Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9620 June 28, 1957

In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian and oppositor-
appellee,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, petitioner-appellant.

Stanley A. Clark for appellant.

Tancredo M. Guray for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In Special Proceedings No. 163 of the Court of First Instance of La Union, appellee Severo Viloria
was, on October 27, 1948, appointed guardian of the person and estate of the minor Roy Reginald
Lelina, beneficiary of arrears pay, insurance, and other benefits from the U.S Veterans Administration
due to the death of his late father Constancio Lelina, supposedly a member of the U.S. Armed Forces
during the war. On March 31, 1950, the court authorized the guardian to withdraw from the estate of
his ward the sum of not to exceed P30 a month for the boy's support and other expenditures.

On March 20, 1952, the U. S. Veterans Administration filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings,
alleging receipt of certain letters from its central office in Washington, D. C., to the effect that the
minor's deceased father had not guerrilla or other service in the armed forces of the United States,
and that consequently, his heir was not entitled to the payment of gratuitous National Service Life
Insurance, and prayed that the guardian be ordered to stop further payment of monthly allowances to
the minor. The court found the motion well-founded and granted the same. A few years later, on
February 15, 1955, the Administrator of Veterans Affairs again filed a motion in the same
guardianship proceedings for a refund to the U.S. Veterans Administration of the sum of $2,879.68,
the balance of gratuitous insurance benefits allegedly wrongfully paid to the minor Roy Reginald
Lelina, which was still on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, San Fernando, La Union Branch.
Upon opposition of the guardian, who submitted evidence of the service record of the minor's
deceased father duly recognized by both the Philippine and U.S. Armies, the motion for refund was
denied. Then on April 27, 1955, the guardian moved to be allowed to withdraw P4,000 from the
minor's estate to meet the minor's needs. This motion was opposed by the Administrator of Veterans
Affairs, arguing that the minors right to National Service Life Insurance benefits is governed
exclusively by the S.S. Code Annotated, which provides (Tit. 38, section 808) that decisions of the
Administrator —

shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact and no other official of the United States,
except a judge or judges of the Unite States courts, shall have jurisdiction to review any such
decisions;

In the same motion, the Administrator prayed for the setting aside of the court's order denying the
refund of the money in the hands of the minor's guardian, on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction".

Acting on the pending motions of the guardian and the Administrator, the lower court held:
If the legal provisions alleged in the petition of the veterans Administration is correct, and should be
taken into account, this Court may not have the right to order the return of the amount of $2,879.68 at
present credited as funds of the minor, and deposited in the name of the said minor with the
Philippine National Bank. Precisely, the issue now pending in this guardianship proceeding is whether
or not, the father of the minor deceased Constancio Lelina, has a valid military service to justify the
payment to him or to his heirs of the National Life Services Insurance benefits.

The minor Reginald Lelina through his guardian and his counsel claims that his father had rendered
services as shown by certain papers submitted in this case to support that claim. As a matter of fact,
the said minor was granted and paid those benefits as shown by the statements of accounts
submitted and duly approved by this court up to and including March 31, 1954, in the order of Judge
Primitivo L. Gonzales dated April 22, 1954. On that other hand the Attorneys of the Veterans
Administration now claim that such payment was an error because the deceased Constancio Lelina
had no recognized military services or was he a member of the Commonwealth Army in the service of
the Armed Forces of the United States Government. This is, therefore, a matter that should be
determined in an appropriate action filed the complete court. This being the case, until this issue is,
finally determined by the competent court in an appropriate action, the balance of the amount now
deposited in the name of the minor through his guardian could not be disposed by this Court one way
or another. In this proceeding, the matter at issue cannot be finally determined. Hence, this Court
believes and so holds, that in the meantime, the status quo should be maintain with respect to funds
now existing and deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union Branch in the name of the
herein minor. (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 47-49) and denied both the guardian's motion to withdraw from the
minor's deposits, and the Administrator's position for refund. The Administrator of Veterans Affairs
sought reconsideration of the above order, which was denied; wherefore, it appealed to this Court.

We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by
the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made
on claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case,
where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between
actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that
are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those
actions where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their
jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would
make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our
courts. That in effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere
subordinate instrumentalities of the veterans' Administrator.

In an analogous case, we have ruled:

By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has
submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order. He can not therefore now
dispute this power. (Brownell vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee guardian, for the
ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof on the
sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies
upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine courts'
determination of the question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator as upon any other
litigant.

Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the
guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and
the proper administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to
the property in the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate
proceeding.

The order of the court below, dated 22 June 1955, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L. and Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12289 May 28, 1958

LIM SIOK HUEY, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFREDO LAPIZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Godofredo C. Montesines and Alfonso E. Generoso for appellants.

Tengco Rosales for appellees Vicente Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an action to recover damages amounting to P83,701.30 filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna. The plaintiffs are Lim Siok Huey, Pua Yek Ben, Pua Chok Ben, Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go
Kuan, the first being the surviving spouse and the last four the surviving children of Chua Pua Lun,
represented by their counsel, and the defendants are Alfredo Lapiz, Victorino Sapin, Vicente Reyes
and Lazaro Limjuco. The damages are claimed by reason of the death of Chua Pua Lun as a result of
a collision suffered by the jeepney in which he was a passenger.

Defendant Alfredo Capiz, the driver of the driver of the Jaguar jeepney, in answer to the complaint,
alleged that the vehicle driven by him was hit by the Kapalaran bus which was driven by defendant
Vicente Reyes due to the negligence of the latter, thereby causing the death of Chua Pua Lun who
was a passenger of the jeepney. Defendant Victorino Sapin in turn alleged that he was not the owner
of the jeepney driven by Lapiz, while defendants Vicente Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco, the first as
driver and the second as owner of the bus, alleged that the collision between the two vehicles was
due to the negligence of Alfredo Lapiz.

Plaintiffs Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan, being minors, the court, upon motion of their counsel,
appointed Chua Pua Tam, a brother of the deceased, as guardian ad litem to represent them in this
case.

After trial, the court rendered decision "dismissing the complaint, defendant Lapiz cross-claim against
defendants Reyes and Limjuco as well as the counterclaim of these last two named defendant
against the plaintiff and their cross-claim against defendants Lapiz and Sapin." Plaintiffs appealed
directly to this Court in view of the amount involved.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court made the following pronouncement:
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, the Court is however, of the opinion that the present action
cannot be maintained not on the ground invoked by the defendants but on the theory that the plaintiffs
have not authorized anyone to file the complaint against the defendants. While an attorney
representing a client `in a case pending in Court is presumed to be authorized for the purpose,
nevertheless in the case under consideration, such presumption had been destroyed and overcome
by the very evidence presented by counsel himself. The plaintiffs are all citizens and residents of
Communist China and they have not communicated with anyone in the Philippines in connection with
the filing of an action for damages in their behalf arising from the death of Chua Pau Lun. Chua Pua
Tam, who is the brother-in-law of the first plaintiff and uncle of the others, testified that the plaintiffs
had not written to him nor had he communicated with them. The letters supposedly sent to Lim Ping
Kok by his sister Lim Sick Huey (Exh. J) and his mother (Exh. K) did not contain any intimation much
less of an authorization for the filing of a claim for damages in behalf of the widow and children of the
deceased, Chua Pua Lun, against the parties responsible for his death. Under this situation, the Court
has no other alternative but to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the evidence on record does
not show that the plaintiffs have authorized much less directed the commencement of the present
action.

Appellants now contend that the trial court erred (1) in finding that plaintiffs, being residents of
Communist China, have not authorized anyone to file the present case against the defendants; (2) in
dismissing the complaint when the authority to prosecute the case stems from the appointment of
Chua Pua Tam as guardian ad litem of minors Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan; (3) in dismissing the
case when the same could be considered as prosecuted by a negotiorum gestor and (4) in finding
that there was no authority to file the case when such question was not raised in issue nor was
evidence adduced on the point.

With regard to the first question, we find no error in the findings made by the trial court. Indeed, the
same is supported by the record and the evidence. Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs who are the
widow and children of the deceased Chua Pua Lun are all citizens and residents of Communist China
and notwithstanding the fact that they have been informed of the death of the deceased, they have
not sent any communication to anyone in the Philippines giving authority to take whatever action may
be proper to obtain an indemnity for his death other than two letters supposedly sent to Lim Ping Kok
by his sister Lim Siok Huey and his mother, which do not contain any intimation nor authorization for
the filing of the present action. The most that they contain was an inquiry with regard to the progress
of the case and the administration of the duck-raising business which the deceased left in the
Philippines. Such certainly cannot be considered as an authority to the present counsel to file and
prosecute the present case in behalf of the widow and children now residing in Communist China.

It should be noted that the present action was initiated by plaintiffs represented merely by their
counsel and the question arose as to whether the latter had the proper authority to represent the
former in view of the fact that they are all residents of a foreign country. And the question was
properly raised in view of the rule that, while a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, he may however be required by the court on motion of
either party to produce his authority under which he appears (Section 20, Rule 127). Undoubtedly, the
question was properly raised by counsel for the defendants as otherwise the trial court would not
have given proper attention to the matter. Indeed, on this point, the trial court made this important
comment: "While an attorney representing a client in a case pending in Court is presumed to be
authorized for the purpose, nevertheless in the case under consideration, such presumption had been
destroyed and come by the very evidence presented by counsel himself ." (Emphasis supplied)

It is true that one Chua Pua Tam was appointed as guardian ad litem of two of plaintiffs who allegedly
are minors to represent them in the prosecution of the present case, but while this representation may
only benefit the minors, and not the other plaintiffs, yet the same would not suffice to meet the
requirement of the rule which provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest (Section 2, Rule 3). Again, we need hereto show that Chua Pua Tam was authorized
by the heirs abroad to act as such in behalf of the minors for it was in this belief that he was so
appointed by the trial court. But when in the course of the," trial it developed that he never had any
communication with any of the heirs and much less received any authority from them either to
prosecute this case or to act, as such guardian in behalf of the minors, the trial court lost no time in
disauthorizing him and considering his representation ineffective. Thus, on this point, the trial court
said: "Chua Pua Tam, who is the brother-in law of the first plaintiff and uncle of the others, testified
that the plaintiffs had not written to him nor had he communicated with them. The letters supposedly
sent to Lim Ping Kok by his sister Lim Siock Huey (Exh. J) and his mother (Exh. K) did not contain
any intimation much less an authorization for the filing of the claim for damages in behalf of the widow
and children of the deceased."

Nor can the claim that Chua Pua Tam can be considered as negotiorum gestor be entertained
because in the present case there is need of express authority on his part to represent the minors by
virtue of an express provision of our Rules of Court. In negotiorum gestio no such authority is
required.

The contention that the trial court considered the issue regarding the lack of authority on the part of
counsel to represent plaintiffs in this case or of Chua Pua Tam to act as guardian ad litem of the
minors even if the same was not raised by any of the opposing parties or their counsel, cannot be
entertained, it appearing that the same was expressly raised by defendants Reyes and Limjuco not
only in the course of the trial but in their answers. Moreover, this flaw in the case of the plaintiffs was
discovered by the court in the course of the trial in view of the evidence presented by the very
counsel of plaintiffs. In view of such development, the trial court could not but take notice of the
matter considering the prayer in defendants' answer that they be given "such reliefs as this Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises.".

Wherefore, the decision appealed from in so far as it the complaint is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

I concur, but with respect to the issue of negotiorum gestio my position is that the same can not exist
where the authority of the alleged gestor is disputed. This quasi-contract presupposes, that the
gestor's authority is taken for granted by the persons with whom he deals, although in fact he has not
been legally empowered by the one in whose behalf he presumes to act.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4898 March 19, 1909
SALVADOR GUERRERO, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen
Sanchez Muñoz,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEOPOLDO TERAN, defendant-appellant.
J. Rodriguez Serra for appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 18th day of March, 1908, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant to recover
the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This amount was claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant upon
the theory that the defendant had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz
from the 1st day of September, 1901, until the 22d day of October, 1906. The plaintiff made a part of
his complaint the following items of indebtedness:
Difference, account of the property "Bonga" ........................................................ P10.55
Difference, account of the property "Basag" ......................................................... 218.75
Difference, small accounts "Bonga" and "Basag" ................................................ 8.80
Difference, account estate of A. Sanchez .............................................................. 150.00
Difference, account heirs of J. M. Ceballos ............................................................ 224.81
Difference, account hemp of "La Trinidad" ........................................................... 82.87
Difference, account workmen at "La Trinidad" ..................................................... 80.70
Difference, account lates of Ligao .......................................................................... 2.00 Small
accounts of "Bonga" and "Basag" .............................................................. 3,676.84 Cost 1
lamp and 1 barometer .................................................................................... 33.50 Workmen at
"La Trinidad" ....................................................................................... 5,709.90 Excess of
salaries paid account general expenses at "La Trinidad"................... 670.00 Account of cockpit
.................................................................................................... 34.15 Account "late Caualog"
........................................................................................... 220.10 Account Jesus Teran
................................................................................................ 235.92 Account Antonio Moreda
....................................................................................... 1,029.83 ———— Total
.......................................................................................................... 12,388.72
In answer to the said complaint, the defendant admitted certain allegations and denied others. The
defendant admitted that he owed the plaintiff P188.39 but claimed that the plaintiff owed him the sum
of P482.14, and that the plaintiff, therefore, still owed to the defendant the difference between
P188.39 and P482.14, or the sum of P239.75, for which latter amount the defendant prayed for
judgment, with interest and cots against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court found that the
evidence that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz, or that part of
the said estate belonging to the plaintiff, owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per
cent until the same amount should be fully paid. From this decision of the lower court the defendant
appealed and made the following assignment of error:
1. The court erred in holding that the defendant, from September 17, 1901, to October 6, 1906,
managed and administered the estate of Sanchez Muñoz as a judicial administrator and
executor.
2. The court erred in holding that the defendant was responsible to the plaintiffs for the loans
made to different persons for different accounts, and for credits against the persons mentioned
in the complaint.
3. The court erred in declaring in the judgment that the difference in the weight of the scales
was illegal.
4. And the court erred in sentencing the defendant to pay the costs specified in the judgment.
With reference to the first above assignment of error, from the record brought to this court the
following facts appear:
First. That the defendant Leopoldo Teran was, on the 17th day of September, 1901, appointed as
administrator of said estate. The record also discloses that the defendant entered into a bond in the
sum of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such representative of the
estate of Antonio Sanchez Muñoz.
Second. The record further discloses that upon the 18th day of March, 1902, the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay appointed Maria Muñoz y Gomez as guardian for the said Maria
Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muñoz, and that the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez gave the
required bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian.
Third. While there are some indications in the record that the defendant continued to act as the
administrator of said estate after the appointment of the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez, up to and
including the 6th day of October, 1906, yet the fact exists and must be accepted as true that the said
Maria Muñoz y Gomez was the actual representative of the said Maria Manuela and Maria del
Carmen Sanchez Muñoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio
Sanchez Muñoz, from and after the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906, and
therefore the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez, as such guardian and administratrix of the estate of the
said minors, must be held responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the period
while she (Maria Muñoz y Gomez) was the actual guardian of said minors.
Fourth. On the 6th day of October, 1906, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay, for the
reason that the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez was not a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time for
her appointment (the 18th day of March, 1902) removed her as such guardian and appointed as
guardian of said minors Felix Samson, and required from said Samson, as provisional guardian, a
bond in the sum of P2,000. On the 18th day of October, 1906, the said Samson duly executed the
bond as required.
From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez her lawyers
appealed to the Supreme Court, which appeal was subsequently withdrawn. The order therefore
revoking the appointment of the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez became final. The mere fact, however,
that she had been removed as said guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to
the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. It must be clear, therefore, that
the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez is responsible to the said minors for administration of their interests in
the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the time of her acceptance of said appointment
on the 18th day of March, 1902, up to the time of her removal on the 6th day of October, 1906. If
during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards and if any
mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. Unquestionably, she
may have an action against the persons to whom she entrusted the direct management of said estate
for any loss which they may have negligently and corruptly occasioned her. Therefore, if any loss
occurred to the plaintiff between the 18th day of March, 1902, and the 6th day of October, 1906, they
have a right of action only against the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under
the law the administratrix of the property of their estate.
In the claim presented by the plaintiff against the defendant no dates are given showing the time of
the particular loss and losses occasioned by the defendant. As was said above, the defendant was
liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal representative of the said minors
in the management of their estate, from the 17th day of September, 1901, up to the time that he was
superseded by the said Maria Muñoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of March, 1902. There is no proof
showing that any of the losses constituting the amount which the plaintiff claims occurred within this
period. However, the defendant acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, he owes to
them the sum of P188.39.
There is no claim of any loss or that the estate has not been properly managed since the appointment
of the said Felix Samson on the 6th day of October, 1906.
From a consideration of all of the evidence brought to this court, we reach the following conclusions:
First. That the defendant, Leopoldo Teran, was the duly appointed and recognized representative of
the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muñoz in the administration of their
interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the 17th day of September, 1901,
until the 18th day of March, 1902.
Second. That the said Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was the duly appointed representative of the said
minors in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from
the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906.
Third. That the Leopoldo Teran was responsible to the plaintiff (the said minors) for the fruits and
profits resulting from their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muñoz from the said
17th day of September, 1901, to the 18th day of March, 1902.
Fourth. That the said Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was responsible to the plaintiff (the said minors)
for the fruits and profits resulting from the management of the estate of the said Don Antonio Sanchez
Muñoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906.
The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiff were due as a result of the
management of the said estate during the time while the said defendant was administering their
interests therein, except the sum of P188.39, admitted to be due by the defendant, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the only amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action is the
said amount of P188.39.
Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment
was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which
requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts,
charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate,
etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians
who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and
guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error for the reason that there is no
evidence in the record indicating any liability on the part of the defendant other than his admission
above indicated.
For the reason above stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, without any special
finding as to costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Willard, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45623 June 30, 1938
JESUS CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
vs.
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, and RAMON
CRISOSTOMO, respondents.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Magno S. Gatmaitan for respondent Crisostomo.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from a decision of the second division of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on June 19, 1937, which dismissed a petition for certiorari and set aside a writ of
preliminary injunction which had been issued, with the costs to the then petitioner. In special
proceedings No. 3632 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entitled "Guardianship of the
Incompetent Petrona Crisostomo", instituted sometime in 1928, the court, on April 21, 1933,
appointed the herein petitioner guardian of the person and property of the incompetent. On February
29, 1936, while the incompetent was already released from the National Psychopathic Hospital of
Mandaluyon, Province of Rizal, where she had been confined, the petitioner, such guardian, filed a
verified petition asking that the court which took cognizance of the guardianship case declare that the
incompetent had recovered her mental faculties, that she was able to take care of her person and to
administer her property, cancel the bond filed by the guardian, and order the termination and filing
away of the record. The petition was supported and accompanied by a verified statement of the
incompetent, who stated under oath that she was then 65 years of age, that she was in good health,
that she had recovered her mental faculties and that she was already able to take care of herself and
to administer her property. This sworn statement was stamped by the ward with her thumbmark and
made under oath on February 15, 1936, before the notary public Victoriano Matienzo. The Petition
was likewise supported and accompanied by two medical certificates of Doctors Alfredo L. Guerrero
and Ramon Syquia, dated February 15, 1936, who stated that Petrona Crisostomo was under their
medical treatment and that she had recovered her mental faculties. On the same date, February 29,
1936, the court which took cognizance of the guardianship case was apprized of the petition and it
favorably acted thereon, issuing the order which states: "It having been shown by a verified motion of
the guardian and by two medical certificates of well-known doctors that the incompetent Petrona
Crisostomo has recovered the full use of her mental faculties and that she is now in a position to take
care of her person and administer her own property, and this court having approved the accounts
submitted by the said guardian including his administration until February 14 of the current year, the
court declares the said Petrona Crisostomo able to take care of her person and to administer her own
property, wherefore, it orders the terminator of this guardianship, the cancellation of the bond of the
guardian and the final filing away of this case. So ordered. Malolos, Bulacan, February 29, 1936.
(Sgd.) SOTERO RODAS, Judge."
After the lapse of about nine months from the issuance of the order of February 29, 1936, that is, on
November 9 of the same year, the respondent Ramon Crisostomo, brother of the incompetent, filed a
motion in the guardianship proceedings and in the same court which had taken cognizance of said
special proceedings, asking that the restoration order of February 29, 1936 be set aside, that the
case be reopened, and that a new guardian of the person and property of Petrona Crisostomo be
appointed, alleging as grounds that the aforesaid order is null and void because entered without
notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent and without hearing and that the latter had not yet
recovered her mentality. The petition objected to this petition on the ground that the order sought to
be annulled had already become final and that the court had already lost jurisdiction to reverse or
annul the same, but on December 15, 1936, the respondent judge issued an order annulling that of
February 29 of the same year. The said judge having denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner, the latter sued out a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which petition was denied,
with the costs.
1. It is beyond question that the judge who took cognizance of and granted the petition to
restore capacity had full jurisdiction, conferred by sections 559, 562 and 575, Chapter XXVII,
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure followed by virtue of a petition for restoration of
competency is neither new nor independent; it is a continuation of the original guardianship
proceedings (32 C. J., sec. 326, p. 674; Ayers vs. Mussetter, 46 Ill., 472; Matter of Osborn, 74
App. Div., 113; 77 N. Y. S., 423; 11 N. Y. Ann. Cas., 211). If the court had jurisdiction to
appoint a guardian of the person and property of the incompetent, it is obvious that it had like
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant the petition for restoration which was filed.
2. The principal question involved in the case has reference to the validity of the order of
restoration to capacity of February 29, 1936. The court declared it null and illegal for lack of
notice and for failure to hold the hearing mentioned in section 562 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It entertained the opinion that the respondent Ramon Crisostomo should have
been notified, being one of the nearest relatives of the incapacitated, and that the want of this
notice divested the jurisdiction of the judge to issue the aforesaid order. The second division of
the Court of Appeals maintained this view. Counsel for the appellant contends that the
applicable section is 575 of the same Code and that even applying section 562, the notice and
the hearing were unnecessary under the circumstances of the case. We agree with the Court
of Appeals in that section 575 is not squarely applicable because its provisions are general in
character and that the case should be governed by section 562 because its provisions are
special in character and the question at issue directly comes under the said provisions. Section
562 is of the following tenor:
 SEC. 562. Restoration of competency. — Any person who has been declared insane or
incompetent, or the guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree or
any friend, may apply, by petition, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which
the appointment of guardians is made, and have the fact of his restoration to capacity
judicially determined. The petition shall be verified by oath, and shall state that such
person is then sane and competent. Upon receiving the petition, the court must appoint
a day for hearing before the court, and shall cause notice of the trial to be given to the
guardian of the person so declared insane or incompetent and to the ward. On the trial,
the guardian, or relatives of the person so declared insane or incompetent, and in the
discretion of the court any other person, may contest the right to the relief demanded.
Witnesses may be required to appear and testify, and may be called and examined by
the court on its own motion. If it be found that the person be of sound mind, and capable
of taking care of himself and property, his restoration to capacity shall be adjudged and
the guardianship of such person, if such person be not a minor, shall cease.
In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid
order restoring him to capacity it is necessary, under this section, (1) that a verified petition be
presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third
degree, or any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has
recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and (3) that upon
receiving the petition the court should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the
incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, in the
discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought. The section does not
require notice of the hearing to any other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In
the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signed by the guardian himself
and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of the incompetent. In the
petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties and this
allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement when she stated that she had
already recovered her mental faculties. In these circumstances the only logical conclusion is
that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially complied with and that the
notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous. It is true that under the section the
respondent Ramon Crisostomo could have appeared at the hearing and opposed the petition,
but this right given to him by law is not absolute in the sense that he is also entitled to a
personal notice. His situation is like that of a person who, not being a defendant in an ordinary
action and not having been notified of the complaint, learns of the existence of the suit and
discovers that he has a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation; there is no question
that he would be entitled to take part therein as intervener, but he cannot successfully ask for
the annulment of the judgment to be rendered on the ground that he had a right to be cited or
notified and to be present at the trial because it happened that he had an interest in the case.
Section 562, like the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be liberally
interpreted pursuant to the provision of section 2 thereof in order to promote its object and
assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. If, as it seems, the intention of the respondent
Ramon Crisostomo is to annul the donation which the incompetent made of her property in
favor of the petitioner, the courts are open for him to bring an action for that
purpose.1ªvvphïl.nët
3. The order issued by the respondent judge on December 15, 1936, annulling that of February
29 of the same year is, in our opinion, null and void because the court was without jurisdiction
to enter the same after the accounts of the guardian had been approved, his bond cancelled
and the record of the guardianship proceedings deemed closed and filed away definitely.
When the respondent Ramon Crisostomo filed his motion asking the annulment of the order of
February 29, 1936, the latter had already become final and binding upon the parties. The
guardianship case was no longer before the court because the accounts of the guardian had
 been definitely approved, his bond had been cancelled, he had been relieved of his charge,
and the incompetent had recovered her capacity before the law.
4. Another of the reasons taken into account in denying the writ of certiorari filed by the herein
petitioner is that the order of December 15, 1936, was appealable and the petitioner could
have perfected an appeal therefrom if he so desired. It is fact, however, that the petitioner did
not appeal from the order and the appeal does not now lie because the period therefor
provided by law has long expired. The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both
in cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been
lost with or without the appellant's negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or
decision which is the subject matter of the remedy.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is reversed and the order of December 15, 1936
entered by the respondent judge is set aside, with costs of this instance to the other respondent
Ramon Crisostomo. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
LIM SIOK HUEY, ET AL.
vs.
ALFREDO LAPIZ, ET AL. G.R. No. L-12289 May 28, 1958 FACTS:
Defendant Alfredo Lapiz, the driver of the Jaguar jeepney, in answer to the complaint, alleged that the
vehicle driven by him was hit by the Kapalaran bus which was driven by defendant Vicente Reyes
due to the negligence of the latter, thereby causing the death of Chua Pua Lun who was a passenger
of the jeepney. Defendant Victorino Sapin in turn alleged that he was not the owner of the jeepney
driven by Lapiz, while defendants Vicente Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco, the first as driver and the
second as owner of the Kapalaran bus, alleged that the collision between the two vehicles was due to
the negligence of Alfredo Lapiz. Plaintiffs Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan, being minors, the court,
upon motion of their counsel, appointed Chua Pua Tam, a brother of the deceased, as guardian
ad litem
to represent them in this case. CFI dismissed the complaint pronouncing that the plaintiffs are citizens
of China, and though there was a letter made by the sister and the mother of Chua Pua Lun, but no
written authority granting Chua Pua Tam to claim for damages in behalf of the widow and children of
deceased. Chua Pua Lun also testified that the plaintiffs had not written to him nor had he
communicated with them. The dismissal included Lapiz
’s
cross-claim against Reyes and Limjuco, Reyes and Limjuco
’s
counterclaim against the plaintiff and their cross-claim against defendants Lapiz and Sapin." Plaintiffs
appealed directly to this Court in view of the amount involved.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs, being residents of China, have not authorized
anyone to file the present case against the defendants; (2) WON the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint when the authority to prosecute the case stems from the appointment of Chua Pua Tam as
guardian
ad litem
of minors Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan; (3) WON the trial court erred in dismissing the case when
the same could be considered as prosecuted by a
negotiorum gestor
and (4) WON the trial court erred in finding that there was no authority to file the case when such
question was not raised in issue nor was evidence adduced on the point.
HELD:
(1) First issue, we find no error in the findings made by the trial court. Such was supported by the
record and the evidence. Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs who are the widow and children of the
deceased Chua Pua Lun are all citizens and residents of China. What the letter contained was an
inquiry with regard to the progress of the case and the administration of the duck-raising business
which the deceased left in the Philippines. Such certainly cannot be considered as an authority to the
present counsel to file and prosecute the present case. The present action was initiated by plaintiffs
represented merely by their counsel
and the question arose as to whether the latter had the proper authority to represent the plaintiffs all
residents of a foreign country. While a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, he may however be required by the court on motion of either party to
produce his authority under which he appears (Section 20, Rule 127). Undoubtedly, the question was
properly raised by counsel for the defendants as otherwise the trial court would not have given proper
attention to the matter. (2) It is true that one Chua Pua Tam was appointed as guardian
ad litem
of two of plaintiffs who allegedly are minors to represent them in the prosecution of the present case,
the same would not suffice to meet the requirement of the rule which provides that every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest (Section 2, Rule 3). Again, we need hereto
show that Chua Pua Tam was authorized by the heirs abroad to act as such in behalf of the minors
for it was in this belief that he was so appointed by the trial court. No evidence showing authority to
prosecute the case or act as guardian in behalf of the minor plaintiffs was presented. The
representation is ineffective. (3) Nor can the claim that Chua Pua Tam can be considered as
negotiorum gestio
since express authority is needed on his part to represent the minors by virtue of an express provision
of our Rules of Court though ordinarily
negotiorum gestio
no authority is required. (4) Regarding the last issue, the trial court did not err in such pronouncement
since said issues were expressly raised by defendants Reyes and Limjuco not only in the course of
the trial but in their answers. This flaw in the case of the plaintiffs was discovered by the court in the
course of the trial in view of the evidence presented by the very counsel of plaintiffs. Wherefore, the
decision appealed from in so far as it the complaint is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L.,
J.,
concurring: I concur, but with respect to the issue of
negotiorum gestio
my position is that the same can not exist where the authority of the alleged
gestor
is disputed. This quasi-contract presupposes, that the
gestor's
authority is taken for granted by the persons with whom he deals, although in fact he has not been
legally empowered by the one in whose behalf he presumes to act.