1995. The motion for
reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995
were denied on October 19, 1995.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 39166, asserting that the existence of the
easement of right of way was not annotated in his
title and that he was not a party to Civil Case No.
Q-91-8703, hence the contract of easement
executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas
could not be enforced against him. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and
denied the reconsideration.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement on the property binds
petitioner.
RULING NO.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the easement in the instant petition is both (1)
an easement by grant or a voluntary easement,
and (2) an easement by necessity or a
legal easement.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have
declared the existence of said easement (right of
way). This finding of fact of both courts below is
conclusive on this Court.
- The small house occupying one meter of the
two-meter wide easement obstructs the
entry of private respondents' cement mixer
and motor vehicle.
- One meter is insufficient for the needs of
private respondents.
- It is well-settled that the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of
the easement.
- Conformably then, petitioner ought to
demolish whatever edifice obstructs
the easement in view of the needs of
private respondents' estate.
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Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound
by the contract of easement because the same
was not annotated in the title and that a notice
of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce
the easement was not recorded with the Register of
Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.
- As already explained, it is in the nature of
legal easement that the servient estate (of
petitioner) is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate (of private respondents in
this case) ingress from and egress to the
public highway.
In this case, private respondents, Julio
Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No.
Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original
owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel.
Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the
Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he
bought the property from the bank which had
acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision
in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For,
although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
5. G.R. No. 149125 RESURRECCION OBRA,
Petitioner, - versus - SPS. VICTORIANO BADUA &
MYRNA BADUA, SPS. JUANITO BALTORES &
FLORDELIZA BALTORES, SPS. ISABELO BADUA &
PRESCILA BADUA, SPS. JOSE BALANON & SHIRLEY
BALANON, SPS. ORLANDO BADUA & MARITA BADUA
and SPS. LEONCIO BADUA & JUVY BADUA
FACTS:
The case arose from a Complaint for
Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents
against Anacleto and Resurreccion Obra, Donato
and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta
Badua in Civil Case No. 5033 entitled Sps. Victoriano
Badua and Myrna Badua, et al. v. Sps. Anacleto
Obra and Resurreccion Obra, et al. before the RTC.
Defendant Anacleto Obra was the husband of
petitioner. Respondents alleged that their
residential houses, erected on a lot commonly
owned by them and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 93-01900281 under Cadastral Lot No. 5518
situated in Galongen, Bacnotan, La Union, were
located west of the properties of the Obras,
Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the
national highway was a pathway traversing the
northern portion of petitioner’s property and the
southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases
and Baduas. The pathway was more than one
meter wide and sixteen meters long. They claimed
that this pathway had been established as early as
1955. In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed
a fence on the northern boundary of their property;
thus, blocking respondents’ access to the national
highway. Respondents demanded the demolition
of the fence, but petitioner refused.
In her Answer, petitioner averred that
respondents had not established any easement of
right-of-way either by law or agreement. She
claimed that respondents failed to satisfy the
requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code in order to establish an easement of
right-of-way on the northern portion of her property.
Moreover, she alleged that respondents had
another access as ingress and egress to the public
road other than the one traversing her property.
The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to
file an answer; consequently, they were declared in
default.
On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered
a Decision dismissing the complaint. It held that
respondents "were not able to satisfy all the
requisites needed for their claim of an easement of
right of way." It observed that when petitioner
fenced the northern portion of her property,
respondents were able to use another pathway as
ingress and egress to the highway. It stated further
that "the new pathway is more than adequate"5 for
respondents’ use. Thus, the applied easement of
right-of-way on the northern portion of petitioner’s
property was not allowed. The said Decision
became final and executory.
It must be noted that the "new" pathway
used by respondents, however, traversed the
southern portion of petitioner’s property. Sometime
in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this
portion of her lot, which again restricted the use of
respondents’ "new" pathway. Aggrieved and
prejudiced by petitioner’s action, respondents filed
on March 6, 2001 a Motion to Enforce the July 7,
2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the
Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based
on the existence of a new pathway which they had
been using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that
petitioner was prohibited from closing said passage.
On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said
motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was rejected in the trial
court’s June 20, 2001 Order.
Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in
its March 20, 2001 Order, held that the dismissal of
the complaint depended on petitioner’s
representation that she was allowing respondents
to use the southern portion of her property as an
alternative pathway. Since the southern portion
was an "agreed pathway," petitioner could not
reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered
petitioner to remove the fence blocking the
passage.
Hence, we have this petition.
ISSUE:
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Petitioner questions the propriety of the trial court’s
issuance of an order clarifying its final and
executory decision and effectively establishing an
easement on petitioner’s property without proper
adjudication.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.
No Voluntary Easement of Right-of-Way
The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not
determine the legality of an easement of right-of-
way over the pathway located south of petitioner’s
property, nevertheless, concluded that the said
passage was an agreed or voluntary easement of
right-of-way which petitioner should respect.
The trial court was in error.
It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it
becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to
amend, modify, or alter a final judgment and is left
only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
Any amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.
To recapitulate, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033
meant that no easement was ever established on
petitioner’s property. However, the trial court, by
issuing its March 20, 2001 Order directing petitioner
to remove the fence that limited respondents’
passage, effectively created a right-of-way on
petitioner’s property in favor of respondents
allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement
between the parties. This directive was in
contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was
null and void for having been issued outside of the
court’s jurisdiction.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of
voluntary easement of right-of-way, subject of the
assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper,
relevant, and material to the issue of right-of-way as
averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5033, still,
the conclusion that there was an agreed or
voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis.
The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal
any agreement executed by the parties on the
claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the
terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon
by the parties, more particularly, the payment of
the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample
enough to support the conclusion that there was a
verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the
southern portion.1avvphi1
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the
land, any agreement creating it should be drawn
and executed with the same formalities as a deed
to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in writing. No
written instrument on this agreement was adduced
by respondents.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the
assailed March 20, 2001 and June 20, 2001 Orders
are null, void, and without any legal effect.
6. G.R. No. 72908 August 11, 1989
EUFEMIA PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA
SUTERIO and MARILYN SUTERIO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, SALUD SUTERIO and PEDRO MATIAS
FACTS:
Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate
in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land
with buildings and improvements in the Quezon
Province. On May 20, 1946, perfecta’s siblings
Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument
entitled “ Extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero.” In it
they disposed that in according to Perfecta’s
wishes and in consideration of love and affection,
the said property be donated to private
respondent Salud Suterio de Matias, Perfecta’s
niece, who will assume the
encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National
Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same
document, the done accepted the donation in a
public instrument. The instrument was never
registered nor the title transferred to Salud’s name
although she immediately took possession of the
land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the
possession of the land to her mother Juana, who
was then staying with her brother Claudio and his
family. During the period they were occupying the
land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 25,
1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale
conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later,
Claudio had the land registered in his name.
Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On
June 30, 1965, the private respondents Salud and
Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the
reconveyance of the property on the ground that
the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious
and the registration in his name was null and void.
Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by
Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately
concealed from her by her brother and the
defendants.
On April 17,1979, Judge Juan M. Montecillo of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon rendered
judgment upholding the donation to the plaintiff
and annulling the deed of sale and the registration
of the land in favor of Claudio Suterio, Sr. The
defendants were required to reconvey the land to
Salud Suterio even as their counterclaim was
dismissed for lack of evidence. 11 On appeal, the
decision was affirmed in toto. The respondent court
is now sought to be reversed in this petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement
was a donation.
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared
themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of
the property in question. As such, they were free to
give the land to whomever they pleased and for
whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose
to respect Perfecta’s wishes and carry out her
intentions by donating the land to Salud, there was
no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no
question that Felipe and Juana could have simply
disregarded their sister’s sentiments and decided
not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that
they did not do this speaks well of their integrity and
their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-
judicial settlement also reflects their own affection
for Salud which constituted the valid consideration
for their own act of liberality.
ARTICLE 651
1. G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN
and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO
VIUDA DE SAGUN,* respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private
respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda
de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates
situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. ** Petitioner
owns the dominant estate which has an area of
2,590 square meters and bounded on the North by
Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino, on the
south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo
and on the West by Pedro Matienzo. Private
respondents co-own the 405-square-meter servient
estate which is bounded on the North by the
National Highway (Laurel-Talisay Highway), on the
South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by
Mamerto Magsino and on the West by Felipe de
Sagun. In other words, the servient estate stands
between the dominant estate and the national
road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet
enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to
the national highway just crossed the servient
estate at no particular point. However, in 1960
when private respondents constructed a fence
around the servient estate, a roadpath
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter
wide was constituted to provide access to the
highway. One-half meter width of the path was
taken from the servient estate and the other one-
half meter portion was taken from another lot
owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation
was asked and non was given for the portions
constituting the pathway.1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his
plant nursery business on his land where he also had
his abode. He would use said pathway as passage
to the highway for his family and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer
hard work flourished and with that, it became more
and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants
and garden soil to and from the nursery and the
highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984,
petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep
which he could use for transporting his plants.
However, that jeep could not pass through the
roadpath and so he approached the servient
estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena
Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they
sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their
property to be added to the existing pathway so as
to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter
consternation, his request was turned down by the
two widows and further attempts at negotiation
proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 6
(Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of
easement of a right of way over an additional
width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns'
405-square-meter parcel of land.2
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was
called to the existence of another exit to the
highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the
dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower
court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987 and
rejected petitioner's claim for an additional
easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals
opined that the necessity interposed by petitioner
was not compelling enough to justify interference
with the property rights of private respondents. The
Appellate Court took into consideration the
presence of a dried river bed only eighty (80)
meters away from the dominant estate and
conjectured that petitioner might have actually
driven his jeep through the river bed in order to get
to the highway, and that the only reason why he
wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's
estate was that it was more convenient for his
business and family needs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an
additional easement of right of way.
RULING
Yes. While there is a dried river bed less than 100
meters from the dominant tenement, that access is
grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may
44 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no
access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if
there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed
route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For
the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must
literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up.
Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is
impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be
used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make
passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were
no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public
road, it has the right of easement over adjacent
servient estates as a matter of law.
Under Art. 651 of the CC, it is the needs of the
dominant property which ultimately determine the
width of the easement of right of way.
As petitioner’s business grew, so did the need for
the use of modern means of conveyance or
transport. Petitioner should not be denied a
passageway wide enough to accomodate his
jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.
Since the easement to be established in favor of
petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature,
the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused
to the servient estate pursuant to Artcile 649 of the
CC.
2) Quimen v. CA
Facts:
Anastacia Quimen, together with his 3 siblings
(Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina),
inherited a piece of property in Pandi, Bulacan.
Abutting the municipal road. The share of
Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was
designated as Lot No. 1448-B- 1. It is bounded on
the right by the property of Sotero designated as
Lot. No. 1448-B-2. Adjoining Soteros property on the
right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally
owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but
which were later acquired by a certain Catalina
Santos. Located directly behind the lots of
Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother
Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the
latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos.
1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92
square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind
Anastacias Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-
B is behind the property of Sotero, father of
respondent Yolanda.
In February of 1982 Yolanda bought lot no. 1448-b-
6-a from her uncle Antonio through her aunt
Anastacia ( acting as his administratrix). Yolanda
hesitant to purchase the lot because it has no
access to the municipal road. But Anastacia,
according to Yolanda, promised her that Anastacia
that she would give her right of way on her
adjoining propert for 200.00 pesos per square
meter. After that, Yolanda constructed a house on
the lot she bought using as her passageway to the
public highway a portion of Anastacia s property.
When Yolanda offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment and barred Yolanda from passing through
her property.
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of
Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located
directly behind the property of her parents who
provided her a pathway gratis et amore between
their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters
from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of
Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter fence. The store is
made of strong materials and occupies the entire
frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide
and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway
leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for
ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be
reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through
the back entrance and the facade of the store to
reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with
the proper court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia s property. An ocular inspection upon
instruction of the presiding judge was conducted
by the branch clerk of court. The report was that
the proposed right of way was at the extreme right
of Anastacias property facing the public highway,
starting from the back of Soteros sari-sari store and
extending inward by one (1) meter to her property
and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid
the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal
road and the way was unobstructed except for an
avocado tree standing in the middle
TC’s findings: Yolanda’s property was situated at
the back of her father’s property and held that
there existed an available space of about 19m long
which could conveniently serve as a right of way
between the boundary line and the house of
Yolanda’ s father. The vacant space ended at the
left back of the store which was made of strong
materials. Which explained why Yolanda requested
a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an
opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters
long to serve as her right of way to the public
highway.
CA’s finding: The proposed right of way of Yolanda,
which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right
of Anastacia’s property will cause the least
prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of
Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying the
sari-sari store made of strong materials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of way proposed by
Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the
parties.
Held:
Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the
easement of right of way shall be established at the
45 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.”
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement
where the way is shortest and will cause least
prejudice shall be chosen. However, if the two
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way where damage will be least shall be used
even if not the shortest route. This is so
because least prejudice prevails over shortest
distance. This means that the court is not bound to
establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way
may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient
estate, such as when there are constructions or
walls which can be avoided by a round about way,
or to secure the interest of the dominant owner,
such as when the shortest distance would place the
way on a dangerous decline.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code,
respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1)
meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme
right of petitioners property, will cause the least
prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of
Yolanda s father which would mean destroying
the sari-sari store made of strong materials. Absent
any showing that these findings and conclusion are
devoid of factual support in the records, or are so
glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts
them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide
egress to a public highway, and another right of
way which although longer will only require an
avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred.
3) Costabella Corporation v. CA
FACTS:
It is admitted that the Costabella Corp. owns the
real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122
and 5124 of the Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong,
Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. The private
respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of
adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began
the construction of its beach hotel, the private
respondents, in going to and from their respective
properties and the provincial road, passed through
a passageway which traversed the petitioner's
property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the
aforementioned passageway when it began the
construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened
another route across its property through which the
private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to
pass. (Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it
undertook the construction of the second phase of
its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property
thus closing even the alternative passageway and
preventing the private respondents from traversing
any part of it.)
As a direct consequence of these closures, an
action for injunction with damages was filed
against the petitioner by the private respondents on
September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu. In their complaint, the private
respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of the
original passageway which they (private
respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road right
of way" that had been existing before World War II
and since then had been used by them, the
community, and the general public, either as
pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to
and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of
the country. The private respondents averred that
by closing the alleged road right of way in question,
the petitioner had deprived them access to their
properties and caused them damages. In the same
complainant, the private respondents likewise
alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike
on the beach fronting the latter's property without
the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of
the residents and local fishermen, and trapping
debris and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed
that the debris and flotsam that had accumulated
prevented them from using their properties for the
purpose for which they had acquired them.
Petitioner’s contention: petitioner denied the
existence of an ancient road through its property
and counter-averred, among others, that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had permitted the
temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or
passage through, its property by the private
respondents and others by mere tolerance and
purely as an act of neighborliness. It justified the
walling in of its property in view of the need to
insure the safety and security of its hotel and beach
resort, and for the protection of the privacy and
convenience of its hotel patrons and guests. At any
rate, the petitioner alleged, the private respondents
were not entirely dependent on the subject
passageway as they (private respondents) had
another existing and adequate access to the
public road through other properties. With respect
to the dike it allegedly constructed, the petitioner
stated that what it built was a breakwater on the
foreshore land fronting its property and not a dike
as claimed by the private respondents. Moreover,
contrary to the private respondents' accusation,
the said construction had benefited the community
especially the fishermen who used the same as
mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity
of flotsam and debris which had formed on the
private respondents' beach front on the other hand
were but the natural and unavoidable
accumulations on beaches by the action of the
tides and movement of the waves of the sea. The
petitioner's answer then assailed the private
respondents' complaint for its failure to implead as
defendants the owners of the other properties
supposedly traversed by the alleged ancient road
right way, indispensable parties without whom no
final adjudication of the controversy could be
rendered.
Now before us, the petitioner contends that the
decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly
erroneous and not in accord with the provisions of
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements
and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
46 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
The petition is meritorious.
ISSUE:
WON Costabella is obliged to open its properties for
the use of the private respondents.
HELD:
No. Easement of right of way cannot be acquired
by prescription and the respondents were not able
to establish a valid claim of compulsory right.
It is already well-established that an easement of
right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by
prescription. Insofar therefore as
the appellate court adhered to the foregoing
precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after
making the correct pronouncement, the
respondent Appellate Court did not order the
reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal
of the complaint after holding that no easement
had been validly constituted over the petitioner's
property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering the
passageway in issue as a compulsory easement
which the private respondents, as owners of the
"dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner
the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way,
the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the
damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of
the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant
estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way
only after he has established the existence of four
requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovable and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4)
the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the
burden of proving the existence of the foregoing
pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate.
." Hence, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a
public highway, even if the said outlet, for one
reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to
open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For
to justify the imposition of an easement or right of
way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it."
Hence, the private respondents' properties cannot
be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory
easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as
the Appellate Court declared the case to be
proper as a controversy for a compulsory right of
way, this Court is constrained to hold that it was in
error.
Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept,
which date back to the iter, actus, and via of the
Romans. They are demanded by necessity, that is,
to enable owners of isolated estates to make full
use of their properties, which lack of access to
public roads has denied them. Under Article 649 of
the Civil Code, they are compulsory and hence,
legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the
concurrence of the other conditions above-
referred to.
But while a right of way is legally demandable, the
owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to
impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under
Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon
two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the
servient state; and (2) where the distance to a
public highway may be the shortest. According,
however, to one commentator, "least prejudice"
prevails over "shortest distance." Yet, each case
must be weighed according to its individual merits,
and judged according to the sound discretion of
the court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound
to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may
be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constructions or
walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way,
or to secure the interest of the dominant owner,
such as when the shortest distance would place the
way on a dangerous decline."
4) National Irrigation Administration v. CA
Facts:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land,
situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in
the name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered
under OCT No. P-24814. The land was granted
subject to the following proviso expressly stated in
the title:
"... that it shall not be subject to any encumbrance
whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association
or partnership except with the consent of the
grantee and the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for
educational, religious or charitable purposes or for
a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions
and public easements and servitudes recognized
and prescribed by law especially those mentioned
in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, and the
right of the Government to administer and protect
the timber found thereon for a term of five (5) years
from the date of this patent, provided, however,
that the grantee or heirs may cut and utilize such
timber for his or their personal use (underscoring
ours)."
47 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the
lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale. On
July 18, 1974, the land was registered in Dick
Manglapus' name under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-26658 of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Cagayan.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in
Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA
then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and
made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed
a complaint for damages against NIA.
ISSUE:
Whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just
compensation for the taking of a portion of his
property for use as easement of a right of way.
Held:
When a land, originally public land is awarded to a
provate individual, a legal easement may be
constituted and thus no just compensation is
required. It would be otherwise if the land were
originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part
thereof for public use as an easement of a right of
way.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a
reservation. It states that title to the land shall be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land
Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as
those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and
subject, further to such conditions contained in the
original title as may be subsisting."
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a
reservation and condition that the land is subject to
"to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law
especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110,
111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended." This reservation, unlike the other
provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by
any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides
that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot
exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works..."
We note that the canal NIA constructed was only
eleven (11) meters in width. This is well within the
limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no
cause to complain.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that,
"Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and
the latter voluntary easements." In the present case,
we find and declare that a legal easement of a
right-of-way exists in favor of the government.
The land was originally public land, and awarded
to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling
would be otherwise if the land were originally
private property, in which case, just compensation
must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for
public use as an easement of a right of way.
5) Floro vs. Llenado
Facts:
Simeon Floro owned a piece of land known
as “Floro Park Subdivision” situated in Barangay
Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It has its own
egress and ingress to and from the McArthur
Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR
level crossing. Orlando A. Llenado, on the other
hand, was the registered owner of two parcels of
land known as the “Llenado Homes”. Prior to its
purchase by Llenado from Francisco de Castro, the
land was known as the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision, duly licensed and registered subdivision
in the name of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the
South by Palanas Creek, which separates it from the
Floro Park subdivision, and on the west by ricelands
belonging to Marcial Ipapo, Montaos and
Guevarra, the Llenado Homes does not have
existing road or passage to McArthur Highway.
However, a proposed access road traversing the
idle Riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically
provided in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel
Homes, which was duly approved by the defunct
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission.
Llenados were permitted by Floros to use
Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park as a passage to
and from McArthur Highway. However, Floro
discovered grave damage to the lots in question
from the passage of heavy machinery and later
barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden
posts and adobe stones, preventing its use by
Llenado. Llenado filed a complaint for easement of
Right of Way. During pendency of case, Orlando
Llenado died and was substituted by his wife,
Wenifreda
On October 16, 1984, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued.
On appeal by Llenado, the appellate court set
aside the decision of the trial court in a
decision 12 promulgated on February 11, 1986
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is an easement of right
of way?
2. W/N they are entitled to compulsory
servitude of right of way?
Held:
A legal easement cannot arise merely for the
convenience of the dominant estate. The owner
must prove that the easement is absolutely
necessary and least restrictive on the servient
estate.
48 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
1.) It is not disputed that Floro granted the Llenados
verbal permission to pass through Floro Park. No
such contract of easement of right of way was
perfected. Citing Dionisio v Ortiz, the use of Road
Lot 4 and 5 by Llenados during the month of March
was by mere tolerance of Floro pending the
negotiation of the terms and conditions of the right
of way. Although such use was in anticipation of a
voluntary easement of right of way, no such
contract as validly entered into by reason of the
failure of the parties to agree on its terms and
conditions. Thus, Llenados cannot claim entitlement
to a right of way through Floro Park on the basis of
voluntary easement.
2.) Preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of NCC:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway
b. After payment of proper indemnity
c. That the isolation was not due to acts of
proprietor of the dominant estate
d. The right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate
The burden of proving these pre-conditions lies on
the owner of the dominant estate.
First precondition is not met since there is an
existing right of way over the Ipapo Property.
Payment of proper indemnity was also not proven
since there the complaint by Llenado did not
contain fixing of amount that he must pay to Floro
in the event the easement of right of way be
constituted. Also, third requisite has not been met.
Moreover, in order to justify the imposition of
the servitude of right of way, there must be a real,
not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by lawas the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
servitude, the same should not be imposed. This
easement can also be established foe the benefit
of tenement with an inadequate outlet, but not
when outlet is merely inconvenient.
The court ruled time and again that one may not
claim a legal easement merely out of
convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to
abandon the Ipapo access road development and
pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He
was stacking the cards in his favor to the
unnecessary detriment of his neighbor. The court
refused to countenance his behavior.
Article 656
1) Valderrama v. North Negros Sugar Co.
Facts:
Hacienda owners, who were up to that time
customers of the central, could not furnish sufficient
cane for milling, as required by the capacity of said
central, the defendant made other milling
contracts with various hacienda owners of Cadiz,
Occidental Negros, in order to obtain sufficient
cane to sustain the central; and this gave rise to the
plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that the
easement of way, which each of them has
established in his respective hacienda, was only for
the transportation through each hacienda of the
sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the
defendant maintains that it had the right to
transport to its central upon the railroad passing
through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the
sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also
that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros.
The plaintiffs prayed the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros to pronounce judgment,
holding that the defendant had no right, under the
easement or otherwise, to cause its locomotives
and wagons to run across the estates of the
plaintiffs for the purpose of transporting sugar cane
of any agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
The defendant answered the amended
complaints, admitting some allegations thereof and
denying others. And as special defense, it alleged
that the plaintiffs respectively granted the
defendant, for the period of fifty years from the
date of the aforesaid contracts, an easement of
way 7 meters wide upon the lands of the plaintiffs
for the construction and operation of a railroad for
the transportation of sugar cane; that said
easement of way was established without any
restriction whatsoever, as regards the ownership of
the cane to be transported over the said railroad;
that said contract was then in full force and effect
and had never been annulled or modified.
After hearing the three cases, the trial court
entered one single judgment for all of them,
holding that the defendant had no right to pass
through the lands of the plaintiffs described in their
amended complaints for the transportation of sugar
cane not grown from any of the haciendas of the
plaintiffs. From this judgment, the defendant
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established
was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from
the hacienda owners’ lands.
HELD:
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda
owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the
period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege
ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of
sugar cane which they did not produce which is
contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is
clear that the easement was established for the
49 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S
benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it
is the intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent,
continuous easement of way in favor of the
corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the
contract that it is only limited to canes produced by
the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that
things serve their owner by reason of ownership and
not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot
limit its use for there is nothing in the contract
prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it
more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art.
543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in
repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or
deposit excavations outside the granted 7 meters.
This does not happen in this case when the North
Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing
the servient estates, since it continues to occupy
the same area and the encumbrance is still the
same regardless of the number of times it passes
through the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the
period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners
no longer desire to furnish the central canes for
milling, the North Negros still has the right to the
easement for the remaining period so the
contention that it should be limited to the canes
produced by the owners has no basis.
Article 676
Parungganan vs. Paredes
FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential
lot adjacent to and bounded on the north by the
lot of Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to
an easement of drainage in favor of Paredes
annotated in the Decree of registration, which read
in part:
That the oppositor (Felisa Paredes) withdraws her
opposition to the registration of the lots Nos. 1 and 2
of the applicant, and in compensation to said
withdrawal by the oppositor of her opposition, the
applicant agrees to respect an easement or
servitude over a portion of the lots Nos. 1 and 2
which is EIGHT AND ONE HALF (8-½) meters in length
commencing from point 4 of Lot No. 2 and
stretching towards Lot No. 1 going Eastward, and
the width is ONE (1) meter, in order that the rain
water coming from the roofing of a house to be
constructed by the oppositor over the ruins of her
brick wall now standing along the Northeastern
boundary of Lot 1 shall fall into the land of the
applicant.
March 1951, the defendants-appellants
constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1
and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in such a manner that
the southern side of their house is exactly on the
brick wall, the southern side of which is the
demarcation line between the plaintiff-appellee
and the defendants-appellants, demolishing said
brick wall and built thereon the southern wall of
their house with 3 windows. The house constructed
by the defendants-appellants is 2-½ meters longer
than the length of roofing allowed in the above
quoted Decree of Registration, and has an outer
roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the
property of the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meters
wider than that allowed in the same Decree of
Registration, and the rain water from the GI roofing
falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the
plaintiff-appellee. The defendants-appellants also
placed 3 windows each on the first and second
floors of their house on the side facing Lots 1 and 2
of plaintiff-appellee. From the time the defendants-
appellants started to construct their house, the
plaintiff-appellee has repeatedly and continuously
been demanding from the defendants-appellants
that the construction of their house be in
accordance with the easement, but the
defendants-appellants refused to observe the
easement and to close their windows. They also
prohibited the plaintiff-appellee from constructing a
party wall between points 1 and 2 of Lot 2 and
between points 2 and 3 and 4 of Lot 1.
Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from
proceeding with the construction of the roof, which
exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in a
summary proceeding decided in favor of
Purugganan.
Summary judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants:
(a) Ordering the defendants to reconstruct the roof
and eaves of their house on the southern side now
existing on their lot such that the falling water shall
not fall on curve into the lots of the plaintiff beyond
one meter from the boundary line and by 8-½
meters in length and to remove the said protruding
eaves and roof;
(b) Ordering the herein defendants to reconstruct
the wall of their house on the southern side either by
placing in two meters north of the boundary line if
they desired their windows on the first and second
floors to continue to exist, or to permanently close
the three windows on the second floor and such
other openings or apertures facing the lot of the
plaintiff;
(c) Ordering the defendants to comply with what is
ordered above in Pars. (a) and (b) within sixty (60)
days from the finality of this judgment. Upon their
failure to do so the Provincial Sheriff of Abra is
50 | A r t i c l e 6 1 3 – A r t i c l e 6 5 6 – E A S E M E N T S o r S E R V I T U D E S

hereby authorized to implement this judgment and
execute the acts mentioned in Pars. (a) and (b)
hereof, at the expense of the defendants:
(d) Enjoining perpetually the herein defendants
from prohibiting the plaintiff from making such legal
and lawful constructions on his lots up to the
boundary between plaintiff's lot and defendants'
lot, provided always that such construction in
whatever form, as a firewall, fence, etc., shall not
violate the casement of drainage in favor of the
defendants, and to conform with the provisions of
Art. 675 of the New Civil Code; and
(e) Ordering the defendants from further
encroaching into plaintiff's lots and molesting the
said plaintiff in the lawful exercise of dominion over
his own property.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
drainage is annotated on his Certificate of Title,
subject to prescribed distances. But what
defendants-appellants have advanced as factual
issues are: (1) that they have not violated the
prescribed distances of the easement of drainage;
and (2) that the easement of light and view was in
existence since time imemorial. The first factual issue
was resolved by the report submitted by the
commissioner to which defendants-appellants have
given their conformity. The second factual issue is
immaterial to the disposition of the case because
the servient estate was registered in 1951 without
the easement of light and view being annotated
on the title. Since the supposed easement of light
and view is not annotated on the title, it becomes
immaterial whether such easement existed since
time immemorial. On this point, there is no need to
have a trial on the merits and a summary judgment
would appear to be in order.

Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to

the measure of the roofing?

HELD: No.

In an easement of receiving rainwater, the

distances prescribed in the decree of registration
should not correspond to the width and length of
the roof of the house but on the distance of the
rainwater falling inside the land of the servient
estate.

Paredes have made a mistake in applying the

distances prescribed in the decree of registration to
the roofing of their house. They failed to
comprehend the meaning of the phrase
“servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados”
constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated,
it means the easement of receiving water falling
from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed
on the land of Purugganan because the
encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain water
falling inside the property of Purugganan. The report
submitted by the court-appointed commissioner
clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the
dimension allowed in the decree of registration.

Defendants-appellants argued that the summary

judgment of the lower court has no legal basis.
Summary judgment is employed as a method of
disposing a case when the pleadings, depositions,
admission and affidavits filed by the parties show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law (Section 3 of Rule 34). In the case
at bar the plaintiff-appellee's right to the reliefs
sought is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the easement of drainage and of light
and view of favor of the defendants-appellants as
well as on the conditions attached to such
easements. There is no dispute that plaintiff-
appellee's property was registered in 1951 under
the Torrens System and that only the easement of