1. Mylene Carvajal vs. Luzon Development Bank and/or Oscar Z.

Ramirez Facts:
Petitioner Mylene Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by respondent Luzon Development Bank
(Bank) on 28 October 2003 under a six-month probationary employment contract, with a monthly salary of
P5,175.00. Respondent Oscar Ramirez is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Bank.
On 10 December 2003, the Bank sent petitioner a Memorandum4 directing her to explain in writing why
she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for "chronic tardiness" on November 3, 5, 6, 14, 18, 20, 21
and 28 2003 or for a total of eight (8) times. Petitioner apologized in writing and explained that she was in the
process of making adjustments regarding her work and house chores.5 She was thus reprimanded in writing and
reminded of her status as a probationary employee.6 Still, on 6 January 2004, a second Memorandum was sent
to petitioner directing her to explain why she should not be suspended for "chronic tardiness" on 13 occasions
or on December 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 22, and 23 2003. On 7 January 2004, petitioner submitted
her written explanation and manifested her acceptance of the consequences of her actions.7 On 12 January
2004, petitioner was informed, through a Memorandum, 8 of her suspension for three (3) working days without
pay effective 21 January 2004. Finally, in a Memorandum dated 22 January 2004, petitioner’s suspension was
lifted but in the same breath, her employment was terminated effective 23 January 2004.9
Hence, petitioner’s filing of the Complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner
alleged, in her position paper, that the following were the reasons for her termination: 1) she is not an effective
frontliner; 2) she has mistakenly cleared a check; 3) tardiness; 4) absenteeism; and 5) shortage.10
In their position paper, respondents averred that petitioner was terminated as a probationary employee
on three grounds, namely: 1) chronic tardiness; 2) unauthorized absence; and 3) failure to perform satisfactorily
as a probationary employee. Respondents explained that petitioner was a chronic violator of the bank’s rules
and regulations on tardiness and absenteeism. Aside from her numerous tardiness, petitioner was absent without
leave for 2 days. She also cleared a check which later turned out to be a bounced check. Finally, petitioner
garnered only a rating of 2.17, with 4 being the highest and 1 the lowest, in her performance evaluation.
On 9 June 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution14 dated 20 July 2006.
In a petition for certiorari filed by respondents, the Court of Appeals rendered the 20 August 2008
Decision reversing the NLRC ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed

Held:
No, the dismissal was valid. A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of
tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an
additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be
terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by
the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.
Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private
sector. As a matter of fact, habitual tardiness is a serious offense that may very well constitute gross or habitual
neglect of duty, a just cause to dismiss a regular employee. Assuming that petitioner was not apprised of the
standards concomitant to her job, it is but common sense that she must abide by the work hours imposed by the
bank. Satisfactory performance is and should be one of the basic standards for regularization. Naturally, before
an employer hires an employee, the former can require the employee, upon his engagement, to undergo a trial
period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on reasonable
standards made known to him at the time of engagement.
It is evident that the primary cause of respondent’s dismissal from her probationary employment was her
“chronic tardiness.” At the very start of her employment, petitioner already exhibited poor working habits. Even
during her first month on the job, she already incurred eight (8) tardiness. Respondent also cited other
infractions such as unauthorized leaves of absence, mistake in clearing of a check, and underperformance. All of
these infractions were not refuted by petitioner.

2. Abbott Laboratories Philippines vs. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz Facts:

Abbott Laboratories needed a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. Alcaraz – who was then a
Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Inc showed interest and Abbott
formally offered Alcaraz the position. In Abbott’s offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a
probationary basis. Alcaraz signed an employment contract which stated that she was to be placed on probation
for a period of six (6) months beginning February to August 2005.Abbott’s Human Resources (HR) Director,
sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an explanation of the procedure for evaluating the performance of
probationary employees and further indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its
employees. Respondent was called to a meeting where she was informed that she failed to meet the
regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs Manager. Thereafter, petitioner requested Alcaraz
to tender her resignation, else they be forced to terminate her services. She was also told that, regardless of her
choice, she should no longer report for work and was asked to surrender her office identification cards. She
requested to be given one week to decide on the same, but to no avail.Alcaraz told her administrative assistant
that she would be on leave for that day. However, respondent was told that Walsh and Terrible already
announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that Alcaraz already resigned due to health reasons. Walsh,
Almazar, and Bernardo personally handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that her services had been terminated.
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers. She claimed that she should have already been
considered as a regular and not a probationary employee given Abbott’s failure to inform her of the reasonable
standards for her regularization upon her engagement as required under Article 295 of the Labor Code. In this
relation, she contended that while her employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary
status, the same did not indicate the standards on which her regularization would be based. She further averred
that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her.
Abbott maintained that Alcaraz was validly terminated from her probationary employment given her
failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her regularization which were made known to her at the time of
her engagement.
The LA ruled in Abbott’s favor. The NLRC reversed, upholding Alcaraz’s allegations. The CA affirmed
the NLRC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment

Held:
No. Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus
of evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz’s PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a
PPSE form was completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance evaluation
discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the
necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz’s performance with the set company
standards.
The Court modified Agabon v. NLRC in the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot where it
created a distinction between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and those due
to an authorized cause, on the other.
If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 296 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee.
If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 297 but the employer failed to comply
with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the
employer’s exercise of his management prerogative.

3. Armando Aliling vs. Jose B. Feliciano, Manuel F. San Mateo Facts:

Respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to employ petitioner Armando
Aliling (Aliling) on June 2, 2004 as “Account Executive (Seafreight Sales),” with a compensation package of a
monthly salary of PhP 13,000, transportation allowance of PhP 3,000, clothing allowance of PhP 800, cost of
living allowance of PhP 500, each payable on a per month basis and a 14th month pay depending on the
profitability and availability of financial resources of the company. The offer came with a six (6)-month
probation period condition with this express caveat: “Performance during probationary period shall be made as
basis for confirmation to Regular or Permanent Status.”
On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract under the terms of conversion to
regular status shall be determined on the basis of work performance; and employment services may, at any time,
be terminated for just cause or in accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement.
However, instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to handle Ground Express
(GX), a new company product launched on June 18, 2004 involving domestic cargo forwarding service for
Luzon. Marketing this product and finding daily contracts for it formed the core of Aliling’s new assignment.
A month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director, emailed
Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the latter’s performance.
On September 25, 2004, Joseph R. Lariosa (Lariosa), Human Resources Manager of WWWEC, asked
Aliling to report to the Human Resources Department to explain his absence taken without leave from
September 20, 2004.
 Aliling responded two days later. He denied being absent on the days in question, attaching to his reply-
letter a copy of his timesheet which showed that he worked from September 20 to 24, 2004. Aliling’s
explanation came with a query regarding the withholding of his salary corresponding to September 11 to 25,
2004.
On October 15, 2004, Aliling tendered his resignation to San Mateo. While WWWEC took no action on
his tender, Aliling nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter
dated October 1, 2004 to management that San Mateo had forced him to resign.
Lariosa’s response-letter of October 1, 2004, informed Aliling that his case was still in the process of
being evaluated. On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his
services effective as of that date owing to his “non-satisfactory performance” during his probationary period.
Records show that Aliling, for the period indicated, was paid his outstanding salary.
However, or on October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced
resignation, nonpayment of salaries as well as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the
complaint was Aliling’s Affidavit dated November 12, 2004, in which he stated: “5. At the time of my
engagement, respondents did not make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a regular
employee.”
Refuting Aliling’s basic posture, WWWEC stated that in the letter offer and employment contract
adverted to, WWWEC and Aliling have signed a letter of appointment on June 11, 2004 containing the terms of
engagement.
WWWEC also attached to its Position Paper a memo dated September 20, 2004 in which San Mateo
asked Aliling to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet the expected job performance,
considering that the load factor for the GX Shuttles for the period July to September was only 0.18% as opposed
to the allegedly agreed upon load of 80% targeted for August 5, 2004. According to WWWEC, Aliling, instead
of explaining himself, simply submitted a resignation letter.
On April 25, 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision declaring that the grounds upon which
complainant’s dismissal was based did not conform not only the standard but also the compliance required
under Article 281 of the Labor Code, Necessarily, complainant’s termination is not justified for failure to
comply with the mandate the law requires. Respondents should be ordered to pay salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contract of employment and all other benefits amounting to a total of P35,811.00
covering the period from October 6 to December 7, 2004.
The Labor Arbiter explained that Aliling cannot be validly terminated for non-compliance with thw
quota threshold absent a prior advisory of the reasonable standards upon which his performance would be
evaluated.
Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
separate motions for reconsideration were also denied by the NLRC.
The CA anchored its assailed action on the strength of the following premises: (a) respondents failed to
prove that Aliling’s dismal performance constituted gross and habitual neglect necessary to justify his dismissal;
(b) not having been informed at the time of his engagement of the reasonable standards under which he will
qualify as a regular employee, Aliling was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee; and
(c) the strained relationship existing between the parties argues against the propriety of reinstatement. Hence,
the instant petition.
Issue:
 What is the effect once a decision was assailed for appeal?

Held:
It is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and
that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not the function of the Supreme
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The
jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. The more recent Peñafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc.,
v. Sarmiento, 634 SCRA 279 (2010), has reaffirmed the above ruling, to wit: Finally, the CA affirmed the ruling
of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-established is the doctrine that findings
of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When
passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon this Court and will not normally be
disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court finds that none are applicable to the present
case.

4. Iluminada Ver Buiser vs. Hon. Vicente Leogardo Facts:

Iluminada Ver Buiser, Ma. Cecilia Rillo-Acuna and Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan entered into an
"Employment Contract (on Probationary Status)" with private respondent, a corporation engaged in the business
of publication and circulation of the directory of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.
Company hereby employs the employee as telephone representative on a probationary status for a
period of eighteen (18) months.
The Employee recognizes the fact that the nature of the telephone sales representative's job is such that
the company would be able to determine his true character, conduct and selling capabilities only after the
publication of the directory, and that it takes about eighteen (18) months before his worth as a telephone saw
representative can be fully evaluated inasmuch as the advertisement solicited by him for a particular year are
published in the directory only the following year.
The private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished or met by the petitioners. Failing to
meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service by the private respondent.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissals.

Issue:
Whether probationary period is limited only to 6 months

Held:
 General rule: The probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months.
Exception: When the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is
established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the
employee.
In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer
period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for
eighteen (18) months, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or
when the job requires certain qualifications, skills, experience or training.
In the case at bar, it is shown that private respondent Company needs at least eighteen (18) months to
determine the character and selling capabilities of the petitioners as sales representatives. The Company is
engaged in advertisement and publication in the Yellow Pages of the PLDT Telephone Directories. Publication
of solicited ads are only made a year after the sale has been made and only then win the company be able to
evaluate the efficiency, conduct, and selling ability of its sales representatives, the evaluation being based on the
published ads.

5. Woodridge School vs. Joanne C. Pe Benito and Randy T. Balaguer Facts:

Woodridge School hired Joanne C. Pe Benito and Randy T. Balaguer as probationary high school
teachers. Their contracts of employment covered a three (3) year probationary period. Respondents, together
with twenty other teachers, presented petitioner with a Manifesto Establishing Relevant Issues Concerning the
School. Petitioner sent two separate Memoranda to respondents placing them under preventive suspension for a
period of thirty days for maligning the school. Petitioner issued respondents their Notice of Termination,
informing respondents that they did not qualify as regular employees for their failure to meet the performance
standards made known to them at the start of their probationary period. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
Issue:
Whether respondents are regular employees

Held:
Respondents were not regular or permanent employees; they had not yet completed three (3) years of
satisfactory service as academic personnel that would have entitled them to tenure as permanent employees in
accordance with the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. A probationary employee is one who, for a
given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent
employment. A probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence
and attitude of a probationer. The word "probationary," as used to describe the period of employment, implies
the purpose of the term or period. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a
probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer at the same time
seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent
employment. Petitioner failed to substantiate their claim by documentary evidence. Considering that
respondents were on probation for three years, and they were subjected to yearly evaluation by the students and
by the school administrators (principal and vice-principal), it is safe to assume that the results thereof were
definitely documented. As such, petitioner should have presented the evaluation reports and other related
documents to support its claim, instead of relying solely on the affidavits of their witnesses. The unavoidable
inference, therefore, remains that the respondents’ dismissal is invalid.

6. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. vs. Leon M. Magtibay Facts:

The Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) hired Magtibay, on contractual basis, to assist, for a period of 5
months, the regular phone operator.
After the expiration of Magtibay’s contractual employment, PDI announced the creation and availability
of a new position for a 2nd telephone operator who would undergo probationary employment.
After the usual interview for the 2nd telephone operator slot, PDI chose to hire Magtibay on a
probationary basis for a period of 6 months. The signing of a written contract of employment followed.
A week before the end the agreed 6-month probationary period, a PDI officer handed Magtibay his
termination paper, grounded on his alleged failure to meet company standards. Aggrieved, Magtibay
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the LA.
Issue:
Whether or not there was illegal dismissal

Held:
No. LABOR CODE , Art. 281. Probationary employment . ̶ Probationary employment shall not exceed 6
months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement
stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a (1) just cause or (2) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee
who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
It is undisputed that PDI apprised Magtibay of the ground of his termination, i.e., he failed to qualify as
a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement,
only a week before the expiration of the six-month probationary period. Given this perspective, does this make
his termination unlawful for being violative of his right to due process of law?
It does not. Unlike under the first ground for the valid termination of probationary employment which is
for just cause, the second ground does not require notice and hearing. Due process of law for this second ground
consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period known to
him at the time of his probationary employment. By the very nature of a probationary employment, the
employee knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and his performance of his assigned
duties and functions would be under continuous scrutiny by his superiors. It is in apprising him of the standards
against which his performance shall be continuously assessed where due process regarding the second ground
lies, and not in notice and hearing as in the case of the first ground.

7. Pine City Educational Center vs. The National Labor Relations Commission Facts:
Private respondents Bentrezet al., were all employed as teachers on probationary basis by petitioner
Pines City Educational Center. All the private respondents, except Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, signed
contracts of employment with petitioner for a fixed duration. On March 31, 1989, due to the expiration of
private respondents’ contracts and their poor performance as teachers, they were notified of petitioners’ decision
not to renew their contracts anymore.
On April 10, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter,
alleging that their dismissals were without cause and in violation of due process. Except for
private respondent Leila Dominguez who worked with petitioners for one semester, all other private
respondents were employed for one to two years. They were never informed in writing by petitioners regarding
the standards or criteria of evaluation so as to enable them to meet the requirements for appointment as regular
employees.
For their part, petitioners contended that private respondents’ separation from employment, apart from
their poor performance, was due to the expiration of the periods stipulated in their respective contracts. In the
case of private respondent DangwaBentrez, the duration of his employment contract was for one year, or
beginning June, 1988 to March 1989 whereas in the case of the other private respondents, the duration of their
employment contracts was for one semester, or beginning November, 1988 to March 1989.
On February 28, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, ordering
their reinstatement and the payment of their full backwages and other benefits and privileges without
qualification and deduction from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement. The computation
of backwages covered only the period private respondents were terminated up to January 31, 1990 or 10 months
and does not include backwages from January 31, 1990 up to their actual reinstatement. In support of this
decision, the Labor Arbiter rationalized that the teacher’s contracts were vague and did not include the specific
description of duties and assignments of private respondents. NLRC affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter.
Hence, the appeal.
 SC held that insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed
periods of employment are concerned, their services were lawfully terminated by reason of the expiration of the
periods of their respective contracts. With respect to the remaining private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia
Chan, both of whom did not sign any contract fixing the periods of their employment nor to have knowingly
and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment, petitioners had the burden of proving that the
termination of their services was legal. As probationary employees, they are likewise protected by the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution. Consequently, they cannot be removed from their positions unless for
cause.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents Picart and Chan, who were illegally dismissed, were entitled to
payment of backwages

Held:
Yes. Private respondents Picart and Chan were entitled to payment of backwages. However, in the
computation of the backwages, the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the
date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom.The order for their
reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges from the time they were
dismissed up to their actual reinstatement was proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, 14 which took effect on March 21, 1989. It should be noted
that private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan were dismissed illegally on March 31, 1989, or after the
effectivity of said amendatory law.
However, in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable to them, SC went back to the rule prior
to the Mercury Drug Rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the
date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom. SC restated the
underlying reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of their employer.
In addition, the law abhors double compensation. To this extent, SC’s ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al., v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on July 5, 1993, was hereby modified.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
November 29, 1990 is hereby MODIFIED. Private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan are ordered
reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and their backwages paid in full inclusive of
allowances, and to their other benefits or their monetary equivalent pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code,
as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, subject to deduction of income earned elsewhere during
the period of dismissal, if any, to be computed from the time they were dismissed up to the time of their actual
reinstatement. The rest of the Labor Arbiter’s decision dated February 28, 1990, as affirmed by the NLRC is set
aside.

8. Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenigildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial Corporation Facts:
 Petitioners Malicdem and Flores were hired by respondent corporation as extruder operators in 2006
They were responsible for the bagging of filament yarn, the quality of pp yarn package and the cleanliness of
the work place area. Their employment contracts were for a period of one (1) year. Every year thereafter, they
would sign a Resignation/Quitclaim in favor of Marulas a day after their contracts ended, and then sign another
contract for one (1) year until such time that they were told not to report to work anymore. They were asked to
sign a paper acknowledging the completion of their contractual status. Claiming that they were illegally
dismissed, the corporation countered that their contracts showed that they were fixed term employees for a
specific undertaking which was to work on a particular order of a customer for a specific period. Their
severance from employment then was due to the expiration of their contracts.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed

Held:
Yes. CA affirming NLRC decision annulled and set aside
Labor Law: Effect of continuous re-hiring of a project employee for the same tasks that are vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual trade or business of the employer
Once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired
by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular
employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence. To rule otherwise would allow
circumvention of labor laws in industries not falling within the ambit of Policy Instruction No. 20/Department
Order No. 19, hence allowing the prevention of acquisition of tenurial security by project or work pool
employees who have already gained the status of regular employees by the employers conduct.
The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. If the
employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely
intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the
necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
It is clear then that there was deliberate intent on the part of the employer to prevent the regularization of
petitioners. To begin with, there is no actual project. The only stipulations in the contracts were the dates of their
effectivity, the duties and responsibilities of the petitioners as extruder operators, the rights and obligations of
the parties, and the petitioners compensation and allowances. As there was no specific project or undertaking to
speak of, the respondents cannot invoke the exception in Article 280 of the Labor Code. This is a clear attempt
to frustrate the regularization of the petitioners and to circumvent the law.
Even granting that petitioners were project employees, they can still be considered as regular as they
were continuously hired by the same employer for the same position as extruder operators. Being responsible
for the operation of machines that produced sacks, their work was vital and indispensable the business of the
employer.
 The respondents cannot use the alleged expiration of the employment contracts of the petitioners as a
shield of their illegal acts. The project employment contracts that the petitioners were made to sign every year
since the start of their employment were only a stratagem to violate their security of tenure in the company.
The respondents invocation of William Uy Construction Corp. v. Trinidad22is misplaced because it is
applicable only in cases involving the tenure of project employees in the construction industry. It is widely
known that in the construction industry, a project employees work depends on the availability of projects,
necessarily the duration of his employment. It is not permanent but coterminous with the work to which he is
assigned. It would be extremely burdensome for the employer, who depends on the availability of projects, to
carry him as a permanent employee and pay him wages even if there are no projects for him to work on. The
rationale behind this is that once the project is completed it would be unjust to require the employer to maintain
these employees in their payroll.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

9. A.M. Oreta & Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, and Sixto Grulla Jr. Facts:
Private respondent Grulla was engaged by Engineering Construction and Industrial Development
Company (ENDECO) through A.M. Oreta and Co., Inc., as a carpenter in its projects in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
The contract of employment, which was entered into June 11, 1980 was for a period of twelve (12) months.
Respondent Grulla left the Philippines for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5, 1980.
On August 15, 1980, Grulla met an accident which fractured his lumbar vertebra while working at the
jobsite. He was rushed to the New Jeddah Clinic and was confined there for twelve (12) days. On August 27,
1980, Grulla was discharged from the hospital and was told that he could resume his normal duties after
undergoing physical therapy for two weeks.
On September 18, 1980, respondent Grulla reported back to his Project Manager and presented to the
latter a medical certificate declaring the former already fit for work. Since then, he started working again until
he received a notice of termination of his employment on October 9, 1980.
In December, 1981, respondent Grulla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of medical
benefits, unpaid wages for the unexpired ten (10) months of his contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as
reimbursement of medical expenses against A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc., and Engineering Construction and
Industrial Development Co. (ENDECO) with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc and ENDECO filed their answer and alleged that the
contract of employment entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as one of the grounds for
termination, violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the contractor; and that Grulla was
dismissed because he has not performed his duties satisfactorally within the probationary period of three
months.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has an employer obligation over private respondent
Held:
Yes. The law is clear to the effect that in all cases involving employees engaged on probationary period
basis, the employer shall make known to the employee at the time he is hired, the standards by which he will
qualify as a regular employee. Nowhere in the employment contract executed between petitioner company and
respondent Grulla is there a stipulation that the latter shall undergo a probationary period for three months
before he can qualify as a regular employee. There is also no evidence on record showing that the respondent
Grulla has been appraised of his probationary status and the requirements which he should comply in order to
be a regular employee. In the absence of this requisites, there is justification in concluding that respondent
Grulla was a regular employee at the time he was dismissed by petitioner. As such, he is entitled to security of
tenure during his period of employment and his services cannot be terminated except for just and authorized
causes enumerated under the Labor Code and under the employment contract.
Anent the respondent Commission's finding of lack of due process in the dismissal of Grulla, the
petitioner claims that notice and hearing are important only if the employee is not aware of the problems
affecting his employment; that the same is not true in the instant case where respondent Grulla knew all along
that he could no longer effectively perform his job due to his physical condition. We find that this contention
has no legal basis.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of
employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's
intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal, while the requirement of hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these requirements can be dispensed with without running
afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, respondent Grulla was not, in any manner, notified of the charges against him before
he was outrightly dismissed. Neither was any hearing or investigation conducted by the company to give the
respondent a chance to be heard concerning the alleged unsatisfactory performance of his work.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of respondent Grulla violated the security of tenure under the
contract of employment which specifically provides that the contract term shall be for a period of twelve (12)
calendar months. Consequently the respondent Grulla should be paid his salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract of employment which is ten (10) months.
10. St. Paul College Quezon City, Sr. Lilia Therese Tolentino vs. Remigio Michael A. Ancheta II and
Cynthia A. Ancheta
Facts:
Remigio Michael was hired by the St. Paul College (SPCQC) as a teacher in the Gen. Education Dept.
with a probationary rank in SY 1996-1997 which was renewed the following year. His wife, Cynthia was was
also hired as a part time teacher of the Mass Comm Dept in the 2nd Sem SY 1996-1997 and her appointment
was renewed for SY 1997-1998. February 1998, the spouses both wrote a letter addressed to Sr. Lilia asking for
their contract to be renewed which was indeed granted by the College Council as evidenced by a letter sent by
petitioner.
April 22,1998, a letter, whose signatures includes that of the respondents, was sent to Sr. Bernadette. The
said letter contains teachers’ sentiments regarding school policies. However, April 21, 1998, a letter written by
the latter was shown, reiterating the conversation of Sr. Bernadette and Remigio regarding the non compliance
of respondent to instructional school policies. Accordingly, Sr. Bernadette wrote a letter endorsing the
termination of the spouses. Respondents submitted their comments however they were still terminated and their
letter for reconsideration denied thus the filling of a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by
both NLRC and LA but was granted by the CA. Petitioners MR was denied hence the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses were illegally dismissed

Held:
The Court finds that there was a valid and just cause for dismissal. The Labor Code commands that
before an employer may legally dismiss an employee from the service, the requirement of substantial and
procedural due process must be complied with. Under the requirement of substantial due process, the grounds
for termination of employment must be based on just or authorized causes. Petitioner school charged respondent
Remigio Michael of non-compliance with a school policy regarding the submission of final test questions to his
program coordinator for checking or comment which was admitted by the respondent in his letter. Respondent
Remigio Michael's spouse shared the same defenses and admissions as to the charges against her. The plain
admissions of the charges against them were the considerations taken into account by the petitioner school in
their decision not to renew the respondent spouses' employment contracts. This is a right of the school that is
mandated by law and jurisprudence. It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its
teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. Schools cannot be required to adopt standards
which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition. The same academic freedom grants the school the
autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching
limitations under the Labor Code.A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an
employer, during which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. The
probationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a
probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become an efficient and productive
employee. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the
term or period, not its length. It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or
term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is
binding for the full three-year probationary period. Therefore, the letters sent by petitioner, which were void of
any specifics cannot be considered as contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that of informal
correspondence among the said individuals. As such, petitioner school has the right not to renew the contracts of
the respondents, the old ones having been expired at the end of their terms.

11. Yolanda M. Mercado, Charito S. De Leon, vs. AMA Computer College-Paranaque City, Inc. Facts:
Petitioners were faculty members of AMA Computer College through the execution of individual
Teacher’s Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to teach, with the following common
stipulation that the teacher has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment for a fixed period or for the duration
of the last term that the teacher is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the
Dean/SAVP-COO.
For the school year 2000-2001, AMA implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth in its
Guidelines on the Implementation of AMA Faculty Plantilla.7 Under the new screening guidelines, teachers
were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience, capability, potential, high academic
qualifications and research background. The performance standards under the new screening guidelines were
also used to determine the present faculty members’ entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to
obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards; hence AMA did not give them any salary increase.
Because of AMA’s action on the salary increases, petitioners filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
underpayment of wages and for discriminatory practices, among others. Thereafter, AMA, through a
memorandum individually sent to petitioners, informed them that with the expiration of their contract to teach,
their contract would no longer be renewed. With this, petitioners amended their complaint to include the charge
of illegal dismissal against AMA claiming that their dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for
their original complaint with the Labor Arbiter.
AMA, on its part, contended that the petitioners worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured
appointment and were still within the 3-year probationary period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed
for the following term because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST) while
other failed to comply with the other requirements for regularization, promotion or increase in salary.
The LA declared that petitioners had been illegally dismissed ruling that Art. 281 of the Labor Code on
probationary employment applied to the case; that AMA allowed petitioners to teach for the 1st semester of
school year 2000-2001; that AMA did not specify who among the petitioners failed to pass the PAST and who
among them did not comply with the other requirements and that the petitioner’s dismissal could not be
sustained on the basis of AMA’s “vague and general allegations” without substantial factual basis.
On appeal, NLRC denied AMA’s appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC, however, observed that the
applicable law is Sec. 92 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools no Art. 281 of the LA. Despite this
observation, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s finding of illegal dismissal since the petitioners were terminated on
the basis of standards that were only introduced near the end of the probationary period. However, the CA
reversed the NRLC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners are probationary employees or fixed-term employees of AMA
Held:
Art. 281. Probationary employment – The services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee.
Sec. 98. Probationary Period – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school
requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three consecutive years of
satisfactory service for this in the elementary and secondary levels, six consecutive regular semesters of
satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for this
in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. (Sec. 98, Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools)
The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon between the
employer and the employee; employment exists only for the duration of the term and ends on its own when the
term expires. In a sense, employment on probationary status also referred to a period because of the technical
meaning “probation” carries in Philippine labor law – maximum period of 6 months, or in the academe, a period
of 3 years for those engaged in teaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however, because of the overriding
meaning that being “on-probation” connotes, i.e., a process of testing and observing the character or abilities of
a person who is new to a role or job.
Understood in the above sense, the essentially protective character of probationary status for
management cannot be readily appreciated. But this same protective character gives rise to the countervailing
but equally protective rule that probationary period can only last for a specific maximum period and under
reasonable, well-laid and properly communicated standards. Otherwise stated, within the period of the
probation, any employer move based on the probationary standards and affecting the continuity of the
employment must strictly conform to the probationary rules.
In a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract specifically used for the
fixed term it offers, Art. 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give
way. This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened by the petitioner’s and the AMA’s hardly concealed
expectation that the employment on probation could lead to permanent status and that the contracts are
renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the school’s standards.

12. Holiday Inn Manila and/or Hubert Liner and Baby Disquitado vs. NLRC Facts:
Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted for
"on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. After completing her training, she was
employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months. Her employment contract stipulated that the
Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period
in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel
rules and the instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards.
Four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the
ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. Honasan filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular employee at the time of her separation and so was
entitled to full security of tenure.

Issue:
Whether Honasan is a regular employee

Held:
Yes. The petitioner placed Honasan on probation twice first during her on-the-job training for three
weeks and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her probation
clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by this article. Probation is the period during which the
employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at
bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continued
after this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a
regular employee. Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her
services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period. But she was
not. On the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they were acceptable, although she was
formally placed this time on probation.

13. Canadian Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. vs. Bart Q. Dalangin, Jr. Facts:
Dalangin was hired by the company in October 2001, as Immigration and Legal Manager, with a
monthly salary of P15,000.00. He was placed on probation for six months. He was to report directly to the
Chief Operations Officer, Annie Llamanzares Abad. His tasks involved principally the review of the clients
applications for immigration to Canada to ensure that they are in accordance with Canadian and Philippine
laws.
Through a memorandum signed by Abad, the company terminated Dalangins employment, declaring
him "unfit" and "unqualified" to continue as Immigration and Legal Manager. The following are the reasons for
Dalangins termination: Obstinacy and utter disregard of company policies, Lack of concern for the company's
interest despite having just been employed in the company, lack of enthusiasm toward work, and lack of interest
in fostering relationship with his co-employees.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno declared Dalangins dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the LA decision. Dalangin moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting him to go to
the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision, the CA reversed the NLRC ruling. As the labor arbiter did, the CA found that the
company failed to support, with substantial evidence, its claim that Dalangin failed to meet the standards to
qualify as a regular employee. The CA denied the company's subsequent motion for reconsideration in its.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
 Whether or not Dalangin was validly dismissed

Held:
In International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC, the Court explained that a probationary
employee, as understood under Article 281 of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by an employer, during
which, the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment.
A probationary appointment gives the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at
work, and to ascertain whether he would be a proper and efficient employee.
Dalangin was barely a month on the job when the company terminated his employment. He was found
wanting in qualities that would make him a "proper and efficient" employee or, as the company put it, he was
unfit and unqualified to continue as its Immigration and Legal Manager.
The CA did not believe that the company could fully assess Dalangins performance within a month. It
viewed Dalangins dismissal as arbitrary, considering that the company had very little time to determine his
fitness for the job.
Contrary to the CAs conclusions, we find substantial evidence indicating that the company was justified
in terminating Dalangins employment, however brief it had been. Time and again, we have emphasized that
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Dalangin overlooks the fact, wittingly or unwittingly, that he offered glimpses of his own behavior and
actuations during his four-week stay with the company; he betrayed his negative attitude and regard for the
company, his co-employees and his work.
Dalangin admitted in compulsory arbitration that the proximate cause for his dismissal was his refusal to
attend the company's "Values Formation Seminar" scheduled for October 27, 2001, a Saturday. He refused to
attend the seminar after he learned that it had no relation to his duties, as he claimed, and that he had to leave at
2:00 p.m. because he wanted to be with his family in the province.
When Abad insisted that he attend the seminar to encourage his co-employees to attend, he stood pat on
not attending, arguing that marked differences exist between their positions and duties, and insinuating that he
did not want to join the other employees. He also questioned the scheduled 2:00 p.m. seminars on Saturdays as
they were not supposed to be doing a company activity beyond 2:00 p.m.
The "Values Formation Seminar" incident is an eye-opener on the kind of person and employee
Dalangin was. The incident also reveals Dalangins lack of interest in establishing good working relationship
with his co-employees, especially the rank and file; he did not want to join them because of his view that the
seminar was not relevant to his position and duties.
Additionally, very early in his employment, Dalangin exhibited negative working habits, particularly
with respect to the one hour lunch break policy of the company and the observance of the companys working
hours.
However, since the company failed to observe the required due process in terminating probationary
employees, Dalangin is entitled to nominal damages.

14. Jocelyn Herrera-Manaois vs. St. Scholastica’s College Facts:

 Josie Herrera Manaois taught in St. Scholastica College (SSC) as an English teacher (part-time). She
was recommended to become a full-time faculty member. In her application, she mentioned that she was taking
her masters in UP and that her oral defense was scheduled for June 2000. This was approved and SSC hired her
as a probationary full time employee. She failed to acquire her MA degree on time and she requested for an
extension. SSC denied and subsequently opted not to rehire her. LA and NLRC ruled for Josie stating that she
was not informed of the requirement to finish her MA degree and that the minimum requirement is finishing
25% of her MA studies only. CA reversed saying that the requirement cited by LA is for ranking purposes and
not a qualification for permanency. SC affirmed the ruling of the LA and also cited a CHED Memorandum
requiring tertiary level educators to be MA degree holders.

Held:
Mere completion of the three-year probation does not guarantee that the employee will acquire
permanent employment status. The probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set
for permanent employment as a member of the teaching personnel. In line with academic freedom and
constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the discretion and prerogative to impose standards
on its teachers and determine whether these standards have been met.