REUBEN M. PROTACIO vs. ATTY. ROBERTO M. MENDOZA [Adm. Case No. 5764.

January 13,
2003]

FACTS:

Complainant claimed that he did not sign the board resolution nor did he attend a board meeting of
the corporation on the date stated therein (March 30, 1998), and therefore the signature purporting
to be his was a forgery. He alleged that the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
had in fact certified that it did not have a copy of the board resolution in question because
respondent had not submitted his notarial report for March 1998. Furthermore, according to
complainant, the records of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) showed
that Nobuyasu Nemoto was out of the country on March 30, 1998, having left the Philippines on
March 26, 1998 and having returned only on March 31, 1998. Hence, complainant claimed, it was
impossible for Nobuyasu Nemoto to have attended the supposed board meeting on March 30, 1998
and to have signed the resolution on the same date. Complainant charged that respondent
knowingly and maliciously notarized the said board resolution without the presence of the party
allegedly executing it.

ISSUE: Can a Jurat be signed even if the notary public is not present?

RULING:

It is necessary that a party to any document notarized by a notary public appear in person before
the latter and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated in the document.] The importance of
this requirement cannot be gainsaid. The acknowledgement of a document is not an empty
meaningless act. By it a private document is converted into a public document, making it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity. For this reason, it behooves every notary public
to see to it that this requirement is observed and that formalities for the acknowledgment of
documents are complied with.

In this case, Nobuyasu Nemoto, who was allegedly a signatory to a resolution of a corporation,
allegedly notarized by respondent, could not have signed the document on March 30, 1998, the date
indicated therein, since he was not then in the Philippines. Respondent’s explanation that Nemoto
actually signed the document on March 31, 1998, after arriving from Japan, cannot be
accepted. Documents must speak the truth if their integrity is to be preserved. That is what a
notary public vouches for when he states in the jurat that the parties have appeared before him at
the time and in the place he (the notary public) states and that the document is then a free act and
deed. It is for this reason that public documents are given full faith and credit, at least as to their
due execution.
 [Adm. Case No. 5831. January 13, 2003]

CESAR A. ESPIRITU, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUAN CABREDO

IV, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed with the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) on May 8, 2001 by complainant Cesar A. Espiritu against Atty.
Juan Cabredo IV for failure to fulfill a fiduciary obligation to a client.
The complaint alleges the following facts:
On November 5, 1999, the BPI Family Savings Bank Inc. (BPI-FSB) filed
two complaints for replevin and damages against Esphar Medical Center,
(Esphar) Inc. and its president Cesar Espiritu and a certain John Doe. In the
first complaint, the BPI-FSB alleged that, on July 14, 1997, Esphar, Cesar
Espiritu, and a certain John Doe executed in favor of Gencars, Inc. (Gencars)
a promissory note in which they obligated themselves jointly and severally to
pay the latter P511,956.00 in monthly installments pursuant to a schedule they
had agreed upon. It was provided that failure on the part of the makers to pay
any installment when due shall make subsequent installments and the balance
of the obligation immediately due and demandable.The promissory note was
secured by a chattel mortgage on an Isuzu Close Van (1997 model) and
registered with the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation Commission.
On July 14, 1997, Gencars executed a deed of assignment in favor of the BPI-
FSB, assigning to the latter all of its rights, title and interest in the promissory
note secured by the chattel mortgage. In 1999, Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe
failed to pay installments for three consecutive months, for which reason
demands were made on the three to pay the entire balance of P186,806.28,
with accrued interest at the rate of 36% per annum or to give to BPI-FSB the
possession of the Isuzu van in order to foreclose the mortgage. As the three
failed to comply with the demands, the BPI-FSB brought suit for replevin and
damages against them. [1]

The second complaint alleged similar facts involving Citimotors, Inc. as the
payee of another promissory note in which Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe, as
makers, obligated themselves solidarily to pay the former P674,640.00 in
monthly installments. The promissory note was secured by a chattel mortgage
on a Mitsubishi L-300 Exceed Montone Van (1997 model), which BPI-FSB, as
holder of the said promissory note, sought to foreclose due to the makers failure
to comply with its terms and conditions. [2]

On December 10, 1999, Espiritu engaged the services of Atty. Juan

Cabredo IV, herein respondent, to represent him in the two civil cases. On same
day, Cabredos secretary, Rose Tria, picked up copies of the complaints from
Espiritus office and, on December 14, 1999, his representative Reynaldo Nuez
received from Esphar P16,000.00 for use as filing and acceptance fees. While
the cases were pending in court, Atty. Cabredo advised Esphar to remit money
and update payments to BPI-FSB through the trial court. Accordingly, on
December 28, 1999 and again January 28, 2000, Esphars representative,
Maritess Alejandrino, delivered a total of P51,161.00 to Atty. Cabredos
office. Later on, when Atty. Cabredo failed to appear at a hearing of the civil
cases, the management of Esphar found out that he did not deliver the sum
of P51,161.00 to the court or BPI-FSB. The management of Esphar then
agreed to settle the cases amicably. For this reason, a joint motion to dismiss
was filed by the parties, and the cases were dismissed on May 15,
2000. Thereafter, on May 8, 2001, Espiritu filed a complaint against Atty.
Cabredo for fraud. [3]

In his answer dated June 6, 2001, respondent Cabredo admitted that his
secretary, Rose Tria, had indeed received P51,161.00 from Esphar, but
claimed that Tria failed to inform him about it. It was only when he read Esphars
first demand letter dated March 21, 2000 that he learned for the first time about
the receipt of the money. Respondent claimed that he failed to get complainants
demand letters of March 24, 2000 and January 5, 2001 because of lapses on
the part of his staff. He thus shifted the blame on his staff.

7. It is quite unfortunate that this incident happened all thru the fault of the law firm
personnel. In spite of respondents candid, honest and sincere desire to faithfully and
religiously serve good clients, [his efforts have been] rendered inutile by lapses of his
staff;

8. Respondent believes that complainant Cesar A. Espiritu would not have resorted to
this present action had the firm personnel been vigilant enough to inform respondent
of this matter.

Respondent said he was willing to reimburse complainant to show his good

faith and to erase the suspicion that respondent intentionally spent the amount
for his own use and benefit. [4]

Acting on the complaint, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled a hearing on September 24,
2001. However, the hearing had to be rescheduled three times  on November
14, 2001, December 14, 2001, and January 18, 2002  because of respondents
failure to appear despite due notice to him. In orders dated November 14,
2001 and December 14, 2001, respondent was warned that the investigator
[5] [6]

would proceed with the case if he failed to appear again in subsequent

hearings. Finally, in the order dated January 18, 2002, Investigating
Commissioner Wilfredo Reyes ordered:

Considering that this is the fifth (5th) time that the respondent has failed to appear
despite notice, the undersigned Commissioner has no option but to decide the case on
the basis of the pleadings submitted. It must be noted that despite receipt of the Orders
of the Commission, the respondent Atty. Juan Cabredo IV has failed to appear before
the Commission on Bar Discipline.

This case is deemed submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the
parties. [7]

On February 13, 2002, Commissioner Reyes submitted his report and

recommendation. He found respondent guilty of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that the latter be suspended
from the practice of law for three months and ordered to return the amount
of P51,161.00 to Esphar. In a resolution dated August 3, 2002, the IBP Board
[8]

of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the investigating

commissioner. [9]

Except for the penalty, we find the recommendation is well taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16  A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01  A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

Rule 16.02  A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03  A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires

a high degree of fidelity and good faith. Hence, in dealing with trust property,
[10]

a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the client
coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and
accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be
commingled with his own or be used by him. [11]

In this case, respondent claims that he did not know about the receipt by his
secretary on the amount of P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the
first demand letter of the company, which stated:

March 21, 2000

JUDGE JUAN CABREDO

Cubao, Quezon City

Dear Judge Cabredo:

Due to your failure to make an interbank deposit as what we have agreed upon
yesterday, March 20, 2000, we are sending bearer, MRS. MARITESS
ALEJANDRINO, to collect the amount of P51,161.00 representing payment intended
for BPI FAMILY BANK which was coursed through your office per your instruction.

We are hoping that you will not fail to return the money through bearer hereof. Her
specimen signature is shown below for identification purposes.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

ESPHAR MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

(signed)

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Specimen Signature of:

(signed)
MARITESS ALEJANDRINO

However, even after receiving this notice and two other demand letters,
respondent never returned the money of complainant nor paid it to the
bank. Indeed, it is improbable that respondents secretary failed to inform
complainant about the receipt of such a substantial sum of money. In failing to
account for the money of his client, respondent violated not only the Code of
Professional Responsibility but also his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his clients. Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper but they
[12]

must also appear to be so. This way, the peoples faith in the justice system
would remain unshaken. [13]

It appears that respondent, while now a practicing lawyer, was a former

judge. Thus, he should have known the ethical precepts guiding lawyers who
[14]

handle money given to them in trust by their clients and the necessary
consequences for violation thereof. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides,

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [emphasis
supplied]

From the evidence presented by complainant, which respondent failed to

rebut, it is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent amounted to
deceit, as well as a violation of his oath, for which he should be penalized with
either disbarment or suspension. While we agree with the findings of the
investigating commissioner, we find the recommended penalty of suspension
for three months to be too light. In Reyes v. Maglaya a lawyer was suspended
[15]

for one year for failing to return P1,500.00 belonging to his client despite
numerous demands.In Castillo v. Taguines, a lawyer failed to deliver to his
[16]

client P500.00, representing the monetary settlement of a civil suit despite

demands. To make matters worse, he fooled the client by issuing a bouncing
check. He was suspended for one year.
For his failure to account for P51, 161.00 received from his client and to
restitute it without any reason, respondent should be suspended for one year.
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Cabredo IV is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1)
year and ORDERED to immediately return to Esphar Medical Center, Inc. the
sum of P51,161.00, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of the Decision be entered in his
record as an attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
 [Adm. Case No. 5036. January 13, 2003]

RIZALINO C. FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO C.

ISIDTO, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint against respondent Atty. Dionisio C. Isidto for

misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath.
Complainant Rizalino C. Fernandez is the son of Vicente K. Fernandez,
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3726, entitled Vicente K. Fernandez v. Cresencia
Dahildahil, filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City. He alleges
that on February 24, 1997, judgment was rendered by the trial court declaring
his father to be the owner of Lot Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the Bacolod Cadastre
covered by TCT No. 29264 and ordering defendant Cresencia Dahildahil to
surrender possession of the lots to the plaintiff. According to complainant, the
decision became final on October 3, 1998 as defendant Dahildahil, who had
filed a notice of appeal, decided not to pursue her appeal upon the advice of
respondent Atty. Isidto.
Complainant claims that on May 24, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of
execution, but respondent moved to quash the same on the ground of the
pendency of another case filed in Branch 11 of the same court. It appears that
respondent had filed on October 26, 1998 a complaint, entitled William Ko, Sio
Bee Ko, and Chona Ko v. Rizalino Fernandez, Virginia Fernandez, Elena
Fernandez, Vicky Fernandez, Vivian Fernandez and Venancia Fernandez and
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-10520, in which he sought the cancellation of a
certificate of title issued in the name of Vicente K. Fernandez (TCT No. 29264),
which had been declared valid in Civil Case No. 3726.
On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied respondents motion to quash on
the ground that the action instituted by respondent in behalf of the children of
Cresencia Dahildahil was barred by the judgment of February 24, 1997 in Civil
Case No. 3726. Respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash the writ, but
it was similarly denied by the trial court on December 9, 1999. Meanwhile, on
motion of the children of Vicente K. Fernandez, as defendants in Civil Case No.
98-10520, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondent as it was
barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. 3726. Respondent filed a notice of
appeal and, on his motion, the Court of Appeals granted him an extension to
file the appellants brief. Nonetheless, for unknown reasons, respondent failed
to file the appellants brief, as a result of which the appeal was dismissed.
Complainant claims that respondents actions were calculated to delay the
execution of the decision of Civil Case No. 3726.
Respondent denies the allegations made against him. He claims that
although it was upon his advice that Dahildahil did not pursue her appeal in Civil
Case No. 3726, he nevertheless filed Civil Case No. 98-10520 in behalf of
Dahildahils children because he honestly believed that they had a valid ground
for seeking the cancellation of the certificate of title in the name of Vicente K.
Fernandez. He contended that the decision in Civil Case No. 3726 did not
constitute a bar to the filing of Civil Case No. 98-10520 as the two cases
involved different parties and causes of action. [1]

Complainant filed a Reply and Supplemental Reply to respondents

comment, after which the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In its Resolution
No. XV-2002-404, dated August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors approved
the recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner, Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.,
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year
for misu[sing] the [R]ules [of] Procedure to impede the noble ends of justice.
The investigating commissioners report reads in pertinent parts:

The records sufficiently establish that Vicente Fernandez (father of complainant) filed
Civil Case No. 3726 (hereinafter referred to as the first case) in the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City on October 10, 1985 against Cresencia Dahildahil (common
law wife of Ko Chun) involving Lots 3, 4, and 5 all of Bacolod Cadastre covered by
TCT No. 29264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City. The action was for
recovery of possession and sum of money.

The case suffered considerable delay due to one reason or another stated in the trial
courts decision of February 24, 1997. Finally, after eleven (11) long years of
litigation, the trial court resolved the main issue that plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to prove his ownership of Lot 3, 4, and 5, Block 1, evidenced by TCT No.
29264 (page 18 Decision; Annex A of Complainants Position Paper) and ordered the
defendant Dahildahil to return possession of the property to plaintiff.

The decision was appealed by Dahildahil to the Court of Appeals. But, later, she
abandoned her appeal (CA G.R. No. 56999) and did not pursue it on the advice of
herein respondent (Comment of Respondent dated August 5, 1999). Consequently, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal which dismissal became final on October 3,
1998.
On October 26, 1998, or 23 days after the dismissal of the appeal, Civil Case No. 98-
10520 (hereinafter referred to as the second case) was instituted by Dahildahils
children against the heirs of Vicente Fernandez, including the complainant, for
cancellation of title of the same property litigated in Civil Case No. 3726 (first case)
and adjudged by the court as belonging to Vicente Fernandez, upon the advice of
herein respondent (Respondents Position Paper on page 2).

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that [the] plaintiffs in the second case
(children of Dahildahil by the late Ko Chun) merely adopted as their cause of action
the defense put up by their mother in the first case.

....

When the final judgment in the first case (Civil Case No. 3726) was being executed
by the prevailing party, the defendant Dahildahil, thru respondent, vigorously opposed
the move on the ground that the pendency of the second case (Civil Case No. 98-
10520) poses a civil prejudicial question which must be resolved before any further
proceedings, or execution, can be taken in the first case.

With equal vigor, the trial court rejected this position. It ruled that precisely there
being identity of parties plaintiffs and defendants in Civil Case No. 98-10520 (second
case) are mere successors-in-interest of the parties at bar; [as the] cause[s] of action
and subject matter [of the two cases are the same], the finding of this Court having
become final and executory, res judicata sets in and Civil Case No. 98-10520 is barred
by prior judgment (Resolution dated August 19, 1999; Annex A of the Supplemental
Reply).

....

Notwithstanding all the foregoing, however, with evident obduracy, respondent

continued to resist execution of the judgment in the first case [by filing a supplemental
motion to quash the writ of execution] reasoning out this time around that the
judgment in the first case will operate only as against Dahildahil but not [as] against
her children (plaintiffs in the second case), who were not parties to the first case
(Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution dated August 20, 1999).

Once more the trial court repudiated this feeble stand of the respondent and [denied
Dahildahils Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution].

Under the Revised Rules of Court, a lawyer shall counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. (Rule 138, Sec. 20, C)
The persistent obstruction engineered by the respondent to the execution of the final
judgment in the first case coupled with his filing of the second case which was
primarily intended to relitigate the settled issue of ownership of subject property is
clearly transgressive of this rule.

....

The Resolution of August 19, 1999 (which resolve[d] respondents motion to quash
writ of execution in the first case) and the Order of December 9, 1999 (which
resolve[d] the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the August 19, 1999
resolution) as well as the Order dated August 3, 2000 (which resolve[d] the motion to
dismiss and the Opposition thereto filed in the second case), discussed thoroughly the
doctrine of res judicata. Unfortunately, however, the respondent did not benefit from
the lessons therein.

Likewise clear in the judgment dated February 24, 1997 (first case) is the trial courts
resolution of the question of who is the true owner of Lot No. 3, Block 1, Lot 4, Block
1 and Lot 5, Block 1 evidenced by TCT No. T-29264, the plaintiff (Vicente
Fernandez, herein complainants father) or the late Ko Chun (father of respondents
client who are plaintiffs in the second case) (on page 3).

....

The issue of true ownership, therefore, of the lots in question is no longer debatable.

....

From all of the foregoing, it is not unreasonable to conclude and hold that respondent
indeed availed of unfair means to unduly delay the termination of the first and second
cases which achieve[d] his objective of prolonging the enjoyment of the property by
his clients gratis et amore and to the detriment and prejudice of the complainant.

Stated in another way, the respondent misused the rules of procedure to impede the
noble ends of justice.

Premises considered, therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent

Atty. Dionisio Isidto be temporarily suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year with the stern warning that a repetition of any similar act shall merit a
more harsh sanction. [2]
 The case has been transmitted to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B 12 (b)
of the 1964 Rules of Court. After a review of this case, we find the IBP report
and recommendation to be well taken.
First. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.

Rule 12.03  A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file . . . briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.

Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.

To be sure, respondent advised his client (Dahildahil) to desist from her

appeal in Civil Case No. 3726, as a result of which the trial courts decision in
that case became final and executory. However, he subsequently filed Civil
Case No. 98-10520 in behalf of his clients children, based on the same ground
invoked by Dahildahil in Civil Case No. 3726, and later invoked the pendency
of the said Civil Case No. 98-10520 to block execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 3726. Such subterfuge proved unsuccessful as the trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 98-10520 under the doctrine of res
judicata. Respondent then filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals,
only to let the period for filing the appellants brief lapse without complying
with the requirement despite an extension granted to him to do so. All these
clearly show respondents efforts to frustrate the final judgment in Civil Case No.
3726, which remained pending in the trial court for nearly 18 years.
The conduct of respondent constitutes a clear violation of Rules 10.03,
12.03 and 12.04. This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the
need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice and [that] once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in
[3]

the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless [cases] that only add to the workload of the judiciary . . . which is
burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter
the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law
or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not
deserve the attention of the courts. [4]

Second. Respondents contention that Civil Case No. 98-10520 is not barred
by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 3726 because the two involved different
parties and causes of action have no legal basis. The doctrine of res judicata
applies not only to the same parties but also to their successors-in-interest. In [5]

this case, the respective heirs of the parties in Civil Case No. 3726, became the
parties in Civil Case No. 98-10520, which concerned the same parcels of land
and the same title subject of litigation in Civil Case No.
3726. Furthermore, as the IBP investigating commissioner noted, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-10520 merely adopted the defense raised by their
mother Cresencia Dahildahil in Civil Case No. 3726, i.e., their natural father, Ko
Chun, had purchased the parcels of land in question from a certain Venancio
Lim but had them titled in the name of Vicente Fernandez, his nephew, because
of the prohibition of ownership of real estate by aliens. Thus, the complaint in
Civil Case No. 98-10520 alleged:

2. That the plaintiffs are the son[s] and daughter of spouses Ko Chun and Cresencia
Dahildahil, said spouses not [being] legally married[.] Plaintiffs are Filipino citizens,
while the defendants are the children of spouses Vicente Fernandez and Venancia
Chua Fernandez;

3. That in the month of August 1965 Ko Chun purchased Lot 3 Block 1, Lot 4 Block 1
and Lot 5 Block 1 from the original owner Venancio Lim for the sum of P65,000.00[.]
Ko Chun being a Chinese citizen put the title of the property in the name of Vicente
Fernandez, . . a relative of Ko Chun. [6]

On the other hand, as the trial court stated in its decision in Civil Case No.
3726:

In her answer with counterclaim, defendant alleges inter alia: That subject properties
Lot 3, Block 1, Lot 4 Blk. 1 and Lot 5 Blk. 1 all situated in the City of Bacolod, . . .
are actually owned by her husband Ko Chun or his estate. The money paid for the
acquisition of said lots came from the exclusive and personal funds of the Ko
Chun. However, since the late Ko Chun at the time of the acquisition of said
properties was a Chinese citizen, he placed the title of said properties in the name of
the plaintiff, Vicente K. Fernandez, in order to circumvent or do away with the
constitutional prohibition against aliens, who are disqualified from acquiring
properties in the Philippines . . .
[7]
 In its decision in Civil Case No. 3726, the trial court declared Vicente K.
Fernandez to be the owner of the parcels of land in question. The trial court
said:

After going over the version of the plaintiff [Vicente Fernandez] as supported by the
testimonial evidence of his witnesses as well as his documentary evidence and the
version of the defendant [Cresencia Dahildahil], supported by the testimonial
evidence of her witnesses as well as her documentary evidence, this Court is inclined
to give plaintiffs version more credit and weight.

....

All told, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to prove his ownership of Lots 3,
4, and 5, Block 1, evidenced by TCT No. T-29264.

While on the other hand, the evidence presented by defendant falls short of
establishing the ownership of her [late] husband [Ko Chun] of Lots 3, 4, and 5, Block
1, evidenced by TCT No. T-29264. [8]

As successors-in-interest of their mother Cresencia Dahildahil, the plaintiffs

in Civil Case No. 98-10520 are bound by the foregoing findings.
In Millare v. Montero, this Court suspended the respondent attorney from
[9]

the practice of law for a period of one year for trying to frustrate the execution
of a judgment through the filing of frivolous appeals and resort to other dilatory
tactics. We find it appropriate for the same penalty to be meted out to
respondent in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the IBP Investigating Commissioner as
approved by the IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent Atty. Dionisio C.
Isidto guilty of violation of Rules 10.03, 12.03, and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED and respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with WARNING that
commission of any or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. Let copies
of the Decision be entered in his record as an attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1469. January 13, 2003]

ROLANDO GUYUD, complainant, vs. JUDGE RENATO P. PINE,

Municipal Trial Court, Echague, Isabela, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.,

This is a complaint against Judge Renato P. Pine of the Municipal Trial

Court of Echague, Isabela for misconduct due to gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant Rolando Guyud, together with eight other accused, all
residents of Barangay Gumbaoan, Echague, Isabela, were charged with
libel by a certain Jeffrey Iloreta, also a resident of Barangay Gumbaoan,
[1]

Echague, Isabela. The criminal complaint against complainant and the other
[2]

accused alleged:

That on or about July 2, 2001 at Barangay Gumbaoan, Echague, Isabela and within
the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspired and
confederated [and] made certification as barangay officials of this barangay, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wrote THAT UNDERSIGNED IS
NOT A LAW ABIDING MEMBER OF THIS BARANGAY AND [HAS] MANY
BAD RECORDS AND [IS] FACING PENDING CASES IN COURT and which
words tend to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt over the person of the
undersigned and his family to the damage and prejudice of the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Echague, Isabela, July 12, 2001.

(original signed)

JEFFREY ILORETA

Complainant

On August 14, 2001, Atty. Marcelino J. Alzate, Branch Clerk of Court of MTC
of Echague, issued a subpoena requiring complainant and his co-accused to
[3]

appear before the court on September 5, 2001, at 8:30 in the morning, for
preliminary investigation. On August 28, 2001, the accused moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that in cases of libel, except for the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, only a municipal trial court judge in the capital town
of the province can conduct a preliminary investigation. Since Echague is not
the capital town of Isabela, respondent had no authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation in this case. [4]

Respondent denied the accuseds motion and, on September 5, 2001,

proceeded with the preliminary investigation. On the same day, he issued a
warrant for their arrest, fixing the bail bond of each at P8,000.00. The accused,
[5]

including herein complainant, were arrested while they were attending the
hearing of a case in court. The following day, September 6, 2001, they filed a
motion for the reduction of their bail to P4,000.00, which respondent granted on
the same day. After posting their bail bond in the reduced amount, the accused
were ordered released. In his affidavit dated September 12, 2001, complainant
alleged that he suffered anxiety and was deeply prejudiced because of his
arrest.
On September 19, 2001, respondent issued an order recalling the warrant
of arrest he had issued and remanded the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for the holding of a preliminary investigation. In his
order, respondent stated: [6]

The accused stand charged of the crime of Libel by means of writings defined and
penalized under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code which carries a penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, hence within the
jurisdiction of first level courts pursuant to [B.P. Blg.] 129, as amended.

Moreover, pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code on General Provisions
relative to the crime of Libel, jurisdiction to try Libel cases rests with the Regional
Trial Court and the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Provincial or
City Fiscal of the province or city, or by the Municipal Court of the City or Capital of
the Province where such action may be instituted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the Records of the case be forwarded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of the Preliminary Investigation.

The Warrant Of Arrest earlier issued by this Court and the bailbonds posted by all of
the accused are hereby set aside and/or cancelled having been issued/ordered beyond
the Courts jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

Echague, Isabela, September 19, 2001.

 (original signed)

RENATO P. PINE

Acting Judge

In his comment on the complaint, respondent admitted the foregoing

[7]

facts. He explains that he is saddled with work and, therefore, is liable to make
mistakes. He claims that as soon as he realized his error, he lost no time to
correct it by remanding the case to the Prosecutors Office, which has
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases, and ordering the
release of the accused. His comment reads:

I humbly admit having conducted a preliminary examination in Criminal Case No.

5807 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Guyud, et al. for Libel By Means
of Writings Or Similar Means for the purpose of determining a probable cause for the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest considering that the penalty for the crime is
only prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods hence, within the
jurisdiction of first level courts pursuant to [B.P. Blg.] 129, as amended. The
corresponding Warrant of Arrest was subsequently issued on September 5, 2001. The
following day, September 6, 2001, five (5) of the [nine (9)] accused, namely: Rolando
Guyud, Leon Saet [Jr.], Gil Rivera, Bonifacio Anchola, Sr. and Efren Morada came to
Court and filed a Motion To Reduce bail bond by virtue of which the Court lowered
the bail bond from P8,000.00 to P4,000.00 On that same day, the aforenamed accused
filed their bail bond[s] and were ordered released. On September 19, 2001, after the
Court realized having acted beyond its jurisdiction, an Order was issued setting aside
the Warrant of Arrest and canceling the bail bonds posted by the accused, copy of the
said Order is hereto attached as Annex A. The Court then forwarded the Records of
the Case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of the Preliminary
Investigation pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC, as amended. Meanwhile, the bailbonds
of the accused were correspondingly returned to each of them by the Clerk of Court.

Your Honor, I only have Wednesdays and Thursdays of every week to attend to cases
before the MTC of Echague, Isabela. I conduct preliminary
examinations/investigations in the morning of every Wednesdays and make
Resolutions and/or Decisions in the afternoon. I hear Civil Cases in the morning of
every Thursdays and hear Criminal Cases in the afternoon. Considering the number of
cases (which were already considerably reduced) pending with this Court which I
have to attend to, plus the cases pending before the MCTC of Jones-San Agustin and
the MCTC of Ramon-San Isidro which I also handle, not to mention four (4) special
cases assigned to me before the MTC of Cordon, Isabela. I am vulnerable to
committing lapses and/or mistakes. At any rate, the mistake has already been
corrected with the issuance of the Order dated September 19, 2001, Annex A
hereof. Practically, the complaint has become moot and academic and the complainant
was not damaged because he was ordered released on the same day he submitted
himself to the Court and posted his reduced bail which was later returned to him.

Your Honor, I humbly beg for leniency and understanding even as I promise to be
more vigilant next time.

Very respectfully yours,

(original signed)

RENATO P. PINE

Acting Judge

In its report, dated August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommends that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter and that respondent judge be fined in the amount of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos for gross ignorance of the law for conducting a preliminary
investigation on the case. Citing the legal maxim ignorance of the law excuses
no one, the OCA rejects respondents explanation and notes that the fact that
the accused moved to dismiss the case should have put him on guard that the
said case was erroneously filed in his sala.
The recommendation is well taken.
Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code indeed provides that preliminary
investigations of libel cases shall be conducted by the provincial or city
prosecutor of the province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital
of the province in which the criminal action may be filed. In this case, the MTC
of Echague, over which respondent presides, is not a municipal trial court of the
city or of the capital of the province and, therefore, has no jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 5807. This is a matter which
respondent, as presiding judge, ought to know. In Dumo v. Perez, this Court
[8]

said that although judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly
or administratively for every erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him
in good faith, it is imperative that they should have basic knowledge of the
law. The jurisdiction of the court over which one presides is such basic
matter. To be able to render justice and to maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence. Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Obviously, they
cannot live up to this expectation if they act in a case without jurisdiction through
ignorance.
In Cacayoren v. Suller, the respondent judge was fined P3,000.00 in each
[9]

case filed against him for misapplying the rulings of the Court by taking
cognizance of an action for damages based on malicious prosecution even if
there was as yet no acquittal nor final dismissal rendered by the court in the
criminal cases. In Ubando-Paras v. Fernandez, the respondent judge was
[10]

fined P5,000.00 for ordering the release of an accused in a criminal case even
though he had paid the bail bond merely by means of a check and did not post
a cash bond. In Bajet v. Areola, the respondent judge issued an order
[11]

authorizing demolition of the improvements on the subject property without first

conducting a hearing. He was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
ordered to pay a fine of P3,000.00.
In other cases, the Court considered the absence of bad faith, or the willful
intention to prejudice a party litigant, or any showing that an erring judge was
impelled by some ulterior ends or ill motives and, accordingly, mitigated the
imposable penalty. In Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M.
Bumanglag, Jr., serious illness justified the inability of the respondent judge to
[12]

decide before his retirement from the service seven (7) criminal cases and three
(3) civil cases within the 90-day reglementary period. The OCA recommended
a fine of P5,000.00 to be imposed on the respondent but the Court lowered it
to P2,000.00. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Quizon, the Court[13]

considered the attenuating circumstances of the respondent judges serious

illness and his heavy caseload and lowered OCAs recommended fine
of P20,000.00 to P5,000.00. In Chavez v. Escaan, respondent judge was
[14]

fined P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law for issuing orders impleading the
owners of the motor vehicle as the accused in a criminal case for reckless
imprudence instituted as a result of a vehicular accident involving the said
vehicle.
In the case at bar, respondents liability is somewhat mitigated by his candor
in admitting his mistake and promptly correcting it. Apparently, he did not
appreciate the point of law raised when his authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation in the libel case was first questioned. But, as soon as he realized
his mistake, he lost no time in declaring himself without jurisdiction to continue
acting in the case and immediately ordered the release of complainant and his
co-accused. A fine of P5,000.00, as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator, would thus appear to be an appropriate sanction to impose on
respondent.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato P. Pine of the Municipal Trial
Court of Echague, Isabela, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) with ADMONITION to be more assiduous in the study of cases and
the applicable statute and jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
 [A.C. No. 5843. January 14, 2003]

JENO A. PILAPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. GERARDO

CARILLO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
Puno, J.:

On January 19,1999, complainant Jeno A. Pilapil filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Cebu Chapter a complaint against respondent Atty. Gerardo Carillo for
negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel.
The Complaint alleged that Pilapil filed a labor case against Visayan Electric
Company. He was represented by Atty. Carillo. In December 1996, after they received an
adverse ruling from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Pilapil and Atty.
Carillo decided to elevate the case to the Supreme Court on certiorari. In January 1997,
Pilapil made a follow up with Atty. Carillo regarding his case, and the latter told him that
he was already preparing the petition. Pilapil, nonetheless, reminded Atty. Carillo of the
60-day period within which to file the petition. Atty. Carillo assured him that there was
nothing to worry about. Pilapil continued to make follow-ups with Atty. Carillo for one year,
but the latter would always give him the same answer. Atty. Carillo informed Pilapil to wait
as he was still working on the petition. Atty. Carillo eventually admitted to Pilapil that when
he went to the Supreme Court, he was told that the Court would not entertain the petition
unless they give a valid reason why it was not filed on time. Atty. Carillo thus instructed
Pilapil to secure a medical certificate from his family doctor to be used as justification for
the late filing of the petition. When the doctor refused to issue a medical certificate, Atty.
Carillo advised Pilapil to go to a doctor whom he personally knows. But he was still unable
to secure a medical certificate. Hence, Pilapil filed this complaint against Atty. Carillo.[1]
On March 18, 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ordered the respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within six (6)
days from notice. A copy of the order was received by respondents agent on April 5,
1999.[2]
On May 7, 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline received a copy of the motion for
extension of time to submit an answer dated April 14, 1999 filed by respondent. [3]
On May 13, 1999, respondent having failed to file his answer within the period given,
Pilapil filed a motion to declare respondent in default and to submit the case for resolution
based on the documents and pleadings submitted.[4]
The case was set for hearing at the IBP on July 21, 2000.[5]
On June 19, 2000, complainant filed a motion for the transfer of the venue of the
hearing since both parties reside in Cebu City. In the alternative, complainant prayed that
the case be resolved based on the pleadings and documents filed. [6] The IBP required
respondent to comment on the motion within ten (10) days from notice. [7]
 On January 12, 2001, the Commission on Bar Discipline, granting complainants
motion for the transfer of the venue of the hearing, forwarded the records of the case to
the Board of Governors for appropriate action.[8]
The records show that respondent did not file an answer to the complaint as
previously required by the IBP. Hence, on July 24, 2002, the IBP, through Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, submitted its Report and Recommendation. It recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It made the following
observation:

The records of this case show that respondent has not filed his Answer despite his
earlier motion requesting for time within which to file such Answer. On the other
hand, the letter-complaint of complainant is straightforward in its allegation that
respondent, who was complainants lawyer in a labor case he filed against Visayas
Electric, failed to file a petition for certiorari of the adverse decision rendered in said
case.

If the above allegation of complainant was not true or was inaccurate, it is

unbelievable that respondent would not take steps to dispute the same such as by
filing his Answer or presenting evidence to disprove the same. That respondent has
not chosen to take any action and has opted to remain silent on the accusation of
complainant, leads credence to the accusation of complainant. Respondents inaction to
defend his name and his continued practice of his profession leads to no other
conclusion but that he was indeed negligent in handling complainants case. Thus it is
recommended that for respondents violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent be suspended from engaging in the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months. [9]

We agree with the observation and recommendation of the IBP. Respondents failure
to file an answer to the complaint despite notice from the IBP amounts to an admission
of the allegations therein. Furthermore, respondents stubborn refusal to submit the
required answer despite the lapse of considerable length of time, as his failure to file the
petition for certiorari relative to complainants labor case, is clear evidence of negligence
on his part. Respondent did not even offer an explanation for his omission. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that every lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.[10] It further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.[11] Thus, we uphold the recommendation of the IBP finding respondent liable for his
negligence in handling complainants suit against Visayan Electric Company which had
been entrusted to him as counsel.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished on the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC. January 16, 2003]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT OF

SANDIGANBAYAN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANACLETO D. BADOY,
JR., TAKING AN AMBULANCE BUT PROCEEDING TO THE GMA
TV STATION FOR AN INTERVIEW INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING
FORTHWITH TO THE HOSPITAL.

[A.M. NO. SB-02-10-J. January 16, 2003]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA, SERAFIN R.

CUEVAS, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, JOSE B. FLAMINIANO,
PACIFICO A. AGABIN, FELIX D. CARAO, JR., CLEOFE V.
VERZOLA, DELIA H. HERMOSO AND RAYMUND P.
FORTUN, complainants, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ANACLETO
D. BADOY, JR., AND TERESITA LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

Judges, like ordinary mortals, are subject to human limitations. At times, the
great tides of perturbing and overwhelming emotions engulf
them. Notwithstanding so, they are expected to be cerebral men who can[1]

control their confounding emotions and idiosyncratic inclinations. Otherwise,

they will be held answerable for their conduct.
Haled in these two consolidated administrative cases, A.M. No. 01-12-01-
SC and A.M No. SB-02-10-J, are Sandiganbayan Justices Anacleto D. Badoy,
Jr. (Ret.) and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro.
The facts of A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC may be synthesized as follows:
On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, whisked
himself to the GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live interview in the
news program Saksi. There, he announced the loss of a Resolution he penned
in connection with the plunder case against former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada and others.
 The media sarcastically referred to the event as a staged comedy or [2]

a television tryst. Leading newspapers contained facetious headlines, such

[3]

as Ambulance rushes Badoyto TV Station, Whats with Justice

[4]

Badoy?, and Unorthodox Behavior Analyze Badoy, Erap Lawyers ask SC.
[5] [6]

Acting on the media reports, this Court directed Justice Badoy to show
cause why he should not be administratively charged with conduct unbecoming
a Justice of the Sandiganbayan. [7]

In his compliance, Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the
[8]

incident, he could not find his Resolution ordering that former President Estrada
be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo.So he requested the National Bureau of
Investigation to conduct an investigation, but to no avail. Thus, on November
29, 2001, agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and claimed
that he (Justice Badoy) sold it for a fee, he decided to go to the GMA-7
Broadcast Station and report its loss, in order that the public may know he is
honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very
sick and cold, intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.
A.M No. SB-02-10-J is set on a different factual milieu, to wit:
Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power, the
Office of the Ombudsman filed several criminal cases against him, his family,
and friends. One of them is Criminal Case No. 26558 wherein he, his son
Jose Jinggoy and Atty. Edward Serapio stand accused for violation of Republic
Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law. The case was raffled to the Third Division
of the Sandiganbayan composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman, and Justices
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M. Ilarde, now retired, as members.
On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial
conference between the parties, the Sandiganbayan furnished them and their
counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their signatures. The defense
panel composed of Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead counsel), Justice Serafin R.
Cuevas, Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola, and
Delia H. Hermoso, refused to sign it on the grounds that: 1) there is no provision
in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial
Order; 2) they were not given ample time to read it; and 3) it incorporates a
[9] [10]

statement that they admitted the existence of certain exhibits although there
was no such admission. [11]

In the course of an argument between Sandiganbayan Justice De Castro

and Justice Cuevas, Atty. Saguisag intervened. In the process, he argued
simultaneously with Justice Cuevas. Despite Justice De Castros request to
[12]

wait for his turn, Atty. Saguisag persisted, prompting her to bang the gavel twice
and order him to stop arguing. This led Justice Badoy to order four Sheriffs to
[13]

take Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom. [14]

Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the assailed portion
of the Pre-trial Order could be deleted. [15]

The prosecution manifested its acquiescence. However, Atty. Flaminiano

objected, insisting that the defense needs more time to study the Pre-trial
Order. Notwithstanding the objection, Justice Badoy terminated the pre-trial
[16]

and set the trial proper on October 1, 3 and 4, 2001 and thereafter, every
Monday, Wednesday and Thursday of the week, all at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon. [17]

On October 1, 2001, the defense lawyers did not appear. Determined to

proceed with the trial, Justice Badoy appointed Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty.
Martin Pison, counsel for accused Atty. Serapio, to represent the
Estradas. Former President Estrada objected, insisting that he has the right to
choose his counsel. Atty. Acut and Atty. Pison declined because of a possible
conflict between their clients interest and that of the Estradas. As a last
recourse, Justice Badoy appointed lawyers from the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) as counsel de officio for the Estradas. [18]

Feeling aggrieved, former President Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and all their
counsel of record in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed the instant administrative
complaint charging Justices Badoy and De Castro with:
1) dishonesty and misrepresentation for incorporating in the Pre-trial
Order a statement that the defense admitted Plaintiffs Exhibit A up to Exhibit C-
45 and its submarkings as to its existence notwithstanding the fact that they did
not admit the same; [19]

2) oppression and gross misconduct for throwing Atty. Saguisag out of

the courtroom; [20]

3) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars for setting

the hearing of the plunder case three times a week, at one oclock in the
afternoon, without prior consultation with the defense counsel; [21]

4) denial of the accuseds right to counsel for appointing PAO lawyers as

counsel de officio of the Estradas during the hearing of October 1, 2001; and [22]

5) penchant for late rulings as shown in the following instances:

[23]

1. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Jinggoy Estradas Motion to

Quash (filed as early as April 2001) after office hours and on the eve of the July 10,
2001 arraignment.
2. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Estradas Petition to Recuse on
the scheduled date of the pre-trial or on September 3, 2001.

3. Respondents failure to resolve complainants Motion to Cancel the October 1, 2001

hearing filed as early as September 19, 2001.

4. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Jinggoy Estradas Motion to

be Allowed to Administer the Oath of Office to Senator Luisa Loi Estrada, on
June 29, 2001, past beyond the scheduled hour of oath-taking, thus, prompting
Justice Ricardo M. Ilarde (Ret.) to write the following annotations on the
Resolution: What is there to deny? This resolution was brought to us only at 4:45
p.m. The matter has been rendered moot and academic.

Respondents filed their separate comments.

Justice De Castro explains as follows:
First, in issuing the Pre-trial Order, the court merely relied on the parties
Joint Stipulations of Facts and on the notes of the five (5) stenographers
recording the pre-trial conferences held before the Division Clerk of
Court. Nonetheless, when complainants called the courts attention regarding
the assailed statement in the Pre-trial Order, she ordered its deletion. Second, [24]

it was Atty. Saguisags contumacious conduct of loudly speaking simultaneously

with Atty. Cuevas that prompted respondent Justices to order him to leave the
courtroom. Third, they consulted the complainants before they set the hearing
[25]

of the plunder case three times a week, resulting in the revision of the trial
settings embodied in the courts Order dated September 14, 2001. Fourth, the
[26]

appointment of three (3) PAO lawyers was intended to provide the accused with
adequate legal assistance during the hearing. And fifth, they resolved the
accuseds three motions to quash only on July 9, 2001 because the parties last
pleading was filed only on July 5, 2001. [27]

For his part, Justice Badoy maintains that the Pre-trial Order has not
prejudiced the accused since they were not obliged to sign it and that they are
free to object to the presentation of any evidence during trial. He ordered Atty.
[28]

Saguisag to leave the courtroom because he ignored Justice De Castros

repeated order to stop arguing. On the setting of the hearing of the plunder
[29]

case three times a week, he stressed that the court was merely complying with
the Speedy Trial Act. And lastly, on the alleged late rulings, he explains:
[30]

Regarding the release of the Resolution of the undersigned on the Motion for
Recusation of the Estradas on the recusation issue. At the time, the undersigned had
no intention of releasing it yet in order to fine-tune the same further. However, he was
informed just before going out for the hearing that the Estradas were going to use the
pendency of their Motion for Recusation as a reason, again, to ask for the
postponement of the setting for that day, one of their several motions for
postponement.

As regards the delay in the Resolution of the undersigned on the permission to

have Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada go to San Juan City to administer the oath to
both his mother as Senator and his brother as the new Mayor of San Juan City,
the reason was because the undersigned was looking hard for a justification to
grant the request since the undersigned sympathized with the same. The
undersigned went to the extent of requesting a copy of the Rules and Regulations
from both the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) as well as the
Bureau of Corrections (BOC).Hence, the delay in the Resolution of
the ponencia. But, even late, there was still a chance for then Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estrada to administer the oaths of office.

xxxxxx

The undersigned stated that, with every Justice having 100% load and 100%
staff, with the plunder case (equivalent easily to 500%), the undersigned now had
a load of 600% but with his support staff remaining in the same level. That is
why he asked for additional staff. (Emphasis supplied)
[31]

At the outset, it must be stressed that the retirement of Justice Badoy from
[32]

the Judiciary does not divest this Court of its jurisdiction over these
cases. In Perez vs. Abiera, this Court ruled:
[33]

X x x. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent
of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy
would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to
wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some
corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable
acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune
to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must
assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other
officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general
public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if
guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper
and imposable under the situation.

We shall resolve A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC first.

An introspective appraisal of the ambulance incident yields reasons for this
Court to adjudge Justice Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. He should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
Judiciary. Concomitant with this is the express mandate of the Canons of
[34]

Judicial Ethics that justice should not be bounded by the individual

idiosyncrasies of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual
and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be spectacular or
sensational in the conduct of his court.
Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing judicial norms. We see no
reason why he should rush to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station just to inform the
public about the loss of a Resolution. This is an internal office incident which
should not be reported to the whole nation. His claim that the Resolution
might have been stolen and sold by someone (using his name) for a fee is a
wild conjecture. Not only did his conduct give an image that he could not
manage his work effectively, but it also indicated that he had corrupt
personnel.Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits.
Justice Badoys aberrant behavior deserves administrative sanction. As the
Chairman of the Division hearing the plunder case against the former President
of the Philippines, he should have been more circumspect in his actuation. A
short pause for reflection might have yielded a better judgment. The loss of the
Resolution, being an internal matter, could have been addressed inside his own
chamber. That he brought it to the arena of public opinion is pure vanity. It
cannot be countenanced. If lawyers are prohibited from making public
statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse public
opinion for or against a party, with more reason should judges be
[35]

prohibited from seeking publicity. Judges are not actors or politicians

who thrive by publicity. Publicity undermines the dignity and impartiality
of a judge. Thus, at no time should he be moved by a desire to cater to
[36]

public opinion to the detriment of the administration of justice. [37]

The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to the ambulance
incident, was strictly ordered by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., to cease
and desist from holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving
interviews to the media on any matter or incident related to the issues subject
of the controversy all the more punctuates his indiscretion.
[38]

As we mentioned earlier, judges are subject to human limitations. Imbedded

in their consciousness is the complex of emotions, habits and
convictions. Aware of this actuality, it behooves them to regulate these
deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either to their own detriment or to
that of the courts they serve. This is the high price they have to pay as
occupants of their exalted positions.
We now resolve A.M No. SB-02-10-J.
At this juncture, let it be stressed that the administration of justice is primarily
a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to
properly perform his role in this task in the same manner that the lawyer expects
a judge to do his part. Their relation should be based on mutual respect
[39]

and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this
manner can each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain
effectively the ends of justice. [40]

The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they
heeded the foregoing clarion call.

Respondents are not guilty of the charges of dishonesty and

misrepresentation. Dishonesty connotes a disposition to deceive, while [41]

misrepresentation means a statement made to deceive or mislead. Obviously, [42]

both imply an intention to deceive. Complainants failed to prove that

respondents acted with deceit or with malice or bad faith in stating in the Pre-
trial Order that the defense admitted the existence of certain exhibits. Other
than their bare allegation, no sufficient evidence was adduced to support the
charge. That respondents did not intend to deceive complainants is clear from
[43]

the fact that the Pre-trial Order states verbatim the Joint Stipulations of Facts
submitted by both parties. Furthermore, when complainants expressed their
objection to the inclusion of the assailed statement, respondents immediately
ordered its deletion. The transcript of stenographic notes is revealing, thus:
AJ BADOY:
The Court would appreciate if you can point out some grammatical errors.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Yes, Your Honor. I am going to do that.
 On page 20, the last paragraph states: The defense admitted exhibit A up to
exhibit C-45 and its sub markings as to its existence but not as to the truth of
the content. In the very first place there never was any admission made by the
defense as even to the existence of the document. And the sentence also we
believe not grammatically appropriate. It should be their sub markings or as
to their existence because this involved several documents, Your Honors.
AJ DE CASTRO:
That portion may be deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, Im not sure about it. Your Honor. I only pointed that there is a need for us to
go over page by page because we got a copy only after there was an incident
xxxxxx
OMB Desierto:
We can have this deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
But there are several others.
AJ DE CASTRO:
What are those?
OMB Desierto:
After one (1) hour they should be able to determine that. After all Your Honor, I would
like to emphasize the fact that the Joint Stipulation of Facts were signedstipulations
which we had a week ago were signed by the parties, by the counsels for the
accused. And now, the things that are reflected here, are found in this Pre-trial
Order. If there is any delineation from what stipulated then and were signed
by the counsels for the defense and also the prosecution, then we can correct
that, but it cannot be possible major changes will have to be made in the Pre-
trial Order since this is only copied anyway from the Joint Stipulation of
Facts. If there are such thing as that particular sentence which should be
objectionable to the defense, the prosecution is ready to agree to its deletion.
xxxxxx
AJ DE CASTRO:
You know what we did here is simply copy verbatim every document that we found
on record pertaining to the Pre-trial conference. We did not add. We did not
subtract. So, anything that you will state now will simply be corrections of some
clerical errors, that is all. Giving you enough time to go over.[44] (Emphasis supplied)

On complainants refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section 2, Rule 118 of

the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. Considering that the Pre-trial
Order contains the recital of the actions taken by the parties, agreements and
admissions, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked, the parties must
[45]

sign it. A party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the
Joint Stipulation of Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party
believes that the Pre-trial Order is not an honest representation of what
transpired in the pre-trial conference, then he must specify his objections
thereto and the court may modify it to prevent injustice. This was what
respondents exactly did when complainants pointed out the assailed statement
in the Pre-trial Order.

II

We now come to complainants allegation of oppression and gross

misconduct. Oppression is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who
under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority. Upon the other hand, the word misconduct implies wrongful
[46]

intention. For gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should
be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard
of well-known legal rules. We find no evidence to prove complainants charges
[47]

of oppression and misconduct.

Records show that Atty. Saguisag was asking the court for a copy of the
Pre-trial Order so that he could follow up the courts discussion. He did not utter
any disrespectful remark against respondents nor attack their integrity or
authority. However, he kept on speaking simultaneously with Justice Cuevas
and refused to yield to the courts repeated order to stop. Such actuation must
have constrained respondents to lose their cool and order the sheriffs to take
him out of the courtroom. At that point, what respondents should have done
was to cite him in direct contempt of court pursuant to Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. In Romero vs. Valle, Jr., this Court ruled:
[48] [49]

Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being
arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court.Respondent judge could very well have
cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by
banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom.

It has been consistently stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those
who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and
courtesy. In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A
judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A
judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
In Echano vs. Sunga, respondent judge, during the course of an argument
[50]

in his sala, lost his cool and called the sheriff to take away the arguing
attorney. And when the attorney kept on talking, respondent judge
countered, Submitted, Buntalin kita dian. This Court admonished him to be
more prudent and restrained in his behavior.
For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Saguisag should have observed the respect due to
respondent magistrates for the maintenance of the courts supreme
importance. Upon being ordered to stop arguing simultaneously with Justice
Cuevas, he should have complied and behaved accordingly. Had he done so,
he would not have been ordered to leave the courtroom. Indeed, he failed to
comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the court.
III
The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order,
not only because the case is of national concern, but more importantly, because
the accused are presently detained. Contrary to complainants assertions, the
[51]

continuous trial is in accordance with the mandate of the law. This Court, in
Administrative Circular No. 3-90 dated January 31, 1990, ordered all trial courts
to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988 and Circular No. 1-89
dated January 19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the
processing of cases. This delay was attributed to the common practice of
piecemeal trial wherein cases are set for trial one day at a time and thereafter
the hearing is postponed to another date or dates until all the parties have
finished their presentation of evidence. Section 2 of Rule 119 of the Revised
[52]

Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 2 Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. Trial once commenced

shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial.In no case shall the entire period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized
by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Corolarilly, the consultations referred to in the foregoing provisions does

not necessarily mean that the court has to secure first from the
prosecution and defense their approval before it can set the date of
hearing. To rule otherwise is to subject our trial system to the control of the
parties and their counsel.
Complainants also assail respondents act of setting the hearing at one
oclock in the afternoon. Again, there is nothing irregular in it. The schedule of
hearing is regarded as a matter necessarily at the discretion of the trial
judge. As a matter of fact, a court may even hold night sessions, and a court of
review will not interfere unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse
of the power of the judge and that injustice has been done. This is because
[53]

the good of the service demands more toil and less idleness, and the limitations
imposed by law are aimed to cut indolence and not the other way around. [54]

IV

Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of violation of the
accuseds right to counsel. A PAO lawyer is considered as independent counsel
within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is not a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. In People
vs. Bacor, we ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the
[55]

constitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the

accused.

Finally, we find that Justice Badoy incurred delay in resolving Jinggoy

Estradas motion to be allowed to administer the oath of his mother, a newly
elected Senator. Every judge is required, at all times, to be alert in his
rulings and in the conduct of the business of the court, so far as he can
make it useful to litigants and to the community. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. A judge
must cultivate a capacity for quick decision and habits of indecision must be
sedulously overcome.
While we commend Justice Badoys persistence in searching for precedents
that would help him resolve Jinggoy Estradas motion to be allowed to
administer the oath of office of his mother, nonetheless, he should not have
delayed resolving the same. As a result, the members of his Division failed to
vote on his Resolution. He knew very well that the oath taking was to be held
at 2:00 P.M. of June 29, 2001. Even if he had to deny the motion, he should
have consulted his members before 2:00 P.M. so as to give them the
opportunity to consider Jinggoy Estradas arguments. When he submitted the
Resolution to his members at 4:45 P.M., he rendered their votes
inconsequential. Even Justices De Castro and Ilarde made notes in the same
Resolution to the effect that the matter subject of the Resolution had become
moot before it reached them. Justice De Castro stated: The matter is now
moot and academic; while Justice Ilarde wrote: What is there to deny? This
resolution was brought to us only on 4:45 P.M. The matter has been
rendered moot and academic. Clearly, Justice Badoy should be held liable for
such delay.
In sum, we find Justice Badoy guilty of the following administrative offenses:
1) conduct unbecoming a Justice for going to GMA-7 Broadcast Station
aboard an ambulance and reporting the loss of a Resolution, classified as a
light charge under Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended; and
[56]

2) undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estradas motion to be allowed to

administer his mothers oath of office, a less serious charge under Section 9 of
the same Rule. [57]

Likewise, we find that both Justice Badoy and Justice De Castro failed to
exhibit judicial temperament. Such conduct deserves admonition.
One last word. The members of the bench and the bar ought to be reminded
that the people expect from them a sense of shared responsibility in the
administration of justice a crucial factor in the speedy and fair disposition of
cases. Each of them must do his share for in the last analysis the quality of
justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers
practicing in the courts and of the judges who have been selected from among
them.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Retired), is
hereby FINED in the sum of P13,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a Justice
and for delay in issuing an Order, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
 Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
tolerant of counsels demeanors which do not detract from the dignity and
solemnity of the court proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents records with this
Court.
SO ORDERED.
 [A. C. No. 5811. January 20, 2003]

MARITESS GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ILUMINADO M.

MANUEL, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

For our resolution is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by

complainant Maritess Garcia against respondent Atty. Iluminado M. Manuel for
gross misconduct for ineffectively handling her case and failing to return to her
the money she gave him.
The facts, as culled from the records, are uncomplicated:
Sometime in February 1999, Maritess Garcia, divorced from husband Oscar
Fauni, approached respondent for legal advice concerning child support and
her condominium unit in San Juan, Metro Manila, which her erstwhile husband
refused to vacate. Respondent agreed to handle her case at a fee
of P70,000. Finding respondent's fees reasonable, complainant entrusted to
respondent all pertinent papers for his study. An advance fee of P10,000 was
then asked by respondent from complainant.
On 17 February 1999, a retainer agreement was entered by complainant
with respondent, calling for the payment of (1) P35,000 payable in weekly
installments of preferably P5,000 but not less than P2,000; (2) P35,000 to come
from the proceeds of the sale of her condominium unit or from any amount that
might be recovered from Mr. Fauni, except that pertaining to child support; and
(3) a contingent fee of 5% of any amount that might be recovered from Mr. Fauni
except that for child support. Incidental expenses, such as filing fees and
postage fees, were also made chargeable to the account of the
complainant. On the same occasion, complainant gave respondent the
[1]

advance fee of P10,000. Thereafter, respondent informed complainant that he

[2]

needed P10,000 for the filing fees.

On 4 March 1999, complainant gave respondent P10,000 for the filing fees
in the ejectment case. She, however, asked respondent as to why the fees
[3]

cost so much. Respondent replied that filing fees are based on a certain
percentage of the price of the property and the amount of child support prayed
for. A demand letter to vacate the premises of the condominium dated 4 March
1999 was then prepared by respondent and mailed to Mr. Fauni on 8 March
1999. [4]
 In the interim, complainant made several follow-ups with respondent
inquiring particularly as to whether the ejectment case had already been
filed. Through a telephone conversation with respondent on 7 April 1999,
complainant found out that the ejectment case had not been filed yet by
respondent. Agitated by the information, complainant immediately went to
respondent's residence. An altercation between respondent and complainant
took place. After serious exchange of words, respondent returned to
complainant all of her documents. No amount of money was, however, returned
by respondent to complainant despite the latters demand for its return.
Aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainant filed on 30 June 1999
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline,
the instant complaint for gross misconduct against respondent. [5]

In his Answer dated 24 September 1999, respondent denied having

committed any malicious, dishonest or anomalous acts against
complainant. Respondent asserted that he did not file the ejectment case
because he had not yet received the registry return card evidencing the receipt
by Oscar Fauni of the demand letter he sent on 8 March 1999. It could not be
said that he misappropriated the P10,000 for the filing fees because
complainant, who was then in arrears with her installment payments for his fee,
agreed that said P10,000 could be applied in the meantime to her
account. Finally, respondent averred that he never withdrew his services as
counsel of complainant; rather it was the complainant who explicitly discharged
him when she demanded for the return of the amounts she had paid him. [6]

In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 May 2001, Investigating

Commissioner Atty. Caesar R. Dulay concluded that respondent was less than
honest to his client and displayed lack of candor and fidelity to her cause. He
cited respondents act of (1) making it appear to complainant that as early a 17
February 1999, he already needed P10,000 for filing fees; (2) failing to advise
his client as to the real amount of the filing fees; and (3) failing to render an
[7]

accounting of the monies received and intended as filing fees. Moreover,

Commissioner Dulay found respondent guilty of misleading the Commission by
his claim of having received the registry return card on 7 April 1999, the truth of
the matter being that respondent already received the registry return card on
24 March 1999. He then recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one month and be ordered to render an accounting of all
monies he received from the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2002-239 of 29 June 2002, the Board of Governors
of the IBP approved and adopted Atty. Dulay's Report and Recommendation. It,
however, increased the recommended penalty of respondent from one month
to six months of suspension from the practice of law.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as
approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01
thereof provides:
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable

conclusion that respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence
reposed in him by the complainant.Respondent Manuel fully knew that the
jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate had to be complied with before
an ejectment case could be filed, and yet he asked complainant to raise the
[8]

filing fee of P10,000 as early as 17 February 1999. He likewise cannot take

[9]

refuge behind his claim that he did not file the ejectment case because he had
not yet received the registry return card. The records reveal that despite Atty.
Manuels receipt of the registry return card on 24 March 1999, he still did not
[10]

file an ejectment case.

Finally, if indeed respondent was in good faith in dealing with complainant,
he should have informed or advised the complainant of the status of her case
or, at the least, responded to her inquiries. Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides:

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information.

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever

present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the
developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and
manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus that the trust
and faith in the counsel may remain unimpaired. [11]

Respondent also failed to comply with the norms embodied in Canon 16 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P10,000 specifically

for filing fees in the ejectment case. Thus, he was under the obligation to render
an accounting of the same.The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of
attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the
funds received from, or held by him for, the client. [12]

Moreover, a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of

his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to
his client (a) when they become due or (b) upon demand. In the instant case,
[13]

respondent failed to account and return the P10,000 for the filing fees despite
complainants repeated demands.
We find untenable respondents claim that since complainant was already in
arrears with his fees, it was proper for him to apply the filing fees to his attorneys
fees. It has been held that an attorneys lien is not an excuse for a lawyers non-
rendition of accounting. And while a lawyer is allowed to apply so much of the
[14]

clients funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
the lawyer is however under the obligation to promptly thereafter notify his
client. Nothing on record supports respondents claim that complainant was
[15]

adequately notified as to the application of the P10,000 (for the filing fees) to
her arrears.
Besides, the receipt dated 4 March 1999 states that:

In the event that whatever is left of the P10,000 after the filing of the ejectment case is
insufficient for the filing fee in the other collection case, the said balance shall be
applied to the installment due for the retainer agreement. [16]

A close reading of the receipt reveals that while it authorizes respondent to

apply whatever would be left of the P10,000 (intended for the filing fees) to the
retainer fee, it clearly presupposes that the filing fee in the ejectment cases
must have been paid already.
We find unwarranted respondents claim that complainant impliedly
terminated his services when she asked for the return of all her
documents. Complainant was upset by respondent's non-filing of the ejectment
case. She honestly believed that respondent would already file the ejectment
case after giving him the P10,000 for the filing fees. It was thus a spontaneous
and natural reaction for her to confront respondent of his inaction. Her
belligerence arose from her zealousness to have her former husband ejected
from her condominium unit. Assuming that complainant terminated
respondents services, respondent would not, nonetheless, be relieved of his
duty to render the necessary accounting for all the monies received by him from
complainant.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.-

- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that

suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The
supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
[17]

attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls
for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be sufficient sanction
[18]

against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as

punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. [19]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Iluminado M. Manuel is found GUILTY of

gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent is
ordered to render, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution, an
accounting of all monies received by him from complainant.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney
in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5841. January 20, 2002]

EMILY SENCIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT

CALVADORES respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Commission on Bar

[1]

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 18 November

1999, complainant Emily Sencio charged respondent Atty. Robert Calvadores
with violation of the lawyers oath, malpractice and gross misconduct.
Complainant Sencio alleged that sometime in 1997 her eldest son, Herbert
Sencio, died in a vehicular accident. She was referred by her mother-in-law to
respondent Calvadores to prosecute the civil aspect of the case. On 19 May
1998 she initially gave the respondent the amount of P1,500 and promised to
pay the attorneys fees later.
On 20 August 1998, after having accumulated enough funds, the
complainant paid the respondent the amount of P12,000 as attorneys fees and
for other expenses relating to the case.The payment was duly acknowledged
by the respondent. [2]

From that time on, complainant Sencio regularly contacted the respondent
to update herself of the status of the case. The respondent kept on assuring her
that everything would be alright. Finally, however, complainant discovered that
the respondent did not file any case, a fact which the respondent admitted. The
latter promised to return to the complainant the money he had received from
her.
The complainant returned several times to respondents house and even
patiently waited for him outside his house to get back her money. The
respondent, however, did not return to her the money. He still did not file the
case in court either.
In its Order of 19 November 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline,
[3]

through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, required the respondent to submit

his answer to the complaint and reminded him that if he failed to answer, he
would be considered in default and the case would be heard ex-parte.
 Notwithstanding his receipt of the Order, as evidenced by the registry return
card, the respondent did not file any answer to the complaint. He was then given
notice to appear at the hearing on 29 May 2001.
In the initial hearing on 29 May 2001, the respondent did not appear. The
hearing was reset to 16 July 2001. The respondent was warned that if he would
fail to appear on that date, the evidence for the complainant would be received;
the case would be deemed submitted for decision; and he would have to face
the consequences of his non-appearance and disrespectful attitude towards the
Commission on Bar Discipline. [4]

When the case was called for hearing on 16 July 2001, the respondent did
not appear despite due notice. Fortunately for him, the counsel for the
complainant was not available for the presentation of evidence. The hearing
was reset to 7 September 2001, and the respondent was directed to be present
at such hearing. The Commission reiterated the warning in its Order of 29 May
[5]

2001. But, on that date the respondent failed again to appear. The hearing was
[6]

then reset to 24 October 2001 but was later cancelled and reset to 14 December
2001. [7]

Again, despite due notice, the respondent did not appear for the hearing on
14 December 2001. Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes, who took charge of
the investigation, received the evidence for the complainant. In his Report and
Recommendation, he found the respondent guilty of the violation of Canons 16,
17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months and be ordered to return to the complainant the amount of P12,000.
In its Resolution No. XV-2002-410 dated 3 August 2002, the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commisioner Reyes.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the Commission, as approved
and adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP. The breach of respondents
sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor and
observe has been sufficiently established.
Needless to state, a lawyer-client relationship existed between the
respondent and the complainant. As such, the respondent, under Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, owed fidelity to the cause of his
client. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task
with dedication and care; less than that, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. In
[8]

failing to file the case he undertook to handle, the respondent violated Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 18.03 thereof,
which provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Likewise, in not returning the money to the complainant after a demand
therefor was made following his failure to file the case, the respondent violated
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03
thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money
belonging to his client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. [9]

We also frown upon the attitude of the respondent in not answering the
complaint and in deliberately disregarding the orders and notices of the IBP on
many occasions. This attitude showed a character or disposition which stains
the nobility of the legal profession. He chose not to appear at the scheduled
hearings despite due notice and the warnings. Section 30, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court specifically provides:

Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be

removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witness in his
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to
appear and answer the accusations, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex
parte.

The Commissioner then had no recourse but to receive ex-parte the

evidence of the complainant.
In view of the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the
respondent and to return the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) to
the complainant is affirmed, with the modification that the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law is hereby increased to six (6) months and that the return
of the P12,000 should be done within thirty (30) days from notice, with legal
interest.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ROBERT CALVADORES is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
immediately, and ordered to return to Emily Sencio, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this Resolution, the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) with
interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Resolution
until its return. The respondent is further warned that a commission of the same
or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 [A.M. No. 99-1-01-RTC. January 20, 2003]

RE: CASES LEFT UNDECIDED BY RETIRED JUDGE ANTONIO E.

ARBIS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 48, BACOLOD CITY.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

On June 13, 1998, Judge Antonio E. Arbis of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 48, Bacolod City, retired compulsorily. Accordingly, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) sent an audit team to Bacolod City to conduct a
judicial audit and physical inventory of cases pending in the said court.
On September 13, 1999, the judicial audit team submitted a Report to the
OCA stating that Judge Arbis decided nine (9) criminal cases and eight (8) civil
cases (enumerated below) before he retired but he promulgated the decisions
after his retirement.

Criminal Cases Nos. Civil Cases Nos.

1. 10449 1. 1703

2. 11243 2. 5707

3. 12438 3. 6022

4. 12601 4. 6374

5. 12602 5. 6435

6. 12810 6. 7094

7. 13592 7. 7134

8. 93-15235 8. 95-9065 [1]

9. 93-15248

Likewise, Judge Arbis failed to render his decisions within the reglementary
period in the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 5160, 5161, 10425, 10426,
10449, 11243, 12438, 12601, 12602, 12810, 13592, 93-15235, 93-15248 and
95-17079, and Civil Cases Nos. 1684, 3605, 4086, 7419.
When directed by this Court to submit his comment, Judge Arbis explained
that on June 11, 1998, or two days before his compulsory retirement on June
13, 1998, he signed his decisions in the nine (9) criminal cases enumerated
above. Consequently, he had no more time to issue the notices of promulgation.
On his failure to decide seasonably the following cases, he gave the
corresponding reasons:

1. Criminal Cases Nos. 5034, 5035 and 5036 records show that on June 10,
1998, or three (3) days before his compulsory retirement, he issued an
order requiring the parties to submit their memoranda;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 5160 and 5161 he inherited these cases from Judge
Romeo J. Hibionada. The records were not submitted by the Clerk of
Court. Neither were these cases considered submitted for decision in the
latters monthly report;

3. Criminal Cases Nos. 10425 and 10426 the records of these cases were not
submitted to him;

4. Civil Case No. 1684 the transcript of stenographic notes was submitted to
him only after he retired from the service on June 13, 1998;

5. Civil Case No. 3605 this case cannot be considered submitted for decision
as of June 13, 1998. On October 6, 1995, he issued an order directing the
Clerk of Court to furnish the new counsel for the defendants pleadings,
notices and orders relative to the case. Since then, no action has been taken
by any of the parties;

6. Civil Case No. 4086 he inherited this case from Judge Romeo J.
Hibionada. The Clerk of Court did not refer the same to him for resolution
or decision; and

7. Civil Case No. 7419 this case was not listed in the monthly report of cases
submitted for decision.

In a Resolution dated February 22, 2000, this Court referred the judicial
audit team Report to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
 In his Memorandum dated May 16, 2000 addressed to the Chief Justice,
Justice Benipayo stated that the nine (9) criminal cases (enumerated above)
decided by Judge Arbis had been submitted for decision for more than one (1)
year prior to his retirement on June 13, 1998. In fact, one of the cases, Criminal
Case No. 11243, was submitted for decision as early as August 15, 1994. Had
Judge Arbis decided those cases within the reglementary period, then he could
have promulgated his decisions before his retirement.
Justice Benipayo recommended that for failure of Judge Arbis to render his
decisions within the ninety-day reglementary period in the following cases:
Criminal Cases Nos. 5160, 5161, 10425, 10426, 10449, 11243, 12438, 12601,
12602, 12810, 13592, 93-15235, 93-15248 and 95-17079, and Civil Cases Nos.
1684, 3605, 4086, 7419, he should be held administratively liable and fined
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from the seventy-five
thousand pesos (P75,000.00) which was withheld from his retirement benefits
per this Courts Resolution dated January 26, 1999.
Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court dated June 26, 2000, Judge Arbis
filed a Manifestation dated August 29, 2000 that he is submitting this case for
decision based on the pleadings filed.
We agree with the findings and recommended penalty of the former Court
Administrator.
No less than our Constitution mandates lower courts to resolve or decide
[2]

cases within three (3) months after they have been submitted for
decision. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. Verily, this Court has incessantly
admonished members of the bench to administer justice without undue delay,
for justice delayed is justice denied. The present clogged dockets in all levels
of our judicial system cannot be cleared, unless every magistrate earnestly,
painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate of the law. Undue delay
in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn, brings
the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the
public in the judiciary. Hence, the failure of judges to render judgment within
[3]

the required period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions on them. [4]

The flimsy excuse proffered by Judge Arbis that the undecided cases were
never brought to his attention before he compulsorily retired on June 13, 1998
deserves scant consideration.Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to manage their dockets in such a manner that the
work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch. It should be
emphasized that the responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases
primarily rests on the presiding judge. He is provided with a court staff, and a
branch clerk of court who shall take steps to meet the requirements of
Administrative Circular No. 10-94. [5]

Moreover, a judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or
resolution, and he is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may
act on them without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the
flow of cases and their speedy disposition. A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since proper and
efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the
[6]

guardians of a judges responsibilities. The efficient administration of justice

cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame from one court personnel
to another. A judge should be the master of his own domain and take
[7]

responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.

[8]

All told, we find respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision

which, under Section 9(1), Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of
Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same
Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Antonio E. Arbis liable for
undue delay in rendering decisions and imposes upon him a fine of P20,000.00,
to be deducted from the P75,000.00 earlier withheld from his retirement
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5948. January 22, 2003]

GAMALIEL ABAQUETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BERNARDITO A.

FLORIDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Bernardito A. Florido filed

[1]

with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
praying that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for representing
conflicting interests.
Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American
citizenship. He resides at 15856 N. 15th Way, Phoenix, Arizona 85022,
U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Cebu City.
On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional services of
respondent through his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, to represent him
in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta, Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner before
[2]

the Regional Trial court of Cebu. [3]

Accordingly, respondent entered his appearance in Special Proceedings

No. 3971-R as counsel for herein complainant. Subsequently, he filed
[4]

complainants Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting,

registering complainants objection

. . . to the inclusion of the properties under Items 1 to 5 contained in the inventory of

the administratrix dated November 9, 1983. These properties are the sole and
exclusive properties of the oppositor per the latest tax declarations already marked as
Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the Formal Offer of Exhibits by oppositor in writing dated
August 17, 1983 xxx. [5]

Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money
against complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and
entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano
Gerona. Respondent signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros
[6]

Yap Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that:

Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain
parcels of land, more particularly as follows
 The parcels of land referred to as conjugal property of complainant and
Milagros Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcels of land in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R which respondent, as lawyer of complainant, alleged
as the sole and exclusive properties of complainant. In short, respondent lawyer
made allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-11453 which were contrary to and in
direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in Special
Proceedings No. 3971-R.
Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never
authorized by the former to appear as counsel for complainants ex-wife in Civil
Case No. CEB-11453; that respondent failed to indicate in the Complaint the
true and correct address of herein complainant, which respondent knew as far
back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote a letter to the complainant at the said
address. Consequently, complainant failed to receive summons and was
[7]

declared in default in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of default was
eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to the Philippines,
which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that
respondents conduct constitute professional misconduct and malpractice as
well as trifling with court processes.
In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer that he always acted in
[8]

good faith in his professional relationship with complainant in spite of the fact
that they have not personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the
Complaint on information and documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig,
complainants sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, indicating that he was sole and
exclusive owner of the properties. This was sometime in November 1983. No
affidavit of adjudication was ever furnished respondent by complainant and this
was apparently suppressed because it would show that the properties formed
part of the estate.
Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings No.
3971-R was settled and the attorney-client relationship between complainant
and respondent was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta through Mrs. Baclig,
engaged his services to file Civil Case No. CEB-11453. Mrs. Baclig presented
to him a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1975, showing that the properties
[9]

subject hereof were not complainants exclusive property but his conjugal
property with his wife, the same having been acquired during the subsistence
of their marriage.Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint
that said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.
Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average
eighty new court cases annually and personally interviews four or five clients,
prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays and Sundays. It
regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until
8:30 p.m. This has been going on for the last twenty-five years out of
respondents thirty-three years of private practice. The absence of personal
contact with complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight
and/or lapse of respondents memory that complainant was a former
client. Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the name
of complainant but was entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Bonifacia
Payahay Abaqueta.
Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that
immediately after discovering that he formerly represented complainant in
Special Proceeding No. 3971-R, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
plaintiff, which was granted by the trial court. He denied any malice in his acts
[10]

and alleged that it is not in his character to do malice or falsehood particularly

in the exercise of his profession.
In his Comments/Observations on Respondents Answer, complainant [11]

averred that respondents conduct was geared towards insuring a court victory
for Milagros Yap in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated
that complainants address was 9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas,
77083, U.S.A., when he knew fully well that complainants true and correct
address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7th Street & Italian School Road, Phoenix,
Arizona, 85013, U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his true and correct
address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment in
favor of his client.
During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared that
respondents son got married to the daughter of IBP National President Arthur
D. Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from participating in the resolution of
the case. Subsequently, a Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate
[12]

the entire records of the case within thirty (30) days from notice. [13]

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not

respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
investigating commissioner found that respondent clearly violated the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests and recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
We find the recommendation well-taken.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that

RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
 There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
[14]

opposed by him when he argues for the other client. [15]

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new

retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. [16]

As pointed out by the investigating commissioner, respondent does not

deny that he represented complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. He
also does not deny that he is the lawyer of Milagros Yap Abaqueta in Civil Case
No. CEB-11453, filed against complainant and involving the same properties
which were litigated in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R.Respondent also
admitted that he did not secure the consent of complainant before he agreed to
act as Milagros Yap Abaquetas lawyer in Civil Case No. CEB-11453.
The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his
clear representation of conflicting interests in this case. First, the investigating
commissioner observed that the name Gamaliel Abaqueta is not a common
name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell in ones mind if he came across the
name again. In this case, respondent actively prosecuted the cause of
complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, such that it would be
impossible for respondent not to have recalled his name.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty,
still it is incredible that he could not recall that complainant was his client,
considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact
and the go-between of complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings No.
3971-R, was the same person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to
him. Even a person of average intelligence would have made the connection
between Mrs. Baclig and complainant under such circumstances.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and
Special Proceedings No. 3971-R are the same properties could not have
escaped the attention of respondent.With such an abundance of circumstances
to aid respondents memory, it simply strains credulity for him to have
conveniently forgotten his past engagement as complainants lawyer. What
rather appears, given the prevailing facts of this case, is that he chose to ignore
them on the assumption that the long period of time spanning his past and
present engagement would effectively blur the memories of the parties to such
a discrepancy.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate
for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
[17]

Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer
[18]

owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
[19]

diligence and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and
[20]

devotion. [21]

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as

counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client. The
[22]

reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Indeed, as we stated
[23]

in Sibulo v. Cabrera, The relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so

[24]

that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery, should be

avoided. [25]

Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent

fraudulently and maliciously falsified the true and correct address of the
complainant notwithstanding respondents knowledge thereof. Lawyers
normally do not have knowledge of the personal circumstances of a party in a
case and usually rely on the information supplied by their clients. The fact that
respondent sent a letter to complainant at the latters correct address sixteen
[26]

months before the filing of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself prove
malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros
Yap Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason
to doubt the correctness of the address of the complainant given to him by
Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was complainants wife.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for Three (3) months. He is further ADMONISHED to exercise
greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients
and the court. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1471. January 22, 2003]

PROSECUTOR ROBERT M. VISBAL, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MARINO S.

BUBAN, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Once again, we find occasion to reiterate this Courts mandate that every
judge should dispose of his courts business promptly. Delay in resolving
motions is inexcusable and should not be condoned. [1]

In a sworn letter-complaint dated April 15, 2000 addressed to then Court

Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Provincial Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal of
Tacloban City charged Judge Marino S. Buban, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 1, Tacloban City, with gross inefficiency and misconduct in
Office.[2]

In his complaint, complainant alleged that on July 29, 1999, he filed with the
MTCC a "Motion to Correct and Re-mark Exhibits of the Prosecution" in
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-CR-19 and 98-07-CR-20. Presiding Judge Marino
S. Buban, respondent, resolved the motion only on March 20, 2000, or almost
eight (8) months from the date it was filed. He deliberately failed to resolve the
motion within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days because he begrudged
complainant's filing of an administrative charge and several motions for his
inhibition.Respondents delay in resolving the motion violated the relevant
provisions of the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore,
respondent committed falsification by stating in his Certificates of Service from
October 1999 to February 2000 that he has no pending motions submitted for
resolution.
In his comment, respondent judge admitted he incurred delay in resolving
[3]

the "Motion to Correct and Re-mark Exhibits of the Prosecution." He attributed

such delay to the frequent resetting of the hearing of the cases. He also alleged
that his clerk of court failed or forgot to submit the records of the pertinent case
to him and to call his attention to the unresolved motion attached to the
voluminous records. He blamed the complainant for failing to remind him earlier
of the motion. It was only during the hearing of March 20, 2000 that complainant
called his attention to the pending incident. Immediately, he granted the motion
and ordered the remarking of exhibits. He stressed that the delay in resolving
the motion did not impede the flow of the proceedings. He surmised that
complainant filed the instant administrative case in order to force him
(respondent) to inhibit himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 98-11-18 for
direct assault upon a person in authority. The accused therein is complainants
wife.
In her Report, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao recommended
that respondent be held administratively liable for gross inefficiency for his delay
in resolving a motion.
This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge
[4]

within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and
the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. Further, such delay
[5]

constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

which mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. [6]

It is undisputed that respondent failed to resolve complainants motion within

the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. He cannot escape liability by
claiming that his clerk failed or forgot to inform him of the unresolved
motion. Though blame may conveniently be placed on court personnels
mismanagement of the records of cases, it must be kept in mind that they are
not the guardians of a judges responsibilities. Proper and efficient court
[7]

management is as much the judges responsibility for he is the one directly

responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. [8]

As a trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and should

at all times act with efficiency and with probity. Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the
[9]

Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should diligently discharge

administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of
other judges and court personnel. [10]

Furthermore, Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the same Code requires every judge to
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business.Respondent fell short of this mandate. He also failed to
comply with this Courts Circular No. 13 dated July 31, 1987 which directs all
judges to closely supervise court personnel. [11]

Noteworthy is the fact that respondent did not refute complainant's

imputation of falsification of his Certificates of Service. In fact, the Office of the
Court Administrator secured copies of respondent's Certificates of Service for
the months of August, September, October, and November 1999 and found that
he continued to certify that all proceedings, applications, petitions, motions and
all civil and criminal cases for submission or determination within ninety (90)
days or more have been determined and decided. [12]

However, Deputy Court Administrator Elepao stated that respondents false

entries in his Certificates of Service were based on his belief, though erroneous,
that he had then no pending matter to resolve. She concluded that there can be
no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. [13]

We find respondent judge administratively liable for undue delay in

rendering an order, a less serious charge under Section 9, Rule 140, as
amended, of the Revised Rules of Court.Pursuant to Section 11(b) of the same
Rule, such offense is punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, for incurring undue delay in rendering an order, respondent
Judge Marino S. Buban of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
1, Tacloban City, is ordered to pay a FINE of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00)
Pesos, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5310. January 28, 2003]

LINA P. VILLAROSA AND JOSE P. VILLAROSA, complainants,

vs. ATTY. OSMONDO V. POMPERADA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:

On 02 August 2000, complainants Lina Villarosa and her son Jose Villarosa
filed before this Court a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Osmondo
Pomperada, charging him with deceit and gross misconduct.
In her affidavit-complaint, Mrs. Villarosa alleged that sometime in 1994 her
late husband, Isidro Villarosa, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their
son, Jose Villarosa, over their property in Barangay Dulao, Bago City, covered
by TCT No. T-18480, specifically described to be -

A parcel of land (Lot 1110-N. Psd-064502-023179), being a portion of Lot 1110, Cad.
40, Bago Cadastre), situated in the Barrio of Talotog, City of Bago, Prov. Of Negros
Occ., Island of Negros, bounded on the NE. and SE. along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-
11-12 by Lot 1112, Cad. 40 Bago Cadastre; on the SE., along line 12-13 by Lot 1110-
S; on the NW., along lines 13-14-15 by 1110-0; along lines 15-16-17 by Lot 1110-J;
by Lot 1110-M, all of the subd. Survey; along lines 18-1 by Lot 111. x x x; containing
an area of ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT (149,728) SQUARE METERS, more or less.

According to complainants, the deed was neither dated nor

notarized. Subsequently, Jose Villarosa sold the property to Loreto Cauntoy
and a deed of agreement, dated 08 April 1997, was executed by the parties.
In August 1999, Jose Villarosa filed Civil Case No. 980, a complaint for
rescission of contract and recovery of possession of the real property against
Loreto Cauntoy before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Bago City. At the
trial, Loreto Cauntoy presented a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 19
April 1993, executed by Isidro Villarosa in favor of his son Jose Villarosa. The
document was purportedly notarized by Atty. Osmondo V. Pomperada per Doc.
No. 59, Page No. 15, Book No. XVIII, Series of 1993. Complainants, however,
submitted a Certification from the Records Management and Archives Office to
the effect that Doc. No. 59, Page No. 15, Book No. XVIII, Series of 1993, of
Notary Public Osmondo V. Pomperada refer(red) to an affidavit executed by
Roberto Z. Salutin of Sitio Dahug, Bo. Tabunan, Bago City, Philippines,
executed on April 19, 1993, a clear indication, said the complainants, that Atty.
Osmondo Pomperada and Loreto Cauntoy had deceitfully falsified the
document.
The Court, in its resolution of 20 September 2000, required respondent
lawyer to comment on the complaint.
In his compliance, Atty. Pomperada commented that the filing of the instant
administrative complaint was merely an act of harassment. In fact, he asserted,
complainants had filed simultaneous criminal complaints against him and
Loreto Cauntoy before the Office of the City Prosecutor. He vehemently denied
having falsified the Deed of Absolute Sale, insisting that the document was
signed by the late Isidro Villarosa, with complainants Lina Villarosa and their
daughter Ma. Elena V. Valenciano acting as witnesses, at the Villarosa
residence.
The Court, in its resolution of 29 January 2001, indorsed the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On 05 August 2002, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline,
submitted to the Court 1) a notice of resolution of the Board of Governors, and
2) the records of the case consisting of two volumes comprising, respectively,
of 231 pages and 27 pages. The resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
(Resolution No. XV-2002-2324), adopting the recommendation of
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, was to the following effect; viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex `A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent has
trifled with the importance or significance of his notarial commission, and had
consequently prejudiced the integrity of the instruments/documents presented to him
in his capacity as Notary Public which dishonest action amounts to gross misconduct,
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years and
Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual Disqualification from being
appointed as Notary Public.

Atty. Pomperada filed a motion for reconsideration contending that he was

utterly deprived of his fundamental right of due process when Commissioner
Milagros San Juan submitted her report, recommending the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification from being
appointed Notary Public, without any formal investigation having first been
conducted.
A perusal of the records would indeed show that no formal investigation was
undertaken by the IBP. In Cottam vs. Atty. Laysa, the Court underscored the
[1]

necessity for such an investigation before any disciplinary sanction can be

imposed. The Court elucidated:

Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at
the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating
the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the
case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex
parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice.Hereunder are some of the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court on this matter; viz.:

`SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. The National Grievance

Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar
referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.

`x x x x x x x x x

`SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the

Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring
him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the
Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal
shall be furnished to the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the
case motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from
notice of the dismissal of the complaint.

`No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

`x x x x x x x x x

`SEC. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to

answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice,
the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

`The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors
upon prior application.

`Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which
shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its commencement.Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a
like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.

The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just
due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly.

Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the sanction

recommended by IBP, a formal investigation that would allow respondent
lawyer a full right to be heard is unavoidable.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings heretofore adverted to
and for it to act thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. 02-1414-MTJ. January 28, 2003]

MARCELO E. GRAVELA, complainant, vs. JUDGE OSMUNDO M.

VILLANUEVA, MCTC-ESPERANZA, SULTAN
KUDARAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is the complaint-affidavit dated July 12, 1999, filed by Marcelo

[1]

Gravela, charging respondent Judge Osmundo M. Villanueva, Presiding Judge

of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, with
falsification and neglect of duty.
In his affidavit, complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of a
parcel of land covered by OCT No. V-19344, situated at Marquez, Esperanza,
Sultan Kudarat, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed on September 21,
1991 by the Philippine National Bank in his favor, for a consideration
of P13,500.00 and ratified on March 12, 1997 before Notary Public Henry G.
Sambrano. [2]

Thereafter, complainant allegedly entered into an agreement with one

Andrew Manganaan whom he authorized to secure a loan with any financial
institution using the aforesaid land title as collateral. However, he was surprised
to learn that on March 3, 1997, a Deed of Sale was executed covering the said
parcel of land and the same Deed was notarized by the respondent. Allegedly,
complainant was misrepresented by another person who pretended to be him
and forged his signature. He claims that respondent judge did not observe due
[3]

diligence in the performance of his official functions as a judge and notary

public ex-officio when he failed to ascertain the identity of the person appearing
before him for the execution of the document. [4]

In his counter-affidavit, respondent judge narrates that on March 3, 1997,

[5]

several persons went to his office and requested him to prepare and notarize a
Deed of Sale involving a parcel of land. He made the necessary inquiries about
their personal circumstances and other matters related to the Deed of Sale. He
then instructed his clerk to prepare the instrument and when this was done, he
explained to the parties the nature and the consequence of their written acts in
the dialects they were conversant with. He claims that since he did not
personally know the vendor, he asked the vendor to produce any authentic
document, i.e. residence certificate, the number of which appeared on the Deed
of Sale, for identification purposes. He further states that it was only after
satisfying himself that the persons before him were indeed the parties to the
Deed of Sale, that he affixed his signature on the Deed.
Complainant originally filed the charges before the Office of the
Ombudsman in Mindanao. In a resolution dated January 27, 2000, the Deputy
[6]

Ombudsman for Mindanao ruled that there is no probable cause to hold

respondent liable for falsification in OMB-MIN-99-0575. He ratiocinated that at
the time of the preparation and notarization of the questioned document,
respondent judge was convinced that the person who appeared before him and
subscribed to the document as the vendor was indeed Marcelo Gravela, the
owner of the property being sold. He further noted that respondent judge asked
the persons appearing before him to produce their residence certificates to
satisfy himself that the persons before him were indeed the parties to the Deed
of Sale. Only then did he affix his signature to the aforesaid document. Based
on the foregoing, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. [7]

With regard to the accusation for neglect of duty in OMB-MIN-ADM-99-337,

the Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, in
an order dated August 31, 1999, forwarded the administrative complaint to the
[8]

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for proper action and disposition
considering that the Supreme Court exercises administrative supervision over
court employees. On November 24, 1999, the Court Administrator required
respondent to file his comment to the complaint-affidavit. [9]

Attached to respondents comment was the affidavit of one Yanena D.

[10]

Portillano, Clerk of Court of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of

Bagumbayan. She declared that she prepares and types instruments or
documents to be notarized by respondent judge as ex-officio notary public. She
said she prepared the Deed of Sale in question. She attested that respondent
judge indeed took pains in ascertaining the identity of the parties to the Deed of
Sale and made sure that the individuals appearing before him were the same
as those stated in the Deed.
Upon evaluation, the OCA opined that although respondent was not liable
for neglect of duty, having found that he exercised the necessary diligence
expected of a notary public by asking for the parties residence certificates, he
has nonetheless violated Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90, which sets forth the
scope of the power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judges to act as notaries public ex officio.
The OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount
of P2,000.00 with a corresponding warning that repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
 There is no denying that respondent judge indeed notarized the document
in question. Pursuant to SC Circular No. 1-90, MTC and MCTC Judges are
authorized to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio. But the Court
lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this authority:

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of
documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties
[Borne v. Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1765-CFI, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA
314; Penera v. Dalocanog, Adm. Matter No. 2113-MJ, April 22, 1981, 104 SCRA
193.] They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which
bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. xxx

However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities
which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges
assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the
capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of
the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos,
Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be
made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public
in such municipality or circuit.[11]

MTC and MCTC Judges may act as notaries public ex-officio even in
municipalities where there are other lawyers or notaries, provided that the
documents so notarized are connected with their official functions and duties. In
municipalities where there are no other lawyers or notaries, they may participate
in the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other acts of conveyances, which bear no direct relation to the performance of
their functions as judges, provided that the following requirements are met: (1)
all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over
to the municipal treasurer; and, (2) a certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit.
Both the Deputy Ombudsman and the OCA find that respondent judge in
this case was not negligent in administering the oath, considering that he first
ascertained the identities of the parties to the Deed. However, we must inquire
whether he complied with the two-fold requirement of SC Circular No. 1-90. In
his comment, he avers that there are no lawyers holding office or residing
[12]

within his territorial jurisdiction. But no certification attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public was made in the documents he notarized. Hence,
respondent failed to satisfy a requisite imposed by Circular No. 1-
90. Additionally, he also failed to indicate that the notarial fees he received for
[13]

that transaction and had received for the other oaths he has administered had
been turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.
While we believe that respondent judge truly acted in good faith when he
notarized the subject Deed of Sale and that he had no financial interest in the
said transaction, we are nevertheless constrained to impose upon him the
appropriate sanction for failing to strictly observe the requirements of SC
Circular No. 1-90. In this regard, to be aware of this Circular as well as observe
what it requires is incumbent upon him. His failure to do so shows his lack of
diligence in fulfilling his duty and keeping abreast with developments in law and
jurisprudence.This much, we must stress, is expected of a judge, considering
that the study of law and procedure is a continuous process.
Finally, it must also be emphasized that a judge must conduct himself in a
manner that is beyond reproach and suspicion. Any hint of impropriety must
[14]

be avoided at all cost. Judges are enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct to
regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties.
[15]

WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge OSMUNDO M. VILLANUEVA

of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bagumbayan-Esperanza, Sultan
Kudarat, is found LIABLE for failing and neglecting to comply with the
requirements set by this Court for the proper notarization of a private
document. As recommended by the OCA, he is hereby ordered to pay a FINE
of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely. He is also ordered to turn over soonest to the
Municipal Treasurer of Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, whatever fees he received
in connection with the aforecited notarial activity.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-02-1680. January 28, 2003]

VICENTE A. PICHON, complainant, vs. JUDGE LUCILO C. RALLOS,

Former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum
City, Branch 1, respondent.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This administrative matter stems from the letter-complaint dated June 24,
1999, of Vicente A. Pichon charging Judge Lucilo Rallos of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tagum City, Branch 1, with incompetence for his failure to
promptly decide Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-41, both entitled People of the
Philippines v. Narciso Labasano, et al., and Criminal Case No. 7842,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Pureza Labasano. All these cases are for
Estafa. Pichon, who is the private complainant in the aforesaid cases, averred
that they were submitted for decision way back in October 1995 but remained
unacted upon by respondent judge despite repeated follow-ups.
In his comment, respondent judge states that he has neither the power nor
authority to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42. He alleges that he did not
preside over any stage of the trial of said criminal cases. Relying on
Administrative Circular No. 3-94, he submits these criminal cases should be
[1]

decided by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio, the former presiding judge of the RTC
of Tagum City, Branch 1, because it was to her that said cases were submitted
for decision. Respondent also cites Adm. Order No. 49-99 dated June 7, 1999,
which revoked Judge Reyes-Carpios designation as Acting Presiding Judge,
RTC of Manila, Branch 17, and directed her to return to her official station at
RTC of Tagum City, Branch 1, not later than June 15, 1999, to resume there
her regular duties.
As found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Criminal Cases
Nos. 7840-42 were originally heard by Judge Marcial L. Fernandez (now retired)
who presided over the reception of the prosecutions evidence. Said cases were
then heard by Judge Bernardo V. Saludares, who granted the prosecution
fifteen (15) days within which to formally offer its evidence and who scheduled
the reception of the evidence for the defense.
On December 1, 1993, Judge Saludares ordered the admission in evidence
of the prosecutions documentary exhibits.
 When Judge Reyes-Carpio assumed office as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Tagum, Branch 1, she presided over the reception of evidence for the defense.
In an order dated April 19, 1995, Judge Reyes-Carpio directed the
admission in evidence of the documentary exhibits for the defense and
scheduled the reception of rebuttal evidence for the prosecution for May 25,
1995. The prosecution, however, did not present rebuttal evidence in Criminal
Cases Nos. 7840-42.
In an order dated August 25, 1995, respondent judge directed the
prosecution and defense to simultaneously submit their respective memoranda
within thirty (30) days. The parties complied with the directive.
On December 18, 1998, complainant requested for a certification regarding
the status of Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42 from the Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
RTC, Tagum City, Branch 1.
Mrs. Virginia R. Coloma-Rafael, Legal Researcher and OIC of RTC, Tagum
City, Branch 1, replied to said query, thus: The cases are now submitted for
decision and the records are already given to Judge Rallos for the preparation
of the decision and that the transcript of stenographic notes during the
proceedings has already been submitted therewith for his further perusal.
In its resolution dated August 16, 2000, the Third Division of this Court in
A.M. No. 00-7-322-RTC (Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Regional Trial Court, Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and 2) required
respondent judge to decide the cases which were submitted to him for
decision/resolution when he was acting presiding judge of RTC, Tagum City,
Branch 1, including Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42.
In his supplemental letter-complaint dated October 20, 2000, complainant
Pichon averred that Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42 were decided by respondent
judge on September 25, 2000, in compliance with this Courts resolution of
August 16, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-7-322-RTC. Complainant declared that from
aforesaid resolution it was clear that Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42, among
others, were submitted for decision to respondent judge as early as 1995.
However, if not for the judicial audit conducted, respondent would have unduly
taken time in resolving those cases. Complainant then prayed that respondent
judge be administratively sanctioned for the inordinate delay.
The sole issue before us is whether respondent judge should be held
administratively liable for delay in deciding Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42.
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.02 in [2]

relation to Canon 3, Rule 3.05 , judges are required to decide cases and
[3]

pending incidents with reasonable dispatch. A judge should be prompt in the

performance of his judicial duties for delay in the administration of justice is a
popular complaint by our countrymen. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and
brings it into disrepute. Hence, magistrates are enjoined to decide cases within
[4]

the periods prescribed therefor. Failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency.

[5]

The raison detre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice, but also
in being able to do so seasonably. [6]

Respondent feebly attempts to disown responsibility by pointing to Adm.

Circular No. 3-94 to justify passing the buck to Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio. His
efforts are futile. His claim that he did not preside at any stage of the trial is not
supported by the record. It does not relieve him of his own responsibility. Recall
that on August 25, 1995, respondent issued an order directing the parties to
submit in Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42 their respective memoranda. Recall
further that as per the certification of Mrs. Coloma-Rafael, the OIC of RTC,
Tagum City, Branch 1, the records and transcripts of the stenographic notes in
said cases were submitted to respondent for the preparation of the decision.
Note that as per our resolution of August 16, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-7-322-RTC,
we ruled that Criminal Cases Nos. 7840-42 were submitted to Judge Rallos as
then Presiding Judge of RTC, Tagum City, Branch 1 and that, therefore, he
should decide said cases. As the OCA points out, if respondent judge honestly
believed that the cases should be decided by a judge other than himself, it was
incumbent upon him to immediately refer the matter to this Court, through the
Court Administrator, instead of leaving the cases undecided. By his failure to
resort to such a simple step or to act expeditiously on said criminal cases,
respondent judge has been remiss in the performance of his duty.
Considering however that respondent judge has no record of previous
administrative sanctions, the Courts attention has been drawn, in applying the
corresponding penalty, to the recommendation of the OCA that respondent be
reprimanded only for his failure to seasonably decide Criminal Cases Nos.
7840-42. Given the facts of this matter, the Court concedes that the OCAs
recommended penalty is in order.
WHEREFORE, JUDGE LUCILO C. RALLOS is found LIABLE for undue
delay in the conduct of judicial proceedings by his failure to decide Criminal
Cases Nos. 7840-42 within the prescribed period therefor, and he is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense shall warrant a more severe penalty.
SO ORDERED.
FEB
 [A.M. No. MTJ-02-1403. February 3, 2003]

BOBBY CARRIAGA, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE ROMEO L.

ANASARIO, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Bobby Carriaga against

Municipal Judge Romeo Anasario of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon, Negros Oriental for gross ignorance of
the law and partiality.
In his verified letter-complaint filed with this Court on September 3, 1999,
Bobby Carriaga alleged that he is the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. B-
21, B-22 and B-23 for estafa, less serious physical injuries and grave threats
against jail guards Antonio Redula and Arsenio Tuanda.
In Criminal Cases Nos. B-22 and B-23, covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, respondent judge issued an order requiring the accused
to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses within ten (10)
days from notice. While the accused received the order on March 5, 1998,
however, they submitted their counter-affidavits only after 130 days or late by
120 days. On August 31, 1998, respondent judge issued an order admitting the
counter-affidavits.
[1]

Apprehensive that respondent judge is biased in favor of the accused

considering that he admitted their counter-affidavits, complainant filed a motion
for inhibition. But it was denied in an order dated May 31, 1999, prompting him
to file with this Court the instant administrative complaint.
In his comment dated October 28, 1999, respondent judge denied
[2]
the
charges against him, contending that he has not admitted in evidence the
accuseds counter-affidavits. In fact, the cases were calendared only for
arraignment and preliminary conference. Moreover, the Rule requiring
[3]
the
submission of counter-affidavits within ten (10) days is merely directory, not
mandatory.
In her Report dated January 8, 2002, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepao made the following evaluation:
x x x The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly provides for the
procedure and imperative duty of the court with regard to criminal cases falling under
Summary Proceedings. Section 12 thereof provides:

(a) If commenced by complaint On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and
other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for
being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in
custody.

(b) If commenced by information When the case is commenced by information, or is

not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an
order which together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits
of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the
complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The
prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-
affidavits of the defense.

Based on the foregoing provisions, it is manifest that respondent has subverted the
very nature of the Rule and defeated its objective of expediting the adjudication of
cases.

Respondent judge should have made a ruling immediately without waiting for 130
days to lapse considering that the accused failed to submit their counter-affidavits
within the 10-day reglementary period prescribed. As aptly explained in Gachon vs.
Devera, Jr. (274 SCRA 540 [1997]), the Rule on Summary Procedure was
promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases. If any of the parties fails to submit the evidence and other
pleadings within the reglementary period, the court can not thereby extend its leniency
and wait for an indefinite time for him to comply, otherwise, a party can derail the
proceedings and defeat the purpose of the summary procedure by not filing the
affidavits required. Hence, the justification posed by respondent judge that his act of
admitting the counter-affidavits of accused despite being filed out of time does not
contravene the spirit of summary procedure because the same are not yet formally
offered as evidence for the trial, making complainants objection thereof premature, is
unequivocally a misapprehension of the rules. [4]

In the same Report, Deputy Court Administrator Elepao recommended that

respondent judge be fined in the sum of P1,000.00, with a warning that a
repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
 In a Resolution dated February 27, 2002, this Court ordered that this case
be re-docketed as an administrative matter and required the parties to manifest,
within twenty (20) days from notice, whether they are submitting it for decision
on the basis of the pleadings already submitted.
Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they are willing to have
the case so decided. In his manifestation, respondent stated that (t)he rule in
summary procedure is that the court may allow the submission of affidavits and
counter-affidavits even up to the time of the preliminary conference, and the
requirement that the accused shall file a counter-affidavit in ten (10) days time
is merely directory, not mandatory. He stressed that he considered what is
[5]

substantial justice rather than mere technicalities in admitting the counter-

affidavits belatedly filed. He also maintained that there is no rule that late
[6]

counter-affidavits should be expunged from the records.

We do not agree. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was
promulgated specifically to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases. In allowing the submission of the accuseds counter-
[7]

affidavits after 130 days from notice, respondent judge violated the Rule. He
should have observed that Section 12(b) of the Rule provides that the court
shall issue an order which shall require the accused to submit his counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses x x x not later than ten (10) days
from receipt of said order.Section 19(e) of the same Rule also provides that a
motion for extension to file affidavits is prohibited. Clearly, these provisions
are mandatory.
When the law or rule is clear, there is no room for interpretation and judges
have no option but to obey. [8]

We thus find that respondent judge is administratively liable for violation of

the Supreme Court Rules, specifically the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
As to the charge of partiality, we find the same to be without merit. That he
admitted accuseds counter-affidavits is not a sufficient basis to conclude that
he is biased. Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be clear
[9]

and convincing evidence to prove the charge.

Under Section 9, Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of Court,
violation of Supreme Court Rules is classified as a less serious charge which,
under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, is punishable by: (a) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Municipal Judge Romeo L. Anasario is declared
guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is FINED in the sum of ELEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
 [A.C. No. 5957. February 4, 2003]

WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G.

DOMINGO, complainants, vs. ATTY. CLETO L. EVANGELISTA,
JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated January 15, 1999 filed with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, Winnie C. Lucente
and Alicia G. Domingo charged Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. with gross
misconduct, deceit, malpractice and crimes involving moral turpitude for
falsification of public documents.
Complainants alleged that respondent is the son of the late Atty. Cleto
Evangelista, who during his lifetime notarized a Deed of Quitclaim executed on
May 7, 1977 by Pedro, Juanito, Eufracia, Cresencia, Consuelo, Maria, all
surnamed Tan, and one Sabina Mascareas, in favor of Asuncion T. Yared and
Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving Lot No. 5514 located in Salvacion, Ormoc
City; and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 7, 1972 by Wenceslao
Magallanes and Apolonia Tan in favor of Salvador Estudillo and Cynthia Yared
Estudillo, involving Lot No. 1187-B located in Poblacion, Ormoc City. On
January 30, 1990, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. issued certified true
copies of the said instruments. On the basis of the certified true copies of the
subject deeds, the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City issued on February 2, 1990
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23889 in favor of Asuncion T. Yared.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint interposing res
adjudicata, arguing that the allegations in the complaint raise the same issues
as those in the criminal case for falsification of public document filed against
him before the Ormoc City Prosecution Office, docketed as I.S. No. 98-178. He
also asserted that Civil Case No. B-1250 filed by complainants, among others,
against Asuncion T. Yared, et al., which was pending before Regional Trial
Court, Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14, for declaration of nullity of the quitclaim and
deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 23889, raised a prejudicial question in
the disbarment proceeding.
Respondent also contended that one Carmen Solidor together with
Francisco Aves came to their law office, Evangelista Law Office in Ormoc City,
Leyte, and asked him to certify true copies of the subject deeds. He acceded to
the request considering that the documents were notarized by his late father as
notary public. He alleged that he issued the assailed certification as a partner
of the law office.[1]

After investigation, the IBP Board of Governors, on April 7, 2000,

recommended the reprimand of Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista with stern warning
that a repetition of the same would be dealt with more severely. The
recommendation was noted by this Court in a Resolution dated July 19,
2000. Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
In his Comment, respondent alleged that the petition failed to comply with
Section 4, Rule 45, Rules of Court considering that (a) the petition did not
indicate the correct and true date when petitioner received the IBP Board of
Governors Resolution; (b) petitioners did not attach to the petition certified true
copy of said resolution; and (c) the certification against forum-shopping was
executed by only one of the petitioners.
Respondent claims that petitioner Alicia Domingo received the Resolution
of IBP Board of Governors on May 25, 2000. It appears, however, that,
petitioners counsel received the same Resolution on June 13, 2000. It is the
receipt of counsel that the period to appeal is reckoned for purposes of
determining the last day for filing of the petition for review. Therefore, [2]

petitioners timely filed this motion for extension of time to file petition for review
on June 22, 2000, which was granted. Petitioners, however, failed to attach a
certified true copy of the assailed resolution. Moreover, only petitioner Winnie
C. Lucente executed the certification against forum shopping.
In A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
[3]

Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on

technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and
the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they
are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their
very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities.
[4]

The Rules must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve, not defeat,

substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. Procedural rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. Where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial
justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified
in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. [5]

The appeal is impressed with merit. Records disclose that Atty. Cleto L.
Evangelista, Jr. admitted having certified true copies of the Deed of Quitclaim
executed on May 7, 1977 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January
7, 1972. His late father, Atty. Cleto P. Evangelista, notarized the subject deeds.
Section 245 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads:

Notarial Register. Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he
shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any parts thereof, to any person
applying for it and paying the legal fees therefor. x x x.

Sections 246 and 247 of the same Code also require the notary public to
forward his notarial register to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city wherein he exercises his office
for safekeeping.
By certifying true copies of the subject deeds, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr.
engaged in an unlawful and deceitful conduct. He was not the notary public
before whom said documents were acknowledged and he was neither the
custodian of the original copies thereof. The Records Management and
Archives Office, Manila, certified that there was no copy on file of the Deed of
Quitclaim notarized by respondents father. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
[6]

of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
is broad enough to cover any form of misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
and personal capacity.
In this connection, we have consistently held that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public,
the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored
[7]

that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of the authenticity thereof. For this reason, notaries public must observe with
[8]

utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. [9]

Contrary to respondents contentions, the complaint for disbarment does not

suffer from serious procedural defects that warrant its outright dismissal.
Complainants did not engage in forum shopping as defined in Administrative
Circular No. 28-91 when they filed the instant case. Forum shopping applies
only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Moreover,
Civil Case No. B-1250 for declaration of nullity of the quitclaim and deed of
absolute sale covering TCT No. 23889 refers to the validity of the documents in
question while the disbarment case refers to respondents having certified true
copies of said documents.
Neither does res adjudicata lie against the complainants. Similarly, the
doctrine applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the Courts administrative powers, as in this case. Neither can it be
[10]

argued that the instant disbarment case has been adjudicated in the criminal
case for falsification of public documents. Respondent was proceeded against
as a private individual in said case. In the present disbarment action, Atty. Cleto
L. Evangelista, Jr. is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts
plenary authority over members of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is found guilty of
gross misconduct. Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that another
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land as well as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 [A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1476. February 4, 2003]

BENITO ANG, complainant, vs. JUDGE REINATO G. QUILALA, CLERK

OF COURT ZENAIDA REYES-MACABEO and CLERK III LOUIE
MACABEO, MeTC, Manila, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified complaint dated October 17, 1997, Benito Ang charged

[1]

Presiding Judge Reinato G. Quilala, Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo

and Clerk III Louie Macabeo, all of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, with extortion relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 266370-266392-CR.
Complainant Benito Ang was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial
[2]

Court of Manila involving the sum of P3,185,276.00 and 22 counts of violation

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
[3]

presided by respondent judge. He attended the scheduled arraignment before

the RTC on June 21, 1997 but failed to attend the arraignment before the MeTC
on June 30, 1997. On the same day, Judge Quilala issued a warrant of arrest
and ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of his surety bond. [4]

When complainant filed the Motion to Lift the Warrant of Arrest, a certain
Louie Macabeo, Clerk III, told him, Kung gusto mo tutulungan kita. Ibigay mo
sa akin ang telephone number mo. He further alleged that the clerk asked him
for P30,000.00. However, he did not give his telephone number, only his pager
number.
A week later, the clerk paged him to return his call, which he did. During
their telephone conversation, the clerk told him, Papaano na ang case mo.
Ilalabas ko na ba ang warrant? He answered, Teka, kakausapin ko muna ang
lawyer ko. Thereafter, he called up his lawyer, who advised him not to give in
to the extortion.
On August 14, 1997, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
to lift order of arrest. Respondent judge denied the motion on August 21,
[5]

1997. On September 9, 1997, his counsel requested the Branch Clerk of Court
[6]

not to release the bench warrant because they will file a motion for
reconsideration of the August 21, 1997 Order. The following morning,
complainant was shocked when he was served the bench warrant by the
Western Police District Manila.
 Consequently, at 1:20 in the afternoon of the same day, his counsel filed a
Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the August 21, 1997 Order and
[7]

asked the Branch Clerk of Court to calendar the hearing of the motion on the
same day at 2:00 oclock. His counsel waited patiently for the motion to be acted
upon. At 4:00 in the afternoon, respondent judge denied the motion. Thus,
[8]

complainant had to spend the night in detention when he failed to put up the
required bond. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, complainant prayed
that respondent judge together with his Clerk of Court and Clerk III be
administratively sanctioned for acting in concert to extort money from him.
Respondent judge filed his Comment on June 8, 1998 while respondents
Clerk III Luis Macabeo and Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo submitted
their Comment on June 10, 1998.
Respondent Judge Quilala explained that after posting the reduced bailbond
as recommended by the Manila Public Prosecutors Office, arraignment of
accused Ang for violation of BP 22 was scheduled on June 30, 1997. Neither
Ang nor his counsel, however appeared during the arraignment, thus he issued
the order for his arrest on the same day.
On August 14, 1997, Ang through counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Lift Order of Arrest, stating that he did not attend the arraignment
because he was indisposed.The motion was denied by respondent judge on
the ground that the reason alleged by Ang for non-appearance was flimsy. He
also ordered that the total bailbond of P338,000.00 as recommended by the
prosecution, pursuant to the Latest Bailbond Guide of the Department of Justice
be reinstated. Ang, nevertheless failed to post the required bond. As a result,
[9]

the police served the warrant against him in the morning of September 10,
1997. At 2:00 in the afternoon, Ang filed a Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the August 21, 1997 Order, without showing proper receipt
thereof by the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila. Despite said procedural
defect, he gave due course to the motion. He, nonetheless, denied said motion
for lack of merit. Thereafter, he inhibited from hearing the BP 22 cases.
Both Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo and her husband Clerk III
Louie Macabeo vehemently denied the charges filed against them. Zenaida
claimed that the administrative case was filed because of the respondent judges
refusal to grant complainants motion. She released the bench warrant after
Judge Quilala signed the same because she had no control over the processes
issued by the judge. She did not calendar Angs Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed at 1:20 in the afternoon of September 10, 1997 because
the hearings of the motions on criminal cases are scheduled only in the
morning.
 Respondent Louie Macabeo claimed that it was impossible for him to
demand money from Ang whom he just met. Being an ordinary clerk, he could
not assure the accused that the respondent judge would act favorably on his
motion. He denied having talked to him on the telephone on August 14, 1997
or the week after. He could not have promised to delay the release of the
warrant of arrest since it had been issued as early as August 10, 1997.
Upon referral of the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, the latter recommended the dismissal of the administrative case
against the respondents. The Office of the Court Administrator found that there
was nothing irregular in the conduct of the respondent judge in denying the
motions for reconsideration, the same being in accordance with the Rules.
There was also no concrete evidence that respondents indeed acted in
concerted effort to commit extortion.
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator.
The settled doctrine is that judges are not liable to respond in a civil action
for damages, and are not otherwise administratively responsible for what they
may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal
powers and jurisdiction. Certain it is that a judge may not be held
[10]

administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he

renders. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
[11]

one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. More importantly, the
[12]

error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
[13]

imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a

wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
[14]

operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes. [15]

While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith
in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.[16]

In the instant case, respondent judge denied the first motion for
reconsideration for complainants failure to attend the scheduled arraignment on
the ground that he was indisposed to attend the same. Respondent judges
action was within his own judicial discretion. Any error therein that a dissatisfied
litigant may raise would be merely an error of judgment, for which the judge
may not be held administratively liable.
The second urgent motion for reconsideration dated September 10, 1997
was likewise correctly denied. First, the motion does not contain proof of service
on the Prosecutors Office, in disregard of the 3-day notice rule. Second, the
motion has no legal basis considering that the reinstatement of the original bond
in the amount of P338,000.00 is proper. The bond was recommended by the
prosecution and was earlier approved by the trial court, pursuant to the latest
Bailbond Guide issued by the Secretary of the Department of Justice.
The record does not show that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or
bad faith in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was manifestly
unjust. Complainant has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety
attended the issuance of the subject resolutions. Bad faith is not presumed and
he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. [17]

The alleged error of the respondent judge was not gross, and the record is
bereft of any showing of deliberate or malicious intent on the part of respondent
judge to cause prejudice to any party.
As regards the charge of extortion, no proof was presented by the
complainant against the officers of the court. Therefore, the dismissal of the
administrative charge against them is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint
against Judge Reinato G. Quilala, Clerk of Court Zenaida Reyes-Macabeo and
Clerk III Louie Macabeo, MeTC, Branch 26, Manila is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-02-1449. February 5, 2003]

ENGR. FUNDADOR AMBALONG, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO C.

LUBGUBAN, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Engr. Fundador Ambalong

against Judge Antonio C. Lubguban, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Circuit Trial
Court, Siquijor-Enrique Villanueva-Larena, Siquijor-Siquijor for delay in
resolving Civil Case No. 311 for damages pending before the sala of
respondent judge.
The complaint alleged that complainant was the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
311 entitled Engr. Fundador Ambalong vs. Jose Castillon and Rudy Castillon
for damages based on quasi-delict filed with the MCTC of Siquijor-Enrique
Villanueva-Larena presided by respondent judge. After termination of the
proceedings on September 13, 1999, respondent judge directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
last transcript. Complainant filed his memorandum on January 5, 2000 while
the defendants did not file any memorandum. Respondent judge, however, has
not rendered a decision on the civil case even at the time of filing of this
administrative complaint on March 14, 2001. Complainant alleged that on
February 21, 2001, respondent judge issued a decision on the separate criminal
case acquitting the accused driver, Jose Castillon, who was also a defendant
in the civil case. Complainant claimed that respondent judge violated the rule
requiring judges to decide a case within three (3) months from the date it is
submitted for decision.
In his Comment, respondent judge admitted that the memorandum
submitted by complainant on January 5, 2000 was the last pleading filed in the
civil case and that from that time, he started to draft the decisions for both the
civil and criminal cases. He finished writing the drafts long before the end of the
three-month reglementary period, but he kept the same in his office cabinet as
he intended to make some final editing. It was only in the latter part of November
2000 when his clerk called his attention regarding the status of Civil Case No.
311 and the related criminal case. Left with no other recourse, respondent judge
finally completed the draft and rendered the decision on the civil case on
November 27, 2000. Respondent judge averred that the oversight might have
been due to his crowded docket, plus the fact that he had other cases to attend
to in another sala at Lazi MCTC, Lazi, Siquijor. Respondent judge denied
complainants allegation that there was no decision yet on the civil case as of
March 1, 2001. He said that a decision has been rendered on November 27,
2000. However, he intended that copies thereof be personally served on the
parties during the promulgation of the judgment in the criminal case originally
set on December 20, 2000 but later moved to February 21, 2001. Unfortunately,
the office clerk forgot to hand copies of the decision in Civil Case No. 311 to the
parties on said date. Hence it was only on March 6, 2001 when copies of the
decision were actually mailed to the parties. Respondent judge asserted that
the delay was not intentional nor motivated by malice, bias or bad faith.
Complainant and respondent judge subsequently filed their respective
Reply and Rejoinder (denominated by respondent judge as Comment to Reply).
After evaluation of the pleadings filed in this case, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency and
recommended that he be fined in the amount of P5,000.00. The report and
recommendation of the OCA stated:

EVALUATION: As established by the evidence on record, respondent admitted in

his Comment that the decision in Civil Case No. 311 was not made within the
constitutionally mandated 3-month limit. To this delay, respondent proffers the
explanation that upon the filing of the last memorandum on January 5, 2000, he
started writing the draft which he finished before the expiration of the 3-month
reglementary period. He, however, placed the draft in the office cabinet for editing
and refinement. When his attention was called by one of his staffs (sic) as to the status
of the subject case, it was already in the later part of November, or seven months past
due. He attributes the inadvertence to his crowded docket and he has other cases to
attend to in another sala at MCTC-Lazi, Siquijor.

The Court has consistently impressed upon members of the bench that the noble office
of a judge is to render justice not only impartially, but expeditiously as well, under the
time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied.

Being designated as acting presiding judge in another sala is not a valid justification
for the unreasonable delay in the rendition of judgment in Civil Case No. 311. If
respondent could not comply with the 3-month reglementary period, he should have
asked for an extension of time within which to decide the case. He never did.

That his docket is crowded is likewise a lame excuse, and will not exculpate him from
administrative sanction. Respondent should have adopted a proper and efficient court
management technique since he is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions. Respondent, however, has been remiss in his duty
and responsibility as court manager by failing to adopt a system of court management
which resulted in his failure to decide the subject case within the reglementary period.

Respondents inadvertence is inexcusable. It is the duty of a judge to take note of the

case/s submitted for his decision or resolution and to see to it that the same are
decided within the 3-month period fixed by law. His failure to do so constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction (Atty. Vicente P.
Montes vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1627, April 17, 2001)

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the

Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative case and that respondent judge be FINED in the amount of
P5,000.00 for gross inefficiency.

We agree with the recommendation of the OCA. No less than the 1987
Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three
(3) months from the date they are submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself.
[1]

Respondent judge admitted that the last pleading in Criminal Case No. 311
which was complainants memorandum was filed on January 5, 2000. Under the
law, respondent judge is required to resolve the case within three (3) months or
until April 5, 2000. Respondent judge, however, issued the decision only on
November 27, 2000, seven (7) months after the deadline.As submitted by the
OCA, the seven-month delay in the resolution of the case constitutes gross
inefficiency for which respondent judge is administratively liable. The delay is
inexcusable, especially since respondent judge admitted that he had
commenced writing the decision immediately after the case was submitted for
decision. He, however, failed to release it on time because it was kept inside
his office cabinet and totally slipped his mind until his office clerk belatedly
called his attention to the status of Civil Case No. 311. This is a clear indication
of poor management of the courts docket. Respondent judge has the duty to
keep track of the development of the cases pending before his sala and to take
note of the cases which are ripe for decision or resolution and to ensure that
said cases are resolved promptly. Canon 3, Rule 3.08 and Rule 3.09 of the
[2] [3]

Code of Judicial Conduct require judges to manage their dockets in such

manner that the work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch. [4]

Respondent judge seeks exemption from administrative liability by citing his

allegedly crowded docket and the fact that he had to attend to other cases in
another sala at the MCTC in Lazi, Siquijor. These reasons, however, do not
serve as an excuse for respondent judges oversight. We have ruled in one case
that the fact that respondent judge has been the presiding judge of two court
salas should not be made an excuse and will not save him from administrative
sanction. We have likewise ruled that a judges heavy caseload is immaterial
[5]

to his obligation to resolve the case and cannot be deemed sufficient excuse
for his failure to do so. It is the duty of a judge to dispose of the courts business
[6]

promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law. If he feels that for
valid reasons, he could not meet the three-month limit, he may seek from this
Court an extension of time within which to render a decision.Respondent judge
failed to do so.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide
cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice
denied. A judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer
justice. Hence, respondent judges inability to render judgment within the three-
[7]

month limit as mandated by the Constitution constitutes gross inefficiency,

warranting the imposition of administrative sanction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) is
imposed on respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5085. February 6, 2003]

PABLITO SANTOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALVARO BERNABE

LAZARO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

ATTY. ALVARO BERNABE LAZARO, a member of the Philippine Bar and

respondent herein, is charged administratively with "inexcusable neglect of
duties as a lawyer to a client-relative." According to complainant Pablito
[1]

Santos, the charge arose from respondents failure to file a memorandum/brief

resulting in his being deprived of his rights over a parcel of land located at F.
Varona St., Tondo, Manila. Complainant also alleged other matters indicative
of further misconduct, such as respondents repeated demands for
unconscionable amounts of money despite awareness of complainants grinding
poverty.
Specifically, complainant averred that he was a defendant in an ejectment
case filed by a certain Alfredo dela Rosa in representation of his minor children
Mila Nelia, Ofelia, Rochelle and Allan, all surnamed dela Rosa, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The complaint was for complainants
[2]

ejectment from a parcel of land at F. Varona St., Tondo, Manila, after he refused
to pay rent.
Subsequently, respondent entered his appearance as counsel for herein
complainant, as defendant in the MeTC, after he paid respondent an
acceptance fee of P20,000.00.Complainant further alleged that while the case
was pending thereat respondent demanded and was paid
another P30,000.00. However, judgment was rendered ordering complainant to
vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein P87,000.00 as back rentals.
Feeling aggrieved, complainant appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. For the appeal, complainant gave respondent another P30,000.00 for
[3]

his professional services. After the MeTC rendered judgment ordering

complainants immediate eviction from the premises, the National Housing
Authority awarded him the property and a transfer certificate of title was issued
in his favor. [4]

On the part of the plaintiffs in the MeTC, they moved for the immediate
execution of the judgment being appealed from. On 17 March 1997 the
Regional Trial Court issued an Orderdirecting defendant-appellant Pablito
Santos to file his memorandum/brief within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.
Several months later, respondent was reproached by the RTC for not
complying with its 17 March 1997 Order. Respondent had to plead that he be
given another chance to file his appellants memorandum as his attention was
focused on matters pertaining on (sic) the submission of pleadings thereafter
needed to be filed in reply to Plaintiffs manifestation and motion. His arguments
however were not sustained.
On 18 August 1997 the RTC granted the motion for a writ of execution upon
finding that defendant therein, complainant herein, did not put up a supersedeas
bond to stay the execution of the judgment. In its Order, the RTC also
disregarded complainants opposition to resolve the motion and considered
counsels excuse for not filing his memorandum as a feeble attempt to extricate
himself (herein respondent Lazaro) from his blunder which is not excusable. [5]

Respondent denied the charges against him. He argued that his failure to
file the memorandum/brief was not deliberate as he is morally and legally
convinced that he may be able to present his clients valid cause or claim over
the disputed property in a hearing called for the purpose. He alleged that he
could have orally argued complainants case before the trial court had he been
given the opportunity to do so. According to him, complainant rudely terminated
his services even before he could explain his legal strategy for winning the
appeal. Moreover, complainants allegation that he milked him dry was far from
the truth since complainant actually gave him only P10,000.00 contrary to
their agreement that he would be remunerated with P30,000.00 for his legal
services. Lastly, respondent claimed that complainant tried to
extort P200,000.00 from him in exchange for the withdrawal of his disbarment
complaint against him. [6]

This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 August 2002 the IBP
[7]

submitted its Report finding respondent guilty of negligence and recommending

that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In[8]

justifying its recommendation, the IBP completely relied on the findings of the
trial court -

From the facts obtaining and the evidence presented, we find the Order dated 18
August 1997 of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 31, says it all with regard to the inexcusable negligence committed by
respondent in handling the case of complainant, to wit:
The record reveals that defendants counsel failed to file any motion for extension to
file his memorandum/brief. This being the case, defendants counsel was of the
thinking that he could get out of his predicament by pleading that his attention was
focused on matters pertaining on the submission of pleadings thereafter needed to be
filed in reply to plaintiffs manifestation and motion, thus his failure to file defendants
memorandum/brief. However, this is farthest from the truth because he already knew
on March 31, 1997 that he was required to file his memorandum/brief not later than
thirty (30) days from that date. The foregoing narration does not speak well of the
stance taken by defendants counsel. [9]

A thorough and exhaustive study of the complaint as well as the comment

thereto argues strongly for the adoption and approval of the IBP Report. Indeed,
complainant would not have undergone the travails of losing his property had
respondent exercised the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides
that negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them
for handling shall render them liable. It is a basic postulate in legal ethics that
when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy
of the trust reposed upon him by his client and makes him answerable to him,
to the courts and to society.
The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles
of professional ethics. By neglecting to file the memorandum/brief, respondent
set off a chain of events which eventually ended in the demolition of a 34-
meter structure which complainant and four other families call home. His [10]

explanation that his attention was focused on matters pertaining on (sic) the
submission of pleadings thereafter needed to be filed in reply to plaintiffs
manifestation and motion is too ludicrous to be believed. His stance, to quote
the trial court, was but a feeble attempt to extricate himself from his blunder
which is not excusable.
Respondents failure to exercise due diligence in attending to the interest of
complainant caused the latter material prejudice. As a lawyer, respondent was
wanting in the exercise of reasonable care demanded of every member of the
Bar; his measure of diligence is several notches below the standard required of
his office.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ALVARO BERNABE LAZARO is found
GUILTY of negligence in protecting the interest of his client, complainant Pablito
Santos, in Civil Case No. 97-82452, of the RTC of Manila, and is accordingly
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, not for six (6) months as recommended
by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
but for one (1) year effective from date of his receipt of this Resolution.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty.
Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro in the Bar Confidants Office, another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and copies thereof circulated in all the courts
of the country.
Respondent Atty. Alvaro Bernabe Lazaro is DIRECTED to inform this Court
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of the date of his receipt of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. MARIA ELISSA F. VELEZ, complainant, vs. Judge RODRIGO R.
FLORES, MTC-Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Atty. Maria Elissa F. Velez charges Judge Rodrigo R. Flores of the

Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, with incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The charges are relative to a case for ejectment, Civil Case No. 7946
entitled Spouses Jose and Lina Velez vs. Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga,
Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero.
The pertinent Sworn Administrative Complaint was filed by complainant
[1]

with the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga on June 13, 2000. The
Complaint was then endorsed by Judge Sunga to the Office of Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. It was later referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to
[2]

then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo for appropriate action. [3]

Atty. Velez narrated in her Complaint that she had filed, on behalf of her
client-parents, an ejectment case against Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga,
Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero. Because of their failure to reach an
amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. They did so on December 9,
1999, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On March 14, 2000, complainant moved ex-parte for the early resolution of [4]

the case within thirty days from receipt of her Motion. She argued that three
months had already elapsed since the parties filed their respective position
papers. She filed a second Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution on April 24,
[5]

2000.
On May 2 and May 9, 2000, complainant personally followed up her motions
with Ramoncito Serrano, Clerk of Court of Branch 2, but to no avail. On May
23, 2000, she attended the hearing of the three criminal cases before the sala
of respondent Judge. As she was preparing to leave, he summoned her and
told her that he was very busy, but would render his decision soon. Then, in a
low, conspiratorial tone, he allegedly said, [C]an you consider giving to me x x
x your offer of financial assistance to the defendants? (Baka p[w]ede mo na
lang ibigay sa akin iyong offer mo sa mga kalaban ninyo?) She pretended not
to have heard anything, gave him a blank stare, and immediately left the court
premises.
 On May 31, 2000, complainant again followed up the case with Clerk of
Court Serrano. Told that respondent Judge had not yet arrived, she proceeded
to another court to wait. Serrano followed her there and asked her to go to the
sala of respondent, who wanted to talk to her. The Judge allegedly told her that
the Decision would be finished either on June 3 or June 5, 2000 at the latest.
He also said, within hearing distance of his staff, that she should try giving
financial assistance to the defendants. He then asked her to repeat the offer
her parents had made to each defendant. Complying with his request, she said
that her parents had offered P5,000 to each of the four defendants, so that they
would peacefully vacate the lot. She allegedly gathered from his tone and
demeanor that he was expecting her to give to him, instead of to the defendants,
the full amount of P20,000.
On two separate occasions, the secretary of complainant phoned the office
of respondent Judge to inquire whether a decision had already been rendered.
One of the staff members in Branch 2, a certain Max, informed her that although
it had not yet been signed, it had already been drafted by respondent Judge on
June 5, 2000. A certain Cindy gave her the same information, except for the
date, which was supposedly June 9, 2000.
Immediately thereafter, complainant manifested in writing that she would
bring the matter to the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
And when she found out that there was no draft decision filed with the records
of the case, she proceeded to the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga,
before whom she narrated the foregoing facts.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the Sworn Complaint
to respondent Judge for comment. [6]

In his Comment dated August 24, 2000, respondent averred that he had
[7]

already promulgated his Decision on the ejectment case on June 13, 2000. He
said that he had tried his best to render the Decision at the earliest possible
time, but that a delay in its promulgation ensued because of his clogged court
docket. This fact had supposedly been acknowledged even by complainant in
her first Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution. He further argued that the delay,
which was not undue, had also been brought about by his research on
applicable jurisprudence. These, according to him, were strong and justifiable
reason[s] for [his] failure to decide the case within the reglementary period of
ninety days.[8]

Moreover, respondent dismissed the allegation of complainant that she

would not be able to appear and handle her other cases before his court in the
future for fear of his reprisal. He reasoned that he was not a vengeful person,
and that he always decided cases on their merits.
 He also denied that his tone and demeanor during his conversation with
complainant implied that he was expecting her to give him the same amount
that her parents were willing to give the defendants. This conclusion allegedly
existed only in Atty. Velezs fertile imagination. He said that not even in joke or
jest did [he] ask complainant to give [him] P5,000 or 20,000. [9]

The Court re-docketed the Complaint as a regular administrative

matter and referred it to Executive Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina of the RTC,
[10]

Branch 45, San Fernando, Pampanga, for investigation, report and

recommendation. [11]

During the investigation, complainant executed a Supplemental Affidavit to [12]

support her claim that the ejectment case was not the first time Judge Flores
asked for money from [her]. She attached a letter dated December 19, 1997
[13]

addressed to a certain Tita Eliza, who complainant claimed was actually she.
The letter, she said, was proof that respondent Judge had interceded for the
amicable settlement of a collection case she was handling. In return for his
intercession, he allegedly demanded from her P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador
brandy. [14]

On January 2, 2002, Judge Flores filed his Reply to the Supplemental

Affidavit of complainant, stating that her letter had not established his
[15]

culpability for the P5,000 pay-off. According to him, the letter was actually a
proof that he and Atty. Velez were on good terms at the time, as evidenced by
the salutation Dear Tita Eliza and his affectionate closing remark Your nephew.
He alleged that the lawyer had filed the administrative Complaint, simply to get
back at him for the delayed promulgation of his Decision on the ejectment case.
Lastly, he denied receiving the bottle of Fundador brandy, claiming he was
diabetic and was not allowed to take hard drinks.
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, Executive Judge Ala-
[16]

Medina found complainants assertions more credible than those of respondent

Judge for the following reasons:

Firstly, Atty. Velez has nothing to gain from accusing Judge Flores with corrupt
practices. At the time Atty. Velez filed the administrative complaint on June 13, 2000,
she did not know that the judge had already rendered a decision on the same day. To
her mind then, she was taking a big risk in making the accusation due to the pending
case. Moreover, aside from the ejectment case, Atty. Velez had four (4) other criminal
cases pending with Judge Flores at that time. She was very much vulnerable to
retaliation from Judge Flores but she came out with her allegations of corruption
nonetheless. Hence, the probabilities strongly suggest that Atty. Velez was motivated
by her desire to speak the truth. Assuming for arguments sake that the administrative
complaint was a tactic to secure a favorable ruling, Atty. Velez could have withdrawn
or abandoned the case after she got a favorable ruling in the ejectment case. Yet, her
efforts did not wane and she even filed a Supplemental Affidavit to bolster her
allegations more than a year after filing the complaint. It would be difficult to sustain
such x x x single-minded zeal if Atty. Velez were only after personal advantage.

Second, although the December 1997 letter of judge Flores to Atty. Velez does not
conclusively prove that Judge Flores demanded or received money from Atty. Velez,
it raises disturbing questions on the judges motives and conduct. Contrary to the
judges explanation, the letter does not merely establish the good relations between the
parties at that time. The undersigned sees in the letter an attempt to conceal his
motives with the false statement suggesting that they are relatives when in fact they
are not. It may be a way to mislead anyone who chances upon the letter and sanitize
its contents. Being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to
document his extortion activities on paper. But the letter was a lapse in judgment
since it raises questions on respondents conduct and reinforces the truth of
complainants allegations.

Third, even without conclusively establishing that Judge Flores demanded money, the
December 19, 1997 letter nonetheless shows that the judge was interceding on behalf
of a litigant, in a case pending before another judge. x x x As a judge, respondent must
be the first to protect and uphold the integrity of his profession by shielding his
colleagues from pressure by litigants. Instead, respondent, aware of his influence or
perhaps ascendancy over some of his colleagues, allowed himself to be used by
litigants to pressure a judge. Indeed, efforts to [reach a compromise in] a case are
laudable but incumbent judges should not undertake them because it tarnishes their
image and raises suspicions that they are doing so out of financial considerations. x x
x.
[17]

Hence, the investigating Judge found respondent guilty of soliciting money

from complainant and of deliberately delay[ing] the resolution of the case to get
the pay-off. She recommended his dismissal from the service.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred in Judge Medinas
findings that respondent was guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Although there was no conclusive proof that he had demanded
[18]

or received any money from complainant in connection with the ejectment case,
his administrative culpability was sufficiently demonstrated by evidence that he
had interceded in the collection case involving complainants grandmother and
the Punzalan spouses.
This Court concurs in the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA.
Judicial indolence is considered gross negligence or inefficiency, and gross
[19] [20]
dereliction of duty. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
[21]

requires that judges dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within
the periods prescribed by law. [22]

It cannot be disputed that respondent failed to promulgate his Decision on

the ejectment case within the period provided under the law. The Rules on
Summary Procedure states that a first-level court must render judgment within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers or upon
the expiration of the period for filing. Should the court find it necessary to
[23]

clarify certain material facts, it may during that period require the parties to
submit affidavits or other pieces of evidence within ten (10) days. Judgment
shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory
affidavits or upon the expiration of the period for their filing. [24]

In this case, the parties submitted their respective position papers on

December 9, 1999; thus the case was deemed submitted for decision on that
date. Accordingly, the Decision should have been rendered not later than
January 8, 2000. However, respondent rendered it only on June 13, 2000, five
months after the case had been submitted for decision.
The reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary Procedure is
precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is therefore
anomalous when a Judge causes the delay sought to be prevented by the
Rule. The need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously cannot be
[25]

overemphasized, for justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition

of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary.
Furthermore, complainant amply demonstrated the propensity of
respondent for demanding money from litigants and/or their lawyers by citing
an instance when he had actually brokered the amicable settlement of a
collection case involving her client. Complainant attached a copy of her PLDT
phone bill and of the letter written to her by respondent, who visited her in her
office on December 19, 1997, as proofs that he had negotiated for the amount
of P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy in exchange for his help in the
collection case.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in
connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received. Respondents act of brokering, for a fee, a
[26]

settlement in the collection case is bribery. It is a serious offense under the

amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and under the September 11,
2001 En Banc Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-SC. This offense merits
[27]

sanctions ranging from a fine of P20,000 to P40,000; to dismissal from service,

forfeiture of all or part of ones benefits, and disqualification from appointment
to any public office.
[28]

A Judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the
court commits a serious misconduct. This Court condemns such act in the
strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one
[29]

charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it
quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. [30]

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Under Rule 2.04
[31]

of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency. It is significant to stress that they are held to higher standards of
integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and
confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. The influence-peddling
[32]

or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has

placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly show
his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe.
[33]

WHEREFORE, Judge Rodrigo Flores of the Municipal Trial Court (Branch

2) of San Fernando, Pampanga is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits excluding earned leave and vacation
benefits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further
ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office upon
receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personnel
records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1287. February 17, 2003]

ROGELIO G. CAPULONG, petitioner, vs. JUDGE VINCI G. GOZUM,

MTC, Floridablanca, Pampanga, respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In two verified complaint-affidavits dated August 25, 1999 and September

7, 1999 filed with Executive Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales of the Regional Trial
Court of Guagua, Pampanga, complainant Rogelio G. Capulong charged Judge
Vinci G. Gozum of the Municipal Trial Court of Floridablanca, Pampanga, with
Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to two criminal
cases which complainant Capulong had filed, to wit: (a) Criminal Case No.
5288, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Proceso T. Sabado, Rudy P.
Serrano, Mardito Ta-a and Auxencio S. Ipac, for Qualified Theft; and (b)
Criminal Case No. 5316, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Proceso T.
Sabado, for Frustrated Murder. Both criminal cases were provisionally
[1]

dismissed by respondent Judge for failure on the part of the prosecution to

conduct the preliminary investigation. [2]

The complaints before Judge Gonzales were docketed as Administrative

Cases Nos. G-99-01 and G-99-02. On September 8, 1999, Judge Gonzales
[3]

referred the two complaints to respondent Judge, requiring him to answer within
ten days from receipt. In his Answer dated September 13, 1999, respondent
[4]

Judge denied the charges against him. [5]

In the meantime, Capulong sent the same complaints-affidavits to Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. On October 29, 1999, then Court Administrator
[6]

Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the complaints to respondent Judge for his

comment. [7]

In his Comments dated November 15, 1999 and November 19, 1999,
respondent Judge vigorously denied the charges. He claimed that the
provisional dismissals in both cases were in accordance with law and procedure
and issued so as to give complainant the opportunity to pursue his case by
securing the services of another counsel because of the repeated failure of
complainants counsel to appear and participate in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. [8]

Meanwhile, after hearing both parties in Administrative Cases Nos. G-99-

01 and G-99-02, Judge Gonzales submitted his Report dated December 27,
1999 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He pointed out that: (a)
under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the investigating officer, whether a fiscal
or municipal judge, has complete control in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation; and (b) the presence of a private counsel for the complainant is
not required for he is not allowed to participate in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
Judge Gonzales found that respondent Judge committed an error of
judgment in provisionally dismissing the two criminal cases; that however, such
error does not render him liable since no proof was adduced to show that the
error was made with deliberate intent to do an injustice; that inasmuch as the
dismissal was without prejudice, complainant could have refiled the cases but
he failed to do so because of his insistence that respondent Judge refused to
accept the receipt which has nothing to do with refiling of the cases.
Judge Gonzales recommended that respondent Judge be simply
admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties. [9]

In its Report dated June 5, 2000, the OCA adopted the findings of Judge
Gonzales but recommended to this Court that respondent Judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00, instead of simple admonition. It observed that the rules
governing the procedure for conducting preliminary investigations are not new
and are quite simple that these are not difficult to follow and, therefore, to not
know a law which is elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]

In a Resolution dated July 5, 2000, the Court re-docketed the case as

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-00-1287 and referred the same to the Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Guagua, Pampanga for
investigation, report and recommendation. [11]

In his letter dated August 28, 2000, Judge Gonzales clarified that the case
referred to him by the Court for investigation is the very same case filed in his
court by herein complainant.Thus, to avoid duplication of work, he is adopting
his investigation report dated December 27, 1999 as his report in compliance
with the resolution of the Court dated July 5, 2000. [12]

Meanwhile, in a letter dated January 31, 2001, complainant informed the

Court that his motion to revive/reopen Criminal Cases Nos. 5316 and 5288 have
remained unacted upon by the respondent Judge. [13]

In his Comment dated March 26, 2001, respondent Judge denied

complainants allegation. He stated that complainants motion to revive was
acted upon by Judge Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip who took over his court while
he was on official leave of absence for the whole month of October 2000. The
motions were denied by Judge Suba-Isip based on the two resolutions of
Prosecution Attorney II Katrina N.S. Buena-Factora and Provincial Prosecutor
Jesus Y. Manarang. [14]

In its Memorandum dated August 28, 2000, the OCA reiterated the
conclusions in its report dated June 5, 2000 finding respondent Judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law and recommending that he be fined in the amount
of P10,000.00.
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well taken.
On the matter of the alleged inaction of respondent Judge on complainants
motion to revive Criminal Cases Nos. 5316 and 5288, the Court finds that such
allegation is negated by the Joint Order issued by Judge Jesusa Mylene C.
Suba-Isip denying the same for insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, it
[15]

appears that respondent Judge was indeed on vacation leave from October 2
to October 31 2000, per verification with the Leave Division, Supreme Court.
The root cause of the complaints is the unfamiliarity of respondent Judge
with the rules on preliminary investigation.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding

for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.

SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation:

(a) Provincial or City Fiscals and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit

Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes

cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint

or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be
filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be
sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating
officer shall either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the
inquiry or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the

respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a)
hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not

submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating
officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the
complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter
may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the

investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days
therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for
trial.
[16]
 Clearly therefore, respondent Judge erred in dismissing the two criminal
complaints on the ground that the prosecution failed to conduct the preliminary
investigation due to the absence of complainants counsel. Nowhere in the rules
is it stated that the counsel of the complainant is authorized to conduct the
preliminary investigation; nor is his presence mandatory. His error visibly
indicates his lack of sufficient grasp of the law. The procedure he followed is
clearly erroneous, thus precluding inference that they were due only to some
mistake or mere inadvertence. [17]

Municipal Judges are the front-line officers in the administration of

justice. They have direct contact with the grass roots. As such, they are the
[18]

most visible representation of the Judiciary. Having accepted the exalted

position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in
the law. The Court has repeatedly impressed on judges the need to be diligent
[19]

in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, for the study of
law is a never-ending and ceaseless process. [20]

No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, [21]

competence is a mark of a good judge.Basic rules must be at the palm of his

hands. There will be great faith in the administration of justice if the party
litigants believe that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of
apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. [22]

One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the law and
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
excuses no one, especially respondent Judge who has been a judge since
[23]

January 24, 1983 or for sixteen years. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire
[24]

tenetur non excusat. When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be
[25]

aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [26]

Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October
1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which
carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of
more than Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos but not exceeding Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. However, considering that the incident took
place on April 21, 1999 which is before A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC took effect, we are
constrained to agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Vinci G. Gozum is found guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1479. February 17, 2003]

ATTY. MELENCIO A. CEA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO C.

PAGUIO, MTC-Br. 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

ATTY. MELENCIO A. CEA, in an Affidavit-Complaint dated 23 January

2001, charged Judge Orlando C. Paguio, MTC-Br. 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
with violation of the Code of Legal Ethics and The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Rep. Act No. 3019). Complainants grievance arose from Crim.
Cases Nos. 95-17285, 95-17286 and 95-17287, for violation of Batas Blg. 22,
all entitled People v. Alicia Cea Tecson, where respondent judge rendered a
consolidated decision dated 3 July 2000 convicting the accused on all counts.
The Affidavit-Complaint dated 23 January 2001 alleged that complainant
was the counsel of his daughter, accused Alicia Cea Tecson, in the above-
entitled criminal cases. It further alleged that at the instance of respondent judge
they met at the Arks Restaurant in Marilao, Bulacan, to discuss the status of the
criminal cases. During one of the meetings, respondent judge intimated that he
would lose the cases and solicited P100,000.00 from him in exchange for a
favorable decision. Feeling insulted by the suggestion, he retorted that he need
not give grease money because his daughter had a meritorious case. He then
dared respondent judge to proceed with the promulgation. True enough,
judgment was rendered and promulgated on 4 December 2000 finding
complainants daughter guilty as charged.
The Affidavit-Complaint was endorsed for appropriate action to the Office of
the Court Administrator which, by 1st Indorsement dated 5 March 2001,
directed respondent to file his Comment thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.
On 6 April 2001 respondent judge filed his Comment categorically denying
the claim that he met with complainant on several occasions regarding the
status of the criminal cases. According to him, the truth of the matter is that he
did not know complainants residence address or that of his law office. He
denied having made any suggestion or proposal to extort money from the
complainant. He argued that if, as complainant claimed, the defense in the
criminal cases was meritorious, it would be futile for him to squeeze any
material consideration from complainant considering that a meritorious case is
always a winning case. He explained that the delayed promulgation on 4
December 2000 of the decision dated 3 July 2000 was caused not by any
devious design on his part but by the continuous failure of the accused to
appear in court for the promulgation.
In its initial Report dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the referral of the instant case to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
By way of a Resolution dated 21 January 2002, the Supreme Court directed
the Executive Judge of RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, to conduct an investigation and
submit his report and recommendation thereon within ninety-(90) days from
receipt of the records.
In compliance therewith, Executive Judge Oscar C. Herrera, Jr., RTC-Br.
20, Malolos, Bulacan, submitted a Report dated 8 October 2002 finding
respondent Judge Orlando C. Paguio guilty of gross misconduct and
[1]

recommended the imposition of an appropriate sanction against him. In finding

complainants testimony plausible, the Executive Judge observed that -

x x x complainant remained firm in his assertion that respondent asked to meet with
him a number of times at Arks Restaurant in Marilao, Bulacan. During these
meetings, the respondent repeatedly asked for the amount of P100,000 for the
acquittal of complainants daughter in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-17285, 95-17286 and
95-17287. He refused to come across and instead asked respondent to promulgate the
decision which the latter continuously delayed. One of these meetings took place on
October 5, 2000, as shown by the Arks Restaurant receipt with Invoice No. 1575
(Exh. A), where complainant was accompanied by his other daughter, Dr. Carmelita
Cea-Mallari.

The undersigned had observed closely the demeanor of complainant when the latter
testified during the investigation. Complainant did so in a straightforward and
categorical manner. He was credible and was consistent with the narrations contained
in the Complaint-Affidavit dated January 22, 2001 which he filed with the OCA. In
fact, respondent himself testified that he knew complainant to be a man of principle.
[2]

The wheels of justice would run smoothly not only if the judiciary is purged
of the debilitating presence of recreant judges, but also importantly, if the
members who perform their functions conscientiously are not hampered by
groundless and vexatious charges. In its attempt to cleanse the Aegean stables,
so to speak, this Court must tread on with utmost circumspection and prudence
to make sure that only the guilty is denounced and the innocent absolved. Thus,
any administrative complaint leveled against a judge, such as the instant case,
must always be examined with a discriminating eye for the consequential
effects are by their very nature highly penal where the respondent stands to
face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. With this in mind, we carefully
evaluated the evidence on record and have come to the conclusion that the
complainant has not veritably proved his case.
In his Affidavit-Complaint, complainant adamantly asserted that he and
respondent judge, at the latters instigation, met a number of times at the Arks
Restaurant, and that during one of these conferences respondent solicited
P100,000.00 from him in exchange for the acquittal of the accused, his
daughter, in Crim. Cases Nos. 95-17285, 95-17286 and 95-17287. In
corroboration, complainant presented a receipt dated 5 October 2000 indicating
the food items which were supposedly ordered by respondent. Complainants
daughter, Dr. Carmelita Cea-Mallari, was also made to testify about her alleged
presence at the meeting between complainant and respondent at the Arks
Restaurant to discuss the criminal cases of accused Alicia Cea Tecson.
We are not persuaded. Other than the oral testimony of complainant and
that of his daughter, there is no extant proof adequately showing that several
meetings had indeed transpired between the contending parties. The receipt,
which is purportedly a proof of the alleged 5 October 2000 meeting, cannot be
given any evidentiary weight since it does not indicate the identity of the
individual or individuals to whom it was issued, or of the person or persons who
might have ordered the food items therein enumerated. If indeed the several
meetings occurred at the Arks Restaurant, which is a public place, complainant
could have easily gathered enough extrinsic evidence, such as the testimonies
of waiters, restaurant employees, or other disinterested witnesses, rather than
rely merely on his uncorroborated oral testimony, or on a receipt which is a
dubious piece of documentary evidence. Dr. Carmelita Cea-Mallari merely
testified that she was in that meeting between her father, complainant herein,
and respondent judge, and faintly heard the figure P100,000.00 mentioned
while the two (2) were conversing. She did not even say who uttered that figure
and whether it was preceded by any demand from anybody. Moreover, if
respondent indeed made the corrupt overtures and even blatantly demanded
money from the complainant, his good sense would dictate that he report the
matter to the authorities and set up entrapment operations against the culprit.
Despite myriad opportunities, complainant failed to come up with a reliably
substantial proof to give flesh to his charges.
In Co v. Calimag where the factual backdrop is analogous to the instant
[3]

case, we dismissed the charge of serious misconduct for bribery because of

complainants failure to go beyond his narrative of accusations and present
substantial evidence. We held -

With respect to the charge of extortion, complainants allegation is supported only by

the affidavit and testimony of Norma Cario to the effect that she delivered an
envelope containing money to respondent on December 27, 1998, but that the same
was returned allegedly because it was not in the amount agreed upon by complainant
and respondent. In corroboration, complainant presented in evidence the envelope,
which purportedly contained the money delivered to respondent.

Firstly, there is no proof that said envelope was even handled by respondent,
complainant not having subjected the same to fingerprint analysis by experts. Without
the envelope, this case becomes a matter of Norma Carios word against that of
respondent.

In the same case, citing Castaos v. Escao Jr., we stressed the primordial
[4]

importance of meeting the requirement of proof -

x x x an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, thus, to our

mind, the complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an
accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a
misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the
quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. In the same case, we
further declared that [i]n order that the allegation of a charge of this nature may not be
considered a fairy tale, evidence other than the doubtful and questionable verbal
testimony of a lone witness should be adduced. Entrapment should have been pursued.
Evidence of a reasonable report to police authorities should have been presented.
Record of where the bribe money came from, its specific denominations and the
manner respondent accepted and disposed of it should have been clearly shown.

It bears noting that complainant had indicated that respondent exhibited

bias and partiality when the latter convicted his daughter in the criminal cases
because he refused to accede to the demand for money. In fact, complainant
declared with confidence that he could not lose the criminal cases because he
had a meritorious defense.
Sad to say, these allegations should be treated for what they really are -
mere allegations founded on speculation and conjecture, if not sheer bravado.
Bias and impartiality cannot be presumed. When the opinion of counsel is at
variance with that of the judge, the former cannot use it as an excuse to hurl
imputations of unfairness and partiality in the absence of clear and convincing
proof. No one can arrogate infallibility unto himself.
 The dearth of evidence to substantiate the charge of serious misconduct
against respondent justifies his being absolved. Surely, we cannot allow
ourselves to be a medium in destroying the reputation of any member of the
bench, by pronouncing his guilt with alacrity on a mere accusation based on
tenuous, if not a nonexistent, evidentiary support. In administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the act complained
of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the complaint must be dismissed.
During the investigation, complainant mentioned the fact that although the
decision was dated 3 July 2000, it was only on 4 December 2000 that the same
was promulgated. According to him, the delay in the promulgation of the
judgment was a ruse employed by respondent to give him time to come up with
the required amount. Respondent, on the other hand, attributed the delay to the
continued absence of the accused who was then abroad.
Although we take exception to complainants speculative imputations,
respondent has not shown enough justification to stay our hand in exercising
disciplinary powers. As pointed out by the investigating judge, the delay in the
promulgation of the criminal cases could have been avoided had respondent
judge resorted to the remedy provided in Sec. 6, Rule 120, of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which is to promulgate the decision in absentia
by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof served
upon counsel of the accused.
For his inexcusable delay in promulgating Crim. Cases Nos. 95-17285, 95-
17286 and 95-17287, respondent deserves to be sanctioned as his action is
contrary to the mandate of the Constitution, which enshrines the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of their cases. The Court observes that this is
not the first time that respondent judge was made subject of an administrative
proceeding. In A.M. No. MTJ-00-1335, he was found guilty of delay in deciding
criminal cases and was accordingly fined. [5]

WHEREFORE, the Complaint against respondent Judge Orlando C.

Paguio for violation of the Code of Legal Ethics and Rep. Act No. 3019 is
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, considering the delay in
the promulgation of the consolidated Decision in Crim. Cases Nos. 95-17285,
95-17286 and 95-17287, respondent Judge is meted a fine of P3,000.00, the
amount to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits may be due him.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-03-1757. February 19, 2003]

ALBERT T. UY, complainant, vs. JUDGE ADRIANO R. OSORIO, RTC,

Branch 171,Valenzuela, Metro Manila, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The present administrative case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint

dated April 7, 1997 filed with this Court by Albert Uy against Judge Adriano R.
Osorio, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
[1]

Albert Uys affidavit-complaint alleges that he and his wife Carmen were
defendants in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 pending in respondent Judge Osorio's
sala. On several occasions, respondent invited complainant to go to "Barracks,"
respondent's karaoke bar in Malabon. There, on different dates, respondent
asked complainant to give him a television set, an air-conditioner, and the
amounts of P20,000.00, P10,000.00, and US$1,000.00 needed by his second
family in Balagtas, Bulacan where his three children with one Inday Osorio
live.Complainant obliged, prompting him to mortgage his car and close his bank
accounts. As consideration for the appliances and money given by
complainant, respondent promised that he will win in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95.
On May 16, 1996, respondent judge issued an order unloading Civil Case
No. 4701-V-95 to another RTC judge on the ground that his court was
designated as a special court to hear and decide only heinous crimes. What is
surprising is that he did not unload Civil Case No. 4692-V-95, Alfredo Atienza
vs. Toyota (Cubao), Inc. Plaintiff here is respondents compadre.
On May 21, 1996, complainant wrote respondent demanding the return of
his money and appliances.
Subsequently, a uniformed policeman delivered to complainants house a
Metrobank check (No. 018382) in the name of Christian Osorio, respondents
son. The check, in the sum of P25,613.25, was intended as payment for the TV
set and the air- conditioning unit. It was received by complainant's sister-in-law,
Diana Uy.
Thereafter, complainant again wrote respondent another letter demanding
payment of the sums of P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and $1,000.00. In response,
respondent sent his compadre, Alfredo Atienza, to complainants house to
deliver another Metrobank check (No. 018388) in the amount of P30,000.00,
also in the name of Christian Osorio. It was received by complainant's wife,
Carmen Uy.
In his comment on the affidavit-complaint, respondent Judge Osorio
vehemently denied complainants imputations against him. He explained that it
is his son, Christian Osorio, who owns the karaoke bar Barracks. Complainant
is a disgruntled litigant and has an axe to grind against him considering that in
Civil Case No. 4701-V-95, he issued a writ of preliminary attachment resulting
in the sale at public auction of complainants vehicles and the garnishment of
his bank deposits. In order to obtain a favorable judgment, complainant
befriended Christian. In the process, complainant convinced Christian to add a
VIP room to his karaoke bar and offered to sell a TV set, an air-conditioning unit
and sound equipment worth P55,000.00, payable as the business
progresses. Later, Christian intimated to pay in part, but complainant said it was
not yet time to pay. He then requested Christian to convince his father to decide
the case in his favor. Christian agreed, informing his father of such request. This
prompted respondent to unload Civil Case No. 4701-V-95, using as reason the
designation of his sala by this Court as a special court to hear and decide
exclusively heinous crimes. He then advised his son to pay complainant for the
appliances.
Respondent judge further averred in his comment that being a widower, he
has no second family; that he has served the judiciary for more than thirty (30)
years with utmost honesty; and that he will not spoil and destroy the earned
credits of his career.
In a Resolution dated March 9, 1998, this Court referred this administrative
matter to then Court of Appeals Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. (now a member of
this Court) for investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a hearing, Justice Callejo submitted his Report
recommending that the affidavit-complaint against respondent judge be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Justice Callejos findings are reproduced as follows:

Calibrating and assessing the evidence of the parties, the Investigating Justice is
convinced that the Complainant had decided to influence the Respondent to
resolve Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 in his favor but that he cannot contact the
Respondent personally as the latter made it a policy, in his Court, that no one can see
him in his Chambers. The Complainant then decided to use the son of the Respondent,
Christian Osorio, as a channel or vehicle to the Respondent and influence the latter in
resolving Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 in his favor. The Complainant managed to
convince Christian Osorio to convert a portion of his Karaoke Bar into a VIP
room and offered to supply Christian Osorio with an air-conditioner and television
unit as well as cash in the amount of P30,000.00 and US$1,000.00. Christian Osorio
knew no better. He took the bait and accepted the appliances and the cash amounts
from the Complainant. As it was, when the time was ripe, the Complainant sought the
help of Christian Osorio to talk with the Respondent to resolve Civil Case No. 4701-
V-95 in favor of the Complainant. However, when apprised by his son of the request
of the Complainant, sometime in April, 1996, the Respondent realized that the
Complainant managed to inveigle himself into the good graces of his son, Christian
Osorio, precisely to influence the Respondent in resolving Civil Case No. 4701-V-
95 in favor of the Complainant. But the Respondent was even caught in a bind
because if he inhibited himself from the case, he had to have a valid reason for so
doing. However, the Respondent cannot use, as a justification for his inhibition, the
attempt of the Complainant to influence the Respondent via his son, Christian Osorio,
as the same would place his son, in a bad light. However, when the Respondent
received Administrative Order No. 51-96of the Supreme Court, the Respondent used
the said Order as justification for unloading Civil Case No. 4701-V-95 to another
Branch of the Court, thus, preserving the integrity of the Court. On the other hand, the
complainant realized that all the appliances and cash money he gave to Christian
Osorio were for naught. He had to recover the appliances and cash money he gave to
Christian Osorio. However, if the Complainant filed a complaint against Christian
Osorio, he will thereby be rendering himself vulnerable to a charge of attempt to
corrupt a public rendering himself vulnerable to a charge of attempt to corrupt a
public officer, a felony under Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, to
compel Christian Osorio to refund to the Complainant the cash money he received
from the Complainant and recover the value of the appliances, he wrote the letters of
demand, Exhibits A and C, to the Respondent smugged that, to avert being charged
administratively by the Complainant, the Respondent will have to insist that his son,
Christian Osorio, complied with the demands of the Complainant. However, the
Complainant sent his letters of demand with the
notations Personal/Confidential written on the envelopes to insure that the staff of the
Respondent will not open the said envelopes thereby insuring that the Respondent will
not be able to charge the Complainant with libel. As it was, after the Complainant had
received the remittances of Christian Osorio, he did not anymore file any charges
against the Respondent. Although the Complainant failed to secure a favorable
judgment from the Respondent, in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95, however, he was able to
recover his investment with Christian Osorio. In fine, the Investigating Justice finds
and so declares that the Complainant failed to prove, with the requisite quantum of
evidence, his charge of Corruption against the Respondent.

This Court agrees with the findings, conclusion and recommendation of

Justice Callejo.
 Actually, on the basis of his affidavit-complaint, complainant is charging
respondent with bribery, dishonesty and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law, classified as serious charges under Sections 7 and 8, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 7. Classification of Charges.- Administrative charges are classified as serious,

less serious, or light.

SEC. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. 3019).

xxx

In Huggland vs. Lantin, this Court held that the culpability of respondent
[2]

judge for gross dishonesty must be established not just by substantial evidence
which suffices in administrative investigation (Section 5, Rule 133, Revised
Rules of Court), but by a clear preponderance of evidence.
In Layola vs. Gabo, Jr., this Court ruled that for a judge to be held liable for
[3]

knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be established beyond cavil

that the judgment adverted to is unjust, contrary to law or unsupported by the
evidence, and that the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice. In other words, the quantum of proof required to hold
respondent judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
A review of the records shows that complainant failed to establish by the
required quantum of evidence the culpability of respondent judge for the serious
charges mentioned above.
From the totality of proofs presented by the parties, we can easily discern
that indeed, complainant used respondents son, Christian Osorio, in order that
he could obtain a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 4701-V-75. However,
when respondent came to know of complainants scheme, respondent unloaded
the case. It was then when complainant wrote respondent to return the
appliances and money.
On this point it may be asked: if it were true that indeed respondent
demanded from complainant a TV set, an air-conditioner and money, why did
the former unload the case? We can only conclude with certainty that there was
no such demand and neither was there a commitment on respondents part to
decide the case in favor of complainant.
Significantly, the two checks issued to complainant in payment of the
appliances were in the name of Christian Osorio. We are thus convinced that
those appliances were delivered to Christian, not to respondent, and that the
latter had nothing to do with the business transaction between his son and
complainant.
We have observed that complainant failed to present any witness to
corroborate his imputations against respondent judge. Nobody testified that
both of them met at one time or another at the Barracks. Noteworthy is the fact
that complainant himself admitted when he testified before Justice Callejo that
respondent judge did not want to see anybody in his chambers, thus:
J. Callejo:
Did you not try to see the judge in his chambers in the Court?
Witness: (Complainant)
No one can see the judge in his room, sir.[4]
If respondent does not allow anybody (apparently referring to litigants) to
enter his chambers, it is unthinkable why he should meet complainant at the
karaoke bar and demand from him appliances and sums of money.
Moreover, while complainant alleged in his affidavit-complaint that
respondent needed the money for his second family, however, he testified that
complainant would spend the same for the renovation of the karaoke bar and
for his vacation during the Holy Week, thus:
Atty. Ligsay:
Did Judge Osorio give you any reason for asking ten thousand, or twenty thousand,
or the television or the airconditioner?
Witness:
Yes, sir. According to him, he needed the money and the appliances because he was
converting the karaoke bar into a VIP room and he needed the one thousand dollars
because he will be on vacation during the Holy Week, sir. [5]

Likewise, complainant does not personally know that respondent has a

second family, thus:
Atty. Osorio:
In other words, only your friend told you that the judge has a second family in
Meycauayan, Bulacan?
Witness:
 Yes, sir.
J. Callejo:
Dont you know that the judge is a widower?
Witness:
Yes, sir.[6]
Incidentally, with respect to respondents failure to unload Civil Case No.
4692-V-95, suffice it to state that it is the party concerned, not herein
complainant, who should ask respondent, through a motion, to inhibit himself
from hearing the case.
In sum, we find that complainants evidence fails to prove his charges. On
the contrary, the evidence for respondent judge sustains his defense that
complainant deliberately established close relationship with his son in order to
obtain a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 4701-V-95.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent
Judge Adriano R. Osorio is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5024. February 20, 2003]

ARSENIA T. BERGONIA, complainant, vs. Atty. ARSENIO A.

MERRERA, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A motion for extension to file an appellants brief carries with it the

presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within the period
granted. Failure to so file the brief without any reasonable excuse is a violation
of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. For such violation, a lawyer may
be administratively sanctioned, especially if it results in damage to the client.

The Case

This administrative case stems from an Affidavit-Complaint[1] filed by

Arsenia T. Bergonia on March 2, 1999, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Arsenio
A. Merrera for violating Canons 12 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Complainant alleged that his inexcusable negligence, while
acting as her counsel, caused the unceremonious dismissal of her appeal.
Specifically, despite obtaining two extensions, he still failed to file the required
appellants brief in the Court of Appeals. After a careful consideration of the
Complaint and respondents Comment[2] thereon dated November 22, 1999, the
Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maalas November 15, 2001
Report[3] recommending the six-month suspension of respondent from the
practice of law was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
June 29, 2002 Resolution No. XV-2002-236. On August 15, 2002, the Notice of
the IBP Resolution[4] and that of the Commissioners Report were forwarded to
the Office of the Bar Confidant by Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, director for bar
discipline of the IBP.[5]

The Facts
 Complainant, together with her relatives, filed a case for the quieting of title
(docketed as Civil Case No. U-4601) against her niece Josephine Bergonia, as
well as Spouses Rodolfo and Remedios Parayno and their minor daughter
Gretchen.[6] After due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49,[7] promulgated its Decision in favor of the Parayno
spouses and their daughter.[8] On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court[9] and the Decision became final and executory.[10]
Since the disputed land was still in the possession of complainant, the
Paraynos instituted Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover possession.[11] After the
Answer was filed, respondent became her counsel of record. After due trial,
Branch 48[12] of the same RTC rendered its Decision[13] ordering her to vacate
the premises and to surrender possession thereof to the Parayno spouses.
Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgment to the CA.
Respondent, as counsel, received a Notice to File Brief[14] on December 17,
1997. Acting on his Motion for extension to file the appellants brief,[15] the CA in
its February 18, 1998 minute Resolution[16] granted him until March 17, 1998 to
do so. Even before the first extension had lapsed, however, he again filed an
Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief,[17] praying that he be given until
April 16, 1998 to submit the required pleading. The CA again granted his
Second Motion.[18]Eventually, the deadline, which had already been extended
twice, lapsed without his filing the appellants brief. Hence, the CA, upon motion
of the appellees, dismissed the appeal in its June 25, 1998 Resolution.[19]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty of inexcusable negligence.

She rejected his explanation that he had already advised complainant not to
pursue the appeal even before the filing of the Notice of Appeal. In fact, after
the appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, he even filed an Opposition,
thus raising complainants hopes of eventual victory.
If respondent thought it was best to dispense with the appellants brief, he
should have filed a manifestation or motion to that effect. Instead, he opposed
the Motion to Dismiss and asked for further extensions of time. His actions
clearly showed how negligent and irresponsible he had been in filing the brief.
The board of directors of the IBP concurred with Commissioner Maala that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
 The Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBP.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, requires

all the members of the bar to observe the following:

A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so.

Expressly stated is the requirement to show good and sufficient cause for
requests of extension of time to file appellate briefs. Section 12 of Rule 44 of
the Rules of Court provides that an extension of time for the filing of a brief shall
not be allowed, except when there is good and sufficient cause, and only when
the motion is filed before the expiration of the extension sought.
From time to time, a request for extension becomes necessary when an
advocate needs more time to study the clients position. Generally, such request
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Lawyers who, for one reason
or another, decide to dispense with the filing of the required pleading, should
promptly manifest this intent to the court. It is necessary for them to do so in
order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those who file motions for
extension in bad faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice,[20] and thus
become liable to disciplinary action.[21]
A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith and with a
genuine intent to file the required pleading within the extended period. In
granting the request, the court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a
justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this
implied trust, the motion for extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay
or thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a means
of preventing the judgment from attaining finality and execution and of enabling
the movant to trifle with procedure and mock the administration of justice.
In this case, respondent twice moved for an extension of time to file the
required appellants brief. In his first Motion, he alleged that he had a hectic daily
schedule of hearings and other pressures from work. In his next Motion, he
claimed he had acute arthritis and asthmatic attacks. The granting of his two
Motions implied that he had been given ample time either to finish researching
his case or to withdraw his appeal. Yet, he still failed to file the required brief. In
its June 25, 1998 Resolution, the CA noted that the appellees Motion to Dismiss
the appeal was filed only after forty (40) days from the expiration of the last
extension.
Respondent claims that he never planted false hopes in the mind of
complainant. Upon receiving the Decision in Civil Case No. U-6061, he
purportedly advised her that her chances of winning in the appellate court were
slim, because the ownership of the disputed land had already been adjudicated
to the other party in Civil Case No. U-4601. He avers that he tried to persuade
her to accept her defeat like a good soldier.
We are not persuaded. If, indeed, respondent failed to convince
complainant to drop her appeal, he should have just withdrawn his appearance.
Based on his arguments in his Opposition to the Motion for Execution and
Demolition, however, we do not believe that he even tried to convince her to
withdraw the appeal. We are inclined to believe that this excuse was merely an
afterthought to justify his negligence.
Moreover, respondent claims that after filing the Motions for Extension, he
surmised that the appeal would be useless, because he could not show
sufficient cause to reverse the Decision.
This justification is even more inexcusable. Respondent, should have
checked first if there was a good ground to support the appeal. If there was
none, he should have been forthright in his evaluation of the case.
Lawyers should fully familiarize themselves with the causes of their clients
before advising the latter on the soundness of litigating. If they find that the
intended suit is devoid of merit or that the pending action is defenseless,[22] they
should promptly inform and dissuade their clients accordingly.
Assuming that respondent indeed tried to persuade complainant to abandon
the appeal, he should have manifested to the CA that he had decided not to file
the appellants brief anymore, instead of just letting the period lapse. His
contention that he could not find the appropriate jurisprudence to support her
case is too flimsy to be credible. A competent and ethical lawyer would have at
least tried to persuade the CA with reason and logic.
Respondent alleges that complainant knew of the dismissal of the appeal.
That she had referred the Motion for Execution and Demolition to him for
comment allegedly showed that she had already given up her desire to pursue
her appeal. He pointed out that if she had indeed blamed his inexcusable
negligence for its dismissal, then she would not have referred that Motion to
him.
We are not convinced. Anyone would have done what complainant did,
because no one else would know the case better than ones lawyer. Contrary to
respondents allegation, we do not read any intention on her part to withdraw
the appeal, which showed that she wanted to oppose the execution of the
Decision.
We concur in the IBPs finding that respondent was negligent in the
performance of his duties as counsel for complainant, and that his negligence
was inexcusable. If indeed it was true that he found her case to be futile, he
should have just withdrawn the appeal, instead of filing several Motions for
extension to file the appellants brief.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession.[23] Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation
and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels
and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct
themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with
fidelity to the courts and their clients. Canon 18.03 of the Code requires that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith renders him liable.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is hereby found guilty of violating
Canons 12 and 18 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from
receipt of this Decision. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 4801. February 27, 2003]

MENA U. GERONA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO

DATINGALING, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Mena U. Gerona against Atty.

Alfredo Datingaling for allegedly falsifying a document and notarizing it
afterwards.
The complaint, which is in the form of an affidavit, concerns a document
entitled Consent to Quarry purporting to be an agreement whereby complainant
Mena U. Gerona and her party, composed of Lucila Umali Magboo, Feliciano
U. Umali, Marife Umali, Jovita Umali Galicia, P.J. Galicia, Wendy Sunshine
Umali, and Aurelia Umali Miranda, allegedly agreed to allow Ronald Reagan
Hernandez, represented by Engr. Bayani N. Melo, of legal age, Filipino, of
Alangilan, Batangas City, his heirs, successors, and assigns, to enter or occupy
a portion of their property in Anilao East, Mabini, Batangas and engage in a
QUARRY business and related activities. [1]

Complainant stated:

1. That I am filing a case for disbarment against ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING

of Batangas City whose house is at the back of the Provincial Jail;

2. That I am constrained to file such disbarment case for the reason that the said
ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING in notarizing the attached document, Annexes A
and A-1, he made it appear that I together with my brother and sisters appeared before
him on July 2, 1997 when in truth and in fact we did not and in the said document
Atty. Alfredo Datingaling said, and I quote:

BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC FOR AND IN THE CITY OF BATANGAS

PERSONALLY APPEARED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS, NAMELY:

RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ, represented by: ENGR. BAYANI MELO

LUCILLE U. MAGBOO

MENA U. ENRIQUEZ GERONA

FELICIANO UMALI

JOVITA U. GALICIA

WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI

AURELIA UMALI MIRANDA

KNOWN TO ME AND TO ME KNOWN TO [BE] THE SAME PERSONS WHO

EXECUTE[D] THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT AND THEY
ACKNOWLEDGED TO [HAVE] MADE THE SAME AS THEIR FREE AND
VOLUNTARY ACT AND DEED.

THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT RELATES TO A CONSENT TO QUARRY

AGREEMENT, CONSIST[ING] OF TWO (2) PAGES, INCLUDING THE PAGE IN
WHICH THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT [IS] WRITTEN AND HAS BEEN SIGNED
BY THE PARTIES TOGETHER WITH THEIR INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES
ON EACH AND EVERY PAGE THEREOF.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 1997 AT

BATANGAS CITY, PHILIPPINES.

3. That aside from the fact that not one of us appeared before Notary Public Alfredo
Datingaling at Batangas City on July 2, 1997 and we have individual daily time
records as we are working in Metro Manila, we have signed each and every document
of Annexes A and A-1 before him as stated by him in his acknowledgement and
clearly page 1 which is Annex A has not been signed by any of us and the name
WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI refers to two persons which are my nieces, Wendy is
nine (9) years old and Sunshine is twelve (12) years old and both of them have no
legal personality to appear before a Notary Public to sign any legal document and
moreover RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ who appears to have a Residence
Certificate No. 8988196 is a son of Elvira Atienza and is only nine (9) years of age
and the first page, Annex A has been written on a different typewriter and inserted to
the document as the front page and allegedly signed on July 3, 1997 at Batangas City
ahead of the notarization of the document which was on July 2, 1997. In short, Atty.
Alfredo Datingaling falsified the whole document and he aggravated such act of
falsification when he notarized the same; that moreover, it refers to a parcel of land
which has never been agreed by the parties;

4. That for such acts of falsification, I have filed with the City Fiscals Office of
Batangas City a falsification case against Atty. Alfredo Datingaling and his clients,
Elvira Atienza, Bayani Melo and Apolonia Bonado. [2]
 Complainant charged that despite knowledge of the falsity of the document,
respondent, as notary public for Batangas City, notarized it on July 3, 1997.
This Court required respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against him. In his counter-affidavit dated March
2, 1998, respondent claimed that the complaint is baseless, out of focus, an
afterthought, childish and in the nature of self-indictment. Respondent denied
[3]

the allegations against him and claimed that complainant had signed the
documents on July 2, 1997 in Quezon City and had it notarized by respondent
the next day (July 3, 1997) in Batangas City. Respondent stated in his counter-
affidavit:

The document was already prepared when it was brought to my law office by Bayani
Melo and company who signed in our office on July 03, 1997. It was my secretary
who stamped my name as Notary Public on the bottom of the Acknowledgement
ready for my signature, but through inadvertence she overlooked that date July 02,
1997 thereof as the date of the actual notarization. It bears emphasis that such date
(July 02, 1997) was typewritten beforehand which could easily be reformed if the
parties so desire. So why does the complainant want to create trouble?

Explaining a little further, the negotiation or transaction between the group of Ronald
Hernandez represented by Bayani Melo on the one hand (my client), and the group of
Mena Umali Gerona on the other took place at the residence of Mena Umali Gerona
in Quezon City where the document in question was prepared on July 2, 1997, and the
parties agreed to meet each other in Batangas City, the following day July 3, 1997 for
purposes of notarization at the office of the Notary Public ATTY. ALFREDO R.
DATINGALING. [4]

Attached to the counter-affidavit were the affidavits of Bayani Melo and Matias
Magnaye (marked Annexes A and B, respectively), corroborating respondents
[5]

allegations. Bayani Melo had signed as the representative of Ronald Reagan

Hernandez, while Matias Magnaye as a witness to the Consent to Quarry.
In reply, complainant submitted an affidavit, dated April 23, 1998, received
by this Court the following day. Respondent was required to file a rejoinder
within 10 days, but he did not do so.
In her reply-affidavit, complainant submitted a copy of the resolution of the
provincial prosecutor of Batangas in I.S. No. 97-3353 (for falsification of public
document), finding probable cause against respondent and recommending the
filing of an information for falsification of a public document against all the
respondents named in the case, including herein respondent Atty. Alfredo
Datingaling. The prosecutor stated:
After a painstaking study and careful analysis of the evidence presented by both
parties, the undersigned has observed the following striking dissimilarities on the two
copies of the document Consent to Quarry (Authorization) which would clearly
distinguish one from the other, to wit:

Page 1 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 reveals that it has that
blank space for the technical description of a parcel of land subject of their agreement;
it is undated; it is signed by Bayani Melo at the bottom but unsigned by Lucila Umali
Magboo and it has insertions and modifications thereon.

On the other hand, page 1 of the notarized copy of that consent to quarry reveals that
the technical description refers to two parcels of land located at Anilao, Mabini,
Batangas described in Tax Declaration No. 003-00097 and in the approved
plan/Application for Small Scale Mining Permit for Quarry; it is dated July 3, 1997, it
has two signatures of Bayani Melo and one signature of Ronald Reagan Hernandez
and it is also unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo.

Page 2 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 shows the signatures of
Mena U. Gerona, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda as well as the signatures of
witnesses Rosemarie, Matias, Geronimo and Apolonia before the acknowledgment
portion; a signature of Lucila N. Magboo at the acknowledgment portion; blank as to
the Notary Public and the Doc., Page No., Book No., and Series of.

Page 2 of the notarized copy of the Consent to Quarry bears the signatures of Mena,
Feliciano, and Aurelia as well as the witnesses before the acknowledgment portion; it
is dated July 2, 1997 and signed by Notary public A.R. Datingaling and it is docketed
as Doc. No. 3473, Page No. 67, Book No. XXVII, Series of 1997.

It has been also established that the said document was brought to Menas residence on
July 2, 1997 ready for signatures and in fact it was signed there by Mena, Feliciano,
Aurelia and Bayani Melo in the presence of those witnesses. After the signing of said
document, a copy was left with Mena and the other copies were brought by the group
of Bayani Melo, which copies were notarized by Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling on July
3, 1997. The issue now is whether the crime of falsification has been committed by
the respondents?

From the glaring dissimilarities between the copies of the document consent to quarry
and the testimony of the complainant and his brother Feliciano, the undersigned
honestly believes that indeed the crime of falsification had been committed by the
respondents in conspiracy with one another. The evidence is clear that Mena Umali
and her brother and sisters had not presented themselves or appeared before said
Notary Public for the acknowledgment of said document as their free act and
voluntary deed and that the lots described in the notarized document are different
from the lot they intended to be the subject of their agreement. From the unnotarized
copy dated July 2, 1997 which bears the proposed insertions/modifications, the land
intended to be described as the subject of that agreement is but a parcel of land while
in the notarized copy, it describes two parcels of land. Further, had the complainant
and her brother and sisters appeared before the Notary Public for notarization of said
document, then there is no reason why Lucila Magboo, Mena Umali, Feliciano Umali
and Aurelia Miranda would not be required to sign on the first page of the
document. In fact, Bayani Melo signed again the said document on the first page
while Ronald Reagan Hernandez who is already represented by Bayani Melo was
required to sign said document on the first page. Hence, there is sufficient ground to
hold respondents for trial for the said offense under I.S. No. 97-3353.

....

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that an

information for Falsification of Public Document be filed against all the respondents
under I.S. No. 97-3353 . . . .
[6]

In addition, complainant submitted on December 4, 2000 a list of criminal

cases, eight in all, filed against respondent, including that filed by
complainant. Four of the cases had been dismissed, while four others were
pending. Most of the cases were for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, estafa, and estafa
through falsification of a public document.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato G.
Cunanan, to whom this case was assigned, recommended the suspension of
respondent Alfredo R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a
period of one year. In his report, Atty. Cunanan stated:

We are therefore of the impression that, to say the least, the respondent has not shown
qualities that endear him to the profession or the Bar. While complainants present
criminal case against the respondent may be pending, and he still enjoys the
presumption of innocence so far as Crim. Case No. 9426 (I.S. No. 97-3353) is
concerned, the fact remains that for purposes of this administrative complaint, the
evidence presented by the complainant considered vis--vis the unconvincing
explanation of the respondent, his silence and failure to file a rejoinder, and the
criminal cases filed against him, it is clear that Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, more particularly Canons 1 and 7.
We therefore recommend the suspension of Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling from the
practice of the profession for a period of one (1) year.
[7]

The IBP Board of Governors approved the report with modification:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, . . . the Report and Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner . . .; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility more
particularly Canons 1 and 7, Respondents Commission as Notary Public is hereby
SUSPENDED with disqualification for appointment as Notary Public for two years
from receipt of notice.
[8]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration declaring himself innocent

and insisting he had no participation in the transaction. In addition, he denied
receipt of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, his motion
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on the ground that it no longer had
jurisdiction over the case as it had already been endorsed to this Court. The
IBP Board cited Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court as the basis of this
resolution.
Rule 139-B, 12(b) provides:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

....

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.

As the provision reads, no mention is made of motions for

reconsideration. However, it was held in Halimao v. Villanueva that although
[9]

Rule 139-B, 12(c) does not mention motions for reconsideration, there is
nothing in its text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion. A motion
for reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors may be filed
within 15 days from notice to a party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion
before the Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering
the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through
a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence. [10]

Be that as it may and considering that the motion for reconsideration was
filed after the records of this case had been forwarded to this Court, we have
decided to treat the motion as a petition for review within the contemplation of
Rule 139-B, 12 (b).
After due consideration of respondents motion for reconsideration, we find
the motion to be without merit.
First. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document filed against
respondent, the records show that as of the date of filing of respondents Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration on September 16, 2002, the same is still pending
trial before Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. Respondent [11]

claims that although he notarized the document, he had no participation

whatsoever in the transaction. He merely notarized the document on the
representation of the persons who appeared before him. [12]

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a
respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment [13]

should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary

suspension, could accomplish the end desired. To be sure, conviction in a
[14]

criminal case is not necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an
administrative proceeding. As we have held in Calub v. Suller, the dismissal
[15]

of a criminal case is not determinative of the liability of the accused for

disbarment. In the case at bar, however, the criminal prosecution based on the
same acts charged in this case is still pending in the court.To avoid
contradictory findings, therefore, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for
the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case for falsification of a
public document.
Second. The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato
Cunanan, as to the violation of Act No. 2103 are fully supported by the
evidence. Act No. 2103, 1(a) provides:

The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly

authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.
[16]

Respondent had a duty to require the persons claiming to have executed the
document to appear personally before him and to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated in the document. If the parties were represented by
other persons, their representatives names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who had executed the same and the latter should be
required to affirm their acts. Respondent failed to do this.
[17]

Respondent also failed to controvert complainants evidence that Wendy

Sunshine Umali are actually two different persons named Wendy and Sunshine,
both surnamed Umali; that they were minors at the time of the execution of the
aforesaid document; and that their signatures therein had been made by an
unidentified person. It is clear even from the face of the Consent to Quarry that
Wendy and Sunshine Umali are two different minors, who were represented by
a person who signed the document in their behalf, thus lending credence to
complainants claim that the document is fictitious. In fact, the residence
certificate number of Wendy Sunshine Umali is not stated in the notarized
document. In addition, page one of the agreement appears to have been
intercalated and to have been typed with a different machine.
The acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act. By it a private
document is converted into a public document, making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. [18]

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot therefore be

overemphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public
documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.
However, the suspension of respondent from his commission as a notary
public for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is too
severe a penalty for what he has committed. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr., this [19]

Court suspended respondents commission as a notary public for one year for
notarizing the verification of a motion to dismiss when the fact was that three of
the affiants had not appeared before him and for notarizing the same instrument
of which he had been one of the signatories. In accordance with that case, the
suspension of respondent from his commission as notary public for one year
would be proper.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling is found guilty of
violation of Act No. 2103, 1(a) and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission
as notary public for a period of one (1) year, with WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with
more severely. The charge of falsifying a public document is DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of an administrative case for the same act should
the evidence warrant such action.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-02-1427. February 27, 2003]

MODESTO MAGSUCANG, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO V.

BALGOS, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, respondent.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated November 18, 2000 and addressed to the

Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, complainant
Modesto Magsucang charged Judge Rolando Balgos, Presiding Judge, MTC,
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, of bias and partiality, grave abuse of discretion,
requiring excessive bail, and violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It appears from the records that on May 10, 2000, a certain Pepito Lim,
owner of the Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft against complainants daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly for
misappropriating cash amounting to P11,200, with grave abuse of confidence.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1593. Subsequently, respondent
judge, before whom the preliminary investigation was conducted, issued a
warrant of arrest. Bail was set at P30,000. On May 11, 2000, Rosalie was
arrested. Complainant posted bail for his daughter from the proceeds of the sale
of his banca and with money borrowed from friends.
Meanwhile, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Mr. Lim against
Rosalie. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610,
1611, 1612, 1613, 1634, and 1635. After preliminary investigations were
conducted in these cases, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued by
respondent judge. In Criminal Case No. 1635, bail was set at P24,000. Neither
Modesto nor Rosalie had money to pay for bail so Rosalie remained
incarcerated.
Complainant faults respondent judge for allegedly committing irregularities
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation when respondent judge
administered the oath to Pepito Lim and for having sent Rosalie to prison
without the benefit of a hearing. According to complainant, when respondent
judge issued several subpoenas on June 2, 2000, requiring Rosalie to file her
counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos. 1608 to 1613, inclusive, he likewise
committed grave abuse of discretion since he failed to consider that Rosalie
was, at the time, locked in jail and incapable of defending herself in
court. Lastly, complainant states that respondent judge violated applicable rules
and regulation when he required excessive bail.
On November 10, 2000, the letter-complaint was referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator. On January 25, 2001, then Court Administrator Alfredo
L. Benipayo required respondent judge to file his comment.
In his comment, respondent maintained that the rules of procedure were
followed in the filing of the criminal complaints against Rosalie
Magsucang. Criminal Cases Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634
and 1635, all for qualified theft, were filed against Rosalie after Criminal Case
No. 1593. In all these later cases, Rosalie filed her counter-affidavit and that of
her witness only after she was already arrested. There is, therefore, no truth to
the complainants allegation that respondent judge acted pursuant to a
conscious effort to defeat the bail posted in Criminal Case No. 1593. He added
that Rosalie virtually disappeared after posting bail in Criminal Case No. 1593;
she was only arrested after an intensive police effort to find her.
Respondent further declared that, excluding Criminal Cases Nos. 1634 and
1635, which were dismissed, he found probable cause to hold Rosalie
Magsucang liable for eight (8) counts of qualified theft. The resolution and the
records of the case have been transmitted to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Bacolod City for review.
The incumbent Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero Velasco, found
respondent judge innocent of the charges contained in the letter-complaint,
except the charge related to excessive bail. Justice Velasco recommended that
the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the
respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.
The parties were asked to manifest whether they agree to submit the case
for decision on the basis of the pleadings on record. Respondent
agreed. Complainant did not respond and is deemed to have no objection
thereto. We shall now resolve the issues raised in the complaint.
First, as to the charge that respondent judge acted with bias and partiality,
we find that complainant failed to substantiate his claim. Other than the letter-
complaint, no evidence was introduced clearly pointing to an act manifestly
favoring private complainant Pepito Lim and injuring the rights of accused
Rosalie Magsucang. In Araos vs. Luna-Pison, we held that the absence of any
[1]

evidence showing that the respondent judge acted in bad faith, ill-will, or malice
reduces the charges against him into a mere indictment. Charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. [2]
 Well to remember as investigating officer the respondent judge is given the
latitude to determine if there exists probable cause that would warrant either the
filing of the corresponding information or the outright dismissal of the
case. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since it must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in a given case, its existence depends to a large degree on the findings or
opinion of the judge conducting the investigation.
Mere allegations in the complaint must be supported by evidence to prove
that a judge has overstepped the parameters of his official prerogative. Here,
we find that complainant has failed to present any evidence to corroborate his
assertion that respondent judge is guilty of committing irregularities in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation.
Section 3 (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that
[3]

the complaint-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor

or government official authorized to administer oaths. Said section likewise
provides that it is the duty of the prosecutor or other government official to certify
that he personally examined the affiants and he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits. It is clear that respondent judge has
performed his duty pursuant to existing rules.
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
function no less than any other public officer. The presumption of regularity of
[4]

official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to

perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no
[5]

less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
[6]

presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment

[7]

will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officers

act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [8]

As to the charge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing six (6) subpoenas

on June 2, 2000, we find the charge bereft of merit. There is nothing in the rules
prohibiting respondent judge from issuing subpoenas to Rosalie requiring her
to file her counter-affidavits to the complaints filed against her. In fact the
respondent judge is bound to do so in the, course of processing the
complaints. The six (6) subpoenas correspond to the number of complaints filed
against her.
As to the remaining charge, we agree with the OCA. Respondent judge
required excessive bail in this case, i.e., Criminal Case No. 1635.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount
of bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a)
financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the
offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the
accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence against
the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture
of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall
not be required. In implementing this mandate, regard should be taken Of the
[9]

prisoners pecuniary circumstances. That which is reasonable bail to a man of

wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Where
the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence
[10]

of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill

this purpose. [11]

In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that Rosalie

Magsucang is illiterate, the daughter of a poor fisherman. She had very limited
financial ability to post bail. In Criminal Case No. 1635, one of the nine cases
that came after Criminal Case No. 1593, Rosalie Magsucang was accused of
stealing only P4,300. Indeed, each of the ten (10) cases carried separate
warrants of arrest, each with its own recommended amount of bail. In fixing the
unreasonably excessive amount of bail at P24,000 in the last cited case, it is
clear that the respondent judge disregarded the guidelines provided by the
Rules of Court. In the same breath that Rosalie was told she could be bailed
out, she was practically denied the means to do so. The excessive amount
required could only mean that her provisional liberty would be beyond her
reach. This is ironic, like categorically telling her that she could not avail of the
right to bail. It appears respondent did not pay heed to the admonition that the
court should not permit any act or omission which undermines public faith and
confidence in the judiciary. [12]

Coming now to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount ofP2,000
does not appear to be commensurate with respondents infraction. Setting
excessive bail evinces disregard of pertinent rules and regulations. Considering
that bail involves a basic right of the accused, this Court finds that a higher
penalty should be imposed. Thus, the fine should be set at P5,000 as more[13]

appropriate in view of the violation proved.

WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge Rolando Balgos, MTC,
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental is found liable for requiring excessive bail and is
hereby FINED the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
 Let this decision be made a part of the personnel record of the respondent
judge.
SO ORDERED.