Gloria v Gloria v. De Guzman, Jr. GR No. 116183, 6 October 1995 position even if the position existed.
position even if the position existed. At any rate, a mere "designation" does not confer upon the
Facts: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA). Under the PD creating it, the Board of Trustees (BOT) is w/ authority to appoint
officials & employees of the college, except the members of the BOT themselves & the
President of the College. In line w/ this, the BOT issued a resolution in 1991 w/c declared that
all faculty/administrative employees are also subject to the required civil service eligibilities.
Thus, private respondents were issued only temporary appointments because at the time of their
appointments, they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the
necessary qualification standards for their respective positions. The temporary appointments
were good & renewable only up to 1992. Private respondent Cerillo was issue a 1-year
temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II which is until December 31, 1992.
However, on March 24, 1992, she was relieved as Board Secretary by reason of loss of
confidence & designated as Coordinatior for extension Services. Subsequently, when the
PAFCA was converted into a state college, the OIC of the BOT informed private respondents
that they shall be deemed separated from the service upon the expiration of their temporary
appointments. After the lapse of their temporary appointments, private respondents filed a
petition for mandamus & reinstatement praying that the DECS Secretary complete the filling
up positions for BOT & order said board to reinstate the respondents in the case at bench to
their respective positions.
Issue: Whether a mandamus will lie to compel reinstatement of private respondents to their
positions
Held: No. The judgment of respondent Judge which orders the reinstatement of Cerillo to the
position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it finds no
support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily extended an
appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of confidence. This
dismissal was neither contested nor appealed from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question,
therefore, that her dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition
for mandamus and reinstatement filed before respondent Judge. The fact is that private
respondent's assignment as "Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere designation. Not
being a permanent appointment, the designation of the position cannot be the subject of a case
for reinstatement. Furthermore, even granting that Cerillo could be validly reinstated as
"Coordinator for Extension Services," her reinstatement thereto would not be possible because
the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not have made any valid
appointment for this inexistent position. This could very well be the reason why she was merely
designated as Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could not have acquired any right to the
designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an acting capacity
only. The fact that Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination
of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition
of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the
appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training,
seniority, and, more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the
confidence and trust of the appointing power. As We said earlier, the position of Board
Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as it does "not only confidence in
the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state."
In other words, the choice of an appointee from among those who possessed the required
qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom,
convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the Head of the
office concerned. Reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an act which is
discretionary on the part of the appointing power. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an
application for a writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment
which is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled,
not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority.
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs Intermediate Appellate Court (140 SCRA 22 –
Law on Public Officers – Ad Interim Appointment)
Facts: In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-
President for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Esteban’s
appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM Board of Regents was not
in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later discovered that his name
was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested
Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor
III instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case
before the Civil Service Commission where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court
reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.
HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term
“ad interim” as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to “temporary”. In this
jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the
landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:
…an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An
ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional
period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment
which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued. In other words,
if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board
issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to
issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until
the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee’s term is converted into the regular
term inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board
of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was
made to believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended
but only as an extension of temporary appointment.
Marohombsar v. Alonto February 25, 1991
 FACTS: •Mar. 22, 1988: Dr. Emily M. Marohombsar was designated as OIC
of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of
Mindanao State University (MSU) Marawi Campus in a concurrent capacity
with her position then as VP for External Studies.
 •Jan. 2, 1989: The Office of the Vice-President for External Studies was
merged with the OVCAA and, as such, the functions of the former were to be
exercised by the latter.
 •Dr. Marohombsar was appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic
Affairs on the same day.
• May 16, 1989: The Board of Regents of the MSU thru Resolution
No. 59, s. 1989, approved her appointment as acting Vice-
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
 "RESOLVED, that upon recommendation of the President of the University of
the Executive Committee of the Board of Regents the following Special
Orders as amended/corrected are hereby confirmed:
 A. DESIGNATIONS
 A1. Major designations xxx
 9) Special Order No. 10-P, S. 1989, designating Prof. Emily M.
Marohombsar as Acting Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, MSU Marawi
Campus, with an honorarium in accordance with the approved policies of the
University, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations, effective
January 2, 1989 and shall remain in force until revoked or amended by
competent authority.'"
• May 14, 1990: Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU President, wrote Dr.
Marohombsar informing her that he has decided to tap her talent
for the MSU system as Vice-President for Academic Affairs which
position is under his administrative staff.
• Same date: Dr. Marohombsar answered that she cannot accept
the position since she has already started several projects in the
OVCAA which she wants to see through.
• May 16, 1990: Pres. Alonto designated Professor Macacuna
Moslem as Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs but the latter did
not accept the designation.
• May 28, 1990: Pres. Alonto issued Special Order No. 158-P
designating Professor Corazon Batara as OIC of the OVCAA.
• Dr. Marohombsar now comes to SC assailing her removal as Vice-
Chancellor by President Alonto.
 ISSUE + RULING: Whether or not Dr. Emily M. Marohombsar, who was
appointed Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs of the MSU Marawi
Campus by MSU President Ahmad Alonto, may be removed from office even
without cause?
 (NO)
 • Marohombsar: Her appointment being permanent, she can be
removed only after hearing and for cause.
• SC: Permanent Appointment. Her appointment as Acting Vice-
Chancellor for Academic Affairs was couched in temporary terms.
However, it should have been an ad interim appointment since
both the security of tenure of the occupant and the needs of the
new office called for the ad interim appointment when the Vice-
Presidency for External Studies was abolished and its functions
were merged with the Vice-Chancellorship for Academic Affairs.
Pres. Alonto cannot use the device of an ambiguous designation
to go around the security of tenure principle.
 ACTING APPOINTMENTS
• CAB: The special order confirmed by the Board of Regents
specifically designated Marohombsar as Acting Vice Chancellor
for Academic Affairs.
• A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially
temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such
appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or
cause. (Austria v. Amante).
 A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity extended and
received without any protest or reservation and who acts thereunder for a
considerable time cannot later be heard to say that the appointment was, in
reality, permanent and therefore there can be no removal except for cause.
(Cabiling v. Pabualan)
• RATIO FOR ACTING APPOINTMENTS: The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until a permanent
appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen. (Austria
v. Amante)
• EXTENT: The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the
claims of the appointee to a lengthy tenure but also defines the
authority of the appointing power.
• A public officer appointed in an acting capacity cannot claim that
the appointment shall in time ripen into a permanent one.
HOWEVER, neither can the appointing power use the principle of
temporary appointments to evade or avoid the security of tenure
principle in the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.
 This is similar to the rule that the head of an office cannot arbitrarily convert
permanent positions to primarily confidential items so that he can more
freely fire and hire or rehire subordinates at his personal discretion.
 o It is the nature of the functions attached to a position, not the
nomenclature or title given by the appointing authority which determines its
primarily confidential nature. (Piñero v. Hechanova) • For the same
reason, the Court may inquire into the true nature of an "acting" appointment
to determine whether or not it is used as a device to circumvent the security
of tenure principle.
• CAB: There was circumvention of the security of tenure principle.
The intent to make Marohombsar serve at the pleasure of the
MSU President is obvious.
 Marohombsar is a career official of MSU for over 27 years. She was VP for
External Studies since 1982. On Mar. 22, 1988, she was given an additional
assignment as OIC of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs
concurrently with the permanent position as VP for External Studies.
 About 9 mos. later, the Vice-Presidency for External Studies was "merged"
with the Vice-Chancellorship for Academic Affairs. At the same time,
Marohombsar was appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
 The effect was to abolish Marohombsar's permanent office and give her a
temporary appointment in the supposedly new office which replaced or
absorbed the former office. Another result was the loss by Marohombsar of
her permanent status.
 AD-INTERIM APPOINTMENT
• There are reasons which indicate that maneuverings by the
President cannot be characterized as bona fide.
• The power to designate is vested in the MSU President pursuant
to Sec. 40.5 (par. 22) Art. 4 of the Code of Governance of the
MSU.
 Must be less than 1 year.
 Must be reported to the Board of Regents at the next regular meeting.
 After the meeting, another designation must be issued if no permanent
appointment was made.
 The earlier designation becomes void as the Board is expected to fill the item
permanently, not merely leaving it temporarily occupied.
• The power to appoint is vested in the Board of Regents (on the
recommendation of the President of the University) pursuant to
MSU Charter, RA 1387.
• If the President merely designates, the Board of Regents does not
confirm the designation. Since it is only for the information of the
Board, the President's action should be merely "noted."
• When the Board of Regents confirmed the appointment of
Marohombsar on May 16, 1989, it was acting on an ad interim
appointment effected by the President.
 If it was a mere designation, it needs no confirmation. The fact that
confirmation was needed shows that it is an ad interim one.
 AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT: one made during the time when the appointing
or confirming body is not in session and there is an existing clear and present
urgency caused by an impending obstruction or paralyzation of the functions
assigned to the office if no immediate appointment is made. (Rodriguez, Jr.
v. Quirino)
• CAB: When the Vice-Presidency for External Studies was
abolished and its functions were merged with the Vice-
Chancellorship for Academic Affairs, both the security of tenure
of the occupant and the needs of the new office called for the ad
interim appointment.
• Pres. Alonto cannot use the device of an ambiguous designation
to go around the security of tenure principle. Under the MSU
Code, a designation requires a fixed period of not less than one
year. The appointment given to Marohombsar was indefinite.
She would serve at the pleasure of the MSU President who is not
even the head of the institution because the head is the Board of
Regents.
• The intent to convert permanent items into temporary ones is
apparent. Practically, all top officers below the President were
converted into positions where the occupants serve at the
pleasure of the President and presumably, the Board of Regents.
 On whether the permanent item of Marohombsar is Professor VI
• Alonto: Marohombsar's designation as Acting VCAA cannot be
deemed a regular or permanent appointment because the
anomalous situation of one permanently appointed to 2 public
positions (Professor VI and VC) simultaneously would arise.
• SC: No merit. The fact that Professor Marohombsar has a
permanent appointment as Professor does not detract from the
permanent nature of her present appointment as Vice-
Chancellor, especially since the same was duly confirmed by the
MSU Board of Regents. The only difference is that her position as
Vice-Chancellor has a fixed term while that of Professor Tapales
was until he retired or resigned.
• Tapales v. President and BOR of UP: UP Deans and Directors
enjoy security of tenure and any attempt to remove them by
limiting their terms of office from permanent to a 5 year term is
unconstitutional.
 Deans and Directors are selected from faculty members. An appointment as
Professor is also needed for salary rating purposes but does not detract from
the permanent nature of the administrative position
 DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Marohombsar shall remain as the lawful
occupant in a permanent capacity of the position of Vice-Chancellor for
Academic Affairs of MSU, Marawi until the end of her three-year term or her
tenure is otherwise lawfully terminated.
• The motion to cite Alonto for contempt is DENIED but Alonto is
admonished to faithfully heed court orders in the future.
Matibag v. Benipayo 380 SCRA 49 Ponente: Justice Carpio
Facts : The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the “Acting Director IV” of the
EID. Some time after, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein
as Comelec Chairman and Comelec Commissioners. The Office of the President
submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the respondents for confirmation.
However, the commissions did not act on said appointments. Once more, President
Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments for the respondents and made them
took their oaths for the second time. Again, the Office transmitted their appointments
to the Commission for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission
could act on their appointments. Thus, the President renewed against the ad interim
appointments of the respondents to the same positions. The Office submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission. They took their oaths of office
anew. In his capacity as Comelec Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum
addressed to petitioner to be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner asked
for a reconsidered of her reassignment but was denied of it. Hence, the petition
herein questioning the validity of the appointment of the respondents.
Issue : (1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is a temporary
appointment that is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution (2)
Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or not the renewal of the
ad interim appointments of the respondents is a violation of Section 1 (2), Article IX-
C of the Constitution
Held : (1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution uses the word “effective only until.”
Padilla v Civil Service Commission
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated January 22, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals affirming (1) Resolution No. 980256[2] dated February 5, 1998
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing petitioner Remedios Padillas appeal
and (2) Resolution No. 981425[3] dated June 10, 1998 of CSC denying her motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts, as found by respondent CSC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, follow.
On January 18, 1982, petitioner Remedios Padilla assumed the permanent position
of Clerk II in the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. On May 11, 1983,
petitioner was promoted to the position of Labor Development Assistant. Without
waiting for the CSCs approval of her appointment, she assumed her new position.
On March 4, 1985, CSC-NCR Regional Director Aurora de Leon sent a 1st
Indorsement to the Minister of Labor and Employment disapproving petitioners
appointment as Labor Development Assistant on the ground that she failed to meet
the eligibility requirement for the position. Maria Esther Manigque, Officer-In-
Charge of the Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, sought reconsideration of
respondent CSCs ruling by pointing out petitioners satisfactory performance. It was
denied. In May 1985, petitioner resigned from the service citing personal reasons.
On July 28, 1985, petitioner took the Career Service Examination (Professional
Level). After passing the same in August, 1985, she re-applied at the respondent
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). She was appointed as Casual
Research Assistant on October 17, 1988, effective until November 30, 1988. Upon
expiration of her appointment, the same was extended to December 31, 1988. From
January 1989 until December 1989, petitioner occupied the position of Casual
Technical.
Due to the implementation of RA 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Act of 1989, casual items such as Casual Research Assistant and
Casual Technical were abolished. Petitioner was offered the position of Clerk II (the
only available permanent position then) for which the Selection Board deemed her
qualified. However, she declined the offer.
On January 2, 1990, petitioner was appointed Casual Clerk III, effective till the end of
June 1990. After the expiration of her appointment as a casual employee, petitioner
was no longer given any position. She then requested the monetary conversion of
her unused sick and vacation leaves which respondent DOLE granted.
Nevertheless, petitioner appealed her alleged termination as casual employee to
the CSC but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. [4]
Thereafter, petitioner filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Secretary of Justice
Teofisto Guingona. The letter-complaint was forwarded to respondent DOLE and
later to the CSC for appropriate action. Acting on the complaint, the CSC treated the
same as a petition to seek relief. In its Resolution No. 980256 dated February 5,
1998, the CSC dismissed the petition and denied petitioners claim. Her motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in CSC Resolution No. 981425 dated June 10,
1998.
Petitioner appealed the CSC resolutions to the Court of Appeals. On January 22,
2001, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and accordingly
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Resolution No. 98-0256 dated
February 5, 1998 issued by the Civil Service Commission dismissing the petitioners
appeal, as well as its Resolution No. 981425 dated June 10, 1998, is (sic) AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals held that the CSC had the power to revoke the appointment of
a public officer whose qualification did not meet the minimum requirements of the
law. To refute petitioners contention that respondent DOLE was obliged to give her
a permanent position upon becoming eligible, the appellate court ruled that,
although the petitioner was a civil service eligible, her acceptance of a temporary
appointment as a casual vested her no right to security of tenure. Her appointment
depended exclusively on the pleasure of the appointing authority.[6]
On July 4, 2001, the appellate court issued a resolution[7] denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal based on the following assignments of error:
I-WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER IS LEGAL.
II-WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF HER COMPLAINT BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.[8]
Petitioner does not question anymore the disapproval of her appointment as Labor
Development Assistant due to her failure to meet the eligibility requirements.
However, she invokes her alleged right to be reinstated to a permanent position
considering that she has since attained the required civil service eligibility and that
she used to hold a permanent position. Petitioner bewails the fact that she ended
up as a casual employee despite her civil service eligibility and without any
derogatory record during her stint in the government. To support her claim, she
cites Section 24 (d) of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Law of 1975,
which states that (a)ny person who has been permanently appointed to a position in
the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been
separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he
is qualified.
She also contends that she was not accorded due process when she was removed
from her permanent position without prior notice. Neither was she given an
opportunity to explain why she should not be removed from office.
Did respondent DOLE violate petitioners purported right to security of tenure? We
do not think so.
The jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.[9] The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal.[10] We have good reason to apply this well-entrenched principle in the
instant case because the factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirm the findings
of fact of the CSC.
One of the exceptions to the rule is when the appellate courts factual disquisitions
are not supported by evidence.[11] In the case at bar, petitioner seeks
reinstatement on the ground that she was unjustly removed from the service, which
was contrary to the appellate courts finding that she voluntarily resigned.
Considering that petitioners submission was premised on an alleged
misapprehension of facts, she had the burden of showing that the CSC and the
appellate courts findings of fact were not supported by evidence.[12] However, she
fell short of that responsibility and ended up with hollow claims.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondents CSC and DOLE, adequately proved that petitioner voluntarily resigned
and was never removed from the service. The OSG presented as evidence
petitioners own letter in 1990 addressed to Sec. Flerida Ruth Romero,[13] then
Special Assistant to the President and Presidential Legislative Liaison Officer, which
read:
In 1985, The Civil Service Commission (CSC) disapproved my appointment because
the qualification standard for the position of Labor Development Assistant was
raised from sub-professional to professional level. Despite my best effort to appeal
before the Civil Service Commission, I never got a favorable response. I was hurt so
much that I decided to resign in April 1985.[14] (underlining supplied)
Petitioner used to occupy the permanent position of Clerk II before the disapproval
of her appointment for Labor Development Assistant, a higher permanent position.
Thereafter, she voluntarily resigned and later came back to occupy casual positions
only despite passing the eligibility requirement for a permanent position. Like
removal for just cause, voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present
and future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-related
ties between the employer and the employee. When she returned to work for
respondent DOLE, the same was not a continuation of her previous service but the
start of a new work slate. Petitioner could not therefore demand from respondent
DOLE her reinstatement to a permanent position under Section 24 (d) of PD 807
inasmuch as she was never unjustly removed.
We agree with the observation of the OSG that when petitioner re-applied for and
was offered the position of Casual Research Assistant and later Casual Technical, she
readily and unqualifiedly accepted the said offer. Having accepted the position of a
casual employee, petitioner should have known that she had no security of tenure
and could thus be separated from the service anytime.
We also take note of the fact that in December 1989, after finishing her contract as
a Casual Technical, respondent DOLE offered to petitioner the permanent position
of Clerk II (the only available permanent position then) for which the Selection
Board deemed her qualified. However, she declined the offer and instead opted to
accept another casual position as Casual Clerk III. Respondent DOLE therefore gave
her the opportunity to re-assume a permanent position but petitioner was
apparently bent on acquiring a position equal to a Labor Development Assistant, a
position she could not obtain by right due to her earlier resignation. On the ground
of estoppel, petitioner is barred from asserting her right to a permanent position.
Not having been unjustly removed from the service, it follows that petitioners right
to due process was not violated. In fact, there was no need to furnish her a notice of
termination since, as a casual employee, petitioner was aware of the date of
expiration of her temporary appointment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Civil Service Commission v Dela Cruz
FACTS: Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air TransportationOffice, he was
a Check Pilot II. He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation
Officer of the Aviation Safety Division.His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying
he did not meet the 4 yrmanagerial & supervisory qualification for the position.CSC-
NCR upheld the protest and recalled the approval of the appointment of Dela
Cruz.Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo, CSC reversed itself and approved
theappointment. (decision of the CSC kept changing)CA approved the appointment.
He has the required qualifications “planning,organizing, directing, coordinating and
supervising the enforcement of airsafety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to
licensing, rating and checkingof all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the
activities of flying schools.
HELD:The requirement is 4 yrs of work in managerial position AND/ORsupervisory
position.“or” – either the 1st clause or 2nd clause may be applied.Dela Cruz had
excellent credentials and a “proven excellent performance.”Every particular job
has:3.formal – age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminarsattended,
etc. and4.informal qualifications – resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,initiative,
loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interestof the service.Even if the
law stated “&”,the Court held that he has “substantially complied”3 yrs & 8mos
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA
FACTS:Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in theOffice of
Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary promotionalappointment as
Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC approved thetemporary appointment.New
OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment, ground: Not CareerExecutive
Service Eligible.CSC diaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was also
noteligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid backwages until
theexpiration of his 1 yr temporary appointment.CA reinstated Darangina.
ISSUE/S:Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
HELD:CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages,only salary
from appointment until termination. With the expiration of histerm upon his
replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term to beserved.Administrative Code
of 1987Book VTitle ISubtitle AChapter 5Section 27. Employment Status. –
Appointment in the career service shall bepermanent or temporary.(1)Permanent
Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a personwho meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is beingappointed, including appropriate
eligibility prescribed, in accordance withthe provisions of law, rules and standards
promulgated in pursuancethereof.(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of
eligible persons and itbecomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a
tempappointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirementsfor the
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civilservice eligibility:
Provided, that such temporary appointment shall notexceed 12 mos., but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualifiedcivil service eligible becomes
available.
Corpuz v Court of Appeals
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner Atty. David Corpuz (hereafter CORPUZ) asks us to set aside the 13 October
1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP-No. 37694[1] which reversed
Resolution No. 93-5964 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),[2] the latter declaring
that petitioners separation from the service as Attorney V in the Movie Television
Review Board (MTRCB) was not in order and directed that he be automatically
restored to his position.
The pleadings of the parties, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution
of the CSC disclose the following facts:
On 18 July 1986, CORPUZ was appointed as the MTRCBs legal Counsel -- Prosecutor
and Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer).[3] The appointment was
approved by Asst. Regional Director Benita Santos of the CSC-National Capital Region.
Subsequently, CORPUZ position was designated Attorney V under the Salary
Standardization Law.
As MTRCB Legal Counsel, CORPUZ duties included attendance in Board meetings
pursuant to then Chairman Moratos memorandum of 11 September 1987.[4]
Sometime in August 1991, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91[5]
entitled An Act To Declare The Appointments Of The Administrative And Subordinate
Employees Of This Board As Null And Void. This undated resolution noted that the
past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the
appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before
forwarding them to the CSC, in violation of Section 5 of P.D. No. 876-A, and later, P.D.
No. 1986.[6] It thus declared:
FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING, this Board, in Session Assembled, hereby declare[s] that
ALL the appointments of the present administrative and subordinate employees of
this Board suffers [sic] from illegality and therefore [are] considered invalid and of no
value and effect ab initio.
IT IS THEREFORE RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED BY THIS BOARD, that the
Chairman recommend to this Board, the appointment of all or some of the present
administrative and subordinate employees of this Board, or new ones, at his initiative,
discretion and preference, including the category of the position for which the
appointees [are] recommended, within a period of ONE MONTH from the approval of
this Resolution;
IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED, that in the interregnum, and in order not to disrupt the
workings and functions of this Board while this body is awaiting for [sic] the
recommendation of the appointments of the old and or new appointees, the present
administrative and subordinate employees shall hold on [to] their position[s] in an
[sic] holdover capacity.
As certified by MTRCB Secretary Vicente G. Sales,[7] Resolution No. 8-1-91 was filed
in his office on 1 August 1991, while Resolution No. 10-2-91, a mere reiteration of
Resolution No. 8-1-91, was approved by the MTRCB en banc on 9 October 1991. No
copy of Resolution No. 10-2-91, however, was found in the records.
CORPUZ was unaware of the promulgation of Resolution No. 8-1-91 as he was then
on leave. The Resolution was likewise kept secret and it was only on 12 March 1993
that an announcement[8] of its contents was posted by an Ad Hoc Committee on the
MTRCB bulletin board. This announcement invited the submission of any information
concerning the appointments involved therein to the Committee. It appears,
however, that nothing was immediately done to implement Resolution No. 8-1-91.
On 14 July 1992, Henrietta S. Mendez was appointed MTRCB Chairman. Thereafter,
new members of the Board were likewise appointed with Mendez assuming office in
August 1992.
At the MTRCB meeting of 19 January 1993, Mendez was informed about Resolution
No. 8-1-91. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members was then
constituted to look into the appointments extended by former Chairman Morato, as
well as the qualifications of the appointees. The Committee then posted on the
MTRCB bulletin board the 12 March 1993 announcement mentioned above.
Thereafter, the Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the
appointments, except that of CORPUZ and seven others.
In a Memorandum[9] dated 28 June 1993, Mendez informed CORPUZ that at the
MTRCB regular meeting of 25 June 1993, his appointment was disapproved effective
30 June 1993. None of the parties attached to their pleadings a copy of the MTRCB
Resolution disapproving the appointment.
On 27 July 1993, CORPUZ and one Larry Rigor filed a complaint with the CSC
requesting a formal investigation and hearing. In her comment to the complaint,
Mendez stated that she discovered that the appointments extended by Morato were
not submitted to the MTRCB for approval pursuant to Section 5(c) of P.D. No. 1986;
hence to cure the defect, she submitted the appointments to the MTRCB.
On 31 August 1993, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 93-3509 granting the MTRCB
authority to fill up positions vacated in the agency due to appointments which were
not submitted to the MTRCB for approval.[10]
However, in Resolution No. 93-5964[11] dated 23 December 1993, the CSC ruled in
favor of CORPUZ, as follows:
It must be appreciated that the appointment of Atty. Corpuz was approved by the
Commission because it was signed by Mr. Manuel Morato, then Chairman of [the]
MTRCB and the duly authorized signatory of MTRCB appointments. All the
appointments signed by Mr. Morato in his capacity as MTRCB Chairman are presumed
to have been made after complying with all the legal requirements including the
Board approval, whether express or implied.
The appointment of Atty. Corpuz, if defective, could have been the subject of a direct
action for revocation or recall which may be brought to the Commission within a
reasonable period of time after its approval Since no such action was filed with the
Commission, we can safely state that Corpuz had already acquired security of tenure
in the said position. Hence, the Commission can not allow the current Boards
disapproval of the said appointment to produce any effect. Atty. Corpuz can no longer
be separated from the service except for cause and after observing the requirements
of due process.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to rule
that the separation of Mr. David Corpuz from the service is not in order. Accordingly,
he is automatically restored to his position of Atty. V with payment of back salaries.
The MTRCBs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC in Resolution No. 94-
2551[12] dated 20 June 1994.
In the meantime, specifically on 22 August 1994, CORPUZ became a permanent
employee of the Ombudsman.[13]
The MTRCB filed with us a special civil action for certiorari which we referred to the
Court of Appeals in view of Republic Act No. 7902.[14] The Court of Appeals then
docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 37694.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared null and void Resolution No. 93-5964 of
the CSC, ruling that since the appointment of CORPUZ was not approved by the
MTRCB, the appointment was invalid and he could not invoke security of tenure. In
support of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held:
Presidential Decree No. 1986, the law creating the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board, specifically provides as follows:
Section 16. Organization Patterns; Personnel. -- The Board shall determine its
organizational structure and staffing pattern. It shall have the power to suspend or
dismiss for cause any employee and/or approve or disapprove the appointment,
transfer or detail of employees. It shall appoint the Secretary of the Board who shall
be the official custodian of the records of the meetings of the Board and who shall
perform such other duties and functions as directed by the Board. (Underscoring
supplied)
The record shows that the appointment of respondent Atty. David Corpuz was not
approved by the Board, as mandated by Presidential Decree No. 1986, Section 16.
The Supreme Court, in a similar case has reiterated the importance of complying with
legal requirements for a valid appointment. In Tomali vs. Civil Service Commission
(238 SCRA 572), it held:
Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position
is essential in order to make it fully effective (Favis vs. Rupisan, 17 SCRA 190, cited in
Mitra vs. Subido, 21 SCRA 127). Without the favorable certification or approval of the
Commission, in cases when such an approval is required, no title to the office can yet
be deemed to be permanent; vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment
can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority (Grospe vs. Secretary
of Public Works and Communication, 105 Phil. 129; Villanueva vs. Balallo, 9 SCRA 407;
Suarez vs. Commission on Elections, 20 SCRA 797). Until an appointment has become
a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule of security of
tenure (See Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240; Mitra vs. Subido, 21
SCRA 797).
It appearing that respondent Atty. Corpuz appointment was not approved by the
Board, the same cannot be considered as [a] valid appointment. As such, he cannot
invoke security of tenure, even if he has rendered service for a number of years.
Neither would the silence or the failure of the Board to recall the private respondents
appointment constitute as a [sic] consent or confirmation. In the aforecited case, the
Supreme Court restated the existing jurisprudence on the matter, thus:
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-
observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal
requirement, on the necessity of the approval of the Commissioner on Civil Service of
appointments, ineffective and unenforceable. The employee, whose appointment
was not approved, may only be considered as a de facto officer. (Tomali vs. Civil
Service Commission, supra citing Favis vs. Rupisan, 17 SCRA 190, 191)
Thus, We find merit in petitioners contention that respondent Atty. David Corpuz did
not acquire a vested right nor does he presently enjoy a [sic] security of tenure to the
subject position in the MTRCB for failure to comply with the legal requirements
needed for a valid appointment. Hence, he cannot be reinstated. Not being a
permanent employee of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board,
the tenure of respondent Atty. Corpuz ceased when he was not properly appointed
under present law.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied in the Resolution[15] of 13
February 1996, CORPUZ filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and asked us to reverse the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals on the sole
ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER
ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ DID NOT HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE MTRCB BOARD WHICH
IF NOT CORRECTED, IS TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
In his Memorandum, however, CORPUZ explicitly declared that he is no longer
seeking reinstatement with respondent MTRCB but for the continuity of his
government service from the time he was illegally dismissed on 30 June 1993 up to
the time he was permanently employed with the Office of the Ombudsman on 22
August 1994 plus back salaries and other benefits due him if not for the illegal
dismissal.[16]
Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1986, the MTRCB is composed of a Chairman, a Vice-
Chairman and thirty (30) members, all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Section 5 thereof enumerates the following functions, powers and duties of the
Chairman as the Chief Executive Officer of the MTRCB, to wit:
(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and
regulations issued by the BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD,
and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and
subordinate personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not
specifically lodged in the BOARD.
On the other hand, Section 16 thereof, quoted in the challenged decision of the Court
of Appeals, vests upon the Board itself the power to, inter alia, approve or disapprove
the appointments of its personnel.
It is thus clear that there are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB
personnel, other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by the Chairman
which is accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper, which is among his
powers under Section 5(d) above; and (b) approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of
the appointment. As to the Secretary, it is the MTRCB itself that is empowered to
appoint said official pursuant to Section 16.
It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the power of
appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further
consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the
commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some
other officer or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment may
be complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the
appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power
is performed.[17] Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested
right in the office nor invoke security of tenure. Hence, in the case of CORPUZ, since
the last act required for the completion of his appointment, viz., approval by the
MTRCB itself, was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately
disapproved it, his appointment ceased to have effect, if at all, and his services were
properly terminated. This Court so declared in Favis v. Rupisan[18] where the
appointment involved was not approved by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
Section 16(h) of R.A. No. 2260 and Section 2(a) of Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules
implementing said law; Taboy v. Court of Appeals[19] and Provincial Board of Cebu v.
Presiding Judge of Cebu Court of First Instance[20] where the appointments of subject
employees were disapproved by the Provincial Boards pursuant to the powers
granted them; in Carillo v. Court of Appeals[21] where the required consent of the
municipal council in the appointment of the chief of police was not obtained; and in
Tomali v. Civil Service Commission,[22] which the Court of Appeals relied upon, where
the required submission to and approval by the Civil Service Commission were not
made as required by Section 9(h) of P.D. No. 807 and Section 11, Rule V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987. In the latter, this Court held that compliance with
the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential to
make it fully effective. That the employee involved had, in fact, assumed office and
performed the functions and duties thereof is of no moment, for it matters not that
the appointee had served for several years. Those years of service cannot substitute
for the want of consent of another body required by law to complete the
appointment. The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials resulting
in non-observance of the requirements of law or rules to complete the appointment
does not render the requirements ineffective and unenforceable.[23]
A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment
is merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the
reason that he assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise.[24] Undeniably, under the facts
here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of 13 October
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP-No.37694 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
LAPINID V. CSC (1991)
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
Facts:Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority
to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal
on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by
private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with
the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the
Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be
designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his
preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal
meritorious. It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an
edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78). Foregoing premises
considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be
appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio
Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position
commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be
notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
Decision:
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals,[2] this Court said:
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature,
according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of
the Civil ServiceLaw, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that
both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy
renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon
except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke
the appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified
for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing
authority. The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant
position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the
Department Head or appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission.
Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications.
Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course,
seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as
resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the
future, and best interests of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who
can do it best should be left to the Head of the Office concerned provided the legal
requirements for the office are satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard Appointment is a
highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of
the appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those
abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing
authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to
review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil
Service Commission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and
October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
THE GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) and RAMON ANINO,
petitioners, vs. JULIETA MONSERATE, respondent.
FACTS: Julieta Monserate was an employee of the PPA. The PPA was reorganized in
1988. Monserate applied for the permanent position of Manager II of the Resource
Management Division. MOnserate was confirmed by the CSC and thereafter
discharged the functions of the office.
Ramon Anino filed an appeal with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting the
appointment. The Board sustained the protest and upheld the appointment of Anino
in place of Monserate.
Monserate filed with the CSC a protest against Anino's appointment which the CSC
dismissed.
ISSUE: Was Monserate validly replaced by Anino
HELD: Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the
selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service.
However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the
appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment
cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his
stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the
revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her.
When the CA reinstated Monserate to her post, it merely restored her appointment
to the said position to which her right to security of tenure had already attached. Her
position as Manager II never became vacant since her demotion was void. In this
jurisdiction, "an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and
void ab initio."
A. Appointment by the President
1987 Philippine Constitution- Article VII (Sec.16)
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]
FACTS: Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the
office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other
public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau
head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
CALDERON VS CARALE 208 SCRA 254
FACTS:In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA
6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees
of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned
Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the
appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned
the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment
is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on
the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution,
as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of
appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the CoA.
RULING:The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required
exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution,
such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the
other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments is required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the
Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the
president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government
officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights).
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from
a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in
the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after
May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is
absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]
FACTS:On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President
Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the
former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres
Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo
warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the
subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.
ISSUE:Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia
were valid.
RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous
President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He
was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming
President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent
President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of
presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments
in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the
inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter
as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions,
and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.
B. Appointment under Civil Service Qualification Standard
1987 Philippine Constitution Article IX-B, Section 2 (2)
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Section 2.(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by
competitive examination.
[G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997]
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent
National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975 when
he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC
with the Department of Labor.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on September 17, 1977 dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on
December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this
Court which rendered a decision on January 17, 1985 reinstating the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and setting aside the decision of NLRC.
On January 6, 1989, the petitioner filed with the Civil Services Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction.
On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.
On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a compliant for illegal
dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC.
On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC through Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that
petitioners was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was
evidence in the record that the criminal case filed against him was purely fabricated,
prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him.
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14,
1981, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter
Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
RULING: (1) The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation Vs. Juco, that
employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created
by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the General Corporation Law, are
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been
supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which now provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2(1).
The rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Having been incorporated under the
Corporation Law, respondent NHC’s relations with its personnel are governed by the
Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14,
1991 is hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990
is REINSTATED.
[G.R. No. 129133. November 25, 1998]
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court to review and set aside the 7 November 1996 Decision[1] and 18 March
1997 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] in CA - G.R. SP No. 37720.
As culled by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts that matter are, as follows:
In a letter dated October 13, 1988, respondent CSC through Chairman Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas required the Secretary of Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB).
Instead of complying with the said letter, petitioner Jose T. Almonte, as Commissioner
of EIIB, wrote a letter dated March 29, 1989, to respondent CSC, requesting for
confirmation of EIIBs exemption from CSC rules and regulations with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions invoking as basis for such exemption PD
No. 1458 and LOI No. 71.
On June 21, 1989, respondent CSC issued the subject Resolution No. 89-400, denying
petitioner Almontes request for exemption of the EIIB from the coverage of the civil
service rules and regulations and reiterating its order that petitioner EIIB submit to
the CSC all appointments to career or non-career positions in the Bureau.
Not having received any compliance from petitioners, respondent CSC, in its Order of
December 7, 1990, directed petitioner Jose T. Almonte to immediately implement
Resolution No. 89-400, with a warning that any EIIB official who shall fail or refuse to
comply with the said order shall be held liable for indirect contempt.
On June 4, 1991, respondent CSC issued another order, requiring petitioner Almonte
to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt for his continued
refusal to implement or comply with CSC Resolution No. 89-400 and the Order of
December 7, 1990.
In a letter, dated June 13, 1991, petitioner Almonte explained to the respondent CSC
the reasons of the EIIB for its inability to comply with Resolution No. 89-400. He
invoked PD No. 1458 and LOI No. 71 exempting the EIIB from the coverage of civil
service rules and regulations on appointments and other personnel actions.
Petitioner Almonte prayed that Resolution No. 89-400, the Order of June 4, 1991, and
the subsequent orders be set aside.
On August 22, 1991, respondent CSC issued an order, finding petitioner Almonte
guilty of indirect contempt of the Commission, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to find
and adjudge Jose T. Almonte, Commissioner, EIIB, guilty of indirect contempt of the
Commission pursuant to Section 12 (11), Book V, Subtitle A of Executive Order No.
292 and Memorandum Circular No. 42, series of 1990. He is thus meted the penalty
of fine P1,000.00 each day from the date of receipt of this Order dated December 7,
1990. Accordingly, the Cashier of the EIIB is hereby directed to deduct from the salary
of Commissioner Almonte the amount of P1,000.00 each day of his failure to comply
with the above CSC Order. Let copies of this Order be furnished the Resident Auditor
of the EIIB as well as the COA, the Secretary of the Department of Finance and the
CSFO-DND, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for
Certiorari. However, on November 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition; ratiocinating thus:
The 1987 Constitution is so clear and categorical in its mandate that:
Article IX (B), Section 2 (1). - The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
The civil service contemplated in the constitutional provision is very comprehensive
in its scope, that it includes every category of officer or employee of the government,
its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and even employees of private
corporations, if such corporations are controlled or owned by the government with
original charters.
In the light of this constitutional mandate, petitioner EIIB, being a government
agency, is necessarily embraced by the civil service. The fact that positions in the EIIB
are primarily confidential did not place it outside the domain of civil servants, since it
is conceded that one holding in the Government a primarily confidential position is in
the Civil Service (Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171). That fact merely exempts confidential
positions in the EIIB from the constitutional rule that appointments in the civil service
shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable ... by competitive examination [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2 (2) ]. And it is in this sense
that the provisions of PD 1458, particularly Section 5 and LOI 71 relied upon by the
petitioners should be interpreted.
Neither does petitioners contention that if EIIBs positions and personnel actions will
be opened, one may know its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics
and the whole of its being deserve merit, as the same is pure speculation and
conjecture. EIIB officials and personnel remain civil servants and as correctly argued
by the Solicitor General, EIIB officials occupying confidential positions, remain
accountable to the people and are subject to the same state policies on morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness and courtesy in the civil service. Thus, We hold
that the personnel in the EEIB are covered by the civil service.
WHEREFORE, the Court upholds Resolution No. 89-400 but declares CSC Orders of
December 7, 1990, June 4, 1991, and of August 22, 1991, as NULL AND VOID, the Civil
Service Commission not having jurisdiction to cite and punish Commissioner Jose T.
Almonte of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau for indirect contempt
of the Commission.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration by Resolution, dated March 18,
1997, of the Court of Appeals, petitioner found its way to this Court via the present
Petition; contending, that:
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS COVERED BY CIVIL SERVICE, RESPONDENT COURT
VIOLATED P.D. No. 1458 AND LOI No. 71 WHICH EXPRESSLY EXEMPT IT FROM CIVIL
SERVICE COVERAGE.
The pivotal issue here is: whether or not the petitioner, Economic Intelligence
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), is embraced by the Civil Service.
Section 2, subparagraph (1), Article IX, paragraph (B) of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter.
Succinct and clear is the provision of the Constitution in point that all government
agencies, without exception, are covered by the civil service.
Petitioner EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance as provided
by Section 17, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.[4]
Therefore, EIIB is within the ambit of the Civil Service Law.
The civil service within the contemplation of the aforecited constitutional provision is
comprehensive in scope. It embraces all officers and employees of the government,
its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities. Even employees of corporations
owned or controlled by the government, with original charters, are covered thereby.
Petitioner contends that EIIB is expressly exempted from civil service coverage, under
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1458, which provides :
Application of WAPCO and Civil Service Rules - Personnel of the FDIIB shall be
exempted from WAPCO and Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to
appointments and other personnel actions: Provided, That they shall be entitled to
the benefits and privileges accorded to government employees ...
On the other hand, LOI No. 71, the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 1458, reads:
10. It is further directed that personnel of the BII shall be exempt from OCPC and Civil
Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions;
Provided, That they shall be entitled to the benefits accorded to government
employees ... "
Petitioners submission is barren of merit.
The aforecited provisions of law provide for the exemption of petitioner EIIB only
from Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel
actions, but not from the Civil Service Law or Civil Service Rules and Regulations
relative to any other matter.
Neither can we uphold petitioners reliance on Section 26 of Executive Order No.
127.[5] Petitioner, in gist, asserts exemption from Civil Service coverage since the
Bureau forms part of the intelligence community created under the said Executive
Order.
There is merit in the disquisition by the Court of Appeals that membership of
petitioner EIIB in the intelligence community is of no moment, insofar as application
of the Civil Service Law is concerned. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), also
a member of the intelligence community which performs functions similar to those
of EIIB, e.g., intelligence gathering, investigation, research, etc., submits to the Civil
Service Commission the appointments of all NBI personnel, whether belonging to the
career or non-career service. Besides, in Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171, this Court
ruled that one holding in the Government a primarily confidential position is in the
Civil Service.
Equally untenable is petitioners contention that because the personnel of EIIB are
occupying jobs highly confidential in nature, the EIIB should not be required to submit
the names of its personnel to the Civil Service Commission.
In Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 [1995], EIIB was ordered by the Ombudsman
to produce documents relating to personnel services and salary vouchers of EIIB
employees. The Bureau pleaded that such documents are classified, and knowledge
of EIIBs documents relative to its Personnel Services Funds and its plantilla will
inevitably lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets and strategies,
which could destroy the Bureau itself. The Court ruled that the required documents
can be examined by the Ombudsman, explaining that:
... [T]here is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIBs function
is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting. Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the
case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel
records of the EIIB as classified information ...
All things viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
Court of Appeals erred not in holding that:
... [R]espondent CSCs act of requiring petitioner EIIB to submit to it all appointments
in the Bureau, for appropriate action, is part of its administrative function as the
central personnel agency of the government. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 37720 AFFIRMED,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992]
FACTS:Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec.
2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits
of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of
service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission
yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1
of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special
civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under
Republic Act No. 6683.
HELD:YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil
servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits
for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including
those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but
the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after
all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement
under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.
Cuevas et al. v. Bacal, [G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000]
FACTS:This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service
officers (CESOs). More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent
Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public
Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her
subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director
of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of
Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for
quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether:
(1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career
Service;
(2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the
position or to the rank the officer is holding;
(3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security
of tenure;
(4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional
Director constitutes a demotion;
RULING:(1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess
the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does
not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of
CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment extended to him cannot
be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
(2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank
and not to position.The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does
not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept
which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service but to
the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Here, respondent did not
acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher
position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the
rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of
the CES Board.
(3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred
from one position to another and from one department, bureau or office to
another;provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public
service and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no member
shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years. If a CESO is assigned
to a CES position with a higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to
receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES
position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached to
his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the Regional Office as it
was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to
her CES rank.
(4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely
temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of
Regional Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be
considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of
the Constitution. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to
security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed – not merely assigned –
to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.
PAGCOR v Rilloraza; GR No. 141141; 25 Jun 2001; 359 SCRA 525
FACTS:On 05 Nov 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss of confidence were
brought against Carlos Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of petitioner PAGCOR.
On 02 Dec 1997, the PAGCOR Board issued a resolution dismissing respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not all PAGCOR employees are confidential employees.
HELD: NO. The classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative
declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of
the position. The exemption provided in the charter pertains to exemption from
competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service.
Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure.
Luego v. Civil Service Commission (G. R. No. L-69137)
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor,
Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was
described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as
“temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private
respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and
accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The
private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor
Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as
well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s
title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than
the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.
Aquino vs Civil Service Commission; [208 SCRA 240; GR 92403, April 22, 1992]
(Public Officers, Appointments: Grounds for Protest, CSC)
Facts: Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by
the DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I.
Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a
promotional appointment to private respondent as Supply Officer I in the DECS
division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as permanent.
Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and
competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.
Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a
decision sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of private respondent,
and petitioner was issued a permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS
Regional Director. Said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office
IV.
In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus
revoking the appointment of petitioner and restoring private respondent to her
position under her previously approved appointment.
In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the
rulings in previous jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested
solely in the appointing authority.
Issue: Whether or not appointment of the respondent can be revoked.
Held: No. It is well settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the
appointee assumes position, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is
protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away
from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause
and with previous notice and hearing.
Said appointment cannot also be revoked on the ground that the protestant is more
qualified than the first appointee. The protest must be for a cause or predicated on
those grounds provided for under Sect 19 (6) of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), namely:
1) that the appointee is not qualified;
2) that the appointee is not the next in rank; and
3) in case of appointment transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment, that
the protestant is not satisfied with the written special reasons or reason given by the
appointing authority.
Note: “for a cause” means “for reasons which the law and sound public policy
recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely
causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient.
It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with
the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and
affect the administration of office and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.”
G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950
EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner, vs.GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his
capacity as City Mayor, PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in his capacity as City Treasurer and
RAFAEL USON, in his capacity as City Auditor, respondents.Francisco S. Reyes for
petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto
Luciano for respondents.Jose P. Laurel and Abelardo Subido as amici curiae.
Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio
on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he
qualified for and began toexercise the duties and functions of the position. On June
1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to
the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of
Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public
Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City
Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid
Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these
proceedings.The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4
of which reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."The respondent in its answer, relied
on the provisions of “Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls
under Chapter 61 entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the
President) to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of
whom is the city engineer.”
Issue:whether or not the removal of the petitioner violates the Article XII Section 4 of
the Constitution?
Held:Particular provision of the Sec 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
which gave the Chief Executive power to remove officers at pleasure has been
repealed by the Constitution and ceased to be operative from the time that
instrument went into effect. Unconstitutionally, as we understand it, denotes life and
vigor, and unconstitutional legislation presupposes posteriority in point of time to the
Constitution. It is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of conduct
the effect of which the Constitution specifically forbids (State ex-rel. Mack vs.
Guckenberger, 139 Ohio St., 273; 39 NE. [2d], 840.) A law that has been repealed is as
good as if it had never been enacted, and can not, in the nature of things, contravene
or pretend to contravene constitutional inhibition. So, unlike legislation that is passed
in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of
section2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration
of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-
existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by
express mandatebefore this petitioner was appointed.
G.R. No. 85670 July 31, 1991
ROGELIO A. TRIA petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, RET. BRIG. GEN. JOSE T. ALMONTE, RET. COL. ERNESTO P. RAVINA
and RET. GEN. MIGUEL M. VILLAMOR, respondents
Facts: Rogelio Tria had been employed with the Bureau of Intelligence and
Investigation now known as the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)
of the Department of Finance, Region 5, Legaspi City, as a Management and Audit
Analyst I, a position expressly described in the letter of appointment as "confidential."
The appointment was signed by Pelagio A. Cruz, Lieutenant General, AFP (Ret)
Commissioner, FMIBI."
On 27 September 1984, Tria wrote a confidential report to the FMIB Deputy
Commissioner detailing the nonfeasance of a FMIB lawyer assigned to Region 5. Tria's
report recommended the lawyer's replacement "With a competent and able lawyer
to handle the cases brought to his attention." On 14 October 1986, Tria submitted
another confidential report, addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of
the President, this time concerning Col. Jackson P. Alparce (Ret.). FMIB Region 5
Director. On 20 October 1986, Tria filed an application for vacation leave for 100
working days, covering the period 1 November 1986 to 30 April 1987. He sought to
take advantage of a Civil Service circular which allows employees who propose to seek
interim employment abroad, to go on prolonged leave of absence without pay
without being considered separated from the service. The application was approved
by his immediate supervisor and Chief, Intelligence and Investigation Service, Col.
Ruperto Amistoso (Ret.), and the personnel officer, Col. Domingo Rodriguez (Ret.),
both based in the Region 5 office of the FMIB. On 23 October 1986, when Tria was
already in Manila attending to the processing of his travel papers, a Memorandum
was sent to him in Legaspi City from the FMIB Central Office in Quezon City by
Assistant FMIB Commissioner Brig. Gen. Miguel Villamor (Ret.), referring to the
confidential report sent out to the Office of the President. The Memorandum in part
stated when he opted to submit his report to Malacanang instead of FMIB, he
tarnished FMIB and the Commissioner’s image. He was then required to explain lest
he will be disciplined. Tria did not respond. Another Memorandum from Quezon City
was issued, this time by Col. Ernesto Rabina (Ret.), Chief, Administrative Service,
FMIB, reminding Tria of his duty to submit the required written explanation. Tria,
however, had already left the country and was unable to comply with the express
directives of the 2nd Memo. He was therefore considered to be on AWOL. This
prolonged absence, as well as his failure to explain his sending out the confidential
report to Malacañang, prompted EIIB Commissioner Brig Gen. Jose Almonte (Ret.) to
issue Letter-Order No. 06-87 informing Tria of the termination of his services
retroactive to "1 November 1986 for continuous absence without official leave and
for loss of confidence." Tria came to know of his termination upon his return. Tria
asked for reinstatement stating that his leave was approved by his immediate
superior. As to the report, he claimed good faith in doing so Reinstatement was
denied by Rabina. Tria's request for payment of the cash equivalent of his accrued
leave credits corresponding to a total of 179 days was also denied by Villamor on the
ground that Section 6 of the Civil Service rules and laws provides that the removal for
cause of an official or employee shall carry with it forfeiture of other benefits arising
from his employment.
Tria then filed a petition for review with prayer for reinstatement and backwages
before CSC but was denied. CSC held that the grant of Tria's application for vacation
leave, notwithstanding the accumulation of sufficient leave credits, was discretionary
on the part of Rabina, the approving official, citing In re: Nicolasura Victor (CSC Res.
No. 88-251) dated 25 May 1988 and Section 20 of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
Issue: (1) Whether Tria’s position is of a confidential nature
(2) Whether there is a legal cause warranting Tria’s removal
Held: (1) No. Hence, he may not be removed without cause. A position in the Civil
Service may be considered primarily confidential: (1) when the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared that
position to be primarily confidential; or (2) when the position, given the character of
the duties and functions attached to it, is primarily confidential in nature. 14 All
positions in the EIIB were apparently declared as "highly confidential" by former
President Marcos in Letter of Implementation No. 71. However, the actual duties and
functions of Tria as a "Management and Audit Analyst I" in the FMIB, as set out in the
job description shows that it is not of confidential nature. Tria’s duties are related to
the study and analysis of organizational structures and procedures, with the end in
view of making recommendations designed to increase the levels of efficiency and
coordination within the organization so analyzed. His rank is modest and of fungible
as underscored by the fact that the salary attached to it was no more than P1,500.00
a month at the time he went on leave. There is nothing to suggest that Tria's position
was "highly" or even "primarily confidential" in nature. The fact that Tria may,
sometimes, handle "confidential matters" or papers which are confidential in nature,
does not suffice to characterize their positions as primarily confidential.
(2) No. In the instant case, Tria was charged with violation of official rules and
regulations consisting more specifically, of: (1) having gone on an extended
unauthorized leave of absence; (2) having bypassed official channels in transmitting
a report concerning alleged misfeasance or non-feasance on the part of a superior
officer of the EIIB directly to the Office of the President through the Deputy Executive
Secretary, rather than through the EIIB Commissioner.
It is true that Tria was probably precipitate in taking off for abroad before his
application for vacation leave was formally approved by the FMIB Central Office in
Quezon City. However, his application for leave without pay had been approved or
indorsed for approval by his immediate superior in the FMIB, Region 5 Office, and so
Tria was not completely without basis in believing that the formal approval of his
application in the FMIB Central Office would follow as a matter of course. It is
pertinent to point out that his immediate superiors in the Region 5, FMIB Office were
the persons in the best position to ascertain whether his presence in the Regional
office during the period covered by his application for leave without pay was really
demanded by imperious exigencies of the service. The record is bare of any indication
what those exigencies were, at that particular time. There is also no showing that the
FMIB actually suffered any prejudice by reason of the non-availability of the services
of Tria during his leave without pay. Tria was just a "Management and Audit Analyst,"
a humble rank separated by many ranks from the appointing power, the FMIB
Commissioner. The extreme penalty of dismissal from the service was unduly harsh;
that suspension for thirty (30) days would have been more than adequate
punishment for precipitately going on leave without pay prior to formal approval of
his leave by the Central Office of the FMIB; and that the real and efficient cause of his
dismissal from the service was the fact that he had bypassed official channels in
rendering the confidential report addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office
of the President, concerning the then Regional Director of FMIB, Region 5. Tria’s act
did not constitute lawful cause for his dismissal from the service.
Laurel vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195
FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed
his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the
Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and
confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial
Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial
Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil
Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as
"primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868.
ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his
brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism
under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of
consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided
therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be
considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the
career service.
Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the
prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on
nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and
designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent
the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its
violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be
differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree,
career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or
temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is
necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes
the same purpose.
Grino vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 458
Facts:Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo.
He resigned and recommended respondent Teotimo Arandela as his replacement.
The OIC governor approved the recommendation and assigned Arandela as his
replacement.
On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Griño assumed office as the newly elected
governor of Iloilo. One month later, he informed respondent Arandela and all the
legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about his decision to terminate their
services. In his letter, petitioner Griño made mention of an article pertaining to the
Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which
"undermined that trust and confidence" that he reposed on them. Petitioner
Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Griño as the Provincial Attorney
Arandela appealed the action taken by Governor Grino to the Merit Systems offices and the need for a relationship based on trust between the officer and the
Protection Board of the CSC. The MSPB declared the termination illegal, and ordered head of the LGU he serves. The fact that the position of Arandela as provincial
Arandela and others to be immediately restored to their positions, with backwages. attorney has already been classified as under career service and certified as
This was affirmed by the CSC. permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature. Since in
Gov. Grino now filed a petition for review assailing the decision of the MSPB and CSC. the Cadiente case the city legal officer was declared by this Court to be primarily
He relied on the case of Cadiente, which ruled that a city legal officer was a primarily confidential, the Court must also hold that the position of provincial attorney is also
confidential position. He argued that since a provincial attorney and a city legal officer primarily confidential. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to classifying 2
has similar functions, the provincial attorney is also a primarily confidential position, positions with the same nature and functions in to incompatible categories
one requiring utmost confidence on the part of the mayor to be extended to said Arandela’s termination is valid. The tenure of an official holding a primarily
officer confidential position ends upon loss of confidence. He was not dismissed or removed
from office, his term merely expired.
Issue: WON the position of a Provincial Attorney and Legal Officer were confidential With respect to the legal assistants and subordinates of the provincial attorney (who
in character and thus can be terminated upon loss of trust were also terminated along with Arandela), they have been employed due to their
technical qualifications. Their positions are highly technical in character and not
Ruling:Yes the Provincial Attorney and Legal officer were confidential position. confidential. Thus they are PERMANENT EMPLOYEES and they belong to the category
In Cadiente vs. Santos, the court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is of CLASSIFIED employees under the CSL. Thus, the positions are permanent and they
undeniably one which is primarily confidential in this manner: enjoy security of tenure.
“The position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the
part of the mayor be extended to said officer. The relationship existing between a
lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that
depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel
selected. The phrase "primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state”
The court agreed to the petitioners that the Cadiente case can be made applicable to
the provincial attorneys.
The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA5185,
which categorized them together as positions of trust. Both the provincial attorney
and the city legal officer serve as a legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of
the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely categorized
by law to be “trusted services.”
A comparison of these 2 positions under the LGC would reveal the close similarity of
the 2 positions. Said functions clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the 2