FIRST DIVISION shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication.
— Upon the filing
[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002.]
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child,
CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89 of Quezon City, a
petition for correction of some entries in the birth certificate of her son Charles Christian
namely: her son's surname "Borbon" be changed to "Eleosida"; the date of the parents'
wedding should be left blank; and the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida" instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support thereof, petitioner alleged that
she gave birth to her son out of wedlock, therefore, the child is illegitimate and should
follow the mother's surname. After the trial court issued a notice of hearing and another
Order setting the date of presentation of evidence, it motu propio dismissed the petition
for lack of merit on the ground that only clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature may be the subject of a judicial order pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil
Code. Hence, the instant petition.
It is true that the changes sought to be made by petitioner were not, merely, clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage
between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. However, changes of such nature are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. It was, therefore, an error for
the trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to
present evidence to support her petition and all other persons who have an interest over
the matter to oppose the same. TcEaAS
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY; THE PROCEEDINGS MAY EITHER BE SUMMARY OR
ADVERSARY IN NATURE. — Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought
to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.
If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic
vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The
Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under
Rule 108 adversary, thus: "The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide: SEC. 3. Parties. —
When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC. 5.
Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice, file his opposition thereto. Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are
— (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to —
(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause
the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to
oppose the petition: — (l) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all these
procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.' . . ."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — It is true in the case
at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage
between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the
petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise
ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other
persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is
any reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with
a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the
trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the
hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to
make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss
the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support
her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the
same.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma. Lourdes
Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The
birth certificate shows, among others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian
Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and
1
Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that the child's parents were
married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City. 2
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate
of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to
"Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the
informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E.
Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out
of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never
married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's
surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena
Borbon as respondents. 3
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida,
praying that the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of her minor
child, Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, be changed and/or
corrected, such that, his last name BORBON be deleted and instead
place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is the surname of his
mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985 - Batangas City", be
likewise deleted, since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena
Borbon, at the time of the minor's birth were not legally married;
and the surname BORBON of petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon
under the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court sitting
at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is
ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper =0njjnjof general circulation and published in Metro
Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at
which date, time and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her
petition, in that all other persons having or claiming any interest
thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they have, the
petition shall not be granted.
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the
petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the Offices of the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General, who are
given fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, within which to file their
opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the Solicitor General may
not be able to appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for and in behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED." 4
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the
presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as
contained in the notice of hearing dated April 23, 1997 requiring
that office to file their opposition, if any, to the petition for
correction of entries in the birth certificate of minor child Charles
Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to present
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the same
time initially present evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning." 5
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
It ruled:
"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND
INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the
parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated
under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or
corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS,
NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will
ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she
wants the Court to direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to
delete the information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and
place of marriage of parents, on the ground that she was never
married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the
information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from
MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is
indicative of petitioner's intention and device to establish that
CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order,
which would authorize a change in the civil status of CHARLES
CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action improper. The matters
desired to be cancelled and/or changed by petitioner cannot be
considered falling under the ambit of the words 'clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature.'
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPRIO (sic)
dismissed." 6
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of
entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation
to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are
substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 7
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG submitted that
even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it
argued that even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual change in the civil
status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as long as all the parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented. 8 Respondent Carlos
Borbon, on the other hand, failed to submit his comment on the petition despite several
notices from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing
of respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the petition. 9
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought
to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.
If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. 10 This is our ruling in
Republic vs. Valencia 11 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
2
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. The Court further laid same.
down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of the
thus: RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set aside. The case is
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide: REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. IcHAaS
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is SO ORDERED.
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
(Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, G.R. No. 130277, [May 9, 2002], 431
|||
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an PHIL 612-621)
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are — (1)
the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time
and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following
are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar,
and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as 'summary.' . . . " 12
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not
merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of
the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their
son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule
108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the
petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise
ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other
persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is
any reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with
a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the
trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the
hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to
make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss
the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support
her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the
3
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170340. June 29, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO,
MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO
(Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which affirmed the September 4, 2002
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer
of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy
Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as those
of Carlito's minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira
filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil
registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also
asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of
some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship
of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese", as well as the deletion of the word
"married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan
Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective
birth certificates was made by Carlito's siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito's children, he prayed that the date of his
and his wife's marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date
appearing in their marriage certificate. EHACcT
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition 3 in which it was additionally
prayed that Carlito's second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth; and that
the name and citizenship of Carlito's father in his (Carlito's) marriage certificate be
corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese", respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks 4 in Mindanao Daily
Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing on
August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar 5 stated her
observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth records of Carlito
and his siblings but interposed no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel for
respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to enter its
appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing to October 9,
2001. 6 On September 14, 2001, 7 the OSG entered its appearance with an authorization
to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and render assistance to it (the
OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also presented testimonial
evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the
same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito's children was
requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to
"Marivel".
By Decision 8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of
Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change
the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his
name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents.
The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of
respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. CHDTIS
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor
children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel)
as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel".
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered
pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlito's father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho"
and the latter's citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese".
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the
trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents
despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors' mother, Marivel, as an
indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with
regard to the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings' parents, and the
latter's citizenship. HAECID
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John
Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioner's appeal and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was observed in
the case.
Regarding Carlito's minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that the
correction of their mother's first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was made to rectify
an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA
conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not affect the
minors' filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time of their
respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlito's first marriage was still
subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlito's legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were born, their
children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on to state, that
Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having been represented
by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 3 9 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with the jurisdictional
requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlito's birth record, it noted, falls under
letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents
were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding
in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents' parents, should have
been notified or impleaded.
4
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlito's name
under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied because the
Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito's prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan
City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlito's aliases and his true name as
"Carlito John I. Kho". Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to
the change of name of Carlito's father. DEIHAa
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of
Carlito's mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the "married" status of
Carlito's parents in his and his siblings' respective birth certificates, as well as change the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature. 10 Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito's mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the
citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. 11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito's and his siblings' parents were "married"
alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate", with significant implications on
their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo-
Rowe v. Republic 12 explains the raison d etre:
. . . . The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up
the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the
civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia, 13 however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under
Rule 108. 14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well
as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law
may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. DTcHaA
xxx xxx xxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. . . .
15 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL
TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE
OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL
ORDER," has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence
that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry
may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. 16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito 17 observed that the obvious effect of Republic
Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register,
leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in
appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil
register is satisfied. 18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. TIDaCE
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial court's Order 19 setting the petition for hearing and
directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose it was posted 20 as
well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings were duly served on
the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that
trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in
behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito's parents
rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial court's
judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 21 That case stemmed from
a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June Salvacion
Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to
correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to
annul the trial court's decision, claiming that she should have been made a party to the
petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she
contended.
In dismissing Barco's petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing
under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil
registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate
adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, which states:
5
Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect
her ward's share in the estate of her father. . . . . CDHacE
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision
would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely
all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or
respondents' parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may
not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city
prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the
non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito's parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings
to correct the entries in her children's birth certificates, especially since the notices,
orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence 23 she shared with
Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct
certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded
therein. 24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of marriage
25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989.
Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his
helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because
his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. 26 Given the evidence presented by
respondents, the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the
correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlito's mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand
that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. 27 Again, that testimony was not
challenged by the city prosecutor. EADSIa
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito's and his siblings' birth
certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of marriage of their parents,
moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph
(Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had
been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted
marriage legally. 28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents'
Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage between Juan Kho
and Epifania. 29 Under the circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the
"date of marriage of parents" is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlito's birth certificate of his name from "Carlito John"
to "Carlito", the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving
changes of name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for
change of name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108
suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlito's official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan
City, 31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, 32 and voter
registration record 33 satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only.
No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mother's citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in
Carlito's birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her
citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not
respondents' fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
SEHTIc
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito's siblings uniformly stated
the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino". To disallow the correction in Carlito's birth
record of his mother's citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal
circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and
father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of
Carlito's wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel". The mistake is clearly clerical or
typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding 34 considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito
and his wife is "Marivel".
Apropos is Yu v. Republic 35 which held that changing the appellant's Christian name of
"Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The change of
name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a
mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. 36 The
same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito's marriage certificate of
6
his father's name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho". Except in said marriage certificate, the
name "Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his
siblings. 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Kho, G.R. No. 170340, [June 29, 2007], 553 PHIL 161-177)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF
ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN
LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO,
respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by
his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married
to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, . . . they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. . . .
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named
Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. . . . Since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried
in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
will be discriminated against because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's Mandarin
language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they
pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. 1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his
middle name — did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled
that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an
interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear
the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should
now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004. 4 The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice
7
of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a
legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name
would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore
instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not
prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to
grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable. 5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) 6 arguing that
the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the
Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to
Article 174 7 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and
mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping
of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony
among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the child." 8 It is argued
that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not
prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan"
will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will
be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community.
Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for
change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to
use, contrary to previous cases 9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition
for change of name. 10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition.
The OSG filed its Comment 11 positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for
change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right
cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG,
there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best
interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for
change of name and/or cancellation of entry. 12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has
not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the
middle name, for that matter. Petitioner's allegation that the continued use of the middle
name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The
OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the child's
middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of
petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is
no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is
customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use
of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law. 13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied. acITSD
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change
his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper
or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied. 14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be 'proper and reasonable
cause' for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a request for change of name,
petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as
a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest. 16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need
only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved
is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. 17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply
seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to
drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions
for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a
handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name 18 and none on requests
for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle
name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant at this point. We
quote, thus:
. . . For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label
or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names
are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons;
they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity
is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when
identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is
immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which
is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child;
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3)
It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is
outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible. 19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that
8
middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others
who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. 20 The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, 21 while illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the father's surname. 22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument
that he bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as
his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate
child. EHDCAI
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires
that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this
would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.
In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic 23 and Calderon v. Republic, 24 which, however, are
not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena
Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from
Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the
following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using
their mother's surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still
being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no
showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will
prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate
minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her
name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C.
Calderon, her mother's husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an
infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The
Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the
surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every
person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic, 25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family
Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the
mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the
family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella
S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her
voter's registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the
denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child,
should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to
choose to use the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court
found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioner's reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his
petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of
Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their
petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their
discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity
most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in
addition to the fact of therein petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a
name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in
her school records and voter's registration records; thus, denying the petition would
only result to confusion. SEcAIC
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in
behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument
that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name.
However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of
name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner
therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be
left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. 26 As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Julian Lin Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, [March 30, 2005], 494
PHIL 149-163)
9
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009.]
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA,
petitioners, vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr.
(Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married 1 on January 4, 1978.
The union bore Ma. Cristina's co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle Ann 3 on May
8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died 5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung,
West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the
Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-
respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma.
Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's
birth certificate 6 from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child: PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL
TITULAR
Date of Birth: 01 January 1996
Mother: Lucille Celestial Titular
Father: Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local Civil Registrar: January 13, 1997
Annotation: "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks: "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January
13, 1997"
Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,
1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy 7 of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-
petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the entries in the birth
record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. DCHIAS
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo,
petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record
with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment,
and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court,
by Order 9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not
acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action
to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and
order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be
ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order
10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the
civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño, 11 Lee v. Court of Appeals 12 and Republic v.
Kho, 13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. 14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code 15
charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16 ATICcS
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show
that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the
ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick's filiation in connection with which
they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick's birth records 17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely
incidental thereto.
Petitioners' position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to
seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille's marriage as void for being bigamous
and impugn Patrick's legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171
18 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well
as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition
filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners' reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first
wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the
death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband
while the latter's marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on
the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the
10
 contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower
courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records
of birth but to establish that they are not the latter's children, hence, there was
nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between the petitioners
and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name
of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners' mother and the substitution thereof with
"Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed
and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the
correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were
illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their
parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to
be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the
proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court's
grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those
obtaining in the present case. HASTCa
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, G.R. No. 181174, [December 4, 2009],
622 PHIL 654-660)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside
the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed
once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person's sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People's Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
11
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative. SCEHaD
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual
[re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted
like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner's
misfortune to be trapped in a man's body is not his own doing and
should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner's first
name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner's gender from
"Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision 8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court's decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No.
02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit. AEScHa
A PERSON'S FIRST NAME
CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name
and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue, 16 form 17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. AcDaEH
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. — The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname
in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one's legal
capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's
first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. EACTSH
12
NO LAW ALLOWS THE
CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO
SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2 (c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance
of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. AIDcTE
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes
of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from“ while
to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such
as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events
(such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership. 27 DHaEAS
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own
will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not. The comprehensive term status . . . include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person's legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner's cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. — The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration
shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to
the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c)
names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place
where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued. AScHCD
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
13
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this
error, 30 is immutable. 31 case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
"female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned
as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
female" 32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that conferment of that privilege.
produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the branch of government, Congress.
contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male- recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female." DCTHaS the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. AaCTID
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Costs against petitioner.
NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR ||| (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, [October 19, 2007], 562 PHIL 953-974)
SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF
EQUITY
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles
of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner's first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman. 37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity
of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. 38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioner's petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law."
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
14
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to
"Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male".
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff. cHaCAS
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of
the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony
of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate
stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs — female and male.
He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondent's condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].
Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and
convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was
medically proven that petitioner's body produces male
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are
that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person
and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male. DHSEcI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following
corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon
payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school
records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED. 3
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking
a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF
THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES
NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE
HER A "MALE". 4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering
the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court. DHECac
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local
civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. 5 The OSG further
contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2
(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow
change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical
condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished
a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, 8 respondent is
15
 actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect
his true sex/gender, 9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, 10 and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court. 11 ICTacD
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SEC. 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his
name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for
change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf,
and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting
the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date
set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of
the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. — Any interested person may
appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in
open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause
appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that
such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition. AcISTE
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. — Judgments or
orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same
in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l)
civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
TcHEaI
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto. AaHTIE
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in
which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent's
petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. 12 Unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much
too short of the requirements of the rules. 13 The corresponding petition should
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have
or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. 14 Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6, 15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts
shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it.
We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent
furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
16
 The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article
412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 16 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 17 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep.
Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register. 18 DAEIHT
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the
civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations;
(8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who
has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such
as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
DcIHSa
CAH is one of many conditions 21 that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply
to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. 22 The term is
now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a
living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male
and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures.
In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a
male or female gender role. 23 Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. 24 More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by
taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into
the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those individuals
who are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." 25 The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the
respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject's birth certificate
entry is in order. IaSAHC
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent's
body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically
or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, 26 to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to
do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics. TCacIE
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently
17
 knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" 27 and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court
affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment
of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be
a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow. 28 The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. TcSHaD
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, [September 12, 2008], 586 PHIL 637-653)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198010. August 12, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY,
respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 Decision 2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated
July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the
June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in
Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of
Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed
resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. She alleged that she
is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. 6 Her Certificate of Live
Birth 7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to
her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school
records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,
8 and passport 9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an
illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to
follow the surname of her mother. 10 She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all
Filipinos. 11 SECcIH
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and
citizenship which was supposedly granted. 12 However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province
of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense
of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor's Office for their information and guidance. 14
Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
AHSEaD
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in
his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change
of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner's name and
citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner's name:
First Name:NORMA
Middle Name:SY
Last Name:LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner's nationality/citizenship:
FILIPINO
SO ORDERED. 15
18
The RTC concluded that respondent's petition would neither prejudice the government
nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer
to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has
effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been
known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted
the petition to avoid confusion. 16 acCITS
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondent's failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation
for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil
Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor's Office. 17 As to whether the petition is a
collateral attack on respondent's filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent,
considering that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings' birth
certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is
Filipino. 18 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July
27, 2011. aETDIc
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure
to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court,to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name. aTCADc
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the proceeding is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings. IaEASH
SEC. 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate,
particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the
correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood,
including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She
likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname
"Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes,
however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent's filiation and
citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to
"Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from
legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the
same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are
substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
EICSTa
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well
as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may
be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. . . .
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding. 22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court's conclusion in Republic v. Kho,
23 Alba v. Court of Appeals, 24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals, 25 that the failure to implead
indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho, 26 petitioner therein
appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite
respondents' failure to implead the minor's mother as an indispensable party. The Court,
however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was
highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries
in her children's birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the
trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27 DHAcET
In Alba v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court's
decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the
proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioner's mother and
guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to
her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned
19
unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly
learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the
Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in
rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is,
therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial court's
compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. 29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition
for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While
recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her
was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for
correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be
affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted
earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the
notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable
parties. EDaHAT
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition
and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by
the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case.
Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v.
Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila v. Delantar, 32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic. 33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 34 claiming that his parents were never legally
married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was
published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of
general default and eventually granted respondent's petition deleting the entry on the
date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to
"Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry
"Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on
respondent's birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The
Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent's failure to comply strictly with the
procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy
availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court,assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate
remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead
the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
THIcCA
In Ceruila v. Delantar, 35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment
of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an
instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it
falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing
with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the
petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing.
Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court
granted the petition and nullified respondent's birth certificate. Few months after,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her
guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial court's decision, hence, the latter
was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court
annulled the trial court's decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule
108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was
nullified.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in
the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single,"
and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court
modified the trial court's decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the
change of petitioner's civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the
OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature
which is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. aIDHET
Respondent's birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese
citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition,
however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but
also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. 37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows
that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to
the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing,
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested
parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently
left out. 43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is mandated.(petition was granted by the SC and ruled in favor
of the republic. Did not grant the change of name for being a substantial alteration)
44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
20
would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
SEHaTC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the
Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma
S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010, [August 12, 2013])
45 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.]
MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of
the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Venue. — The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for
at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. . . .
21
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation"
of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5 (4) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."
8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment
is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9
and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and
wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
13 Thus, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To
apply Section 2 (a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the
party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. CaAIES
Fujiki's motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court
should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its
two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, . . . ."
23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) . . . as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court . . . which is
Sec. 2 (a) . . . ." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled
that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages . . . ." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] . . .
." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground"
to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition
for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC's "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with . . . A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC . . . be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic 33 which held that Section 2 (a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
SCHATc
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from
the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would
file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
22
 reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the
prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, 36 this
Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code.In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
upon a person's legal capacity and status . . . ." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog 40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive
for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she
had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear
that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46 ScTaEA
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 47 this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. 49
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50 EaISTD
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons, 52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial, 54 the trial 55 and the
judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, 58 this Court explained that "[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of
lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under
the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. ECcTaS
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
23
under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66
which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact." 67 AIaHES
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry
of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) 68 his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime
of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or
the wife of the union recognized by law. DHSCTI
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage
to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 — it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave
ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of
the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] . . . can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. EAcTDH
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary(Tina D.-
does not apply to cases where there is already a case decision by a foreign court) to prevent
24
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are
the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, 88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court's decision in
Van Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91 IDETCA
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated
— the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event
that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground
for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago." CcHDSA
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
25
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, [June 26, 2013])
[G.R. No. 189538. February 10, 2014.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Regional Trial Court 1 (RTC) Decision 2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order 3 dated August
25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda
L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the
assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. cIaHDA
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time
the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a
travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport. 6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent. 7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8 TADCSE
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged
marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED. 9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake. 10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. 11
26
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise: aASEcH
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner's
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED. 12
Contrary to petitioner's stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent's identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order
based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR
CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION
OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14 IHDCcT
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latter's personal circumstances. 15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in
the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage
null and void ab initio. 16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are
raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value
of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of
law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, to wit: TSEHcA
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
TaSEHC
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia
19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established
and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding." 20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered. 21 AEIDTc
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. 22 HIAcCD
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
27
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate. HTCSDE Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties- SO ORDERED. SaHcAC
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in
Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified ||| (Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, [February 10, 2014], 726 PHIL 378-388)
of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature
appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent's signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court thus made
a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate was not
hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her
petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz
Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office 24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry. ScaEIT
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity
to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed

28

Tina D.- legitimacy status is considered as a substantial alteration, hence, the appropriate
adversary proceeding under Rule 108 should be complied with and not the summary
proceeding under RA 9048
[G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014.]
FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
LAS PIÑAS CITY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders 1 dated October 7, 2010 and
March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special
Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P.
Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.
The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner filed a petition 2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before
the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A.
Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were
married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and
that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry
1) Date and place of marriage of his
parents
2) First name of his mother
3) His first name
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of
entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the
proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and
would affect petitioner's status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the
correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar
Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
as it found no proof that petitioner's parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
CHaDIT
Essentially, the petition raises four issues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the
correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the
entry on petitioner's birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23,
1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings;
(3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and (4)
whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner's parents were not
married on December 23, 1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of
entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,
3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil
registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that
proof that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial, not during the
filing of the petition for correction of entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of
petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A.
No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner's birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all
interested parties are impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother
as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A.
No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC's ruling on this point. 4
Indeed, under Section 1 5 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a
civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned
city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by
R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
FromSECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error andToChange of First
Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be
December 23, 1983- changed or corrected without a judicial order, Not except for
Bicol clerical or typographical errors and change ofmarried first name or
Tely nickname, the day and month in the date of birth orMatilde
sex of a person
Franc Ler Francler
where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic, 6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications
for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent
and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In
Republic v. Cagandahan, 7 we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or
typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can
avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother's first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioner's birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings.
Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a
legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, 8 we held that corrections of
entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in
29
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is,
proceedings. 9 ScTIAH however, declared to be without prejudice.
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of No pronouncement as to costs.
entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction SO ORDERED.
he sought on his and his mother's first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under ||| (Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, G.R. No. 197174
the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction (Resolution), [September 10, 2014])
of entries before the RTC be reinstated since the same petition includes the correction he
sought on his and his mother's first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTC's dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner
can avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother's first
name. He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous
entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we
reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City: 10
. . . This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not
merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they
would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed
under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are
complied with. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil
register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as
petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is required by
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida, 11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under
Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, 12 we have similarly ruled that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the
Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead
his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also
affect them.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as
petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married
on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose. ACTESI
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and

30