VOL.
 328, MARCH 27, 2000  749 750
Ong Chia vs. Republic
G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.*
ONG   CHIA,   petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings   and   Practice; Formal
Offer of Evidence; Judgments; The rule on formal offer of evidence
(Rule   132, §34)   is   clearly   not   applicable   to   a   petition   for
naturalization;   Decisions   in   naturalization   proceedings   are   not
covered by the rule on res judicata.—Petitioner failed to note Rule
143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—These rules shall
not   apply   to   land   registration,   cadastral   and   election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not   herein   provided   for, except   by   analogy   or   in   a   suppletory
character   and   whenever   practicable   and   convenient.   (Emphasis
added)   Prescinding   from   the   above,   the   rule   on   formal   offer   of
evidence   (Rule   132,   §34)   now   being   invoked   by   petitioner   is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied
by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is “practicable
and convenient.” That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in
fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action   considering   that   decisions   in   naturalization   proceedings
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final
favorable   judgment   does   not   preclude   the   State   from   later   on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
of the same documents.
________________
*
 SECOND DIVISION.
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
50 
Ong Chia vs. Republic
Same; Same; Same; Same; The   reason   for   the   rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility.—Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of
the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence
before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their  authenticity,  effectively  depriving  him  of  his  fundamental
right to procedural due process.  We are not persuaded.  Indeed,
the   reason   for   the   rule   prohibiting   the   admission   of   evidence
which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He
could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief
he filed with the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Public Documents; Where a party fails to make
a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast
doubt on the authenticity of documents which have been executed
under  oath, the  court  may  rely  on  them.—The  Court  notes  that
these documents—namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner’s marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him
and his wife, and petitioner’s income tax returns—are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They
are thus reliable.  Sinoe  petitioner failed to make  a satisfactory
showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity   of   these   documents,   it   is   our   conclusion   that   the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
 Naturalization; Statutory   Construction; It   is   settled   that
naturalization   laws   should   be   rigidly   enforced   and   strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.—
The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this
case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the
effect of petitioner’s failure to include the address “J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo” in his petition, in accordance with §7, CA. No. 473. This
address   appears   on   petitioner’s   Immigrant   Certificate   of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex
A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he
failed   to   mention   said   address   in   his   petition,   but   argues   that
since   the   Immigrant   Certificate   of   Residence   containing   it   had
been   fully   published,   with   the   petition   and   the   other   annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This
is allegedly because the publication effectively  Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong
751
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000  751
Ong Chia vs. Republic
satisfied   the   objective   sought   to   be   achieved   by   such
requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government
the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent   suppression   of   information   regarding   any   possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived   at   one   time   or   another.   It   is   settled,   however,   that
naturalization   laws   should   be   rigidly   enforced   and   strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the
applicant   for   naturalization   shall   set   forth   in   the   petition   his
present   and   former   places   of   residence.   This   provision   and   the
rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioner’s   argument   of   “substantial   compliance”   with   the
requirement   under   the   Revised   Naturalization   Law.   On   this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Algarra, Mutia & Trinidad Law Offices for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This   is   a   petition   for   review   of   the   decision1 of   the   Court   of
Appeals   reversing   the   decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court,
Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In
1932, as a nine­year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on
board   the   vessel   “Angking.”   Since   then,   he   has   stayed   in   the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started
his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he 
__________________
1
 Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices
Gloria C. Paras and Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez.
2
 Presided by Judge Rodolfo C. Soledad.
752
752  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ong Chia vs. Republic
had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a
verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA. No.
473,   otherwise   known   as   the   Revised   Naturalization   Law,   as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required
in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the
law, stated—
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under
the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special
Committee   on   Naturalization,   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,
Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not
acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization   was   not   reconstituted   after   the   February,   1986
revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications
and  presented   three  witnesses  to  corroborate his  testimony.   So
impressed   was   Prosecutor   Isaac   Alvero   V.   Moran   with   the
testimony   of   petitioner   that,   upon   being   asked   by   the   court
whether the State intended to present any witness against him,
he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself
which is rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well­
versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so,
on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner
really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And
for   this   reason, we   do   not   wish   to   present   any   evidence   to
counteract   or   refute   the   testimony   of   the   witnesses   for   the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly,   on   August   25,   1999,   the   trial   court   granted   the
petition   and   admitted   petitioner   to   Philippine   citizenship.   The
State,   however,   through   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,
appealed   contending   that   petitioner:   (1)   failed   to   state   all   the
names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of CA. No. 473, §7; 
___________________
3
 TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Emphasis added)
753
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000  753 
Ong Chia vs. Republic
(3)   failed   to   conduct   himself   in   a   proper   and   irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of
§2;   (4)   has   no   known   lucrative   trade   or   occupation   and   his
previous  incomes  have  been  insufficient  or misdeclared,   also  in
contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State’s appellant’s brief was a copy of a 1977
petition   for   naturalization   filed   by   petitioner   with   the   Special
Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of “Ong Chia,” he
had likewise been known since childhood as “Loreto Chia Ong.”
As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition   for   naturalization,   it   was   contended   that   his   petition
must fail.6 The state also annexed income tax returns 7 allegedly
filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income
could   hardly   support   himself   and   his   family.   To   prove   that
petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended
that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel
had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then
again in church  in  1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife
without   the   benefit   of   marriage   from   1953   until   they   were
married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his   1953   marriage   contract,   if   there   be   any.   The   State   also
annexed   a   copy   of   petitioner’s   1977   marriage   contract 8 and   a
JointAffidavit9 executed   by   petitioner   and   his   wife.   These
documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel
on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in
accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and
Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband  militates against a decision in his favor . . . This is a mandatory
_________________
4
 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21­22; CA Rollo, pp. 35­36.
5
 Annex B; Id., pp. 129­138.
6
 Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.
7
 Annexes F, F­1, F­2, F­3 and F­4; Id., pp. 144­157.
8
 Annex D; Id., p. 139.
9
 Annex E; Id., p. 140.
754
754  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is
Ong Chia vs. Republic
and   wife   since   1953   without   the   benefit   of   marriage.   This,
according   to   the   State,   belies   his   claim   that   when   he   started
living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The   State   also   argued   that,   as   shown   by   petitioner’s
Immigrant Certificate of Residence,10 petitioner resided at “J.M.
Basa   Street,   Iloilo,”  but   he  did   not  include   said   address   in   his
petition.
On   November   15,   1996,   the   Court   of   Appeals   rendered   its
decision   which,   as   already   noted,   reversed   the   trial   court   and
denied   petitioner’s   application   for   naturalization.   It   ruled   that
due   to  the   importance   of   naturalization   cases,   the   State  is   not
precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court
and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court
held:
As   correctly   observed   by   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor   General,
petitioner   Ong   Chia   failed   to   state   in   this   present   petition   for
naturalization   his   other   name,   “LORETO   CHIA   ONG,”   which
name   appeared   in   his   previous   application   under   Letter   of
Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in
the   petition   for   naturalization   and   failure   to   include   the   same
requirement   to   allow   those   persons   who   know   (petitioner)   by
those other names to come forward and inform the authorities of
any legal objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.
Furthermore,   Ong   Chia   failed   to  disclose  in   his   petition   for
naturalization that he formerly resided in “J.M. Basa St., Iloilo”
and “Alimodian, Iloilo.” Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requires the applicant to state in his petition “his present
and former places of residence.” This requirement is mandatory
and   failure   of   the   petitioner   to   comply   with   it   is   fatal   to   the
to   give   the   public,   as   well   as   the   investigating   agencies   of   the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity
to   be   informed   thereof   and   voice   their   objections   against   the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner
is depriving the public and said
_________________
 Annex A; Records, p. 16.
10
 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted.
11
755
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000  755 
Ong Chia vs. Republic
agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the
law 
. . .
Ong   Chia   had   not   also   conducted   himself   in   a   proper   and
irreproachable manner when he lived­in with his wife for several
years,   and   sired   four   children   out   of   wedlock.   It   has   been   the
consistent   ruling   that   the   “applicant’s   8­year   cohabitation   with
his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three 2. II.THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and THE   PETITIONER   HAS   BEEN   KNOWN   BY   SOME
irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law,” OTHER   NAME   NOT   STATED   IN   HIS   PETITION   IS
and   therefore   disqualifies   him   from   becoming   a   citizen   of   the NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Philippines   by   naturalization 
. . . 756
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia’s alleged annual income in 1961 of 756  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is Ong Chia vs. Republic
not   lucrative   income.   His   failure   to   file   an   income   tax   return
“because   he   is   not   liable   for   income   tax   yet”   confirms   that   his
1. III.CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF
income   is   low   .   .   .   “It   is   not   only   that   the   person   having   the
APPEALS,   THE   PETITIONER   STATED   IN   HIS
employment   gets   enough   for   his   ordinary   necessities   in   life.   It
PETITION   AND   ITS   ANNEXES   HIS   PRESENT   AND
must be shown that the employment gives one an income such
FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses
as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
2. IV.THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
unemployment,   sickness,   or   disability   to   work   and   thus   avoid
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF
one’s becoming the object of charity or public charge.” . . . Now
IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS
that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The
monthly   pension   given   by   the   elder   children   of   the   applicant
cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like Petitioner’s principal contention is that the appellate court erred
bonuses,   commissions   and   allowances,   said   pensions   are in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by
contingent, speculative and precarious . . . the   State   to   its   appellant’s   brief   and,   on   the   basis   of   which,
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors: justified the reversal of the trial court’s­decision. Not having been
presented   and   formally   offered   as   evidence,   they   are   mere
“scrap(s)   of   paper   devoid   of   any   evidentiary   value,” 12 so   it   was
1. I.THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ABUSED   ITS
argued,   because   under   Rule   132,   §34   of   the   Revised   Rules   on
DISCRETION   IN   RULING   THAT   IN
Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
NATURALIZATION   CASES,   THE   APPELLATE
formally offered.
COURT   CAN   DENY   AN   APPLICATION   FOR
The   contention   has   no   merit.   Petitioner   failed   to   note   Rule
PHILIPPINE   CITIZENSHIP   ON   THE   BASIS   OF
14313 of the Rules of Court which provides that—
DOCUMENTS   NOT   PRESENTED   BEFORE   THE
TRIAL   COURT   AND   NOT   FORMING   PART   OF   THE These   rules   shall not apply   to   land   registration,   cadastral   and
RECORDS OF THE CASE. election   cases, naturalization and   insolvency   proceedings,   and
other   cases   not   herein   provided   for, except   by   analogy   or   in   a
suppletory   character   and   whenever   practicable   and
convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence
(Rule   132,   §34)   now   being   invoked   by   petitioner   is   clearly   not
applicable   to   the   present   case   involving   a   petition   for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied
by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is “practicable
and convenient.” That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in
fact, appears to be the more practical  not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
________________
 Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.
12
 Now   found   under   Rule   1,   §4   of   the   1997   Rules   of   Civil
13
Procedure.
757
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000  757
Ong Chia vs. Republic
and   convenient   course   of   action   considering   that   decisions   in
naturalization   proceedings   are   not   covered   by   the   rule   on res
judicata.14 Consequently,   a   final   favorable   judgment   does   not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the
grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present  and   formally   offer   its   documentary   evidence   before   the
trial   court,   he   was   denied   the   right   to   object   against   their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
procedural   due   process.15 We   are   not   persuaded.   Indeed,   the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance  to object  to  their admissibility.16 Petitioner  cannot  claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He
could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief
he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus:
The   authenticity   of   the alleged petition   for   naturalization   (SCN
Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under
LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged  petition  for   naturalization  .   .   .  is 031767 while  the  case
number   of   the   petition   actually   filed   by   the   appellee
is 031776.Thus,   said   document   is   totally   unreliable   and   should
appeal.17
Indeed,   the   objection   is   flimsy   as   the   alleged   discrepancy   is
trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error
on the part of petitioner himself. That “SCN Case No. 031767,” a
copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the 
___________________
14
 Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).
15
 Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.
16
 See Peninsula   Construction,   Inc.   v.   Eisma, 194   SCRA
667 (1991).
17
 Appellee’s Brief, p. 13; CA Rollo; p. 184.
758
758  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ong Chia vs. Republic
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as
“SCN   Case   No.   031767.”  Other   than   this,   petitioner   offered   no
evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented
by the State.
 Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents—namely,
the   petition   in   SCN   Case   No.   031767,   petitioner’s   marriage
contract,   the   joint   affidavit   executed   by   him   and   his   wife,   and
petitioner’s   income   tax   returns—are   all   public   documents.   As
such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw
or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not
err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough
to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall
briefly   discuss   the   effect   of   petitioner’s   failure   to   include   the
address “J.M. Basa St., Iloilo” in his petition, in accordance with
§7, CA. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner’s Immigrant
Certificate   of   Residence,   a   document   which   forms   part   of   the
records   as   Annex   A   of   his   1989   petition   for   naturalization.
Petitioner  admits  that he failed  to  mention  said  address  in  his
petition,   but   argues   that   since   the   Immigrant   Certificate   of
Residence   containing   it   had   been   fully   published, 19 with   the
petition   and   the   other   annexes,   such   publication   constitutes
substantial   compliance   with   §7.20 This   is   allegedly   because   the
publication   effectively   satisfied   the   objective   sought   to   be
achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies
of the government the opportunity to check on the background of
the applicant and prevent  Notes.—A   former   citizen   who   opts   to   reacquire   Philippine
_______________
 Annex   C;   CA   Rollo,   p.   133.   Said   evaluation   sheet
18
recommended that the petition be dismissed as petitioner failed to
meet   the   requirements   under   LOI   491   because   his   income   is
insufficient for his support and that of his family and also because
he failed to show that he believes in the principles underlying the
Constitution.
 In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.
19
 Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.
20
759
VOL. 328, MARCH 27, 2000  759 
Ong Chia vs. Republic
suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on
his part in any community where he may have lived at one time
or   another.21 It   is   settled,   however,   that   naturalization   laws
should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and  against  the  applicant. 22 As  noted  by  the  State,
CA.   No.   473,   §7   clearly   provides   that   the   applicant   for
naturalization   shall   set   forth   in   the   petition   his   present   and
former places of residence.23 This provision and the rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s
argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under
the   Revised   Naturalization   Law.   On   this   ground   alone,   the
instant petition ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE,   the   decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo,   (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization
Law is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by said law,
and   it   is   not   for   him   to   decide   and   to   select   the   requirements
which   he   believes   are   applicable   to   his   case   and   discard   those
which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.
(Republic vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994])
 An   applicant   for   naturalization   may   only   take   his   oath   of
allegiance after the Solicitor General finds that within the period
of two years from the date the decision granting citi­
____________________

21
 Watt v. Republic, supra.
22
 Chan   Chen   v.   Republic, 109   Phil.   940 (1960), citing Co
Quing v. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958) and Co. v. Republic, 108
Phil. 265 (1960). VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996  699 
23
 Comment, p. 23; Rollo, p. 110. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
760 G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.*
760  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
CECILIA   ZULUETA,   petitioner, vs. COURT   OF   APPEALS   and
People vs. Mamalias ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
zenship   is   promulgated,   the   applicant   has   complied   with   the Evidence; Illegally   Obtained   Evidence; Constitutional
conditions set out in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 530. (Hermo vs.
Law;Privacy   of   Communication   and   Correspondence; Privacy   of
Dela Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998])
communication   and   correspondence   is   inviolable.   The   only
exception in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a]
——o0o——
court   or   when   public   safety   or   order   requires,   otherwise,   as
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights prescribed   by   law.”—Indeed   the   documents   and   papers   in
reserved. question   are   inadmissible   in   evidence.   The   constitutional
injunction   declaring   “the   privacy   of   communication   and
correspondence   [to   be]   inviolable”   is   no   less   applicable   simply
because   it   is   the   wife   (who   thinks   herself   aggrieved   by   her
husband’s   infidelity)   who   is   the   party   against   whom   the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in 
_______________

*
 SECOND DIVISION.
700
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
00       Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by   law.”   Any   violation   of   this   provision   renders   the   evidence
obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person by contracting marriage
does   not   shed   his/her   integrity   or   his   right   to   privacy   as   an
individual  and  the  constitutional  protection  is  ever  available  to
him or to her.—The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the   other   and   in   ransacking   them   for   any   telltale   evidence   of
marital   infidelity.   A   person,   by   contracting   marriage,   does   not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law insures absolute freedom
of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.—
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse   while   the   marriage   subsists.   Neither   may   be   examined
without   the   consent   of   the   other   as   to   any   communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save   for   specified   exceptions.   But   one   thing   is   freedom   of
communication;   quite   another   is   a   compulsion   for   each   one   to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming   the   decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return docu­
701
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996  701 
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
ments and papers taken by her from private respondent’s clinic
without the latter’s knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner   Cecilia   Zulueta   is   the   wife   of   private   respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother,   a   driver   and   private   respondent’s   secretary,   forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin   and   his   alleged   paramours,   greeting   cards,   cancelled
checks,   diaries,   Dr.   Martin’s   passport,   and   photographs.   The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr.   Martin   brought   this   action   below   for   recovery   of   the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The
case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, declaring him “the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties   described   in   paragraph   3   of   plaintiff’s   Complaint   or
those further  described in the  Motion to Return  and  Suppress”
and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to  immediately   return   the properties   to Dr.   Martin  and  to  pay
him   P5,000.00,   as   nominal   damages;   P5,000.00,   as   moral
damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The
writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives
were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence”
the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence
this petition.
There   is   no   question   that   the   documents   and   papers   in
question  belong   to  private respondent,   Dr.   Alfredo  Martin,   and
that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without
his   knowledge   and   consent.   For   that   reason,   the   trial   court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of  however   having   appealed   the   said   order   to   this   Court   on   a
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  702
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent   and   enjoined   her   from   using   them   in   evidence.   In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court’s decision, petitioner’s only ground is that in Alfredo
Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1this Court ruled that the documents
and   papers   (marked   as   Annexes   A­1   to   J­7   of   respondent’s
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore,
their   use   by   petitioner’s   attorney,   Alfonso   Felix,   Jr.,   did   not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is
contended   that   the   Court   of   Appeals   erred   in   affirming   the
decision   of   the   trial   court   instead   of   dismissing   private
respondent’s complaint.
Petitioner’s  contention  has   no  merit.   The  case   against  Atty.
Felix,   Jr.   was   for   disbarment.   Among   other   things,   private
respondent,   Dr.   Alfredo   Martin,   as   complainant   in   that   case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr.
committed   malpractice   or   gross   misconduct   because   of   the
injunctive   order   of   the  trial   court.   In   dismissing   the   complaint
against   Atty.   Felix,   Jr.,   this   Court   took   note   of   the   following
defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be “impressed with
merit:”2
On   the   alleged   malpractice   or   gross   misconduct   of   respondent
[Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
. . . .
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia’s case for legal separation
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an
order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex “A­1 to J­7.” On September 6, 1983,
petition  for   certiorari,   this   Court   issued   a   restraining   order   on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the
trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court’s order,
respondent’s request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and
authenticity   of   the   subject   annexes   cannot   be   looked   upon   as
malpractice. Notably, petitioner 
_______________
1
 163 SCRA 111 (1988).
2
 Id. at 120­121, 126.
703
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996  703 
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
Dr.   Martin   finally   admitted   the   truth   and   authenticity   of   the
questioned   annexes.   At   that   point  in  time,   would   it  have  been
malpractice   for   respondent   to   use   petitioner’s   admission   as
evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the
Regional   Trial   Court   of   Makati?   Respondent   submits   it   is   not
malpractice.
Significantly,   petitioner’s   admission   was   done   not   thru   his
counsel   but   by   Dr.   Martin   himself   under   oath.   Such   verified
admission  constitutes   an  affidavit,   and,   therefore,   receivable  in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission.
For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband’s admission and use
the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case
amounts   to   no   more   than   a   declaration   that   his   use   of   the
documents  and papers  for  the purpose of  securing  Dr. Martin’s
admission   as   to   their   genuineness   and   authenticity   did   not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By
no   means   does   the   decision   in   that   case   establish   the
admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It   cannot   be   overemphasized   that   if   Atty.   Felix,   Jr.   was
acquitted   of   the   charge   of   violating   the   writ   of   preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the
time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order
of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The
TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for
certiorari   filed   by   petitioner  against  the  trial   court’s   order  was
dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use
of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy
of   communication   and   correspondence   [to   be]   inviolable” 3 is   no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved  by her husband’s infidelity) who  is  the party against
whom   the   constitutional   provision   is   to   be   enforced.   The   only
exception  to  the  prohibition  in  the  Constitution  is  if there   is a
“lawful   order   [from   a]   court   or   when   public   safety   or   order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” 4 Any violation of this
provision   renders   the   evidence   obtained   inadmissible   “for   any
purpose in any proceeding.”5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and
in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or   his   right   to   privacy   as   an   individual   and   the   constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the  spouses  by   making  it  privileged.  Neither   husband   nor  wife
may  testify  for or  against the other without the consent of the
affected   spouse   while   the   marriage   subsists. 6 Neither   may   be
examined   without   the   consent   of   the   other   as   to   any
communication   received   in   confidence   by   one   from   the   other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
     Regalado (Chairman), Romero and Puno, JJ.,concur.
Petition denied.
504  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Yatar
G.R. No. 150224.  May 19, 2004.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs. JOEL   YATAR
alias “KAWIT,” appellant.
Criminal   Law; Witnesses; The   Supreme   Court   will   not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility   of  witnesses  unless  there  appears  in  the  record  some
fact   or   circumstance   of   weight   and   influence   which   has   been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.—
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of   witnesses   unless   there   appears   in   the   record   some   fact   or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked
or   the   significance   of   which   has   been   misinterpreted.   Well­
entrenched   is   the   rule   that   the   findings   of   the   trial   court   on
credibility   of   witnesses   are   entitled   to   great   weight   on   appeal
unless   cogent   reasons   are   presented   necessitating   a
reexamination   if   not   the   disturbance   of   the   same;   the   reason
being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing
first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct
and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood,   or   misapplied   some   facts   or   circumstances   of
weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s
assessment   of   credibility   deserves   the   appellate   court’s   highest
respect. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Circumstantial   Evidence; An   accused   can   be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, so long as sufficient
circumstantial  evidence is presented to  prove beyond  doubt that
the accused committed the crime.—The weight of the prosecution’s
evidence   must   be   appreciated   in   light   of   the   well­settled   rule
which   provides   that   an   accused   can   be   convicted   even   if   no
eyewitness   is   available,   as   long   as   sufficient   circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt
that the accused committed the crime.
Same; DNA Testing; Words and Phrases; DNA is a molecule
that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms, and a
person’s   DNA   is   the   same   in   each   cell   and   it   does   not   change
throughout a person’s lifetime—the DNA in a person’s blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
rectal cells.—Significantly, subsequent testing 
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
505
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  505 
People vs. Yatar
showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical semen to be
that of appellant’s gene type. DNA is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s
lifetime;   the DNA  in  a   person’s  blood  is the  same  as  the  DNA
found   in   his   saliva,   sweat,   bone,   the   root   and   shaft   of   hair,
earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most   importantly,   because   of   polymorphisms   in   human   genetic
structure,   no   two   individuals   have   the   same   DNA,   with   the
notable exception of identical twins.
Same; Same; DNA   print   or   identification   technology   has
been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence   has   been   left.—DNA   print   or   identification   technology
has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to   a   crime,   or   to   exonerate   a   wrongly   accused   suspect,   where
biological   evidence   has   been   left.   For   purposes   of   criminal
investigation,   DNA   identification   is   a   fertile   source   of   both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in
effecting   a   more   accurate   account   of   the   crime   committed,
efficiently   facilitating   the   conviction   of   the   guilty,   securing   the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration
of   justice   in   every   case.   DNA   evidence   collected   from   a   crime
scene   can   link   a   suspect   to   a   crime   or   eliminate   one   from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents
involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as
hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets,   bedding,   or   furniture   could   also   be   transferred   to   the
victim’s   body   during   the   assault.   Forensic   DNA   evidence   is
helpful   in   proving   that   there   was   physical   contact   between   an
assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime
scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
Same; Same; In   assessing   the   probative   value   of   DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors—
how   the   samples   were   collected,   how   they   were   handled,   the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in   analyzing   the   samples,   whether   the   proper   standards   and
procedures   were   followed   in   conducting   the   tests,   and   the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests; Admittedly,
we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be
cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters though
we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions.—The U.P. National Science
Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this
case,   used   the   Polymerase   chain   reaction   (PCR)   amplification
method   by   Short   Tandem   Repeat   (STR)   analysis.   With   PCR
testing,  doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
506
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
06 
People vs. Yatar
tiny   amounts   of   a   specific   DNA   sequence   can   be   copied
exponentially   within   hours.   Thus,   getting   sufficient   DNA   for
analysis   has   become   much   easier   since   it   became   possible   to
reliably   amplify   small   samples   using   the   PCR   method.   In
assessing   the   probative   value   of   DNA   evidence,   courts   should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether   the  proper   standards  and   procedures   were  followed  in
conducting   the   tests,   and   the   qualification   of   the   analyst   who
conducted   the   tests.   In   the   case   at   bar,   Dr.   Maria   Corazon
Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based
on  Dr.  de  Ungria’s  testimony,  it  was  determined  that  the  gene
type   and   DNA   profile   of   appellant   are   identical   to   that   of   the
extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the
appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA
15/19,   TH01   7/8,   DHFRP2   9/10   and   CSF1PO   10/11,   which   are
identical   with   semen   taken   from   the   victim’s   vaginal   canal.
Verily,   a   DNA   match   exists   between   the   semen   found   in   the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning
to   integrate   these   advances   in   science   and   technology   in   the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can
benefit   from   the   wealth   of   persuasive   jurisprudence   that   has
developed   in   other   jurisdictions.   Specifically,   the   prevailing
 Same; Same; Evidence; Evidence  is  relevant  when  it  relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non­
existence.—In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as
long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow
at   trial,   including   the   introduction   of   new   kinds   of   scientific
techniques.   DNA   typing   is   one   such   novel   procedure.   Under
Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non­existence.
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained   through   PCR   testing   and   utilizing   STR   analysis,   and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since   it   is   reasonably   based   on   scientifically   valid   principles   of
human genetics and molecular biology.
Same; Same; Same; Self­Incrimination; The   right   against
self­incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from  the   lips   of  the   accused   an   admission   of  guilt—it   does   not
apply   where   the   evidence   sought   to   be   excluded   is   not   an
incrimination   but   as   part   of  object   evidence.—In   an   attempt   to
exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted
in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right 
507
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  507
People vs. Yatar
against self­incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of
the Constitution. This contention is untenable. The kernel of the
right   is   not   against   all   compulsion,   but   against   testimonial
compulsion. The right against self­incrimination is simply against
the   legal   process   of   extracting   from   the   lips   of   the   accused   an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to
be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Ex   Post   Facto   Laws; No   ex­post   facto
law is involved in DNA testing since the science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court—whereas an ex­post facto law
refers   primarily   to  a   question  of  law,   DNA  profiling   requires  a
factual   determination   of   the   probative   weight   of   the   evidence
presented.—Appellant   further   argues   that   the   DNA   tests
conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on
the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of
an ex­post   factolaw.   This   argument   is   specious.   No ex­post
facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves   the   admissibility,   relevance   and   reliability   of   the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex­post
facto law   refers   primarily   to   a   question   of   law,   DNA   profiling
requires  a  factual   determination  of  the  probative  weight  of  the
evidence presented.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The legal relevancy
of evidence denotes “something more than a minimum of probative
value,” suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
“plus   value”—evidence   without   “plus   value”   may   be   logically
relevant   but   not   legally   sufficient   to   convict.—Generally,   courts
should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of
evidence denotes “something more than a minimum of probative
value,” suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
“plus value.”  This may  be  necessary  to preclude the trial  court
from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without
“plus value” may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to
convict.   It   is   incumbent   upon   the   trial   court   to   balance   the
probative   value   of   such   evidence   against   the   likely   harm   that
would result from its admission. The judgment in a criminal case
can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which
the   court   can   properly   find   or   infer   that   the   accused   is   guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires
moral   certainty   of  guilt  in  order  to  sustain a   conviction.   Moral
certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding   and   satisfies   the   reason   and   judgment   of   those
who   are   bound   to   act   conscientiously   upon   it.   It   is   certainty
beyond reasonable  doubt. This requires  that the  circumstances,
taken  together,   should be of  a  conclusive  nature  and  tendency;
leading,   on   the   whole,   to   a   satisfactory   conclusion   that   the
accused, and no  reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of
508
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  However,   in   rape   committed   by   close   kin,   such   as   the   victim’s
08  father,   step­father,   uncle,   or   the   common­law   spouse   of   her
People vs. Yatar
one   else,   committed   the   offense   charged.   In   view   of   the
totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present
case passes the test of moral certainty.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption   of   Innocence; Motive; As   a
matter   of   procedure,   and   for   the   purpose   of   meeting   the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential
for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
—As a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential
for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim
was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that
motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of
witnesses   on   the   acts   or   statements   of   the   accused   before   or
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that   may   express   it   or   from   which   his   motive   or   reason   for
committing it may be inferred.
Same; Rape with Homicide; Elements.—Accordingly, we are
convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the   special   complex   crime   of   rape   with   homicide.   Appellant
sexually   assaulted   Kathylyn   Uba,   and   by   reason   or   on   the
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently
sealed   the   victim’s   lips   by   stabbing   her   repeatedly,   thereby
causing   her   untimely   demise.   The   following   are   the   elements
constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge   of   a   woman;   (2)   carnal   knowledge   of   a   woman   was
achieved   by   means   of   force,   threat   or   intimidation;   and   (3)   by
force,   threat   or   intimidation,   appellant   killed   the   woman.
mother,  it  is not necessary  that actual  force or intimidation be
employed.   Moral   influence   or   ascendancy   takes   the   place   of
violence   and   intimidation.   The   fact   that   the   victim’s   hymen   is
intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere
entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction
of rape. The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable;
it   may   be   so   elastic   as   to   stretch   without   laceration   during
intercourse.   Absence   of   hymenal   lacerations   does   not   disprove
sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court 
of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Br. 25.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      The Solicitor General for appellee.  floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan
509
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  509
People vs. Yatar
     Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulanao, Tabuk,  Kalinga,  Branch 25, sentencing  appellant Joel
Yatar   alias   “Kawit”   to Death for   the   special   complex   crime   of
Rape  with  Homicide,   and   ordering   him  to  pay   the  heirs   of  the
victim,   Kathylyn   D.   Uba,   civil   indemnity   in   the   amount   of
P75,000.00,   moral   damages   in   the   amount   of   P200,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages
in   the   amount   of   P186,410.00,   or   total   damages   amounting   to
P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant  was   charged   with   Rape   with   Homicide   under   the
following Information:
“That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West,
Rizal,   Kalinga,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable
Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously,   and   with   use   of   a   bladed   weapon   stab   the   latter
inflicting   upon   her   fatal   injuries   resulting   in   the   death   of   the
victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully,
unlawfully   and  feloniously,  and  by  means  of  force  and  violence
had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas­a and her first
cousin,   seventeen   year   old   Kathylyn   Uba,   were   on   the   ground
West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by
their   aunt,   Luz   Yatar,   to   her   husband,   appellant   Joel   Yatar,
through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the
letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At   9:00   a.m.   of   the   same   day,   Judilyn   and   her   husband,
together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan
some two 
_______________
1
 Decision   penned   by   Judge   Milnar   T.   Lammawin   on   27
August 2001.
2
 Original Records, p. 1.
3
 TSN,   Direct  Examination   of  Isabel   Dawang,   30  September
1998, pp. 296­306.
510
510  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Yatar
kilometers   away.   Before   Judilyn   and   her   husband   departed,
Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but
in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay
home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita
Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. 4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly
Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the
back of the house. They went inside the house through the back
door   of   the   kitchen   to   have   a   drink   of   water.   Anita   asked
appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was
getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At   12:30   p.m.,   while   Judilyn   was   on   her   way   home   from
Nagbitayan,   she   saw   appellant   descend   the   ladder   from   the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the
back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing
a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at
the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant
and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her
near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without
collar  and blue pants.  Appellant told  her that he would  not  be
getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it.
She   noticed   that   appellant’s   eyes   were   “reddish   and   sharp.”
Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something
important   to   tell   him.   Judilyn’s   husband   then   arrived   and
appellant   immediately   left   and   went   towards   the   back   of   the
house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home
and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for
her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor
was   open.   She   noticed   that   the   water   container   she   asked
Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up
the ladder  was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at
_______________
4
 Id., at pp. 317­319.
5
 TSN,   Direct   Examination   of   Beverly   Deneng,   27   January
1999, pp. 531­540, 568­576. See also Exhibit “W,” Joint Affidavit
of   Anita   Wania   and   Beverly   Deneng   executed   on   3   July   1998,
Original Records, p. 17.
6
 TSN,   Cross­Examination   of   Judilyn   Pas­a,   30   September
1998, p. 377.  On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could
7
 Id.,   at   pp.   275­324. See   also TSN, supra note   7   at   pp.   356­
358.
8
 Id., at pp. 314­323, 339­344.
511
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  511
People vs. Yatar
to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs.
She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to
get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found
out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was
given   a   flashlight   by   Judilyn.   She   focused   the   beam   and   saw
Kathylyn   sprawled   on   the   floor   naked,   with   her   intestines
protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived
to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police. 10
At 9:00 that evening, SPO4 Melchor Faniswa received a report
that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together
with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found
the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds. The
people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant
approximately 12:30 p.m.
The   police   discovered   the   victim’s   panties,   brassiere,   denim
pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of
the   crime,   and   they   found   a   dirty   white   shirt   splattered   with
blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police  authorities,  appellant  denied
any   knowledge   of   Kathylyn’s   death,11 however,   he   was   placed
under police custody.
relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to
the   toilet   around   seven   to   ten   meters   away   from   the   police
station.   They   suddenly   heard   someone   shout   in   the   Ilocano
dialect, “Nagtaray!” (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando
Manuel   exited   through   the   gate   of   the   Police   Station   and   saw
appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters THE   TRIAL   COURT   SERIOUSLY   ERRED   IN   NOT
away from the sta­ ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED­APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS
_______________ CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
9
 Id., at pp. 267­270. The   issue   regarding   the   credibility   of   the   prosecution
10
 Id., at pp. 271­273. witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will
11
 TSN,   Direct   Examination   of   SPO4   Melchor   Faniswa,   9 not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining
the   credibility   of   witnesses   unless   there   appears   in   the   record
September   1998,   pp.   9­20. See   also TSN,   Cross­Examination   of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
SPO4 Melchor Faniswa, 9 September 1998, pp. 21­38.
overlooked   or   the   significance   of   which   has   been
512
misinterpreted.13 Well­entrenched is the rule that the findings of
512  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
the   trial   court   on   credibility   of   witnesses   are   entitled   to   great
People vs. Yatar weight   on   appeal   unless   cogent   reasons   are   presented
tion   when   Police   Officer   Abagan   recaptured   him. 12 He   was necessitating a re­examination if not the disturbance of the same;
charged   with   Rape   with   Homicide.   When   he   was   arraigned   on the   reason   being   that   the   former   is   in   a   better   and   unique
July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded “not guilty.” position of hearing first hand the witnesses 
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with _______________
Homicide,   defined   and   penalized   under   Article   266­A   of   the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known
12
 TSN,   Cross­Examination   and   Re­Direct   Examination   of
as  the  Anti­Rape  Law   of  1997,   and  was  accordingly,   sentenced Police Officer Orlando Manuel, 9 September 1998, pp. 76­84. See
to Death. also TSN, Direct and Cross­Examination of SPO1 Felix Turingan,
Hence,   this   automatic   review   pursuant   to   Article   47   of   the 9 September 1998, pp. 88­96.
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns 13
 People   v.   Remudo, G.R.   No.   127905,   30   August   2001, 364
the following errors: SCRA 71.
I 513
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  513 
THE   TRIAL   COURT   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   GIVING   MUCH
People vs. Yatar
WEIGHT   TO   THE   EVIDENCE   PRESENTED   BY   THE
and   observing   their   deportment,   conduct   and   attitude.14Absent
PROSECUTION   NOTWITHSTANDING   THEIR
any  showing   that  the  trial   judge  overlooked,   misunderstood,  or
DOUBTFULNESS.
misapplied   some   facts   or   circumstances   of   weight   which   would
II affect   the   result   of   the   case,   the   trial   judge’s   assessment   of
credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. 15 Where
there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated
in light of the well­settled rule which provides that an accused
can   be   convicted   even   if   no  eyewitness   is  available,   as  long   as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. 17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11)
wounds,   six   (6)   stab   and   five   (5)   incised,   were   found   on   the
victim’s   abdomen   and   back,   causing   a   portion   of   her   small
intestines  to  spill  out of  her  body.18 Rigor  mortis of the  victim’s
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00
a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be
approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to
the   completion   of rigor   mortis.19 In   other   words,   the   estimated
time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on
June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the
lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang
was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report
by   the   attending   physician,   Dr.   Pej   Evan   C.   Bartolo,   indicates
that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted
on the  does   not   change   throughout   a   person’s   lifetime;   the   DNA   in   a
_______________
14
 People v. Santos, G.R. No. 137993, 11 April 2002, 380 SCRA
608, 613.  polymorphisms   in   human   genetic   structure,   no   two   individuals
15
 Id.
16
 People  v.   Payot, G.R.   No.   119352,   8  June  1999, 308   SCRA
43, 62­63.  DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a
17
 People   v.   Cabug, G.R.   No.   123149,   27   March   2001, 355
SCRA 391.
18
 See TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, 16
September 1998, pp. 106­157.
19
 TSN,   Direct   Examination   of   Dr.   Rey   Evan   C.   Bartolo,   16
September 1998, pp. 116­118.
514
514  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Yatar
victim,20 Dr.   Bartolo   discovered   the   presence   of   semen   in   the
vaginal   canal   of   the   victim.   During   his   testimony,   Dr.   Bartolo
stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could
only   be   done   through   sexual   intercourse   with   the   victim. 21 In
addition,   it   is   apparent   from   the   pictures   submitted   by   the
prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested
by   a   bruise   and   some   swelling   in   her   right   forearm   indicating
resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue.22
Significantly,   subsequent   testing   showed   that   the
Deoxyribonucleic   acid   (DNA)   of   the   sperm   specimen   from   the
vagina of the victim was identical semen to be that of appellant’s
gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all
living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it
person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone,   the   root   and   shaft   of   hair,   earwax,   mucus,   urine,   skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most importantly, because of
have   the   same   DNA,   with   the   notable   exception   of   identical
twins.25
uniquely   effective   means   to   link   a   suspect   to   a   crime,   or   to
exonerate  a  wrongly   accused  suspect,   where  biological  evidence
has   been   left.   For   purposes   of   criminal   investigation,   DNA
identification   is   a   fertile   source   of   both   inculpatory   and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more
accurate  account  of  the  crime  committed,   efficiently   facilitating
the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect
to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle
as  became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR
_______________
20
 See TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, 16
September 1998, pp. 266­304.
21
 Id., at pp. 266­304.
22
 See Exhibits “F­1,” “G,” “H,” Original Records, pp. 6A­6C.
23
 Peter   Sudbery, Human   Molecular   Genetics (2nd   ed.   2002);
1999­2000 Pocket Part, p. 51.
24
 K.M. Turman, “Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide for
Victim   Service   Providers,”   OVC   Bulletin   (U.S.   Department   of
Justice, April 2001), p. 1. 
25
 84 ALR 4th 313.
515
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  515
People vs. Yatar
fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood,
or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime
scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could   also   be   transferred   to   the   victim’s   body   during   the
assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there
was   physical   contact   between   an   assailant   and   a   victim.   If
properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA
can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the
scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which
conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain
reaction   (PCR)   amplification   method   by   Short   Tandem   Repeat
(STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient   DNA   for   analysis   has   become   much   easier   since   it
method.
In   assessing   the   probative   value   of   DNA   evidence,   courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples
were   collected,   how   they   were   handled,   the   possibility   of
contamination   of   the   samples,   the   procedure   followed   in
analyzing   the   samples,   whether   the   proper   standards   and
procedures   were   followed   in   conducting   the   tests,   and   the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. 29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was
duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA
print   or   identification   techniques.30 Based   on   Dr.   de   Ungria’s
testi­
_______________
26
 Id.
27
 Id.
28
 Id., at pp. 1­2.
29
 People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA
192, 209. 
30
 Dr.   de   Ungria   is   Head   of   the   Genetic   Engineering
Laboratory, University of the Philippines, Assistant Supervisor of
the DNA Analysis Laboratory, University of the Philippines, and
Assistant   Professor   at   the   Ateneo   de   Manila   University.   In
December   1999,   Dr.   de   Ungria   was   a   1999   Jose   Rizal   Young
Awardee for the Professional Sector for her participation in the
identification   of   the   body   of   a   victim   of   the   Paco   fire.   She
commenced   working   as   Assistant   Supervisor   of   the   U.P.   DNA
Laboratory
516
516  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Yatar
mony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant   are   identical   to   that   of   the   extracts   subject   of
examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen
taken   from   the   victim’s   vaginal   canal. 32 Verily,   a   DNA   match
exists   between   the   semen   found   in   the   victim   and   the   blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances
in   science   and   technology   in   the   Philippine   criminal   justice
system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of
persuasive   jurisprudence   that   has   developed   in   other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has
proven instructive.
In Daubert   v.   Merrell   Dow,33 it   was   ruled   that   pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as
long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow
at   trial,   including   the   introduction   of   new   kinds   of   scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under   Philippine   law,   evidence   is   relevant   when   it   relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non­existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the
DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis,   and   which   was   appreciated   by   the   court a   quo is
relevant and reli­
_______________
in   February   1999   after   returning   from   Sydney,   Australia.
Prior   to   February   1999,   she   worked   as   a   DNA   Analyst.   An
alumna   of   the   Philippine   Science   High   School,   Dr.   de   Ungria
obtained   a   Bachelor   of   Science   (Honours)   degree   in   Biology   at
Macquarie   University,   and   a   Doctor   of   Philosophy   degree   in
Molecular Microbiology at the University of New South Wales, in
Australia.   She   is   a   member   of   the   Philippine   Society   of
Microbiology and an associate member of the National Research
Council   of   the   Philippines. See TSN,   Direct   Examination   of   Dr.
Ma. Corazon Abogado de Ungria, 18 February 2000, pp. 739­743.
31
 TSN, 18 February 2000, pp. 789­790. See Exhibits “XX” and
“YY­1,”   Original   Records,   p.   144,   149­150. See   also TSN,
Continuation  of  Direct  Examination  of  Dr.   de  Ungria,   18   April
2000, p. 842.
32
 TSN, 18 April 2000, p. 842. See also Exhibits “Z,” “ZZ” and
“ZZ­1,” Original Records, pp. 152­154.
33
 509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469.
34
 Rules of Court, Rule 128, sec. 4.
517
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  517 
People vs. Yatar
able since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
 Independently   of  the  physical   evidence   of  appellant’s   semen
found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the
following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction  beyond   reasonable   doubt:   (1)   Appellant   and   his   wife
were   living   in   the   house   of   Isabel   Dawang   together   with   the
victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the
house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received
from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in
the  early morning of  June 30, 1998;  (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30,
1998   near   the   kitchen   of   the   house   of   Isabel   Dawang,   acting
strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn
Pas­a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m.,
this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when
the   husband   of   Judilyn   Pas­a   was   approaching;   (7)   Salmalina
Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the
ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found
dead;   (8)   The   door   leading   to   the   second   floor   of   the   house   of
Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from
her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with
her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery;   (10)   Laboratory   examination   revealed   sperm   in   the
victim’s vagina (Exhibits “H” and “J”); (11) The stained or dirty
white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with
blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibits “J” and “H,” compared with the
DNA   profile   of   the   appellant   are   identical;   and   (13)   Appellant
escaped   two   days   after   he   was   detained   but   was   subsequently
apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial   evidence,   to   be   sufficient   to   warrant   a
conviction,   must  form  an  unbroken  chain  which  leads  to  a  fair
and reasonable conclusion that  the  accused,  to the exclusion of
others,   is   the   perpetrator   of   the   crime.   To   determine   whether
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of
all the circum­
_______________
 Decision, pp. 46­48. See Rollo, pp. 300­302.
35
518
518  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Yatar
stances   is   such   as   to   produce   a   conviction   beyond   reasonable
doubt.36
In   an   attempt   to   exclude   the   DNA   evidence,   the   appellant
contends  that  the  blood  sample taken  from   him  as  well  as  the
DNA   tests   were   conducted   in   violation   of   his   right   to   remain
silent as well as his right against self­incrimination under Secs.
12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This  contention  is  untenable.   The  kernel  of   the right  is  not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. 37 The
right against self­incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We   ruled   in People   v. Rondero 38 that   although   accused­
appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and   submitted   to   the   National   Bureau   of   Investigation   for
forensic   examination,   the   hair   samples   may   be   admitted   in
evidence   against   him,   for   what   is   proscribed   is   the   use   of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.
 Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing,   paraffin,   blood   and   DNA,   as   there   is   no
testimonial   compulsion   involved.   Under People
v. Gallarde,39 where   immediately   after   the   incident,   the   police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of
counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against
self­incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a
physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense
of which he is accused.
It  must  also  be noted  that  appellant in  this case  submitted
himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on
March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the
prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that
resort   thereto   is   tantamount   to   the   application   of   an ex­post
facto law. 
_______________
36
 Rules of Court, Rule 133, sec. 4.
37
 Alih   v.   Castro, G.R.   No.   69401,   23   June   1987, 151   SCRA
279.
 G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383.
38
 G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835.
39
519
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  519
People vs. Yatar
This argument is specious. No ex­post facto law is involved in the
case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility,
relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules
of   Court.   Whereas   an ex­post   facto law   refers   primarily   to   a
question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of
the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s   twin   defense   of   denial   and   alibi   cannot   be
sustained.   The   forensic   DNA   evidence   and   bloodied   shirt,
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel
Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed,
undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did
not   demonstrate   with   clear   and   convincing   evidence   an
impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in
this   case   where   the   two   places   are   located   in   the   same
barangay.40 He   lives   within   a   one   hundred   (100)   meter   radius
from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk
to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his
alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the  court a   quo committed   reversible  error  in  convicting   him  of
the   crime   charged.   He   alleges   that   he   should   be   acquitted   on
reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally,   courts   should   only   consider   and   rely   upon   duly
established   evidence   and   never   on   mere   conjectures   or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes “something
more than a minimum of probative value,” suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a “plus value.” 41 This may be
necessary   to   preclude   the   trial   court   from   being   satisfied   by
matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice
and   hasty   conclusions.   Evidence   without   “plus   value”   may   be
logically   relevant   but   not   legally   sufficient   to   convict.   It   is
incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of
such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its
admission.
The   judgment   in   a   criminal   case   can   be   upheld   only   when
there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find
or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond 
_______________ house on June 25, 1998. 48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that
when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated
40
 See People   v.   Manguera, G.R.   No.   139906,   5   March from   her   husband,   “this   Joel   Yatar   threatened   to   kill   our
2003, 398 SCRA 618. family.”49 Accord­
41
 I Wigmore on Evidence §28, at pp. 409­410. _______________
520
520  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
42
 R.J. Francisco, Evidence (3rd Ed., 1996), p. 577, citing Shaw,
People vs. Yatar C.J., Commonwealth   v.   Webster,   Benis’   Rep.   Of   the   Trial,
reasonable   doubt   requires   moral   certainty   of   guilt   in   order   to 469; Com. V. Costley, 118 Mass. 1.
sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty 43
 Words   and   Phrases,   “Moral   Certainty,”
that   convinces   and   directs   the   understanding   and   satisfies   the citing Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 55, 57.
reason   and   judgment   of   those   who   are   bound   to   act 44
 People   v.   Verzo, G.R.   No.   L­22517,   26   December   1967, 21
conscientiously   upon   it.   It   is   certainty   beyond   reasonable SCRA 1403. 
doubt.42 This   requires   that   the   circumstances,   taken   together, 45
 TSN,   Cross­Examination   of   Judilyn   Pas­a,   30   September
should   be  of  a   conclusive nature  and  tendency;  leading,   on  the 1998, pp. 376­380.
whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one 46
 Id., at p. 324.
else,   committed  the  offense  charged. 43 In  view   of  the  totality   of
evidence   appreciated   thus   far,   we   rule   that   the   present   case
47
 Id.,   at   p.   332. See Exhibits   “Q,”   “Q­1”   and   “Q­2,”   Original
passes the test of moral certainty. Records, pp. 13­14.
However,   as   a   matter   of   procedure,   and   for   the   purpose   of
48
 Id., at p. 334.
meeting   the   requirement   of   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt, 49
 Id., at p. 333.
motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the 521
identity of the culprit.44 VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  521 
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas­a, first cousin of People vs. Yatar
the   victim,   testified   that   she   last   saw   the   victim   alive   in   the ing to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument
morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by
witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, “If you leave me, I
and proceeding to the back of the same house. 46 She also testified will   kill   all   your   family   and   your   relatives   x   x   x.” 50 These
that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter statements were not contradicted by appellant.
revealed to her that “Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim
came   from   the   school.”47 The   victim   told   Judilyn   about   the was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that
incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of
her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s
witnesses   on   the   acts   or   statements   of   the   accused   before   or 54
 People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 137480, 28 February 2001, 353
immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words SCRA 161, 172.
that   may   express   it   or   from   which   his   motive   or   reason   for 55
 People v. Añonuevo, G.R. No. 137843, 12 October 2001, 367
committing it may be inferred.51 SCRA 249.
Accordingly,   we   are   convinced   that   the   appellant   is   guilty 522
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with
522  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
homicide.   Appellant   sexually   assaulted   Kathylyn   Uba,   and   by
People vs. Yatar
reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful
it   may   be   so   elastic   as   to   stretch   without   laceration   during
deed,   permanently   sealed   the   victim’s   lips   by   stabbing   her
intercourse.   Absence   of   hymenal   lacerations   does   not   disprove
repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56
The   following   are   the   elements   constitutive   of   rape   with
In  the  case  at  bar,  appellant  is  the  husband   of  the  victim’s
homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2)
aunt.   He   is   seven   years   older   than   the   victim   Kathylyn   Uba.
carnal   knowledge  of   a  woman  was  achieved  by  means  of  force,
Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of
threat   or   intimidation;   and  (3)   by   reason   or   on   the   occasion   of
his mother­in­law, together with the victim and his wife. After the
such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
separation,   appellant   moved   to   the   house   of   his   parents,
appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close
approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother­in­law’s
kin,   such   as   the   victim’s   father,   step­father,   uncle,   or   the
house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he
common­law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over
force   or   intimidation   be   employed.53 Moral   influence   or
the victim.
ascendancy   takes   the   place   of   violence   and   intimidation. 54 The
Under Article 266­B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of
fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding
death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips
homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court
of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
the   hymen,   suffices   for   conviction   of   rape. 55The   strength   and
as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the
dilatability of the hymen are invariable; 
ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and
_______________
that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
50
 Id., at pp. 336­338. As   to   damages,   civil   indemnity ex   delicto of
P100,000.00,57 actual   damages   incurred   by   the   family   of   the
51
 Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 649 (1949).
victim   that   have   been   proved   at   the   trial   amounting   to
52
 Articles 266­A and 266­B, Revised Penal Code.
P93,190.00,58 and   moral   damages   of   P75,000.0059 should   be
53
 People v. Remudo, supra. awarded   in   the   light   of   prevailing   law   and   jurisprudence.
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of 
_______________ with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of
Rep.   Act   No.   7659,   let   the   records   of   this   case   be   forthwith
56
 People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 134101, 5 September 2001, 364 forwarded   to   the   President   of   the   Philippines   for   the   possible
SCRA 519.  exercise of the pardoning power.
57
 People   v.   Manguera, supra; People   v.   Seranilla, G.R.   Nos. Costs de oficio.
113022­24,   15   December   2000, 348   SCRA   227; People   v. SO ORDERED.
Payot, G.R. No. 119352, 8 June 1999, 308 SCRA 43.      Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares­Santiago, Sand
58
 Arts.   2199   and   2202,   Civil   Code,   Art.   2199,   states   that oval­Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria­Martinez, Corona, Carpio­
“[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by      Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Puno, J., On Official Leave.
him as he has duly proved.” Art. 2202 provides that “[i]n crimes Judgment affirmed with modification.
and quasi­delicts,  the defendant shall  be liable  for all  damages
Notes.—DNA, being a relatively new science, has not yet been
which  are  the  natural   and   probable  consequences   of  the  act or
accorded   official   recognition   by   the   courts—paternity   will   still
omission  complained   of.   It  is  not   necessary   that   such   damages
have to be resolved by conventional evidence. (Pe Lim vs. Court of
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.” Appeals, 210 SCRA 1 [1997])
59
 People v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 136299, 29 August 2003, 410 Being   a   novel   scientific   technique,   the   use   of   DNA   test   as
evidence   is   still   open   to   challenge,   but   eventually,   as   the
SCRA 183.
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
523
admissibility of DNA evidence. Courts should apply the results of
VOL. 428, MAY 19, 2004  523
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
People vs. Yatar
since to reject said result is to deny progress. (Tijing vs. Court of
the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.60 Appeals, 354 SCRA 17 [2001])
WHEREFORE,  in view  of the foregoing,  the Decision  of  the _______________
RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No.
 Article 2230, Civil Code.
60
35­98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias “Kawit” to Death for
524
the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED
with   the   MODIFICATION   that   he   be   ORDERED   to   pay   the 524  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the SMC Quarry 2 Workers Union­February Six Movement (FSM) Local Chapter
amount   of   P100,000.00,   P93,190.00   in   actual   damages   and No. 1564 vs. Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation
P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages
is DELETED. Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance
DNA   test   is   synonymous   to   DNA   typing,   DNA   fingerprinting,
DNA profiling, genetic tests, and genetic fingerprinting. (People
vs. Marquez, 380 SCRA 561 [2002])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  79
Tating vs. Marcella
G.R. No. 155208. March 27, 2007.*
NENA   LAZALITA** TATING,   petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD
TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA,
CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Civil  Law; Contracts; A contract is  simulated if the parties
do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).—The
CA   and   the   trial   court   ruled   that   the   contract   of  sale   between
petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the
parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or
if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).
The  primary   consideration  in  determining  the  true   nature  of   a
contract   is   the   intention   of   the   parties.   Such   intention   is
determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as
from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
Same; Same; The most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence on the part of the vendee of any attempt in any
manner   to   assert   his   rights   of   ownership   over   the   disputed
property.—In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 430 (1995),
the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is
the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in
any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows
that petitioner 
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
**
 Also spelled as Lasalita in other parts of the Rollo.
80
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
0 
Tating vs. Marcella
declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it
in her name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she
religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that
it  was  only   in   1974   and   1987   that  she   failed   to  pay   the  taxes
thereon.   While   tax   receipts   and   declarations   and   receipts   and
declarations   of   ownership   for   taxation   purposes   are   not,   in
themselves,   incontrovertible   evidence   of   ownership,   they
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation   purposes   manifests   not   only   one’s   sincere   and   honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such   an   act   strengthens   one’s bona   fide claim   of   acquisition   of
ownership.
Same; Same; Property; Sales; Ownership; Possession   along
with   ownership   is   transferred   to   the   vendee   by   virtue   of   the
notarized   deed   of   conveyance.—It   is   true   that   Daniela   retained
physical possession  of the  property even after she  executed  the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property
was transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact, Daniela continued to
occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in
the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However,
it   is   well­established   that   ownership   and   possession   are   two
entirely   different   legal   concepts.   Just   as   possession   is   not   a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non­possession inconsistent
with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil
Code   states   that   when   the   sale   is   made   through   a   public
instrument,   the   execution   thereof   shall   be   equivalent   to   the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal consequence
that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her
favor because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.
Civil   Procedure; Evidence; Affidavits; The   admissibility   of
evidence   should   not   be   equated   with   weight   of   evidence;   It   is
settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they
are not gener­
81
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  81
Tating vs. Marcella
ally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.—There
is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains
to   evidence   already   admitted   and   its   tendency   to   convince   and
persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that
affidavits   are  classified   as   hearsay   evidence   since   they   are  not
generally   prepared   by   the   affiant   but  by   another   who   uses   his
own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus
be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Same; Same; As   in   all   civil   cases,   the   burden   is   on   the
plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of   the   evidence   of   the   defendant.—Private   respondents   should
have   presented   other   evidence   to   sufficiently   prove   their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of
her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor
of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely
on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement,
private   respondents   failed   to   present   any   other   documentary
evidence   to   prove   their   claim.   Even   the   testimonies   of   their
witnesses   failed   to   establish   that   Daniela   had   a   different
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Pamplona, Genito and Valdezco for petitioner.
     Guanzon and Guanzon Law Firm for respondents.  _______________
82
82  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tating vs. Marcella
AUSTRIA­MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court
are   the   Decision1 dated   February   22,   2002   and   the   Resolution
dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­G.R.
CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of
land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd31182, located
at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot,
containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela
Solano   Vda.   de   Tating   (Daniela)   as   evidenced   by   Transfer
Certificate   of   Title  (TCT)   No.   T­4393   issued   by   the   Registry   of
Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her
granddaughter,   herein   petitioner   Nena   Lazalita   Tating   (Nena).
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute   Sale   executed   by   Daniela   in   favor   of
Nena.4 Subsequently,   title   over   the   subject   property   was
transferred in the name of Nena. 5 She declared the property in
her   name   for   tax   purposes   and   paid   the   real   estate   taxes   due
thereon   for   the   years   1972,   1973,   1975   to   1986   and
1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement
claiming   that   she   had   actually   no   intention   of   selling   the
property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply
to transfer title over the subject property in favor of 
1
 Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in
by   Justices   Conchita   Carpio­Morales   (now   a   member   of   this
Court) and Sergio L. Pestaño; Rollo, p. 53.
2
 Original Records, pp. 318­342.
3
 Exhibit “A,” Id., at p. 138.
4
 Exhibit “Q”/“1,” Id., at p. 177.
5
 Exhibit “3”, Id., at p. 179.
6
 Exhibits “8­A” to “8­AA,” Id., at pp. 183­212.
83
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  83 
Tating vs. Marcella
the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject
property   for   the   purpose   of   helping   her   defray   her   business
expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan
nor   mortgage  the  property;   she   wants   the   title  in   the   name  of
Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela   died   on   July   29,   1988 8 leaving   her   children   as   her
heirs,   namely:   Ricardo,   Felicidad,   Julio,   Carlos   and   Cirilo   who
predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that
when   Daniela   died   they   discovered   the   sworn   statement   she
executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the
subject property as heirs of Daniela. 9 Nena did not reply. Efforts
to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence,   on   September   6,   1989,   Carlos   and   Felicidad,
represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC
of   Cadiz  City,   Negros   Occidental   against   Nena   praying   for   the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in (Exh. “Q”) executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and
her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:
and  issuance of  a  new  title and  tax  declaration  in  favor  of  the
heirs   of   Daniela.10 The   complaint   also   prayed   for   the   award   of 1. 1.The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No.
moral   and   exemplary   damages   as   well   as   attorney’s   fees   and 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in the names
litigation   expenses.   On   March   19,   1993,   the   plaintiffs   filed   an of   Carlos   Tating, Pro­indiviso owner   of   one­fourth   (1/4)
amended   complaint   with   leave   of   court   for   the   purpose   of portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro­
excluding Ricardo  as a party plaintiff,  he having died  intestate
indivisoowner   of   one­fourth   (1/4)   portion;   Julio
and   without   issue   in   March   1991.11 He   left   Carlos,   Felicidad,
Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.  Tating, Pro­indivisoowner of one­fourth (1/4) portion and
_______________ Nena   Lazalita   Tating, Pro­indiviso owner   of   one­fourth
(1/4) portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed
7
 Exhibit “D,” Id., at p. 142. fees;
8
 Exhibit “I,” Id., at p. 149.
2. 2.The   City   Assessor   of   the   City   of   Cadiz   to   cancel   Tax
9
 Exhibit “E,” Id., at p. 143.
Declaration   No.   143­00672   and   in   lieu   thereof   issue   a
10
 Id., at p. 1.
new   Tax   Declaration   in   the   names   of   Carlos   Tating,
11
 Id., at p. 55.
1/4 Pro­indiviso portion;   Felicidad   Tating   Marcella,
84
1/4 Pro­indivisoportion;   Julio   Tating,   1/4 Pro­
84  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
indiviso portion;   and   Nena   Lazalita   Tating,   1/4 Pro­
Tating vs. Marcella
indiviso portion,   all   of   lot   56   as   well   as   the   house
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation
standing  thereon  be  likewise  declared in  the  names  of
attended the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She
the persons mentioned in the same proportions as above­
also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She
stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
prayed   for   the   dismissal   of   the   complaint,   and   in   her
counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual,
exemplary   and   moral   damages   as   well   as   attorney’s   fees   and 3. 3.The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs
litigation expenses.12 the   sum   of   P20,000.00   by   way   of   moral   damages,
Trial   ensued.   On   November   4,   1998,   the   RTC   rendered P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by
judgment with the following dispositive portion: way of attorney’s fees and P3,000.00 by way of litigation
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby expenses; and to
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and
hereby   declaring   the   document   of   sale   dated   October   14,   1969 _______________
  Id., at pp. 23­25.
12
85
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  85
Tating vs. Marcella
1. 4.Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA
rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.14
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated August 22, 2002.15
Hence,   herein   petition   for certiorari anchored   on   the   ground
that the CA “has decided the instant case without due regard to
and   in   violation   of   the   applicable   laws   and   Decisions   of   this
Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even
against the evidence on record.”16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant
petition   for certiorari under   Rule   65   of   the   Rules   of   Court   is
inappropriate.   Considering   that   the   assailed   Decision   and
Resolution   of   the   CA   finally   disposed   of   the   case,   the   proper
remedy   is   a   petition   for   review   under   Rule   45   of   the   Rules   of
Court.
The   Court   notes   that   while   the   instant   petition   is
denominated   as   a   Petition   for Certiorari under   Rule   65   of   the
Rules   of   Court,   there   is   no   allegation   that   the   CA   committed
grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually
avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are
the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in
accordance with  the liberal spirit  pervading the Rules  of Court
and   in   the   interest   of   justice,   the   Court   decided   to   treat   the
present petition for certiorari as having been filed 
_______________
13
 Id., at p. 342.
14
 CA Rollo, p. 86.
15
 Id., at p. 103.
16
 Rollo, p. 5.
86
86  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tating vs. Marcella
under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed within the
reglementary period for filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case
for the private respondents rests on the proposition that the Deed
of   Absolute   Sale   dated   October   14,   1969   is   simulated   because
Daniela’s actual intention was not to dispose of her property but
simply   to   help   petitioner   by   providing   her   with   a   collateral.
Petitioner   asserts   that   the   sole  evidence   which   persuaded   both
the   RTC   and   the   CA   in   holding   that   the   subject   deed   was
simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December
28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement
should   have   been   rejected   outright   by   the   lower   courts
considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document
was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to
cross­examine her.
Petitioner   also   contends   that   while   the   subject   deed   was
executed   on   October   14,   1969,   the   Sworn   Statement   was
purportedly   executed   only   on   December   28,   1977   and   was
discovered   only   after   the   death   of   Daniela   in   1994. 18Petitioner
argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would
have   taken   action   against   the   petitioner   during   her   lifetime.
However,   the  fact  remains  that  up to  the  time  of her  death  or
almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she
never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in
departing from the doctrine held time and again by the Supreme
Court   that   clear,   strong   and   convincing   evidence   beyond   mere
preponderance   is   required   to   show   the   falsity   or   nullity   of   a
notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the
CA erred in its pronouncement that the transac­
_______________
17
 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil.
1066, 1075; 268 SCRA 597, 605 (1997).
18
 Based   on   the   certification   issued   by   the   Civil   Registry   of
Cadiz City, Daniela S. Tating died on July 29, 1988.
87
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  87
Tating vs. Marcella
tion between Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship
between them because of the settled rule that where the terms of
a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
In   their   Comment   and   Memorandum,   private   respondents
contend  that petitioner failed  to show   that  the  CA  or  the  RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed
judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence
to   prove   that   the   contract   of   sale   by   and   between   her   and
petitioner   was   merely   simulated;   and   that,   in   effect,   the
agreement   between   petitioner   and   Daniela   created   a   trust
relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The   CA   and   the   trial   court   ruled   that   the   contract   of   sale
between   petitioner   and   Daniela   is   simulated.   A   contract   is
simulated   if   the   parties   do   not   intend   to   be   bound   at   all
(absolutely   simulated)   or   if   the   parties   conceal   their   true
agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the
parties.20 Such intention is determined from the express terms of
their   agreement   as   well   as   from   their   contemporaneous   and
subsequent acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private
respondents in proving their allegation that the subject deed of
sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the
sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial
court   admitted   the   said   sworn   statement   as   part   of   private
respondents’   evidence   and   gave   credence   to   it.   The   CA   also
accorded great probative weight to this document.
There   is   no   issue   in   the   admissibility   of   the   subject   sworn
statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not 
_______________
19
 People’s   Aircargo   and   Warehousing   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Court   of
Appeals, 357 Phil. 850, 869­870; 297 SCRA 170, 189 (1998).
20
 Ramos   v.   Heirs   of   Honorio   Ramos,   Sr., 431   Phil.   337,
345; 381 SCRA 594, 601 (2002).
21
 Id., at p. 345.
88
88  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tating vs. Marcella
be   equated   with   weight   of   evidence. 22 The   admissibility   of
evidence   depends   on   its   relevance   and   competence   while   the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency   to   convince   and   persuade.23Thus,   a   particular   item  of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends
on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but
by   another   who   uses   his   own   language   in  writing   the   affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by   the   one   writing   them.25 Moreover,   the   adverse   party   is
deprived   of   the   opportunity   to   cross­examine   the   affiant. 26 For
this   reason,   affidavits   are   generally   rejected   for   being   hearsay,
unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the
CA   committed   error   in   giving   the   sworn   statement   probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness
stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have
given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes
of proving  that the contract  of sale between her  and  petitioner
was simulated and that,  as  a consequence,  a trust  relationship
was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to
sufficiently   prove   their   allegation   that  Daniela,   in  fact,   had   no
intention of disposing of her property when she executed 
_______________
22
 Ayala   Land,   Inc.   v.   Tagle, G.R.   No.   153667,   August   11,
2005, 466 SCRA 521, 532.
23
 Id., at p. 532.
24
 Heirs   of   Lourdes   Sabanpan   v.   Comorposa, 456   Phil.   161,
172; 408 SCRA 692, 700 (2003).
25
 Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 60, 78; 323 SCRA 102, 119
(2000) citing People’s Bank and Trust Company v. Leonidas, G.R.
No. 47815, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 164; D.M. Consunji, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249,
260­261.
26
 D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Id., at pp. 260­261.
27
 Id., at pp. 260­261.
89
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  89 
Tating vs. Marcella
the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases,
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of
his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. 28 Aside
from   Daniela’s   sworn   statement,   private   respondents   failed   to
present   any   other   documentary   evidence   to   prove   their   claim.
Even  the  testimonies  of their  witnesses  failed  to  establish that
Daniela   had   a   different   intention   when   she   entered   into   a
contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most
protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence, on the
part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his
rights of ownership over the disputed property. 30 In the present
case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared
the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.
Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid
the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in
1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax
receipts   and   declarations   and   receipts   and   declarations   of
ownership   for   taxation   purposes   are   not,   in   themselves,
incontrovertible   evidence   of   ownership,   they   constitute   at   least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 31 The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title
to   the   property   and   announces   his   adverse   claim   against   the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute 
_______________
 28
 Dungaran   v.   Koshnicke, G.R.   No.   161048,   August   31,
2005, 468 SCRA 676, 685.
29
 321 Phil. 809, 831­832; 251 SCRA 430, 450 (1995).
30
 Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., supra note 20, at pp.
348­349; p. 604.
31
 Heirs of Miguel Franco v. Court of Appeals, 463 Phil. 417,
433; 418 SCRA 60, 72 (2003).
90
90  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tating vs. Marcella
needed   revenues   to   the   Government.32 Such   an   act   strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 33 On the other
hand,   private   respondents   failed   to   present   even   a   single   tax
receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the
disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only
Tax   Declaration   in   the   name   of   Daniela,   which   private
respondents   presented   in   evidence,   refers   only   to   the   house
standing   on   the   lot   in   controversy. 34 Even   the   said   Tax
Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the
lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the real intention of
Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she
never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in
executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her
true   intentions   through   the   sworn   statement   she   executed   on
December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from
her   relatives;   and   despite   her   declaration   therein   that   she   is
appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took   any   concrete   step   to   recover   the   subject   property   from
petitioner until her death more than ten years later.
It   is   true   that   Daniela   retained   physical   possession   of   the
property   even   after   she   executed   the   subject   Absolute   Deed   of
Sale   and   even   after   title   to   the   property   was   transferred   in
petitioner’s   favor.   In   fact,   Daniela   continued   to   occupy   the
property   in   dispute   until   her   death   in   1988   while,   in   the
meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is
well­established that ownership and possession are two entirely
different legal concepts.35 Just as possession is not a 
_______________
32
 Calicdan   v.   Cendaña, G.R.   No.   155080,   February   5,
2004, 422 SCRA 272, 280.
33
 Id., at p. 280.
34
 Exhibit “B,” OR, 139.
35
 Spouses   Sabio   v.   The   International   Corporate   Bank,
Inc., 416 Phil. 785, 820; 364 SCRA 385, 416 (2001).
91
VOL. 519, MARCH 27, 2007  91 
Tating vs. Marcella
definite proof of ownership, neither is non­possession inconsistent
with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil
Code   states   that   when   the   sale   is   made   through   a   public
instrument,   the   execution   thereof   shall   be   equivalent   to   the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. 36 Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal consequence
that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her
favor because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.
 As   to   Daniela’s   affidavit   dated   June   9,   1983,   submitted   by
petitioner, which confirmed the validity of the sale of the disputed
lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn
statement   earlier   adverted   to,   for   being   hearsay.   Naturally,
private respondents were not able to cross­examine the deceased­
affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
However,   even   if   Daniela’s   affidavit   of   June   9,   1983   is
disregarded, the fact remains that private respondents failed to
prove   by   clear,   strong   and   convincing   evidence   beyond   mere
preponderance   of   evidence37 that   the   contract   of   sale   between
Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is
in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its
regularity   has   the   burden   of   proving   its   simulation. 38 Since
private respondents failed to discharge the bur­
_______________
36
 Id., at p. 820; Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
113472­73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 347.
37
 Mendezona   v.   Ozamiz, 426   Phil.   888,   904; 376   SCRA   482,
496 (2002).
38
 People’s   Aircargo   and   Warehousing   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Court   of
Appeals,   supra note   19,   at   p.   870;   p.   189; Ramos   v.   Heirs   of
Honorio Ramos, Sr., supra note 20, at p. 346; p. 602.
92
92  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Criminal Law; Alibi; Denials; Denial and alibi interposed by
Tating vs. Marcella
den of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between
petitioner   and   Daniela   was   simulated,   the   presumption   of
regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute
Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or
simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to
whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   GRANTED.   The   assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV
No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278­
C,   are   REVERSED   AND   SET   ASIDE.   The   complaint   of   the
private respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Ynares­Santiago (Chairperson), Callejo,   Sr., Chico­
Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution reversed and
set aside. Complaint dismissed.
Note.—Tax   receipts   and   declarations   of   ownership   for
taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership. (Alonso vs.
Cebu Country Club, Inc., 375 SCRA 390 [2002])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 173476. February 22, 2012.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs. RODRIGO   SALAFRANCA y BELLO,   accused­
appellant.
the accused are worthless in the face of his positive identification
as the assailant.—Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in
the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant
of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such
incrimination   by   Mendoza   considering   that   Salafranca   did   not
even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to
testify against him unless it was upon the truth.
Same;   Treachery;   Treachery   is   present   when   the   offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially  to  insure   its   execution,   without   risk   to  himself  arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.—Based on
Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind
and  had “encircled his left arm  over the neck  (of  Bolanon)  and
delivered  the  stabbing   blow   using   the  right  (hand)   and  coming
from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the
blow   towards   below   the   left   nipple.”   Relying   on   Mendoza’s
recollection   of   how   Salafranca   had   attacked   Bolanon,   the   RTC
found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the
CA   concurred   with.   We   join   the   CA’s   concurrence   because
Mendoza’s eyewitness account of  the manner  of attack remained
uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The
method   and   means   Salafranca   employed  constituted   a   surprise
deadly   attack   against   Bolanon   from   behind   and   included   an
aggressive physical control of the latter’s movements that ensured
the success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the
part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code, treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person,   employing   means,   methods   or   forms   in   the   execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without   risk   to   himself   arising   from   the   defense   which   the
offended party might make.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
502
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
02
People vs. Salafranca
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Hearsay   Evidence   Rule;   Dying
Declarations;   Res   Gestae;   The   statement   of   the   victim   an   hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae
either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.—It appears
from   the   foregoing   testimony   that   Bolanon   had   gone   to   the
residence   of   Estaño,   his   uncle,   to   seek   help   right   after   being
stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to
bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab;
that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who
had   stabbed   him,   and   the   latter   had   told   Estaño   that   his
assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance
Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing
Estaño   to   advise   him  not  to   talk   anymore;   and   that   about   ten
minutes   after   his   admission   at   the   emergency   ward   of   the
hospital,   Bolanon   had   expired   and   had   been   pronounced   dead.
Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a
dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that
the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks   either   of   a   dying   declaration   or   part   of   the res
gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A dying declaration is generally
inadmissible for being hearsay; Exceptions.—A dying declaration,
although   generally   inadmissible  as   evidence   due   to   its  hearsay
character,   may   nonetheless   be   admitted   when   the   following
requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern
the   cause   and   surrounding   circumstances   of   the   declarant’s
death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant
is   under   a   consciousness   of   an   impending   death;   (c)   that   the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration
is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which   the   declarant   is   a   victim.   All   the   requisites   were   met
herein.   Bolanon   communicated   his   ante­mortem   statement   to
Estaño,   identifying   Salafranca   as   the   person   who   had   stabbed
him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his
impending   death,   having   sustained   a   stab   wound   in   the   chest
and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty
in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room
a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the
declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be
503
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012
People vs. Salafranca
shown   by   the   declarant’s   own   statements   or   from
circumstantial   evidence,   such   as   the   nature   of   his   wounds,
statements   made   in   his   presence,   or   by   the   opinion   of   his
physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject   of   the   declaration   had   he   survived.   Lastly,   the   dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in
which Bolanon was the victim.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   Res   Gestae;   Requisites   for
declaration   or   an   utterance   as   part   of   the   res   gestae   to   be
admissible   in   evidence   as   an   exception   to   the   hearsay   rule.—A
declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and
thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act,
the res   gestae,   is   a   startling   occurrence;   (b)   the   statements   are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c)
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately   attending   circumstances.   The   requisites   for
admissibility   of   a   declaration   as   part   of   the res   gestae concur
herein.   Surely,   when   he   gave   the   identity   of   the   assailant   to
Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his
stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab
that would bring him  to the hospital,  and thus had no  time to
contrive   his   identification   of   Salafranca   as   the   assailant.   His
utterance   about   Salafranca   having   stabbed   him   was   made   in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The
statement   was   relevant   because   it   identified   Salafranca   as   the
perpetrator.
Same;  Same;  Same;   Same;  Same;  The  term res gestae  has
50 been defined as “those circumstances which are the undersigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when   illustrative   of   such   act.”—The   term res   gestae has   been
defined   as   “those   circumstances   which   are   the   undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae refers
to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main   fact   and   serve   to   illustrate   its   character   and   are   so
spontaneous   and   contemporaneous   with   the   main   fact   as   to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res
gestae encompasses   the   exclamations   and   statements   made   by
either   the   participants, victims,   or   spectators   to   a   crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excite­
504
 5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
04
People vs. Salafranca
ment of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant   to   deliberate   and   to   fabricate   a   false   statement.   The
test   of   admissibility   of   evidence   as   a   part   of   the res   gestae is,
therefore,   whether   the   act,   declaration,   or   exclamation   is   so
intimately   interwoven   or   connected   with   the   principal   fact   or
event   that   it   characterizes   as   to   be   regarded   as   a   part   of   the
transaction   itself,   and   also   whether   it   clearly   negatives   any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Civil   Law;   Damages;   Civil   Indemnity;   Damages   to   be
awarded   when   death   occurs   due   to   a   crime.—We   modify   the
limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of
Bolanon   were   entitled   by   law   to   more   than   such   indemnity,
because the damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a
crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory
damages;   (c)   moral   damages;   (d)   exemplary   damages;   and   (e)
temperate damages.
Same;  Same; Same;  The death indemnity  compensated  the
loss  of  life   due  to  crime,   but  appropriate   and  reasonable  moral
damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional
sufferings   of   the   surviving   family   of   the   victim.—The   death
indemnity   compensated   the   loss   of   life   due   to   crime,   but
appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage
the   mental   anguish   and   emotional   sufferings   of   the   surviving
family   of   the   victim.   Although   mental   anguish   and   emotional
sufferings   of   the   surviving   heirs   were   not   quantifiable   with
mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set
an   amount   that   would   restore   the   heirs   of   Bolanon   to   their
moral status   quo   ante.   Given   the  circumstances,   the  amount  of
P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing   jurisprudence,   we   are   bound   to   award   despite   the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish
and emotional suffering.
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages may
be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability “when the
crime   was   committed   with   one   or   more   aggravating
circumstances.”—The Civil   Code provides   that   exemplary
damages  may   be  imposed in criminal   cases  as  part  of  the  civil
liability   “when   the   crime   was   committed   with   one   or   more
aggravating circumstances.” The Civil 
505
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 50
5
People vs. Salafranca
Code permits   such   damages   to   be   awarded   “by   way   of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate,   liquidated   or   compensatory   damages.”   Conformably
with   such   legal   provisions,   the   CA   and   the   RTC   should   have
recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary
damages   because   of   the   attendance   of   treachery.   It   was   of   no
moment   that   treachery   was   an   attendant   circumstance   in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
 An ante­mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide,
or   parricide   that   meets   the   conditions   of   admissibility   under
the Rules   of   Court and   pertinent   jurisprudence   is   admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo   Salafranca y Bello   was   charged   with   and   tried   for
murder   for   the   fatal   stabbing   of   Johnny   Bolanon,   and   was
ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch   18,   in   Manila   on   September   23,   2004.   On   appeal,   his
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its
decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing
to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated
him.
_______________
1 Rollo,   pp.   2­11;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Conrado   M.
Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice, now retired), with Associate
Justice Juan  Q.  Enriquez,  Jr.  and  Associate Justice  Vicente  Q.
Roxas, concurring.
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
The   established   facts   show   that   past   midnight   on   July   31,
1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in
Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran
away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle
Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him
to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way
to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who
had   stabbed   him;   that   Bolanon   eventually   succumbed   at   the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that
the   stabbing   of   Bolanon   was   personally   witnessed   by   Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex
at the time.2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded
arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being
issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at
the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
“The   evidence   is   clear   that   it   was   Rodrigo   Salafranca   who
delivered   two   (2)   stabbing   blows   to   the   victim   while   holding
Johnny   Bolanon   with   his   left   arm   encircled   around   Bolanon’s
neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right
sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s death. Not only because it
was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo
Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital
and who relayed to the court  that when  he  aided Bolanon  and
even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering
from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was
Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.”3
The   RTC   appreciated   treachery   based   on   the   testimony   of
Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his
attack   against   Bolanon,   observing   that   by   “encircling   his
(accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the latter’s neck
and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,”
_______________
2 Id., pp. 3­4.
3 CA Rollo, p. 36.
507
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 507
People vs. Salafranca
Salafranca   did   not   give   Bolanon   “any   opportunity   to   defend
himself.”4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and his
witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his
residence   the   day   after   the   incident   and   had   stayed   away   in
Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had
he   not   been   hiding,   there   would   be   no   reason   for   him   to
immediately leave his residence, especially because he was also
working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
“With  the  above   observations   and   findings,   accused   Rodrigo
Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined
and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery
(248   par.   1   as   amended)   without   any   mitigating   nor   other
aggravating   circumstance   attendant   to   its   commission,   Rodrigo
Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
He   shall   be   credited   with   the   full   extent   of   his   preventive
imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of
the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City
thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
sum of P50,000.00 representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is
hereby made.
SO ORDERED.”6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the
RTC,7 citing the dying declaration made to his uncle
_______________
4 Id., p. 38.
5 Id., pp. 36­38.
6 Id., p. 39.
7 Supra, at note 1.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive
identification   as   the   culprit   by   Mendoza. 9 It   stressed   that
Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the
incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as
his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and
employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his
guilt.10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that
the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting   Mendoza   and   Estaño   as   witnesses   against
Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly
concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable.
The determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses
at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its
unique   and   unequalled   position   of   observing   their   deportment
during   testimony,   and   of   assessing   their   credibility   and
appreciating   their   truthfulness,   honesty   and   candor.   Absent   a
substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made
and   conclusions   reached   by   the   RTC,   the   CA   as   the   reviewing
court   was   bound   by   such   assessment   and
conclusions,11considering that the CA as the appellate court could
neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions
without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the
circumstances   or   omitted   significant   evidentiary   matters   that
would alter  the  result.12Salafranca   did not  persuasively   show  a
misappreciation or omis­
_______________
8  Id., at p. 6.
 9  Id., at p. 9.
10 CA Rollo, p. 110.
11 People v. Resuma, G.R. No. 179189, February 26, 2008, 546
SCRA 728, 737.
12 People   v.   Taan,   G.R.   No.   169432,   October   30,   2006,   506
SCRA   219,   230; Bricenio   v.   People,   G.R.   No.   157804,   June   20,
2006, 491 SCRA 489, 496.
509
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 509
People vs. Salafranca
sion   by   the   RTC.   Hence,   the   Court,   in   this   appeal,   is   in   no
position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the
CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect. 13
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his
positive  identification  by   Mendoza   as   the  assailant  of   Bolanon.
The   lower   courts   properly   accorded   full   faith   to   such
incrimination   by   Mendoza   considering   that   Salafranca   did   not
even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to
testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14
Based   on   Mendoza’s   account,   Salafranca   had   attacked
Bolanon   from   behind   and   had   “encircled   his   left   arm   over   the
neck   (of   Bolanon)   and   delivered   the   stabbing   blow   using   the
right(hand)   and   coming   from   wnnt   (sic)   up   right   sideways  and
another   one   encircling   the   blow   towards   below   the   left
nipple.”15 Relying   on   Mendoza’s   recollection   of   how   Salafranca
had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant
in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the
CA’s   concurrence   because   Mendoza’s eyewitness account   of   the
manner   of   attack   remained   uncontested   by   Salafranca   who
merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca
employed   constituted   a   surprise  deadly   attack   against  Bolanon
from behind and included an aggres­
_______________
13 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007,
539   SCRA   306,   314; People   v.   Cabugatan,   G.R.   No.   172019,
February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547, People v. Taan, G.R. No.
169432,   October  30,   2006,   506   SCRA   219,   230; Perez  v.   People,
G.R. No. 150443, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 219; People v.
Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153­
154; People v. Genita, Jr., G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004, 425
SCRA   343,   349; People   v.   Pacheco,   G.R.   No.   142887,   March   2,
2004,  424  SCRA 164,  174; People v.  Abolidor,  G.R. No.  147231,
February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260, 265­266; People v. Santiago,
G.R. No. 137542­43, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256.
14 Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, October 12, 2009, 603
SCRA 488, 508.
15 TSN, September 1, 2003, pp. 3­4.
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
sive physical control of the latter’s movements that ensured the
success  of  the  attack  without  any  retaliation  or  defense  on  the
part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without   risk   to   himself   arising   from   the   defense   which   the
offended party might make.
The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance
by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant
right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
 Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on
his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what
did he say?
A “Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako.”
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who
stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A “Matagal na ho kasi mag­neighbor kami.”
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to
identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
_______________
16 Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
511
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012
People vs. Salafranca
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name
of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
  When he told you the name of his assailant what was
his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not
to talk anymore because he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I   cannot   remember   the   time   because   I   was   already
confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When   he   was   brought   to   the   emergency   room   what
happened?
A He was pronounced dead.17
It   appears   from   the   foregoing   testimony   that   Bolanon   had
gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after
being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed
up   to   bring   his   nephew   to   the   Philippine   General   Hospital   by
taxicab;   that   on   the   way   to   the   hospital,   Estaño   had   asked
Bolanon  who   had   stabbed   him,   and   the  latter   had   told   Estaño
that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance   Bolanon   had   seemed   to   be   having   a   hard   time
breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and
that   about   ten   minutes   after   his   admission   at   the   emergency
ward   of   the   hospital,   Bolanon   had   expired   and   had   been
pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of
511
Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of
the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking
incident bore all the earmarks either
_______________
17 TSN, March 18, 2003, pp. 3­4.
512
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was
an exception to the hearsay rule.18
A   dying   declaration,   although   generally   inadmissible   as
evidence   due   to   its   hearsay   character,   may   nonetheless   be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that
the   declaration   must   concern   the   cause   and   surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness;
and   (d)   that   the   declaration   is   offered   in   a   criminal   case   for
homicide,   murder,   or   parricide,   in   which   the   declarant   is   a
victim.19
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his
ante­mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the
person   who   had   stabbed   him.   At   the   time   of   his   statement,
Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained
a   stab   wound   in   the  chest   and,   according   to   Estaño,   was   then
experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the   hospital   emergency   room   a   few   minutes   from   admission,
which   occurred   under   three   hours   after   the   stabbing.   There   is
ample   authority   for   the   view   that   the   declarant’s   belief   in   the
imminence   of   his   death   can   be   shown   by   the   declarant’s   own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of
his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of
his physician.20 Bolanon
_______________
18 People v.  Loste,  G.R. No.  94785,  July  1,  1992,  210  SCRA
614,  621,  citing People v.  Mision, G.R.  No.  63480,  February  26,
1991, 194 SCRA 432, 339­340.
19 People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2, 2010, 626
SCRA 267, 278; see also People v. Garma, G.R. No. 110872, April
18,   1997,   271   SCRA   517,   522; People   v.   Elizaga,   No.   L­78794,
November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 516, 520; People v. Lanza, No. L­
31782, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 613, 625; People v. Saliling,
No. L­27874, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427, 438.
20 M.   Graham, Federal   Practice   and   Procedure:   Evidence §
7074,   Interim   Edition,   Vol.   30B,   2000,   West   Group,   St.   Paul,
Minne­
513
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 513
People vs. Salafranca
would   have   been   competent   to   testify   on   the   subject   of   the
declaration   had   he   survived.   Lastly,   the   dying   declaration   was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon
was the victim.
A   declaration   or   an   utterance   is   deemed   as   part   of   the res
gestae and   thus   admissible   in   evidence   as   an   exception   to   the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal   act,   the res   gestae,   is   a   startling   occurrence;   (b)   the
statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise;   and   (c)   the   statements   must   concern   the   occurrence   in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.21
The   requisites   for   admissibility   of   a   declaration   as   part   of
the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of
the   assailant   to   Estaño,   Bolanon   was   referring   to   a   startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on
board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus
had   no   time   to   contrive   his   identification   of   Salafranca   as   the
assailant.   His   utterance   about   Salafranca   having   stabbed   him
was   made   in   spontaneity   and   only   in   reaction   to   the   startling
occurrence.   The   statement   was   relevant   because   it   identified
Salafranca as the perpetrator.
 The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances
which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and which are admissible when illustrative of
_______________
sota; citing Shepard v. United States, 290 US 96, 100; Mattox
v. United States, 146 US 140, 151 (sense of impending death may
be  made  to  appear  “from  the  nature   and   extent  of  the  wounds
inflicted, being obviously such that he must have felt or known
that he could not survive.”); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395­396
(7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mobley, 491 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.
1970).
21 People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 94570, September 28, 1994, 237
SCRA   218,   224; People   v.   Maguikay,   G.R.   Nos.   103226­28,
October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587, 600.
514
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
such   act.”22 In   a   general   way, res   gestae refers   to   the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous
and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses
the   exclamations   and   statements   made   by   either   the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when
the   circumstances   are   such   that   the   statements   were   made   as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity  for  the  declarant to
deliberate   and   to   fabricate   a   false   statement. 24 The   test   of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether   the   act,   declaration,   or   exclamation   is   so   intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and   also   whether   it   clearly   negatives   any   premeditation   or
purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We  modify the limiting of  civil  damages  by the CA and  the
RTC to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that
the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than
such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death
occurs   due   to   a   crime   may   include:   (a)   civil   indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b)
actual or compensatory damages; (c)
_______________
22 Alhambra Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. DeCelle, 118 P. 2d 19, 47
C.A.   2d  409; Reilly  Tar  &  Chemical  Corp. v.  Lewis,   61   N.E.   2d
297, 326 Ill. App. 117.
23 Kaiko v. Dolinger, 440 A. 2d 198, 184 Conn. 509; Southern
Surety Co. v. Weaver, Com. App. 273 S.W. 838.
24 People v.  Sanchez,  G.R. No.  74740,  August 28,  1992,  213
SCRA 70, 79.
25 Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 166 N.E. 530, 335 Ill.
164; Campbell v. Gladden, 118 A. 2d 133, 383 Pa. 144, 53 A.L.R.
2d 1222.
515
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012 515
People vs. Salafranca
moral   damages;   (d)   exemplary   damages;   and   (e)   temperate
damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted
moral   damages   which   were   different   from   the   death
indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due
to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would
justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving   family   of   the   victim. 28 Although   mental   anguish   and
emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable
with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive
to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their
moral status   quo   ante.   Given   the  circumstances,   the  amount  of
P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to
prevailing   jurisprudence,29 we   are   bound   to   award   despite   the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish
and   emotional   suffering.   The   rationale   for   doing   so   rested   on
human nature and experience having shown that:
“xxx   a   violent   death   invariably   and   necessarily   brings   about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It
is  inherently   human  to suffer   sorrow,  torment,   pain  and   anger
when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing.
Such   violent   death   or   brutal   killing   not   only   steals   from   the
family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of
his love, affection
_______________
26 People   v.   Fontanilla,   G.R.   No.   177743,   January   25,
2012; People   v.   Domingo,   G.R.   No.   184343,   March   2,   2009,   580
SCRA 436, 455.
27 Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos, L­25913, February 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 327, 333.
28 Article   2206,   (3),   in   relation   to   Article   2217   and   Article
2219, Civil Code, and Article 107, Revised Penal Code.
29 People  v.  Salva,  G.R.  No.  132351,   January  10,  2002,  373
SCRA 55, 69; People v. Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30,
2008, 567 SCRA 319, 340; People v. Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196,
August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367­368; People v. Berondo, Jr.,
G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547.
516
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that
an injustice has been done to them.”30
The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting
in  their   non­recognition   of   the  right  of   the  heirs   of   Bolanon   to
temperate   damages.   It   is   already   settled   that   when   actual
damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by
receipts,   temperate   damages   of   at   least   P25,000.00   are
warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs
of   the   victim   to   deny   them   compensation   by   way   of   actual
damages.31
Moreover,   the Civil   Code provides   that   exemplary   damages
may   be   imposed   in   criminal   cases   as   part   of   the   civil   liability
“when   the   crime   was   committed   with  one  or   more   aggravating
circumstances.”32 The Civil   Code permits   such   damages   to   be
awarded “by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition   to   the   moral,   temperate,   liquidated   or   compensatory
damages.”33Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and
the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of
the   victim   to   exemplary   damages   because   of   the   attendance   of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant
circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed
in murder. The Court explained so in People v. Catubig:34
“The   term   “aggravating   circumstances”   used   by   the Civil
Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood
in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two­pronged   effect,   one   on   the   public   as   it   breaches   the   social
order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings,
_______________
 30 People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348
SCRA 679, 690­691.
31 People  v.   Lacaden,   G.R.  No.   187682,   November   25,   2009,
605 SCRA 784, 804­805.
32 Article 2230, Civil Code.
33 Article 2229, Civil Code.
34 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, 635.
617
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 22, 2012
People vs. Salafranca
each   of   which   is  addressed   by,   respectively,   the  prescription   of
heavier   punishment   for   the   accused   and   by   an   award   of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a
shift   to   a   graver   felony   underscores   the   exacerbation   of   the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended
for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the   private   offended   party   when   the   aggravating
circumstance   is   ordinary   but   to   be   withheld   when   it   is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect
of   the   case,   an   aggravating   circumstance,   whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the  offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.”
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of
P30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and proper,35 because we think
that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES
the   awards   of   civil   damages   by   adding   to   the   amount   of
P50,000.00   awarded   as   death   indemnity   the   amounts   of
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall
617
bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
_______________
35 See People   v.   Dela   Cruz,   G.R.   No.   188353,   February   16,
2010, 612 SCRA 738, 752, People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580,
February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 625, 637­638.
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Salafranca
SO ORDERED.
Corona   (C.J.,   Chairperson),   Leonardo­De   Castro,
Villarama, Jr. and Perlas­Bernabe,** JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.—As   a   rule,   a   dying   declaration   is   hearsay   and   is
inadmissible   as   evidence.   (People   vs.   Labagala, 626   SCRA   267
[2010])
Res   gestae refers   to   statements   made   by   the  participants  or
the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before,
during,   or   after   its   commission—these   statements   are   a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the   occasion,   without   any   opportunity   for   the   declarant   to
fabricate a false statement.  (People vs.  Fallones, 645 SCRA  650
[2011])
——o0o——  to crossexamine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to
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reserved.
70  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001.*
SCC   CHEMICALS   CORPORATION,   petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE   COURT   OF   APPEALS,   STATE   INVESTMENT
HOUSE,   INC.,   DANILO   ARRIETA   and   LEOPOLDO   HALILI,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Evidence; Rule that hearsay
evidence is excluded and carries no probative value admits of an
exception; It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross­examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness
are hearsay.—As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries
no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same
is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the
right   of   a   litigant   to   cross­examine.   It   is   settled   that   it   is   the
opportunity   to  cross­examine  which   negates   the   claim  that   the
matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right
cross­examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules
of   Court,   a   judicial   admission   requires   no   proof.—As   correctly
found  by the Court of Appeals,  petitioner’s admission as  to the
execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent
Arrieta and Bermundo at pre­trial suf­
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
71
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001  7
1 
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
ficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre­
trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission.
Under   Section   4,   Rule   129   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   a   judicial
admission requires no proof.
Civil   Law; Attorneys   Fees; Award   of   attorney’s   fees   is   the
exception rather than the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial
court  to  make  findings  of  fact  and  law,   which  would  bring   the
case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.—It is
settled that the award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather
than the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to make
findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of the award. Otherwise stated,
given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale
for the award of attorney’s fees, the same shall be disallowed. In
the   present   case,   a   perusal   of   the  records   shows   that   the   trial
court failed to explain the award of attorney’s fees. We hold that
the same should thereby be deleted.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Romeo B. Batino & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
     Escober and Alon Law Office for private respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules
of   Court,   of   the   Decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   dated   in
November   12,   1996   in CA­G.R.   CV   No.   45742entitled “State
Investment   House,   Inc.   v.   Danilo   Arrieta,   et   al.,   and   SCC
Chemical Corporation.” The questioned decision affirmed in toto
the  decision  of   the  Regional   Trial   Court   of  Manila,   Branch  33,
dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case No. 84­25881, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   judgment   is   hereby
rendered   in   favor   of   the   plaintiff   and   against   the   defendants
ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the
following: a) To  pay  plaintiff State Investment  House,  Inc.,  the
sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at  Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI
72
72  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  effect for lack or failure of consideration.
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
30%  per   annum  reckond  (sic)  from  April,   1984   until   the  whole
amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to
25% of the total amount due and demandable as attorney’s fees
and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.1
Equally   challenged   in   this   petition   is   the   Resolution   of   the
appellate court dated February 27, 1997, denying SCC Chemicals
Corporation’s motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the
Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for
brevity) through its chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta
and   vice   president,   Pablo   (Pablito)   Bermundo,   obtained   a   loan
from   State   Investment   House,   Inc.,   (hereinafter   SIHI)   in   the
amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate
of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining
balance   of   the   principal   upon   non­payment   on   the   due   date­
January   12,   1984.   To   secure   the   payment   of   the   loan,   Danilo
Arrieta   and   private   respondent   Leopoldo   Halili   executed   a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and
severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to
pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to
SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no
payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84­25881 for a
sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against
SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In   its   answer,   SCC   asserted   SIHFs   lack   of   cause   of   action.
anchored   its   cause   of   action   was   null,   void,   and   of   no   binding
The case was then set for pre­trial. The parties were allowed
to meet out­of­court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No
settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was
agreed upon: 
_______________
1
 Rollo, p. 33.
73
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001  73
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
1. 1.Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the
plaintiff and the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to
try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff
and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to
be sued in this present action;
2. 2.Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the
defendant   SCC   Chemical   Corporation   dated   April   4,
1984 together with a statement of account of even date
which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. 3.Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant
SCC   Chemical   Corporation   the   latter   acting   through
defendants   Danilo   E.   Arrieta   and   Pablito   Bermundo
executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for
the   amount   of   P129,824.48   with   maturity   date   on
January 12, 1984.2
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or
not the defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent
was the liability.
SIHI   presented   one   witness   to   prove   its   claim.   The   cross­
examination of said witness was postponed several times due to
one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case
was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or
its   counsel   failed   to   appear   despite   notice.   SCC   was   finally
declared   by   the   trial   court   to   have   waived   its   right   to   cross­
examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision
in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals where it was docketed as CA­G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case against it.
SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its
claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not
established   and   there   was   no   showing   that   he   had   personal
knowledge   of   the   transaction.   SCC   further   maintained   that   no
proof   was   shown   of   the   genuineness   of   the   signatures   in   the
documentary   exhibits   presented   as   evidence   and   that   these
signatures were 
_______________
2
 Id. at 31.
74
74  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
neither   marked   nor   offered   in   evidence   by   SIHI.   Finally,   SCC
pointed  out  that  the original   copies  of  the  documents  were  not
presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
judgment appealed from.
On   December   11,   1996   SCC   filed   its   motion   for
reconsideration,   which   the   Court   of   Appeals   denied   in   its
resolution dated February 27, 1997.
 Hence,   petitioner’s   recourse   to   this   Court   relying   on   the
following assignments of error:
I are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN   FINDING   THAT   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT   PROVED   ITS
CAUSE   OF   ACTION   AND   OVERCAME   IT’S   BURDEN   OF
PROOF.
II
THE   RESPONDENT   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY
ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
1. (1)Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of
law in holding that private respondent SIHI had proved
its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
2. (2)Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the award of attorney’s fees to SIHI.
Anent   the first   issue,   petitioner   contends   that   SIHI   introduced
documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose
competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of
the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It
argues that the same was in violation of Sections 363 and 
_______________
3
 “SEC.   36. Testimony   generally   confined   to   personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded.—A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
in these rules.”
75
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001  75 
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for
the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC
points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have
seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by
SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus
ran   afoul   of   Section   2,5 Rule   132   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   which
requires   proof   of   due   execution   and   authenticity   of   private
documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner
likewise   submits   that   none   of   the   signatures   affixed   in   the
documentary   evidence   presented   by   SIHI   were   offered   in
evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the
requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was
thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to consider
the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non­production of the
originals   of   the   documents   presented   in   evidence   allows   the
presumption   of   suppression   of   evidence   provided   for   in   Section
3(e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
Petitioner’s arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us. 
_______________
 “SEC.   48. General   Rule.—The   opinion   of   a   witness   is   not
4
admissible, except as indicated in the following sections.”
 5
 “SEC. 2. Proceedings to be recorded.—The entire proceedings
of   a   trial   or   hearing;   including   the   questions   propounded   to   a
witness   and   his   answers   thereto,   the   statements   made   by   the
judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to
the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or
by   other   means   of   recording   found   suitable   by   the   court.  he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official
stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by
him   shall   be   deemed   prima   facie   a   correct   statement   of   such
proceedings.”
6
 “SEC.   34. Offer   of   evidence.—The   court   shall   consider   no
evidence   which   has   not   been   formally   offered.   The   purpose   for
which the evidence is offered shall be specified.”
7
 “SEC.   3. Disputable   presumptions.—The   following
presumptions   are   satisfactory   if   uncontradicted,   but   may   be
contradicted   and   overcome   by   other   evidence:  matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. 10However, the right
x x x
1. “(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.”
76
76  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
We   note   that   the   Court   of   Appeals   found   that   SCC   failed   to
appear   several   times   on   scheduled   hearing   dates   despite   due
notice  to  it  and   counsel.   On  all  those  scheduled   hearing   dates,
petitioner was supposed to cross­examine the lone witness offered
by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate
court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow
the   admission   in   evidence   of   said   testimony   pursuant   to   the
“hearsay rule” contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC.   36. Testimony   generally   confined   to   personal   knowledge;
hearsay excluded.—A witness can testify only to those facts which
from his  own  perception, except as otherwise  provided  in  these
rules.
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries
no probative value.8 However, the rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same
is admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in
the right of a litigant to cross­examine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity   to  cross­examine  which   negates   the   claim  that   the
to cross­examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party
to cross­examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to
cross­examine   the   other   party’s   witness.   Petitioner   repeatedly
failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed  by   the  respondent  court  when  it  sustained  the  trial
court’s   finding   that   petitioner   had   waived   its   right   to   cross­
examine 
_______________
 Waterous   Drug   Corporation   v.   NLRC, 280   SCRA   735,   745
8
(1997)   citing People   v.   Laurente, 255   SCRA   543,   567
(1996); Batiquin   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 258   SCRA   334,   342
(1996); Eugenio   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 239   SCRA   207,   216   (1994)
citing People   v.   Valero, L­45283­84,   March   19, 112   SCRA
661 (1982); 3 Jones on evidence, 2nd Ed., 745 (1994).
9
 Krohn v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146, 154 (1994).
10
 San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138­
146(1991).
77
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001  77
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
the opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be
raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals
correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness
as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioner’s other submissions, the same are moot
and   academic.   As   correctly   found   by   the   Court   of   Appeals,
petitioner’s admission as to the execution of the promissory note
by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre­
trial   sufficed   to   settle   the   question   of   the   genuineness   of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of
facts at pre­trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial
admission.  Under  Section  4,11Rule  129  of  the  Rules of  Court,   a
judicial admission requires no proof.
Nor   will   petitioner’s   reliance   on   the   “best   evidence
rule”12 advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need to present
the   original   of   the   documents   as   there   was   already   a   judicial
admission   by   petitioner   at   pre­trial   of   the   execution   of   the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too
late   for   petitioner   to   be   questioning   their   authenticity.   Its
admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to
establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to
the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment
of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the
appellate   court   when   it   held   petitioner   liable   on   its   obligation,
pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads: 
_______________
11
 “SEC.   4. Judicial   admissions.—An   admission,   verbal   or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same   case,   does   not   require   proof.   The   admission   may   be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.”
12
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 3 and 4.
78
78  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with
reversible   error   for   having   sustained   the   trial   court’s   award   of
attorney’s fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the
Philippines   v.   Rodriguez, 182   SCRA   899,   909   (1990),   where   we
held that when attorney’s fees are  awarded,  the  reason  for the
award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s
decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did not state
any reason for awarding the same, the award of attorney’s fees
should have been disallowed by the appellate court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorney’s fees is the exception
rather than the rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to
make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
the   exception   and   justify   the   grant   of   the   award. 13 Otherwise © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the reserved.
rationale   for   the   award   of   attorney’s   fees,   the   same   shall   be
disallowed.  In  the present case,  a  perusal  of the records shows
that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorney’s fees.
We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE,   the   instant   petition   is   PARTLY   GRANTED.
The decision dated November 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s
fees   to   private   respondent   SIHI   is   hereby   deleted.   No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition partly granted, judgment affirmed with modification.

_______________

 Philippine   National   Bank   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 256   SCRA

13

491, 504 (1996).
79
VOL. 353, FEBRUARY 28, 2001  79
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004  543 
Note.—The failure of a party to interpose a timely objection to Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
the presentation of prosecution’s testimonial evidence results in G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004.*
the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof. (People LANDBANK   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
vs. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264[1999]) VICENTE   BANAL   and   LEONIDAS   ARENAS­BANAL,
respondents.
——o0o—— Agrarian   Reform; Just   Compensation; Due   Process; The
determination of just compensation of the property taken involves
80 the examination of the factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657
—the   trial   court   cannot   dispense   with   the   hearing   and   merely
order the parties to submit their respective memoranda.—The RTC
failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
requirements   in   determining   just   compensation   for   the
property. Firstly,   it   dispensed   with   the   hearing   and   merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such
action   is   grossly   erroneous   since   the   determination   of   just
compensation   involves   the   examination   of   the   following   factors
specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended: 1. the cost of the
acquisition of the land; 2. the current value of like properties; 3.
its nature, actual use and income; 4. the sworn valuation by the
owner;   the   tax   declarations;   5.   the   assessment   made   by
government   assessors;   6.   the   social   and   economic   benefits
contributed   by   the   farmers   and   the   farmworkers   and   by   the
government to the property; and 7. the non­payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land, if any. Obviously, these factors involve factual matters
which   can   be   established   only   during   a   hearing   wherein   the
contending  parties present  their respective evidence. In fact,  to
underscore  the intricate  nature of determining  the valuation of
the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special
Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Same; Same; Judicial   Notice; Well­settled   is   the   rule   that
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or
are  pending  in  the  same  court  or  before  the  same  judge.—Well­
settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection”
and  “with the  knowledge  of the  opposing  party,”  which are not
obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court
shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts.
In   this   regard,   Section   3,   Rule   129   of   the   Revised   Rules   on
Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court
takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus: “SEC. 3. Judicial
notice, when hearing necessary.—During the 
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
544
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
44 
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
and  allow  the parties to  be  heard  thereon.  “After  the trial,  and
before   judgment   or   on   appeal,   the   proper   court,   on   its   own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.” (emphasis added)
Same; Same; It   is   error   for   the   trial   court   to   apply   the
formula   prescribed   in   E.O.   No.   228   and   R.A.   No.   3844,   as
amended, in determining the valuation of land planted to coconut
and rice and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR
Administrative   Order   No.   13,   Series   of   1994—it   should   have
applied  DAR  Administrative Order  No.   6,  as  amended  by  DAR
Administrative   Order   No.   11.—The   RTC   erred   in   applying   the
formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228 and R.A.
No.   3844,   as   amended,   in   determining   the   valuation   of   the
property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. It must be stressed
that   EO   No.   228   covers   private   agricultural   lands primarily
devoted   to   rice   and   corn,   while   R.A.   3844   governs agricultural
leasehold   relation between   “the   person   who   furnishes   the
landholding,   either   as   owner,   civil   law   lessee,   usufructuary,   or
legal   possessor,   and   the   person   who   personally   cultivates   the
same.” Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not
involve   agricultural   leasehold   relation.   What   the   trial   court
should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order
No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed
earlier.
Same; Same; DAR   Administrative   Order   No.   13,   Series   of
1994 does not apply to lands taken under P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
No.  228   whose   owners   have  not  been   compensated.—As  regards
the  award  of compounded  interest,  suffice it to state that DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the
subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree
No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been
compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657,
as   amended,   and   respondents   have   been   paid   the   provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre­trial.
Same; Same; While   the   determination   of   just   compensation
involves the exercise of judicial discretion, such discretion must be
discharged   within   the   bounds   of   the   law.—While   the
determination   of   just   compensation   involves   the   exercise   of
judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged
within   the   bounds   of   the   law.   Here,   the   RTC   wantonly
disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules
and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11).
545
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004  545
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Miguel   M.   Gonzales, Rosemarie   M.   Ozoteo, Ricarte   P.A.
Rey and Norberto L. Martinez for petitioner.
     Manuel Ferrer for private respondents.
SANDOVAL­GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses   Vicente   and   Leonidas   Banal,   respondents,   are   the
registered   owners   of   19.3422   hectares   of   agricultural   land
situated   in   San   Felipe,   Basud,   Camarines   Norte   covered   by
Transfer   Certificate   of   Title   No.   T­6296.   A   portion   of   the   land
consisting   of   6.2330   hectares   (5.4730   of   which   is   planted   to
coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired
by   the   Department   of   Agrarian   Reform   (DAR)   pursuant   to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In   accordance   with   the   formula   prescribed   in   DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, 2 as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, 3 the Land Bank of
the   Philippines4 (Landbank),   petitioner,   made   the   following
valuation of the property: 
_______________
 Effective June 15, 1988.
1
 Rules   and   Regulations   Amending   the   Valuation   of   Lands
2
Voluntarily Offered and Compulsorily Acquired As Provided For
Under Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 1989, As Amended,
Issued Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.
 3
 Revising the Rules and Regulations Covering the Valuation
of   Lands   Voluntarily   Offered   or   Compulsorily   Acquired   as
Embodied in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992.
4
 Executive   Order   No.   405,   dated   June   14,   1990,   vests   the
Land   Bank   of   the   Philippines   the   primary   responsibility   to
determine   the   land   valuation   and   compensation   for   all   private
lands covered by R.A. 6657, as amended. See Philippine Veterans
Bank   vs.   Court   of   Appeals, G.R.   No.   132767,   January   18,
2000, 322 SCRA 139, 145.
546
546  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
Acquired property Area in hectares Value
Coconut land  5.4730  P148,675.19
Riceland  0.7600  25,243.36
    P173,918.55
Respondents   rejected   the   above   valuation.   Thus,   pursuant   to
Section   16(d)   of   R.A.   6657,   as   amended,   a   summary
administrative   proceeding   was   conducted   before   the   Provincial
Agrarian   Reform   Adjudicator   (PARAD)   to   determine   the
valuation   of   the   land.   Eventually,   the   PARAD   rendered   its
Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.
Dissatisfied   with   the   Decision   of   the   PARAD,   respondents
filed   with   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC),   Branch   40,   Daet,
Camarines   Norte,   designated   as   a   Special   Agrarian   Court,   a
petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the
Landbank.   Petitioners   therein   prayed   for   a   compensation   of
P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an
aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During   the   pre­trial   on   September   23,   1998,   the   parties
submitted to the RTC the following admissions of facts: (1) the
subject  property  is  governed  by  the  provisions of  R.A.  6657,  as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers­beneficiaries; and
(3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based
on the valuation made by the DAR.5
On the same day after the pre­trial, the court issued an Order
dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.6
In   its   Decision   dated   February   5,   1999,   the   trial   court
computed   the   just   compensation   for   the   coconut   land   at
P657,137.00   and   for   the   riceland   at   P46,000.00,   or   a   total   of
P703,137.00,   which   is   beyond   respondents’   valuation   of
P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest at
P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
_______________
5
 Pre­trial Order, Rollo at pp. 76­77.
6
 Rollo at pp. 25, 82.
547
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004  547 
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
1. 1.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners,
the   spouses   Dr.   Vicente   Banal   and   Leonidas   Arenas­
Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of
SIX   HUNDRED   FIFTY­SEVEN   THOUSAND   ONE
HUNDRED   THIRTY­SEVEN   PESOS   (P657,137.00)   in
cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. 2.Ordering   respondent   Landbank   to   pay   the   petitioners
for the .7600 hectares of riceland the sum of FORTY­SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds
in the proportion provided by law; and
 3. 3.Ordering   respondent   Landbank   to   pay   the   petitioners
the   sum   of   SEVENTY­NINE   THOUSAND   SEVEN
HUNDRED   THIRTY­TWO   PESOS  (P79,732.00)   as   the
compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”7
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the
same on the facts established in another case pending before it
(Civil Case No. 6679, “Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.”), using the
following formula:
For the coconut land
1. 1.Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per
kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)
2. 2.NI   /   6%   =   Price   Per   Hectare   (PPH)   (applying   the
capitalization formula under Republic Act No. 38448)
For the riceland
1. 1.2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land
Value (LV) or PPH (using the formula under Executive
Order No. 2289
2. 2.AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP =
Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
_______________
7
 RTC Decision at p. 7, Id., at p. 68.
8
 Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.
9
 Entitled   “Declaring   Full   Land   Ownership   to   Qualified
Farmer   Beneficiaries   Covered   by   Presidential   Decree   No.   27,
Determining   the   Value   of   Remaining   Unvalued   Rice   and   Corn
Lands Subject of P.D. No. 27, and Providing for the Manner of
Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation
to the Landowner,” dated July 17, 1987.
548
548  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
Forthwith,   the   Landbank   filed   with   the   Court   of   Appeals   a
petition for review, docketed as CA­G.R. SP No. 52163.
On   March   20,   2000,   the   Appellate   Court   rendered   a
Decision10 affirming in   toto the   judgment   of   the   trial   court.   The
Landbank’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court
of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s valuation of the
land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To  begin   with,   under   Section   1   of   Executive  Order   No.   405
(1990),   the   Landbank   is   charged   “primarily”   with   “the
determination   of   the   land   valuation   and   compensation   for   all
private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer
to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement . . . ” For its part,
the  DAR relies on  the determination  of the  land  valuation  and
compensation by the Landbank.12
Based   on   the   Landbank’s   valuation   of   the   land,   the   DAR
makes an offer to the landowner. 13 If the landowner accepts the
offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land
after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders
the   certificate   of   title  in   favor   of   the   government. 14 In  case   the
landowner   rejects   the   offer   or   fails   to   reply   thereto,   the   DAR
adjudicator15 conducts   summary   administrative   proceedings   to
determine   the   compensation   for   the   land   by   requiring   the
landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence   as   to   the   just   compensation   for   the   land. 16 These
functions by the DAR are in  may   bring   the   matter   to   the   RTC   designated   as   a   Special
_______________
10
 Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Rodrigo   V.   Cosico   and
concurred by Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Delilah
Vidallon­Magtolis.
11
 Resolution dated May 16, 2000, Rollo at p. 60.
12
 Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 405 (1990); Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R.   No.   122256,   October   30,   1996, 263   SCRA
758 and Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
13
 Sec. 16(a) of R.A. 6657, as amended.
14
 Sec. 16(c), Id.
15
 The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) and
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), depending
on   the   value   of   the   land   within   their   respective   territorial
jurisdiction (Rule II, Sec. 2, DARAB Rules of Procedure).
16
 Sec.   16(d)   of   R.A.   6657,   as   amended; Philippine   Veterans
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
549
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004  549
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
accordance with its quasi­judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A.
6657, as amended, which provides:
“SEC. 50. Quasi­Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby
vested   with   primary   jurisdiction   to   determine   and   adjudicate
agrarian   reform   matters   and   shall   have   exclusive   original
jurisdiction   over   all   matters   involving   the   implementation   of
agrarian   reform,   except   those   falling   under   the   exclusive
jurisdiction   of   the   Department   of   Agriculture   (DA)   and   the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x.”
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator
Agrarian Court17 “for final determination of just compensation.”18
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the
Rules of Court19 and, on its own initiative or at the instance of any
of the parties, “appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including
the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x
x.”20 In   determining   just   compensation,   the   RTC   is   required   to
consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as
amended, thus:
“Sec.   17. Determination   of   Just   Compensation.—In   determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value  of  like  properties,  its  nature,   actual   use  and  income,  the
sworn   valuation   by   the   owner,   the   tax   declarations,   and   the
assessment  made   by   government  assessors  shall   be  considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well
as   the   non­payment   of   taxes   or   loans   secured   from   any
government   financing   institution   on   the   said   land,   shall   be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.”
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to 
_______________
17
 Sec. 56, Id.
18
 Sec. 16(f), in relation to Sec. 57, Id.
19
 Sec. 57, Id.
20
 Sec. 58, Id.
550
550  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  2. 2.the current value of like properties;
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
the DAR’s rule­making power to carry out the object and purposes
of R.A. 6657, as amended.21
The   formula   stated   in   DAR   Administrative  Order   No.   6,   as
amended, is as follows:
“LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
     LV = Land Value
     CNI = Capitalized Net Income
     CS = Comparable Sales
     MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above  formula  shall be used if all the  three factors  are
present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are
applicable, the formula shall be:
     LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are
applicable, the formula shall be:
     LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV
is applicable, the formula shall be:
     LV = MV x 2”
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and
the fundamental requirements in determining just compensation
for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such
action   is   grossly   erroneous   since   the   determination   of   just
compensation   involves   the   examination   of   the   following   factors
specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. 1.the cost of the acquisition of the land;
3. 3.its nature, actual use and income;
4. 4.the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
_______________
21
 “Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations.—The PARC and the DAR
shall   have   the   power   to   issue   rules   and   regulations,   whether
substantive or procedural, to carry out the object and purposes of
this   Act.   Said   rules   shall   take   effect   ten   (10)   days   after
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.”
551
VOL. 434, JULY 20, 2004  551 
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
1. 5.the assessment made by government assessors;
2. 6.the   social   and   economic   benefits   contributed   by   the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to
the property; and
3. 7.the   non­payment   of   taxes   or   loans   secured   from   any
government   financing   institution   on   the   said   land,   if
any.
Obviously,   these   factors   involve factual matters   which   can   be
established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties
present   their   respective   evidence.   In   fact,   to   underscore   the
intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section
58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly,   the   RTC,   in   concluding   that   the   valuation   of
respondents’ property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice
of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a
hearing   and   worse,   without   the   knowledge   or   consent   of   the
parties, thus:
“x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730
hectares, defendants determined the average gross production per
year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz
Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in
Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands
and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also
the lands in the above­entitled case are situated, the value fixed
therein   was   1,061.52   kilos   per   annum per   hectare   for
coconut   land   and   the   price   per   kilo   is   P8.82,   but   in the
instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case,
we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per
hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut
lands   is   harvest   every   forty­five   days.   We   cannot   also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there
is a great variance in average production per year when in the
two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place
of   Basud,   Camarines   Norte.   We   believe   that   it   is   more   fair   to
adapt  the  1,061.52   kilos  per  hectare  per  year  as  average  gross
production. In   the Rodriguez   case, the   defendants   fixed   the
average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per
year. The court is also constrainedto apply this yearly palay
production in the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
x x x      x x x      x x x
“As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the
area of the coconut land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares.
But as already noted, the average gross production a year of
506.96   kilos   per   hectare   fixed   by   Landbank   is  too   low   as
compared to the Rodriguez
552
552  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Banal
case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both
cases   are in   the   same   town   of   Basud,   Camarines   Norte,
compelling   this   court then   to   adapt   1,061   kilos   as   the
average gross production a year of the coconut land in this
case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is
the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
“The  net  income  of   the coconut  land   is  equal   to  70%  of  the
gross income. So, the net income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70
x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization
formula   of R.A.   3844 to  the net  income  of  P7,204.19   divided   by
6%,   the   legal   rate   of   interest,   equals   P120,069.00   per   hectare.
Therefore,   the   just   compensation   for   the   5.4730   hectares   is
P657,137.00.
“The   Riceland   taken   under Presidential   Decree   No.   27 as   of
October   21,   1972   has   an   area   of   .7600   hectare. If   in
the Rodriguezcase the   Landbank   fixed   the   average   gross
production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .
7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the
riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals
P46,000.00.22
“PARC Resolution 94­24­1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by
DAR   AO   13,   granted   interest   on   the   compensation   at   6%
compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans
for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of
the compounded interest is P79,732.00.”23 (emphasis added)
Well­settled   is   the   rule   that   courts   are   not   authorized   to   take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge.24 They may only do so “in the absence
of objection”   and   “with   the   knowledge   of   the   opposing
party,”25which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply
to   all   proceedings   before   the   Special   Agrarian   Courts.   In   this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is
explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
notice of a certain matter, thus:
“SEC.   3. Judicial   notice,   when   hearing   necessary.—During   the
trial,   the   court,   on   its   own   initiative,   or   on   request   of   a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court,   on  its  own  initiative  or  on  request  of   a   party,   may   take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”
(emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly,   the   RTC   erred   in   applying   the   formula   prescribed
under   Executive   Order   (EO)   No.   22826 and   R.A.   No.   3844,27 as
amended,   in  determining   the   valuation  of   the  property;   and   in
granting   compounded  interest  pursuant to  DAR  Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994. 28 It must be stressed that EO No.
228   covers   private   agricultural   lands primarily   devoted   to   rice
and   corn,   while   R.A.   3844   governs agricultural   leasehold
relation between   “the   person   who   furnishes   the   landholding,
either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor,
and the person who personally cultivates the same.” 29 Here, the
land   is   planted   to   coconut   and   rice   and   does   not   involve
agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have
applied   is   the   formula   in   DAR   Administrative Order   No.   6,   as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As   regards   the   award   of   compounded   interest,   suffice   it   to
state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does
not   apply   to   the   subject   land   but   to   those   lands   taken   under
Presidential Decree No. 2730 and Executive Order No. 228 whose
owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is
covered  by  R.A.  6657,  as  amended,   and  respondents  have  been
paid the provisional  compensation  thereof,  as stipulated during
the pre­trial.
While   the   determination   of   just   compensation   involves   the
exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly
disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules
and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred
in determining the valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it
proper   to   remand   this   case   to   the   RTC   for   trial   on   the   merits
wherein   the   parties   may   present   their   respective   evidence.   In
determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court
shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657,
as   amended,   mentioned   earlier.   The   formula   prescribed   by   the
DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended
by   DAR   Administrative   Order   No.   11,   Series   of   1994,   shall   be
used   in   the   valuation   of   the   land.   Furthermore,   upon   its   own
initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court
may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate
and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
 WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   GRANTED.   The   assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA­G.R.
SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED
to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the
merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly
the   procedures   specified   above   in   determining   the   proper
valuation of the subject property.
_______________
30
 Entitled “Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the
Bondage of the Soil Transferring To Them The Ownership of the
Land They Till  and Providing the  Instruments  and Mechanism
Therefor,” dated October 21, 1972.
555
SO ORDERED.
     Panganiban (Chairman) and Carpio­Morales, JJ.,concur.
     Corona, J., On Leave.
Petition granted, assailed decision reversed.
Notes.—The CARL and E.O. 407 were not intended to take
away property without due process of law nor were they intended
to impair the obligation of contracts. (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245 [1996])
It would subvert the “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the
RTC   for   the   DAR   to   vest   original   jurisdiction   in   compensation
cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions. What agrarian
adjudicators   are   empowered   to   do   is   only   to   determine   in   a
preliminary   manner  the reasonable  compensation to  be  paid  to
land­owners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide
the   question.   (Republic   vs.   Court   of   Appeals, 263   SCRA
758 [1996])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  551 
People vs. Kulais
G.R. Nos. 100901­08. July 16, 1998.*
THE   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs. JAILON   KULAIS,   CARLOS   FALCASANTOS   @
“Commander   Falcasantos,”   AWALON   KAMLON   HASSAN   @
“Commander Kamlon,” MAJID SAMSON @ “Commander Bungi,”
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN
DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL
PLASIN y ALIH,   JAINUDDIN   HASSAN y AHMAD,   IMAM
TARUK   ALAH y SALIH,   JALINA   HASSAN   DE   KAMMING,
FREDDIE   MANUEL   @   “Ajid”   and   several   JOHN   and   JANE
DOES, accused. JAILON KULAIS, accused­appellant.
Criminal   Law; Constitutional   Law; Right   of
Confrontation;Judicial   Notice; As   a   general   rule,   courts   should
not take judicial
_______________
 *
 FIRST DIVISION.
552
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  from  going  home.  The  Court justified  the  conviction by  holding
52  that   the   offense   consisted   not   only   in   placing   a   person   in   an
People vs. Kulais
notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been   heard   and   are   actually   pending   before   the   same   judge.—
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of
the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have
been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard
and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially
true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional
right to confront and cross­examine the witnesses against him.
Same; Kidnapping; The fact that the victims were detained
for   only   three   hours   does   not   matter   if   said   victims   are   public
officers.—Victims   Virginia   San   Agustin­Gara,   Monico   Saavedra
and   Calixto   Francisco   were   members   of   the   government
monitoring   team   abducted   by   appellant’s   group.   The   three
testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to
identify the appellant. Even so, appellant’s identity as one of the
kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and
Perez,   who   were   with   Gara,   Saavedra   and   Francisco   when   the
abduction   occurred.   That   Gara,   Saavedra   and   Francisco   were
detained   for   only   three   hours   does   not   matter.   In People   vs.
Domasian, the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was
released even before his parents received the ransom note. The
accused   therein   argued   that   they   could   not   be   held   guilty   of
kidnapping   as   no   enclosure   was   involved,   and   that   only   grave
coercion   was   committed,   if   at   all.   Convicting   appellants   of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight­
year­old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained
enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner,
of his liberty. Likewise, in People vs. Santos, the Court held that
since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267,
paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty
which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was
locked up.
Same; Witnesses; Alibi   and   Denial; Jurisprudence   gives
greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses
than to the negative testimonies of the defense.—The appellant’s
bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the
face of  the prosecution witnesses’  positive identification of him.
Jurisprudence  gives   greater   weight  to  the  positive  narration  of
prosecution witnesses 
553
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  553 
People vs. Kulais
than   to   the   negative   testimonies   of   the   defense.   Between
positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it
on   the   one   hand,   and   a   bare   denial   on   the   other,   the   former
generally   prevails.   Jessica   Calunod,   Armando   Bacarro   and
Edilberto   Perez   testified   in   a   clear,   straightforward   and   frank
manner;   and   their   testimonies   were   compatible   on   material
points.   Moreover,   no   ill   motive   was   attributed   to   the   kidnap
victims and none was found by this Court.
Same; Penalties; Life imprisonment is not synonymous with
reclusion perpetua.—The trial court erred when it sentenced the
appellant   to   six   terms   of   life   imprisonment.   The   penalty   for
kidnapping   with   ransom,   under   the   Revised   Penal   Code,
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988,
when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the
maximum   penalty   that   could   have   been   imposed   was reclusion
perpetua.   Life   imprisonment   is   not   synonymous   with reclusion
perpetua.   Unlike   life   imprisonment, reclusion   perpetua carries
with  it  accessory  penalties  provided  in  the  Revised  Penal  Code
and   has   a   definite   extent   or   duration.   Life   imprisonment   is
invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion   perpetua is   prescribed   in   accordance   with   the
Revised Penal Code.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of  Zamboanga,   Philippines,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this
Zamboanga City, Br. 12.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court’s erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness’
testimony in another case, also pending before it, does not affect
the   conviction   of   the   appellant,   whose   guilt   is   proven   beyond
reasonable   doubt   by   other   clear,   convincing   and   overwhelming
evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this
occasion   also   to   remind   the   bench   and   the   bar   that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment. 
554
554  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  2
People vs. Kulais
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom
(Crim.   Case   Nos.   10060,   10061,   10062,   10063   and   10064)   and
three Informations for kidnapping (Crim. Case Nos. 10065, 10066
and   10067),   all   dated   August   14,   1990,   were   filed 1 before   the
Regional   Trial   Court   of   Zamboanga   City   against   Carlos
Falcasantos,   Jailon   Kulais,   Jumatiya   Amlani,   Norma   Sahiddan
de   Kulais,   Jalina   Hassan   de   Kamming,2 Salvador   Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam3 Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel   alias   “Ajid,”   and   several   John   and   Jane   Does.   The
Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical
allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
“That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,   being   all   private
individuals,   conspiring   and   confederating   together,   mutually
aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of
FELIX   ROSARIO   [in   Criminal   Case   No.   10060] 4 and   for   the
purpose  of extorting  ransom from  the said Felix  Rosario or his
families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously,   KIDNAP   the   person   of   said   Felix   Rosario, 5 a   male
public   officer   of   the   City   Government   of   Zamboanga,   who   was
then  aboard   a  Cimarron  vehicle  with  plate No.   SBZ­976   which
was   being   ambushed   by   the   herein   accused   at   the   highway   of
Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and 
_______________
1
 These   Informations   were   signed   by   Zamboanga   City   First
Assistant   Prosecutor   Manuel   Tatel   and   approved   by   City
Prosecutor Wilfredo M. Yu.
 Referred to as “Jaliha Hussin” in the Decision.
3
 Also referred to as “Iman.”
 4
 Record, p. 1; ALLAN BASA in Crim. Case No. 10061, record,
p.   1;   EDILBERTO   PEREZ y SALVADOR   in   Crim.   Case   No.
10062,  record,  p.  1;  JESSICA S.  CALUNOD  in  Crim. Case No.
10063, record, p. 1; ARMANDO O. BACARRO in Crim. Case No.
10064, record, p. 1. Brackets supplied.
5
 Ibid.
555
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  555
People vs. Kulais
brought   said   Felix   Rosario6 to   different   mountainous   places   of
Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained,
held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989,
the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom
was made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said
victim; there being present an aggravating circumstance in that
the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men
or persons who insure or afford impunity.”
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of
the   Revised   Penal   Code,   likewise   alleged   identical   facts   and
circumstances, except the names of the victims:
“That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of
Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the   above­named   accused,   being   all   private   individuals,
conspiring   and   confederating   together,   mutually   aiding   and
assisting   one  another,   by   means  of   threats  and   intimidation  of
person,  did then  and there,  wilfully, unlawfully and  feloniously
KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO
SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public
officer   of   the   City   Government   of   Zamboanga,   against   his   will,
there   being   present   an   aggravating   circumstance   in   that   the
aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.”
Of   the   twelve   accused,   only   nine   were   apprehended,   namely,
Jailon   Julais,   Jumatiya   Amlani,   Norma   Sahiddan   de   Kulais,
Salvador   Mamaril,   Hadjirul   Plasin,   Jainuddin   Hassan,   Imam
Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused
pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On 
_______________
6
 Ibid.
7
 Record,   p.   1;   VIRGINIA   SAN   AGUSTIN   GARA,   a   female
public officer, in Crim. Case  No. 10066,  record, p.  1;  CALIXTO
FRANCISCO   in   Crim.   Case   No.   10067,   record,   p.   1.   Brackets
supplied.
8
 See Decision,   p.   3.   Although  the   trial   court   listed   the   nine
arrested accused, it erroneously wrote that there were only eight
of them.
556
556  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Kulais
April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36­
page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE,   above   premises   and   discussion   taken   into
consideration,   this   Court   renders   its   judgment,   ordering   and
finding:
1. 1.FREDDIE MANUEL, alias “AJID” and IMAM TARUK
ALAH   y   SALIH   [n]ot   [g]uilty   of   the   eight   charges   of
[k]idnapping   for   [r]ansom   and   for   [k]idnapping,   their
guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  557 
ordered,  unless detained for some other offense besides these 8 People vs. Kulais
cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060­10067).
1. 3.JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty
1. 2.JAINUDDIN   HASSAN   y   AHMAD,   JAILON   KULAIS, in the three charges of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted
SALVADOR  MAMARIL   y  MENDOZA   and  HADJIRUL of   these   charges   (Crim.   Cases   Nos.   10065,   10066   and
PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in 10067).
all these 8  cases  for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and  for
[k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060­10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in
the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced
with the aid of armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the to serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of
penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period. prision   mayor   as   minimum   to   EIGHTEEN   (18)   YEARS   of
WHEREFORE,   for   the   five   charges   of   [k]idnapping   for reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060­10064).
[r]ansom, and pursuant to Art.  267 of  the Revised  Penal  Code,
five   life   imprisonments   are   imposed   on   Jainuddin   Hassan   y
1. 4.NORMA   SAHIDDAN   DE   KULAIS,   18   years   old,   and
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul
JALIHA   HUSSIN   (charged   as   Jalina   Hassan   de
Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060­10064).
Kamming),   15   years   old,   [n]ot   [g]uilty   in   the   three
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin­Gara, a female and
charges   for   [k]idnapping   and   are,   therefore,
public officer and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par.
ACQUITTED of these three charges (Crim. Cases Nos.
4), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y
10065, 10066 & 10067).
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul
Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066).
But   Norma   Sahiddan   de   Kulais   and   Jalina   Hussin   are   found
For   kidnapping   Monico   Saavedra   y   Limen,   and   Calixto
[g]uilty   as   accomplices   in   the   five   charges   for   [k]idnapping   for
Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping not having lasted more
[r]ansom.   Being   minors,   they   are   entitled   to   the   privileged
than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the
mitigating   circumstance   of   minority   which   lowers   the   penalty
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused—Jainuddin
imposable on them by one degree.
Hassan   y   Ahmad,   Jailon   Kulais,   Salvador   Mamaril   y   Mendoza
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin
and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih—are  sentenced  to serve  two (2) jail
are sentenced to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6)
terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum,
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim.
AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases
Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
Nos. 10060­10064).
557
 Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful      Cash  P 300.00 
offenders “convicted of an offense punishable by death or life” by    
Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 To Virginia San Agustin­Gara 
(of   which   [k]idnapping   for   [r]ansom   is   such   an   offense)   the
     One (1) Wrist Watch  P 850.00 
sentences  on  Norma  Sahiddan  de  Kulais  and  Jaliha  Hussin de
The   benefit   of   Art.   29,   Revised   Penal   Code,   on   preventive
Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
suspension, shall be extended to those sentenced.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
The  cases  against  Majid  Samson,   alias  “Commander  Bungi”
Plasin   are   sentenced   further   to   return   the   following
Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. “Commander Kamlon” Carlos Falcasantos
personaleffects   taken   on   December   12,   1988,   the   day   of   the
and several “John Does” and Jane “Does” are ARCHIVED until
kidnapping, ortheir value in money, their liability being solidary.
their arrest.
To Jessica Calunod:  Costs against the accused convicted.
    SO ORDERED.”9
     One (1) Seiko wrist watch  P 250.00  On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos,
     One Bracelet  P 2,400.00  Norma   Sahiddan   de   Kulais   and   Jaliha   Hussin   filed   their   joint
     One Shoulder Bag  P 200.00  Notice of Appeal.10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
     Cash  P 200.00  appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because
558 of   their   application   for   “amnesty.”   In   our   March   19,   1997
558  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Resolution,  we  granted  their  motion.  Hence,  only  the appeal  of
Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court.11
People vs. Kulais
To Armando C. Bacarro:  _______________
   
     One (1) wrist watch  P 800.00  9
 Decision, pp. 33­36; rollo, pp. 52­55.
     One Necklace  P 300.00 
10
 Through   Atty.   Catherine   P.C.   Fabian   of   the   Public
     One Calculator  P 295.00  Attorney’s Office, who represented them during the trial.
     Eyeglasses  P 500.00 
11
 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on February
21,   1997,  when the  Court  received a  letter from the  Bureau of
     One Steel Tape  P 250.00 
Cor­
   
559
To Edilberto S. Perez  VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  559 
   
People vs. Kulais
     One (1) Rayban  P1,000.00 
     One Wrist Watch  P1,800.00 
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The   solicitor   general   summarized,   in   this   wise,   the   facts   as
viewed by the People:
“On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various
government agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team
to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
composed   of  Virginia   Gara,   as   the  head   of  the  team;   Armando
Bacarro,   representing   the   Commission   on   Audit;   Felix   del
Rosario,   representing   the   non­government;   Edilberto   Perez,
representing   the   City   Assessor’s   Office;   Jessica   Calunod   and
Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the
driver   from   the   City   Engineer’s   Office.   (p.   3,   TSN,   October   22,
1990.)
On   that   particular   day,   the   group   headed   to   the   Lincomo
Elementary   School   to   check   on   two   of   its   classrooms.   After
inspecting   the   same,   they   proceeded   to   the   Talaga   Footbridge.
The group was not able to reach the place because on their way,
they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns
at them. (p. 4, TSN, ibid.)
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were
divested of their personal belongings. They were then ordered to
walk   to   the   mountain   by   the   leader   of   the   armed   men   who
introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos. (p. 5, TSN, ibid.)
While   the   group   was   walking   in   the   mountain,   they
encountered  government  troops  which  caused  their  group  to be
divided.   Finally,   they   were   able   to   regroup   themselves.
Commander   Kamlon   with   his   men   joined   the   others.   (pp.   7­8,
TSN, ibid.)
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty­four (54) days in
the   forest.   During   their   captivity,   the   victims   were   able   to
recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns.
The   wives   of   the   kidnappers   performed   the   basic   chores   like
cooking. (pp. 9­10, TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the
ransom notes which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and 
_______________
rections   confirming   the   confinement   of   Appellant   Jailon
Kulais at the NBP.
560
560  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Kulais
P14,000.00   in  exchange  for   twenty   (20)  sets  of  uniform.   (p.   15,
TSN, ibid.)
On  February 3, 1989,  at around 12:00  o’clock noontime, the
victims were informed that they would be released. They started
walking until around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of that day. At
around   12:00   o’clock   midnight,   the   victims   were   released   after
Commander   Falcasantos   and   Kamlon   received   the   ransom
money.   (p.   19,   TSN, ibid.)   The   total   amount   paid   was
P122,000.00.   The   same   was   reached   after   several   negotiations
between   Mayor   Vitaliano   Agan   of   Zamboanga   City   and   the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x.”12
The   prosecution   presented   fifteen   witnesses,   including   some   of
the   kidnap   victims   themselves:   Jessica   Calunod,   Armando
Bacarro,   Edilberto   Perez,   Virginia   San   Agustin­Gara,   Calixto
Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 13
“On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, while
weeding their farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused­
appellant   Jumatiya   Amlani   was   picked   up   by   soldiers   and
brought   to   a   place   where   one   army   battalion   was   stationed.
Thereat,   her   five   (5)   co­accused,   namely   Salvador   Mamaril,
Hadjirul   Plasin,   Jainuddin   Hassin,   Imam   Taruk   Alah   and
Freddie  Manuel  were already  detained.  In the afternoon of  the
same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan
were   brought   to   the   battalion   station   and   likewise   detained
thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported
to  Metrodiscom,   Zamboanga  City.  Here  on the  same  date,  they
were joined by accused­appellant Jaliha Hussin.
_______________
 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 8­10; rollo, pp. 149h­149j.
12
 Appellant’s Brief, prepared by the Public Attorney’s Office
13
and signed by Public Attorney III Bartolome P. Reus and Public
Attorney II Rector E. Macapagal, pp. 8­11; rollo, pp. 92­95.
561
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  561
People vs. Kulais
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just
escaped   from   the   captivity   of   Carlos   Falcasantos   and   company
who   in   1988   kidnapped   and   brought   her   to   the   mountains.
Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives
for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide
of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water
and   run   other   errands   for   everybody.   An   armed   guard   was
assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the
ill­treatment of Falcasantos’ other wives one of whom was armed.
After about two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos
and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard
was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash
for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2­15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused­appellant Jaliha
Hussin, who was thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen
years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was
kidnapped   by   Daing   Kamming   and   brought   to   the   mountains
where   he   slept   with   her.   She   stayed   with   him   for   less   than   a
month   sleeping   on   forest   ground   and   otherwise   performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good
her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming
and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui­
an where she took a “bachelor” bus in going back to her mother’s
house  at Pudos,  Guiligan,  Tungawan,  Zamboanga  del Sur.   One
day,   at   around   2:00   o’clock   in   the   afternoon,   while   she   was
harvesting   palay   at   the   neighboring   village   of   Tigbalangao,
military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an
army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought
to   Vitali,   then   to   Metrodiscom,   Zamboanga   City,   where   on   her
arrival,   she   met  all   the  other   accused  for  the  first   time  except
Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16­21)
Another   female   accused   is   appellant   Norma   Sahiddan,   a
native   of   Sinaburan,   Tungawan,   Zamboanga   del   Sur.   At   about
3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her
husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers
did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they
shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six
by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck
brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside
the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the
civilians   present   were   her   six   co­accused   Hadjirul   Plasin,
Salvador   Mamaril,   Jaimuddin   Hassan,   Ima[m]   Taruk   Alah,
Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of
them were brought to Tictapul, 
562
562  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 People vs. Kulais
Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom,
Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights.
On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail,
Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6­11)
The   husband   of   Norma   Sahiddan   is   Jailon   Kulais   who,   as
heretofore   narrated,   was   arrested   with   his   wife   the   day   the
soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with
his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and
in   the   duration   of   their   confinement   up   to   the   present.   (TSN,
January 22, 1991, pp. 2­4)
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The   trial   court   found   Appellant   Kulais   guilty   of   five   counts   of
kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a woman and
public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of
“life   imprisonment.”   It   also   found   him   guilty   of   two   counts   of
slight   illegal   detention   for   the   kidnapping   of   Monico   Saavedra
and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
“Principally,   the   issue   here   is   one   of   credibility—both   of   the
witnesses and their version of what had happened on December
12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court
gives  credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their  testimonies.
Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of
evil   or   dishonest   motive   was   imputed   or   imputable   to
[p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses
testify,  [p]rosecution witnesses testified only  because they  were
impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily,   [d]efense   evidence   is   weak,   uncorroborated   and
consisted   only   of   alibis.   The   individual   testimonies   of   the   nine
accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on
May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he
or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989,
when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine
accused   were   keeping   the   five   or   six   hostages   named   by
[p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present
during   the   course   of   the   captivity   of   the   five   kidnap­victims­
complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) 
563
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  563 
People vs. Kulais
Norma   Sahiddan;   (4)   Jailon   Kulais;   (5)   Hadjirul   Plasin;   (6)
Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel
alias “Ajid,” and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be
declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven
accused   guilty   as   conspirators   as   charged   in   the   eight
Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows
that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused belonged
had   formed   themselves  into  an  armed   band   for   the  purpose   of
kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off
from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests,
moved from  place to place in order to hide their  hostages.  The
wives   of   these   armed   band   moved   along   with   their   husbands,
attending to their needs, giving them material and moral support.
These   wives   also   attended   to   the   needs   of   the   kidnap   victims,
sleeping with them or comforting them.
x x x      x x x      x x x
II) The   guilt   of   Jainuddin   Hassan,   Jailon   Kulais,   Salvador
Mamaril and  Hadjirul  Plasin. The  Court holds these  four men
guilty  as  conspirators  in  the  8  cases  of  kidnapping.  Unlike  the
three   women­accused,   these   male   accused   were   armed.   They
actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place
to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril
and  Jailon  Kulais were  positively  identified  as  among   the  nine
armed   men   who   had   kidnapped   the   eight   kidnap   victims   on
December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the
four accused is supported  by the rulings of our Supreme Court
quoted below.
1. (1)The time­honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is
not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a
number   of   infinite   acts,   conditions   and   circumstances
which   may   vary   according   to   the   purposes   to   be
accomplished and from which may logically be inferred
that   there   was   a   common   design,   understanding   or
agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
charged.   (People   vs.   Cabrera, 43   Phil.   64; People   vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
2. (2)The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of
the   act   and   intent   which   existed   between   the   sixteen
accused,   be   regarded   as   the   act   of   the   band   or   party
created by them, and they are all equally responsible for
the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et al., 3 Phil.
89, 98.)
564
564  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Kulais
1. (3)When   two   or   more   persons   unite   to   accomplish   a
criminal object, whether through the physical volition of
one,   or   all,   proceeding   severally   or   collectively,   each
individual   whose   evil   will   actively   contribute   to   the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same
as   though   performed   by   himself   alone.   (People   vs.
Peralta, et al., 25 SCRA 759, 772 [1968].)14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz.:
I
“The   trial   court   erred   in   taking   judicial   notice   of   a   material
testimony given in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who
allegedly   was   the   team   leader   of   the   government   troops   which
allegedly   captured   the   accused­appellants   in   an   encounter;
thereby,   depriving   the   accused­appellants   their   right   to   cross­
examine him.
II
On   the   assumption   that   Lt.   Feliciano’s   testimony   could   be
validly taken judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred
in   not   disregarding   the   same   for   being   highly   improbable   and
contradictory.
III
The   trial   court   erred   in   finding   that   accused­appellants
Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided
Carlos   Falcasantos,   et   al.,   with   material   and   moral   comfort,
hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom
cases.
IV
 The trial court erred in denying to accused­appellant Jaliha
Hussin   and   Norma   Sahiddan   the   benefits   of   suspension   of
sentence   given   to   youth   offenders   considering   that   they   were
minors at the time of the commission of the offense.”15
_______________
 Decision, pp. 29­33.
14
 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1­2; rollo, pp. 85­86.
15
565
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  565
People vs. Kulais
As   earlier   noted,   Jumatiya   Amlani,   Jaliha   Hussin   and   Norma
Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and
fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer
be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant
Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending
cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as
a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of
the penalty imposed by the trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First   Issue:  against  the  appellant.   Hence,   Appellant   Kulais   was   not   denied
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the
trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another
case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of
the   government   troops   that   captured   him   and   his   purported
cohorts.16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross­
examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano,
he contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used against
him.17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice
of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have
been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard
and   are   actually   pending   before   the   same   judge. 18 This   is
especially   true   in   criminal   cases,   where   the   accused   has   the
constitutional right to confront and cross­examine the witnesses
against him. 
_______________
16
 Appellant’s Brief, p. 11; rollo, p. 95.
17
 Ibid., p. 12; rollo, p. 96.
18
 Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650, May 6, 1991.
See   also Occidental   Land   Transportation   Co.,   Inc.   vs.   Court   of
Appeals, 220 SCRA 167, March 19, 1993.
566
566  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Kulais
Having   said   that,   we   note,   however,   that   even   if   the   court a
quo did   take   judicial   notice   of   the   testimony   of   Lieutenant
Feliciano,   it   did   not   use   such   testimony   in   deciding   the   cases
due   process.   His   conviction   was   based   mainly   on   the   positive
identification   made   by   some   of   the   kidnap   victims,   namely,
Jessica   Calunod,   Armando   Bacarro   and   Edilberto   Perez.   These
witnesses   were   subjected   to   meticulous   cross­examinations
conducted by appellant’s counsel. At best, then, the trial court’s
mention   of   Lieutenant   Feliciano’s   testimony   is   a   decisional
surplusage   which   neither   affected   the   outcome   of   the   case   nor
substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Second   Issue:    x x x x x x x x x 
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence Q  Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty­four days and 
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the you really came to know them. Will you still be able to recognize 
latter’s testimony:  these persons if you will see the[m] again? 
“CP CAJAYON D MS:  A  Yes, ma’am. 
Q  And how long were you in the custody of these persons?  Q  Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of 
A  We stayed with them for fifty­four days.  those you mentioned are here? 
Q  And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were  A  Yes, they are here. 
with the group?  Q  Some of them are here? 
A  We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty­ A  Some of them are here. 
four days.    x x x x x x x x x 
Q  And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?  Q  Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing? 
A  For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon  A  White t­shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of 
we came to know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us those nine armed men who took us from the highway.
some food.  RTC INTERPRETER: 
Q  You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care        Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his 
of you?  name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS. 
A  Yes.  CP CAJAYON D MS: 
Q  And to whom were you assigned?  Q  Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and 
A  To Ila Abdurasa.  made you alight, what else was he doing while you were in their 
567 captivity? 
VOL. 292, 567
A  He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of 
JULY 16,
Nana. 
1998 
COURT: 
People vs. Kulais Q  Who? 
Q  And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are  A  Tangkong. 
assigned to, who else did you come to know?    x x x      x x x      x x x”19
A  Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives 
of Commander Falcasantos—Mating and Janira—another brother­ _______________
in­law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira. 
 19
 TSN, October 22, 1990, pp. 8­11. Italics supplied. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and 
568 you did not mention Tangkong? 
568  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  A  I did not mention but I can remember his face. 
People vs. Kulais   x x x      x x x      x x x 
Likewise   clear   and   straightforward   was   Bacarro’s   testimony Q  And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not 
pointing to appellant as one of the culprits: 
tell you that he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not 
“FISCAL CAJAYON: 
recognize him? 
  x x x      x x x      x x x  569
Q  And what happened then?  VOL. 292, JULY 16, 569 
A  Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one 1998 
[to] g[i]ve food to us.  People vs. Kulais
Q  [To] whom were you assigned?  A  No, I can recognize him because he was the one who 
A  I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.  took my shoes. 
  x x x      x x x      x x x  COURT: 
Q  Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you  Q  Who? 
remember how he looks like?  A  Tangkong, your Honor. 
A  Yes.    x x x      x x x      x x x”20
Q  Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez’ candid narration: 
and his wife are here?  “FISCAL CAJAYON: 
A  Yes, ma’am.    x x x      x x x      x x x 
Q  Could you please point this Tangkong to us?  Q  Who else? 
A  Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified  A  The last man. 
[himself] as Jailon Kulais. Q  Did you come to know his name? 
Q  Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?  A  Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who 
A  Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.  identified himself as Jailon Kulais.) 
  x x x      x x x      x x x  Q  And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain? 
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)  A  The same, guarding us. 
Q  When did you first meet Tangkong?  CROSS­EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK 
A  That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us. Q  Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your 
Q  When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr.  way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by 
 ambushed?  A  He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us. 
A  I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.    x x x      x x x      x x x”21
Q  They did not fire any shots?  It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro
A  But they were pointing their guns at us.  and Perez that kidnapping or detention did take place: the five
Q  And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga  victims   were   held,   against   their   will,   for   fifty­three   days   from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that
Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos? 
Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who
A  Yes. 
staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded
Q  Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?  the   victims   during   the   entire   period   of   their   captivity.   His
A  Yes.  participation  gives  credence  to  the  conclusion  of  the  trial   court
Q  Will you please identify?  that he was a conspirator.
A  That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who  Kidnapping for Ransom
identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)  That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom is also apparent from the testimony of Calunod,
_______________ who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating
the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters. 
 TSN, October 23, 1990, pp. 9 and 25. Italics supplied.
20

570 _______________
570  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Kulais  TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 18­23. Italics supplied.
21

571
  x x x      x x x      x x x 
VOL. 292, 571 
CROSS­EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN 
JULY 16,
Q  You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp? 
1998 
FISCAL CAJAYON: 
People vs. Kulais
      Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word
Tangkong.  “CP CAJAYON D MS: 
ATTY. FABIAN  Q  Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there 
Q  You said Tangkong guarded you [.W]hat do you mean?  were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City 
A  He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two  Government. What do you mean by this? What were you supposed 
hours another will be on duty guarding us.  to negotiate? 
Q  Where did you meet Tangkong?  A  Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the 
 terms.22 572
Q  And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?  572  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
A  I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by  People vs. Kulais
Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.  Q  There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod. 
Q  At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you  A  And over it is a signature. 
asked to write for your ransom?  Q  That is your signature? 
A  I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.  A  Yes, ma’am. 
Q  Why will you able to identify the same?  Q  How about in the other letter, did you sign it also? 
A  Because I was the one who wrote it.  A  Yes, there is the other signature. 
Q  And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?  Q  There are names—other names here—Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando 
A  Yes.  Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the 
Q  Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by  same. Did you come up to know who signed this one? 
the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5—there are  A  Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic] 
five letters all handwritten.  Q  And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is 
COURT:  the signature above the same. Did you come to know who signed it? 
      Original?  A  [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that. 
CP CAJAYON D MS:    x x x      x x x      x x x 
  Original, your Honor.  Q  Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the 
Q  And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of  portion here which says the terms? . . . 
these were the ones you were asked to write.  A  (Witness reading) “Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad 
A  (Witness going over [letters])  nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes 
  This one—2 pages. This one—2 pages. No more.  (Pebrero 3, 1989).”23
Q  Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these    x x x      x x x      x x x 
letters, what else will make you remember that these are really the  INTERPRETER (Translation): 
ones you wrote while there?        “This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and 
A  The signature is there.  P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 
1989. 
_______________   x x x      x x x      x x x 
Q  Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 
22
 TSN, October 22, 1990, p. 13. Italics supplied.
21, 1988.24 Now, could you please ex
_______________ INTERPRETER: 
      “They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete 
23
 This  letter,   dated  January   31,  1989   and   consisting   of  two
uniform (7 colors, marine­type not including the shoes), one half 
pages,   was   marked   Exhs.   “A”   and   “A­1”;   Jessica   Calunod’s
medium, one half large.” 
signature   thereon   was  marked   Exh.   “A­2.”  This  quoted   portion
was marked Exh. “A­3.”   x x x      x x x      x x x 
24
 This letter, dated January 21, 1989, was marked Exh. “B”; Q  After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they 
the   second   page   thereof,   Exh.   “B­1,”   and   Jessica   Calunod’s were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you know if 
signature, Exh. “B­2.” these letters were sent? If you know only. 
573 A  I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by 
VOL. 573 Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, 
292, and when we were already—I was asked again to write, we were 
JULY 16, ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are 
1998  alive.”26 [sic] 
People vs. Kulais
  plain to us why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero  _______________
31, 1989 or January 31, 1989? 
 This portion was marked Exh. “B­3.”
25
A  I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989. 
 TSN, October 22, 1990, p. 13.
26

Q  January 21, 1989?  574
A  Yes.  574  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
  x x x      x x x      x x x  People vs. Kulais
Q  Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?  Calunod’s   testimony   was   substantially   corroborated   by   both
  Please go over this.  Armando   Bacarro27 and   Edilberto   Perez.28 The   receipt   of   the
A  (Going over the letter)  ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom,
  Yes, ma’am.  and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were
Q  Could you please read it aloud to us?  testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy
A  (Witness reading)  Mejia.30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article
  “Gusto nila ang P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga 
267 of the Revised Penal Code,31 having been sufficiently 
completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang 
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.”25 _______________
  x x x      x x x      x x x 
 27
 TSN,   October   23,   1990,   pp.   10­11.   During   his   testimony, 575
Bacarro confirmed that Jessica Calunod and Engineer Perez were VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  575 
made to write ransom letters, and that he, along with the other People vs. Kulais
hostages, was made to sign the letters. He also identified another proven,   and   the   appellant,   a   private   individual,   having   been
letter, marked as Exh. “D,” dated January 15, 1988 and addressed clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms
to   Mayor   Vitaliano   Agan.   Written   in   response   to   the   mayor’s the   trial   court’s   finding   of   appellant’s   guilt   on   five   counts   of
request to reduce the ransom money from P500,000 to P350,000, kidnapping for ransom.
this letter stated that Commander Falcasantos did not want to
Kidnapping of Public Officers
reduce   the   aforesaid   amount,   but   he   agreed   to   the   reduced
Victims Virginia San Agustin­Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto
amount of P450,000, as he took pity on the plight of the hostages.
Francisco   were   members   of   the   government   monitoring   team
28
 TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 13­15. Perez stated that he also
abducted by appellant’s group. The three testified to the fact of
wrote a ransom letter and identified the same; he also confirmed
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant.
that Jessica Calunod likewise wrote ransom notes, and that he
Even   so,   appellant’s   identity   as   one   of   the   kidnappers   was
and all the other hostages were asked to sign them.
sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were
29
 TSN,   December   11,   1990.   Mayor   Agan   testified   that   he
with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
received ransom letters; that he facilitated their delivery to the
That   Gara,   Saavedra   and   Francisco   were   detained   for   only
kidnappers;   and   that   upon   payment   of   the   ransom   money,   the
three   hours32 does   not   matter.   In People   vs.   Domasian,33 the
kidnap victims were released.
victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even
30
 TSN, November 7, 1990, pp. 2­7. Mr. Mejia testified that he
before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein
was one of those who delivered the money to the kidnappers and
argued   that   they   could   not   be   held   guilty   of   kidnapping   as   no
witnessed the release of the victims.
enclosure   was   involved,   and   that   only   grave   coercion   was
31
 “Art.   267. Kidnapping   and   serious   illegal   detention.   Any
committed,   if   at   all.34 Convicting   appellants   of   kidnapping   or
private individual who shall detain or kidnap another, or in any
serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal
other manner, deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
Code, the Court found that the victim, an 
of reclusion perpetua to death:
_______________
1. 1.If  the   kidnapping   or   detention   shall   have   lasted   more
than five days. 1. 3.If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
2. 2.If   it   shall   have   been   committed   simulating   public kill him shall have been made.
authority.
 2. 4.If the person kidnapped or detained shall be  a minor,
female or public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was   committed   for   the   purpose   of   extorting   ransom   from   the
victim   or   any   other   person,   even   if   none   of   the   circumstances
above­mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.”
(This   definition   has   been  amended   by   Section  8,   RA   No.   7659,
effective December 31, 1993. The crimes happened in 1988.)
32
 TSN, November 6, 1990, p. 9.
33
 219 SCRA 245, March 1, 1993.
34
 Ibid., p. 250.
576
576  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
People vs. Kulais
eight­year­old   boy,   was   deprived   of   his   liberty   when   he   was
restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by
holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in
an   enclosure,   but   also   in   detaining   or   depriving   him,   in any
manner, of his liberty.35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos,36 the Court
held  that since the appellant  was charged  and convicted under
Article   267,   paragraph   4,   it   was not   the   duration of   the
deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco for only a few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that
the victims were public officers37—Gara was a 
_______________
35
 Ibid., p. 253.
36
 GR   No.   117873,   December   22,   1997.   Citing   Ramon   C.
Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1­2, the
Court  said that  the  Spanish  version  of  Art.   267  of  the  Revised
Penal   Code   uses   the   terms   “lock­up”   (encerrar)   rather   than
“kidnap” (sequestar or raptar). “Lockup” is included in the broader
term “detention,” which refers not only to the placing of a person
in   an   enclosure   which   he   cannot   leave,   but   also   to   any   other
deprivation of liberty.
37
 Art. 203, Revised Penal Code, provides:
“Art. 203. Who are public officers. For the purpose of applying the
provisions of this and the preceding titles of this book, any person
who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment
by   competent   authority,   shall   take   part   in   the   performance   of
shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank
or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.”
In   defining   “public   officers,”   former   Chief   Justice   Ramon  C.
Aquino cited Maniego vs. People, in which the Court held: “The
definition   of   public   officer   in   Art.   203   is   quite   comprehensive,
embracing as it does every public servant from the lowest to the
highest.   It   obliterates   the   distinction   between   officer   and
employee   in   the   law   of   public   officers,   it   does   not   distinguish
between permanent and temporary employees x x x.” He likewise
presented  a  list  of persons  held  to  be  public  officers  in  various
cases, e.g. a customs secret service agent, a public
577
VOL. 292, JULY 16, 1998  577 
People vs. Kulais
fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the
City Engineer’s Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman
at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be
punished,   therefore,   under   Article   267,   paragraph   4   of   the
Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,38which
held that the crime committed was not kidnapping under Article
267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that
case had tricked his seven­year­old victim into going with him to
a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when a
group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him.
The Court noted that the victim’s testimony and the other pieces
of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain
her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution
indubitably established that the victims were detained, albeit for
a   few   hours.   There   is   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that
kidnapping  took place, and  that  appellant was a member of the
armed group which abducted the victims.
Third   Issue:  Perez, when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.
Denial and Alibi
The appellant’s bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even
weaker   in   the   face   of   the   prosecution   witnesses’   positive
identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the  Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was
_______________
works inspector, a sanitary officer, a barrio lieutenant, a laborer
discharging clerical functions, an emergency helper in the Bureau
of Forestry on a daily wage basis, performing the duties of janitor
and messenger. See Ramon C. Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997
ed., Vol. II, pp. 409­410.
38
 GR No. 110097, December 22, 1997.
578
578  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Kulais
negative   testimonies   of   the   defense.39 Between   positive   and
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one
hand,   and   a   bare   denial   on   the   other,   the   former   generally
prevails.40 Jessica   Calunod,   Armando   Bacarro   and   Edilberto
Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and
their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover,
no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was
found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court’s observation that the appellant
did   not   meet   the   charges   against   him   head   on.   His   testimony
dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and
on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where
he   was   during   the   questioned   dates   (December   12,   1988   to
February   3,   1989);   neither   did   he   rebut   Calunod,   Bacarro   and
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms
of   life  imprisonment.   The   penalty   for   kidnapping   with  ransom,
under   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   is reclusion   perpetua to   death.
proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could
have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is
not   synonymous   with reclusion   perpetua.   Unlike   life
imprisonment, reclusion   perpetua carries   with   it   accessory
penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite
extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for
serious   offenses   penalized   by   special laws,   while reclusion
perpetua is   prescribed   in   accordance   with   the   Revised   Penal
Code.41
 WHEREFORE,   the   conviction   of   Appellant  Jailon   Kulais   as
principal   in  five  counts   of   kidnapping   for   ransom   and   in  three
counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is
hereby   MODIFIED   as   follows:   Appellant   is   sentenced   to   five
terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for
kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua,
one   each   for   the   kidnapping   of   Public   Officers   Virginia   Gara,
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused
who   withdrew   their   appeals,   he   is   REQUIRED   to   return   the
personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap
victims.   Additionally,   he   is   ORDERED   to   pay   the   amount   of
P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
_______________
41
 People   vs.   Layno, GR   No.   110833,   November   21,
1996; People vs.  Magana, GR  No.  105673,  July  26, 1996; People
vs.   Gregorio, 255   SCRA   380,   March   29,   1996; People   vs.
Magalong, 244   SCRA   117,   May   12,   1995.   See People   vs.
Samson, 244   SCRA   146,   May   16,   1995. NOTA   BENE:   It   is
noteworthy that Appellant Kulais was also the appellant in this
cited case. He appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Branch 12, presided by Judge Pelagio S. Mandi
who penned the  Decision appealed in the present case.  In  that
case,   Kulais   was   convicted   of   kidnapping   with   ransom   for   the
abduction   of   one   Airman   Ruben   Monteverde,   committed   on
January   30,   1990.   The   persons   he   was   charged   with   were
the same ones he was charged and convicted with in the case at
bar. See also People vs. Ramos,  Jr., 203 SCRA 237, October 28,
1991; and People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459, April 30, 1991.
Notes.—Courts   should   not   at   once   look   with   disfavor   at   the
defense of alibi, and that when an accused puts up the defense of
alibi, the court should not at once have a mental prejudice against
him. (People vs. Escalante, 238 SCRA 554[1994])
When   the   prosecution’s   cause   is   weak,   an   accused’s   alibi
assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating his criminal
liability,  and his alibi should  be considered for there are times
where an accused has no other possible defense but alibi, as that
could   really   be   the   truth.   (People   vs.   Adofina, 239   SCRA
67 [1994])
The  exception  to  the  right  of   confrontation  contemplated   by
law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses
made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
previous   decisions   or   judgments.   (People   vs.   Ortiz­Miyake, 279
SCRA 180 [1997])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
414  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.*
MENANDRO   B.   LAUREANO,   petitioner, vs. COURT   OP
APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
Actions; Conflict   of   Laws; The   party   who   claims   the
applicability of a foreign law has the burden of proof, and where
said   party   has   failed   to   discharge   the   burden,   Philippine   law
applies.—At   the   outset,   we   find   it   necessary   to   state   our
concurrence   on   the   assumption   of   jurisdiction   by   the   Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on
the  application  of  Philippine  law,   thus:   “Neither  can  the  Court
determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under
the   Singapore   Laws   because   of   the  defendant’s   failure   to   show
which   specific   laws   of   Singapore   Laws   apply   to   this   case.   As
substantially   discussed   in   the   preceding   paragraphs,   the
Philippine   Courts   do   not   take   judicial   notice   of   the   laws   of
Singapore.   The   defendant   that   claims   the   applicability   of   the
Singapore   Laws   to   this   case   has   the   burden   of   proof.   The
defendant   has   failed   to   do   so.   Therefore,   the   Philippine   law
should be applied.”
Same; Labor Law; Prescription; Illegal Dismissals; In illegal
dismissal, it is settled, that the ten­year prescriptive period fixed
in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked, for the Civil
Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period
fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable
to claims arising from employee­employer relations.—What rules
on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been
decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the
ten­year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code
may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of
general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article
292   of   the   Labor   Code   [now   Article   291]   is   a   SPECIAL   LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee­employer relations.
Same; Same; Same; Although   the   commencement   of   a   civil
action   stops   the   running   of   the   statute   of   prescription   or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff
leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action
had been commenced at
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
415
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 2, 2000  415 
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
all.—Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal
before   the   Labor   Arbiter   of   the   National   Labor   Relations
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it
has  no legal  leg to stand on. In Olympia International,  Inc.  vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that “although the commencement of a
civil   action   stops   the   running   of   the   statute   of   prescription   or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff
leaves   the   parties   in   exactly   the   same   position   as   though   no
action had been commenced at all.”
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; It   is   a   settled   rule   that
contracts have the force of law between the parties.—As to whether
petitioner’s   separation   from   the   company   due   to   retrenchment
was valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract
of petitioner allowed for pre­termination of employment. We agree
with the Court of Appeals when it said, “It is a settled rule that
contracts   have   the   force   of   law   between   the   parties.   From   the
moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to
all   consequences   which,   according   to   their   nature,   may   be   in
keeping   with   good   faith,   usage   and   law.   Thus,   when   plaintiff­
appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the
right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice
or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and
readily   understandable,   hence,   there   is   no   room   for
interpretation.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of  to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Montilla Law Office for petitioner.
     Bengzon, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengson   &   Jimenez for
private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 29, 1993, in CA. G.R. No. CV 34476,  On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course
416
416  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  at defendant’s expense. Having successfully completed and passed
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied
the motion for reconsideration.
The   facts   of   the   case   as   summarized   by   the   respondent
appellate court are as follows:
“Sometime   in   1978,   plaintiff   [Menandro   B.   Laureano,   herein
petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of
Air   Manila,   applied   for   employment   with   defendant   company
[herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On  September   30,   1978,   after  the  usual   personal   interview,
defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as
an expatriate B­707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and
commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six­
month   probation   period,   plaintiffs   appointment   was   confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex “B,” p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of
his two­year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979
in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex
“C,” p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B­707 captain, plaintiff on August 24,
1980, while in command of a flight, committed a noise violation
offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized. (Exh.
“3,” p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident
wherein  the  tail   of  the  aircraft  scraped   or  touched   the runway
during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was
investigated   by   a   board   headed   by   Capt.   Choy.   He   was
reprimanded.
of A­300 conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France
the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A­300 and subsequently appointed
as   captain   of   the   A­300   fleet   commanding   an   Airbus   A­300   in
flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes “D,” “E” and “F,” pp. 34­38,
Rec.).
Sometime   in   1982,   defendant,   hit   by   a   recession,   initiated
costcutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the
Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant’s requirement
(t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its
expatriate 
417
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 2, 2000  417 
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take
advance leaves. (Exh. “15,” p. 466, Rec.).
Realizing   that   the   recession   would   not   be   for   a   short   time,
defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6,
1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it’s A­300
pilots. It reviewed their qualifications  for  possible  promotion to
the   B­747   fleet.   Among   the   17   excess   Airbus   pilots   reviewed,
twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one
of the twelve.
On   October   5,   1982,   defendant   informed   plaintiff   of   his
termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid
three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex “I,”
pp. 41­42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such
short   notice,   plaintiff   requested   a   three­month   notice   to   afford
him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and
retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1)
month salary, (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987, p. 25).
Aggrieved,   plaintiff   on   June   29,   1983,   instituted   a   case   for
illegal   dismissal   before   the   Labor   Arbiter.   Defendant  moved  to
dismiss   on   jurisdictional   grounds.   Before   said   motion   was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed
the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract
of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1­10, Rec.).
Again,   defendant   on   February   11,   1987   filed   a   motion   to
dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts
have   no   jurisdiction   over   the   instant   case.   Defendant   contends
that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money
claim  arising out of and in the  course of plaintiffs  employment
“thus   it   is   the   Labor   Arbiter   and   the   NLRC   who   have   the
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code” and that,
since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his
employment   contract   and/or   documents   executed   in   Singapore.
Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and
courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50­69, Rec.).
In   traversing   defendant’s   arguments,   plaintiff   claimed   that:
(1)   where   the   items   demanded   in   a   complaint   are   the   natural
consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor
benefits,   the   case   is   intrinsically   a   civil   dispute;   (2)   the   case
involves  a  question  that  is  beyond  the  field   of  specialization  of
labor   arbiters;   and   (3)   if   the   complaint   is   grounded   not  on  the
employee’s dismissal 
418
418  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence
thereof,  the  case  falls  under  the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
(pp. 70­73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant’s motion
to dismiss (pp. 82­84, Ibid.). The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied, (p. 95, ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating
the   grounds   relied   upon   in   its   motion   to   dismiss   and   further
arguing   that plaintiff  is  barred  by  laches,   waiver,   and  estoppel
from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action.
(pp. 102­115)”1
On   April   10,   1991,   the  trial   court   handed   down   its   decision   in
favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Menandro   Laureano   and   against   defendant   Singapore   Airlines
Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of—
SIN$396,104.00,   or   its   equivalent   in   Philippine   currency   at
the current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as and for
unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid;
 SIN$154,742.00,   or   its   equivalent   in   Philippine   currency   at
the   current   rate   of   exchange   at   the   time   of   payment;   and   the
further   amounts   of   P67,500.00   as   consequential   damages   with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00   as   and   for   moral   damages;   P1,000,000.00   as
and   for   exemplary   damages;   and   P100,000.00   as   and   for
attorney’s fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.”2
Singapore  Airlines timely appealed before the respondent  court
and   raised   the   issues   of   jurisdiction,   validity   of   termination,
estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision
of the trial court, thus,  EMPLOYER   MERELY   FAILS   TO   REALIZE   THE
_____________
1
 Rollo, pp. 30­32.
2
 Id. at 65.
419
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 2, 2000  419
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
“.   .   .  In  the  instant  case,   the  action  for   damages  due  to  illegal
termination   was   filed   by   plaintiff­appellee   only   on   January   8,
1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff­appellee’s action
has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE,   the  appealed  decision  is  hereby   REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.”3
Petitioner’s   and   Singapore   Airlines’   respective   motions   for
reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. 1.IS   THE   PRESENT   ACTION   ONE   BASED   ON
CONTRACT   WHICH   PRESCRIBES   IN   TEN   YEARS
UNDER   ARTICLE   1144   OF   THE   NEW   CIVIL   CODE
OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY
TO   THE   RIGHTS   OF   THE   PLAINTIFF   WHICH
PRESCRIBES   IN   FOUR   YEARS   UNDER   ARTICLE
1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. 2.CAN   AN   EMPLOYEE   WITH   A   FIXED   PERIOD   OF
EMPLOYMENT   BE   RETRENCHED   BY   HIS
EMPLOYER?
3. 3.CAN   THERE   BE   VALID   RETRENCHMENT   IF   AN
EXPECTED   PROFITS   EVEN   IF   IT   WERE   NOT,   IN
FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch   9.   The   trial   court   rightly   ruled   on   the   application   of
Philippine law, thus:
“Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the
plaintiff   is   legal   under   the   Singapore   Laws   because   of   the
defendant’s failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws
apply   to   this   case.   As   substantially   discussed   in   the   preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of
the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability
of the Singapore 
_____________
3
 Id. at 40.
420
420  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 Laureano vs. Court of Appeals
Laws   to   this   case   has   the   burden   of   proof.   The   defendant   has
failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.”4
Respondent   Court   of   Appeals   acquired   jurisdiction   when
defendant   filed   its   appeal   before   said   court. 5 On   this   matter,
respondent court was correct when it barred defendant­appellant
below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now  raises the  issue  of whether his action is one
based   on   Article   1144   or   on   Article   1146   of   the   Civil   Code.
According   to   him,   his   termination   of   employment   effective
November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which is
under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as
provided   for   in   said   article.   Thus   he   claims   the   ruling   of   the
appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only
four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the
action   for   illegal   dismissal   originally   filed   before   the   Labor
Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed
again   in   1987   before   the   Regional   Trial   Court,   had   already
prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 1144 7 nor Article 11468 of the Civil
Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the
Labor Code, viz.:
“Article   291. Money   claims.—All   money   claims   arising   from
employee­employer   relations   accruing   during   the   effectivity   of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has
long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled,
that the ten­year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the
Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is
a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in
Article  292   of  the  Labor   Code  [now   Article  291]  is  a  SPECIAL
LAW   applicable   to   claims   arising   from   employee­employer
relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10where the
money   claim   was   based   on   a   written   contract,   the   Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
“. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its
application  only to ‘money  claims specifically recoverable  under
said Code’ but covers all money claims arising from an employee­
employer relations” (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238
SCRA   721,   764   [1994];   and Uy   v.   National   Labor   Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996])....
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is
a special law applicable to money claims arising from employer­
employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144
of  the  Civil  Code,   a  general  law.  Basic  is  the  rule in statutory
construction   that   ‘where   two   statutes   are   of   equal   theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should
prevail.’   (Citing Leveriza   v.   Intermediate   Appellate   Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.”11
In   the   light   of   Article   291,   aforecited,   we   agree   with   the
appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner’s action for damages
due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more
than   four   (4)   years   after   the   effective   date   of   his   dismissal   on
November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
“In   the   instant   case,   the   action   for   damages   due   to   illegal
termination   was   filed   by   plaintiff­appellee   only   on   January   8,
1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff­appellee’s action
has already prescribed.”
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but
on   Article   291   of   the   Labor   Code,   which   sets   the   prescription
period   at   three   (3)   years   and   which   governs,   under   this
jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period
was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission.
However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal
leg   to   stand   on.   In Olympia   International,   Inc.   vs.   Court   of
Appeals,   we   held   that   “although   the   commencement   of   a   civil
action   stops   the   running   of   the   statute   of   prescription   or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff
leaves   the   parties   in   exactly   the   same   position   as   though   no
action had been commenced at all.”12
Now, as to whether petitioner’s separation from the company
due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the
employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre­termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
“It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between
the parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus,
when plaintiff­appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was
bound   by   the   terms   and   conditions   set   forth   in   the   contract,
among   others,   the  right  of   mutual   termination   by   giving   three
months   written   notice   or   by   payment   of   three   months   salary.
Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there
is no room for interpretation.”
x x x
Further, plaintiff­appellee’s contention that he is not bound by
the provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto,
deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff­appellee’s
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to
the   aforementioned   Agreement.   As   such,   plaintiff­appellee   is
estopped from questioning the legality of the said agreement or
any proviso contained therein.”13
Moreover,   the   records   of   the   present   case   clearly   show   that
respondent court’s decision is amply supported by evidence and it
did   not   err   in   its   findings,   including   the   reason   for   the
retrenchment:
“When   defendant­appellant   was   faced   with   the   world­wide
recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in the
company’s   growth   particularly   in   the   regional   operation   (Asian
Area)   where   the   Airbus   300   operates.   It   had   no   choice   but   to
adopt   cost   cutting   measures,   such   as   cutting   down   services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of
flying points for the A­300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17­18). As
a result, defendant­appellant had to lay off A­300 pilots, including
plaintiff­appellee,   which   it   found   to   be   in   excess   of   what   is
reasonably needed.”14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to
conclude that petitioner’s termination from employment was for
an  authorized  cause,   for  which  he  was  given  ample  notice  and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent 
company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could
be attributed to respondent appellate court.
ACCORDINGLY,   the   instant   petition   is   DISMISSED.   The
decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   in   CA.   CV   No.   34476   is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
 Notes.—It   is   a   time­honored   principle   that   contracts   are
respected as the law between the contracting parties. (Henson vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11[1987])
The parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at
the time they enter into a contract and at the time it is to become
operative—and, a person is presumed to be more knowledgeable
about his own state law than his alien or foreign contemporary.
(Communication   Materials   and   Design,   Inc.   vs.   Court   of
Appeals, 260 SCRA 673 [1996])
A manning agency cannot be faulted for complying with the
applicable   foreign   law.   (Omanfil   International   Manpower
Development   Corporation   vs.   National   Labor   Relations
Commission, 300 SCRA 455 [1998])
——o0o——
425
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013.*
CASAN   MACODE   MAQUILING,   petitioner, vs.   COMMISSION
ON   ELECTIONS,   ROMMEL   ARNADO   y   CAGOCO,   LINOG   G.
BALUA, respondents.
Citizenship;   Renunciation   of   Philippine   Citizenship;
Commonwealth   Act   No.   63;   While   the   act   of   using   a   foreign
passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No.   63   constituting   renunciation   and   loss   of   Philippine
citizenship,   it   is   nevertheless   an   act   which   repudiates   the   very
oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.―While the act of using a foreign passport is not
one   of   the   acts   enumerated   in   Commonwealth   Act   No.   63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless   an   act   which   repudiates   the   very   oath   of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position. When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or
just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted   his   Oath   of   Renunciation   that   he   “absolutely   and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA” and  that  he “divest(s) [him]self  of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United   States   of   America.”   We   agree   with   the   COMELEC En
Banc that   such   act   of   using   a   foreign   passport   does   not   divest
Arnado   of   his   Filipino   citizenship,   which   he   acquired   by
repatriation.   However,  by  representing  himself  as  an  American
citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status   as   a   dual   citizen.   Such   reversion  was   not   retroactive;   it
took   place   the   instant   Arnado   represented   himself   as   an
American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a
foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
 Same; Same; Election Law; The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just 
_______________
* EN BANC.
421
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously.   Any   act   which   violates   the   oath   of   renunciation
opens   the   citizenship   issue   to   attack.―The   citizenship
requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must
be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. We agree with
the   pronouncement   of   the   COMELEC   First   Division   that
“Arnado’s   act   of   consistently   using   his   US   passport   effectively
negated his “Affidavit of Renunciation.” This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No.
9225,   for   he   in   fact   did.   It   was after complying   with   the
requirements   that   he   performed   positive   acts   which   effectively
disqualified   him   from   running   for   an   elective   public   office
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Same;   Same;   Same;   While   those   who   acquire   dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who
seek   election   or   appointment   to   public   office   are   required   to
renounce   their   foreign   citizenship   to   be   deserving   of   the   public
trust.   Holding   public   office   demands   full   and   undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.―Citizenship is not a
matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant  civil   and   political   rights   accorded   by   the   state   to  its
citizens. It likewise  demands  the concomitant duty  to  maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who
seek   election   or   appointment   to   public   office   are   required   to
renounce  their  foreign  citizenship  to  be  deserving   of  the  public
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance
to the Republic and to no other. We therefore hold that Arnado,
421
by   using   his   US   passport   after   renouncing   his   American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section   40(d)   of   the   Local   Government   Code   applies   to   his
situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office
but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
Election Law; When a person who is not qualified is voted for
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will
of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect
in   the   qualifications   of   the   candidate.   To   rule   otherwise   is   to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications   and   disqualifications   of   candidates.―The   ballot
cannot override the
422
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
22
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and   disqualifications   of   candidates.   When   the   law   requires
certain   qualifications   to   be   possessed   or   that   certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as
elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before
one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified
is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes,
even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot
cure   the   defect   in   the   qualifications   of   the   candidate.   To   rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets  forth the qualifications and  disqualifications  of candidates.
We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is  the  sole  determinant  of  who  should  be  proclaimed
worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
Same;   When   there   are   participants   who   turn   out   to   be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the
next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
lacks  any  of  the   qualifications   set   in   the   rules   to  be  eligible  as
candidates.―We   have   ruled   in   the   recent   cases   of Aratea   v.
COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012) and Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 683
SCRA 1 (2012), that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election. Even
when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the
will   of   the   electorate   is   still   respected,   and   even   more   so.   The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice
and   must   also   be   respected.   As   in   any   contest,   elections   are
governed   by   rules   that   determine   the   qualifications   and
disqualifications   of   those   who   are   allowed   to   participate   as
players.   When   there   are   participants   who   turn   out   to   be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the
next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
Same;   Knowledge   by   the   electorate   of   a   candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed   second   to   a   disqualified   one   can   be   proclaimed   as   the
winner.―The   electorate’s   awareness   of   the   candidate’s
disqualification   is   not   a   prerequisite   for   the   disqualification   to
attach   to   the   candidate.   The   very   existence   of   a   disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineli­
423
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 423
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
gible.   Knowledge   by   the   electorate   of   a   candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed   second   to   a   disqualified   one   can   be   proclaimed   as   the
winner. The second­placer in the vote count is actually the first­
placer   among   the   qualified   candidates.   That   the   disqualified
candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is
of   no   moment.   The   subsequent   disqualification   based   on   a
substantive   ground   that   existed   prior   to   the   filing   of   the
certificate   of   candidacy   voids   not   only   the   COC   but   also   the
proclamation.
Same;   Citizenship;   Dual   Citizenship;   The   disqualifying
circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. Arnado was both
a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code; The
affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after
the   elections,   reaches   back   to   the   filing   of   the   certificate   of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May   2010   elections.―The   disqualifying   circumstance   affecting
Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a
Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy.   He  was  a   dual   citizen   disqualified   to  run   for   public
office   based   on   Section   40(d)   of   the   Local   Government   Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement “The following persons are
disqualified   from   running   for   any   elective   local   position.”   The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under
any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.   With   Arnado   being   barred   from   even   becoming   a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except   that   Arnado   rendered   it   impossible   to   effect   his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer
to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he
was   already   proclaimed   the   winner.   To   hold   that   such
proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of
the   certificate   of   candidacy.   The   affirmation   of   Arnado’s
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches
back   to   the   filing   of   the   certificate   of   candidacy.   Arnado   is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado being a non­candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not   have   been   counted.   This   leaves   Maquiling   as   the   qualified
candidate
424
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
24
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
who   obtained   the   highest   number   of   votes.   Therefore,   the
rule   on   succession   under   the   Local   Government   Code   will   not
apply.
Carpio, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Citizenship; View that Philippine courts have
no power to declare whether a person possesses citizenship other
than that of the Philippines.―Philippine courts have no power to
declare whether a person possesses citizenship other than that of
the Philippines. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999),
Constitutional  Commissioner  Joaquin G.  Bernas was quoted  as
saying, “[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because
we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries.
We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely
beyond our control.” In the present case, we have no authority to
declare that Arnado is an American citizen. Only the courts of the
USA, using American law, have the conclusive authority to make
an assertion regarding Arnado’s American citizenship.
Same; Same; Renunciation of Citizenship; Republic Act No.
9225; View that Arnado’s use of his American passport after his
execution   of   an   Affidavit   of   Renunciation   of   his   American
Citizenship is a retraction of his renunciation; It is as if he never
renounced   his   American   citizenship   at   all.   Arnado,   therefore,
failed   to   comply   with   the   twin   requirements   of   swearing   to   an
Oath   of   Allegiance   and   executing   a   Renunciation   of   Foreign
Citizenship as found in Republic Act No. 9225.―Arnado’s use of
his   American   passport   after   his   execution   of   an   Affidavit   of
Renunciation of his American Citizenship is a retraction of his
renunciation. When Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
30 November 2009, there was no longer an effective renunciation
of   his   American   citizenship.   It   is   as   if   he   never   renounced   his
American  citizenship  at  all.  Arnado,  therefore,   failed  to  comply
with the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship as found in
Republic  Act  No.   9225.   We  previously   discussed  the  distinction
between dual   citizenship and  dual   allegiance,   as   well   as   the
different   acts   required   of   dual   citizens,   who   may   either   have
involuntary   dual   citizenship   or   voluntary   dual   allegiance,   who
desire   to   be   elected   to   Philippine   public   office   in  Cordora   v.
COMELEC, 580 SCRA 12 (2009).425
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 425
 Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Stray Votes; View that Arnado used his
USA passport after his Renunciation of American Citizenship and
before  he  filed his  Certificate  of Candidacy. This positive act  of
retraction of his renunciation before the filing of the Certificate of
Candidacy   renders   Arnado’s   Certificate   of   Candidacy   void   ab
initio. Therefore, Arnado was never a candidate at any time, and
all   the   votes   for   him   are   stray   votes.―Arnado   used   his   USA
passport afterhis   Renunciation   of   American   Citizenship
and before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. This positive act
of retraction of his renunciation before the filing of the Certificate
of Candidacy renders Arnado’s Certificate of Candidacy void ab
initio. Therefore, Arnado was never a candidate at any time, and
all   the   votes   for   him   are   stray votes.   We   reiterate   our   ruling
in Jalosjos   v.   COMELEC,   683   SCRA   1   (2012),   on   this   matter:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second­placer cannot be
proclaimed   winner   if  the   first­placer   is  disqualified  or   declared
ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy  of the  first­placer was valid at the time of  filing  but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing
of   the  certificate  of  candidacy.   If  the  certificate  of  candidacy   is
void ab   initio,   then   legally   the   person   who   filed   such   void
certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at
any  time.  All  votes  for   such   non­candidate  are  stray  votes  and
should not be counted. Thus, such non­candidate can never be a
first­placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab
initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election,
prevailing  jurisprudence  holds  that  all votes  for  that  candidate
are   stray   votes.   If   a   certificate   of   candidacy   void ab   initio is
cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such
candidate   should   also   be   stray   votes   because   the   certificate   of
candidacy   is   void   from   the   very   beginning.   This   is   the   more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of
a   certificate   of   candidacy   that   is   void ab   initio.   Otherwise,   a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or
more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
Brion, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Citizenship; Republic Act No. 9225; View that RA 9225 was
enacted   to   allow   the   re­acquisition   and   retention   of   Philippine
citizenship by: 1) natural­born citizens who were deemed to have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of
426
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
26
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
a   foreign   country;   and   2)   natural­born   citizens   of   the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, became citizens of
a   foreign   country.―RA   9225   was   enacted   to   allow   the   re­
acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship by: 1) natural­
born   citizens   who   were   deemed   to   have   lost   their   Philippine
citizenship   by   reason   of   their   naturalization   as   citizens   of   a
foreign   country;   and   2)   natural­born   citizens   of   the   Philippines
who, after the effectivity of the law, became citizens of a foreign
country.   The   law   provides   that   they   are   deemed   to   have   re­
acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance. x x x Arnado falls under the first category as a
natural­born   Filipino   citizen   who   was   deemed   to   have   lost   his
Philippine   citizenship   upon   his   naturalization   as   an   American
citizen.
 Same;   Same;   Renunciation   of   Citizenship;   View   that
Arnado’s   use   of   his   US   passport   in   travelling   back   to   the
Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could
not,   by   itself,   be   an   express   renunciation   of   the   Philippine
citizenship   he   adopted   as   his   sole   citizenship   under   RA
9225.―Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009,
but he was not immediately notified of the issuance so that and
he   only   received   his   passport   three   months   after   or   sometime
in September 2009. Clearly, when Arnado travelled on April
14,   2009,   June   25,   2009   and   July   29,   2009,   he   had   no
Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the
United States to attend to the winding up of his business
and other affairs in America. A travel document issued by the
proper Philippine government agency (e.g., a Philippine consulate
office in the US) would not suffice because travel documents could
not   be   used;   they   are   issued   only   in   critical   instances,   as
determined by the consular officer, and allow the bearer only a
direct, one­way trip to the Philippines. Although Arnado received
his Philippine passport by the time he returned to the Philippines
on   November   24,   2009,   he   could   not   use   this   without   risk   of
complications   with   the   US   immigration   authorities   for   using   a
travel document different from what he used in his entry into the
US on July 29, 2009. Plain practicality then demanded that the
travel document that he used to enter the US on July 29, 2009 be
the same travel document he should use in leaving the country on
November 24, 2009. Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of
his   US   passport   in   travelling   back   to   the   Philippines   on
November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could not, by itself, be
an express renunciation of
427
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
the Philippine citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship
under RA 9225.
Same; Same; Same; View that the ponencia fails to consider
that under  RA  9225,  natural­born  citizens  who  were deemed  to
have   lost   their   Philippine   citizenship   because   of   their
naturalization   as   citizens   of   a   foreign   country   and   who
subsequently   complied   with   the   requirements   of   RA   9225,   are
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.―I disagree
with   the   ponencia’s   view   that   by   using   his   US   passport   and
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado effectively
reverted   to   the   status   of   a   dual   citizen. Interestingly,   the
ponencia   failed   to   cite   any   law   or   controlling
jurisprudence   to   support   its   conclusion,   and   thus   merely
makes   a   bare   assertion. The ponencia fails   to   consider   that
under RA 9225, natural­born citizens who were deemed to have
lost their Philippine citizenship because of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently complied with
the requirements of RA 9225, are deemed not to have lost their
Philippine   citizenship. RA   9225   cured   and   negated   the
presumption made under CA 63. Hence, as in Japzon, Arnado
assumed   “pure”   Philippine   citizenship   again   after   taking   the
Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his
American citizenship under RA 9225.
Same;   Same;   Same;   View   that   the   law   requires   express
renunciation   in   order   to   lose   Philippine   citizenship.   The   term
means a renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is
not left to inference or implication; it is a renunciation manifested
by  direct and  appropriate language,   as  distinguished  from  that
427 which  is  inferred   from  conduct.―I  loathe  to  rule  that  Arnado’s
use of his US passport amounts to an express renunciation of his
Filipino   citizenship,   when   its   use   was   an   isolated   act   that   he
sufficiently explained and fully justified. I emphasize that the law
requires express   renunciation in   order   to   lose   Philippine
citizenship.   The   term   means   a   renunciation   that   is
made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or
implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and
appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is
inferred from conduct.
Same;  Same; Same;  View that  in the absence of clear and
affirmative   acts   of   re­acquiring   US   citizenship   either   by
naturalization or by express acts (such as the re­establishment of
permanent resi­
428
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
28
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
dency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport
cannot  but  be  considered  an  isolated  act  that  did  not  undo  his
renunciation   of   his   US   citizenship.―In   the   present   case,   other
than   the   use   of   his   US   passport   in   two   trips   to   and   from   the
United   States,   the   record   does   not   bear   out   any   indication,
supported   by   evidence,   of   Arnado’s   intention   to   re­acquire   US
citizenship. To my mind, in the absence of clear and affirmative
acts of re­acquiring US citizenship either by naturalization or by
express   acts   (such   as   the   re­establishment   of   permanent
residency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport
cannot  but  be  considered an isolated  act  that  did  not  undo  his
renunciation of his US citizenship. What he might in fact have
done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this
is a matter irrelevant to the present case. Thus, Arnado remains
to   be   a   “pure”   Filipino   citizen   and   the   loss   of   his   Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of
using his US passport for travel purposes.
Same; Same; Same; View that Arnado sufficiently justified
the   use   of   his   US   passport   despite   his   renunciation   of   his   US
citizenship; when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009
and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that he could
have used to travel to the United States to attend to the business
and   other   affairs  that   he  was   leaving;  He  consistently   used   his
Philippine passport for travel after November 24, 2009, the true
character of his use of his US passport stands out and cannot but
be an isolated and convenient act that did not negate his Oath of
Renunciation.―I   disagree   however,   with   the   conclusion   that
Arnado   effectively   negated   his   Oath   of   Renunciation   when   he
used his US passport for travel to the United States. To reiterate
if only for emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his
US passport despite his renunciation of his US citizenship; when
he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009,
he had no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to
the United States to attend to the business and other affairs that
he   was  leaving.   If   at  all,   he  could   be  faulted   for   using   his   US
passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on November
24, 2009 because at that time, he had presumably received his
Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances explained
above and that he consistently used his Philippine passport for
travel after November 24, 2009, the true character of his use of
his  US passport   stands  out  and  cannot  but  be  an  isolated  and
convenient act that did not negate his Oath of Renunciation.429
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 429
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
ABAD, J., Separate and Concurring Opinion:
 Citizenship; Republic Act No. 9225; View that Section 5(2) of
Republic   Act   9225   provides   the   means   by   which   a   former
Philippine   citizen   who   has   acquired   foreign   citizenship   to   later
reacquire   his   old   citizenship   by   complying   with   certain
requirements.―Sec. 5(2) of Republic Act 9225 provides the means
by   which   a   former   Philippine   citizen   who   has   acquired   foreign
citizenship   to   later   reacquire   his   old   citizenship   by   complying
with certain requirements. Respondent Rommel Arnado complied
with these requirements for regaining Philippine citizenship but,
because he wanted to run for public office, he also renounced his
United States (U.S.) Citizenship when he filed his certificate of
candidacy, conformably with the provisions of Republic Act 9225
that  reads:   (2)  Those   seeking   elective  public  in  the  Philippines
shall   meet   the   qualification   for   holding   such   public   office   as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the   filing   of   the   certificate   of   candidacy,   make   a   personal   and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public   officer   authorized   to   administer   an   oath.   But   his
compliance with the above was challenged before the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) because Arnado afterwards twice used his
U.S. passport in going to and coming from the U.S., the country
whose citizenship he had renounced.
Same; Same; Renunciation of Citizenship; View that Section
349 (a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides
that “(a) A person who is a national of the United States whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily
performing   any   of   the   following   acts   with   the   intention   of
relinquishing   United   States   nationality―x   x   x   (5)   making   a
formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular
officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may
be prescribed by the Secretary of State.” He does not effectively
renounce   his   citizenship   who   does   not   comply   with   what   his
country requires of him.―Section 349 (a)(5) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) sets the procedure that those who have
moved   their   residence   to   other   countries   must   observe   when
renouncing their U.S. citizenship. It provides that “(a) A person
who   is   a   national   of   the   United   States   whether   by   birth   or
naturalization,   shall   lose   his   nationality   by   voluntarily
performing   any   of   the   following   acts   with   the   intention   of
relinquishing   United   States   nationality―x x x   (5)   making   a
formal renunciation of na­
430
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
30
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
tionality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United
States in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the
Secretary   of   State.”   He   does   not   effectively   renounce   his
citizenship who does not comply with what his country requires of
him.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Rexie   Efren   A.   Bugaring   &   Associates   Law   Offices   and
Musico Law Office for petitioner.
  Federico R. Miranda for respondent Linog G. Balua.
   Tomas   O.   Cabili   and   Rejoice   S.   Subejano for   respondent
Mayor Rommel Arnado.
SERENO, C.J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in conjunction
with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the
Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC).   The   Resolution1 in   SPA
No. 10­109(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
2010   is   being   assailed   for   applying   Section   44   of   the   Local
Government   Code   while   the   Resolution2 of   the   COMELEC En
Bancdated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
respondent   Rommel   Arnado   y   Cagoco   (respondent
Arnado/Arnado)   is   solely   a   Filipino   citizen   qualified   to   run   for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
Facts
Respondent   Arnado   is   a   natural   born   Filipino
citizen.3However,   as   a   consequence   of   his   subsequent
naturalization
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 38­49.
2 Id., at pp. 50­67.
3 Id., at p. 229, Exhibit “1­MR,” Certificate of Live Birth.
431
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225   before   the   Consulate   General   of   the   Philippines   in   San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval   of   his   Citizenship   Retention   and   Re­acquisition   was
issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support
and   defend   the   Constitution   of   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines
and   obey   the   laws   and   legal   orders   promulgated   by   the   duly
constituted   authorities   of   the   Philippines   and   I   hereby   declare
that   I   recognize   and   accept   the   supreme   authority   of   the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
the   Republic   and   executed   an   Affidavit   of   Renunciation   of   his
foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely
and   perpetually   renounce   all   allegiance   and   fidelity   to   the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I
divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights
and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
_______________
4 Id., at p. 241, Exhibit “12­MR,” Oath of Allegiance.
5 Id., at p. 239, Exhibit “10­MR,” Order of Approval.
6 Ibid., Note 2 and Annex “1” of Duly Verified Answer, Rollo, 
431
p. 160 and Annex “2” of Memorandum for Respondent, Rollo, p.
178.
7 Ibid., pp. 160 and 178.
432
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
On   30   November   2009,   Arnado   filed   his   Certificate   of
Candidacy   for   Mayor   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del   Norte,   which
contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I   am   not   a   permanent   resident   of,   or   immigrant   to,   a   foreign
country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to   cancel   his   certificate   of   candidacy   for   municipal   mayor   of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local   and   national   elections.9 Respondent   Balua   contended   that
Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau   of   Immigration   dated   23   April   2010   indicating   the
nationality of Arnado as “USA­American.”10
To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
presented   in   his   Memorandum   a   computer­generated   travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in enter­
_______________
8  Id., at p. 139, Annex “B” of Petition for Disqualification; Id.,
at p. 177, Annex “1” Memorandum for Respondent.
9  Id., at p. 134, Petition to Disqualify Rommel Cagoco Arnado
and/or to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in Connection with May 10, 2010
Local and National Elections.
10 Id., at p. 140, Certification.
11 Id., at p. 191, Exhibit “A” of Memorandum for Petitioner
filed before the Commission on Elections.
433
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
ing   and   departing   the   Philippines.   The   said   record   shows   that
Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June
2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the
Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua   likewise   presented   a   certification   from   the  Bureau  of
Immigration   dated   23   April   2010,   certifying   that   the   name
“Arnado,   Rommel   Cagoco”   appears   in   the   available   Computer
Database/Passenger   manifest/IBM   listing   on   file   as   of   21   April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA­AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA­AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
 
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After   Arnado   failed   to  answer   the   petition,   Balua   moved   to
declare him in default and to present evidence ex­parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the
2010   elections   where   Arnado   garnered   the   highest   number   of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It   was   only   after   his   proclamation   that   Arnado   filed   his
verified   answer,   submitting   the   following   documents   as
evidence:14
_______________
433
12 Id., at p. 192, Exhibit “C” of Memorandum for Petitioner
filed before the Commission on Elections.
13 Records, pp. 76­77.
 14 Rollo, p. 42, Resolution dated 5 October 2010, penned by
Commissioner   Rene   V.   Sarmiento,   and   concurred   in   by
Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
434
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
1. Affidavit   of   Renunciation   and   Oath   of   Allegiance   to   the
Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint­Affidavit   dated   31   May   2010   of   Engr.   Virgil   Seno,
Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all
neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long­time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously
and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification   from   the Punong   Barangay of   Poblacion,
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
that   Arnado   is   a bona   fide resident   of   his barangay and
that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local
Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that
Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan,
from   January   1964   to   June   1974   and   from   15   February
1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter   Certification   issued   by   the   Election   Officer   of
Kauswagan  certifying   that  Arnado   has  been  a   registered
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
The Ruling of the COMELEC First Division
Instead   of   treating   the   Petition   as   an   action   for   the
cancellation   of   a   certificate   of   candidacy   based   on
misrepresentation,15 the   COMELEC   First   Division  considered   it
as  one  for  disqualification.  Balua’s  contention that  Arnado  is a
resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that
“Balua failed to present any evidence to support his conten­
_______________
15 Id.
435
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 435
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
tion,”  whereas the First Division still could “not conclude that
16
Arnado failed to meet the one­year residency requirement under
the Local Government Code.”17
In the  matter  of the  issue of citizenship,  however, the  First
Division   disagreed   with   Arnado’s   claim   that   he   is   a   Filipino
citizen.18
We   find   that   although   Arnado   appears   to   have   substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of
consistently   using   his   US   passport   after   renouncing   his   US
citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
x x x x
Arnado’s   continued   use   of   his   US   passport   is   a   strong
indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US
citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the
glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US
passport   six   times   and   his   claim   that   he   re­acquired   his
Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted
by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, “[a] passport is defined as
an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries.” Surely, one
who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue
to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The   dispositive   portion   of   the   Resolution   rendered   by   the
COMELEC First Division reads:
 WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   petition   for
disqualification   and/or   to   cancel   the   certificate   of   candidacy   of
Rommel   C.   Arnado   is   hereby GRANTED.   Rommel   C.   Arnado’s
proclamation  as  the   winning   candidate  for   Municipal   Mayor   of
Kauswagan, Lanao
_______________
16 Id., at p. 43.
17 Id., at p. 44.
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 46­47, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
del   Nore   is   hereby ANNULLED.   Let   the   order   of   succession
under   Section   44   of   the   Local   Government   Code   of   1991   take
effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado   sought   reconsideration   of   the   resolution   before   the
COMELEC En   Banc on   the   ground   that   “the   evidence   is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution
is contrary to law.”21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The   finding   that   he   is   not   a   Filipino   citizen   is   not
supported   by   the   evidence   consisting   of   his   Oath   of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show
that he has substantially complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation
of   his   American   citizenship   is   not   tantamount   to   a
repudiation   of   his   Filipino   citizenship,   as   he   did   not
perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than
the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed
of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used
his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s   petition   to   cancel   the   certificate   of   candidacy   of
Arnado   was   filed   out   of   time,   and   the   First   Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for dis­
_______________
20 Id., at p. 48.
21 Id., at p. 214, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
22 Id., at pp. 193­211, Verified Motion for Reconsideration; id.,
at pp. 212­246, Amended Motion for Reconsideration; id., at pp.
247­254,   Rejoinder   to   Petitioner’s   Comment/Opposition   to
Respondent’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
437
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 437
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
qualification   constitutes   grave   abuse   of   discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his
winning the elections;
6. His   proclamation   as   the   winning   candidate   ousted   the
COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a
petition   for quo   warranto,   which   should   have   been   filed
within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner   Casan   Macode   Maquiling   (Maquiling),   another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case   and   filed   before   the   COMELEC En   Banc a   Motion   for
Reconsideration   together   with   an   Opposition   to   Arnado’s
Amended   Motion   for   Reconsideration.   Maquiling   argued   that
while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable   in   this   case.   Consequently,   he   claimed   that   the
cancellation   of   Arnado’s   candidacy   and   the   nullification   of   his
proclamation,   Maquiling,   as   the   legitimate   candidate   who
obtained   the   highest   number   of   lawful   votes,   should   be
proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling   simultaneously   filed   his   Memorandum   with   his
Motion   for   Intervention   and   his   Motion   for   Reconsideration.
Arnado   opposed   all   motions   filed   by   Maquiling,   claiming   that
intervention   is   prohibited   after   a   decision   has   already   been
rendered,   and   that   as   a   second­placer,   Maquiling   undoubtedly
lost   the   elections   and   thus   does   not   stand   to   be   prejudiced   or
benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 224, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
In   its   Resolution   of   02   February   2011,   the   COMELEC En
Banc held   that   under   Section   6   of   Republic   Act   No.   6646,   the
Commission   “shall   continue   with   the   trial   and   hearing   of   the
action,   inquiry   or   protest   even   after   the   proclamation   of   the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned.”
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also
cited   Section   6   of   R.A.   No.   6646   which   allows   intervention   in
proceedings   for   disqualification   even   after   elections   if   no   final
judgment   has   been   rendered,   but   went   on   further   to   say   that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The   COMELEC En   Banc agreed   with   the   treatment   by   the
First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled
that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than
11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling   of   the   First   Division   and   granted   Arnado’s   Motion   for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
 
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225,
the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April   3,   2009,   that   the   respondent   became   a   pure   Philippine
Citizen again.
_______________
24 A   verified   petition   to   disqualify   a   candidate   pursuant   to
Sec.   68   of   the   OEC   and   the   verified   petition   to   disqualify   a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for
disqualification   may   be   filed   on   any   day   after   the   last   day   for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation. (Sec. 4.B.1. COMELEC Resolution No. 8696).
439
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 439
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
x x x x
The use of a US passport […] does not operate to revert back
his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no
law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does
not operate to “unrenounce” what he has earlier on renounced.
The   First   Division’s   reliance   in   the   case   of In   Re:   Petition   for 25 Rollo,   pp.   64­66,   COMELEC En   Banc Resolution   dated   2
Habeas   Corpus   of   Willy   Yu   v.   Defensor­Santiago,   et   al. is February 2011.
misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen 440
who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the   renewal   of   his   Portuguese   passport.   Strict   policy   is Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, In   his   Separate   Concurring   Opinion,   COMELEC   Chairman
who   acquire   their   citizenship   by   choice,   thus   discarding   their Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born “[T]he application of the more assimilative principle of continuity
citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then
of   citizenship is   more   appropriate   in   this   case.   Under   said
decided   to   repatriate   to   supposedly   help   in   the   progress   of
principle,   once   a   person   becomes   a   citizen,   either   by   birth   or
Kauswagan.   He   did   not   apply   for   a   US   passport   after   his
naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a
renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the
citizen,   and   this   assumption   stands   until   he   voluntarily
case at bar.
denationalizes or expatriates  himself. Thus,  in  the instant  case
x x x x
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be
The   respondent   presented   a   plausible  explanation  as  to   the
presumed   to   have   remained   a   Filipino   despite   his   use   of   his
use   of   his   US   passport.   Although   he   applied   for   a   Philippine
American   passport   in   the   absence   of   clear,   unequivocal   and
passport,   the   passport   was   only   issued   on   June   18,   2009.
competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be
However,   he   was   not   notified   of   the   issuance   of   his   Philippine
resolved in favor of retention of citizenship.”26
passport   so  that   he   was   actually   able   to   get   it  about  three  (3)
On   the   other   hand,   Commissioner   Rene   V.   Sarmiento
months   later.   Yet   as   soon   as   he   was   in   possession   of   his
dissented, thus:
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
[R]espondent   evidently   failed   to   prove   that   he   truly   and
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s
wholeheartedly   abandoned   his   allegiance   to   the   United   States.
submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he
The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all
used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31,
the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of
2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31,
the afore­mention[ed] citizenship runs contrary to his declaration
2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US
that   he   chose   to   retain   only   his   Philippine   citizenship.
passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport
Respondent’s   submission   with   the   twin   requirements   was
was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements
might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his
for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10,
control during that time.25
2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
_______________
 Qualifications   for   elective   office,   such   as   citizenship,   are
continuing   requirements;   once   any   of   them   is   lost   during   his
incumbency,   title   to   the   office   itself   is   deemed   forfeited.   If   a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost
his   citizenship   after   his   election   to   office,   he   is   disqualified   to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the
plurality of votes for the
_______________
26 Id., at p. 69, Separate Concurring Opinion.
441
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
mayoralty   post   cure   the   latter’s   failure   to   comply   with   the
qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes
of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does
not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but
was   adversely   resolved   against   him   after   election,   his   having
obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election
valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox
populi   suprema   est   lex because   the   application   of   the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter   of   popularity.   To   apply   it   is   to   breath[e]   life   to   the
sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified
the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27
The Petition before the Court
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety
of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed   as   the   winner   in   the   2010   mayoralty   race   in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error
on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a
Filipino   citizen   despite   his   continued   use   of   a   US   passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En
Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary   to   his   plea   to   reverse   the   ruling   of   the
COMELEC En   Banc or   to   affirm   the   First   Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the
441
applicability
_______________
27 Id., at pp. 72­73, Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Rene
V. Sarmiento, citing the cases of Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337
SCRA   574   [2000]; Santos   v.   COMELEC,   103   SCRA   628
[1981]; Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961]; and Reyes v.
COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 [1980].
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
of Section 44 of the Local  Government Code,  claiming  that  the
COMELEC   committed   reversible   error   in   ruling   that   “the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified
is in order.”
Issues
There   are   three   questions   posed   by   the   parties   before   this
Court   which   will   be   addressed   seriatim   as   the   subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in
a disqualification case.
 The   second   question   is   whether   or   not   the   use   of   a   foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing
a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or
not   the   use   of   a   foreign   passport   after   renouncing   foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in
the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
Our Ruling
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case
is   proper  
there   has   not   yet   been   any   proclama­
tion of the winner.
Petitioner  Casan  Macode   Maquiling   intervened  at  the  stage
when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the
candidate   who   garnered   the   second   highest   number   of   votes,
Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification
case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter
is disqualified, the votes cast for
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Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
him should be considered stray and the second­placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before
the   COMELEC   is   one   for   cancellation   of   the   certificate   of
candidacy and/or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division
and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one
for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.―Any candidate who has
been  declared by  final  judgment  to  be disqualified  shall  not  be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning   number   of   votes   in   such   election,   the   Court   or
Commission   shall   continue   with   the   trial   and   hearing   of   the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any   intervenor,   may   during   the   pendency   thereof   order   the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
when  evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28 clarified the right of intervention in a
disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That   petitioner   had   a   right   to   intervene   at   that   stage   of   the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear  from  Section  6  of R.A.   No.  6646,  otherwise  known  as  the
Electoral   Reforms   Law   of  1987,   which   provides:   Any   candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for   any   reason   a   candidate   is   not   declared   by   final   judgment
before   an   election   to   be   disqualified   and   he   is   voted   for   and
443 receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any   intervenor,   may   during   the   pendency   thereof   order   the
suspension of the proclamation of such candi­
_______________
28 367 Phil. 132; 307 SCRA 630 (1999).
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
date   whenever   the   evidence   of   guilt   is   strong.   Under   this 30 G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.
provision,   intervention   may   be   allowed   in   proceedings   for 445
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 445
judgment rendered.29 Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. Those   who   retain   or   re­acquire   Philippine   citizenship   under
The   fact   that   the   COMELEC En   Banc has   already   ruled   that this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the   second­placer   rule   set   forth   in Sinsuat   v.   COMELEC30 are the Philippines and the following conditions:
present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of x x x x
the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the (2) Those   seeking   elective   public   in   the   Philippines   shall
matter before this Court. meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the the   certificate   of   candidacy,   make   a   personal   and   sworn
decision   of   the   COMELEC   En   Banc,   cannot   be   sustained.   The renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x31
finality.   It   is   only   after   this   Court   has   ruled   upon   the   issues Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run
raised   in   this   instant   petition   that   the   disqualification   case for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced
originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality. his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing
The   use   of   foreign   passport   after  these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
renouncing   one’s   foreign   citizen­ 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re­acquisition Act of 2003,
ship   is   a   positive   and   voluntary  he became eligible to run for public office.
act   of   representation   as   to   one’s  Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once
nationality   and   citizenship;   it   does  but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation
not   divest   Filipino   citizenship  before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution
regained   by   repatriation   but   it
of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance
recants   the   Oath   of   Renunciation
to the Republic, Arnado re­acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
required   to   qualify   one   to   run   for
the   time,   however,   he  likewise   possessed   American  citizenship.
an elective position.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re­acquisition After   reacquiring   his   Philippine   citizenship,   Arnado
Act of 2003 provides: renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
_______________ Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to
29 Id., at pp. 142­143; p. 639. run for public office.
 _______________
31 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
By   renouncing   his  foreign  citizenship,   he  was  deemed  to  be
solely   a   Filipino   citizen,   regardless   of   the   effect   of   such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
_______________
32 See   excerpts   of   deliberations   of   Congress   reproduced
in AASJS   v.   Datumanong,   G.R.   No.   160869,   11  May   2007,   523
SCRA 108.
In   resolving   the  aforecited   issues   in   this   case,   resort   to   the
deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of
the   legislative   branch   in   drafting   the   assailed   law.   During   the
deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record
of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
x x x x
Pursuing  his  point,   Rep.   Dilangalen  noted  that  under
the measure, two situations exist―the retention of foreign
citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
In  this  case,   he  observed   that  there  are  two  citizenships
and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under
the   Constitution,   dual   allegiance   is   inimical   to   public
interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of
dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship
and the reacquisition  of Philippine citizenship,  there will
now be a violation of the Constitution.
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek
to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance
as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed
law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that
in   one   sense,   it   addresses   the   problem   of dual
citizenship by   requiring   the   taking   of   an   oath.   He
explained   that   the   problem   of dual   citizenship is
transferred   from   the   Philippines   to   the   foreign
country because the latest oath that will be taken by
the   former   Filipino   is   one   of   allegiance   to   the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case
may   be.   He   added   that   this   is   a   matter   which   the
Philippine   government   will   have   no   concern   and
competence over. Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no
longer   be   the   country’s   concern,   when   dual   allegiance   is
involved.
447
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 447
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
However,   this   legal   presumption   does   not   operate   per­
manently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
_______________
Rep.  Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection  to
the original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of
allegiance. Since   the   measure   now   requires   this   oath,   the
problem   of   dual   allegiance   is   transferred   from   the
Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.
x x x x
Rep.   Dilangalen   asked   whether   in   the   particular   case,   the
person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still
owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time,
owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there
is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
 Rep.   Locsin   clarified   that by   swearing   to   the   supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces
his   foreign citizenship.   However,   he   said   that   this   is   not   a
matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a
member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
x x x x
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have
dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with
by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in
the bill which states that “It is hereby declared the policy of the
State   that   all   citizens   who   become   citizens   of   another   country
shall   be   deemed   not   to   have   lost   their   Philippine   citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.” He stressed that what the bill
does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing
about the other citizenship.
Rep.   Locsin   further   pointed   out   that   the   problem   of   dual
allegiance   is   created   wherein   a   natural­born   citizen   of   the
Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in
that   oath   says   that   he   abjures   and   absolutely   renounces   all
allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
_______________
   foreign   country.   The   original   Bill   had   left   it   at   this
stage,   he   explained. In   the   present   measure,   he
clarified,   a  person   is  required   to  take   an   oath   and
the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country.
He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is
no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the
other foreign country. (Emphasis supplied)
33 See   Discussion   of   Senators   Enrile   and   Pimentel   on   Sec.
40(d)   of   the Local   Government   Code,   reproduced   in   Cordora   v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.
By   electing   Philippine   citizenship,   such   candidates   at
the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which  they   are also  citizens  and  thereby   terminate  their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is   of   no   moment   as   the   following   discussion   on   §40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE:
Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line
41,   page   17:   “Any   person   with   dual   citizenship”   is
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present   Constitution,   Mr.   President,   someone   whose
mother  is  a  citizen  of  the  Philippines  but  his father  is  a
foreigner is a natural­born citizen of the Republic. There is
no   requirement   that   such   a   natural­born   citizen,   upon
reaching   the   age   of   majority,   must   elect   or   give   up
Philippine citizenship.
On   the   assumption   that   this   person   would   carry   two
passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father
and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such   a   situation   disqualify   the   person   to   run   for   a   local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when  he would want to run for public office,  he
has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
449
 VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack
when,   after   renouncing   his   foreign  citizenship,   he   continued   to
use   his  US  passport  to  travel   in  and  out  of  the  country   before
filing   his   certificate   of   candidacy   on   30   November   2009.   The
pivotal   question   to   determine   is   whether   he   was   solely   and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed
_______________
SENATOR ENRILE:
Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that
person,   nevertheless,   as   a   citizen?   No   one   can   renounce.
There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be
considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE:
But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require   an   election.   Under   the   Constitution,   a   person
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman’s   example,   if   he   does   not   renounce   his   other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he
is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to
say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: “I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one citizenship.”
SENATOR ENRILE:
But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law,
Mr.   President.   He   will   always   have   one   citizenship,   and
449 that   is   the   citizenship   invested   upon   him   or   her   in   the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will   prove   that   he   also   acknowledges   other   citizenships,
then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run
for public office.
Between   03   April   2009,   the   date   he   renounced   his   foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit   of   renunciation   he   had   earlier   executed.   By   using   his
foreign   passport,   Arnado   positively   and   voluntarily   represented
himself  as   an   American,   in   effect   declaring   before   immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States
of America.
The  renunciation  of   foreign  citizenship  is  not  a   hollow   oath
that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the
next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of
the   foreign   citizenship   and   a   full   divestment   of   all   civil   and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
Mercado  v. Manzano34 already  hinted at this situation when
the Court declared:
His   declarations   will   be   taken   upon   the   faith   that   he   will
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust,   there   are   enough   sanctions   for   declaring   the   loss   of   his
Philippine   citizenship   through   expatriation   in   appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor­Santiago, we sustained the denial
of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking   his   oath   as   a   naturalized   citizen,   he   applied   for   the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar   sanction   can   be   taken   against   anyone   who,   in   electing
Philippine   citizenship,   renounces   his   foreign   nationality,   but
subsequently   does   some   act   constituting   renunciation   of   his
Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
_______________
34 Supra note 28 at p. 153; pp. 649­650.
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renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, 35 it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for
a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country
to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven   days   after   he   renounced   his   American   citizenship,   he
recanted   his   Oath   of   Renunciation 36 that   he   “absolutely   and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA”37 and that he “divest(s) [him]self of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America.”38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using
a   foreign   passport   does   not   divest   Arnado   of   his   Filipino
citizenship,   which   he   acquired   by   repatriation.   However,   by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily
and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual
_______________
35 Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino  citizen may
lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3)   By  subscribing  to  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  support  the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty­
one years of age or more;
(4) By   accepting   commission   in   the   military,   naval   or   air
service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6)    By   having   been   declared   by   competent   authority,   a
deserter   of   the   Philippine   armed   forces   in   time   of   war,   unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7)  In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if,
451
by   virtue   of   the   laws   in   force   in   her   husband’s   country,   she
acquires his nationality.
36 See Note 7.
37 Id.
38 Id.
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
citizen.   Such   reversion   was   not   retroactive;   it   took   place   the
instant   Arnado   represented   himself   as   an   American   citizen   by
using his US passport.
This   act   of   using   a   foreign   passport   after   renouncing   one’s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective
local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship   is   acquired   through   a   positive   act   of   applying   for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens
by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation   as   the   mere   filing   of   the   certificate   of   candidacy
already   carries   with   it   an   implied   renunciation   of   foreign
citizenship.39Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are   required   to   take   not   only   the   Oath   of   Allegiance   to   the
Republic   of   the   Philippines   but   also   to   personally   renounce
foreign citizenship  in order to qualify  as a candidate for  public
office.
By   the   time   he   filed   his   certificate   of   candidacy   on   30
November  2009,   Arnado   was  a   dual   citizen   enjoying   the  rights
and   privileges   of   Filipino   and   American   citizenship.   He   was
qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was not qualified to run
for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen
only for a period of eleven days,  or from  3 April  2009  until  14
April   2009,   on  which  date  he  first  used  his  American  passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
_______________
39 See Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February
2009, 580 SCRA 12.
40 Sec. 40. Disqualifications.―The   following   persons   are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
x x x x
(d) Those with dual citizenship; x x x.
453
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once
any   of   the   required   qualifications   is   lost,   his   title   may   be
seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The   citizenship   requirement   for   elective   public   office   is   a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which   violates   the   oath   of   renunciation   opens   the   citizenship
issue to attack.
We   agree   with   the   pronouncement   of   the   COMELEC   First
Division that “Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his “Affidavit of Renunciation.” 42 This does not
mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the
requirements   that   he   performed   positive   acts   which   effectively
disqualified   him   from   running   for   an   elective   public   office
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of  the Local  Government  Code  in  disqualifying
dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced
his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself
as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
explanation   that   he   was   not   notified   of   the   issuance   of   his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was
only   able   to   obtain   his   Philippine   passport   three   (3)   months
later.43 
_______________
41 Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944; 174 SCRA 245,
453 255 (1989).
42 Rollo, p. 46, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.
43 Id., at p. 219, Amended Motion for Reconsideration. 
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu,
the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino
citizen   and   later   applied   for   the   renewal   of   his   Portuguese
passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act
that   violated   the   Oath   of   Renunciation   he   took.   It   was   still   a
positive   act   of   representation   as   a   US   citizen   before   the
immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated “Yet, as
soon   as   he   was   in   possession   of   his   Philippine   passport,   the
respondent   already   used   the   same   in   his   subsequent   travels
abroad.”44 We  cannot  agree  with  the  COMELEC.   Three  months
from  June  is  September.   If  indeed,   Arnado  used  his  Philippine
passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have
used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides,   Arnado’s  subsequent  use  of  his  Philippine passport
does   not   correct   the   fact   that   after   he   renounced   his   foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used
his   US   passport.   In   the   same   way   that   the   use   of   his   foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent
use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship   is  not   a   matter   of   convenience.   It  is  a   badge   of
identity   that   comes   with   attendant   civil   and   political   rights
accorded   by   the   state   to   its   citizens.   It   likewise   demands   the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded
the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to
public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to
be  deserving   of  the  public trust.  Holding  public  office  demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
_______________
44 Id., at p. 66, Resolution dated 02 February 2011.
455
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 455
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code   applies   to   his   situation.   He   is   disqualified   not   only   from
holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in
the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving   the   third   issue   necessitates   revisiting Topacio   v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that
a second­placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest.   This   doctrine   must   be   re­examined   and   its   soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever­recurring issue that
a   second­placer   who   loses   to   an   ineligible   candidate   cannot   be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner,   Felipe   Topacio,   and   the   respondent,   Maximo   Abad,
were   opposing   candidates   for   that   office.   Topacio   received   430
votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole
ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the
second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912,   without   the   four   years   required   by   Act   No.   2045   having
intervened.46
 Abad thus questioned the eligibility of Topacio on the basis of
a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re­election absent the
four year interruption.
The   often­quoted   phrase   in Topacio   v.   Paredes is   that   “the
wreath   of   victory   cannot   be   transferred   from   an   ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is
_______________
45 23 Phil. 238 (1912).
46 Id., at p. 240.
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots.”47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter
dictum. The Court was comparing “the effect of a decision that a
candidate   is   not   entitled   to   the   office   because   of   fraud   or
irregularities   in   the   elections   x x x   [with]   that   produced   by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.”
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled
to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is
quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible
to   hold   such   an   office.   In   the   former   case   the   court,   after   an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than
the candidate declared to have received a plura[l]ity by the board
of  canvassers  actually   received  the  greater  number  of  votes,   in
which   case   the   court   issues   its mandamus to   the   board   of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that
the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received
a   [plurality]   of   the   legally   cast   ballots.   In   the   latter   case,   no
question  as  to   the   correctness   of   the   returns   or   the   manner   of
casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and
generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In
the   former,   we   have   a   contest   in   the   strict   sense   of   the   word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be
found   that   the   successful   candidate   (according   to   the   board   of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that
another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in
favor   of   the   latter.   In   the   other   case,   there   is   not,   strictly
speaking,   a   contest,   as the   wreath   of   victory   cannot   be
transferred   from   an   ineligible   candidate   to   any   other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the
one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the
one   case   the   question   is   as   to   who   received   a   plurality   of   the
legally cast ballots; in the
_______________
47 Id., at p. 255.
457
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 457
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
other,   the   question   is   confined   to   the   personal   character   and
circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with
“In  the  other case,  there is  not, strictly  speaking,  a contest” in
contrast   to   the   earlier   statement,   “In   the   former,   we   have   a
contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy.”
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held
that “the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots.”
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is
that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try
a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who
obtained   the   highest   number   of   votes   in   the   election,   its
jurisdiction being confined “to determine which of the contestants
has been duly elected” the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when
he “declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on
4 June 1912” where “the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio   was   eligible   to   be   elected   and   to   hold   the   office   of
municipal president.”
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The
Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold
that   the   respondent   judge   exceeded   his   jurisdiction   in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elect[ed] municipal
president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election;
and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon
are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is
rendered   on   respondents’   answer   to   the   order   to   show   cause,
unless respondents
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 254­255.
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered
accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On   closer   scrutiny,   the   phrase   relied   upon   by   a   host   of
decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a
mere   pronouncement   of   the   Court   comparing   one   process   with
another   and   explaining   the   effects   thereof.   As   an   independent
statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
“x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an  ineligible candidate to any other candidate when  the
sole   question   is   the   eligibility   of   the   one   receiving   a
plurality of the legally cast ballots.”
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the
ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When   the   issue   being   decided   upon   by   the   Court   is   the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots
and ineligibility is thereafter established,  what stops the Court
from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next
highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him
that “wreath?”
An   ineligible  candidate  who   receives  the   highest   number   of
votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could
not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of
the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances,
his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date.   Consequently,   he   may   have   had   the   opportunity   to   hold
himself out  to the electorate as  a legitimate and  duly  qualified
candidate.   However,   notwithstanding   the   outcome   of   the
elections,   his   ineligibility   as   a   candidate   remains   unchanged.
Ineligibility   does   not   only   pertain   to   his   qualifications   as   a
candidate  but necessarily   affects  his  right  to  hold  public office.
The number of ballots
_______________
49 Id., at p. 258.
459
 VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with
the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public
office.
The   popular   vote   does   not   cure   the  460
ineligibility of a candidate.
The   ballot   cannot   override   the   constitutional   and   statutory
requirements   for   qualifications   and   disqualifications   of
candidates.   When   the   law   requires   certain   qualifications   to   be
possessed   or   that   certain   disqualifications   be   not   possessed   by
persons   desiring   to   serve   as   elective   public   officials,   those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.
When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually
garners   the   highest   number   of   votes,   even   the   will   of   the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in
the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample
upon   and   rent   asunder   the   very   law   that   sets   forth   the
qualifications   and   disqualifications   of   candidates.   We   might   as
well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the
sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.
This   has   been,   in   fact,   already   laid   down   by   the   Court
in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The   fact   that   he   was   elected   by   the   people   of
Sorsogon   does   not   excuse   this   patent   violation   of   the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to   the   citizens   of   this   country.   The   qualifications
prescribed   for   elective   office   cannot   be   erased   by   the
electorate   alone.   The   will   of   the   people   as   expressed
through   the   ballot   cannot   cure   the   vice   of   ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
459 the   candidate   was   qualified. Obviously,   this   rule   requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
_______________
50 Supra note 41.
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing
all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco
v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon
and   Saya­ang   cannot   be   interpreted   without   qualifications   lest
“Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements.”53
[W]e   have   ruled   in   the   past   that   a   candidate’s   victory   in   the
election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate   sought   to   be   disqualified   if   the   main   issue   involves
defects   in   the   candidate’s   certificate   of   candidacy.   We   said
that while   provisions   relating   to   certificates   of   candidacy   are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as
regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain
steps   before   elections   will   be   construed   as   directory   after   the
elections,   to   give   effect   to   the   will   of   the   people. We   so   ruled
in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya­ang v. COMELEC:
The   present   case   perhaps   presents   the   proper   time   and
opportunity to fine­tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization   that   a   blanket   and   unqualified   reading   and
application   of   this   ruling   can   be   fraught   with   dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections.
For   one,   such   blanket/unqualified   reading   may   provide   a   way
around   the   law   that   effectively   negates   election   requirements
aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to
make   an   informed   choice   about   a   candidate’s   eligibility   and
fitness for office.
The   first   requirement   that   may   fall   when   an   unqualified
reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what   should   be   stated   in   a   COC.   Section   78   may   likewise   be
emasculated
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 944­945, p. 255.
52 G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614­
615.
53 Id., at p. 615, citing Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927,
15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 635, Saya­ang v. COMELEC, 462
Phil. 373; 416 SCRA 650 (2003).
461
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny
due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate   with   false   COC   data   wins.   To   state   the   obvious,
candidates   may   risk   falsifying   their   COC   qualifications   if   they
know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs
may   have.   Election   victory   then   becomes   a   magic   formula   to
bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing
a   seemingly   valid   COC,   concealing   any   disqualification,   and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed
against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if
winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign
voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the
rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot
to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
and   disqualifications   of   candidates   is   not   democracy   or
republicanism.   It   is   electoral   anarchy.   When   set   rules   are
disregarded   and   only   the   electorate’s   voice   spoken   through   the
ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Maquiling   is   not   a   second­placer   as
he   obtained   the   highest   number   of 
votes   from   among   the   qualified
candidates.
With   Arnado’s   disqualification,   Maquiling   then   becomes   the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.462
461 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
We   have   ruled   in   the   recent   cases   of Aratea   v.
COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot
produce   any   legal   effect.   Thus,   the   votes   cast   in   favor   of   the
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even   when   the   votes   for   the   ineligible   candidate   are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part
of that voice and must also be respected.
 As   in   any   contest,   elections   are   governed   by   rules   that
determine   the   qualifications   and   disqualifications   of   those   who
are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel
is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications   nor   lacks   any   of   the   qualifications   set   in   the
rules to be eligible as candidates.
There   is   no   need   to   apply   the   rule   cited   in Labo   v.
COMELEC56 that   when   the   voters   are   well   aware   within   the
realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast
their   votes   in   favor   said   candidate,   then   the   eligible   candidate
obtaining   the   next   higher   number   of   votes   may   be   deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the   rules   affecting   qualified   candidates   who   placed   second   to
ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification
is   not   a   prerequisite   for   the   disqualification   to   attach   to   the
candidate.   The   very   existence   of   a   disqualifying   circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s   disqualification   is   not   necessary   before   a   qualified
candidate who placed second to a disquali­
_______________
54 G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105, 145.
55 G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 1, 32.
56 G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.
463
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
fied one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second­placer in
the   vote   count   is   actually   the   first­placer   among   the   qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed
and   has   assumed   office   is   of   no   moment.   The   subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC
but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.―Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning   number   of   votes   in   such   election,   the   Court   or
Commission   shall   continue   with   the   trial   and   hearing   of   the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any   intervenor,   may   during   the   pendency   thereof   order   the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There   was   no   chance   for   Arnado’s   proclamation   to   be
suspended   under   this   rule   because   Arnado   failed   to   file   his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only
filed his  Answer  on  15  June  2010,  long  after the  elections  and
after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The   disqualifying   circumstance   surrounding   Arnado’s
candidacy   involves   his   citizenship.   It   does   not   involve   the
commission   of   election   offenses   as   provided   for   in   the   first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
463 which   is   to   disqualify   the   individual   from   continuing   as   a
candidate,   or   if   he   has   already   been   elected,   from   holding   the
office.
The   disqualifying   circumstance   affecting   Arnado   is   his
citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and
an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy.
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement “The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.” The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under
any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With  Arnado being  barred from  even becoming  a  candidate,
his   certificate   of   candidacy   is   thus   rendered   void   from   the
beginning.   It   could   not   have   produced   any   other   legal   effect
except   that   Arnado   rendered   it   impossible   to   effect   his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer
to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he
was already proclaimed the winner.
To   hold   that   such   proclamation   is   valid   is   to   negate   the
prohibitory   character   of   the   disqualification   which   Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long
after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May 2010 elections.
Arnado   being   a   non­candidate,   the   votes   cast   in   his   favor
should   not   have   been   counted.   This   leaves   Maquiling   as   the
qualified   candidate   who   obtained   the   highest   number   of   votes.
Therefore,   the   rule   on   succession   under   the   Local   Government
Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Petition   is
GRANTED.   The   Resolution   of   the   COMELEC En   Banc dated   2
February   2011   is   hereby   ANNULLED   and   SET   ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from
running   for   any   local   elective   position.   CASAN   MACODE
MAQUILING   is  hereby   DECLARED   the  duly   elected   Mayor   of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.465
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 465
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Let   a   copy   of   this   Decision   be   served   personally   upon   the
parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco,   Jr.,   Peralta,   Bersamin,   Villarama,   Jr.,   Perez,
Reyes and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Concurring Opinion.
Leonardo­De Castro, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ.,
Join the dissent of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., See: Dissent.
Abad, J., See Separate and Concurring Opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I   concur   in   the   ponencia.   Respondent   Rommel   Arnado
(Arnado)   is   disqualified   from   running   for   any   local   elective
position.   The   Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   should   be
directed   to   proclaim   Petitioner   Casan   Macode   Maquiling
(Maquiling) as the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado received the highest number of votes in the May 2010
elections   and   was   proclaimed   Mayor   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del
Norte.   Respondent   Linog   G.   Balua   (Balua),   one   of   Arnado’s
opponents, filed a petition before the COMELEC against Arnado.
Balua’s   petition   to   disqualify   Arnado   and/or   to   cancel   his
certificate of candidacy rests on the allegation that Arnado lacks
the   residency   and   citizenship   requirements.   Balua   presented
evidence   to   show   that   Arnado   used   his   American   passport   to
enter and depart the Philippines. Maquiling, on the other hand,
was also one of Arnado’s oppo­
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
nents.   Maquiling   received   the   second   highest   number   of   votes
next to Arnado. Maquiling filed motions for intervention and for
reconsideration   before   the   COMELEC En   Banc.   Maquiling
asserted that he should have been proclaimed as Mayor for being
the legitimate candidate with the highest number of votes.
Arnado is a natural­born Filipino Citizen who lost his Filipino
citizenship   upon   his   naturalization   as   an   American   citizen.
Arnado applied for repatriation, and subsequently took two Oaths
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, then renounced
his American citizenship. The relevant timeline is as follows:
10  July  2008 –  Arnado  pledged his  Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.
3 April 2009 – Arnado again pledged his Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his American citizenship.
14 April to 25 June 2009 – Arnado used his United States
of America  (USA) Passport No.  057782700  to depart  and
enter the Philippines.
29 July to 24 November 2009 – Arnado again used his USA
Passport   No.   057782700   to   depart   and   enter   the
Philippines.
30   November   2009 –   Arnado   filed   his   Certificate   of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
A certification from the Bureau of Immigration showed that
Arnado arrived in the Philippines on 12 January 2010, as well as
on 23 March 2010. Both arrival dates show that Arnado used the
same USA passport he used in 2009.
Despite Balua’s petition before the COMELEC, the elections
proceeded without any ruling on Arnado’s qualification. Arnado
received the highest number of votes in the May 2010
467
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 467
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
elections   and   was   proclaimed   Mayor   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del
Norte.
The COMELEC  First Division  issued  its  ruling  on  Arnado’s
qualification   after   his   proclamation.   The   COMELEC   First
Division treated  Balua’s  petition to  disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel   his   certificate   of   candidacy   as   a   petition   for
disqualification.   The   COMELEC   First   Division  granted   Balua’s
petition   and   annulled   Arnado’s   proclamation.   The   COMELEC
First   Division   stated   that   “Arnado’s   continued   use   of   his   US
passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention
to   renounce   his   US   citizenship   and   that   he   only   executed   an
Affidavit   of   Renunciation   to   enable   him   to   run   for   office.”   The
COMELEC   First   Division   decreed   that   the   order   of   succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 1 should
take effect.
Arnado   filed   a   motion   for   reconsideration   before   the
COMELEC En   Banc.   Maquiling   intervened,   and   asserted   that
although   the   COMELEC   First   Division   correctly   disqualified
Arnado,   the   law   on   succession   should   not   apply.   Instead,
Maquiling should have been proclaimed as Mayor for being the
legitimate candidate with the highest number of votes.
 The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of
the  COMELEC  First  Division.   In  granting   Arnado’s  motion  for
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc stated that Arnado’s use
of   his   USA   passport   “does   not   operate   to   revert   back   [sic]   his
status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no
law   saying   such.”  COMELEC  Chair  Sixto  Brillantes  concurred,
and   stated   that   Arnado   “after   reacquiring   his   Philippine
citizenship   should   be   presumed   to   have   remained   a   Filipino
despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear,
unequivocal and competent proof of ex­
_______________
1 Section 44. Permanent   Vacancies   in   the   Offices   of   the
Governor,   Vice­Governor,   Mayor,   and   Vice­Mayor.―If   a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the   vice­governor   or   vice­mayor   concerned   shall   become   the
governor or mayor. x x x.
468
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
patriation.”   Commissioner   Rene   Sarmiento   dissented,   and
declared   that   Arnado   failed   to   prove   that   he   abandoned   his
allegiance   to   the   USA   and   that   his   loss   of   the   continuing
requirement of citizenship disqualifies him to serve as an elected
official.   Moreover,   having   received  the  highest   number   of  votes
does not validate Arnado’s election.
The ponencia granted   Maquiling’s   petition   before   this  Court,
and annulled and set aside the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
The ponencia declared that Arnado’s use of his USA passport did
not divest him of his Filipino citizenship but vested back in him
the American citizenship he earlier renounced. The ponencia also
directed the COMELEC to proclaim Maquiling as the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the May 2010 elections
for   being   the   qualified   candidate   who   received   the   highest
number of votes.
On Arnado’s Use of a Non­Philippine Passport
Philippine courts have no power to declare whether a person
possesses   citizenship   other   than   that   of   the   Philippines.
In Mercado   v.   Manzano,2 Constitutional   Commissioner   Joaquin
G.   Bernas   was   quoted   as   saying,   “[D]ual   citizenship   is   just   a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country   is   something   completely   beyond   our   control.”3 In   the
present case, we have no authority to declare that Arnado is an
American   citizen.   Only   the   courts   of   the   USA,   using   American
law, have the conclusive authority to make an assertion regarding
Arnado’s American citizenship.
Arnado, as a naturalized American citizen and a repatriated
Filipino, is required by law to swear to an Oath of Alle­
_______________
2 367 Phil. 132; 307 SCRA 630 (1999) citing 1 Record of the
Constitutional Commission 203 (23 June 1986).
3 Id., at p. 147; p. 643.
469
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 469
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
giance   to   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines   and   execute   a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before he may seek elective
Philippine public office. The pertinent sections of R.A. No. 9225
read:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.―Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural­born citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby   deemed   to   have   re­acquired   Philippine   citizenship   upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
“I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the   Philippines   and   obey   the   laws   and   legal   orders
promulgated   by   the   duly   constituted   authorities   of   the
Philippines;   and   I   hereby   declare   that   I   recognize   and
accept  the  supreme   authority   of  the  Philippines   and  will
maintain   true   faith   and   allegiance   thereto;   and   that   I
imposed   this   obligation   upon   myself   voluntarily   without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 5. Civil   and   Political   Rights   and   Liabilities.―Those
who   retain   or   re­acquire   Philippine   citizenship   under   this   Act
shall   enjoy   full   civil   and   political   rights   and   be   subject   to   all
attendant   liabilities   and   responsibilities   under   existing   laws   of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the   certificate   of   candidacy,   make   a   personal   and   sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
x x x x.
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Arnado’s use of his American passport after his execution of
an   Affidavit   of   Renunciation   of   his   American   Citizenship   is
a retraction of   his   renunciation.   When   Arnado   filed   his
Certificate   of   Candidacy   on   30   November   2009,   there   was   no
longer an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. It is
as if he never renounced his American citizenship at all. Arnado,
therefore,   failed   to   comply   with   the   twin   requirements   of
swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation
of   Foreign   Citizenship   as   found   in   Republic   Act   No.   9225.   We
previously   discussed   the   distinction   between dual
citizenship and dual   allegiance,   as   well   as   the   different   acts
required of dual citizens, who may either have involuntary dual
citizenship or voluntary dual allegiance, who desire to be elected
to Philippine public office in Cordora v. COMELEC:4
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our
rulings in Mercado v. Manzano, Valles v. COMELEC, and AASJS
v.   Datumanong.   Mercado   and   Valles   involve   similar   operative
facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting,
possessed   dual   citizenship   by   the   circumstances   of   their   birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian
mother   and   a   Filipino   father   in   Australia.   Our   rulings
in Manzano and Vallesstated   that   dual   citizenship   is   different
from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run
for   public   office,   by   effect.   Dual   citizenship   is   involuntary   and
arises   when,   as   a   result   of   the   concurrent   application   of   the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered   a   national   by   the   said   states.   Thus,   like   any   other
natural­born   Filipino,   it   is   enough   for   a   person   with   dual
citizenship   who   seeks   public   office   to   file   his   certificate   of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Dual   allegiance,   on   the   other   hand,   is   brought   about   by   the
individual’s   active   participation   in   the   naturalization   process.
AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized   citizen   of   another   country   is   allowed   to   retain   his
Filipino citizenship by
_______________
4 G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12. Citations
omitted.
471
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
swearing   to   the   supreme   authority   of   the   Republic   of   the
Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit
renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act   of   2003,   was   enacted   years   after   the   promulgation
of Manzanoand Valles.   The  oath  found   in  Section  3  of  R.A.   No.
9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and   defend   the   Constitution   of   the   Republic   of   the
Philippines   and   obey   the   laws   and   legal   orders
promulgated   by   the   duly   constituted   authorities   of   the
Philippines;   and   I   hereby   declare   that   I   recognize   and
accept  the  supreme   authority   of  the  Philippines   and  will
maintain   true   faith   and   allegiance   thereto;   and   that   I
impose   this   obligation   upon   myself   voluntarily   without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the  framers were  not
concerned   with   dual   citizenship per   se,   but   with   the   status   of
naturalized   citizens   who   maintain   their   allegiance   to   their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(2) of
R.A.   No.   9225   states   that   naturalized   citizens   who   reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in
the   Philippines   shall   “meet   the   qualifications   for   holding   such
public   office   as   required   by   the   Constitution   and   existing   laws
and,   at   the   time   of   filing   the   certificate   of   candidacy,   make   a
personal   and   sworn   renunciation   of   any   and   all   foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath” aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
471 served   as   the   bases   for   our   recent   rulings   in Jacot   v.
Dal and COMELEC,   Velasco   v.   COMELEC,   and Japzon   v.
COMELEC, all of which involve natural­born Filipinos who later
became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran
for   elective   office   in   the   Philippines.   In   the   present   case,
Tambunting,   a   natural­born   Filipino,   did   not   subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.5
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 23­25.
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
Hence, Arnado’s failure to comply with the twin requirements
of R.A. No. 9225 is clearly a failure to qualify as a candidate for
Philippine   elective   public   office.   He   is   still   deemed,   under
Philippine   law,   holding   allegiance   to   a   foreign   country,   which
disqualifies him from running for an elective public office. Such
failure to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is
included among the grounds for disqualification in Section 68 of
the   Omnibus   Election   Code:   “Disqualifications.―x x x.   Any
person   who   is   a   permanent   resident   of   or   an   immigrant   to   a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a
permanent   resident   or   immigrant   of   a   foreign   country   in
accordance   with   the   residence   requirement   provided   for   in
election laws.”
On the Selection of the Lawful Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Sur
Arnado   used   his   USA   passport after his   Renunciation   of
American   Citizenship   and before he   filed   his   Certificate   of
Candidacy.   This   positive   act   of   retraction   of   his   renunciation
before the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy renders Arnado’s
Certificate   of   Candidacy void ab   initio.   Therefore,   Arnado
was never a   candidate   at   any   time,   and   all   the   votes   for   him
are stray   votes.   We   reiterate   our   ruling   in Jalosjos   v.
COMELEC6 on this matter:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second­placer cannot
be proclaimed winner if the first­placer is disqualified or declared
ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy  of the  first­placer was valid at the time of  filing  but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing
of the
_______________
6 G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 1,
31­32. Citations omitted. See also Cayat v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
163776 and 165736, 24 April 2007, 522 SCRA 23; and Aratea v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105.
473
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 473
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who filed such  void  certificate of
candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All
votes for such non­candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non­candidate can never be a first­placer in
the   elections.   If   a   certificate   of   candidacy   void ab   initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence   holds   that   all   votes   for   that   candidate   are   stray
votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one
day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should
also   be   stray   votes   because   the   certificate   of   candidacy   is   void
from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical
approach   on   the   effect   of   the   cancellation   of   a   certificate   of
candidacy   that   is   void ab   initio.   Otherwise,   a   certificate   of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid
certificates of candidacy for the same position.7
It   is   undisputed   that   Arnado   had   to   comply   with   the   twin
requirements of allegiance and renunciation. However, Arnado’s
use   of   his   USA   passport   after  the   execution   of  his   Affidavit  of
Renunciation constituted a retraction of his renunciation, and led
to his failure to comply with the requirement of renunciation at
the   time   he   filed   his   certificate   of   candidacy.   His   certiticate   of
candidacy was thus void ab initio. Garnering the highest number
of   votes   for   an   elective   position   does   not   cure   this   defect.
Maquiling,   the   alleged   “second   placer,”   should   be   proclaimed
Mayor   because   Arnado’s   certificate   of   candidacy   was   void   ab
initio. Maquiling is the qualified candidate who actually garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
_______________
7 Id.
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusions that:
(1)respondent   Rommel   C.   Arnado’s   (Arnado)   use   of   his   US
passport   in   traveling   twice   to   the   US   violated   his   Oath   of
Renunciation   so   that   he   reverted   back   to   the   status   of   a   dual
citizen―a distinct ground for disqualification under Section 40(d)
of   the   Local   Government   Code   (LGC)   that   barred   him   from
assuming the office of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; and
(2)the   petitioner,   Casan   Macode   Maquiling   (Maquiling),   the
“second placer” in the 2010 elections, should be rightfully seated
as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
I base this Dissent on the following grounds:
1) Arnado has performed all acts required by Section 5(2) or
Republic   Act   No.   92251 (RA   9225)   to   re­acquire   Philippine
citizenship and to qualify and run for public office;
2) The evidence on record shows that Arnado’s use of his US
passport in two trips to the US after re­acquiring his Philippine
citizenship   under   RA   9225   and   renouncing   his   US   citizenship,
were mere isolated acts that were sufficiently justified under the
given circumstances that Arnado fully explained;
3) Arnado’s   use   of   his   US   passport   did   not   amount   to   an
express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship under Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA 63);
4) Under the circumstances of this case, Arnado did not do
anything to negate the oath of renunciation he took;
_______________
1 An Act Making The Citizenship Of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire   Foreign   Citizenship   Permanent,   Amending   For   the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63. As Amended And For Other
Purposes.
475
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
5) At   any   rate,   all   doubts   should   be   resolved   in   favor   of
Arnado’s  eligibility  after this was  confirmed by  the mandate  of
the   people   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del   Norte   by   his   election   as
Mayor; and
6) The assailed findings of facts and consequent conclusions
of   law   are   based   on   evidence   on   record   and   are   correct
applications of law; hence, no basis exists for this Court to rule
that the Comelec en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling on the case.
The Antecedent Facts
Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen, born to Filipino parents on July 22, 1957 at Iligan City,
Lanao del Norte.2 In 1985, he immigrated to the United States for
job purposes.3 He was deemed to have lost his Filipino citizenship
by operation of law4 when he became a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America while in America.
In 2003, Congress declared it the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be   deemed   not   to   have   lost   their   Philippine   citizenship   upon
compliance with the statute Congress passed―RA 9225.5
Arnado, like many other Filipinos before him, at age 51 and
after a stay of 23 years in the U.S., opted to re­affirm his Filipino
citizenship by filing the required application and
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 229.
3 Id., at p. 162.
4 Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 states:
Section 1. How   citizenship   may   be   lost.―A   Filipino   citizen
may   lose   his   citizenship   in   any   of   the   following   ways   and/or
events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
475
 5 Otherwise   known   as   the   Citizenship   Retention   and   Re­ 12, 2010 (Arrival), January 31, 2010 (Departure), March 31, 2010
acquisition Act of 2003. (Arrival), April 11, 2010
476 _______________
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 6  Rollo, p. 239.
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections 7  Id., at p. 240.
taking his oath before the Philippine Consulate General in San 8  Id., at p. 160.
Francisco, USA. His application was approved by Consul Wilfredo 9  Id., at p. 191.
C.   Santos,   evidenced   by   an   Order   of   Approval   dated   July   10,
10Id., at p. 218.
2008.6 He   took   his   Oath   of   Allegiance   to   the   Republic   of   the
11Id., at p. 219.
Philippines   (Republic)   on   the   same   day   and   was   accordingly
477
issued   Identification   Certificate   Number   SF­1524­08/2008
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 477
declaring him once more purely a citizen of the Republic. 7
On April 3, 2009, Arnado took another Oath of Allegiance to Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
the   Republic   and   executed   an   Affidavit   of   Renunciation   of   his (Departure)  April  16,   2010  (Arrival),  May  20,   2010  (Departure)
foreign citizenship.8 and June 4, 2010 (Arrival).12
Eleven   days   later   or   on April   14,   2009,   Arnado   left   the On November 30, 2009 or six months after he fully complied
country   for   the   United   States.   According   to   Bureau   of with   the   requirements   of   R.A.   No.   9225, Arnado   filed   his
Immigration records, Arnado then used a passport―US Passport Certificate   of   Candidacy (CoC)   for   the   position   of   Mayor   of
(No.   057782700)―that   identified   his   nationality   as   “USA­ Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.13
AMERICAN.” The same record also indicated that Arnado used Five months after or on April 28, 2010, respondent mayoralty
the same U.S. Passport when he returned to the country on June candidate   Linog   C.   Balua   (Balua)   filed   a   petition   to   disqualify
25, 2009. This happened again when he left for the United States Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC. Balua contended that Arnado is
on July 29, 2009 and returned to the country on November 24, a foreigner and is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
2009.9 Balua   attached   to   his   petition   a   Bureau   of   Immigration   (BI)
The record does not show the exact date when Arnado applied certification dated April 23, 2010 indicating Arnado’s nationality
for   a   Philippine   passport;   it   shows   however   that   Consulate as “USA­American” and certifying that the name Arnado Rommel
General   of   the   Philippines   in   San   Francisco,   USA,   approved Cagoco   appears   in   the   Computer   Database/Passenger   Manifest
and issued a Philippine Passport (No. XX 3979162) for Arnado with the following pertinent travel records:14
on June 18, 2009.10 He received this passport three (3) months DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
later.11 Thereafter, he used his Philippine passport in his travels NATIONALITY : USA­AMERICAN
on the following dates: December 11, 2009 (Departure), January PASSPORT : 057782700
     
 DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010 default. The Comelec, however, failed to act on the motion as the
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010 case was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
Arnado   won   the   election,   garnering   5,952   votes   over   the
NATIONALITY : USA­AMERICAN
second   placer,   Maquiling,   who   garnered   5,357   votes.   The
PASSPORT :  057782700
Municipal Board of Canvassers subsequently proclaimed him as
(Significantly,   Arnado   also   submitted   the   photocopy   of   his
the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.18
Philippine passport showing that he used his Philippine passport
In the Answer which he filed after his proclamation, Arnado
on travels on these dates.)15
averred that he did not commit any material misrepresentation in
Balua   also   presented   a   computer   generated   travel   record
his CoC, and that he was eligible to run for the office of mayor of
dated December 3, 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using
Kauswagan,   Lanao   del   Norte;   he   had   fully   complied   with   the
his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and depart­
requirements   of   RA   9225   by   taking   the   required   Oath   of
_______________
Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of his U.S.
12 Id., at pp. 242­245. citizenship.19 To   support   his   allegations,   Arnado   also   submitted
13 Id., at p. 139. the following documentary evidence:
14 Id., at p. 192. _______________
15 Annexes   A­1­A­4   of   Respondent’s   Motion   for 16 Id., at p. 191.
Reconsideration, Id., at pp. 204­208. 17 Balua   filed   the   petition   to   disqualify   and/or   to   cancel
478 Arnado’s   CoC   on   April   28,   2010,   prior   to   the   May   10,   2010
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED elections. Id., at pp. 134­136.
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections 18 Id., at p. 161.
ing   the   Philippines.   The   record   showed   that   Arnado   left   the 19 Id., at pp. 148­156.
country   on   April   14,   2009   and   returned   on   June   25,   2009;   he 479
departed again on July 29, 2009 and arrived back in the country VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 479
on   November   24,   2009.16 In   these   lights,   Arnado’s Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
disqualification was a live election issue, well­known to the  
Kauswagan electorate, who nevertheless voted Arnado into (1) Affidavit   of   Renunciation   and   Oath   of   Allegiance   to   the
office as Mayor.17 Republic of the Philippines dated April 3, 2009;
The Comelec First Division ordered Arnado to file his Answer (2) Joint­Affidavit   dated   May   31,   2010   of   Engr.   Virgil   Seno,
(to Balua’s petition) and a Memorandum. With the petition filed a Virginia   Branzuela,   Leoncio   Daligdig,   and   Jessy   Corpin,   all
mere two weeks from election day, Arnado failed to comply, thus neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long­time resident
giving Balua the opportunity to move that Arnado be declared in of   Kauswagan   and   that   he   has   been   conspicuously   and
continuously   residing   in   his   family’s   ancestral   house   in
Kauswagan;
(3) Certification   from   the   Punong   Barangay   of   Poblacion,
Kauswagan,   Lanao   del   Norte   dated   June   3,   2010   stating   that
Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the
Philippines in 2009;
(4) Certification dated May 31, 2010 from the Municipal Local
Government   Operations   Office   of   Kauswagan   stating   that   Dr.
Maximo   P.   Arnado,   Sr.   served   as   Mayor   of   Kauswagan   from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from February 15, 1979 to April
15, 1986;
(5) Voter   Certification   issued   by   the   Election   Officer   of
Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of
Kauswagan since April 3, 2009.20
The Comelec First Division Ruling
The   Comelec   First   Division   treated   Balua’s   petition   as   a
petition for disqualification instead of a petition for cancellation of
CoC based on misrepresentation. Because Balua failed to present
evidence to support his contention that Arnado is a resident of the
United States, the First Division found no basis to conclude that
Arnaldo did not meet the one­year residency requirement under
the LGC.
On the issue of citizenship, the First Division held Arnado’s
act of using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship
on April 3, 2009, effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation. As
basis, the First Division cited the Court’s ruling in In Re Petition
for   Habeas   Corpus   of   Willie   Yu   v.   Defensor­Santiago,   et   al. It
concluded that Arnado’s continued use of
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 160­164.
480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
his   US   passport   was   a   strong   indication   that   he   had   no   real
intention   to   renounce   his   US   citizenship   and   that   he   only
executed an Oath of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
The   Division   noted   in   this   regard   the   glaring   inconsistency
between   Arnado’s   unexplained   use   of   his   US   passport   and   his
claim   that   he   had   re­acquired   Philippine   citizenship   and   had
renounced his US citizenship.
Based   on   these   premises,   the   Comelec   First   Division
disqualified Arnado, annulled his proclamation, and ordered that
the order of succession to the mayoralty under Section 44 of the
LGC be given effect.21
Maquiling’s Intervention
While   Arnado’s   motion   for   reconsideration   was   pending,
Maquiling intervened and filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
an opposition to Arnado’s motion for reconsideration.
Maquiling   argued   that   while   the   First   Division   correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 is
not applicable; he claimed that with the cancellation of Arnado’s
CoC   and   the   nullification   of   his   proclamation,   he   should   be
proclaimed the winner since he was the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes.22
The Comelec en banc Ruling
The Comelec en banc affirmed the First Division’s treatment
of the petition as a petition for disqualification. It also agreed
with the disposition  of the  First  Division  to  follow the  order of
succession   under   Section   44,   thus   ruling   out   second   placer
Maquiling’s entitlement to the post of Mayor.
The Comelec en banc however, reversed the First Division
ruling and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration. It held
that by renouncing his US citizenship, Arnado
 _______________
21 Id., at pp. 38­49.
22 Id., at pp. 89­96.
481
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
became a “pure” Philippine citizen again. It ruled that the use of a
US passport does not operate to revert Arnado’s status as a dual
citizen   prior   to   his   renunciation;   it   does   not   operate   to   “un­
renounce” what had earlier been renounced.
The Comelec en banc further ruled that the First Division’s
reliance   on In   Re   Petition   for   Habeas   Corpus   of   Willie   Yu   v.
Defensor­Santiago, et al.,23 was misplaced as the facts of this cited
case are not  the same or comparable  with those of  the present
case.   Unlike   the   present   case,   the   petitioner   in   Yu   was   a
naturalized   citizen   who,   after  taking   his   oath   as  a   naturalized
Filipino citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport.  office,   such   as   citizenship,   are   continuing   requirements;   once
Finally, the Comelec en banc found that Arnado presented a
plausible and believable explanation justifying the use of his US
passport. While his Philippine passport was issued on June 18,
2009, he was not immediately notified of the issuance so that he
failed   to   actually   get   it   until   after   three   months   later.   He
thereafter used his Philippine passport in his subsequent travels
abroad.24
The Separate and Dissenting Opinions
Significantly, Comelec   Chairman   Sixto   S.   Brillantes
issued   a   Separate   Opinion   concurring   with   the   Comelec
majority. He opined that the use of a foreign passport is not one
of   the   grounds   provided   for   under   Section   1   of   CA   63   through
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. He cites the assimilative
principle   of   continuity   of   Philippine   citizenship:   Arnado   is
presumed   to   have   remained   a   Filipino   despite   his   use   of   his
American  passport  in  the absence  of   clear  and   unequivocal
proof of expatriation. In addition, all doubts should be resolved
in favor of Arnado’s retention of citizenship.25
_______________
481 23 G.R. No. L­83882, January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 364.
24 Rollo, pp. 50­67.
25 Id., at pp. 68­69.
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
In   his Dissenting   Opinion,   Commissioner   Rene   V.
Sarmiento emphasized that Arnado failed to prove that he truly
abandoned his allegiance to the United States; his continued use
of his US passport  and enjoyment  of all the  privileges of  a  US
citizen ran counter to his declaration that he chose to retain only
his Philippine citizenship. He noted that qualifications for elective
citizenship is lost, title to the office is deemed forfeited. 26
The Issues
The complete issues posed for the Court’s consideration are:
(1) Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case;
(2) Whether  the  use  of  a   foreign passport   after  renouncing
foreign   citizenship   amounts   to   undoing   a   renunciation
made,   and   whether   the   use   of   a   foreign   passport   after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to
run for public office;
(3) Assuming   Arnado   is   disqualified,   whether   the   rule   on
succession in the LGC is applicable in the present case;27
(4) How should doubt in the present case be resolved in light
of Arnado’s election; and
 (5) Whether, based on the facts presented and the applicable
law,   the   Comelec en   banc committed   grave   abuse   of
discretion.
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 70­73.
27 Ponencia, p. 10.
483
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 483
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
The Ponencia
The ponencia grants   Maquiling’s   petition   for   certiorari,   thus
holding   that   the   Comelec   en   banc   committed   grave   abuse   of
discretion in considering the facts and the law presented. It thus
holds that Arnado is a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office   under   Section   40(d)   of   the   LGC.   On   this   basis,
the ponencia rules   that   with   Arnado’s   disqualification,   second
placer Maquiling should be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Based   on   this   conclusion,   the ponencia resolves   all   doubts
against   Arnado   and   disregards   the   democratic   decision   of   the
Kauswagan electorate.
As   the ponencia reasons   it   out,   the   act   of   using   a   foreign
passport   does   not   divest   Arnado   of   his   Filipino   citizenship.   By
representing   himself   as   an   American   citizen,   however,   Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as dual
citizen.   It   emphasizes   that   such   reversion   is   not   retroactive;   it
took   place   the   instant   Arnado   represented   himself   as   an
American citizen by using his US passport.
Thus, by the time Arnado filed his CoC on November 30, 2009,
the ponencia concludes that  Arnado was  a dual  citizen enjoying
the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship; he
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40 (d) of the LGC, he was not qualified as a candidate to
run for a local elective position.28
With   Arnado   barred   from   candidacy,   the ponencia further
concludes   that   his   CoC   was   void   from   the   beginning.   The
affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the CoC so that he was
not a candidate at all in the May 10, 2010 elections. Hence, the
votes cast in his favor should not be counted and Maquiling, as
the qualified candidate who obtained the
_______________
28 Ponencia, p. 17.
484
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
highest number of vote, should be declared the duly elected mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.29 In this manner, the ponencia
effectively disenfranchised 5,952 or 52.63% of those who voted
for   the   top   two   contending   candidates for   the   position   of
Mayor; it rules for a minority Mayor.
Refutation of the Ponencia
Arnado   performed   all   acts   required   by
Section   5(2)   of   RA   9225   to   reacquire
Philippine   citizenship   and   run   for
public   office;   in   fact,   he   actively   fol­
lowed   up   his   re­affirmed   citizenship 
by running for public office.
RA 9225 was enacted to allow the re­acquisition and retention
of   Philippine   citizenship   by:   1)   natural­born   citizens   who   were
deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization   as   citizens   of   a   foreign   country;   and   2)   natural­
born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the
law, became citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that
they are deemed to have re­acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.30
Section 3 of RA 9225 on these points reads:
Section 3. Retention   of   Philippine   Citizenship.―Any
provision   of   law   to   the   contrary   notwithstanding,   natural­born
citizenship   by   reason   of   their   naturalization   as   citizens   of   a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re­acquired Philippine
citizenship   upon   taking   the   following   oath   of   allegiance   to   the
Republic:
“I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Repub­
_______________
29 Id., at p. 26.
30 De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180048,
June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 141, 156.
485
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
lic of  the Philippines and  obey the  laws and  legal orders
promulgated   by   the   duly   constituted   authorities   of   the
Philippines;   and   I   hereby   declare   that   I   recognize   and
accept  the  supreme   authority   of  the  Philippines   and  will
maintain   true   faith   and   allegiance   thereto;   and   that   I
imposed   this   obligation   upon   myself   voluntarily   without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Arnado falls under the first category as a natural­born Filipino
citizen  who  was  deemed  to  have  lost  his  Philippine  citizenship
upon his naturalization as an American citizen.
Under   the   given   facts,   Arnado   indisputably   re­acquired
Philippine citizenship after taking the Oath of Allegiance not only
once but twice―on July 10, 2008 and April 3, 2009. Separately
from this oath of allegiance, Arnado took an oath renouncing his
American   citizenship   as   additionally   required   by   RA   9225   for
those seeking public office.
Section 5 of RA 9225 on this point provides:
Section 5. Civil   and   Political   Rights   and
Liabilities.―Those   who   retain   or   re­acquire   Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and   be   subject   to   all   attendant   liabilities   and   responsibilities
under   existing   laws   of   the   Philippines   and   the   following
conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
485 time   of   the   filing   of   the   certificate   of   candidacy,   make   a
personal   and   sworn   renunciation   of   any   and   all   foreign
citizenship   before   any   public   officer   authorized   to
administer an oath.
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,31 we ruled that Section
5(2) of RA 9225 requires the twin requirements of taking an Oath
of Allegiance and the execution of a similarly sworn Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship. We said:
Breaking down the afore­quoted provision, for a natural born
Filipino,   who   reacquired   or   retained   his   Philippine   citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before American citizenship, solely retaining his Philippine citizenship
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.32 as the law requires. In this way, Arnado qualified for the position
Thus, the respondent in that case, Jaime Ty―a natural born of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and filed a valid CoC.
Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized American The   evidence   on   record   shows   that
citizen―became a “pure” Philippine citizen again after taking the Arnado’s   use   of   his   US   passport   after
Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his his   compliance   with   the   terms   of   RA 
American citizenship. To quote our Decision: 9225,   was   an   isolated   act   that   was 
He   was   born   and   raised   in   the   Municipality   of   General sufficiently explained and justified.
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work The records bear out that Arnado used his US passport in two
in   the   USA   and   eventually   became   an   American   citizen.   On   2 trips to and from the US after he had executed his Affidavit of
October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking Renunciation   on   April   3,   2009.   He   travelled   on   the   following
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before dates:
Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General
Date Destination
in   Los   Angeles,   California,   USA,   in   accordance   with   the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. At this point, Ty still held April 14, 2009 to the U.S.
dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 June 25, 2009 to the Philippines
March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a July 29, 2009 to the U.S.
notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen. 33 November 24, 2009 to the Philippines
In   the  present   case,   Arnado   indisputably   complied   with  the Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but
second requirement of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. On April 3, 2009, he was not immediately notified of the issuance so that and he
he personally executed an Affidavit of Renunciation an only   received   his   passport   three   months   after   or   sometime
_______________ in September   2009.34 Clearly,   when   Arnado   travelled   on
31 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331. April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no
32 Id., at p. 346. Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the
33 Id., at p. 344. United States to attend to the winding up of his business
487 and other affairs in America. A travel
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 487 _______________
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections 34 Rollo, p. 219.
Oath   of   Allegiance   before   notary   public   Thomas   Dean   M. 488
Quijano.   Therefore,   when   he   filed   his   CoC   for   the   position   of 488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mayor   of   the   Municipality   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del   Norte   on Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
November   30,   2009,   he   had   already   effectively   renounced   his
document   issued   by   the   proper   Philippine   government   agency
(e.g.,  a  Philippine  consulate  office  in  the US)  would  not  suffice
because travel documents could not be used; they are issued only
in critical instances, as determined by the consular officer, and
allow the bearer only a direct, one­way trip to the Philippines. 35
Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time
he returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009, he could
not   use   this   without   risk   of   complications   with   the   US
immigration   authorities   for   using   a   travel   document   different
from  what  he  used  in  his  entry   into  the  US  on  July   29,   2009.
Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document that
he   used   to   enter   the   US   on   July   29,   2009   be   the   same   travel
document he should use in leaving the country on November 24,
2009.
Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in
travelling back to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an
isolated act that could not, by itself, be an express renunciation of
the Philippine citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship under
RA 9225.
Arnado’s   use   of   his   US   passport  63? Or alternatively, the retention of his dual citizenship status?
was   not   an   express   renunciation   of  I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts
his   Philippine   citizenship   under
Section 1 of CA 63.
I   disagree   with   the ponencia’s   view   that   by   using   his   US
passport   and   representing   himself   as   an   American   citizen,
Arnado   effectively   reverted   to   the   status   of   a   dual
citizen. Interestingly, the ponencia failed to cite any law or
controlling   jurisprudence   to   support   its   conclusion,   and
thus merely makes a bare assertion.
_______________
35 See http://www.philippineconsulatela.org/FAQs/FAQS­
passport.htm#TD1 (last visited April 14, 2013).
489
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 489
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
The ponencia fails   to  consider   that   under   RA   9225,   natural­
born   citizens   who   were   deemed   to   have   lost   their   Philippine
citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country and who subsequently complied with the requirements of
RA   9225,   are deemed not   to   have   lost their   Philippine
citizenship. RA   9225   cured   and   negated   the   presumption
made   under   CA   63.   Hence,   as   in Japzon,   Arnado   assumed
“pure”   Philippine   citizenship   again   after   taking   the   Oath   of
Allegiance   and   executing   an   Oath   of   Renunciation   of   his
American citizenship under RA 9225.
In this light, the proper framing of the main issue in this case
should be whether Arnado’s use of his US passport affected his
status   as   a   “pure”   Philippine   citizen.   In   question   form―did
Arnado’s use of a US passport amount to a ground under
the   law   for   the   loss   of   his   Filipino   citizenship   under   CA
to an express renunciation of his Filipino citizenship, when its use
was   an   isolated   act   that   he   sufficiently   explained   and   fully
justified.   I   emphasize   that   the   law   requires express
renunciation in  order   to  lose  Philippine  citizenship.   The  term
means   a   renunciation   that   is   made distinctly   and   explicitly
and   is   not   left   to   inference   or   implication;   it   is   a
renunciation   manifested   by   direct   and   appropriate
language,   as   distinguished   from   that   which   is   inferred
from conduct.36
A clear and vivid example, taken from jurisprudence, of what
“express   renunction”   is   not transpired   in Aznar   v.
Comelec37 where   the   Court   ruled   that   the   mere   fact   that
respondent Osmeña was a holder of a certificate stating that he is
an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino,
_______________
36 Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Go Callano, G.R.
No. L­24530, October 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 890, 899.
37 G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703.
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did
not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
In the present case, other than the use of his US passport in
two trips to and from the United States, the record does not bear
out any indication, supported by evidence, of Arnado’s intention
to re­acquire US citizenship. To my mind, in the absence of clear
and   affirmative   acts   of   re­acquiring   US   citizenship   either   by
naturalization or by express acts (such as the re­establishment of
permanent residency in the United States),  Arnado’s use of his
US passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not
undo  his renunciation of  his US  citizenship.  What  he  might  in
fact   have   done   was   to   violate   American   law   on   the   use   of
passports,   but   this   is   a   matter   irrelevant   to   the   present   case.
Thus, Arnado remains to be a “pure” Filipino citizen and the loss
of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from
his isolated act of using his US passport for travel purposes.
Arnado   did   not   violate   his   oath   of  travel after November 24, 2009, the true character of his use of
renunciation;   at   any   rate,   all   doubts
should   be   resolved   in   favor   of   Ar­
nado’s   eligibility   considering   that   he
received   the   popular   mandate   of   the
people   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del 
Norte as their duly elected mayor
I   completely   agree   with   the ponencia that   the   Oath   of
Renunciation   is   not   an   empty   or   formal   ceremony   that   can   be
perfunctorily professed at any given day, only to be disregarded
on the next. As a mandatory requirement under Section 5 (2) of
RA 9225, it allows former natural­born Filipino citizens who were
deemed   to   have   lost   their   Philippine   citizenship   by   reason   of
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to enjoy full civil
and political rights, foremost among them, the privilege to run for
public office.491
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 491
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
I   disagree   however,   with   the   conclusion   that   Arnado
effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation when he used his US
passport for travel to the United States. To reiterate if only for
emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his US passport
despite his renunciation of his US citizenship; when he travelled
on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no
Philippine   passport   that   he   could   have   used   to   travel   to   the
United States to attend to the business and other affairs that he
was   leaving.   If   at   all,   he   could   be   faulted   for   using   his   US
passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on November
24, 2009 because at that time, he had presumably received his
Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances explained
above and that he consistently used his Philippine passport for
his  US passport   stands  out  and  cannot  but  be  an  isolated  and
convenient act that did not negate his Oath of Renunciation.
The   People   of   Kauswagan   have   spoken
and   any   doubt   should   be   resolved   in 
favor of their verdict.
 Separately from the issue of Arnado’s isolated act of using his
US passport, we cannot ignore the fact in a community as small
as  Kauswagan where the two  mayoralty candidates  garnered  a
total of 11,309 votes, Balua’s claim of Arnado’s foreign citizenship
and even the latter’s residency status could not be avoided but be
live   election   issues. The   people   of   Kauswagan,   Lanao   del
Norte, therefore, made their own ruling when they elected
Arnado as their mayor despite the “foreigner” label sought
to be pinned on him. At this point, even this Court should heed
this verdict by resolving all doubts regarding Arnado’s eligibility
in his favor. This ap­
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
proach,   incidentally,   is   not   a   novel   one 38 as   in Sinaca   v.
Mula,39 the Court has already ruled:
_______________
38 See J. Panganiban’s Concurring Opinion in Bengson III v.
House   of   Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal (G.R.   No.   142840,
May 7, 2001, 357 SCRA 545) where respondent Teodoro C. Cruz’
citizenship was also questioned, viz.:
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and
unmistakable   mandate   of   the   people.   It   cannot   supplant   the
sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured
legalism.   The   people   of   the   District   have   clearly   spoken.   They
overwhelmingly  and  unequivocally  voted  for  private  respondent
to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that
Cruz garnered (80,119) in the last elections were much more than
those of all his opponents combined (66,182). In such instances,
all   possible   doubts   should   be   resolved   in   favor   of   the   winning
candidate’s   eligibility;   to   rule   otherwise  would   be   to  defeat  the
will of the people.
Well­entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in
case of doubt, political laws must be so constructed as to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times,
be the paramount considerations in election controversies. For it
would be better to err in favor of the people’s choice than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms.
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival
of   our   democracy.   In   any   action   involving   the   possibility   of   a
reversal   of   the   popular   electoral   choice,   this   Court   must   exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect   to  the  will   of   the  majority,   for   it   is   merely   sound   public
policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice   of   the   majority.   To   successfully   challenge   a   winning
candidate’s   qualifications,   the   petitioner   must   clearly
demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional   and   legal   principles   that   overriding   such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people   would   ultimately   create   greater   prejudice   to   the   very
democratic   institutions   and   juristic   traditions   that   our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.
See   also Fernandez   v.   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
39 373 Phil. 896; 315 SCRA 266 (1999).
493
VOL. 696, APRIL 16, 2013 493
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections
[When]   a   candidate   has   received   popular   mandate,
overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should
be   resolved   in   favor   of   the   candidate’s   eligibility   for   to   rule
otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all,
the   determination   of   the   true   will   of   the   electorate   should   be
paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must
prevail.   This,  in  essence,   is  the  democracy  we continue  to  hold
sacred.
No   Basis   to   Rule   that   the
Comelec   Committed   Grave
Abuse of Discretion.
As my last point, the Comelec en banc considered and accepted
as its factual finding that Arnado’s explanation on the use of his
US passport was sufficient  justification to conclude that he  did
not abandon his Oath of Renunciation. This finding is undeniably
based on evidence on record as the above citations show. In a Rule
64 petition, whether this conclusion is correct or incorrect is not
material   for   as   long   as   it   is   made   on   the   basis   of   evidence   on
record, and was made within the contemplation of the applicable
law.40
In   other   words,   the   Comelec en   banc properly   exercised   its
discretion in acting on the matter; thus, even if it had erred in its
conclusions, any error in reading the evidence and in applying the
law   was   not   sufficiently   grave   to   affect   the   exercise   of   its
jurisdiction.41 From these perspectives, this Court has no recourse
but to dismiss the present petition for failure to show any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec.
In these lights, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
SEPARATE AND CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I   fully   concur   with   the   majority   but   would   add   another
argument in support of the decision.
Sec. 5(2) of Republic Act 9225 provides the means by which a
former Philippine citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship to
later   reacquire   his   old   citizenship   by   complying   with   certain
requirements.  Respondent Rommel Arnado complied  with these
requirements for regaining Philippine citizenship but, because he
wanted   to   run   for   public   office,   he   also   renounced   his   United
States   (U.S.)   Citizenship   when   he   filed   his   certificate   of
candidacy, conformably with the provisions of Republic Act 9225
that reads:
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the  time of the filing of the certificate  of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all   foreign   citizenship   before   any   public   officer
authorized to administer an oath.
But his compliance with the above was challenged before the
Commission   on   Elections   (Comelec)   because   Arnado   afterwards
twice used his U.S. passport in going to and coming from the U.S.,
the country whose citizenship he had renounced.
The  majority   opinion  amply   states   that  by   his  acts,   Arnado
showed that he did not effectively renounce his U.S. citizenship.
To   this   I   add   that   he   also   failed   to   comply   with   the   U.S.
requirements for citizens wishing to renounce their citizenships.
Section   349   (a)(5)   of   the   Immigration   and   Nationality   Act
(INA)1 sets   the   procedure   that   those   who   have   moved   their
residence to other countries must observe when renouncing their
U.S. citizenship. It provides that “(a) A person who is a national of
the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose
his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following acts
with   the   intention   of   relinquishing   United   States
nationality―x x x (5) making a formal renunciation of nationality
before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a
foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary
of   State.”   He   does   not   effectively   renounce   his   citizenship   who
does not comply with what his country requires of him.
Here, there is no showing that Arnado, a U.S. citizen, fulfilled
the   above   requirement.   To   the   eyes   of   the   U.S.   government,
Arnado remains its citizen, owing obligations of loyalty to it and
subject   to   its   laws   wherever   he   may   be.   Indeed,   the   U.S.
government had not cancelled his passport, permitting him to use
the same  a number of times  after he  reacquired his  Philippine
citizenship. If the U.S. continues to regard Arnado as its citizen,
then   he   has   two   citizenships,   a   ground   for   cancelling   his
certificate of candidacy for a public office in the Philippines.
Petition   granted,   COMELEC   En   Banc   resolution   dated   2
February 2011 annulled and set aside.
Notes.―It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow
the   citizenship   of   the   father   and   that   illegitimate   children   are
under   the   parental   authority   of   the   mother   and   follow   her
nationality. (Go, Sr. vs. Ramos, 598 SCRA 266 [2009])
R.A.   No.   9225   categorically   demands   natural­born   Filipinos
who   re­acquire   their   citizenship   and   seek   elective   office,   to
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships   before   an   authorized   public   officer   prior   to   or
simultaneous   to   the   filing   of   their   certificates   of   candidacy,   to
qualify as candidates  in  Philippine  elections.  (Sobejana­Condon
vs. Commission on Elections, 678 SCRA 267 [2012])
――o0o―― 
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
Case law teaches that the issue as to the identity of the drugs
allegedly sold is commonly resolved by a scrutiny of the chain of
custody of the recovered drugs. (People vs. Bernardino, 602 SCRA
270 [2009])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 188314. January 10, 2011.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.KHADDAFY   JANJALANI,   GAMAL   B.   BAHARAN
a.k.a.   Tapay,   ANGELO  TRINIDAD  a.k.a.  Abu  Khalil,   GAPPAL
BANNAH  ASALI   a.k.a.   Maidan  or  Negro,   JAINAL   SALI   a.k.a.
Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky,
and other JOHN and JANE DOES, accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a.
Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or
Zaky, accused­appellants.
Criminal   Procedure;   Plea   of   Guilty;   All   trial   judges   must
refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and
the import of an inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge
to   conduct   a   searching   inquiry   applies   more   so   in   cases   of   re­
arraignment.—As  early   as  in People  v.   Apduhan,   24   SCRA  798
the Supreme Court has ruled that “all trial judges … must refrain
from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound
to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty,   he   understands   fully   the   meaning   of   his   plea   and   the
import of an inevitable conviction.” Thus, trial court judges are
required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
158
 1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
58
People vs. Baharan
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When
the   accused   pleads   guilty   to   a   capital   offense,   the court   shall
conduct   a   searching   inquiry into   the   voluntariness   and
full   comprehension   of   the   consequences   of   his   plea and
shall  require the prosecution  to prove his guilt and  the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his   behalf.   The   requirement   to   conduct   a   searching   inquiry
applies more so in cases of re­arraignment. In People v. Galvez,
378   SCRA   389   (2002),   the   Court   noted   that   since   accused­
appellant’s original plea was “not guilty,” the trial court should
have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his
plea to “guilty.”
Same; Same; The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry
should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the
accused—the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of
judges,  as  they are mandated  by the  rules to satisfy themselves
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions;   or   a   misunderstanding   of   the   significance,   effects,
and   consequences   of   their   guilty   plea.—The   requirement   to
conduct   a   searching   inquiry   should   not   be   deemed   satisfied   in
cases   in   which   it   was   the   defense   counsel   who   explained   the
consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in
this case. In People v. Alborida, 359 SCRA 495 (2001), this Court
found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if
the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel
had   explained   the   consequences   of   the   guilty   plea;   that   he
understood   the   explanation   of   his   counsel;   that   the   accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching   inquiry   remains   the   duty   of   judges,   as   they   are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had
not   been   under   coercion   or   duress;   mistaken   impressions;   or   a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of
their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Same;  Same;  Convictions based on an improvident plea  of
guilt   are   set   aside   only   if   such   plea   is   the   sole   basis   of   the
judgment.—In People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634 (2004), the Court
declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching
inquiry was not complied with, “[t]he manner by which the plea of
guilt   is   made   …   loses   much   of   great   significance   where   the
conviction can be based on independ­
159
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 15
9
People vs. Baharan
ent evidence proving the commission by the person accused
of the offense charged.” Thus, in People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490
(2000),   the   Court   stated: Convictions   based   on   an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient   and   credible   evidence   to   convict   the   accused,
the   conviction   must   be   sustained,   because   then   it   is
predicated  not  merely  on  the  guilty  plea  of  the  accused  but  on
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
Criminal   Law;   Conspiracy;   Principals;   One   who   gave
instructions   and   training   to   another   on   how   to   make   bombs—
coupled   with   their   careful   planning   and   persistent   attempts   to
bomb different areas in Metro Manila and his confirmation that
another would be getting TNT from one of the accused as part of
their mission—make him a principal by inducement since it is his
co­inducement   which   was   the   determining   cause   of   the
commission of the crime.—In the light of the foregoing evidence,
the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17
of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   reads:   Art.   17. Principals.—The
following   are  considered   principals:   1.   Those  who  take  a   direct
part   in  the  execution  of   the  act   2.   Those   who  directly   force   or
induce   others   to   commit   it   3.   Those   who   cooperate   in   the
commission of the offense by another act without which it would
not   have   been   accomplished   Accused   Rohmat   is   criminally
responsible   under   the   second   paragraph,   or   the   provision   on
“principal by inducement.” The instructions and training he had
given  Asali  on how   to  make  bombs—coupled  with  their  careful
planning   and   persistent   attempts   to   bomb   different   areas   in
Metro Manila and Rohmat’s confirmation that Trinidad would be
getting   TNT   from   Asali   as   part   of   their   mission—prove   the
finding that Rohmat’s co­inducement was the determining cause
of the commission of the crime. Such “command or advice [was] of
such   nature   that,   without   it,   the   crime   would   not   have
materialized.”
Same; Same; Evidence; While it is true that statements made
by   a   conspirator   against   a   co­conspirator   are   admissible   only
when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant
repeats   the   statement   in   court,   his   extrajudicial   confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as
to   both   conspirators.—Accused   contend   that   the   testimony   of
Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. It is true that    Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
160
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
60
People vs. Baharan
under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a
co­conspirator   are   admissible   only   when   made   during   the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People
v.   Buntag,   427   SCRA   180   (2004),   if   the   declarant   repeats   the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial
admission,   making   the   testimony   admissible   as   to   both
conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA 486 (2000), the
Court   held   the   following:   …   [W]e   must   make   a   distinction
between   extrajudicial   and   judicial   confessions.   An   extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but
not against his co­accused as they are deprived of the opportunity
to cross­examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against
the   declarant’s   co­accused   since   the   latter   are   afforded
opportunity to cross­examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party
adversely   affected   has   the   opportunity   to   cross­examine
the   declarant. Mercene’s   admission   implicating   his   co­accused
was   given   on   the   witness   stand.   It   is   admissible   in   evidence
against  appellant  Palijon.   Moreover,   where  several   accused   are
tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co­accused
implicating   his   co­accused   is   competent   evidence   against   the
latter.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
SERENO, J.:
 Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05­
476   and   05­4777   dated   18   October   2005.   The   latter   Decision
convicted   the   three   accused­appellants—namely,   Gamal   B.
Baharan   a.k.a.   Tapay,   Angelo   Trinidad   a.k.a.   Abu   Khalil,   and
Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky—of the complex
crime   of   multiple   murder   and   multiple   frustrated   murder,   and
sentenced them to suffer the pen­
161
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 161
People vs. Baharan
alty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence
to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act
Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as
follows:
On   14   February   2005,   an   RRCG   bus   was   plying   its   usual
southbound   route,   from   its   Navotas   bus   terminal   towards   its
Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).
Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move
out   of   the   Guadalupe­EDSA   southbound   bus   stop,   the   bus
conductor   noticed   two   men   running   after   the   bus.   The   two
insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let
them in.
According   to   Elmer   Andales,   the   bus   conductor,   he
immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they
got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other—one
sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of
the  bus.  At the  time, there  were only 15 passengers inside the
bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish.
When he approached the person near the driver and asked him
whether   he   was   paying   for   two   passengers,   the   latter   looked
dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying   for   two   and   gave   PhP20.   Andales   grew   more   concerned
when   the   other   man   seated   at   the   back   also   paid   for   both
passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain
that   the   two   were   up   to   no   good,   and   that   there   might   be   a
holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because
both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala
Avenue.   The   witness   also   noticed   that   the   man   at   the   back
appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of
him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales
162
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales
admitted,   however,   that   he   did   not   report   the   suspicious
characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus.
According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them   off   the   bus,   because   a   Makati   ordinance   prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually,
the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight.
The   two   immediately   got   off   the   bus   and   ran   towards   Ayala
Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw
fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a
nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was.
He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking
traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the
Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The   prosecution   presented   documents   furnished   by   the
Department   of   Justice,   confirming   that   shortly   before   the
explosion,   the   spokesperson   of   the   Abu   Sayyaf   Group—Abu
Solaiman—announced   over   radio   station   DZBB   that   the   group
had   a   Valentine’s   Day   “gift”   for   former   President   Gloria
Macapagal­Arroyo.   After   the   bombing,   he   again   went   on   radio
and warned of more bomb attacks.
As   stipulated   during   pretrial,   accused   Trinidad   gave   ABS­
CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after the
incident,   confessing   his   participation   in   the   Valentine’s   Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused   Baharan   likewise   admitted   his   role   in   the   bombing
incident.   Finally,   accused   Asali   gave   a   television   interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan   and   Trinidad,   and   confirmed   that   they   were   the   two
men   who   had   entered   the   RRCG   bus   on   the   evening   of   14
February.163
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011
People vs. Baharan
Members   of   the   Abu   Sayyaf   Group—namely   Khaddafy
Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah
Asali,   Jainal   Asali,   Rohmat   Abdurrohim   a.k.a.   Abu   Jackie   or
Zaky, and other “John” and “Jane Does”—were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad,   Asali,   and   Rohmat   were   arrested,   while   the   other
accused remain at­large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim.
Case No. 05­476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea
of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated   murder charge   (Crim.   Case   No.   05­477),   accused
Asali   pled guilty.   Accused   Trinidad   and   Baharan   pled not
guilty.   Rohmat   pled not   guilty to   both   charges.   During   the
pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all  three  accused namely alias  Baharan,  Trinidad,
and Asali admitted knowing one another before February
14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb
exploded  in the  RRCG  bus  while  the bus was  plying the
EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of
the Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias
Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to make explosive
devices.
5.) The   accused   Trinidad   also   admitted   knowing   Rohmat
before the February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to
causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left
four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
163 7.) Both   Baharan   and   Trinidad   agreed   to   stipulate   that
within   the   period   March   20­24   each   gave   separate
interviews to the ABS­CBN news network admitting their
participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject
of these cases.164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading
guilty   to   these   crimes,   because   they   were   guilt­stricken
after  seeing   a  man  carrying   a  child  in  the  first  bus  that
they had entered.
 9.) Accused   Asali   likewise   admitted   that   in   the   middle   of
March 2005 he gave a television news interview in which
he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which
resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which
resulted in the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
that they are members of the Abu Sayyaf.1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked
whether   accused   Baharan   and   Trinidad   were   amenable   to
changing   their   “not   guilty”   pleas   to   the   charge   of multiple
frustrated   murder,   considering   that   they   pled   “guilty”   to  the
heavier   charge   of multiple   murder,   creating   an   apparent
inconsistency   in   their   pleas.   Defense   counsel   conferred   with
accused   Baharan   and   Trinidad   and   explained   to   them   the
consequences   of   the   pleas.   The   two   accused   acknowledged   the
inconsistencies   and   manifested   their   readiness   for   re­
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan
and   Trinidad   pled   guilty   to   the   charge   of multiple   frustrated
murder.2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified
that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat,
a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they
were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that
their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway
Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As   found   by   the   trial   court,   Asali,   after   his   training,   was
required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu So­
_______________
1 Omnibus Decision of the Trial Court at 6, CA Rollo at p. 97.
2 TSN, 18 April 2005, at 3­17.
165
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 165
People vs. Baharan
laiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun,
aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he
knew   would   be   used   to   make   a   bomb.   He   then   recalled   that
sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for
a   total   of   4   kilos   of   TNT—that   is,   2   kilos   on   two   separate
occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad
would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The
TNT   was   allegedly   placed   in  two  buses   sometime   in  December
2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day
bombing,   Trinidad   and   Baharan   got   another   two   kilos   of   TNT
from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call
from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go
to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad
had   already   been   exploded   in   Makati.   Thirty   minutes   later,
Trinidad   called   Asali,   repeating   the   warning   of   Abu   Solaiman.
The   next   day,   Asali   allegedly   received   a   call   from   accused
Rohmat,   congratulating   the   former   on   the   success   of   the
mission.3According   to   Asali,   Abu   Zaky   specifically   said,   “Sa
wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.”
Assignment of Errors
Accused­appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The   trial   court   gravely   erred   in   accepting   accused­
appellants’ plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching
inquiry   into   the   voluntariness   and   full   comprehension   of
the consequences of the said plea.
_______________
 3 CA Rollo at p. 29.
166
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
accused­appellants for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.4
First Assignment of Error
Accused­appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial
court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed
their   plea   from   “not   guilty”   to   “guilty.”   The   transcript   of
stenographic   notes   during   the   18   April   2005   re­arraignment
before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court :Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering
the   stipulations   that   were   agreed   upon   during   the   last
hearing,   is   to   address   this   matter   of   pleas   of   not   guilty
entered   for   the   frustrated   murder   charges   by   the   two
accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will
recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder
charges,   but   then   earlier   pleas   of   not   guilty   for
the frustrated multiple murder charges
      remain…   [I]s   that   not   inconsistent   considering   the
stipulations   that   were   entered   into   during   the   initial
pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to
have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at
least   four   people  and   injury   of  about  forty   other  persons
and   so   under   the   circumstances,   Atty   Peña,   have   you
discussed this matter with your clients?
… … …
Atty. Peña :Then we should be given enough time to talk with
them. I haven’t conferred with  accused, they have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and
_______________
4 Brief for the Accused­Appellants at 1­2, CA Rollo at 73­74.
167
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 167
People vs. Baharan
them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
… … …
Court :Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist
the   two   accused   because   if   they   are   interested   in
withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
     (At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused,
namely Trinidad and Baharan)
      I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to
them the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that
the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to
the frustrated   multiple   murder actually   are   inconsistent
with their pleas.
Court :With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty.   Peña:Yes,   your   Honor.   So,   they   are   now,   since   they
already plead guilt to the murder case, then they are now
changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one
of   guilt.   They   are   now   ready,   your   Honor,   for   re­
arraignment.
… … …
INTERPRETER:(Read again that portion [of the information]
and  translated  it  in  Filipino  in  a  clearer  way   and  asked
both accused what their pleas are).
       Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of
guilt to the crime charged.
COURT:All right. So after the information was re­read to the
changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated
 murder.   Thank   you.   Are   there   any   matters   you   need   to
address at pretrial 
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
now?   If   there   are   none,   then   I   will   terminate   pretrial   and
accommodate…5
As   early   as   in People   v.   Apduhan, the   Supreme   Court   has
ruled that “all trial judges … must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy   administration,   judges   are   duty   bound   to   be   extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an
inevitable   conviction.”6 Thus,   trial   court   judges   are   required   to
observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—
When   the  accused   pleads   guilty   to  a   capital   offense,   the court
shall   conduct   a   searching   inquiry into   the   voluntariness
and   full   comprehension   of   the   consequences   of   his
plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise   degree   of   culpability.   The   accused   may   also   present
evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more
so in cases of re­arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted
that since accused­appellant’s original plea was “not guilty,” the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why
he changed his plea to “guilty.”7According to the Court:
“The   stringent   procedure   governing   the   reception   of   a   plea   of
guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed
upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the
possibility that
_______________
5 TSN, 18 April 2005, at 3­4, 14­15.
6 People  v.  Apduhan, G.R.   No.  L­19491,   30  August  1968,   24
SCRA 798.
7 People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 135053, 6 March 2002, 378 SCRA
389; see alsoPeople v. Chua, G.R. No. 137841, 1 October 2001, 366
SCRA 283.
169
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 169
People vs. Baharan
the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea.”8
Likewise,   the   requirement   to   conduct   a   searching   inquiry
should   not   be   deemed   satisfied   in   cases   in   which   it   was   the
defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea
to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida,
this   Court   found   that   there   was   still   an   improvident   plea   of
guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that
his   counsel   had   explained   the   consequences   of   the   guilty   plea;
that   he   understood   the   explanation   of   his   counsel;   that   the
accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted
out   to   him;   and   that   he   had   not   been   intimidated,   bribed,   or
threatened.9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching   inquiry   remains   the   duty   of   judges,   as   they   are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had
not   been   under   coercion   or   duress;   mistaken   impressions;   or   a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of
their   guilty   plea.10 This   requirement   is   stringent   and
mandatory.11
 Nevertheless,   we   are   not   unmindful   of   the   context   under
which the re­arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court
observes   that   accused   Baharan   and   Trinidad   previously   pled
guilty  to  another  charge—multiple  murder—based  on  the  same
act relied upon in the multiple frustrated
_______________
8  People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 135053, 6 March 2002, 378 SCRA
389, citing People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517, 526 (2000).
9  People   v.   Alborida,   G.R.   No.   136382,   25   June   2001,   359
SCRA 495.
10 People v. Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, 20 July 1990, 187 SCRA
637; People   v.   Alborida,   G.R.   No.   136382,   25   June   2001,   359
SCRA 495, citing People v. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519 (1999)
11 People   v.   Galvez,   G.R.   No.   135053,   6   March   2002,   378
SCRA 389.
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change
of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two
other   confessions   of   guilt—one   through   an   extrajudicial
confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both
accused   during   pretrial),   and   the   other via judicial   admission
(pretrial   stipulation).   Considering   the   foregoing   circumstances,
we   deem   it   unnecessary   to   rule   on   the   sufficiency   of   the
“searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for re­
arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was
not   the   sole   basis   of   the   condemnatory   judgment   under
consideration.12
Second Assignment of Error
In People   v.   Oden,   the   Court   declared   that   even   if   the
requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied
with, “[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses
much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent   evidence   proving   the   commission   by   the   person
accused of the offense charged.” 13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the
Court stated:
“Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set
aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If
the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict   the   accused,   the   conviction   must   be   sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused   but   on   evidence   proving   his   commission   of   the   offense
charged.”14 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused­appellants assert
that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They
_______________
12 People   v.   Alborida,   G.R.   No.   136382,   25   June   2001,   359
SCRA 495.
13 People   v.   Oden,   G.R.   Nos.   155511­22,   14  April   2004,   427
SCRA 634, citing People v. Galas, 354 SCRA 722 (2001).
14 People v. Nadera, G.R. Nos. 131384­87, 2 February 2000,
324 SCRA 490.
171
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 171
People vs. Baharan
pointed   out   that   the   testimony   of   the   conductor   was   merely
circumstantial,   while   that   of   Asali   as   to   the   conspiracy   was
insufficient.
 Insofar   as   accused­appellants   Baharan   and   Trinidad   are
concerned,  the  evidence  for the prosecution,  in addition to that
which   can   be   drawn   from   the   stipulation   of   facts,   primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales,
and of the accused­turned­state­witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had
acted   suspiciously   while   inside   the   bus;   who   had   insisted   on
getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who
had   scampered   away   from   the   bus   moments   before   the   bomb
exploded.   On  the  other   hand,   Asali   testified   that  he  had   given
accused   Baharan   and   Trinidad   the   TNT   used   in   the   bombing
incident in Makati  City.  The guilt  of  the  accused  Baharan and
Trinidad   was   sufficiently   established   by   these   corroborating
testimonies,   coupled   with   their   respective   judicial   admissions
(pretrial   stipulations)   and   extrajudicial   confessions   (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that
they   were   indeed   the   perpetrators   of   the   Valentine’s   Day
bombing.15 Accordingly,   the   Court   upholds   the   findings   of   guilt
made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent   accused   Rohmat,   the   evidence   for   the   prosecution
consisted of the testimony of accused­turned­state­witness Asali.
Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on
the   state   prosecutor’s   direct   examination   of   state­witness   Asali
during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q: You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under
what circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to
assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
_______________
15 Alano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111244, 15 December
1997,  283  SCRA 269,  citing People v.  Hernandez, 260
SCRA 25 (1996).
172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
A: Abu   Zaky,   Abu   Solaiman,   Khadaffy   Janjalani,   the
three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be the
one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q: Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it
take that training?
A: If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb
about one month and two weeks.
… … …
Q: Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you
were   still   in   training   at   Mr.   Cararao,   is   there   any
mission   that   you   undertook,   if   any,   with   respect   to
that mission?
… … …
A: Our   first  mission  was   to  plant  a   bomb   in  the  malls,
LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila, sir.16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for
accused Baharan and Trinidad.
Q: Now,   going   back   to   the   bomb.   Mr.   witness,   did   you
know   what   happened   to   the   2   kilos   of   bomb   that
Trinidad   and   Tapay   took   from   you   sometime   in
November 2004?
A: That was the explosive that he planted in the G­liner,
which did not explode.
Q: How did you know, Mr. witness?
A: He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
… … …
Q: What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did
not explode, as told to you by Trinidad?
A: On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of
TNT bombs.
… … …
 Q:   Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount Q: So besides these two incidents, were there any other
of explosive on that date, December 29, 2004? Will you incidents   that   Angelo   Trinidad   and   Tapay   get   an
kindly tell us the reason why? explosive for you, Mr. witness?
… … … … … …
_______________ A: If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30
p.m.
16 TSN, 26 May 2005, at 24­36. Q: Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
173 A: It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 173 … … …
People vs. Baharan Q: How   many   explosives   did   they   get   from   you,   Mr.
A: He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the witness, at that time?
TNT so that he could detonate a bomb A: They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
… … … Q: Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to
Q: Were there  any  other person,  besides Abu  Solaiman, use that explosive?
who called you up, with respect to the taking of the A: No, sir.174
explosives from you? SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A: There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also. People vs. Baharan
Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up? Q: Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third
A: He told me that “this is your first mission.” batch   of   explosives,   which   were   taken   from   you   by
Q: Please   enlighten   the   Honorable   Court.   What   is   that Trinidad and Tapay?
mission you are referring to? … … …
A: That is the first mission where we can show our anger A: That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
towards the Christians. Q: Why did you know, Mr. witness?
… … … A: Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by
Q: The   second   time   that   he   got   a   bomb   from   you,   Mr. Abu   Solaiman.   He   told   me   not   to   leave   the   house
witness, do you know if the bomb explode? because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and
A:    I   did   not   know   what   happened   to   the   next   2   kilos Angelo Trinidad exploded.
taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was … … …
caught,   because   I   was   told   by   the   policeman   that Q: Was   there   any   other   call   during   that   time,   Mr.
interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos Witness?
were planted in a bus, which also did not explode. … … …
A: I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house
because the explosive that he took exploded already,
sir.
Q:   How sure were you, Mr.  witness, at that time, that
indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati, beside the call
of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A: It   was   told   by   Abu   Solaiman   that   the   bombing   in
Makati should coincide with the bombing in General
Santos.
… … …
A: He   told   it   to   me,   sir…   I   cannot   remember   the   date
anymore,   but   I   know   it   was   sometime   in   February
2005.
Q: Any other call, Mr.  witness, from Abu Solaiman and
Trinidad after the bombing exploded in Makati, any
other call?
… … …
A: There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A: He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a
successful mission.
… … …
A: He told me that “sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro
ko sayo.”
… … …175
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 175
People vs. Baharan
Q: By  the way,  Mr.  witness,  I  would  just like to clarify
this.   You   stated   that   Abu   Zaky   called   you   up   the
following   day,   that   was   February   15,   and
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My
question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the
relation   of   that   mission,   wherein   you   were
congratulated   by   Abu   Zaky,   to   the   mission,   which
have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt.
Cararao, Mr. witness?
A: They are connected, sir.
Q: Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A: Because when we were undergoing training, we were
told that the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war to the
forest, but also wage our battles in the city.
Q: Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A: The government, sir.17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu
Sayyaf Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so
that   they   could   show   their   “anger   towards   the   Christians.” 18 It
can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu
Solaiman,   had   carefully   planned   the   Valentine’s   Day   bombing
incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali
and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training,
Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs
in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that
Trinidad   would   get  two   kilos   of   TNT   from   Asali,   as   they   were
“about   to   commence”   their   “first   mission.” 19 They   made   two
separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail.
The   day   before   the   Valentine’s   Day   bombing,   Trinidad   got
another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu
Sayyaf   Group   announced   that   they   had   a   gift   for   the   former
President, Gloria Macapagal­Arroyo. On their third try, their plan
finally
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 24­51.
18 Id., at p. 36.
19 Id., at pp. 24­51.
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group
declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali
then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: “Sa wakas
nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.”20
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the
finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:
“Art.   17. Principals.—The   following   are   considered
principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another   act   without   which   it   would   not   have   been
accomplished.”
Accused   Rohmat   is   criminally   responsible   under   the   second
paragraph,   or   the   provision   on   “principal   by   inducement.”   The
instructions   and   training   he   had   given   Asali   on   how   to   make
bombs—coupled   with   their   careful   planning   and   persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat’s
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part   of   their   mission—prove   the   finding   that   Rohmat’s   co­
inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime.21 Such   “command   or   advice   [was]   of   such   nature   that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized.”22
Further, the inducement was “so influential in producing the
criminal   act   that   without   it,   the   act   would   not   have   been
performed.”23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
_______________
20 Id., at p. 49.
21 See generally U.S. v. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913); People
v. Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil. 609 (1935).
22 People   v.   Cruz,   G.R.   No.   74048,   14   November   1990,   191
SCRA 377, 385.
23 Luis   B.   Reyes,   The   Revised   Penal   Code:   Criminal   Law–
Book One, 529 (2008).
177
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 177
People vs. Baharan
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor
Sanchez was a co­principal and co­conspirator, and because the
act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered
liable   for   all   the   resulting   crimes. 24 The   same   finding   must   be
applied to the case at bar.
The   Court   also   affirms   the   finding   of   the   existence   of
conspiracy   involving   accused   Baharan,   Trinidad,   and   Rohmat.
Conspiracy was clearly established from the “collective acts of the
accused­appellants before, during and after the commission of the
crime.”   As   correctly   declared   by   the   trial   court   in  its   Omnibus
Decision:
“Asali’s   clear   and   categorical   testimony,   which   remains
unrebutted   on   its   major   points,   coupled   with   the   judicial
admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused,
are   sufficient   to   prove   the   existence   of   a   conspiracy   hatched
between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist
group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis
by   indiscriminately   killing   and   injuring   civilian   victims   by
utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
 While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not
been  expressly   admitted   by   accused   Baharan,   Angelo  Trinidad,
and   Rohmat,   more   specifically   with   respect   to   the   latter’s
participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which
established   the   existence   of   the   conspiracy   itself   and   the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that
the conspirators’ criminal design would be realized.
It is well­established that conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts   of   the   accused,   which   clearly   manifests   a   concurrence   of
wills,   a   common  intent  or  design  to  commit  a  crime  (People  v.
Lenantud,   352   SCRA   544).   Hence,   where   acts   of   the   accused
collectively   and   individually   demonstrate   the   existence   of   a
common design towards the
_______________
24 People v. Sanchez, et al., G.R. No. 131116, 27 August 1999,
313 SCRA 254.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baharan
accomplishment   of   the   same   unlawful   purpose,   conspiracy   is
evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).”25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be
justified in concluding that the defendants therein were engaged
in a conspiracy “when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of
the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were   in   fact   concerted   and   cooperative,   indicating   closeness   of
personal   association,   concerted   action   and   concurrence   of
sentiments.”26
Accused contend  that  the  testimony   of  Asali   is  inadmissible
pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that
under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co­
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence
of   the   conspiracy.   However,   as   the   Court   ruled   in People   v.
Buntag,   if   the   declarant   repeats   the   statement   in   court,   his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the
testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 27Thus, in People v.
Palijon, the Court held the following:
“…   [W]e   must   make   a   distinction   between   extrajudicial   and
judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in
evidence against the confessant but not against his co­accused as
they   are   deprived   of   the   opportunity   to   cross­examine   him.   A
judicial   confession   is   admissible   against   the   declarant’s   co­
accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross­examine
the   former. Section   30,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court
applies only to extrajudicial 
_______________
25 Omnibus Decision of the Trial Court at 6, CA Rollo at p.
123.
26 People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L­35700, 15 October 1973, 53
SCRA   246,   254,   citing People   v.   Cabrera,   43   Phil.   64,   66
(1922); People v. Carbonell, 48 Phil. 868 (1926).
27 People   v.   Buntag,   G.R.   No.   123070,   14   April   2004,   427
SCRA 180; see also People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA 486 (2000).
179
VOL. 639, JANUARY 10, 2011 179
People vs. Baharan
acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the
party   adversely   affected   has   the   opportunity   to   cross­
examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co­
accused   was   given   on   the   witness   stand.   It   is   admissible   in
evidence   against   appellant   Palijon.   Moreover,   where   several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co­accused   implicating   his   co­accused   is   competent   evidence
against the latter.”28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by
the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio­Morales   (Chairperson),   Brion,   Bersamin and 
Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Appeal denied.
Notes.—It bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus G.R. No. 152375. December 13, 2011.*
on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the REPUBLIC   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,
consequences   of   the  plea.   (People   vs.   Aranzado,   365   SCRA   649 petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN   (FOURTH   DIVISION),   JOSE
[2001]) L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR.,
The procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R.
MARCOS,   FERDINAND   R.   MARCOS,   JR.,   JUAN   PONCE
commits grave abuse of discretion. (People vs. Chua, 366 SCRA
ENRILE,   and   POTENCIANO   ILUSORIO   (substituted   by   his
283 [2001])
heirs), respondents.
——o0o—— 
_______________ Remedial   Law;   Distinction   between   a   Final   Judgment   or
Order   and   an   Interlocutory   Order.—Case   law   has   conveniently
28 People v. Palijon, G.R. No. 123545, 18 October 2000, 343 demarcated  the  line  between  a final  judgment  or  order and  an
SCRA   486,   citing People   v.   Flores,   195   SCRA   295,   308 interlocutory   one   on   the   basis   of   the   disposition   made.   A
judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the
(1991); People v. Ponce, 197 SCRA 746, 755 (1991).
action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights of   the   same   action;   in   such   case,   the   remedy   available   to   an
reserved. aggrieved party is appeal. If
_______________
 pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the   underprivileged.   Such   rules   shall   provide   a   simplified   and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase,   or   modify   substantive   rights.   Rules   of   Procedure   of
special   courts   and   quasi­judicial   bodies   shall   remain   effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.”
* EN BANC.
153
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental
matters   and   leaves   something   more   to   be   done   to   resolve   the
merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved
party’s   remedy   is   a   petition   for certiorari under   Rule   65.
Jurisprudence pointedly holds that: “As distinguished from a final
order   which   disposes   of   the   subject   matter   in   its   entirety   or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined
by   the  court,   an  interlocutory   order   does   not   dispose   of   a   case
completely,   but  leaves   something   more   to   be   adjudicated   upon.
The   term   “final”   judgment   or   order   signifies   a   judgment   or   an
order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no
further questions or directions for future determination. On the
other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it
leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with
the   controversy.   It   does   not   end   the   task   of   the   court   in
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights
and   liabilities   as   against   each   other.   In   this   sense,   it   is
basically provisional in its application.”
Same;  An  interlocutory order  remains under the  control of
the   court   until   the   case   is   finally   resolved   on   the   merits.—We
clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control
of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits. The
court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment. In this light,
the  Sandiganbayan’s  1998  resolution—which  merely   denied  the
adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009—could not have attained finality (in the manner
that   a   decision   or   final   order   resolving   the   case   on   the   merits
15 does)   despite   the   petitioner’s   failure   to   move   for   its
reconsideration or to appeal.
Same;   The   proscription   against   a   second   motion   for
reconsideration   is   directed   against   a   judgment   or   final   order;
Although a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere “rehash” of the
arguments   already   passed   upon   and   resolved   by   the   court,   it
cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or
by   the   rules   as   a   prohibited   motion.—We   also   agree   with   the
petitioner   that   its   3rd   motion   cannot   be   considered   as   a
proscribed   third   (actually   second)   motion   for   reconsideration   of
the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second
motion   for   reconsideration   is   directed   against   “a   judgment
or final order.”  Although  a   second   motion  for  reconsideration  of
an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a
mere “rehash” of the arguments
154
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
54
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
 already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be
rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the
rules as a prohibited motion.
Same;  Certiorari;  While Section  1, Rule  41 of  the  Rules of
Court   prohibits   an   appeal   from   an   interlocutory   order,   the
aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory
order through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.—
Under   Section   1,   Rule   41   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   an   aggrieved
party   may   appeal   from   a   judgment   or   final   order   which
completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of
Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an
appeal   from   an   interlocutory   order,   the   aggrieved   party   is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must
be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment,
order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires among others that neither
an   appeal   nor   any   plain,   speedy   and   adequate   remedy   in   the
ordinary   course   of   law   is   available   to   the   aggrieved   party;
Exception.—While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order,
as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by
the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have
been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not
totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on
the   issuance   of   a   disputed   interlocutory   ruling.   For   a   petition
for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
requires,   among   others,   that   neither   an   appeal   nor   any   plain,
speedy   and   adequate remedy in   the   ordinary   course   of   law   is
available  to  the  aggrieved   party.   As   a   matter   of  exception,   the
writ of certiorari may  issue notwithstanding  the existence of an
available   alternative   remedy,   if   such   remedy   is   inadequate   or
insufficient   in   relieving   the   aggrieved   party   of   the   injurious
effects of the order complained of.
Same;   Same;   Without   clear   showing   that   its   action   was   a
capricious   and   whimsical   exercise   of   judgment   affecting   its
exercise   of   jurisdiction,   the   Sandiganbayan’s   erroneous   legal
conclusion was only an error of judgment or at best an abuse of
discretion but not a grave one.—In light of the above discussions
and   conclusions,   the   Sandiganbayan   undoubtedly erred   on   a
question   of   law in   its   ruling,   but   this   legal   error   did   not
necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence
of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. Without
this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclu­
155
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 15
5
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
sion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse
of   discretion but   not   a   grave   one. For   this   reason   alone,   the
petition should be dismissed.
Same; Evidence; Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has
adduced   his   direct   evidence   in   the   course   of   discharging   the
burden of proof, he is considered to have rested his case, and is
thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.—Although the
word  “rested”  nowhere  appears in  the  Rules  of  Court,  ordinary
court procedure has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence
under   Section   5,   Rule   30   (which   capsulizes   the   order   of
presentation of a party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to
Rule 18 on Pre­Trial, both of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5,
Rule   30,   after   a   party   has   adduced   his   direct   evidence   in   the
course of discharging the burden of proof, he is considered to have
rested   his   case,   and   is   thereafter   allowed   to   offer   rebutting
evidence   only.   Whether   a   party   has   rested   his   case   in   some
measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has
concluded his presentation of evidence.
Same; Same; The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party
from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence
even after it has rested its case.—On the other end, though, there
was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion
to   reopen   its   case   before   the   court   ruled   on   its   formal   offer   of
evidence.   The   Rules   of   Court   does   not   prohibit   a   party   from
requesting   the   court   to   allow   it   to   present   additional   evidence
even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however,
for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional evidence is
already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from
the   prism   of   the   exercise   of   this   discretion   that   the
Sandiganbayan’s   refusal   to   reopen   the  case   (for   the   purpose   of
introducing,   “marking   and  offering”  additional   evidence)  should
be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it
had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Under Section 5 Rule 30, a party who has the
burden   of   proof   must   introduce,   at   the   first   instance,   all   the
evidence   he   relies   upon   and   such   evidence   cannot   be   given
piecemeal.—Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof
must  introduce,   at  the  first  instance,   all  the  evidence  he  relies
upon and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The obvious
rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the
other   party   and   the   consequent   delay   in   the   administration   of
justice.
Same;   Where   the   evidence   is   rebuttal   in   character,   whose
necessity,   for   instance,   arose   from   the   shifting   of   the   burden   of
evidence from one party to the other or where the evidence sought
to be presented is in the nature of newly
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56
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
discovered   evidence,   the   party’s   right   to   introduce   further
evidence   must   be   recognized.—A   party’s   declaration   of   the
completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing   further   evidence;   but   where   the   evidence
is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from
the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;
or   where   the  evidence   sought   to  be  presented   is  in  the   nature
of newly   discovered evidence,   the   party’s   right   to   introduce
further   evidence   must   be   recognized.   Otherwise,   the   aggrieved
party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Same;   Civil   Procedure;   Consolidation   of   Cases;
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an
aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the  court may  be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties.—Consolidation is a
procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding
how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of
the   court   may   be   dispatched   expeditiously   and   with   economy
while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the
rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases
in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those
cases.
Same; Same; Deposition; Before a party can make use of the
deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its
sub­paragraphs   (a)   to   (d),   it   also   requires   as   a   condition   for
admissibility, compliance with “the rules on evidence.”—Before a
party   can   make use of   the   deposition   taken   at   the   trial   of   a
pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not
only   require   due   observance   of   its   sub­paragraphs   (a)   to  (d);   it
also   requires,   as   a   condition   for   admissibility,   compliance   with
“the rules on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By
reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that
the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule
23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section
47,   Rule   130.   In   determining   the   admissibility   of   the   Bane
deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to
the   exclusion   of   the   other; both   provisions   must   be
considered.   This   is   particularly   true   in   this   case   where   the
evidence   in   the   prior   proceeding   does   not   simply   refer   to   a
witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under
another and farther jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Depositions are not meant as substitute
for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.—A
deposition is chiefly a
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VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement
the   pleadings   for   the   purpose   of   disclosing   the   real   points   of
dispute   between   the   parties   and   affording   an   adequate   factual
basis   during   the   preparation   for   trial.   Since   depositions   are
principally made available to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant
as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a
party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for
oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a
requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court,   the   deposition   may   be   used   without   the   deponent   being
actually   called   to   the   witness   stand.—That   opportunity   for
cross­examination   was   afforded   during   the taking of   the
deposition   alone   is   no   argument,   as   the   opportunity   for
cross­examination  must  normally  be  accorded  a party at
the   time   that   the   testimonial   evidence   is
actually presentedagainst him during the trial or hearing
of   a   case. However,   under   certain   conditions   and   for
certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand.
Same; Same; Same; Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires
inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition
that   the   adverse   party   must   have   had   an   opportunity   to   cross­
examine   the   witness   or   the   deponent   in   the   prior   proceeding.—
15
Section  47,  Rule 130 of the Rules of Court  is an  entirely
different   provision. While   a former   testimony   or
depositionappears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the
classification   of former   testimony   or   deposition as   an   admissible
hearsay is not universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic
of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to
cross­examine   the   out­of­court   declarant.   However,   Section   47,
Rule   130   explicitly   requires, inter   alia,   for   the   admissibility   of
a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have
had an opportunity to cross­examine the witness or the deponent
in the prior proceeding.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Requisites   for   the   admission   of   a
testimony   or   deposition   given   at   a   former   case   or   proceeding.—
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following
requisites for theadmission of a testimony or deposition given at a
former   case   or   proceeding.   1.   The   testimony   or   deposition   of   a
witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify; 2. The testimony
was   given   in   a   former   case   or   proceeding,   judicial   or
administrative; 3. Involv­
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1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
58
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
ing the same parties; 4. Relating to the same matter; 5. The
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross­examine him.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase “unable to testify” appearing
in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a
physical   inability   to  appear   at   the   witness   stand  and  to  give  a
testimony;   Where   the   deposition   is   taken   not   for   discovery
purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition
should   be   rejected   in   evidence.—The   phrase   “unable   to   testify”
appearing  in  both  Rule  23  and  Rule  130  of  the  Rules  of Court
refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to
give   a   testimony.   Hence   notwithstanding   the   deletion   of   the
phrase   “out   of   the   Philippines,”   which   previously   appeared   in
Section   47,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court, absence   from
jurisdiction—the   petitioner’s   excuse   for   the   non­presentation   of
Bane in open court—may still constitute inability to testify under
the   same   rule.   This   is   not   to   say,   however,   that   resort   to
deposition   on   this   instance   of   unavailability   will   always   be
upheld. Where   the   deposition   is   taken   not   for   discovery
purposes,   but   to   accommodate   the   deponent,   then   the
deposition should be rejected in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The witness himself, if available, must
be   produced   in   court   as   if   he   were   testifying   de   novo   since   his
testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.—Although the
testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former
proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony
alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The witness
himself,   if   available,   must   be   produced   in   court   as   if   he   were
testifying de novosince his testimony given at the former trial is
mere hearsay. The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is
also inadmissible for the same reason.
Same; Witnesses; Cross­Examination; The function of cross­
examination   is   to   test   the   truthfulness   of   the   statements   of   a
witness   made   on   direct   examination;   this   right   is   available   of
course, at the taking of deposition, as well as on the examination
of witnesses at the trial.—The function of cross­examination is to
test   the   truthfulness   of   the   statements   of   a   witness   made   on
direct   examination.   The   opportunity   of   cross­examination   has
been   regarded   as   an   essential   safeguard   of   the   accuracy   and
completeness   of   a   testimony.   In   civil   cases,   the   right   of   cross­
examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party
against whom a witness may be called. This right is available, of
course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination
of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general
exclusion   of   hearsay   statements   and   for   the   admission,   as   an
exception to the
 159
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
hearsay   rule,   of   reported   testimony   taken   at   a   former
hearing   where   the   present   adversary   was   afforded   the
opportunity  to  cross­examine,  is  based on  the  premise  that  the
opportunity   of   cross­examination   is   an   essential   safeguard
against falsehoods and frauds.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Notice; In adjudicating a case on
trial,   courts   are   not   authorized   to   take   a   judicial   notice   of   the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding
that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.—In adjudicating a case
on   trial,   generally,   courts   are   not   authorized   to   take   judicial
notice  of  the  contents   of  the  records  of   other  cases,   even  when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding   that   both   cases   may   have   been   tried   or   are
actually pending before the same judge. This rule though admits
of   exceptions.   As   a   matter   of   convenience   to   all   the   parties,   a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before   it,   when, with   the   knowledge   of, and absent   an
objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it
for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner
by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record
of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from
the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of
the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of
the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists
15 in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of
the latter case.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil   Procedure;   Consolidation   of   Cases;   In   Philippine
jurisprudence,   the   consolidation   of   cases   merges   the   different
actions into one and the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a
single   judgment.—In   Philippine   jurisprudence, the
consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one
and  the  rights  of the  parties  are adjudicated   in  a  single
judgment, thus: The effect of consolidation of actions is to
unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated
into a single action, in the same manner as if the different
causes of action involved had originally been joined in a
single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the
different   actions   until   it   is   vacated   or   set   aside. After   the
consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the
separate actions, which are by vir­
160
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
60
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
tue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded
by   a   single   action,   which   should   be   entitled   in   such
manner   as   the   court   may   direct,   and   all   subsequent
proceedings   therein   be   conducted   and   the   rights   of   the
parties adjudicated in a single action.”
Same; Same; Same; Unlike a mere order of a joint hearing or
trial   of   any   or   all   the   matters   in   issue   in   the   actions,   the
consolidation   of   actions   merges   the   different   actions   into   one
single action; this means that evidence such as depositions taken
after   the   consolidation   is   admissible   in   all   the   actions
consolidated whenever relevant or material.—The 12 April 1993
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of the
incidental   cases,   including   Civil   Case   No.   0130,   with  the  main
case,   Civil   Case   No.   0009. Unlike   a   mere   order   of   a   joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters  in issue in the
actions, the consolidation of actions merges the different
actions into one single action. This means that evidence, such
as depositions, taken after the consolidation is admissible in all
the  actions  consolidated  whenever  relevant  or  material.   In  this
case,   since   the   notice   and   the   deposition­taking   was   after   the
consolidation   of   Civil   Case   No.   0130   with   the   main   case,   Civil
Case No. 0009, the deposition could be admitted as evidence in
the consolidated cases.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Yolanda Q. Javellana for substituted heirs of J.L. Africa.
  Agcaoili Law Offices for P. Ilusorio.
  Robert A.C. Sison and Vicente Millora for Imelda R. Marcos.
  M.M. Lazaro and Associates for respondent Nieto, Jr.
  Edgar Dennis Padernal for Juan Ponce Enrile.
   Marcos,   Ochoa,   Serapio   and Tan   Law   Firm for   Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr.
161
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of
the   Philippines   (petitioner)   to   set   aside   the   February   7,   2002
resolution   (2002   resolution)2 of   the   Sandiganbayan3 denying   the
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re:
Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).
The Antecedents
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
through   the   Presidential   Commission   on   Good   Government
(PCGG), filed a  complaint (docketed  as Civil  Case  No. 0009)
against   Jose   L.   Africa,   Manuel   H.   Nieto,   Jr.,   Ferdinand   E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce
Enrile,   and   Potenciano   Ilusorio   (collectively, the respondents)
for reconveyance,   reversion,   accounting,   restitution,
and damagesbefore   the   Sandiganbayan.   The   petitioner
alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the
purchase   of   the   major   shareholdings   of   Cable   and   Wireless
Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),
which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto,
Jr.   held   for   themselves   and,   through   their   holdings   and   the
corporations   they   organized,   beneficially   for   respondents
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. 4
Civil Case No. 0009  is the main  case subject  of the  present
petition. Victor   Africa   (Africa),   son   of   the   late   Jose   L.
Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party
to Civil Case No. 0009.5
161 _______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 2 Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Rodolfo   G.   Palattao,   and
concurred in by Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo
T. Ferrer; Rollo, pp. 60­67.
3 Fourth Division.
4 Petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence
andComment/Opposition Ad Cautelam; Rollo, pp. 370­371.
5 See Republic   v.   Sandiganbayan,   334   Phil.   475;   266   SCRA
515 (1997).
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162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Civil   Case   No.   0009   spawned   numerous   incidental
cases,6 among   them,   Civil   Case   No.   0130. 7 The   present
respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No.
0130.
Civil Case No. 0130
In   the   August   7,   1991   PCGG­conducted   ETPI   stockholders
meeting, a PCGG­controlled board of directors was elected. Later,
the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders
meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As
a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected. 8
Thereafter,   Africa,   as   an   ETPI   stockholder,   filed   a   petition
for certiorari,   with   prayer   for   a   temporary   restraining
order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed
as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991
and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed
Africa:
“[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease
and desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares
in   the   special   stockholders’   meeting   to   be   held   on   August   12,
1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or
agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in
the management of ETPI.”9
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130,
Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since
January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been “illegally ‘exercising’ the
rights of stockholders of ETPI,”10especially in the election of the
members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance
of   an   order   for   the   “calling   and   holding   of   [ETPI]   annual
stockholders meeting for
_______________
6  Petitioner’s Reply; id., at pp. 744­745.
7  Entitled Victor Africa v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government.
8   See Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, 450 Phil. 98,
104; 402 SCRA 84, 86 (2003).
9  Id., at p. 103; p. 85.
10 Id., at p. 104; p. 86.
163
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 163
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed
guidelines.”11
In   its   November   13,   1992   resolution,   the   Sandiganbayan
favored Africa’s motion in this wise:
“WHEREFORE,   it   is   ordered   that   an   annual   stockholders
meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on Friday, November 27,
1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room,
Telecoms   Plaza,   7th   Floor,   316   Gil   J.   Puyat   Avenue,   Makati,
Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be conducted
under   the   supervision   and   control   of   this   Court,   through   Mr.
Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their
duly authorized  representatives  or their  proxies may  vote  their
corresponding shares.
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and
carefully maintained until final judicial resolution of the question
of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper
case   the   underlying   assets   of   the   corporation   concerned)
constitute ill­gotten wealth[.]”12
The   PCGG   assailed   this   resolution   before   this   Court viaa
petition   for certiorari docketed   as G.R.   No.   10778913(PCGG’s
petition),   imputing   grave   abuse   of   discretion   on   the
Sandiganbayan   for   holding, inter   alia,   that   the   registered
stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November 26,
1992   Resolution,   we   enjoined   the   Sandiganbayan   from
implementing its assailed resolution.
In   the   meantime,   in   an April   12,   1993   resolution, the
Sandiganbayan   ordered   the consolidation   of   Civil   Case   No.
0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter
as the main case and the former merely an incident.15
_______________
11 Id., at p. 103; p. 86.
12 Id., at pp. 104­105; pp. 86­87.
13 Resolved by this Court on April 30, 2003.
14 Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8.
15 Rollo, p.   304.   The   other   incident   cases   which   were
consolidated with the main case are as follows:
1. Civil Case No. 0043 (Polygon Investors and Managers, Inc.
v.   PCGG)—a   complaint   praying   that   judgment   be   rendered
enjoining the
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the
PCGG filed with this Court a “Very Urgent Petition for Authority
to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the]  Sole Purpose  of
Increas­
_______________
PCGG,   its   commissioners,   officers,   employees,   agents   and/or
representatives   from   enforcing   and/or   implementing   a   writ   of
sequestration.
2. Civil   Case   No.   0044   (Aerocom   Investors   and   Managers,
Inc.   v.   PCGG)—a   complaint   praying   that   the   Writ   of
Sequestration dated June 15, 1988 and Mission Order No. MER­
88­20 dated August 1, 1988 be declared null and void ab initio.
3. Civil   Case   No.   0045   (Africa   v.   PCGG)—an   amended
complaint   praying   that   judgment   be   rendered   restraining   (a)
defendant Eduardo M. Villanueva from representing himself and
acting   as   Director,   President   and/or   General   Manager   of   ETPI
and   committing   or   continuing   to   exercise   the   power,   authority
and   functions   appertaining   to   such   office;   and   (b)   defendant
PCGG   from   directly   or   indirectly   interfering   with   the
management of ETPI.
4. Civil   Case   No.   0047   (Africa   v.   Gutierrez,   et   al.)—a
complaint   praying   that   defendants   be   enjoined   from   acting   as
directors of ETPI.
5. Civil Case No. 0131 (Traders Royal Bank v. PCGG, Africa,
et   al.)—complaint   praying   that   defendants   be   ordered   to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
6. Civil Case No. 0139 (Far East Bank and Trust Company v.
PCGG,   Africa,   et   al.)—a   complaint   praying   that   defendants   be
directed to interplead and litigate their respective claims on the
proceeds   of   the   deposit   accounts   maintained   with   plaintiff   and
that judgment be accordingly rendered.
 7. Civil Case No. 0143 (Standard Chartered Bank v. PCGG,
Africa,   Nieto,   et   al.)—a   complaint   praying   that   judgment   be
rendered   requiring   all   the   defendants   to   interplead   among
themselves   and   litigate   to   determine   who   are   the   legitimate
signatories of OWNI in its accounts with the plaintiff.
 8. Civil   Case   No.   0128   ( Traders   Royal   Bank   v.   PCGG)—a
complaint praying that defendants be directed to interplead and
litigate their conflicting claims between them, and that judgment
be rendered accordingly.
9. Civil Case No. 0106 (Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. v.
PCGG   and   Asset   Privatization   Trust)—a   petition   praying   that
PCGG   be   ordered   to   withdraw   its   objection   to   the   alleged
settlement agreed upon between DOMSAT and APT.
165
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 165
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
ing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock” (Urgent Petition). In our
May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the
Sandiganbayan   for   reception   of   evidence
and immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the
Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17
In   the   proceedings   to   resolve   the   Urgent   Petition,   the
testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer­
in­trust   of   ETPI)   was   taken—at   the   petitioner’s   instance   and
after serving notice of the deposition­taking on the respondents 18
—on   October   23   and   24,   1996   by   way   of   deposition   upon   oral
examination (Bane deposition) before
_______________
10. Civil Case No. 0114 (PHILCOMSAT and POTC v.
PCGG)—a   complaint  seeking   to   declare   as   null   and   void
the writs of sequestration issued by PCGG over plaintiffs­
corporations and to enjoin PCGG and its officers, agents,
and nominees from interfering with the management and
operations of the plaintiffs­corporations. (Records, Volume
III, pp. 451­452; 841­843.)
16 Resolution dated December 13, 1996; id., at p. 300.
17 Ibid.
18 Petitioner   sent   to   the   respondents   a Notice   to   Take   Oral
Deposition   of   Mr.   Maurice   V.   Bane dated   August   30,
1996, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of
Court   (Records,   Volume   XXXVI,   pp.   11534­11535),   which   the
Sandiganbayan   “noted.”   Considering   Victor   Africa’s
manifestation,   among   others,   that   he  was   not   available  on   the
previously scheduled dates, on September 25, 1996, the petitioner
filed  and  sent  a  Second   Amended   Notice   to  Take   Deposition   of
Mr. Maurice V. Bane upon Oral Examination (Rollo, pp. 68­71).
The Second Amended Notice reads:
The   right   to   take   deposition de   bene   esse is   a
precautionary privilege to prevent [the] loss of evidence in
the event the attendance of the witness at the trial cannot
be procured. Hence, Section 1, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules
of   Court,   specifically   grants   the   plaintiff the   right   to
depose   Mr.   Maurice   Bane   without   leave   of   court.
x x x.
It   should   moreover   be   noted   that   Mr.   Maurice   Bane,
who   resides   in   England,   has   resigned   from   Cable   and
Wireless   and   is   unable   to   travel   to   Manila   to   attend   or
testify   before   this   Honorable   Court.   Section   4,   Rule   24,
allows   Plaintiff   to   use   Mr.   Maurice   V.   Bane’s   proposed
deposition   in   evidence insofar   as   the   same   may   be
admissible under the Rules of Evidence. (underscoring
and boldfacing supplied)
166
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Consul   General   Ernesto   Castro   of   the   Philippine   Embassy   in
London, England.
Invoking   Section   1,   Rule   24   (of   the   old   Rules   of   Court),
purportedly   allowing   the   petitioner   to   depose   Bane without
leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants
have filed their answer, the notice stated that “[t]he purpose of
the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set
forth in his affidavit19x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in
favor  of  [the   petitioner]  and/or   establish   the prima   facie factual
foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A stock in support
of   the   [Urgent   Petition].”20 The   notice   also   states   that   the
petitioner   shall   use   the   Bane   deposition   “in   evidence…   in   the
main case of Civil Case No. 0009.” 21 On the scheduled deposition
date, only Africa was present and he cross­examined Bane.
On   December   13,   1996,   the   Sandiganbayan   resolved   the
Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGG (i) “to cause
the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole
purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock” and (ii) “to
vote therein the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock.” 22 Thus, a
special stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled,
on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital
stock   was   “unanimously   approved.”23 From   this   ruling,   Africa
went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R.
No. 147214 (Africa’s petition).
We   jointly   resolved   the   PCGG’s   and   Africa’s   petitions,   and
ruled:
“This   Court   notes   that,   like   in   Africa’s   motion   to   hold   a
stockholders   meeting   (to   elect   a   board   of   directors),   the
Sandiganbayan,   in   the   PCGG’s   petition   to   hold   a   stockholders
meeting   (to  amend  the  articles   of  incorporation  to  increase   the
authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two­tiered
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 292­297.
20 Id.,   at   pp.   68­69.   The   records   show   that   Maurice   Bane
executed the aforesaid affidavit dated January 1991 in Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines. Records, Volume III, pp. 683­688.
21 Id., at p. 69.
22 Id., at pp. 299­321.
23 Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8, at p.
109.
24 Resolved by this Court on April 30, 2003.
167
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 167
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast
by the PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This
lapse   by   the   Sandiganbayan   leaves   this   Court   with   no   other
choice   but   to   remand   these   questions   to   it   for   proper
determination.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at
bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to determine
whether   there   is   a prima   facie evidence   showing   that   the
sequestered   shares   in   question   are   ill­gotten   and   there   is   an
imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them
in  a stockholders  meeting  to elect the ETPI  Board of Directors
and   to   amend   the   ETPI   Articles   of   Incorporation   for   the   sole
purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI.”
The   Sandiganbayan   shall   render   a   decision   thereon   within
sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution and in conformity
herewith.
Civil Case No. 0009 a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it b. Maurice Bane
was only on November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997 that the first c. Evelyn Singson
pre­trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25 d. Leonorio Martinez
In its Pre­Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner e. Ricardo Castro; and
offered to present the following witnesses: f. Rolando Gapud
WITNESSES   TO   BE   PRESENTED   AND   A   BRIEF 2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009]
DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES their   testimonies   and   the   documentary   exhibits   presented   and
(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless identified   by   them,   since   their   testimonies   and   the   said
Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized. documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the
x x x x [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x 3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x the opportunity to cross­examine them.
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st
(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina – x x x motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed a Common Reply 30to these
_______________ Oppositions.
25 Sandiganbayan   Third   Division   Pre­Trial   Order   dated _______________
March 17, 1997, p. 1; Rollo, p. 576. Penned by Associate Justice 27 Dated   January   21,   1998; id.,   at   pp.   322­329.   Originally,
Sabino  R.   de  Leon,   Jr.,   and  concurred  in  by   Associate  Justices what the petitioner filed was a Manifestation that it was adopting
Cipriano A. del Rosario and Leonardo I. Cruz. the testimonies of specified witnesses, among others. However, on
26 Records, Volume XXXVI, p. 11405. January 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan required the petitioner “to
168 file  a  corrected  pleading   in  the  form  of  a  motion  in  lieu  of  the
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Manifestation.” (Records, Volume XLIV, pp. 128­130, 175).
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) 28 Civil   Case   Nos.   0048,   0050   and   0146   were   ordered
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x consolidated with Civil Case No. 0009 by the Court in Africa v.
(7) Caesar Parlade – x x x PCGG,   G.R.   Nos.   83831,   85594,   85597,   and   85621,   January   9,
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition 1992, 205 SCRA 38.
At   the   trial   of   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   the   petitioner   filed 29 Records, Volume XLIV, pp. 278­282 and 497­500; Volume
a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that— XLV, pp. 3­6 and 22­26.
1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], 30 Dated March 13, 1998; Rollo, pp. 593­597.
i.e.,   Civil   Case   Nos.   0048,   0050,   0130,   0146 28 the   following 169
witnesses were presented therein: VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 169
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
On   April   1,   1998,   the   Sandiganbayan31 promulgated   a
resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 1st motion,
as follows:
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is—
1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to
adopt the testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and
Rolando   Gapud as   part   of   its   evidence   in   Civil   Case   No.
0009for   the  reason   that   said   deponents  according   to   the
[petitioner] are not available for cross­examination in this
Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)
2.    partly   Granted,   in   the   interest   of   speedy   disposition  of
this long pending case, insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt
certain/particular   testimonies   of   Cesar   O.   Parlade,   Evelyn
Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary
exhibits   which   said   witnesses   have   identified   in   incident   Civil
Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following conditions:
xxx
xxx
That   the   said   witnesses   be   presented   in   this   Court   so   that
they   can   be   cross­examined   on   their   particular   testimonies   in
incident Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
The   petitioner   did   not   in   any   way   question   the   1998
resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence
on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition
was not included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying
the   omission,   the   petitioner   filed   an Urgent   Motion   and/or
Request   for   Judicial   Notice34(2nd   motion)   dated   February   21,
2000, with the alternative prayer that:
_______________
31 Fourth Division.
32 Penned   by   Associate  Justice   Sabino  R.   de   Leon,   Jr.,   and
concurred in by Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Teresita
J. Leonardo­de Castro (now a Member of this Court); Rollo, pp.
331­338.
33 Id., at p. 18.
34 Id., at pp. 339­346.
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
1. An   order   forthwith   be   issued re­opening the   plaintiff’s
case and setting the same for trial any day in April 2000 for the
sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only
to   the   marking   and   offering   of   the   [Bane   deposition]   which
already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130
x x x;
2. In   the   alternative,   x   x   x   the   [Sandiganbayan]   to   take
judicial notice of the facts established by the [Bane deposition],
together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis
ours]
On   August   21,   2000,   the   Sandiganbayan   promulgated   a
resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 2nd motion:
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled “What
Need   Not   Be   Proved.”   Apparently,   this   provision   refers   to   the
Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings,   or   in   the  course   of  the   trial   or   other   proceedings   in
resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and
in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the
Court.  Such being the case,  the Court finds the Urgent Motion
and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not
be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission
is   done   through   the   ordinary   formal   offer   of   exhibits
wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise
objection   on   grounds   provided   by  law. Definitely,   it  is  not
under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]
On   November   6,   2000   and   on   several   dates   thereafter,   the
respondents   separately   filed   their   respective   demurrers   to
evidence.36 On   the   other   hand,   the   petitioner   moved   for   the
reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the
Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution37(2001 resolution).
_______________
35 Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Rodolfo   G.   Palattao,   and
concurred in by Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo
T. Ferrer; id., at pp. 352­355.
36 Id., at pp. 777­778.
37 Id., at pp. 357­359.
171
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 171
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
IIc. Motion   to   Admit   Supplemental   Offer   of  simple expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
On   November   16,   2001,   the   petitioner   filed   its   3rd   Motion,
seeking   once   more   the   admission   of   the   Bane   deposition. 38 On
February   7,   2002   (pending   resolution   of   the   respondents’
demurrers   to   evidence),39 the   Sandiganbayan   promulgated
the assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd
motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or
not plaintiff has already rested its case as to obviate the further
presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the
non­appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right
to   cross­examine   Bane   as   to   qualify   the   admission   of   the
deposition   sans   such   cross­examination.   Indeed,   We   do   not   see
any   need   to   dwell   on   these   matters   in   view   of   this
Court’s Resolution rendered   on   April   1,   1998   which   already
denied   the   introduction   in   evidence   of   Bane’s   deposition
and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to
file  any  motion   for  reconsideration   or  appeal  within   the
15­day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution
stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point
in time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules
of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years
and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its
ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to
introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in
the   alternative   for   the   court   to   take   judicial   notice   of   the
allegations   of   the   deposition.   But   how   can   such   a   motion   be
granted   when   it   has   been   resolved   as   early   as   1998   that   the
deposition   is   inadmissible.   Without   plaintiff   having   moved   for
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution
has   attained finality and   its   effect   cannot   be   undone   by   the
a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of
this court’s 1998 ruling.” [emphases ours]
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 360­368.
39 The   Sandiganbayan   (Fourth   Division)   promulgated   on
April 1, 2003 a resolution denying the demurrers to evidence filed
by the respondents; id., at pp. 777­790.
40 Supra note 2.
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
 The Petition  41 Represented by the Office of  the Solicitor  General. While
The   petitioner   filed   the   present   petition   claiming   that   the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.
II.
x x x   IN   x x x   REFUSING   TO   ADMIT   THE   BANE
DEPOSITION   –WHICH   WAS   ALREADY   ADMITTED   AS
EVIDENCE   IN   AN   INCIDENT   CASE   (CIVIL   CASE   NO.
0130)  – AS  PART  OF PETITIONER’S  EVIDENCE  IN  THE
MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).
III.
x   x   x   IN   REFUSING   TO   ADMIT   A   HIGHLY   RELEVANT
AND   IMPORTANT   PIECE   OF   EVIDENCE   FOR   THE
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS
TECHNICAL GROUNDS.  Bane deposition) that it would be used as evidence in
The   petitioner41 argues   that   the   1998   resolution   of   the
Sandiganbayan   is   merely   an   interlocutory   order;   thus,   the
petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have
given it a character of “finality” so long as the main case remains
pending.42 On   this   basis,   the   petitioner   concludes   that   the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On   the   issue   of   the   Sandiganbayan’s   refusal   (in   its   2002
resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil
Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken,
introduced and
_______________
this   case   was   pending,   then   Chief   Presidential   Legal   Counsel
Eduardo   Antonio   Nachura   was   appointed   Solicitor   General,
formerly a Member of this Court.
42 Rollo, p. 28, citing People v. MTC of Quezon City, 333 Phil.
500; 265 SCRA 645 (1996).
173
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 173
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
admitted in evidence) is but a “child” of the “parent” case, Civil
Case   No.   0009;   under   this   relationship,   evidence   offered   and
admitted in any of the “children” cases should be considered as
evidence in the “parent” case.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance
of   the   Bane   deposition,   the   Sandiganbayan   should   not   have
denied its admission on “flimsy grounds,” considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the
Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on
all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed
to   have waived their   right   to   cross­examine   the   witness
when they failed to show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very  vital cog in the case of the
petitioner   relative   to   its   allegation   that   the   respondents’
interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the
government.
3. The non­inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s
formal   offer   of   evidence   was
obviously excusable considering   the   period   that   had
lapsed from the time the case was filed and the voluminous
records that the present case has generated.43
 THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS  The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its
and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY
In   the respondents’   Comments44 (filed   in   compliance   with
our Resolution of April 10, 200245), they claim that the present
petition   was   filed   out   of   time—i.e.,   beyond   the   60­day
reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.46 This as­
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 35­50.
44 In his Manifestation, respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.
stated that he was adopting the Comment of respondent Nieto; id.
at 856­857. On the other hand, respondent Juan Ponce Enrile and
the substituted heirs of respondent Jose Africa merely reiterated
the arguments advanced by respondent Nieto.
45 Id., at p. 471.
46 Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
sertion proceeds from the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion,
being   a   mere   rehash   of   similar   motions   earlier   filed   by   the
petitioner,   likewise   simply   assails   the   Sandiganbayan’s   1998
resolution. Along the same  line,  they  posit that the petitioner’s
3rd   motion   actually   partakes   of   a   proscribed   third   motion   for
reconsideration   of   the   Sandiganbayan’s   1998   resolution. 47 They
likewise   assert,   on   the   assumption   that   the   1998   resolution   is
interlocutory in character, that the petitioner’s failure to contest
the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave
the 1998 resolution a character of “finality.”
case, the admission of a supplemental offer of evidence requires
the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the
Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing
to reopen the case since the evidence sought to be admitted was
“within   the   knowledge   of   the   [petitioner]   and   available   to   [it]
before [it] rested  its case.”48 The respondents also advert to  the
belated   filing   of   the   petitioner’s   3rd   motion—i.e.,   after   the
respondents had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
On   the   petitioner’s   claim   of   waiver,   the   respondents   assert
that   they   have   not   waived   their   right   to   cross­examine   the
deponent;   the   Sandiganbayan   recognized   this   right   in   its   1998
resolution  and  the  petitioner  never  questioned  this  recognition.
They   also   assert   that   the   allegations   in   the   Bane   deposition
cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the
Rules   of   Court.   The   respondents   lastly   submit   that   the   Bane
deposition   is   inadmissible   in   evidence   because   the   petitioner
failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
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When and where petition filed.—The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day   period   shall   be   counted   from   notice   of   the   denial   of   said
motion.
47 Respondent Nieto’s Comment, citing GSIS v. CA, 334 Phil.
163 (1997); Rollo, p. 490.
48 Respondent   Nieto’s Comment,   citing   Vicente   J.
Francisco, The   Revised   Rules   of   Court   in   the   Philippines,   p.
338; id., at p. 489.
175
 VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 175 their  comments, we resolve  to dispense with the filing of these
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) comments and to consider this petition submitted for decision.
In   its Reply,49 the   petitioner   defends   the   timeliness   of   the _______________
present petition by arguing that a party may opt to wait out and 49 Id., at pp. 521­528.
collect   a   pattern   of   questionable   acts   before   resorting   to   the 50 Petitioner’s Reply (to   Nieto’s Comment),   citing
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 582, 2001 ed.; id., at p.
filed   the   3rd   motion   precisely   because   of   the   Sandiganbayan’s 522.
2000   resolution,   which   held   that   the   admission   of   the   Bane 176
deposition   should   be   done   through   the   ordinary   formal   offer   of 176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
the   petitioner’s   3rd   motion   as   a   proscribed   motion   for The Issues
reconsideration.   The   petitioner   generally   submits   that   the On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues
dictates   of   substantial   justice   should   have   guided   the for our resolution, as follows:
Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise. 1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case 2. Whether   the   Sandiganbayan   committed   grave   abuse   of
although it has filed a formal offer of evidence. A party normally discretion—
rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he i. In   holding   that   the   1998   resolution   has   already
formally   offered;   before   then,   he   still   has   the   opportunity   to attained finality;
present   further   evidence   to   substantiate   his   theory   of   the   case ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes
should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence. 50 of a prohibited motion for reconsideration;
The   petitioner   further   maintains   that   the   mere   reasonable iii. In   refusing   to   re­open   the   case   given   the   critical
opportunity   to   cross­examine   the   deponent   is   sufficient   for   the importance of the Bane deposition to the petitioner’s
admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is cause; and
not   an   ordinary   witness   who   can   be   easily   summoned   by   our iv. In   refusing   to   admit   the   Bane   deposition
courts  in  light  of  his  foreign  residence,   his   citizenship,   and  his notwithstanding the prior consolidation of Civil Case
advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply 3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under—
to   the   present   case,   as   explicitly   stated   in   the   notice   of   the i. Rule   23,   Section   4,   par.   (c)   alone  or in   relation   to
deposition­taking. Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; and
To   date,   respondents   Imelda   Marcos   and   the   heirs   of ii. The principle of judicial notice.
Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their respective comments on The Court’s Ruling
the petition.  Given the time that had lapsed since  we required We deny the petition for lack of merit. 
I. Preliminary Considerations
I   (a). The   interlocutory   nature   of   the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available,
a party  aggrieved  by a court order,  resolution or  decision must
first   correctly   identify   the   nature   of   the   order,   resolution   or
decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily
determine whether the 1998 resolution is “final” or “interlocutory”
in nature.
_______________
51 Raymundo   v.   Isagon   Vda.   de   Suarez,   G.R.   No.   149017,
November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 384.
177
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 177
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Case   law   has   conveniently   demarcated   the   line   between   a
final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of
the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if
the   order   disposes   of   the   action   or   proceeding   completely,   or
terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the
remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or
resolution,   however,   merely   resolves   incidental   matters   and
leaves   something   more   to   be   done   to   resolve   the   merits   of   the
case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s remedy
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly
holds that:
“As   distinguished   from   a   final   order   which   disposes   of   the
subject   matter   in   its   entirety   or   terminates   a   particular
proceeding   or   action,   leaving   nothing   else   to   be   done   but   to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an
interlocutory   order   does   not   dispose   of   a   case   completely,   but
leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term “final”
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes
of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or
directions for future determination.
On  the  other  hand,   a  court  order  is  merely   interlocutory   in
character   if   it   leaves   substantial   proceedings   yet   to   be   had   in
connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court   in   adjudicating   the   parties’   contentions   and   determining
their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it
is   basically provisional   in   its   application.”54 (emphasis
supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the
1998  resolution  is  interlocutory.  The  Sandiganbayan’s  denial   of
the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a
time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation
of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve
the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve
this end.
_______________
52 Investments,   Inc.   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   231   Phil.   302;   147
SCRA   334   (1987),   cited   in Denso   (Phils.),   Inc.   v.   Intermediate
Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256; 148 SCRA 280 (1987).
53 Rudecon Management Corp. v. Singson, 494 Phil. 581; 454
SCRA 612 (2005).
54 Tomacruz­Lactao v. Espejo, 478 Phil. 755; 434 SCRA 588
(2004).
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the
control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits.
The   court   may   therefore   modify   or   rescind   the   order   upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. 55 In
this   light,   the   Sandiganbayan’s   1998   resolution—which   merely
denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence
in Civil Case No. 0009—could not have attained finality (in the
manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the
merits   does)   despite   the   petitioner’s   failure   to   move   for   its
reconsideration or to appeal.56
I   (b). The   3rd   motion   was   not
     prohibited by the Rules.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot
be considered as a proscribed third (actually second) motion for
reconsideration   of   the   Sandiganbayan’s   1998   resolution.   As
Section   5,   Rule   37   of   the   Rules   of   Court   clearly   provides,   the
proscription   against   a   second   motion   for   reconsideration   is
directed  against  “a   judgment  or final order.”  Although a   second
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied
on the ground that it is a mere “rehash” of
_______________
55 Jose   Y.   Feria   and   Maria   Concepcion   Noche,   2   Civil
Procedure   Annotated,   2001   ed.,   pp.   151­152,   citing Manila
Electric Co. v. Artiaga and Green, 50 Phil. 144, 147 (1927). This
proceeds   from   the   court’s   inherent   power   to   control   its   process
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse
of   discretion,   or   that   no   injustice   results   thereby   (Bangko
Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 755;
360 SCRA 322 [2001]).
56 Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court reads:
Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a
judgment   or   final   order   that   completely   disposes   of   the
case,   or  of  a   particular  matter  therein  when  declared   by
these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x
(c) An interlocutory order;
x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not   appealable,   the   aggrieved   party   may   file   an   appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
179
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 179
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it
cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or
by the rules as a prohibited motion.57
I   (c). The   1998   resolution   was   not
     ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved
party   may   appeal   from   a   judgment   or   final   order   which
completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of
Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an
appeal   from   an   interlocutory   order,   the   aggrieved   party   is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must
be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment,
order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On   the  premise   that   the  1998   resolution   is  interlocutory   in
nature, the respondents insist that the 60­day period for filing a
petition   for certiorari should   be   reckoned   from   the   petitioner’s
notice of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that
since   this   ruling   had   long   been   rendered   by   the   court,   the
petitioner’s   subsequent  filing   of   similar   motions   was  actually   a
devious attempt to resuscitate the long­denied admission of the
Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While
the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued
by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the
claim   that   the   1998   resolution   should   have   been   immediately
questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as
a petition for certiorariis not grounded solely on the issuance of a
disputed   interlocutory   ruling.58 For   a   petition   for certiorari to
prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among
others,   that   neither   an   appeal   nor   any   plain,   speedy   and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
_______________
57 Rollo, p. 31, citing Philgreen Trading Construction Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 433; 271 SCRA 719 (1997).
58 Indiana   Aerospace   University   v.   Commission   on   Higher
Education, 408 Phil. 483; 356 SCRA 367 (2001).
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the
writ of certiorari may  issue notwithstanding  the existence of an
available   alternative   remedy,   if   such   remedy   is   inadequate   or
insufficient   in   relieving   the   aggrieved   party   of   the   injurious
effects of the order complained of.59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No.
0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded the presentation of its
evidence,  much less made any  formal  offer  of evidence.  At  this
stage   of   the   case,   the   prematurity   of   using   the   extraordinary
remedy   of certiorari to   question   the   admission   of   the   Bane
deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain
remedy   available   to   the   petitioner   was   to   move   for   a
reconsideration   to   assert   and   even   clarify   its   position   on   the
admission   of   the   Bane   deposition.   The   petitioner   could
introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence
in   its   formal   offer61—as   the   petitioner   presumably   did   in   Civil
Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a
petition for certiorari, and the denial of the 1st motion could not
have   been   the   reckoning   point   for   the   period   of   filing   such   a
petition.
II. The   Sandiganbayan’s   ruling   on 
     the   finality   of   its   1998   resolution   was
     legally   erroneous   but   did   not   consti­
     tute grave abuse of discretion 
In   light   of   the   above   discussions   and   conclusions,   the
Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of lawin its
ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave
abuse of discretion
_______________
59 Africa   v.   Hon.   Sandiganbayan, 350   Phil.   846;   287   SCRA
408 (1998).
60 When a deposition is presented at trial and admitted by the
court, it is competent evidence for the party in whose behalf it
was   taken,   although   it  may   not   have  been   actually   read   when
introduced in evidence. (Vicente J. Francisco, 2 The Revised Rules
of Court in the Philippines, p. 127, 1966, citing Baron v. David, 51
Phil. 1 [1927].)
61 Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court reads:
Offer   of   evidence.—The   court   shall   consider   no   evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
181
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 181
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious
and   whimsical   exercise   of   judgment   affecting   its   exercise   of
jurisdiction.62 Without   this   showing,   the   Sandiganbayan’s
erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at
best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason
alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately
dismiss the petition in light of the unique circumstances of this
case   where   the   petitioner   cannot entirely be   faulted   for   not
availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case,
by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and
has become a matter of public concern. 63 In other words, we opt to
resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest
and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving
the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word “rested” nowhere appears in the Rules of
Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it from an overview
of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the
order of presentation of a party’s evidence during trial), read in
relation   to   Rule   18   on   Pre­Trial, 64 both   of   the   Rules   of   Court.
Under Section 5,
_______________
62 Leviste   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   G.R.   No.   189122,   March   17,
2010,   615   SCRA   619,   633,   citing Dueñas,   Jr.   v.   House   of
Representatives   Electoral   Tribunal,   G.R.   No.   185401,   July   21,
2009, 593 SCRA 316, 344.
63 Republic   of   the   Philippines   v.   Sandiganbayan,   453   Phil.
1059; 406 SCRA 190 (2003).
64 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requires the parties
to state in their respective Pre­Trial Briefs the following:
(a)    A   statement   of   their   willingness   to   enter   into
amicable   settlement   or   alternative   modes   of   dispute
resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A   summary   of   admitted   facts   and   proposed
stipulation of facts;
(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents   or   exhibits   to   be   presented,
stating the purpose thereof;
(e)    A   manifestation   of   their   having   availed  or   their
intention   to   avail   themselves   of   discovery   procedures   or
referral to commissioners; and
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Rule   30,   after   a   party   has   adduced   his   direct   evidence   in   the
course   of   discharging   the   burden   of   proof, 65 he   is   considered   to
have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting
evidence   only.66 Whether   a   party   has   rested   his   case   in   some
measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has
concluded his presentation of evidence.67
In   its   second   and   third   motions,   respectively,   the  petitioner
expressly admitted that “due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed
and rested its case”;68 and that it “had terminated the presentation
of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009.” 69 In the face of these
categorical judicial   admissions,70 the   petitioner   cannot
suddenly make an
_______________
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and
the substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure   to  file  the  pre­trial   brief   shall   have   the   same
effect   as   failure   to   appear   at   the   pre­trial.   (emphases
added)
65 Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court reads:
Burden of proof.—Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present   evidence   on   the   facts   in   issue   necessary   to   establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
(emphasis added)
66 See Manuel V. Moran, 2 Comments on the Rules of Court,
1996 ed., p. 140.
67 Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court reads:
Demurrer   to   evidence.—After   the   plaintiff
has completed   the   presentation   of   his   evidence,   the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.  If  his  motion  is  denied,  he  shall  have  the  right  to
present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence. (emphasis added)
68 Petitioner’s Urgent   Motion   and/or   Request   for   Judicial
Notice, p. 3; Rollo, p. 341.
69 Petitioner’s Motion   to   Admit   Supplemental   Offer   of
Evidence, p. 6; id., at p. 365.
70 Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court reads:
Judicial   admissions.—An   admission,   verbal   or
written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings
in   the   same   case,   does   not   require   proof.   The   admission
may be contradicted only by showing that
183
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
about­face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the
usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of
its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the
evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition,
which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition,
was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer
of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by
the trial court.
The   Court   observes   with   interest   that   it   was   only   in   this
present   petition   for certiorari that   the   petitioner   had   firmly
denied having rested its case. 71 Before then, the petitioner never
found it appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s
denial   of   its   2nd   motion   which   prayed, inter   alia,   for
the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s
case.
Although   the   denial   of   the   petitioner’s   first   motion   did   not
necessitate   an   immediate   recourse   to   the   corrective   writ
of certiorari,   the   denial   of   the   2nd   motion   dictated   a   different
course   of   action.   The   petitioner’s   non­observance   of   the   proper
procedure   for   the   admission   of   the   Bane   deposition,   while
seemingly   innocuous,   carried   fatal   implications   for   its   case.
Having   been   rebuffed   on   its   first   attempt   to   have   the   Bane
deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking
reconsideration  of the  denial,  the petitioner presented its other
pieces  of evidence and  eventually rested its case.  This time,  the
petitioner   forgot   about   the   Bane   deposition   and   so   failed   to
include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.
More   than   two   years   later,   the   petitioner   again   tried   to
squeeze   in   the   Bane   deposition   into   its   case.   In   resolving   the
183 petitioner’s   motion   for   reconsideration   of   the   Sandiganbayan’s
2000   resolution,   the   Sandiganbayan   held   that   the   Bane
deposition has “become part and parcel” of Civil Case No. 0009.
This pronouncement has obscured the
_______________
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
71 In page 6 of the petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental
Offer of Evidence, the petitioner admitted the termination of the
presentation   of   its   evidence;   yet,   in   page   4   of   the
petitioner’s Reply (to   respondent   Nieto’s   opposition   to
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence), the
petitioner stated that it has not yet rested its case.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
real   status   of   the   Bane   deposition   as   evidence   (considering
that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s
attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case
No.   0009   for   the   deponent   cannot   be   cross­examined   in   court).
Nevertheless,   the   Sandiganbayan ultimately   denied the
petitioner’s motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted
the   resting   of   its   case,   the   petitioner   should   have   already
questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since
the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed
all   avenues   available   to   it   for   the   consideration   of   the   Bane
deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed
the 60­day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd
motion.
Significantly,   the  petitioner  changed   its  legal   position  in  its
3rd motion by denying having rested its case and insisting on the
introduction   of   the   Bane   deposition.   Rebuffed   once   more,   the
petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the
Sandiganbayan’s   resolutions,72 which   allegedly   gave   it   “mixed
signals.”73 By   pointing   to   these   resolutions,   ironically,   even   the
petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe
for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized
was that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case
for   the   introduction   of   further   evidence   consisting   of   the   Bane
deposition.   Having   been ultimatelydenied   by   the   court,   the
petitioner could not have been prevented from taking the proper
remedy   notwithstanding   any   perceived   ambiguity   in   the
resolutions.
On   the   other   end,   though,   there   was   nothing   intrinsically
objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to reopen its case before
the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court
does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to
present additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any
such   opportunity,   however,   for   the   ultimate   purpose   of   the
admission   of   additional   evidence   is   already   addressed   to
the sound   discretion   of   the   court.   It   is   from   the   prism   of   the
exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganba­
_______________
72 Dated August 21, 2000 and April 3, 2001.
73 Rollo, pp. 31 and 34.
185
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 185
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
yan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing,
“marking and offering” additional evidence) should be viewed. We
can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
    III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its 
    discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen 
    the case for the purpose of introducing and 
   admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further
evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
“Sec. 5. Order of trial.—Subject to the provisions of section 2
of   Rule   31,   and   unless   the   court   for   special   reasons   otherwise
directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre­
trial order and shall proceed as follows:
 x x x x
(f) The   parties   may   then   respectively   adduce   rebutting
evidence   only, unless the   court,   for good   reasons   and   in   the
furtherance   of   justice,   permits   them   to adduce   evidence
upon their original case[.]” [emphases ours]
Under   this  rule,   a  party   who  has  the  burden  of  proof  must
introduce,   at   the   first   instance,   all   the   evidence   he   relies
upon74 and   such   evidence   cannot   be   given   piecemeal. 75 The
obvious   rationale   of   the   requirement   is   to   avoid   injurious
surprises   to   the   other   party   and   the   consequent   delay   in   the
administration of justice.76
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of
his   evidence   prevents   him   from   introducing   further
evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose
necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of
evidence from one party to
_______________
74 James   M.   Henderson,   6 Commentaries   on   the   Law   of
Evidence in Civil Cases Based Upon the Works of Burr W. Jones, §
2502, pp. 4950­4951.
75 Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil.
121 (1920).
76 Ibid.
77 John Henry Wigmore, 6 A Treatise on the Anglo­American
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 1940, p. 519.
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
the other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the
nature   of newly   discovered evidence,79 the   party’s   right   to
introduce   further   evidence   must   be   recognized.   Otherwise,   the
aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely,   the   exercise   of   the   court’s   discretion80 under   the
exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on
the attendant facts—i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify
as   a   “good   reason”   and   be   in   furtherance   of   “the   interest   of
justice.” For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower
court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the
lower  court’s  action  was  attended  by  grave  abuse  of  discretion.
Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
or,   the   exercise   of   power   in   an   arbitrary   manner   by   reason   of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to
perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of
the   law.81 Grave   abuse   of   discretion   goes   beyond   the   bare   and
unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness,
and   beyond   allegations   that   merely   constitute   errors   of
judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83 
In Lopez   v.   Liboro,84 we   had   occasion   to   make   the   following
pronouncement:
“After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs,
they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been
held,   the   court,   for   good   reasons,   in   the   furtherance   of   justice,
may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and
its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate
_______________
78 Director   of   Lands   v.   Roman   Archbishop   of   Manila,
supra note 75.
79 Seares   v.   Hernando,   etc.,   et   al., 196 Phil.   487;   110   SCRA
343 (1981).
 80 88 C.J.S. § 104, p. 217; 5A C.J.S. § 1606, p. 102; and Lopez
v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 431 (1948).
81 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil.
755; 409 SCRA 455 (2003).
82 San   Fernando   Rural   Bank,   Inc.   v.   Pampanga   Omnibus
Development   Corporation,   G.R.   No.   168088,   April   4,   2007,   520
SCRA 564.
83 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, supra note 62.
84 Supra note 80, at p. 434.
187
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 187
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
court   where   no   abuse   of   discretion   appears. So,   generally,
additional   evidence   is   allowed when   it   is   newly   discovered,
or where   it   has   been   omitted   through   inadvertence   or
mistake,   or   where   the   purpose   of   the   evidence   is   to   correct
evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on
the  testator’s  knowledge of  Spanish had not  been  deliberate.  It
was due to a misapprehension or oversight.”  (citations  omitted;
emphases ours)
Likewise,   in Director   of   Lands   v.   Roman   Archbishop   of
Manila,85 we ruled:
“The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when
he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted
in   the   sound   discretion   of   the   court.   “The   proper   rule   for   the
exercise of this discretion,” it has been said by an eminent author,
“is, that material testimony should not be excluded because
offered   by   the   plaintiff   after   the   defendant   has   rested,
although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a
trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and
affecting his case injuriously.”
These  principles  find   their  echo  in  Philippine  remedial   law.
While   the   general   rule   is   rightly   recognized,   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure   authorizes  the  judge  “for  special   reasons,”  to  change
the order of the trial, and “for good reason, in the furtherance of
justice,”   to   permit   the   parties   “to   offer   evidence   upon   their
original   case.”   These   exceptions   are   made   stronger   when   one
considers the character  of registration proceedings  and the fact
that   where   so   many   parties   are   involved,   and   action   is   taken
quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should
not   always   be   expected. Even   at   the   risk   of   violating
legal formulæ, an opportunity should be given to parties to
submit   additional   corroborative   evidence   in   support   of
their   claims   of   title,   if   the   ends   of   justice   so   require.”
(emphases ours)
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
“However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance
of justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original
case,   and   its   ruling   will   not   be   disturbed   where   no   abuse   of
discretion   appears,   Generally, additional evidence is   allowed
when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed where it was
withheld deliberately and without justification.”86
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85 Supra note 75, at p. 124.
86 Manuel V. Moran, supra note 66, at p. 141, citing 64 C.J.
160­163.
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
The   weight   of   the   exception   is   also   recognized   in   foreign
jurisprudence.87
Under   these   guidelines,   we   hold   that   the
Sandiganbayan   gravely   abused   its  discretion   in   refusing
to   reopen   the   case. Instead   of   squarely   ruling   on   the
petitioner’s   2nd   motion   to   avoid   any   uncertainty   on   the
evidentiary   status  of  the  Bane  deposition,  the  Sandiganbayan’s
action   actually   left   the   petitioner’s   concern   in   limbo   by
considering   the   petitioner’s   motion   “redundant.”   This   is
tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated
by   the   circumstances   and   is   equivalent   to   an   act   outside   the
contemplation of law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner
moved   to   re­open   its   case,   the   respondents   had   not   yet   even
presented   their   evidence   in   chief.   The   respondents,   therefore,
would   not   have   been   prejudiced   by   allowing   the   petitioner’s
introduction   of   the   Bane   deposition,   which   was   concededly
omitted “through oversight.”88 The higher interest of substantial
justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken
lightly.89
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not
have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court
on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of
the Bane deposition.
_______________
87 In Hampson   v.   Taylor (8   A.   331,   23   A.   732,   15   R.I.   83,
January 11, 1887) the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled:
We  are  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  entirely  within  the
discretion   of   the   court   to   open   the   case   for   further
testimony. The counsel for the plaintiff says, in excuse for
the   omission,   that   it   was   conceded   at   the   former   trial,
without contest, that the place of the accident was a part of
the public highway, and he was thus put off his guard. It is
quite   common   for   the   court   to   allow   a   party   to
submit further testimony, after he has rested, when
his   opponent   attempts   to   take   advantage   of   some
formal   point   which   has   been   inadvertently
overlooked, since it is or ought to be the aim of the
court, in ordering the course of proof, to further, not
to defeat the ends of justice.
88 Rollo, p. 18.
89 Republic   of   the   Philippines   v.   Sandiganbayan,   336   Phil.
304; 269 SCRA 316 (1997).
189
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 189
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should
follow as a matter of course. The state of the parties’ submissions
and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case
No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action.
At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued for
or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No.
0009 is a 25­year old sequestration case that is now crying out for
complete   resolution.   Admissibility,   too,   is   an   issue   that   would
have again been raised on remand and would surely stare us in
the  face  after  remand.90 We  are  thus  left  with  no  choice  but  to
resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and
now.
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition  
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case
No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense 
with the usual requisites of admissibility 
_______________
90 In W. W. Dearing v. Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., 187 Phil. 488,
493­494; 98 SCRA 758, 764 (1980), we held:
Anent grave abuse of discretion, in Icutanim v. Hernandez, x x
x it was held that appeal and not certiorari, is the proper remedy
for the correction of any error as to the competency of a witness
committed by an inferior court in the course of trial, since such a
situation involves an error of law constituting a violation of the
rules of evidence, apart from the fact that to allow any special civil
action under the circumstances would lead to multiplicity of suits
and lead to protracted if not endless trials. Similarly and for the
same reasons, that rule would apply to the admission or rejection
of a deposition being offered as evidence. Thus, the jurisprudential
rule is that the admission or rejection of certain interrogatories in
the course of discovery procedure could be an error of law but not
an abuse of discretion, much less a grave one. Again, the reason
for this rule [is that] the procedure for the taking of depositions
whether   oral   or   thru   written   interrogatories   is   outlined   in   the
rules leaving no discretion to the Court to adopt any other not
substantially equivalent thereto. Should the judge substantially
deviate from what the rule prescribes, he commits a legal error,
not   an   abuse   of   discretion.   (citation   omitted;   emphases   and
underscoring ours)
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
In  support  of   its   3rd  motion,   the  petitioner  argues   that  the
Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing
the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 91 The
petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil
Case   No.   0009   and   Civil   Case   No.   0130,   among   others, 92 the
“former case or proceeding” that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no
longer   exists.   Rule   31   of   the   old   Rules   of   Court 93—the   rule   in
effect   at   the   time   Civil   Case   Nos.   0009   and   0130   were
consolidated—provided that:
Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation.—When   actions   involving   a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue   in   the   actions; it   may   order   all   the   actions
consolidated;   and   it   may   make   such   orders   concerning
proceedings   therein   as   may   tend   to   avoid   unnecessary   costs   or
delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as
an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so
that  the business   of  the  court  may   be  dispatched   expeditiously
and   with   economy   while   providing   justice   to   the   parties.   To
promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single
trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of
issues within those cases.95
_______________
91 Petitioner’s Reply to the Opposition (filed by the substituted
heirs of respondent Jose Africa), p. 7; Rollo, p. 462.
92 Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1606, in effect at the time
of the consolidation, provides:
Rule­making   Power. The   Sandiganbayan   shall   have   the
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and, pending such
promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings.
93 1964   Rules  of   Court.   This  provision  was   copied   verbatim
under the present rules.
94 This   provision,   in   turn,   is   an   exact   reproduction   of   Rule
42(a) of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the United
States.
95 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d
§ 2381, p. 427.
191
 VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to
two observations. First, Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s
of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the
causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the
consolidated   cases. Second,   while   Rule   31   gives   the   court   the
discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the
actions   consolidated,   jurisprudence   will   show   that   the   term
“consolidation” is used generically and even synonymously with
joint   hearing   or   trial   of   several   causes. 96 In   fact,   the   title
“consolidation”   of   Rule   31   covers   all   the   different   senses   of
consolidation, as discussed below.
These   observations   are   not   without   practical   reason.
Considering that consolidation is basically a function given to the
court,   the   latter   is   in   the   best   position   to   determine   for   itself
(given   the   nature   of   the   cases,   the   complexity   of   the   issues
involved,   the   parties   affected,   and   the   court’s   capability   and
resources vis­à­vis all   the   official   business   pending   before   it,
among other  things) what  “consolidation” will  bring, bearing in
mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the
Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient premise that
the   deposition­taking   took   place afterthe   Sandiganbayan
ordered   the   consolidation   is   to   beg   the   question. It   is
precisely   the   silence   of   our   Rules   of   Procedure   and   the
dearth   of   applicable   case   law   on   the effect of
“consolidation”   that   strongly   compel   this   Court   to
determine the kind of “consolidation” effected to directly
resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term “consolidation” is
used in three different senses:97
191 (1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until
one   is   tried,   in   which   case   the   judgment   in   the   one   trial   is
conclusive as to the oth­
_______________
96 See People   v.   Sandiganbayan,   456   Phil.   707;   409   SCRA
419,   424   (2003); Cojuangco,   Jr.   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   G.R.   No.
37404,   November   18,   1991,   203   SCRA   619; Caños   v.   Hon.
Peralta, etc., et al., 201 Phil. 422; 115 SCRA 843 (1982).
97 Wright and Miller, supra note 95, at p. 429.
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
ers. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such.
(quasi­consolidation)98
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their
separate identity, and become a single action in which a single
judgment   is   rendered.   This   is   illustrated   by   a   situation   where
several   actions   are   pending   between   the   same   parties   stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint.
(actual consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but
each  retains  its  separate  character  and  requires  the  entry   of  a
separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the
suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be
parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100
Considering   that  the Sandiganbayan’s  order101 to  consolidate
several incident cases does not at all provide a hint on the extent
of   the   court’s   exercise   of   its   discretion   as   to   the   effects   of   the
consolidation it ordered—in view of the function of this procedural
device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official
business—we  are compelled  to  look deeper  into the  voluminous
records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is
nothing that would even
_______________
98 1 C.J.S. § 107, p. 1341; Wright and Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2382.
99 1 C.J.S. § 107, id.; Wright and Miller, id., at p. 429. See Yu,
Sr.   v.   Basilio   G.   Magno   Construction   and   Development
Enterprises,   Inc.,   G.R.   Nos.   138701­02,   October   17,   2006,   504
SCRA 618.
100 1 C.J.S. § 107, id.; 1 Am. Jur. 2d § 131, p. 804; Wright and
Miller, id.
101 The   April   15,   1993   Resolution   ordering   consolidation
reads:
Submitted for resolution is the Motion for Consolidation, dated
June   22,   1992,   filed   by   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines
(represented by the PCGG), counsel.
The   record   shows   that   there   is   no   opposition   in   the   above­
entitled cases to the said motion. It also appears that the subject
matters of the above entitled cases are and/or may be treated as
mere incidents in Civil Case No. 0009.
WHEREFORE,   the   above­entitled   cases   are   hereby   ordered
consolidated  with Civil  Case  No.  0009,   and  shall  henceforth  be
consolidated and treated as mere incidents of said Civil Case No.
0009. (Records, Volume III, pp. 843­844.)
193
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
suggest   that   the   Sandiganbayan   in   fact   intended   a   merger   of
causes of action, parties and evidence. 102 To be sure, there would
have been no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain
unopposed)  the  testimonies  in  the  incident  cases  had  a  merger
actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case,
the Sandiganbayan can already take judicial notice of the same.
Significantly,   even   the   petitioner   itself   viewed
consolidation,   at   most,   to   be   merely   a   consolidation   for
trial.103 Accordingly,   despite   the   consolidation   in   1993,   the
petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which
denied   the   petitioner’s   1st   Motion   on   the   ground   that   the
witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be
adopted,   “are   not   available   for   cross­examination   in”   the
Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the
main case, so that the respondents can cross­examine them. 
These  considerations   run  counter   to  the conclusion  that  the
Sandiganbayan’s order of consolidation had actually resulted in
the complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in
the sense   of   actual   consolidation,   and   that   the   parties   in   these
consolidated cases
_______________
102 See Victor   Africa’s   Motion   (Records,   Volume   XVIII,   pp.
6717­6722).
103 In its Motion for Consolidation, the petitioner argued:
4.    On   various   dates,   several   actions   were   filed   which   are
intimately related with Civil Case No. 0009, involving as they are
the same subject matter and substantially the same parties x x x.
x x x x
10. Besides,   the   present   Motion   for   Consolidation   is   not
193 without   a   paradigm   which   was   recently   sketched   by   [the
Sandiganbayan]. During   the   hearing   on   April   6,   1992
of Africa vs. PCGG
   , docketed as Civil Case No. 0127, [the
Sandiganbayan] resolved to conduct a joint trial of the said
case   and   of OWNI   vs.   Africa,   docketed   as  Civil   Case   No.   0126,
inasmuch   as   both   cases   are   intimately   related. The
consolidation   of   the   above­captioned   cases   would   be
merely   a   step   in   the   same   direction already   taken   by   [the
Sandiganbayan] in Africa and OWNI. (Records, Volume XV, pp.
5617­5622.)
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual
consolidation without objection.104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally
independent of one another and the fact that in the present case
the   party   respondents   to   Civil   Case   No.   0009   (an   action   for
reconveyance,   accounting,   restitution   and   damages)
are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed
by an ETPI stockholder involving
_______________
104 In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules
of Court, Francisco wrote:
The   effect   of   consolidation   of   actions   is   to   unite   and
merge all of the different actions consolidated into a single
action,   in   the   same   manner   as   if   the   different   causes   of
actions   involved   had   originally   been   joined   in   a   single
action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of
competent  jurisdiction,   is  binding   upon  all   the  parties  to
the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After
the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the
separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
discontinued   and   superseded   by   a   single   action,   which
should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct,
and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and
the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1
C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371­1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation
of   actions   in   the Corpus   Juris   Secundum,   the   following
caveat appears:
The   term   consolidation   is   used   in   three   different
senses. First, where several actions are combined into one
and lose their separate identity and become a single action
in which a single judgment is rendered; second, where all
except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in
which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the
others; third, where several actions are ordered to be tried
together   but   each   retains   its   separate   character   and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to
distinguish   between   these   methods   of   procedure,
which   are   entirely   distinct,   the   two   latter,   strictly
speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which has
not   always   been   noted,   has   caused   some   confusion
and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341­1342)
(Emphasis added).
In   defining   the   term   “consolidation   of   actions,”   Francisco
provided a colatilla that the term “consolidation” is used in three
different   senses,   citing   1   C.J.S.   1341   and   1   Am.   Jur.   477
(Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).
195
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 195
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
a   corporate   squabble   within   ETPI),   the   conclusion   that   the
Sandiganbayan   in   fact   intended   an actual   consolidationand,
together   with   the   parties   affected, 105 acted   towards   that   end—
where   the   actions   become   fused   and   unidentifiable   from   one
another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also
appreciated   in   another   action—must   find   support   in   the
proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a case with
the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to
impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation
(which   find   no   clear   support   in   the   provisions   of   the   Rules   of
Court,   jurisprudence,106 and   even   in   the   proceedings   before   the
Sandiganbayan   itself   and   despite   the   aforementioned
considerations)   results   in   an   outright   deprivation   of   the
petitioner’s   right   to   due   process.   We   reach   this   conclusion
especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply
a   testimony taken   in   one   of   the   several   cases,   but   a   deposition
upon oral  examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose
admission   is   governed   by   specific   provisions   on   our   rules   on
evidence.
We   stress   on   this   point,   too,   that  while  the   Sandiganbayan
ordered   the   consolidation   in   1993   (that   is, before the   deposition
was   taken),   neither   does   the   Pre­Trial   Order 107 issued   by   the
Sandiganbayan in   1997 in   Civil   Case   No.   0009   contain   any
reference, formal or substan­
_______________
105 The   respondents   vigorously   opposed   the   petitioner’s
motion to adopt the testimony of, among others, Maurice Bane,
and the Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the respondents, without
the petitioner questioning this development until after two years
later.   This  circumstance  cannot  be  taken  lightly  in  view  of  the
petitioner’s   gross   procedural   deficiency   in   the   handling   of   this
main case.
106 In those  cases  where  the  Court  ordered  or  affirmed  the
order of  consolidation, even without  expressly providing for  the
admissibility   of   evidence   in   all   of   the   consolidated   cases,   the
parties   are   the   same   and/or   the   issues   are   relatively   simple
and/or the causes of action could have actually been stated in one
complaint   (see Domdom   v.   Third   and   Fifth   Divisions   of   the
Sandiganbayan,   G.R.   Nos.   182382­83,   February   24,   2010,   613
SCRA   528; Active   Wood   Products   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Court   of   Appeals,
G.R.  No.  86603,  February  5,  1990,  181  SCRA 774; Delta Motor
Sales Corporation v. Mangosing, No. L­41667, April 30, 1976, 70
SCRA 598; Sideco v. Paredes, et al., 74 Phil. 6 (1942).
107 Dated March 17, 1997; Rollo, pp. 576­587.
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
tive, to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre­Trial Brief
dated   August   30,   1996,109 the   petitioner   even   made   a
representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV   (b). Use   of   deposition   under   Section  
     4,   Rule   23   and   as   a   former   testimony   un­
     der Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No.
0130 as an  original,  albeit  incidental,  case,  the admissibility  of
the   Bane   deposition   cannot   avoid   being   measured   against   the
requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court—the
rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a
different   proceeding.   In   this   regard,   the   petitioner   argues   that
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24) 110 must, at
any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
At  the  outset,   we  note that  when  the petitioner’s   motion  to
adopt the testimonies taken in the incident cases drew individual
oppositions   from   the   respondents,   the  petitioner   represented   to
the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions
of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 112 and, in fact, again
presented some of
_______________
 108 Under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, a Pre­Trial
Order   controls   the   subsequent   course   of   the   action,   unless
modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.
109 Records, Volume XXXVI, p. 11405.
110 1964 Rules of Court, Rule 24, Depositions and Discovery.
111 Petitioner’s Reply   with   Manifestation   to   Respondent
Enrile’s Comment, pp. 12­13; Rollo, pp. 679­680.
112 Records, Volume XLV, pp. 110­112. Petitioner’s Common
Reply reads:
1. While it is true that Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides:
x x x x
[petitioner] wishes to inform this Honorable Court that
in order to substantially comply with the aforementioned
requirements,   it   would   be   willing   to   present   subject
witnesses,   except   for   Maurice   Bane   and   Rolando   Gapud
whose   availability   are   difficult   to   obtain   being   foreign
residents, only to be cross­examined by the
197
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 197
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
the   witnesses.   The   petitioner’s   about­face   two   years   thereafter
even   contributed   to   the   Sandiganbayan’s   own   inconsistency   on
how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section   4,   Rule   23   of   the   Rules   of   Court   on   “Deposition
Pending   Action”   (deposition de   bene   esse)   provides   for   the
circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at
the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use   of   depositions.—At   the   trial   or   upon   the
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all
of   a   deposition, so   far   as   admissible   under   the   rules   of
evidence,   may   be used  against   any   party   who  was  present  or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
x x x x
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party,  may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1)
that   the   witness   is   dead;   or   (2)   that   the   witness   resides   at   a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place
of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that   his   absence   was   procured   by   the   party   offering   the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance  of  the  witness  by   subpoena;   or  (5)  upon  application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make
it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance   of   presenting   the   testimony   of   witnesses   orally   in
open court, to allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony   or   deposition   at   a   former
proceeding.—The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased
or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or   administrative,   involving   the   same   parties   and   subject
matter, may   be   given   in   evidence against   the   adverse   party
who had the opportunity to cross­examine him.
_______________
defendants   who   had   no   opportunity   to   cross­examine
them in said previous proceeding.
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
 A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects
the petitioner’s position that the Bane deposition can be admitted
into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before  a  party   can  make use of   the  deposition  taken   at  the
trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
does not only require due observance of its sub­paragraphs (a) to
(d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance
with “the rules on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130
of   the   Rules   of   Court   before   the   deposition   may   be used in
evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to
recognize   that   the   principle   conceding   admissibility   to   a
deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on
evidence   under   Section   47,   Rule   130.113 In   determining   the
admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be
given   on   one   provision   to   the   exclusion   of   the   other; both
provisions   must   be   considered.   This   is   particularly   true   in
this   case   where   the   evidence   in   the   prior   proceeding   does   not
simply   refer   to   a   witness’   testimony   in   open   court   but   to   a
deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.
A   common   thread   that   runs   from   Section   4,   Rule   23   of   the
Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is their
mutual reference to depositions.
A   deposition   is   chiefly   a   mode   of   discovery   whose   primary
function   is   to   supplement   the   pleadings   for   the   purpose   of
disclosing   the   real   points   of   dispute   between   the   parties   and
affording   an   adequate   factual   basis   during   the   preparation   for
trial.114 Since   depositions   are   principally   made   available   to   the
parties  as  a   means   of   informing   themselves  of  all   the  relevant
facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or
_______________
113 Dasmariñas   Garments,   Inc.   v.   Reyes,   G.R.   No.   108229,
August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 622.
114 Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu,
G.R.   No.   155010,   August   16,   2004,   436   SCRA   559,   573,
citing Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108119,
January 19, 1994, 229 SCRA 355, 362.
199
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 199
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
witness.   Generally,   the   deponent   must   be   presented   for   oral
examination   in   open   court   at   the   trial   or   hearing.   This   is   a
requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court.—The examination
of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open
court,   and   under   oath   or   affirmation.   Unless   the   witness   is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode
of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed,   any   deposition   offered   to   prove   the   facts   set   forth
therein,  in lieu of the actual  oral  testimony  of the  deponent in
open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded
under the hearsay rule—i.e., that the adverse party had or has no
opportunity to cross­examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross­examination
was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is
no   argument,   as   the   opportunity   for   cross­examination
must   normally   be   accorded   a   party   at   the   time   that   the
testimonial   evidence   is   actually presented against   him
during   the   trial   or   hearing   of   a   case. 116 However,   under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be
used without  the deponent  being  actually  called  to the  witness
stand.117
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely
different   provision. While   a former   testimony   or
deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the
classification   of former   testimony   or   deposition as   an   admissible
hearsay   is   not   universally   conceded.118 A   fundamental
characteristic of hearsay evidence is the
_______________
115 Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, supra note 113.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Jovito R. Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence, p. 540, 2nd
ed., 1958. John Henry Wigmore, supra note 77, at 51­53. But the
generally accepted view, followed by our own rules on evidence, is
that   prior   testimony   or   deposition   is   an   exception   to   hearsay
prohibition. (McCormick on Evidence by Edward Cleary, § 254, p.
759, 3rd ed., Hornbook Series, Lawyer’s ed., 1984).
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
adverse  party’s lack  of opportunity  to cross­examine the out­of­
court   declarant.   However,   Section   47,   Rule   130   explicitly
requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity
to   cross­examine   the   witness   or   the   deponent   in   the   prior
proceeding.
This opportunity to cross­examine though is not the ordinary
cross­examination119 afforded   an   adverse   party   in   usual   trials
regarding “matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith.”   Section   47,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court
contemplates   a   different   kind   of   cross­examination,   whether
actual   or   a   mere   opportunity,   whose   adequacy   depends   on   the
requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in
the   present   case   where   the   former   testimony   or   deposition   is
sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both
cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there is
no basis in saying that the former statement was—or would have
been—sufficiently   tested   by   cross­examination   or   by   an
opportunity   to   do   so.120 (The   requirement   of   similarity   though
does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be
the same.121Although some issues may not be the same in the two
actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which
is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122)
These   considerations,   among   others,   make   Section   47,   Rule
130   a   distinct   rule   on   evidence   and   therefore   should   not   be
confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23
of   the   Rules   of   Court.   In   other   words,   even   if   the   petitioner
complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of
_______________
119 Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court reads:
Cross­examination;   its   purpose   and   extent.—Upon   the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross­
examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the
direct   examination,   or   connected   therewith,   with   sufficient
fullness  and  freedom  to  test his  accuracy   and  truthfulness and
freedom   from   interest   or   bias,   or   the   reverse,   and   to   elicit   all
important facts bearing upon the issue.
120 John Henry Wigmore, supra note 77, at p. 83.
121 Oscar   M.   Herrera,   5 Remedial  Law,   1999,   pp.  773,   774­
775.
 122 Id., at p. 773, citing Gibson v. Gagnon, 82 Colo 108, 257, p.
348; 2 Jones, Sec. 9:25.
201
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 201
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule
130   of   the   Rules   of   Court   cannot   simply   be   avoided   or
disregarded.
Undisputably,   the   Sandiganbayan   relied   on   the   Bane
deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this very
same   case.   Thus, what   the   petitioner   establishedand what   the
Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition,
refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule
23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that
imposes   further   requirements   in   the   use   of   depositions   in
a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the
deposition   under   Section   4(c),   Rule   23   cannot   be   taken   as
compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same
deposition   as   hearsay,   unless   the   requisites   for   its   admission
under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether the
petitioner complied with the latter rule.
Section   47,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court   lays   down   the
following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition
given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or  deposition  of a witness deceased or
otherwise unable to testify;
2. The   testimony   was   given   in   a   former   case   or
proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross­
examine him.123
The  reasons  for  the  admissibility   of   testimony   or  deposition
taken   at  a   former   trial   or   proceeding   are   the   necessity   for   the
testimony and its trustworthiness.124However,  before the former
testimony   or   deposition can   be   introduced   in   evidence, the
proponent must first lay the
_______________
123 Manuel V. Moran, 5 Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980
ed., p. 409.
124 Vicente J. Francisco, Evidence, 1955, p. 646.
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
proper   predicate therefor,125 i.e.,   the   party   must   establish   the
basis   for   the   admission   of   the  Bane   deposition   in  the   realm  of
admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must
now examine and resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply requires, inter alia, that
the witness or deponent be “deceased or unable to testify.” On the
other   hand,   in   using   a   deposition   that   was   taken during   the
pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
provides   several   grounds   that   will   justify   dispensing   with   the
actual testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter
alia,   the  circumstances   of   the  deponent’s   inability   to   attend   or
testify, as follows:
(3) that   the   witness   is unable   to attend   or testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours] 126
 The phrase “unable to testify” appearing in both Rule 23 and
Rule 130 of  the Rules of  Court refers to a physical  inability to
appear   at   the   witness   stand   and   to   give   a   testimony. 127 Hence
notwithstanding   the   deletion   of   the   phrase   “out   of   the
Philippines,” which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, absence from
_______________
125 Ricardo J. Francisco, 7 The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, Evidence, Part I, 1997 ed., pp. 628­629.
126 Prior to the revision of the rules on evidence, the phrase
“out  of the  Philippines”  appeared in the context  of the  witness’
unavailability (Section 41, Rule 130 of the 1964 Rules of Court).
After the revision (the latest amendments to the rules on evidence
became effective on July 1, 1989), this phrase was deleted from
the   present   Section   47,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court.   In
contrast,   the   same   phrase,   which   appeared   in   Rule   24   of   the
old Rules (Rule   24,   Deposition   and   Discovery,   1964   Rules   of
Court), was retained in the present Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
on depositions. The phrase “unable to testify,” however, survived
the amendment of the rules and was retained in both Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the
same Rules.
127 Vicente J. Francisco, Evidence, supra note 124, at p. 649.
203
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
jurisdiction —the petitioner’s excuse for the non­presentation of
128
Bane in open court—may still constitute inability to testify under
the   same   rule.   This   is   not   to   say,   however,   that   resort   to
deposition   on   this   instance   of   unavailability   will   always   be
upheld. Where   the   deposition is   taken   not   for   discovery
purposes,   but   to   accommodate   the   deponent,   then   the
deposition should be rejected in evidence.129
Although   the   testimony   of   a   witness   has   been   given   in   the
course of a former proceeding between the parties to a case on
trial,   this  testimony   alone  is  not  a   ground   for   its  admission  in
evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in
court as if he were testifying de novosince his testimony given at
the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness,
otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition
in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor of
the   requisite   unavailability   of   the   witness.   For   purposes   of
the present case   (Civil   Case   No.   0009),   however,   the
Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can
or   should   we,   that   the   previous   condition,   which   previously
allowed   the   use   of   the   deposition,   remains   and   would   thereby
justify   the   use   of   the   same   deposition   in another   case   or
proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same
court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in
principle,   being   necessity,131 the   burden   of   establishing   its
existence   rests   on   the   party   who   seeks   the   admission   of   the
evidence.   This   burden   cannot   be   supplanted by   assumingthe
continuity of the previous condition or conditions in light of the
general   rule   against   the   non­presentation   of   the   deponent   in
203 court.132
_______________
128 John Henry Wigmore, 5 A Treatise on the Anglo­American
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 1404, p. 149.
129 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cruz, 376 Phil. 96; 317 SCRA
761 (1999).
 130 Ricardo   J.   Francisco, supra note   125,   at   627,   cited   in
the Commentfiled   by   the   substituted   heirs   of   respondent   Jose
Africa, p. 3.
131 John Henry Wigmore, supra note 128, at p. 148.
132 To   make   matters   worse,   by   not   questioning   the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 1st Motion (to Adopt), the petitioner
has impliedly acceded to the
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
    IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of  Unfortunately,   the   petitioner   “realized”   its   mistake   only   two
    the adverse party to cross­examine; identity
    of parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross­examination is to test the truthfulness of
the statements of a witness made on direct examination. 133 The
opportunity   of   cross­examination   has   been   regarded   as   an
essential   safeguard   of   the   accuracy   and   completeness   of   a
testimony.   In   civil   cases,   the   right   of   cross­examination   is
absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a
witness may be called.134 This right is available, of course, at the
taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at
the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of
hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the
hearsay   rule,   of   reported   testimony   taken   at   a   former   hearing
where   the   present   adversary   was   afforded   the   opportunity   to
cross­examine,   is  based  on   the  premise   that  the  opportunity   of
cross­examination is an essential safeguard 135 against falsehoods
and frauds.
In   resolving   the   question   of   whether   the   requirement   of
opportunity   to   cross­examine   has   been   satisfied,   we   have   to
consider   first   the   required   identity   of   parties   as   the   present
opponent  to  the admission of  the Bane deposition  to whom the
opportunity   to  cross­examine  the  deponent  is  imputed  may   not
after   all   be   the   same   “adverse   party”   who   actually   had   such
opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial
or action, the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as
the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is
not   required;   substantial   identity136 or   identity   of
interests137 suffices, as
_______________
Sandiganbayan’s   ruling   that   the   non­presentation   of   the
deponent   in   court   for   cross­examination   is   unjustified.
precious years later.
133 Ricardo J. Francisco, supra note 125, at p. 220.
134 Id., at p. 219.
135 Edward Cleary, supra note 118, at p. 48.
136 Manuel V. Moran, supra note 123, at p. 410.
137 Jovito R. Salonga, supra note 118, at p. 542.
205
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 205
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
where   the   subsequent   proceeding   is   between   persons   who
represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in
blood,   or   in   estate.   The   term   “privity”   denotes   mutual   or
successive relationships to the same rights of property.138
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less
establish,   the   identity   of   interest   or   privity   between   the   then
opponent,   Africa,   and   the   present   opponents,   the   respondents.
While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most,
the deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI
stockholder   who   filed   the certiorari petition   docketed   as   Civil
Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor­in­interest of the
late  respondent   Jose  Africa).   While  Africa   and  the  respondents
are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at
all any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to
the   acts   or   omissions   of   the   former   respecting   the   cross­
examination of the deponent.   The sequestration  of their  shares
does not result in the integration of their rights and obligations as
stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis­a­
vis other stockholders.139
IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of
     taking of Bane deposition is insuffi­
     cient evidence of waiver
The   petitioner   staunchly   asserts   that   the   respondents   have
waived their right to cross­examine the deponent for their failure
to   appear   at   the   deposition­taking   despite   individual   notices
previously sent to them.140
_______________
138 Oscar M. Herrera, supra note 121, at p. 772. Privies are
distributed into several classes, according to the manner of the
relationship.   Thus,   there   are   privies   in   estate,   as   donor   and
donee,   lessor  and  lessee,   and  joint tenants;   privies  in  blood,  as
heir   and   ancestor;   privies   in   representation   as   executor   and
testator, administrator and intestate; privies in law for the law
without privity of blood and estate casts the land upon another as
by escheat. (Id., at p. 542.)
139 Notably, Africa was not impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009
(Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 106244, January 22, 1997,
266 SCRA 515).
140 Petitioner’s Reply to   Nieto’s   Comment,   p.   4;   and
petitioner’s Reply   with   Manifestation to Respondent   Enrile’s
Comment, pp. 11­12. Rollo, pp. 678­679.
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V.
Bane dated August 30, 1996,141 the petitioner originally intended
to depose Mr. Bane on September 25­26 1996. Because it failed to
specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition,
the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition
of Mr. Maurice V. BaneUpon Oral Examination where it likewise
moved the scheduled deposition­taking to October 23­26, 1996.
The   records   show   that   Africa   moved   several   times   for
protective   orders   against   the   intended   deposition   of   Maurice
Bane.142 On   the   other   hand,   among   the   respondents,   only
respondent  Enrile   appears   to  have  filed   an   Opposition 143 to   the
petitioner’s   first   notice,   where   he   squarely   raised   the   issue   of
reasonability  of the  petitioner’s nineteen­day  first notice.   While
the   Sandiganbayan   denied   Africa’s   motion   for   protective
orders,144 it   strikes   us   that no   ruling   was   ever   handed   down on
respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145
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141 Records, Volume XXXVI, p. 11534.
142 Records,   Volume   XXXVI,   pp.   11574­11578;   Volume
XXXVII, pp. 11649­11654; 11704­11709.
143 Records, Volume XXXVI, pp. 11610­11612.
144 Records, Volume XXXVII, pp. 11719­11720.
145 While the Sandiganbayan recognized  that the petitioner
intends   to   use   the   Bane   deposition   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009   (as
stated in the Second Amended Notice of the Taking of the Bane
Deposition),   the   Sandiganbayan   denied   Africa’s   Motion   as   if
Africa himself was impleaded in and is a party who can be bound
by   the   proceedings   and   the   judgment   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009
(except   only   as   a   substituted   heir   of   the   late   respondent   Jose
Africa).   In   denying Victor   Africa’s motion   (forgetting   about   the
concern raised by respondent Enrile—which is equally applicable
to the other respondents), the Sandiganbayan seemed oblivious of
the fact that the respondents who were non­parties to Civil Case
0130   (where   the   deposition   was   taken)   should   be   heard.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan relied blindly on the petitioner’s
assertion that the taking of deposition is a matter of right and
failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise
from   the   apparently   innocuous   statement   that   the   petitioner
intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009 (where
only   the   respondents,   and   not   Africa,   are   parties).   The
Sandiganbayan ruled:
“More importantly, under Section 1 of Rule 24 the taking of
such deposition, after the answer has been served, is a matter of
right and
207
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 207
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission
of the deposition upon oral examination is not simply based on
the   fact   of   prior   notice   on   the   individual   sought   to   be   bound
thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz,146 we ruled that—
“The   provision   explicitly   vesting   in   the   court   the   power   to
order   that   the   deposition   shall   not   be   taken   connotes   the
authority   to   exercise   discretion   on   the   matter.   However,   the
discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised,
not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always
see   to   it   that   the   safeguards   for   the   protection   of   the
parties   and   deponents   are   firmly   maintained. As   aptly
stated by Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well
as the deponent, sufficient protection against abuses that
may   be   committed   by   a   party   in   the   exercise   of   his
unlimited   right   to   discovery.   As   a   writer   said:   “Any
discovery involves a prying into another person’s affairs—
prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to
litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid.” For
this   reason,   courts   are   given   ample   powers   to   forbid
discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but
merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent
or the adverse party, or both.” (emphasis ours)
In  the  present   case,   not  only   did  the  Sandiganbayan  fail   to
rule   on   respondent   Enrile’s   Opposition   (which   is   equally
applicable to his co­respondents), it also failed to provide even the
bare minimum “safeguards for the protection of,” (more so) non­
parties,147 and to ensure
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can be resorted to without leave of court.” (Records, XXXVII,
pp. 11719­11720)
146 376 Phil. 111­112; 317 SCRA 761 (1999).
147 In its Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January 28,
1997,   the   petitioner   itself   conceded   that   respondents
are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130, where the deposition was
taken:
7. In   this   connection,   we   are   not   unmindful   of   the
observation of [the Sandiganbayan] that:
The   principal   issue   in   the   main   case,   Civil   Case   No.
0009   x x x   which   is   an   action   for   reversion,   forfeiture,
accounting   and   damages,   is   whether   or   not   there   is
preponderance of evidence that the Class “A” shareholding
in ETPI is ill­gotten wealth x x x.
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
that   these   safeguards   are   firmly   maintained.   Instead,   the preponderance   of   evidence   of   alleged   ill­gotten   wealth   of   the
Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioner’s assertion (that the defendants therein, especially Jose Africa, Roberto S. Benedicto
taking  of Bane  deposition is a matter of right) and  treated the and   Manuel   H.   Nieto,   Jr., none   of   whom   is   a   party   either   in
lingering concerns—e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non­ incident Civil Case No. 0130 or in the subject G.R. No. 107789.
party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130—at whose (Italics supplied) (Records, XL, pp. 12568­12569.)
incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was 148 Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058,
taken—rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
August   1,   2002,   386   SCRA   110;   and Development   Bank   of   the
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s
Philippines v. Bautista, et al., 135 Phil. 201; 26 SCRA 366 (1968).
reliance   on   the   prior   notice   on   the   respondents,   as   adequate
209
opportunity for cross­examination, cannot override the non­party
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 209
status of   the   respondents   in   Civil   Case   No.   0130—the   effect   of
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
consolidation being merely for trial. As non­parties, they cannot
“Effect  of substitution of parties.—Substitution of  parties
be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be
does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and,
bound   by   the   taking   of   the   Bane   deposition   without   the
when an action has been dismissed and another action involving
consequent   impairment   of   their   right   of   cross­
the   same   subject   is   afterward   brought   between the   same
examination.148Opportunity for   cross­examination,   too,   even
assuming   its   presence,   cannot   be   singled   out   as   basis   for   the parties or   their   representatives   or   successors   in   interest,   all
depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may
admissibility   of   a former   testimony   or   deposition since   such
be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.” [italics and
admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties.
underscoring ours]
To   reiterate,   although   the   Sandiganbayan   considered   the   Bane
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim
deposition   in   resolving   Civil   Case   No.   0130,   its   action   was
that   the   respondents   waived   their   right   to   cross­examination
premised   on   Africa’s   status   as   a   party   in   that   case   where   the
when   they   failed   to   attend   the   taking   of   the   Bane   deposition.
Bane deposition was taken.
Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the
cross­examine   the   deponent   speaks   loudly   that   they   never
Rules of Court through its Section 5 which provides:
intended any waiver of this right.
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Interestingly,   the  petitioner’s  notice  of  the  deposition­taking
That point should not be pre­empted in the resolution of
relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Section 15 of this rule
the subject incident in G.R. No. 107789 x x x
reads:
8. Nor   are   we   unmindful   that   this   Honorable   Court   made
“Deposition   upon   oral   examination;   notice;   time   and
clear that the finding in its December 13, 1996 resolution “does
place.—A   party   desiring   to   take   the   deposition   of   any   person
not   render   moot   and   academic   the   principal   issue   in  the   main
case,   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   which   is:   whether   or   not   there   is upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time
and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of
each   person   to   be   examined,   if   known,   and   if   the   name   is   not
known,   a   general   description   sufficient   to   identify   him   or   the
particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of any
party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause
shown enlarge or shorten the time.”
Under   this   provision,   we   do   not   believe   that   the   petitioner
could reasonably expect that the individual notices it sent to the
respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the
then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross­examination since, to begin with,
they were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we observe
that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent
was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that
their inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would
amount to a waiver of their right of cross­examination, without
prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their objections
at the appropriate time.149 We
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149 Section 6, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court reads:
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold
that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor
in substantial identity of interest with any of the parties in
the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of
the   latter,   by   the   mere   expedient   of   a   notice.   Thus,   we
cannot simply deduce  a resultant  waiver from the  respondents’
mere failure to attend the deposition­taking despite notice sent by
the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not
have   been   taken   earlier   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009—the principal
action where it was sought to be introduced—while Bane was still
here   in   the   Philippines.   We   note   in   this   regard   that   the
Philippines was no longer under the Marcos administration and
had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No.
0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the
“purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and
testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit,” which Mr. Bane had
long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro 
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149 Section 6, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court reads:
Objections   to   admissibility.—Subject   to   the   provisions   of
section   29   of   this   Rule,   objection   may   be   made   at   the   trial   or
hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for
any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if
the witness were then present and testifying.
Section 17, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court reads:
Record   of   examination;   oath;   objections.—The   officer
before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on
oath   and   shall   personally,   or   by   someone   acting   under   his
direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness.
The testimony shall be taken stenographically unless the parties
agree   otherwise.   All   objections   made   at   the   time   of   the
examination   to   the   qualifications   of   the   officer   taking   the
deposition,   or   to   the   manner   of   taking   it,   or   to   the   evidence
presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection
to   the   proceedings,   shall   be   noted   by   the   officer   upon   the
deposition.   Evidence   objected   to   shall   be   taken   subject   to   the
objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties
served with notice of taking a deposition may transmit written
interrogatories   to  the  officers,   who   shall   propound   them  to   the
witness and record the answers verbatim.
211
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 211
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Manila.  Clearly,   a   deposition   could   then   have   been   taken—
150
without compromising the respondents’ right to cross­examine a
witness against them—considering that the principal purpose of
the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind,
are   avoidable   omissions   that,   when   added   to   the   deficient
handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies
of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of
the   peculiar   circumstances   of   this   case,   the leastthat   the
petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane
deposition   and   proceed   with   the   deposition   immediately   upon
securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the
respondents  would  have a  chance  to  be heard,   the respondents
cannot   avoid   a   resultant   waiver   of   their   right   of   cross­
examination   if   they   still   fail   to   appear   at   the   deposition­
taking. Fundamental   fairness   dictates   this   course   of
action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents
non­parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest
in   Africa’s certiorari petition   asserting   his   right   as   an   ETPI
stockholder.
Setting   aside   the   petitioner’s   flip­flopping   on   its   own
representations,151 this Court can only express dismay on why the
petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his
deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of
what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony of Bane
is   allegedly   a   “vital   cog”   in   the   petitioner’s   case   against   the
respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to
take   the   deposition in   an incident case   (instead   of   the   main
case) at a time when it became the technical right of the petitioner
to do so.
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150 Records, Volume XXXVII, pp. 11628­11623.
151 See   the   petitioner’s   Pre­Trial   Brief   (Records,   Volume
XXXVI, p. 11405) where the petitioner made a representation to
present   Mr.   Maurice   Bane.   See  the   petitioner’s   Common  Reply
(Records,   Volume   XLV,   pp.   110­112)   where   the   petitioner
conceded   the   applicability   of   Section   47,   Rule   130;   see   the
petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Records, Volume XL,
pp.   12568­12569)   where   the   petitioner   admitted   that   the
respondents were not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (where the
deposition  was taken) and Victor  Africa was neither  a  party to
Civil Case No. 0009.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
V. The   petitioner   cannot   rely   on   principle   of
judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had
already   been  previously   introduced   and   admitted   in   Civil   Case
No.   0130,   then   the   Sandiganbayan   should   have   taken   judicial
notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges
may properly take and act on without proof because these facts
are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption
by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary
support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in
securing   and   introducing   evidence   on   matters   which   are   not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
 The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil
and   canon   law   maxim, manifesta (or   notoria) non   indigent
probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court
will   dispense   with   the   traditional   form   of   presentation   of
evidence.   In  so  doing,   the   court   assumes   that  the   matter  is  so
notorious that it would not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to
take   judicial   notice, inter   alia,   of   “the   official   acts   of   the   x x x
judicial departments of the Philippines,” 155or gives the court the
discretion to take judicial notice of matters “ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.”156 On the other hand, a
party­litigant   may   ask   the   court   to   take   judicial   notice   of   any
matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the
propriety of taking judicial notice
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152 Ricardo J. Francisco, supra note 125, at p. 69.
153 Oscar M. Herrera, supra note 121, at p. 72.
154 Manifest  things  require no proof;  what  is  known by the
magistrate need not be proved; Jovito R. Salonga, supra note 118,
at  p.   45;   and  Eduardo   B.   Peralta,   Jr., Perspectives   of  Evidence,
2005, p. 52, citing 1 Jones on Evidence, p. 209.
155 Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
156 Id., Section 2.
213
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
of the matter involved.157 In the present case, after the petitioner
filed   its Urgent   Motion   and/or   Request   for   Judicial   Notice,   the
respondents   were   also   heard   through   their   corresponding
oppositions.
In   adjudicating   a   case   on   trial,   generally,   courts   are   not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. 158 This
rule though admits of exceptions.
As   a   matter   of   convenience   to   all   the   parties,   a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before   it,   when, with   the   knowledge   of, andabsent   an
objection  from, the adverse  party,reference  is  made  to it
for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner
by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record
of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from
the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of
the case then pending.159
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157 Id., Section 3.
158 Manuel   V.   Moran, supra note   123,   at   pp.   47­48,
citing Municipal Council of San Pedro Laguna v. Colegio de San
Jose, 65 Phil. 318 (1938);and Prieto v. Arroyo, 121 Phil. 1335; 14
SCRA 549 (1965).
159 In Occidental   Land   Transportation   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Court   of
Appeals,  G.R.  No.  96721,  March 19,   1993,  220  SCRA  167,  176,
213
citing Tabuena   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   196   SCRA   650   (1991),   we
stated:
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the records
of   the   instant   case   (Civil   Case   No.   2728)   with   the
knowledge   of   the   parties   and   in   the   absence   of   their
 objection. This fact was pointed out by the lower court, to
wit:
The x x x findings of the Oroquieta Court became
as   conclusive   upon   the   company   and   its   driver   by
their   acquiescence   and   silence   x   x   x.   (Decision   of
lower court, p. 12; records, p. 239)
x x x x
Returning   to   Exhibit   “O,” supra (Decision,   Civil
Case No. 3156, CFI, Branch III, Oroquieta City), the
Court hastens to add:
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another
case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the
case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. 160
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Said   exhibit   has   not   been   objected   to  nor   commented
upon   by   the   defendants   Company   and   Enerio,   through
their counsel, x x x.
This being the case, petitioners were aware that Exhibit “O”
(Decision in Civil Case No. 3156) had formed part of the records of
the case and would thereby be considered by the trial court in its
decision.
160 Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads:
Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter,   that  there  is
another  action  pending between  the same parties  for the
same   cause,   or   that   the   action   is   barred   by   a   prior
judgment   or   by   statute   of   limitations,   the   court   shall
dismiss the claim. (underscoring ours)
In Lewin v. Galang, etc., 109 Phil. 1041, 1045 (1960), cited by
the petitioner, the Court held:
In view of this special defense [res judicata], the court
below   should   have   taken   judicial   notice   of   the habeas
corpus proceedings instituted by petitioner before the same
Court   of   First   Instance   of   Manila   and   before   the   same
judge,   Case   No.   28409, Ted   Lewin   v.   Commissioner   of
Immigration   and   Commissioner   of   Customs,   and   we   find
that practically the same facts relied upon in petitioner’s
present petition for declaratory judgment are the very facts
upon which petitioner based his request for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus in the previous case.
In Tiburcio,   et   al.   v.   People’s   Homesite   and   Housing
Corporation, et al., 106 Phil. 477, 483­484 (1959), likewise cited by
the petitioner, we held:
Appellants  finally  claim  that  the lower  court  erred  in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by
taking   judicial   notice   of   its   own   records   in   Land
Registration   Case   No.   L­3   invoking   in   support   of   their
contention  the principle  that a court cannot take judicial
notice   of   the   contents   of   the   records   of   other   cases   even
when   such   cases   had   been   tried   by   the   same   court   and
notwithstanding the [fact] that both cases may have been
tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is
considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute.
215
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 215
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
 The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the
rule   on   mandatory   taking   of   judicial   notice;   neither   is   the
applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice
seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept
of   judicial   notice   from   a genealogical   perspective of   treating
whatever   evidence   offered   in  any   of   the  “children”   cases—Civil
Case 0130—as evidence in the “parent” case—Civil Case 0009—or
“of the whole family of cases.” 161 To the petitioner, the supposed
relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.
We   strongly   disagree. First,   the   supporting   cases162 the
petitioner   cited   are   inapplicable   either   because   these   cases
involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which
proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is
obviously   obnoxious   to   a   system   of   orderly   procedure.   The
petitioner itself admits that the
_______________
There   are   exceptions   to   this   rule.   Thus,   as   noted   by
former Chief Justice Moran:
In   some   instance[s],   courts   have   taken   judicial
notice   of   proceedings   in   other   causes,   because   of
their   close   connection   with   the   matter   in
controversy. x x x
Moreover, appellants’ objection to the action of the trial
court on this matter is merely technical because they do not
dispute  the  fact  that  appellant  x  x   x,   who  instituted  the
present case, is the same person who filed the application
in Land Registration Case No. L­3 for the registration of
the same parcel of land which application was denied by
the  court  x x x.   It  may   therefore  be said  that in  the  two
cases   there   is   not   only   identity   of   subject   matter   but
identity   of  parties  and  causes  of  action.   Indeed,  the  trial
court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground
of res judicata.
161 Petitioner’s Reply   with   Manifestation (to   respondent
Enrile’sComment) enumerates the various “family member” cases
which arose from the present and main case, Civil Case No. 0009.
162 De   los   Angeles   v.   Hon.   Cabahug,   et   al.,   106   Phil.   839
(1959); Lewin v. Galang, etc., supra note 160; and Tiburcio, et al.
v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al., supra note
160.
163 Lewin   v.   Galang, etc.,   supra;   and Tiburcio,   et   al.   v.
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al., supra.
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood,
involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the
petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion
by   indiscriminately   allowing   the   admission   of   evidence   in   one
case,   which   was   presumably   found   competent   and   relevant   in
another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases.
It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party­litigant, to properly lay
before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief
it  seeks,   instead   of   imposing   that   same   duty   on   the  court.   We
invite the petitioner’s attention to our prefatory pronouncement
in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164
“Down the oft­trodden path in our judicial system, by common
sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in trying a case sees only
with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of
the   case,   except   those   which   have   been   adduced   judicially   in
evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is
empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants
to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they
rely.” (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the
petitioner’s argument that we should take judicial notice of the
Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial
of the petitioner’s 3rd motion—the Motion to Admit Supplemental
Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)—was a legal
error   that   did   not   amount   to   grave   abuse   of   discretion; (2) the
Sandiganbayan’s   refusal   to   reopen   the   case   at   the   petitioner’s
instance   was   tainted   with   grave   abuse   of   discretion;
and (3) notwithstanding   the   grave   abuse   of   discretion, the
petition   must   ultimately   fail as   the   Bane   deposition   is   not
admissible under the rules of evidence.165
_______________
164 319 Phil. 387, 389; 249 SCRA 281, 282 (1995).
165 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 47.
217
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified
Dissent
At   the   last   minute,   Justice   Carpio   circulated   a   modified
dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His covering note states:
“I   have   revised   my   dissenting   opinion   to   include   the   Bane
deposition so that the Court and the public will understand what
the Bane deposition is all about.” (underlining added)
In   light   of   this   thrust,   a   discussion   refuting   the   modified
dissent is in order.
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The
dissent   perfectly   identified   what   is   at   issue   in   this   case—i.e.,
the admissibility of   the   Bane   deposition.   Admissibility   is
concerned   with   the   competence and relevance166 of   the  evidence,
whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the
Bane   deposition,   it   may   not   be   amiss   to   point   out   that the
relevance   of  the  Bane   deposition (or,   to   adopt   the   dissent’s
characterization, whether “Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness”)
is not an   issue   here   unless   it   can   be   established first that   the
Bane deposition is a competent evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation   of   Cited   Authority. The
dissent   insists   that   “in   Philippine   Jurisprudence,   the
consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and
the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment,”
citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we
footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position, which
we will restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of
Court, Francisco wrote:
217 The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all
of the different  actions  consolidated into a single action, in the
same manner as if the  different causes of  actions involved had
originally   been   joined   in   a   single   action,   and   the   order   of
consolidation,   if   made   by   a   court   of   competent   jurisdiction,   is
binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is va­
_______________
166 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 128, Section 3.
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
cated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further
proceedings in  the  separate  actions,  which are  by  virtue of the
consolidation   discontinued   and   superseded   by   a   single   action,
which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct,
and   all   subsequent   proceedings   therein   be   conducted   and   the
rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1 C.J.S., 113,
pp. 1371­1372).
At   the   very   beginning   of   the   discussion   on   consolidation   of
actions   in   the Corpus   Juris   Secundum,   the   following   caveat
appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First,
where   several   actions   are   combined   into   one   and   lose   their
separate identity   and  become  a  single  action  in  which   a  single
judgment   is   rendered; second,   where   all   except   one   of   several
actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment
in   the   one   is   conclusive   as   to   the   others; third,   where   several
actions   are   ordered   to   be   tried   together   but   each   retains   its
separate   character   and   requires   the   entry   of   a   separate
judgment. The failure to distinguish between these methods
of  procedure,   which   are  entirely   distinct,   the two latter,
strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which has
not   always   been   noted,   has   caused   some   confusion   and
conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341­1342) (Emphasis
added).
In   defining   the   term   “consolidation   of   actions,” Francisco
provided a colatilla that the term “consolidation” is used
in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur.
477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).”
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have
quoted Francisco’s statement out of context. As it is, the issue of
the   effect   of   consolidation   on   evidence   is   at   most   an   unsettled
matter   that   requires   the   approach   we   did   in   the   majority’s
discussion on consolidation.167
_______________
167 The dissent then compares the proceedings in the Court
when   cases   are   consolidated   to   support   its   position   that
consolidation   results   in   the   merger   of   the   different   causes   of
action. However, it is not exactly appropriate to compare the
consolidation   of   cases   in   the   Supreme   Court   with   the
consolidation ordered by the Sandiganbayan because the
Supreme Court is NOT a trier of facts. First, the scope of our
review is limited generally to “questions of law.” Hence, no issue
of   prejudice   to   other   parties   can   arise   should   petitions   in   the
Court   be   consolidated. Second, unlike   consolidated   cases   in
the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan
219
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 219
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
 
  Third: Misappreciation   of   the   Purpose   of   Consoli ­
dation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of consolidation—
to   “expeditiously   settle   the   interwoven   issues   involved   in   the
consolidated cases” and “the simplification of the proceedings.” It
argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the same
evidence is dispensed with.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact
that   since   consolidation   is   primarily   addressed   to   the   court
concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be
in  keeping   with  the   orderly   trial   procedure   if  the   court   should
have   a   say   on   what   consolidation   would   actually
bring168 (especially where   several   cases   are  involved   which   have
become relatively complex). In the present case, there is nothing
in   the   proceedings   below   that   would   suggest   that   the
Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the
respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyondjoint hearing or
trial. Why should this Court—which is not a trial court—impose a
purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?
 Fourth: The   Due   Process   Consideration. The   dissent
argues   that   even   if   the   consolidation   only   resulted   in   a   joint
hearing   or   trial,   the   “respondents   are   still   bound   by   the   Bane
deposition   considering   that   they   were   given   notice   of   the
deposition­taking.” The issue here boils down to one of due
process—the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not
subjected to the rigor of cross­examination) is generally excluded
in the realm of admissible evidence—especially when read in light
of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute
for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of
deposition­taking   (questioning   the   reasonableness   thereof—an
issue   applicable   to   the   rest   of   the   respondents)   which   the
Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s
omission   worse,   the   Sandiganbayan   blindly   relied   on   the
petitioner’s assertion that the
_______________
itself had, in fact, separately adjudged an incident of Civil
Case No. 0130 and the few other incident cases independent of
Civil Case No. 0009.
168 Correctible under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
deposition­taking   was   a   matter   of   right   and,   thus,   failed   to
address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the
apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends
to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the
respondents, and not Africa, are the parties). 169 There is simply
the absence of “due” in due process.
Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The
dissent   repeatedly   misstates   that   the   Sandiganbayan   “granted”
the   request   for   the   deposition­taking.   For   emphasis,
the Sandiganbayan   did   not   “grant”   the   request since   the
petitioner   staunchly   asserted   that   the   deposition­taking   was
a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues
that   these   consolidated   cases   have   reached.   Considering   the
consolidation   of   cases   of   this   nature, the   most   minimum   of
fairness   demands   upon   the   petitioner   to move for   the
taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan
to   make   a   ruling   thereon (including   the   opposition   filed   by
respondent  Enrile  which  equally   applies  to  his co­respondents).
The burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in this
case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty of
violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Sixth: Issues   Posed   and   Resolved   Go   Beyond
Technicalities. The   above   conclusions,   contrary   to   the
petitioner’s   claim,   are   not   only   matters   of   technicality.
Admittedly, rules of procedure involve technicality, to which we
have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the
resolution   of   the   issues   raised   goes   beyond   pure   or   mere
technicalities   as   the   preceding   discussions   show.   They   involve
issues   of   due   process   and   basic   unfairness   to   the   respondents,
particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane
deposition  to  be acting  in  behalf  of  the  Marcoses  so  that  these
shares   should   be   deemed   to   be   those   of   the   Marcoses.   They
involved,   too,   principles  upon   which  our   rules   of  procedure   are
founded and which we cannot disregard without flirting with the
violation   of   guaranteed   substantive   rights   and   without   risking
the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of
their evolution.
_______________
169 When it denied Africa's separate opposition.
221
 VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the
Court failed to arrive at a conclusive decision because of a tie vote
(7­7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in
the re­voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is
deemed sustained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition
for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona   (C.J.),   Peralta,   Bersamin,   Del   Castillo,
Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the opinion of J.A.T. Carpio with the
qualification   that   the   Bane   deposition   cannot   be   used   against
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile because of his opposition thereto.
Leonardo­De Castro, J., No Part.
Abad, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Villarama, Jr., J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Sereno, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Reyes, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Perlas­Bernabe, J., I join the dissent of J. Carpio.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 filed by the Republic
of   the   Philippines   (petitioner),   through   the   Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG),  seeking to set aside
the   Resolution   dated   7   February   2002   of   the   Sandiganbayan,
which denied petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane).
221 _______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
The   case   pertains   to   the   complaint   filed   before   the
Sandiganbayan   by   petitioner   against   private   respondents   for
reconveyance,   reversion,   accounting,   restitution,   and   damages.
The complaint, which was filed on 22 July 1987, was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0009. Civil Case No. 0009 involves, among others,
the shares of private respondents in Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which were allegedly ill­gotten and were
eventually sequestered by the government.2
The   issue   in   this certiorari proceeding   concerns   the
admissibility   of   the   deposition   of   Maurice   V.   Bane,   taken
primarily for testimony regarding the interlocutory issue in Civil
Case No. 0130, which is one of the incident cases of Civil Case No.
0009.
Civil Case No. 0130 is a petition for certiorari filed with the
Sandiganbayan by Victor Africa, son of Jose L. Africa, 3who is one
of   the   defendants   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   against   the   PCGG.
Victor   Africa   filed   the   petition,   seeking   to   nullify   the   PCGG
orders directing him, among others, to account for his sequestered
shares   in   ETPI. In   a Resolution   dated   12   April   1993,4 the
Sandiganbayan   ordered   the   consolidation   of   the   main
case,   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   with   several   incident   cases
including Civil Case No. 0130.5
On 25 September 1996, in Civil Case No. 0009 in connection
with Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789, petitioner filed
with   the   Sandiganbayan   a Second   Amended   Notice   to   Take
Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination. 6 On
23 and 24 October 1996, the deposition upon oral examination of
Maurice V. Bane, former director and treasurer­in trust of ETPI,
was   taken   before   Consul   General   Ernesto   Castro   at   the
Philippine Embassy in London, Eng­
_______________
2 See Petition   for Certiorari,   dated   14   March   2002,   p.
12; Rollo, p. 13.
3 Upon his demise, Jose L. Africa was eventually substituted
by his heirs as defendants in Civil Case No. 0009. Victor Africa is
one   of   the   legal   representatives/forced   heirs   of   deceased
respondent Jose L. Africa; Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 1
April 1998, p. 6; Rollo, p. 336.
4 Promulgated on 15 April 1993.
5 See Sandiganbayan   Resolution   issued   on   1   April   1998,   p.
5; Rollo, p. 335; Records, pp. 6646­6649.
6 Rollo, pp. 68­71.
223
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
land. Among the defendants in the main Civil Case No. 0009, only
Victor Africa appeared during the taking of the deposition.
On 22 January 1998, petitioner filed a motion 7 praying that it
be allowed to adopt the testimonies of several of its witnesses in
incidental Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130 and 0146, including
the  deposition of  Maurice  V. Bane, as its evidence  in  the main
case, Civil Case No. 0009. On 1 April 1998, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution, denying  in  part the  motion as  regards  the
adoption of the testimony on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane
(and Rolando Gapud) as part of petitioner’s evidence in Civil Case
No.   0009,   “for   the  reason   that  said   deponents   according   to   the
plaintiff, are not available for cross examination in this Court by
the defendants.”8
On   14   December   1999,   petitioner   made   its Formal   Offer   of
Evidence consisting of Exhibits “A” to “XX­27.” However, through
oversight,   petitioner   failed   to   include   among   its   exhibits   the
deposition of Maurice V. Bane. Thus, in its Urgent Motion And/Or
Request   for   Judicial   Notice dated   21   February   2000,   petitioner
prayed that it be allowed to introduce as additional evidence the
deposition   of   Maurice   V.   Bane,   or   in   the   alternative,   for   the
Sandiganbayan to take judicial notice of the facts established by
the   said   deposition.   On   21   August   2000,   the   Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion. The Resolution
stated:
“Allegedly the deposition of Maurice V. Bane was introduced
as PCGG’s evidence in Civil Case No. 0130 (in relation to G.R. No.
107789) which is an incident of and consolidated with the above­
entitled case in connection with PCGG’s “Very Urgent Petition for
Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for the Purpose of
Increasing   ETPI’s   Authorized   Capital   Stock”   and   the   said
223
deposition  of  Maurice   V.   Bane  is  now   a  part  and  parcel   of  the
record of this main case.
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled “What
Need   Not   Be   Proved.”   Apparently,   this   provision   refers   to   the
Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings,   or   in   the  course   of  the   trial   or   other   proceedings   in
resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
_______________
7Id., at pp. 322­329.
8 See Sandiganbayan   Resolution   issued   on   1   April   1998,   p.
6; Rollo, p. 336.
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
mandatory   and   in   those   cases   where   it   is   discretionary,   the
initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds
the Urgent Motion and/or Request for judicial notice as something
which   need   not   be   acted   upon   as   the   same   is   considered
redundant.
On   the   matter   of   the   deposition   of   Maurice   V.   Bane,   the
admission of the same is done through the ordinary formal offer of
exhibits   wherein   the   defendant   is   given   ample   opportunity   to
raise objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not
under Article 129 on judicial notice.”9
Petitioner   moved   for   reconsideration,   which   the
Sandiganbayan   denied   in   a   Resolution   issued   on   3   April   2001.
The Resolution stated:
“In   the   subject   Resolution   [issued   on   21   August   2000],   this
Court ruled that the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial
Notice was something that need not be acted upon as the same
was already considered redundant, the deposition of Bane,
having become part and parcel of the record of this main
case since Civil Case No. 0130 is an incident to the same.
This  Court further held that the admission  of same  is done
through   ordinary   formal   offer   of   exhibits   wherein   defendant   is
given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by
law, and not under Rule 129 on judicial notice.
WHEREFORE,   there   being   no   other   issue   which   merit
consideration   of   this   Court,   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   is
hereby denied.”10(Emphasis supplied)
On   16   November   2001,   petitioner   filed   a Motion   to   Admit
Supplemental   Offer   of   Evidence   (Re:   Deposition   of   Maurice   V.
Bane), seeking once again the admission of the deposition. On 7
February   2002,   the   Sandiganbayan   promulgated   the   assailed
Resolution,   denying   petitioner’s   motion.   The   Sandiganbayan
ruled:
“The   only   issue   that   the   court   is   actually   called   upon   to
address in the pending incident is whether or not We should allow
plaintiff­movant’s Supplemental   Offer   of   Evidence consisting   of
the deposition of Maurice V. Bane.
_______________
9  Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 21 August 2000, pp. 3­
4; Rollo, pp. 354­355.
10 Sandiganbayan   Resolution   issued   on   3   April   2001,   p.
2; Rollo, p. 358.
225
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 225
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
      x x x
Defendants’ Opposition to   the   pending   incident   as   well   as
plaintiff’s Reply to   the Opposition gave   various   reasons   why   the
motion should or should not be granted. But in the court’s view, it
is not  really   a  question  of  whether  or  not  plaintiff has  already
rested its case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence.
It is not even a question of whether the non­appearing defendants
are deemed to have waived their right to cross­examine Bane as
to   qualify   the   admission   of   the   deposition   sans   such   cross­
examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these
matters   in   view   of   this   court’s Resolution rendered   in   April   1,
1998 which already denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s
deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure
to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15­day
reglementary   period.   Rightly   or   wrongly,   the   resolution   stands
and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time
would   in   effect   sanction   plaintiff’s   disregard   for   the   rules   of
procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years
and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its
ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to
introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in
the   alternative   for   the   court   to   take   judicial   notice   of   the
allegations   of   the   deposition.   But   how   can   such   a   motion   be
granted   when   it   has   been   resolved   as   early   as   1998   that   the
deposition   is   inadmissible.   Without   plaintiff   having   moved   for
reconsideration   within   the   reglementary   period,   the   resolution
has attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple
expedient   of   filing   a   motion,   which   though   purporting   to   be   a
novel   motion,   is   in   reality   a   motion   for   reconsideration   of   this
court’s 1998 ruling. Hence, the subsequent motions, including the
present incident are deemed moot and academic.” 11
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
I vote to grant the petition.
It   is   important   to   note   that   the Second   Amended   Notice   to
Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination,
filed on 25 September 1996, was after the consolidation of Civil
Case No. 0130 with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, through
the   Sandiganbayan   Resolution   dated   12   April   1993.   This   is
evident in the caption of the notice, thus:
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 63, 65­67.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANDIGANBAYAN
MANILA
                              Third Division
Republic   of   the   Philippines,
                            Plaintiff,               CIVIL   CASE   NO.   0009
            ­versus­                                                (Incident Case No. 0130
                                                       and G.R. No. 107789)
JOSE   L.   AFRICA,   ET   AL.,
                      Defendants.
It   should   be   noted   that   the   late   Jose   L.   Africa,   one   of   the
defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, has been substituted by his
heirs,   including   his   son   Victor   Africa.   Thus,   Justice   Brion’s
statement that Victor Africa is “plainly not a party to Civil Case
No.   0009”12 is   misleading.   Although   Victor   Africa   was   not
originally impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009, Victor Africa became
one of the substitute defendants in Civil Case No. 0009 upon the
demise   of   Jose   L.   Africa.   In   fact,   Victor   Africa,   as   substitute
defendant   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   has   filed   with   the
Sandiganbayan several pleadings13 and his Offer of Evidence.14
All the defendants of Civil Case No. 0009 were given notice of
the scheduled testimony by oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane.
Furthermore,   the   notice   stated   that   “[t]he   deposition   of   said
witness shall be used in evidence in Incident Case No. 0130­G.R.
No. 107789 as well
_______________
12 Justice Brion’s modified draft Decision, p. 2.
13 Comment cum Opposition, filed on 18 July 2008, SB records
(Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 66, pp. 126­136; Rejoinder, filed on
14 September 2009, SB records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 67,
pp.   206­210; Comment   cum   Opposition,   filed   on   14   September
2009,   SB   records   (Civil   Case   No.   0009),   Volume   67,   pp.   212­
213; Memorandum,  filed  on  8  February   2010,   SB  records  (Civil
Case No. 0009), Volume 68, pp. 62­73.
14 Offer of Evidence filed on 14 May 2008, SB records (Civil
Case No. 0009), Volume 65, pp.  539­545; Supplemental Offer of
Evidence filed on 4 September 2008, SB records (Civil Case No.
0009), Volume 66, pp. 242­243.
227
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 227
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
as in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009.”15 Since notices have
been duly served on all the defendants, those who failed to show
up at the deposition­taking are deemed to have waived their right
to appear and cross­examine the deponent. Indeed, under Section
4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the deposition “may be
used against any party who was present or represented at
the   taking   of   the   deposition   or   who   had   due   notice
thereof.” Section 4, Rule 23 reads:
“Sec. 4. Use of depositions.—At the trial or upon the hearing
of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition,   so   far   as   admissible   under   the   rules   of
evidence, may be used against any party who was present
or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had
due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose
of   contradicting   or   impeaching   the   testimony   of   deponent   as
witness;
(b)  The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of
the taking of the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent   of   a   public   or   private   corporation,   partnership,   or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for
any purpose;
(c)  The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that
the   witness   is   dead;   or   (2) that   the   witness   resides   at   a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless
it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance  of  the  witness  by   subpoena;   or  (5)  upon  application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make
it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance   of   presenting   the   testimony   of   witnesses   orally   in
open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
(d)   if only part of the deposition is offered in evidence by a
party, the  adverse  party may require  him  to  introduce all of  it
which is relevant to the
_______________
15 Underscoring in the original.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Granting that among the defendants in the main Civil Case
No. 0009, only Victor Africa is a party to the incident Civil Case
No.  0130,  still   all  the  other   defendants   in  Civil   Case  No.   0009
were given notice of the scheduled deposition­taking. The reason
why all the defendants were given notice of the said deposition­
taking was because at that time, Civil Case No. 0130 was already
consolidated with Civil Case No. 0009 and as emphasized in the
second amended notice, “[t]he deposition of said witness shall
be   used   in   evidence   in   Incident   Case   No.   0130­G.R.   No.
107789 as well as in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009.”16
The   Sandiganbayan   Resolution   dated   12   April   1993   which
consolidated   the   main   case,   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   with   several
incident cases including Civil Case No. 0130,reads:
Republic of the Philippines
SANDIGANBAYAN
Manila
 ­ ­ ­ ­ JOSE   L.   AFRICA,   ET   AL.,
THIRD DIVISION                                  Plaintiffs,
REPUBLIC   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,                ­versus­                                   CIVIL CASE NO. 0045
                                        Plaintiff, EDUARDO   M.   VILLANUEVA   and
            ­versus­                              CIVIL CASE NO. 0009 PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON
JOSE   L.   AFRICA,   ET   AL., GOOD   GOVERNMENT,
                                       Defendants.                                  Defendants.
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x
VICTOR   AFRICA,   ET   AL., JOSE   L.   AFRICA,   ET   AL.,
                                        Intervenors,                                   Plaintiffs,
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x                 ­versus­                                  CIVIL CASE NO. 0047
_______________ MELQUIADES   GUTIERREZ,   ET   AL.,
16 Underscoring in the original; boldfacing supplied.                                  Defendants.
229 x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 229 VICTOR   AFRICA,   ET   AL.,
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)                                    Plaintiffs,
POLYGON   INVESTORS   AND   MANAGERS,                 ­versus­                                CIVIL CASE NO. 0130230
INC., 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
                                   Plaintiff, Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
               ­versus­                                   CIVIL CASE NO. 0043 PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON
PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL.,
GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL.,                                   Defendants.
                               Defendants. x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x TRADERS   ROYAL   BANK,
AEROCOM   INVESTORS   AND   MANAGERS,                                   Plaintiff,
INC.,                ­versus­                                   CIVIL CASE NO. 0131
                                  Plaintiff, PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON
               ­versus­                                   CIVIL CASE NO. 0044 GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL.,
PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON                                  Defendants.
GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL., x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x
                                 Defendants. FAR   EAST   BANK   &   TRUST   CO.,
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x                                    Plaintiff,
               ­versus­                                  CIVIL CASE NO. 0139
PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON                                       Plaintiffs,
GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL.,                      ­versus­                             CIVIL CASE NO. 0114
                                 Defendants. PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION              Present:
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x ON   GOOD   GOVERNMENT,                    HERMOSISIMA, J.,
STANDARD   CHARTERED   BANK,                                       Defendant.          Chairman,
                                  Plaintiff,                                                                DEL   ROSARIO   &
                 ­versus­                                 CIVIL CASE NO. 0143                                                                DE   LEON, JJ.
PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON                                                      Promulgated: April 15, 1993
GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL., x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­x
                                 Defendants. R E S O L U T I O N
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x
DE LEON, J.
TRADERS   ROYAL   BANK,
Submitted for resolution is the Motion for Consolidation, dated
                                  Plaintiff,
June   22,   1992,   filed   by   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines
                   ­versus­                               CIVIL CASE NO. 0128
(represented by the PCGG), through counsel.
PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON
The   record   shows   that   there   is   no   opposition   in   the
GOOD   GOVERNMENT,   ET   AL.,
above­entitled   cases   to   the   said   motion.   It   also   appears
                                 Defendants.
that   the   subject   matters   of   the   above­entitled   cases   are
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x231
and/or may be treated as mere incidents in Civil Case No.
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 231
0009.232
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
DOMESTIC   SATELLITE
PHILIPPINES,   INC., Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
                                      Petitioner, WHEREFORE,   the   above­entitled   cases   are   hereby
                 ­versus­                                 CIVIL CASE NO. 0106 ordered  consolidated  with Civil Case No.  0009,  and shall
PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION   ON henceforth be considered and treated as mere incidents of
GOOD   GOVERNMENT   AND   THE said Civil Case No. 0009.
ASSET   PRIVATIZATION   TRUST, SO ORDERED.
                                     Respondents. Manila, Philippines, April 12, 1993.17
x ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ x Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:
PHILIPPINE   COMMUNICATIONS “Section 1. Consolidation.—When   actions   involving   a
SATELLITE   CORPORATION   AND common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
PHILIPPINE   OVERSEAS   TELECOM­ may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
MUNICATIONS   CORPORATION,
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and
it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Emphasis supplied)
The   12   April   1993   Resolution   of   the   Sandiganbayan
ordered a consolidation of all the cases, not merely a joint
hearing or trial.  “The  effect  of consolidation of actions is  to unite  and
Justice   Brion   maintains   that   to   resolve   the   issue   of   the
admissibility   of   the   Bane   deposition,   the   effect   of   the
consolidation   of   Civil   Case   No.   0130   with   Civil   Case   No.   0009
should first be determined. Justice Brion emphasizes that despite
the   consolidation,   the   two   cases   remain   distinct   and   separate
from   each   other,   such   that   a   mere   notice   of   deposition   taking,
even   if   under   the   expressed   intent   of   using   the   testimony   in
evidence in the main case, cannot automatically bind the private
respondents who were not previously heard thereon.
In his modified draft Decision, Justice Brion posits that the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 with several incident cases
including Civil Case No. 0130 is merely a “consolidation for trial.”
On page 31 of the modified Draft Decision, a “consolidation for
trial,” as defined in American jurisprudence is:
“Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each
retains  its  separate  character   and  requires  entry   of  a   separate
judgment. This type of
_______________
17 SB   Records   (Civil   Case   No.   0009),   Volume   18,   pp.   6646­
6649. (Boldfacing supplied)
233
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
consolidation   does   not   merge   the   suits   into   a   single   action,   or
cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other.”
In   this   kind   of   consolidation,   the   cases   are   merely   tried
together but a decision is rendered separately in each case.
In   Philippine   jurisprudence, the   consolidation   of   cases
merges the different actions into one and the rights of the
parties are adjudicated in a single judgment, thus:
merge all of the different actions consolidated into a single
action,   in   the   same   manner   as   if   the   different   causes   of
action   involved   had   originally   been   joined   in   a   single
action,   and   the   order   of   consolidation,   if   made   by   a   court   of
competent   jurisdiction,   is   binding   upon   all   the   parties   to   the
different   actions   until   it   is   vacated   or   set   aside. After   the
consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the
separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
discontinued   and   superseded   by   a   single   action,   which
should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct,
and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and
the   rights   of   the   parties   adjudicated   in   a   single
action.”18 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, when consolidated cases are appealed to the Supreme
Court or when the Court orders consolidation of cases, the Justice
to   whom   the   consolidated   cases   are   assigned   renders   a   single
decision,   adjudicating   all   the   rights   of   the   parties   in   the
consolidated   cases.19 The   Chief   Justice   assigns   the   consolidated
cases   to   the   Member­in­Charge   to   whom   the   case   having   the
lower or lowest docket number has been raffled.20
233 _______________
18 2   V.   Francisco,   The   Revised   Rules   of   Court   in   the
Philippines 352­353 (1973).
19 See Republic   of   the   Philippines   v.   Sandiganbayan,   G.R.
Nos.   166859,   169203   &   180702,   12   April   2011,   648   SCRA
47; Raquel­Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 174986, 175071
&   181415,   7   July   2009,   592   SCRA   169; Grefalde   v.
Sandiganbayan, 401 Phil. 553; 348 SCRA 367 (2000).
20 Active   Wood   Products,   Co.   Inc.   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   260
Phil. 825; 181 SCRA 774 (1990). Section 5, Rule 9 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court reads:
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordered
the consolidation of the incidental cases, including Civil Case No.
0130, with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009. Unlike a mere
order of a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue   in   the   actions,   the consolidation   of   actions   merges
the different ac­
_______________
SEC. 5. Consolidation of cases.—The Court may order
the   consolidation   of   cases   involving   common   questions   of
law or fact. The Chief Justice shall assign the consolidated
cases to  the Member­in­Charge  to whom the case having
the lower or lowest docket number has been raffled, subject
to equalization of cases load by raffle. The Judicial Records
Office shall see to it that (a) the rollos of the consolidated
cases are joined together to prevent the loss, misplacement
or   detachment   of   any   of   them;   and   (b)   the   cover   of
each rollo indicates   the  G.R.   or   UDK   number   of   the  case
with which the former is consolidated.
The Member­in­Charge who finds after study that the
cases do not involve common questions of law or of fact may
request the Court to have the case or cases returned to the
original Member­in­Charge.
The   Sandiganbayan   has   a   similar   rule   regarding   the
consolidation of  cases. Section  2, Rule  XII  of the  Revised
Internal   Rules   of   Sandiganbayan   (A.M.   No.   02­6­07­SB
dated 28 August 2002) provides:
SEC. 2. Consolidation   of   Cases.—Cases   arising   from
the   same   incident   or   series   of   incidents,   or   involving
common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in
the Division to which the  case bearing  the lowest  docket
number is raffled.
(a)  Before Cases Are Raffled—Should the propriety of
consolidation appear upon the filing of the cases concerned
as determined by the Raffle Committee, all such cases shall
be consolidated and considered as one case for purposes of
the raffle and inventory of pending cases assigned to each
of the Divisions.
(b) After  Cases  Are  Raffled—Should   the  propriety   of
such   consolidation   become   apparent   only   after   the   cases
are   raffled,   consolidation   may   be   effected   upon   written
motion of a litigant concerned filed with the Division taking
cognizance of the case to be consolidated. If the motion is
granted,   consolidation   shall   be   made   to   the   Division   in
which the case with the lowest docket number is assigned.
The   Division   to   which   the   cases   are   consolidated   shall
transfer to the Division from which the consolidated cases
came, an equivalent number of cases of approximately the
same age, nature and stage in the proceedings, with proper
notice to the parties in said cases.
235
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 235
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
tions into one single action. This means that evidence, such as
depositions, taken after the consolidation is admissible in all the
actions consolidated whenever relevant or material. In this case,
since   the   notice   and   the   deposition­taking   was   after   the
consolidation   of   Civil   Case   No.   0130   with   the   main   case,   Civil
Case No. 0009, the deposition could be admitted as evidence in
the consolidated cases.21
The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits,
prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial   court,   and   save   unnecessary   costs   and   expenses. 22 The
consolidation  of  actions  involving   a  common  question  of   law   or
fact   seeks   to   prevent   a   repetition   of   evidence,   such   that   the
testimony of witnesses may be used in all the consolidated cases
whenever it is relevant or material.
In Bank   of   Commerce   v.   Perlas­Bernabe,23 the  Court   ordered
the consolidation of two cases which involve the same focal issue
and   require   substantially   the   same   evidence   on   the   matter.
Similarly,   in Domdom   v.   Third   and   Fifth   Division   of   the
Sandiganbayan,24 the Court ordered the consolidation of cases in
the   Sandiganbayan,   where   the   core   element   of   the   cases   is
substantially  the  same and the main witness  is also  the same.
The Court held:
“In Teston v. Development Bank of the Philippines, the Court
laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases, viz.:
“A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried
together   where   they   arise   from the   same   act,   event   or
transaction, involve   the   same   or   like   issues,   and   depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that
the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or
prejudice the substantive rights of the parties.
_______________
21 It is even held in American jurisprudence that “[w]here two
or   more   actions   are   consolidated,   a   deposition   taken   in   one   of
them prior to the consolidation is admissible on the trial of the
consolidated action.” (1 C.J.S. 1375)
22 Philippine   National   Bank   v.   Gotesco   Tyan   Ming
Development,   Inc., G.R.   No.   183211,   5   June   2009,   588   SCRA
798; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 497;
403 SCRA 403 (2003).
23 G.R. No. 172393, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 107.
24 G.R. Nos. 182382­83, 24 February 2010, 613 SCRA 528.
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
The   rule   allowing   consolidation   is   designed   to   avoid
multiplicity   of   suits,   to   guard   against   oppression   or   abuse,   to
prevent   delays,   to   clear   congested   dockets,   and   to   simplify   the
work of the trial court—in short, the attainment of justice with
the least expense and vexation to the parties­litigants.
x x x
In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and
equity if all the cases filed against petitioner were consolidated
with   that   having   the   lowest   docket   number   pending   with   the
Third   Division   of   the   Sandiganbayan.   The   only   notable
differences in these cases lie in the date of the transaction, the
entity transacted with and the amount involved. The charge and
core   element   are   the   same—estafa through   falsification   of
documents   based   on   alleged   overstatements   of   claims   for
miscellaneous   and   extraordinary   expenses.   Notably,   the   main
witness is also the same—Hilconeda P. Abril.
It need not be underscored that consolidation of cases, when
proper,   results  in  the  simplification  of  proceedings which  saves
time,   the   resources   of   the   parties   and   the   courts   and   the
abbreviation  of  trial.   It  contributes  to  the  swift  dispensation  of
justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases before REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
the   courts.   Above   all,   consolidation   avoids   the   possibility   of SANDIGANBAYAN
rendering conflicting decisions in two or more cases which would MANILA
otherwise   require   a   single   judgment.”25 (Emphasis   and Third Division
underscoring in the original) Republic   of   the   Philippines,
In this case, Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness in the main                                    Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 0009 and the incidental Civil Case No. 0130. In                                                           CIVIL   CASE   NO.   0009
fact,   as   pointed   out   by   Justice   Brion,   in   petitioner’s   Pre­Trial       ­versus­                                  (Incident Case No. 0130
Brief dated 30 August 1996, petitioner offered to present Maurice                                                          and G.R. No. 107789)
V. Bane as one of the witnesses in the main Civil Case No. 0009. JOSE   L.   AFRICA,   ET   AL.,
Thus,   when   petitioner   filed   on   25   September   1996   its Second                                  Defendants.
Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ x
Oral   Examination,   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009   in   connection   with SECOND AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF MR.
Incident   Case   No.   0130   and   G.R.   No.   107789,   petitioner MAURICE V. BANE UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
emphasized   that   “[t]he   deposition   of   said   witness   shall   be ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
used in evidence in Incident Case No. 0130­G.R. No. 10779 ­­­­­­
as well as in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009.” In fact, Pursuant to Rule 2426 of the Revised Rules of Court, notice is
all the respondents were given the chance to be heard considering hereby given to defendants Jose L. Africa (deceased) thru
that all the defendants of Civil Case No. 0009 were given notice of his Estate represented by Victor Africa and Atty. Juan de
_______________ Ocampo and Atty. Yolanda Javellana, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr.,
25
 Id., at pp. 535­536. Ferdinand   E.   Marcos   (deceased)   thru   his   Estate
237 represented by Special Administratrix BIR Commissioner
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 237 Liwayway Vinzons­Chato, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) Marcos,   Jr.,   Juan   Ponce   Enrile,   and   Potenciano   Ilusorio
the scheduled testimony by oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane, thru   their   counsels   on   records   that   Plaintiff   thru   the
which was taken on 23 and 24 October 1996. This is very clear undersigned   counsel   will   take   the   testimony   by   oral
from   petitioner’s Second   Amended   Notice   to   Take   Deposition   of deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane c/o Cable & Wireless Plc.,
Mr.   Maurice   V.   Bane   Upon   Oral   Examination,   filed   on   25 124 Theobalds Road, London WC1X 8RX, England on October 23,
September   1996,   in   Civil   Case   No.   0009   in   connection   with 24 and 25, 1996 at 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., until finished before
Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789, thus: the Philippine Consul General in London, England, in his office or
in a suitable place in London or in Wales, England, as may be
advised to the parties.
 _______________
26 Now Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
The purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane
to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit
hereto attached as Annex “A” so as to prove the ownership
issue   in   favor   of   plaintiff   and/or   establish prima
faciefactual   foundation   for   sequestration   of   Eastern’s
Class A stock in support of the “Very Urgent Petition For
Authority To Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting For the
Sole   Purpose   of   Increasing   Eastern’s   Authorized   Capital
Stock”   (Incident   Case   No.   0130   –   G.R.   No.   107789). The
deposition   of   said   witness   shall   be   used   in   evidence   in
Incident   Case  No.   0130­G.R.   No.   107789  as  well  as  in   the
main   case   of   Civil   Case   No.   0009. (Underscoring   in   the
original; boldfacing supplied)
In his modified draft Decision, Justice Brion maintains that
respondents’   notice   of   the   taking   of   the   Bane   deposition   is
insufficient waiver of their right to appear and cross­examine the
deponent when they failed to show up at the deposition­taking.
Justice Brion insists that respondents “cannot  be  bound by  the
taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment
of their right to cross­examine.”27
I   disagree.   The   12   April   1993   Resolution   of   the
Sandiganbayan, ordering the consolidation of the incidental cases,
including Civil Case No. 0130, with the main case, Civil Case No.
0009,   effectively   merged   the   different   actions   into   one   single
action. The consolidation of the cases was meant to expeditiously
settle  the  interwoven issues involved  in the  consolidated  cases.
The simplification of the proceedings with the aim of affording the
parties   a   just,   speedy   and   inexpensive   determination   of   their
cases   before   the  courts   can  be  achieved   when   repetition   of  the
same evidence or presentation of identical witnesses is dispensed
with. This means that evidence, such as depositions, taken after
the   consolidation   is   admissible   in   all   the   actions   consolidated
whenever relevant or material. In this case, since the notice and
the deposition­taking was after the consolidation of Civil Case No.
0130   with   the   main   case,   Civil   Case   No.   0009,   the   deposition
could   be   admitted   as   evidence   in   the   consolidated   cases.   This
Court has even held in Yu, Sr. v. Basilio G. Magno Construction
and Devel­
_______________
27 Justice Brion’s modified draft Decision, p. 47.
239
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 239
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
opment   Enterprises,   Inc.28 that   in   consolidated   cases,   “[t]he
evidence in each case effectively became the evidence of both, and
there   ceased   to   exist   any   need   for   the   deciding   judge   to   take
judicial notice of the evidence presented in each case.” Besides,
even   assuming   that   the   12   April   1993   Resolution   of   the
Sandiganbayan merely ordered a joint hearing or a “consolidation
for   trial,”   private   respondents   are   still   bound   by   the   Bane
deposition   considering   that   they   were   given   notice   of   the
deposition­taking. The evidence adduced in a joint trial binds all
the parties. Otherwise, what would be the point of holding a joint
trial if common witnesses have to be presented again in each of
the   cases   and   the   same   evidence   offered   again   and   again?
Precisely, a joint trial aims to prevent repetition of the same or
common evidence and  to spare the common witnesses  from  the
unnecessary   inconvenience   of   testifying   on   the   same   issues   in
separate proceedings if the cases were not jointly tried. To rule
otherwise is to frustrate the purpose of a joint trial which is to
prevent delay and save unnecessary costs and expense.29
In Tan v. Lim,30 the Court even allowed evidence that has not
been   formally   offered   in   a   case   which   was   jointly   heard   with
another   case   because   evidence   offered   during   the   joint   hearing
was deemed evidence for both cases which were jointly heard. The
Court ruled:
“It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules directs
the   court   to  consider   no  evidence   which   has   not  been  formally
offered   and   that   under   Section   35,   documentary   evidence   is
offered   after   presentation   of   testimonial   evidence.   However,   a
liberal   interpretation   of   these   Rules   would   have   convinced   the
trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case
No.   6518   was   superfluous   because   not   only   was   an   offer   of
evidence   made   in   Civil   Case   No.   6521   that   was   being   jointly
heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already
declared he was adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518.
The trial court itself stated that it would freely utilize in one case
evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture.
Jose Renato Lim testified in Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court
should have at least considered his testimony since at the time it
was made, the
_______________
28 G.R. Nos. 138701­02, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 618, 634.
29 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 240 Phil. 561; 156 SCRA 597
(1987).
30 357 Phil. 452; 296 SCRA 455 (1998).
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the
time the witness is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not
be   applied   in   a   very   rigid,   technical   case   as   they   are   devised
chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.”31
Furthermore,   Justice   Brion   posits   that   in   determining   the
admissibility of the Bane deposition, not only Section 4, Rule 23
must   be   considered   but   also   Section   47,   Rule   130.   The   said
provisions read:
“Sec. 4. [Rule  23] Use   of   depositions.—At  the   trial   or   upon
the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part
or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules
of   evidence,   may   be   used   against   any   party   who   was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the
following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose
of   contradicting   or   impeaching   the   testimony   of   deponent   as
witness;
(b)  The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of
the taking of the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent   of   a   public   or   private   corporation,   partnership,   or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for
any purpose;
(c)  The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that
the   witness   is   dead;   or   (2) that   the   witness   resides   at   a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless
it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance  of  the  witness  by   subpoena;   or  (5)  upon  application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make
it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance   of   presenting   the   testimony   of   witnesses   orally   in
open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
(d)   if only part of the deposition is offered in evidence by a
party, the  adverse  party may require  him  to  introduce all of  it
which   is   relevant   to   the   part   introduced,   and   any   party   may
introduce any other parts.
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 478­479; p. 482.
241
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Sec. 47. [Rule   130] Testimony   or   deposition   at   a   former
proceeding.—The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
unable   to   testify, given   in   a   former   case   or   proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who
had the opportunity to cross­examine him.” (Emphasis supplied)
In my opinion, Section 47, Rule 130 does not apply in this case
since   the   Bane   deposition   was   not   taken   in   a   former   case   or
proceeding.   The   records   show   that   the Bane   deposition   was
taken   when   the   cases   were   already   consolidated. Clearly,
there is no “former proceeding” to speak of which would require
the  application   of  Section  47,   Rule  130. The   Bane   deposition
was taken in CIVIL CASE NO. 0009 (Incident Case No. 0130
and G.R. No. 107789). In fact, in the Second Amended Notice to
Take   Deposition   of   Mr.   Maurice   V.   Bane   Upon   Oral
Examination,filed on 25 September 1996, the title of the case was
“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, versus JOSE L.
AFRICA, ET AL., Defendants” with case number “CIVIL CASE
NO. 0009 (Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789).” Thus,
Justice   Brion’s   reliance   on   Section   47,   Rule   130   is   misplaced.
Besides, even if Section 47 is applicable, the Bane deposition may
still be given in evidence against the respondents since all of them
were given notice of the deposition, and thus had the opportunity
to   cross­examine   the   deponent   had   they   participated   in   the
deposition­taking. Since notices have been duly served on all the
respondents, those who failed to show up at the deposition­taking
are   deemed   to   have   waived   their   right   to   appear   and   cross­
examine the deponent.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan granted the request for the
241 taking of the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, who was Executive
Vice­President   and   Treasurer   of   ETPI   from   1974   until   his
retirement   in   1987.32 In   October   1996,   during   the   deposition­
taking, Maurice V. Bane was already 72 years old and residing at
1 Ecton Hall, Church
_______________
32 Transcript   of   the   notes   on   the   Deposition   of   Maurice   V.
Bane, p. 10; Rollo, p. 89.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Way, Ecton, Northants (England).33 Clearly, under Section 4(c)(2)
of  Rule  23,34 the  deposition  of  Maurice  V.  Bane  can  be  used  as
direct  evidence.   In fact,  in its Resolutions  issued on 21 August
2000   and   3   April   2001,   the   Sandiganbayan   stated   that   the
deposition of Maurice V. Bane has “become part and parcel of
the   record   of   this   main   case   (Civil   Case   No.   0009)   since
Civil Case No. 0130 is an incident to the same.”
A cursory reading of the Bane deposition, which took two days
to complete and covers 211 pages of the transcript of record of the
proceedings  and  the  testimony,   reveals  that  it  is  a  critical   and
vital   evidence   in   the   case   of   petitioner   against   private
respondents with regard to its allegation in Civil Case No. 0009
that   private   respondents’   shareholdings   in   ETPI   were   illegally
purchased and rightly belongs to the Government.
The testimony of the witness, Maurice V. Bane, was offered for
the following purposes:
“[I]n general the testimony is offered to prove that the Class A
stockholdings in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines Inc, or
“Eastern”   for   short,   otherwise   referred   to   as   the   Filipino   60%
equity,  is ill  gotten  in  nature;  that  the actual  and/or  beneficial
owner of said shares was the late President Ferdinand Marcos;
and that accordingly, said shares are subject to reversion
_______________
33 Transcript   of   the   notes   on   the   Deposition   of   Maurice   V.
Bane, p. 8; Rollo, p. 87.
34 Sec. 4. [Rule 23] Use of depositions.—At the trial or upon
the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part
or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules
of   evidence,   may   be   used   against   any   party   who   was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the
following provisions:
x x x
(c)  The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that
the   witness   is   dead;   or   (2) that   the   witness   resides   at   a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless
it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; (Emphasis supplied)
243
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
and/or   forfeiture   in   favor   of   the   Plaintiff   Republic   of   the
Philippines in this case. Specifically, the testimony is offered to
establish   the   environmental   facts   and   attendant   circumstances
surrounding the formation and organization of Eastern in 1974;
that there was duress and/or compulsion exerted upon Cable &
Wireless and its wholly owned subsidiary, the Eastern Extension
Australasia   Telegraph   Company,   of   which   the   witness   was   the
then   General   Manager   in   the   Philippines,   such   that   Cable   &
Wireless   and   Eastern   Extension   Australasia   were   forced   or
compelled   to  give  up   their  legitimate  business   activities   in  the
Philippines which was 100% British owned in favor of Eastern,
which  was  to be  newly   organized  as  a  60/40  Filipino company,
with 40% being for the account of the company of the witness, Mr.
Bane.”
In short, the witness will establish in these proceedings that
President Marcos and/or his emissaries or parties acting on his
behalf gave the witness only two possible options which was: (1) a
40%   equity   in   the   company   to   be   newly   organized,   which   is
Eastern   in   exchange   for   surrendering   all   of   the   assets   and
franchise of Eastern Extension Australasia; or 100% of nothing,
meaning that if the witness and his company refused to give up
their legitimate business in the Philippines then Marcos made it
clear that there will be no more Eastern Extension Australasia
that would be operating in the Philippines.
Lastly, the testimony is offered to prove the ownership issue
that   is   involved   in   this   case   in   favor   of   the   Plaintiff,   and   also
support the pending petition of Eastern Telecoms to increase its
authorized capital stock from the present 250 million pesos to 4
billion pesos by allowing the PCGG to vote the sequestered Class
A   stock   in   the   company.   Hence,   the   testimony   will   establish
the prima   faciefactual   foundation   for   maintaining   the
243 sequestration of the Class A stock.”35
 In   the   deposition   of   Maurice   V.   Bane,   he   identified   and
affirmed   his   Affidavit36 dated   9   January   1999.   Excerpts   from
Bane’s testimony
_______________
35 Transcript   of   the   notes   on   the   Deposition   of   Maurice   V.
Bane, pp. 8­9; Rollo, pp. 87­88.
36                       A F F I D A V I T
I, MAURICE V. BANE, of legal age married, a British [words
missing from photocopy], and with business address at Eastern
Telecommunications  [missing   words]   Inc.,   Telecoms  Plaza,   Sen.
Gil   Puyat   Avenue,   Makati,   Manila,   after   being   duly   sworn,   do
hereby depose and say,
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
during the deposition­taking are as follow:
_______________
1. I   am   presently   the   Senior   Adviser   of   Eastern
Telecommunications   Philippines,   Inc.   (“ETPI”),   a   Philippine
corporation   duly   registered   and   authorized   to   engage   in   the
business of telecommunications in the Philippines since 1974;
2.    Until   my   retirement,   I   served   as   the   representative   of
Cable   and   Wireless,   Ltd.,   (“C&W”)   a   British   company   that
presently owns 40% of the outstanding capital stocks of “ETPI”,
“C&W”, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Eastern Extension
Australasia and China Telephone Co., (“EEATC”), was formerly
the sole owner and operator of the franchise that is now owned
and   held   by   “ETPI”.   The   company   has   been   operating   in   the
Philippines since 1880 initially under a royal decree from Spain.
Following the Pacific War in 1945, the franchise was renewed in
1952 by the Philippine Government under then President Elpidio
Quirino;
3. In   the   late   60’s   the   possibility   of   establishing   earth
satellite   stations   in   the   Philippines   arose   as   a   result   of   heavy
pressure from the U.S. Military who were to be its major users.
Many companies and consortiums, including “EEATC” bidded for
the contract. Then President Marcos finally awarded the contract
together   with   the   franchise   to   the   Philippines   Overseas
Telecommunications   Corp.   (“POTC”)   which   at   that   time   was
relatively   unknown   in   the   international   communications
industry. The prime movers of “POTC” were Messrs. Potenciano
Ilusorio, Honorio Poblador, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. and Roberto S.
Benedicto,   who   were   all   known   Marcos   associates.   This   group
became very much a part of the Philippines telecommunications
scene.
 4.    “EEATC”   forged   a   partnership   with   “POTC”   for   the
establishment   of   a   tropospheric   scatter   system   communications
with   Taiwan.   A   franchise,   Oceanic   Wireless   Network,   Inc.   was
purchased   and   all   government   approvals   were   obtained   by
Messrs. Nieto and Ilusorio. The system was installed and during
its   inauguration,   the   principal   guests   were   President   and   Mrs.
Marcos,   showing   perhaps   the   political   influence   of   Nieto   and
Ilusorio.
5. When   President   Marcos   declared   Martial   Law   in
September  1972,  it  was  clear that  his  grip  on  the  country   was
virtually complete. “C&W” was fully aware of its uneasy tenure in
the   Philippines.   In   March   1973,   then   Secretary   of   National
Defense   Juan   Ponce   Enrile   called   us   to   a   conference   at   Camp
Crame.   I   attended   the   said   meeting   together   with   the
representatives   of   RCA   and   Globe   Mackay.   Secretary   Enrile
firmly told us that we had until July, 1974 to organize ourselves
into 60/40 corporations with Filipino majority ownership and, if
we   did   not   comply,   the   Government   would   take   the   necessary
action.
 6. I   pointed   out   that   “EEATC”   was   not   covered   by   the
Laurel­Langley   Act   since   we  were  a  British  corporation   with  a
fully constitutional franchise. Secretary Enrile said that if we did
not comply with his directive, there would be no more “EEATC”;
245
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 245
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
MR. LIM: Mr. Bane, paragraph 2 of your affidavit refers
to   a   company   ETPI,   the   acronym   in   letter   “ETPI.”
May I ask you, sir, what is ETPI?
_______________
7. While we might have legal and valid grounds to contest
the   directive,   under   the   prevailing   martial   law
restrictions we had little recourse but to comply. After
considering   all   economic   and   political   factors,   it   was
felt   that   some   form   of   partnership   with   the   POTC
group would be the most advantageous option;
8.    Prior   to   the   above,   discussions   had   been   held   with
Ilusorio and Poblador, who then appeared in charge of
POTC – discussions were generally unsatisfactory since
it was quite hard to pin Ilusorio down and we gained
the impression that they wanted us to give them their
participation   in   “EEATC”   with   minimal   monetary
consideration in return for political protection;
9. In   approximately   April/May   1973,   rapid   changes   took
place in POTC. Ilusorio and Poblador appeared to have
lost their  control  in POTC and Nieto emerged as the
controlling figure. We learned much later that this was
upon   the   instructions   of   President   Marcos.   Thus,
discussions  concerning   “EEATC”  were  continued  with
Nieto;
10.  The time factor was important with July 1974 over the
horizon and it was agreed to call a meeting with the
accounting   group   of   SyCip,   Gorres   and   Velayo   as
intermediary. At the said meeting, we found that Atty.
Jose   Africa   was   the   main   representative   of
Nieto/POTC.   He   had   previously   not   seemed   a   major
figure in the group although he had attended several
board   meetings   of   Oceanic   Wireless.   Africa   quickly
spelt out the rules – that they were interested in the
proposition   and   that   we   were   to   deal   only   with   the
DAN group (composed of Roberto Benedicto, Jose Africa
and   Manuel   Nieto,   Jr.).   We   were   informed   that   this
was at the express wish of President Marcos who had
appointed   their   group   to   control   the
telecommunications interests;
11.    Negotiations   were   thereafter   commenced   with   Mr.
Eduardo M. Villanueva of SGV as intermediary, David
West   and   W.   H.   Davies   were   the   major   “C&W”
participants. We also requested Atty. Luciano Salazar
Law Office to represent us on legal matters;
12.    The   figure   eventually   negotiated   for   the   assets   (net
book   value   only   and   no   good   will)   was   Ten   Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on the basis of which the BAN
group   will   put   up   Six   Million   Pesos   (P6,000,000.00).
Further meetings took place to finalize the details but
Africa later informed us that they could not raise the
required amount. As a compromise, he suggested that
the   new   corporation   raise   a   bank   loan   from   which
“C&W” could be paid. While we were not happy with
this   arrangement,   we   resigned   ourselves   to   the   fact
that   we   would   have   to   accede.   It   was   agreed   that
stockholders’ contribution would be Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) plus a bank loan of Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00)   to   cover   asset   payment   and   working
capital. Africa then advised that they could only raise
 246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A That’s   Eastern   Telecommunications   Philippines,
Incorporated.
Q ETPI and Eastern refer to the same company, which is
Eastern   Telecoms   or   the   full   name  thereof,   Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc?
A That’s correct, yes.
Q Again, your Honor, for consistency in the proceedings,
instead of ETPI, the questions and the answers will
refer   to   “Eastern   Telecommunications   Philippines,
Inc”   as   simply   “Eastern.”   Paragraph   2   also   of   your
affidavit refers  to  “EEATC.”  Please,  sir,   tell   us,  Mr.
Bane, what position, what particular position you held
in EEATC when it was operating in the Philippines?
A I was the general manager.
Q Was that the highest position in the Philippines? Was
that   the   highest   office   in   EEATC   in   the   Philippine
operation?
_______________
One   Million   Pesos   (P1,000,000.00)   and   “C&W”   could   loan
them   Two   Million   Pesos   (P2,000,000.00).   Again,   we
were unhappy but again we complied;
13.    All   the   necessary   documents,   articles,   by­laws   and
stockholders agreements were drawn up by the Salazar
Law   Office.   Of   particular   delicacy   was   the   issue   of
franchise. It was decided that the old franchise should
be retained in all detail but this was to be transferred
to   a   new   company   to   be   called   Eastern
Telecommunications   Philippines,   Inc.   Atty.   Salazar
drafted the Presidential Decree for the transfer of the
franchise. The draft was personally delivered to Nieto
who   committed   to   secure   President   Marcos’   approval
and   signature.   True   enough,   Marcos   signed   the   P.D.
Drafted   by   Atty.   Salazar   in   its   entirety,   without  any
revision or amendment. This was convincing evidence
of the political power and influence of the BAN group;
14.   After complying with all the registration requirements
and other government regulations, “ETPI” commenced
to   fully   operate   as   a   telecommunications   company
under its new franchise in August 1974;
15.   I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of
the foregoing facts in order to elucidate on the events
and circumstances that led to the transfer of the assets
and franchise of “EEATC” in favor of “ETPI” and the
emergence of BAN group thereat.
            Affiant further sayeth naught.
           09 January 1991, Makati, Metro Manila.
                                                                                         
(signed)
                                                                                  
MAURICE   V.   BANE
                                                                                  
Affiant
247
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 247
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A Yes,   it   was,   yes,   the   British   terminology   for   these
things quite often is that we always used to refer to
“managers” but the American terminology, of course,
is usually “president” it was the equivalent of.
Q Thank you, sir. Now, just for clarity can you elaborate
on what was EEATC in relation to Cable and Wireless
or C&W?
MR. AFRICA: He has already answered, your Honor.
 A Yes, it was a wholly, 100% owned subsidiary of Cable
and Wireless.37
x x x
Q x x x Mr. Bane, I would refer you back to paragraph 3
of your affidavit, sir. I noted from your narration in
paragraph 3 that the earth satellite stations contract
which   you   had   just   explained   was   awarded   after
bidding   by   President   Marcos   to   a   company   you
mentioned   here   which   is   Philippines   Overseas
Telecommunications   Corporation,   or   POTC.   My
question is: do you know this POTC, what was it?
A Yes, it was the ­ ­ I think I’m correct in saying ­ ­ it was
the   management   arm   of   Philcomsat.   Philcomsat,
Philippines   Telecommunications   Satellite
Corporation. POTC, well the managers of Philcomsat,
and   I   understand   that   the   shareholders   were   the
same in each case.
Q In   this   paragraph,   sir,   you   stated   in   reference   to
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
or   POTC   that   it   was   “relatively   unknown   in   the
international   telecommunications   industry.”   Could
you explain that?38
x x x
A Well, there were some, I should imagine, some ten or
twelve   companies   were   bidding   or   hoping   to   be
awarded the earth station contract. Among those was
my   own   company,   Eastern   ­   ­   EEATC.   We   had   not
heard   of,   any   of  us:   RCA,   ITT,   the  large  number   of
other domestic companies such as Clavicili and others,
were all bidding for this earth station and none of us
had heard of POTC until it suddenly emerged that it
was a company that had been
_______________
37 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 16­17; Rollo, pp. 95­96.
38 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 19­20; Rollo, pp. 98­99.
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
formed and that very shortly after our bids all went in, we
heard   that   it   had   been,   that   the   contract   had   been
awarded to Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation.
Q Thank   you,   sir.   (Off   the   record)   May   I   proceed,   your
Honor? Did you find out who were the people behind
POTC?
A Yes.
Q And who were they?
A To  the  best   of  my   recollection  the  incorporators  were
Potenciano   Ilusorio,   Honorio   Poblador,   Ambassador
Nieto, Ambassador Benedicto, and I think there were
two   other   gentlemen,   one   of   them   I   think   was   the
brother in law of Mr. Nieto and the other one I cannot
recall   ­  ­   no,   I   can’t   recall   his   name.   He  died   fairly
soon after, I think, that was formed.39
x x x
MR.   LIM:Mr.   Bane,   you   mentioned   personalities   like
Potenciano Ilusorio, Honorio Poblador, Manuel Nieto
Jr.,   Roberto   Benedicto.   My   question   to   you,   sir,   is:
what   was   your   personal   impression   of   these
gentlemen vis­a­vis,   for   instance,   the   Marcos
administration?
 AWell,   it   was   common   knowledge   among   the   expatriate,
senior   expatriate   community   that   these   gentlemen
were close associates of President Marcos.
MR. AFRICA: May I also object again, your Honor please,
to   the   statement   of   the   witness.   Again,   it’s   not   a
statement   of   fact   but   only   a   matter   of   discussion
among   his   co­workers,   but   facts   again   are   different
from what his perception was.
MR. LIM: That is noted, your Honor.
CONSUL GENERAL: That is noted, Mr. Africa.
MR.   LIM: Mr.   Witness,   was  this  group   of   people,   these
gentlemen or personalities that you have mentioned,
do you know if they were later on identified with any
particular   business   or   industry   sector   in   the
Philippines?
A Yes,   they   were   identified   with   telecommunication
interests.
Q Was   there   an   occasion   when   your   own   company,
EEATC, forged a partnership or business with POTC?
_______________
39 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 20­21; Rollo, pp. 99­100.
249
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 249
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A Yes, there was.
Q What was the business that the two companies forged
or engaged in?
A That  business   was  to  establish   a  tropospheric  scatter
system between the Philippines and Taiwan. In actual
fact,   it  was   three   companies   involved:   it   was  POTC
and also Western Union International in the United
States, and Eastern Extension or EEATC.
x x x
Q So   that   tropospheric   scatter   system   became
operational?
A Oh yes, yes.
Q Do you know if the system was inaugurated?
A It was, yes.
Q Who   were   the   principal   guests   during   the
inauguration?
A President and Mrs. Marcos.
Q Now   what   technical   qualification   did   your   company,
EEATC,   have   to   operate   that   tropospheric   scatter
system?
A In   addition   to   being   a   20%   stockholder,   my   company
was   appointed   as   managers.   Eastern,   with   the
backing of Cable & Wireless, was able to provide all
the   necessary   technical   expertise   for   the
implementation and operation of the system. Cable &
Wireless   as   such   has   done   these   systems,   a   large
number of these systems worldwide, so we had all the
experience necessary.
Q At   that   time,   meaning   at   the   time   this   tropospheric
scatter   system   was   established,   what   was   your
company then, what was your company at that time?
A Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph.
Q EEATC?
A EEATC.
Q If you don’t mind, sir, kindly refer to that as EEATC
instead   of   Eastern.   What   technical   qualification   did
POTC have to be able to be EEATC’s partner in this
tropospheric system business?
A To   the   best   of   my   knowledge   little   or   no   technical
qualification.40
x x x
_______________
40 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 23­25; Rollo, pp. 102­104.
250
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Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Q Now Mr. Bane, let me now take you to paragraph 5 of
your affidavit and if I may read to you, sir. Paragraph
5:   When   President   Marcos   declared   Martial   Law   in
September   1972,   it   was   clear   that   his   grip   on   the
country was virtually complete. C&W was fully aware
of   its   uneasy   tenure   in   the   Philippines.   In   March
1973, then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce
Enrile   called   us   to   a   conference   at   Camp   Crame.   I
attended   said   meeting   together   with   the
representatives of RCA and Globe Mackay. Secretary
Enrile firmly told us that we had until July 1974 to
organize   ourselves   into   60/40   corporations   with
Filipino majority ownership and, if we did not comply,
the   Government   would   take   the   necessary   action.
First   of   all,   please   explain   and   elucidate   on   your
statement  “C&W was aware of its uneasy tenure  in
the Philippines.”
A Well,   prior   to   Martial   Law   we   were   operating   quite
comfortably   as   a   company,   but   with   the
implementation of Martial Law there was great deal
of uncertainty as to what might happen in the country
under   Martial   Law.   In   other   countries   it   had   been
known that things were, shall we say, nationalized or
taken over and, of course, there was a certain degree
of unease among us when we discussed in the Cable &
Wireless that something similar might happen in the
Philippines.
Q Now you made mention in this paragraph that I read of
other   companies,   namely   RCA   and   Globe   Mackay.
What were these companies?
A They were similar to EEATC, operating in exactly the
same   fashion,   doing   the   same   type   of   business,   all
three   of   us   were   competing   against   each   other   for
international business.
Q Do   you   know   the   nationality   of   RCA   and   Globe
Mackay?
A They were both 100% American corporations.
Q Whereas EEATC was, according to you, 100% British?
A That is correct, yes.
Q Except for that difference in the nationality the three of
you, meaning EEATC, RCA and Globe Mackay, were
engaged   in   the   same   kind   of   business   which   was
telecommunications in the Philippines?
A Correct.
x x x251
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 251
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Q Now,   can   you   remember   where   in   Camp   Crame   this
meeting took place?
A Yes, it was in a fairly large boardroom. I would imagine
the table was large enough to accommodate about 16
people.   I   had   the   impression   that   it   was   the   board
room perhaps attached to the Secretary of Defense’s
office in Camp Crame.
Q Now,   was   it   actually   Secretary   of   National   Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile who met with you?
A Yes, it was.
Q In person?
A In person.
Q Now,   in   paragraph   6   of   your   affidavit   which   is   a
reference   to   what   transpired   in   that   meeting,   you
stated, and I would like to quote the short sentence in
paragraph 6: “I pointed out that ­ ­ “ I withdraw the
question.   Mr.   Witness,   what   transpired   in   this
meeting with Secretary Enrile? In other words, why
did he call you together with RCA and Globe Mackay
people to a meeting?
A Well, he said, as far as I can recall and after all it’s a
long time ago, he recalled that the meeting was to in
effect   spell   out   the   rules   in   terms   of
telecommunications. He pointed out to RCA and ITT
that under the Laurel­Langley Act, which was due I
think in July 1974 to expire, that they would have to
go 60% Philippine ownership. I think that I’m pretty
sure that  Mr.  Voss or  his lawyer  did say  that  their
franchise in actual fact was established in 1924 and
therefore   it   fell   without,   beyond   the   Laurel­Langley
Act, but I seem to recall that Attorney Enrile said that
that’s not germane, you will go 60/40. He also said to
us, EEATC, that you will go 60/40.
x x x
MR.   LIM: x   x   x   My   question,   sir,   is:   what   exactly   did
Secretary Enrile tell you, and I refer to your person,
and your lawyer who was with you, Attorney Luciano
Salazar?
A After he dealt with RCA and Globe Mackay, I said to
him: well,  the  Laurel­Langley Act  does not apply  to
EEATC;   we   are   100%   British   corporation,   our
franchise   goes   back   to   1880   and   we   were   the   first
company,  actually,  to  connect the Philippines to the
outside world in  communications,  granted by Queen
Isabella   of   Spain,   I   think,   and   after   the   War,   the
Second World War, the
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
franchise   was   renewed   by   President   Quirino   in   1952,   I
think it was.
x x x
Q You mean to tell the court that Secretary Enrile also
included your company EEATC to be made 60/40?
A Oh yes.
Q Now,   your   companion,   Attorney   Luciano   Salazar,   did
he say anything to Mr. Enrile?
A Yes, he did.
Q What was his remark or explanation if any?
A He said that the franchise was perfectly constitutional
and that Mr. Bane was quite correct and that legally
there was no reason for Eastern to go 60/40.
Q When you say now, just now Eastern you are referring
to EEATC?
A EEATC, yes.
x x x
MR. LIM: Did Secretary Enrile respond favorably to the
explanations of Attorney Salazar?
A No, he did not. He said that if EEATC did not move to a
60/40 position then there would be no EEATC.
x x x
Q What options did Secretary Enrile give you during this
meeting?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor please, which
is   that   Secretary   Enrile   is  the  best   witness   for   this
particular aspect.
 MR. LIM: Same request for ­ ­ subject to a court ruling
later.
A Two options really: to become 60/40 Filipino corporation
or to, in effect, have 100% of nothing, because there
would not be any EEATC.41
x x x
MR.   LIM: Thank  you,   your  Honor.   Mr.   Bane,  we  ended
your testimony with your confirmation that the events
narrated in paragraph 7 up to paragraph 14 of your
affidavit   all   transpired   after   that  meeting   in   March
1973 with Secretary Enrile, so my question now
_______________
41 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 26­31, 33, 35; Rollo, pp. 105­110, 112, 114.
253
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 253
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
is:   in   particular   what   followed   after   that   meeting   with
Secretary Enrile, was the formation and organization
of Eastern in 1974?
A Mmm.
Q Is that correct?
A Well, yes, the events really were I had to advise Cable
&   Wireless   Hong   Kong,   who   were   very   closely
connected with the Philippines, of the situation and I
said   we   had   no   alternative   but   to   go   to   a   60/40
corporation. It was decided that I should come back to
London and discuss it with the directors of Cable &
Wireless   in   London.   Also,   we   were   asked   at   the
meeting,   which   perhaps   I   forgot   earlier   on,   by
Secretary   Enrile   for   progress   reports   of   moving   to
60/40   corporation.   So   I   wrote   a   letter   to   Secretary
Enrile and said that we were now actively planning
and   that   I   had   already   spoken   to   one   or   two   other
telecommunication   corporations   but   that   I   had   to
return   to   London   to   discuss   it   with   my   senior
directors. It was difficult at that time because it was
Martial   Law.   No   people   were   allowed   to   leave   the
Philippines   so,   through   that   letter,   I   made   an
application to leave and I was granted leave to come
back to the UK to discuss with Cable & Wireless the
formation of a 60/40 corporation.
Q Eventually, after clearing all those hurdles, after doing
all the groundwork, I mean after passing through all
the   groundwork   and   the   details,   eventually   what
transpired was the organization of Eastern in 1974 as
a 60/40 Filipino corporation?
A That is correct, yes.
Q And   the   40%   or   minority   equity   was   taken   by   your
company, Cable & Wireless?
A Correct, yes.
Q Mr. Bane, would you, and I refer to your person, have
agreed   to   divest   of   100%   British   owned   EEATC   if
pressure was not exerted on you by Secretary Enrile?
MR.   AFRICA: Objected   to,   your   Honor   please,   no
relevance.
MR. LIM: I am asking the witness for his answer to the
basic facts that now present themselves as a result of
the previous testimony.
MR. AFRICA: The same objection, your Honor. It calls for
a personal opinion.254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
MR.   LIM: Subject   to   the   court’s   ruling   may   I   ask   the
witness   to   answer?   May   I   repeat   the   question,   sir?
Would you, and I refer to you person, have acceded or
 agreed   to   divesting   yourself   of   100%   British   owned
EEATC   in   favor   of   only   40%   equity   in   a   new
corporation,   if   pressure   was   not   exerted   on   you   by
Secretary Enrile?
A No, I would not; I would have continued with EEATC
as   100%   British   Corporation.   You   see,   you   have   to
appreciate   that   I   had   all   the   resources   and   all   the
backing   and   all   the   financial   support   of   Cable   &
Wireless   who   were   the   largest   telecommunications
operator in  the  world.   We could  have  quite  easily  –
and   I   know   that   finance   would   have  been   available
from them – we could have quite easily continued as
100% British corporation.
Q Would   Cable   &   Wireless,   your   own   company,   have
agreed   to   the   divestment   of   100%   British   owned
EEATC   if   pressure   was   not   exerted   by   Secretary
Enrile?
A No, I don’t think they would.
x x x
MR. LIM: In other words, you are saying that had it not
been   for   that   fateful   meeting   with   Secretary   Enrile
and the pressure was brought to bear on your person
and   your   company   you   would   not   have   agreed   to
organizing Eastern in 1974?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor, please, calling
for an opinion and a conclusion.
A No, I would not.
MR. LIM: And the same thing is true with your company,
C&W,   there   would   have   been   no   permission   or
approval from C&W?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor, please.
A No, they would not.
MR. LIM: And when you say no, you would not, you are
saying   that   your   person   and   C&W   would   not   have
agreed to divesting EEATC of 100% British control?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor, please.
A Correct.
MR. LIM: He said “That’s correct.” Did you, and I refer to
your person, or Attorney Salazar check or try to find
out   if   Secretary   Enrile   was   acting   for   President
Marcos in reference to this March 1973 meeting?255
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 255
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A No, no we didn’t. It was under Martial Law and I mean
when   you   spoke   of   President   Marcos   you   spoke   of
Secretary Enrile, they were the two very close people.
Martial Law, after all, was declared as a result of an
apparent   attempted   assassination   on   Secretary
Enrile. There was no point in us trying to appeal to
President   Marcos.   We   had   to   accept   that   what
Secretary Enrile said was in effect President Marcos. 42
x x x
MR   LIM.: Now,   subject   to   the  same  request   for   a   later
ruling from the court, do I understand it, Mr. Bane,
that   initially   you   were   talking   to   Ilusorio   and
Poblador?
A That’s correct.
Q But later in the negotiations the two were out and you
were now just talking to Mr Nieto?
A Not just to Mr. Nieto; we were also talking to Attorney
Jose Africa.
Q So   let   me   clarify   that.   After   the   Enrile   meeting   and
because  of  your  decision  to  just  go along   with  what
Enrile wanted, there was this process set into motion
 to   organize   a   new   outfit   and   at   the   start   you   were
talking to Ilusorio and Poblador, is that right?
A Correct.
Q Later on, and this was before Eastern was organized,
you   continued   the   negotiations,   this   time   with
Ambassador Manuel  Nieto  junior and Attorney  Jose
L. Africa, is that correct?
A Correct.
Q Now, there is a statement in paragraph 9: “We learned
much   later   that   this   was   upon   the   instructions   of
President   Marcos.”   Who   told   you   that   President
Marcos had issued the instruction to be dealing with
Nieto?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor, asking for –
MR. LIM: I am asking the source of the statement.
MR.   AFRICA: My   objections,   I   am   just   putting   it   on
record: objected to for asking for hearsay evidence.
MR. LIM: Subject to a later ruling, your Honor.
_______________
42 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 37­41; Rollo, pp. 116­120.
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A It was either Ambassador Nieto or Attorney Africa.
Q Now, I show you paragraph 10 of your affidavit which
is continued, I am sorry I show you paragraph 10, I
draw your attention to paragraph 10 of your affidavit
which is found on page 4. Do you confirm and ratify in
particular   what   is   stated   in   paragraph   10   of   the
affidavit?
MR.   AFRICA: Subject   to   question   and   answer   later   on,
your Honor, please.
A Yes.
MR. LIM: Thank you, sir. May I request, your Honor, that
the entire paragraph 10 be sub marked as Exhibit C­
12­C­1   and   that   the   last   sentence   therein   reading:
“Africa  quickly  spelt out  the  rules  –   that  they  were
interested in the proposition and that we were to deal
only   with   the   BAN   group   (composed   of   Roberto
Benedicto,   Jose   Africa   and   Manuel   Nieto,   Jr.,).   We
were   informed   that   this   was   at  the  express   wish   of
President   Marcos  who  had   appointed  their   group   to
control   telecommunications   interests;”   that   that
particular   sentence   be   now   underscored   but   same
would   be   part   of   C­12­C­1   which   is   the   entire
paragraph 10, but the last sentence I request that it
be underlined or underscored for emphasis. (Marked)
Q What participation did you have in the organization of
Eastern?
A I was very deeply involved, together with our director
from London, Wilfred H. Davies and also our finance
director, David West.
Q Were you one of the incorporators of Eastern?
A I was, yes.
Q Did you sign the Articles of Incorporation of Eastern?
A I did.
Q Would you have agreed to be one of the incorporators of
Eastern   and   signed   its   Articles   if   no   pressure   was
exerted on you by Secretary Enrile?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor, please.
MR. LIM:I request an answer for the same reason.
A No, I don’t think I would.
Q What is that, Mr Bane?
A No, I would not, no.257
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 257
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Q You are telling the honorable court that your agreeing
to   incorporate   Eastern   and   your   having   signed   the
Articles   of   Eastern   was   the   result   of   that   pressure
during the Enrile meeting in March of 1973?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor.
A Yes, that is correct, because we would have continued
as   100%   British   corporation.   So   the   pressure   was
brought to bear upon us to go to a 60/40 corporation.
MR.   LIM: I   notice   from   the   Articles   of   Incorporation   of
Eastern that you are the Treasurer in Trust, that you
were the Treasurer in Trust, meaning the Treasurer
upon the incorporation of Eastern?
A Yes, that’s true.43
x x x
MR. LIM: That is the tenor of the affidavit. Just to satisfy
that   concern   I   will   rephrase   the   question.   Do   you
know   what  happened  to  the  assets of  EEATC  when
Eastern was incorporated on June 10, 1974?
A Yes, Eastern purchased all the assets of EEATC.
Q I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 12 of
your   affidavit   which   I   read:   “The   figure   eventually
negotiated for the assets (net book value only and no
good will) was ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) on
the   basis   of   which   the   BAN   group   will   put   up   six
million pesos (P6,000,000.00). Further meetings took
place to finalize the details but Africa later informed
us that they could not raise the required amount. As a
compromise,   he   suggested   that   the   new   corporation
raise   a   bank  loan   from   which   ‘C&W’   could   be   paid.
While we were not happy with this arrangement, we
resigned ourselves to the fact that we would have to
accede. It was agreed that stockholders’ contribution
would   be   five   million   pesos   (P5,000,000.00)   plus   a
bank   loan   of   seven   million   pesos   (P7,000,000.00)   to
cover asset payment and working capital. Africa then
advised that they could only raise one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00)   and   ‘C&W’   could   loan   them   two
million   pesos   (P2,000,000.00).   Again,   we   were
unhappy but again we complied.” My question is: do
you confirm the correctness of this narration including
the figures mentioned here?
_______________
43 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 47­50; Rollo, pp. 126­129.
258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
MR.   AFRICA: Subject   to   question   and   answer,   your
Honor   please,   as   there   are   statements   which   are   of
conclusion and/or hearsay.
A Yes, I do confirm that that’s precisely what happened.
MR.   LIM: What   this   one   million   pesos   which   was   the
amount   that   the   Africa   group   said   they   could   only
raise, what was this one million?
A Well,   it   was   their   contribution   to   the   capital   of   the
company.
Q Aside   from   the   one   million   pesos   contribution   to   the
capital   of   Eastern   from   the   Filipino   group   of
Benedicto,   Africa,   and   Nieto,   do   you   know   if
additional contributions in terms of money were made
by them afterwards?
A Well,   in   as   much   as   that   they   repaid   the   loans   that
C&W   granted   them   out   of   the   dividends   yes,   there
were in effect contributions, I suppose.
Q How much was the amount of the loan?
A Two million pesos.
Q That two million pesos loan was repaid by the Filipino
group out of stock dividends?
A No, out of – yes, stock dividends, yes, cash dividends.
Q Cash dividends?
A Cash dividends as I recall.
Q Now,   aside   from   that   were   there   any   subsequent
contributions   to   the   capital   of   Eastern   from   the
Filipino group?
A Not as far as I can recall, no.
Q So   in   terms   of   cold   cash   or   money,   what   they
contributed initially was only one million pesos?
A Correct.
Q The loan that they got from C&W of two million was
repaid   to   the   company,   or   to   C&W   in   terms   of   the
dividends?
MR. AFRICA: Already answered, your Honor.
A Yes, yes, correct.
MR. LIM: Who granted the loan to the Filipino group?
A The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Well, they didn’t
grant   it   to   the   Filipino   group;   they   granted   it   to
Eastern.
Q And was there a guarantee made for that loan?
MR. AFRICA: Leading, your Honor please.259
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 259
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
AYes, a guarantee was made by Cable & Wireless.
MR.   LIM: I   request,   your   Honor,   for   emphasis   that
paragraph 12 of the affidavit which has been read into
the   record   and   which   has   been   confirmed   by   the
witness be bracketed and sub marked as Exhibit C­
12­d­1, paragraph 12. (Marked)
Mr.  Bane,  would you  or  your  company  Cable &  Wireless
have   agreed   to   that   kind   of   payment   arrangement,
which   is   to   pay   in   dividends,   if   it   were   not   for   the
pressure from Secretary Enrile?
MR. AFRICA: Same objection, your Honor please.
A No,   we   would   not;   it   wasn’t,   it   was   not   standard
business   practice   in   any   way   at   all.   We   would   not
normally have agreed to a condition such as that.
x x x
Q Mr Bane, what was the position of Manuel Nieto Jr. in
Eastern after incorporation?
A He was the President.
x x x
Q Now, Mr Bane, paragraph 13 of your affidavit mentions
that:   “Attorney   Luciano   Salazar   drafted   the
Presidential   Decree   for   the   transfer   of   EEATC’s
franchise   to   Eastern,   that   said   draft   decree   was
personally   delivered   to   Manuel   Nieto,   Jr.,   who
committed to secure President Marcos’ approval and
signature.”   Do   I   take   it   that   this   was   in   1974
contemporaneously with the organization of Eastern?
A Yes, it was.
Q You said Manuel Nieto Jr., was the Eastern President?
A That’s correct.
Q Was Mr. Nieto able to secure the approval of President
Marcos   to   the   transfer   of   EEATC’s   franchise   to
Eastern?
A Yes, he was, it was issued under Presidential Decree.
Q If I show you a copy of that Presidential Decree would
you be able to recognize it in the sense that it refers to
your   company,   the   former   EEATC,   not   former,   the
EEATC?
A Yes. (Handed)
Q At  this  point,  your Honor, I make of record that this
representation   has   handed   to   Mr.   Maurice   Bane
Exhibit C Motion Increase in Capital.260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
A Yes, that is indeed the Presidential Decree.
Q Your   Honor,   may   I   make   a   little   correction   in   my
manifestation.   What   I   handed   to   the   witness   is   a
photocopy   of   Presidential   Decree   48944 with   the
Exhibit   marking   being   reproduced   as   part   of   the
document, the document actually marked as Exhibit C
is   now   part   of   the   case   records.   Now,   Mr.   Witness,
please   tell   the   court   whether   you   had   any   personal
participation   in   the   preparation   of   this   particular
decree PD 489?
A Yes, I did. I consulted with Attorney Salazar. We went
through the Eastern franchise and so to that extent,
in   putting   this   together,   yes   I   did   co­operate   with
Attorney Salazar, although of course Attorney Salazar
was the prime person behind drafting the document.
Q Your   affidavit   mentions   that   this   was   approved   by
President Marcos in the entirety of the draft decree as
prepared   by   Attorney   Salazar   and   you,   meaning   no
correction was made by Malacañang. My question is:
what  did  that  convey   to  you,   meaning   the  fact   that
Marcos  approved  the Presidential   Decree  drafted  by
Attorney   Salazar   and   yourself   without   revision   or
amendment?
MR. AFRICA: Objected to, your Honor please, asking for
an opinion and a conclusion.
MR. LIM: That is very relevant, your Honor, the witness
having participated in preparing this.
MR. AFRICA: Anyway, my objection is on the record.
AWell, Mr. Nieto undertook and promised us that he would
get the draft Presidential Decree signed into law by
President Marcos.
MR. LIM: And was he able to deliver on his promise?
A He   certainly   was.   You   can   see   the   signature   on   the
bottom.
Q Witness referring to –
A I do recognize that signature, yes, as President Marcos’
signature.
Q Your Honor, at this point may I request that this draft
– I’m sorry that this copy of PD 489 be again marked
in this deposition pro­
_______________
44 Authorizing   “The   Eastern   Extension   Australasia   and
China   Telegraph   Company,   Limited”   to   Transfer   the
Franchise   Granted   to   that   Company   Under   Republic
Act No. 808, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5002, to
the Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
261
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 261
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
ceedings as Exhibit D Deposition Bane and the signature of
President Marcos at the bottom of page 2 pointed at
by the witness be sub marked and bracketed as D­1
Deposition   Bane.   (Marked)   Mr.   Bane,   did   you   also
serve   as   director   of   Eastern,   one   of   the   directors,   I
mean, of Eastern?
A Yes, I was for a time, a short period of time.
Q Now,   after   Eastern’s   incorporation   in   1974   did   you
carry on as an officer of Eastern?
A Yes, I did.
Q What positions?
A Executive Vice President and Treasurer.
Q And as you said this was up to 1987?
A Yes.
x x x
Q Would you have acceded to that kind of set up, meaning
having Filipino partners in the persons of Mr. Nieto
and   later   Attorney   Africa   if   it   were   not   for   the
pressure   from   Secretary   Enrile   during   your   March
1973 meeting?
MR. AFRICA: Already answered, your Honor please.
A I can only repeat what I said before, that no, of course I
would not.
MR.   LIM: Now,   during   your   stint   with   Eastern   in
association   with   Mr.   Nieto   and   later   with   Attorney
Jose Africa, do you know of instances when President
Marcos   intervened   on   behalf   of   Eastern,   or   showed
personal interest for Eastern?
MR. AFRICA: Question is vague and intervene is an all­
encompassing word.
MR. LIM: I reform, your Honor. Mr Bane, you said that
from   1974   continuously   up   to   1987   you   were
associated with Eastern, you were one of its officers
and   you   were   working   with   Filipino   directors   or
officers.   During   this   time   the   President   of   the
Philippines   of   course   was   continuously   Mr.   Marcos.
My   question,   sir,   is:   during   your   incumbency   in
Eastern   do   you   know   of   instances   when   President
Marcos   helped   your   company   obtain
correspondenceships,   or   in   its   competition   with
PLDT?
A Yes, I do, yes.262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Q In what way did Marcos help Eastern?
A Well,   once   the   company   was   formed   and   under   the
formation   of   the   company   Eastern   or   Cable   &
Wireless had a management contract to manage the
company,   we   could   see   that   telecommunications
development   was   very   badly   needed   in   the
Philippines.   The   satellite   earth   station   had   been
constructed and the Tropo had gone in, but there was
still   a   very   large   demand   for   circuits.   We   therefore
devised   a   plan   to   put   underseas   cables,   telephone
cables,   from   the   Philippines   to   Japan,   from   the
Philippines   to   Hong   Kong,   Philippines   to   Singapore
and then latterly Philippines to Taiwan. For that we
obviously needed approvals right at the top, because
we were, in effect, in competition with PLDT. PLDT
were   really   dragging   their   heels   in   development,
perhaps because of lack of financing or whatever. So
we saw an opportunity to perhaps establish Eastern
as   a   major   player   in   the   Philippines
telecommunications. I therefore drafted a letter which
was   –   what   is   the   word   I’m   looking   for   perhaps   –
which   was   fine   tuned   perhaps   is   the   best   word,   by
Attorney Jose Africa. And this set out Eastern’s plans
for   development   of   submarine   cable   systems   and
everything   else,   and   we   asked   at   the   bottom   of   the
letter   for   Presidential   approval.   And   this   letter   was
signed   by   Ambassador   Nieto;   it   was   taken   to
Malacañang and it was signed, written across the top
of the page, I think the  words were  just “Approved,
President   Marcos”   so   we   received   approval,   direct
approval from President Marcos to proceed with the
implementation of this very big cable project. It meant
to   say   that   we   had   bypassed   the   national
telecommunications   commission   under   whose
 authority  this would  normally  have been  submitted,
but  knowing  as  we did  that with PLDT’s  opposition
we probably wouldn’t have got it through the NTC.
Q So   it   was   President   Marcos   himself   who   gave   the
approval for Eastern to undertake the construction of
these submarine cables that you mentioned?
A That’s correct, yes.
Q And can you tell us the significance of that designation,
what happened to Eastern because it got this project?
A Well, by putting in the submarine cable systems, since
we were financing them, we had to have the approval
of, of course, the distant administration – in this case
Hong   Kong,   Singapore   and   Taiwan,   so   one   of   the
benefits that accrued from this was that we
263
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 263
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
became a telephone correspondent to these countries. After
all,  these  cables were very  high  capacity.  I think to
Hong   Kong   they   were   1380   telephone   circuits,   to
Japan   960   telephone   circuits,   so   that  what  it   did   it
was for the great benefit of the Philippines. We used
the phrase in the letter “to make the Philippines the
hub of telecommunications in South East Asia,” which
we hoped we were going to do and I think to a large
extent we did do. The ultimate benefit to Eastern was
quite considerable, it enormously increased cash flow
and of course from that we financed the cables.45
x x x
Q Mr. Bane, you stated that you were with Eastern for 21
years?
A That’s correct, yes.
Q 21 continuous years.
A With EEATC and with Eastern.
x x x
Q Mr.   Bane,   were   there   other   stockholders   of   Class   A
during this 21 year period?
A The only changes that I was aware of that were made
was that Attorney Jose Africa pointed out to me, after
the incorporation, that they wanted to put some of the
stock, or they would put some of the stock in the name
of   various   companies.   He   also   mentioned   that   of
course   they   were   going   to   put   some   small,   a   very
small   minority   of   shares   in   the   names   of   family
members. That’s as far as I knew.
Q These   companies,   what   companies   were   these?   Or
rather,   excuse   me   sir,   rather   what   would   be   the
nature of these companies?
A I don’t know, I don’t know what the companies were. I
do know the names. I think Ambassador Nieto’s was
Aerocom,   was   Ambassador   Benedicto’s   Universal
Molasses, I can’t remember? And then Attorney Jose
Africa, I think, was Polygon.
Q Now having been associated with Manuel Nieto Jr. and
Jose L. Africa and also Mr. Benedicto for many years,
did you come to know at any time during that period
of   association   with   them   whether   President   Marcos
had any participation or control in their stockholdings
in Eastern?
_______________
45 Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, pp. 56­65; Rollo, pp. 135­144.
264
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
 MR.   AFRICA: Please,   objected   to,   your   Honor,   witness
isn’t   competent.   The   best   witnesses   would   be   the
persons  themselves,  not what this witness  has  been
told.
MR. LIM: If the witness knows, your Honor.
MR. AFRICA: But what he was told, not what is true, or
what is true and correct?
A No,   I   was   not   told   that   President   Marcos   had   a
stockholding   in   Eastern.   There   was,   of   course,
speculation among ourselves as to – in a vague sort of
way we often wondered. The only time that I actually
knew   that   President   Marcos   had   a   significant
stockholding   in   Eastern   was   when,   after
sequestration, Ambassador Nieto went on to television
and   stated   on   television   that   I   think   first   of   all   he
stated something about Philcomsat POTC and he then
stated on television that President Marcos owned 40%
of   the   stock   of   Eastern.   That’s   the   only   time  that  I
was,   I   had   any   direct,   shall   we   say,   or   had   been
directly   informed   –   by   television   of   course   –   that
President Marcos was a stockholder.46
In the 2006 case of Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan,47 this Court
overturned   the   ruling   of   the   Sandiganbayan’s   Partial   Decision
and held that the testimonies through depositions of Campos,
Gapud   and   de   Guzman   established   the   Marcoses’   beneficial
ownership of Prime Holding Incorporated (PHI). The Court ruled
that “the testimonies of Campos, Gapud, and de Guzman, persons
who   actually   participated   in   the   formation   and   early   years   of
operation of PHI, constitute evidence that directly addresses the
critical issue.”48
In this case, the deponent Maurice V. Bane was the Executive
Vice­President   and   Treasurer   of   ETPI   from   1974   until   his
retirement in 1987. Maurice V. Bane had personal knowledge of
and involvement in the circumstances leading to the formation of
ETPI   in   1974,   which   is   crucial   to   petitioner’s   allegation   that
private   respondents’   interest   in   ETPI   rightfully   belongs   to   the
Government.   To   dismiss   the   Bane   deposition   as   inadmissible
based on the tenuous ground that there
_______________
46 Transcript   of   the   notes   on   the   Deposition   of   Maurice   V.
Bane, pp. 76­78; Rollo, pp. 155­157.
47 515 Phil. 1; 479 SCRA 1 (2006).
48 Id., at p. 46; p. 54.
265
VOL. 662, DECEMBER 13, 2011 265
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
was no “actual consolidation” of cases is to disregard the obvious
fact   that   the   Bane   deposition   was   taken   in CIVIL   CASE   NO.
0009 (Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789) and that
all   the  defendants   (now   private  respondents)   in  Civil   Case   No.
0009 were duly notified of the scheduled deposition­taking.
Although   petitioner,   in   its   formal   offer   of   evidence   in   Civil
Case No. 0009, inadvertently omitted the deposition of Maurice V.
Bane, petitioner thereafter filed an urgent motion praying that it
be allowed to introduce as additional evidence the deposition of
Maurice V. Bane. The Sandiganbayan should have granted this
motion or the succeeding Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence   (Re:   Deposition   of Maurice   V.   Bane) filed   on   16
November   2001.   As   held   in   the   1997   case   of Republic   v.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division):49
“In all cases involving alleged ill­gotten wealth brought by or
against the Presidential Commission on Good Government, it is
the policy of this Court to set aside technicalities and formalities
that serve merely to delay or impede their judicious resolution.
This   Court   prefers   to   have   such   cases   resolved   on   the   merits
before the Sandiganbayan. Substantial justice to all parties, not
mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
pursued. Eleven years have passed since the government started
its search for and reversion of such alleged ill­gotten wealth. The
definitive   resolution   of   such   cases   on   the   merits   is   thus   long
overdue.   If   there   is   adequate   proof   of   illegal   acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be
brought out now.”50
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 7 February
2002 should be reversed and set aside. The deposition of Maurice
V.   Bane   taken   on   23   to   24   October   1996,   together   with   the
accompanying documentary exhibits, should be admitted as part
of   petitioner’s   evidence.   I   vote   to GRANT the   petition
and REMAND this   case   to   the   Sandiganbayan   for   further CASES REPORTED
proceedings. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Petition dismissed.  
_______________ ____________________
49 G.R. No. 113420, 7 March 1997, 269 SCRA 316.  
G.R. No. 200751.  August 17, 2015.*
50 Id., at p. 334.
MONICO   LIGTAS,   petitioner, vs. PEOPLE   OF   THE
266
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
Note.—Lest it be forgotten, the rationale for consolidation is on Certiorari; Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for
to have all cases which are intimately related, acted upon by one review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the
branch of the court to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   are   conclusive   and   binding   on   the
being   rendered.   (Philippine   Airlines,   Incorporated   vs.   Zamora, Supreme Court (SC) when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
564 SCRA 50 [2008]) —Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the Regional
——o0o——  Trial Court are conclusive
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved. _______________
 *  SECOND DIVISION.
 
 
2
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
and   binding   on   this   court   when   affirmed   by   the   Court   of
Appeals. This court has differentiated between a question of law
and question of fact: A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy   concerns   the   correct   application   of   law   or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not
call   for   an   examination   of   the   probative   value   of   the   evidence
presented,   the   truth   or   falsehood   of   facts   being   admitted.
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the   truth   or   falsehood   of   facts   or   when   the   query   invites
calibration   of   the   whole   evidence   considering   mainly   the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There are exceptions to the rule
that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45.—Petitioner admits that the Petition raises
substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule
he seeks redress from. However, there are exceptions to the rule
that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely
on   speculation,   surmises   or   conjectures,   (2)  when  the  inference
made   is   manifestly   mistaken,   absurd   or   impossible,   (3)   when
there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based
on   misapprehension   of   facts,   (5)   when   the   findings   of   fact   are
conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond
the   issues   of   the   case,   or   its   findings   are   contrary   to   the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the
CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are  conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on   record,   or   (11)   when   the   CA   manifestly   overlooked   certain
relevant   facts   not   disputed   by   the   parties,   which,   if   properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   The   issue   of   tenancy,   in   that
whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a
question of fact.—The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person
is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of fact. To
be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a
legal conclusion
 
 
3
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 3
Ligtas vs. People
based   on   facts   presented   corresponding   to   the   statutory
elements of tenancy.
Administrative   Proceedings;   Generally,   decisions   in
administrative   cases   are   not   binding   on   criminal
proceedings; Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a
bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.—We hold that
a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is
conclusive   and   binding   on   courts   if   supported   by   substantial
evidence.   Generally,   decisions   in   administrative   cases   are   not
binding   on   criminal   proceedings.   This   court   has   ruled   in   a
number   of   cases   that:   It   is   indeed   a   fundamental   principle   of
administrative   law   that   administrative   cases   are   independent
from   criminal   actions   for   the   same   act   or   omission. Thus,   an
absolution   from   a   criminal   charge   is   not   a   bar   to   an
administrative   prosecution,   or   vice   versa.   One   thing   is
administrative   liability;   quite   another   thing   is   the   criminal
liability for the same act. . . . Thus, considering the difference in
the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and
the   sanctions   imposed   in   criminal   and   administrative
proceedings,   the   findings   and   conclusions   in   one   should   not
necessarily   be   binding   on   the   other.   Notably,   the   evidence
presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the
same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.
Tenancy   Relationship;   Department   of   Agrarian   Reform
Adjudication   Board;   Jurisdiction;   The   Department   of   Agrarian
Reform   Adjudication   Board   (DARAB)   is   the   quasi­judicial
tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there   is   a   tenancy   relationship   between   adverse   parties.—The
DARAB   is   the   quasi­judicial   tribunal   that   has   the   primary
jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship
between   adverse   parties.   This   court   has   held   that   “judicial
determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding effect as
judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.” Disputes under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons
in   negotiating,   fixing,   maintaining,   changing   or   seeking   to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
 
 
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; It is true that trial
courts   are   not   mandated   to   take   judicial   notice   of   decisions   of
other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge.—It is true
that   trial   courts   are   not   mandated   to   take   judicial   notice   of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have
been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.   In   declaring   that   the   DARAB’s   findings   on   the   tenancy
relationship   between   petitioner   and   private   complainant   are
immaterial  to  the  criminal  case  for  theft,  the  Court  of Appeals
relied on Cornes, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA
545 (2008).
Criminal Law; Theft; Elements of.—The essential elements
of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner’s
consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done
without   violence   against   or   intimidation   of   the   person   or   force
upon things.
Agrarian Reform; “Tenants,” Defined; Words and Phrases.—
Tenants have been defined as: persons who — in themselves and
with   the   aid   available   from   within   their   immediate   farm
households   —   cultivate   the   land   belonging   to   or   possessed   by
another,   with   the   latter’s   consent,   for   purposes   of   production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system,   or   paying   to   the   landholder   a   price   certain   or
ascertainable  in  produce  or  money  or  both  under  the  leasehold
tenancy system. (Citation omitted) Under this definition, a tenant
is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The
landowner’s   share   in   the   produce   depends   on   the   agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is
with the landowner’s consent.
Constitutional Law; Right to be Presumed Innocent; No less
than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed
innocent of the crime until proven guilty.—In this case, petitioner
harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce
as   a   legitimate   tenant   cultivating   the   land   owned   by   private
complainant.  Personal  property  may  have  been  taken,  but  it  is
with   the   consent   of   the   owner.   No   less   than   the   Constitution
provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime
until proven guilty. “[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals
than to convict one innocent person.” Thus, courts must consider
“[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]”
Equally   settled   is   that   “[w]here   the   evidence   admits   of   two
interpretations,   one   of   which   is   consistent   with   guilt,   and   the
other  with  innocence,  the  accused must  be  given  the benefit  of
doubt and should be acquitted.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
 “Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?” tanong ni Tata Selo.
“Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya
ang may­ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba’t kaya
maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay
ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?”
Hindi   pa   rin   umaalis   sa   harap   ng   istaked   si   Tata   Selo.
Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit
wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
. . . .
 “Binabawi po niya ang aking saka,” sumbong ni Tata Selo.
“Saan pa po ako pupunta kung wala na akong saka?”
. . . .
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi
niyang   lahat   ay   kinuha   na   sa   kanila,   lahat,   ay!   ang   lahat   ay
kinuha na sa kanila. 
– “Tata Selo” (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat
 
The   uncontested   declaration   of   the   Department   of   Agrarian
Reform   Adjudication   Board   that   Monico   Ligtas   was   a   tenant
negates   a   finding   of   theft   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   Tenants
having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their
own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules   of   Court,   assailing   the   Court   of   Appeals’   Decision 2 dated
March 16, 2010 and the Resolution 3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The
Court   of   Appeals   affirmed   the   Decision 5 of   the   Regional   Trial
Court   finding   Monico   Ligtas   (Ligtas)   guilty   beyond   reasonable
doubt of theft.6
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code.7 The Information provides:
That   on   or   about   the   29th day   of   June   2000
at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San   Juan,   Municipality   of   Sogod,
Province   of   Southern   Leyte,   Philippines   and   within   the
jurisdiction  of  this  Honorable  Court,   the  above  named   accused,
with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to
one Anecita Pacate, and once inside the plantation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of
abaca   fibers,   valued   at   Php29,000.00   at   Php29.00   per   kilo,
without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage
and   prejudice   in   the   aforestated   amount   of   Twenty­Nine
Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
 
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9
The   prosecution   presented   five   (5)   witnesses   during   trial:
Efren Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate,
SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10
According   to   the   prosecution   witnesses,   Anecita   Pacate   was
the   owner   of   an   abaca   plantation   situated
at SitioLamak, Barangay San   Juan,   Sogod,   Southern   Leyte.   On
June   29,   2000,   Cabero,   the   plantation’s   administrator,   and
several men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest
abaca   upon   Anecita   Pacate’s   instructions.   At   about   10:00   a.m.,
Cabero   and   his   men   were   surprised   to   find   Ligtas   harvesting
abaca   at   the   plantation.   Ligtas   was   accompanied   by   three   (3)
unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would
be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero
reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police.11
_______________
upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or
farm products.
8   Id., at p. 93.
9   Id.
10  Id.
11  Id., at pp. 93­98.
 
 
8 16  Id., at pp. 45 and 99. Records show that Anecita Pacate
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
On   July   2,   2000,   Cabero   and   Cipres   went   back   to   the
plantation   and   conducted   a   survey   on   the   condition   of   the
plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00
per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.12
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each
other   before   the   Sogod   Police   Station. 13 Ligtas   admitted   to
harvesting   the   abaca   but   claimed   that   he   was   the   plantation
owner.14
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas;
Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife. 15 According to
Ligtas,   he   had   been   a   tenant   of   Anecita   Pacate   and   her   late
husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. 16Andres Pacate installed him
as   tenant   of   the   1.5   to   two   hectares   of   land   involved   in   the
criminal case.17
Ligtas   allegedly   “made   his   first   harvest   in   1997.” 18 He   then
gave Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest. 19However, he could
not   remember   the   exact   amount   anymore. 20 Previously,   Ligtas
and Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares,
owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21
Ligtas   alleged   that   on   June   28,   2000,   Anecita   Pacate   sent
workers to harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas
_______________
12  Id., at pp. 94 and 96.
13  Id., at pp. 94 and 96­99. The confrontation was pursuant to
a summons sent to Ligtas by the Sogod police.
14  Id., at p. 94.
15  Id., at pp. 42­47.
and   Andres   Pacate,   Sr.   (id.,   at   p.   17)   had   two   sons:   Ernesto
Pacate  and  Andres  Pacate,  Jr.  (id.,  at  p.   42).   However,   Andres In   the   Decision   dated   August   16,   2006,   the   Regional   Trial
Pacate, Sr. is referred to in the records as “Andres Pacate.” Court held that “the prosecution was able to prove the elements of
17  Id. theft[.]”30 Ligtas’   “defense   of   tenancy   was   not   supported   by
concrete  and  substantial  evidence nor  was his  claim  of  harvest
18  Id., at p. 45.
sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by
19  Id.
any witness.”31 His “defense of alibicannot
20  Id.
21  Id., at pp. 42­47. _______________
 
  22  Id., at pp. 46 and 99.
9 23  Id.
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
24  Id., at pp. 28 and 196.
Ligtas vs. People
25  Id., at pp. 28­34. The case was docketed as DARAB Case
prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the
No.   VIII­319­SL­2000.   The   Decision   was   penned   by   Provincial
rightful tenant of the land.22
Adjudicator Miguel G. Polinar.
Furthermore,   Ligtas   denied   harvesting   abaca   at   the
26  Id., at p. 33.
plantation on June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero
27  Id., at p. 49.
and   Cipres   attending   a barangay   fiesta at SitioHubasan,   San
Juan,   Sogod,   Southern   Leyte,   when   the   alleged   harvesting 28  Id., at p. 104.
happened.23 29  Id., at p. 178.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of 30  Id., at p. 48.
Agrarian   Reform   Adjudication   Board   (DARAB)   of   Sogod, 31  Id.
Southern   Leyte   for   Maintenance   of   Peaceful   Possession   on  
November 21, 2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered  
the   Decision25 ruling   that   Ligtas   was   a bona   fide tenant   of   the 10
land.26 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was Ligtas vs. People
formally   offered   as   evidence   before   the   trial   court,   records   are prevail   over   the   positive   identification   . . .   by   prosecution
clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial witnesses.”32
court27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any objection on the The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
part of the People of the Philippines.29
 WHEREFORE,   finding   the   accused   Monico   Ligtas   guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this court hereby
renders judgment, sentencing him:
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine
(9) months and ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8) years and
eight (8) months as maximum;
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
a. The   amount   of   P29,000.00   for   the   value   of   the   abaca
stole[n];
b. The amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages;
c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney’s
fees;
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.33
I
The   Court   of   Appeals   affirmed   the   ruling   of   the   trial
court.34 According to it, “the burden to prove the existence of the
ten­
_______________
32  Id., at p. 100.
33  Id., at p. 49A. Per the testimonies of the witnesses before
the   trial   court   and   as   adopted   by   the   Court   of   Appeals,   the
“Kasabutan”   or   Agreement   dated   February   24,   2007   was
previously   executed   between   Ligtas   and   Anecita   Pacate.   The
Agreement involved another incident of theft committed by Ligtas
against Anecita Pacate. He was also charged with theft in 1988;
however, the case was ultimately dismissed (id., at pp. 18­19, 37,
40, 41­43, 46­47, and 49).
34  Id., at p. 109.
 
 
11
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 11
Ligtas vs. People
ancy   relationship”35 belonged   to   Ligtas.   He   was   not   able   to
establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement.36
The   Court   of   Appeals   declared   that   Ligtas’   reliance   on   the
DARAB Decision “declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the . . .
land is irrelevant in the case at bar”:37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that “findings of
or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence   or   absence   of   a   tenancy   relationship   between   the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are
not binding upon the courts.[”]38
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that
Ligtas had taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a
legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate’s title over
the   land.   Under   Rule   131,   Section   2   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   a
tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of
the commencement of the tenancy relation.39
The   Court   of   Appeals   remained   unconvinced   as   to   Ligtas’
allegations   on   ownership.   “He   claims   that   the   parcel   of   land
owned   by   [Anecita   Pacate]   is   different   from   the   subject   abaca
land. However, such assertion was based merely on the testimony
of   the   municipal   assessor,   not   an   expert   competent   to   identify
parcels of land.”40
More   importantly,   the   Court   of   Appeals   ruled   that   Ligtas
committed theft by harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate’s
_______________ established.   “[W]here   an   accused’s alibi is   established   only   by
himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should
35  Id., at p. 101. be accorded the strictest scrutiny.”48
36  Id., at pp. 101­103. Ligtas’   attack   on   the   credibility   of   the   witnesses   did   not
37  Id., at p. 104. prosper.49 He   failed   to   show   that   the   case   was   initiated   only
38  Id.,   citing Cornes   v.   Leal   Realty   Centrum   Co.,   Inc.,   582 through   Anecita   Pacate’s   quest   for   revenge   or   to   ensure   that
Ligtas would be evicted from the land.50
Phil. 528, 552; 560 SCRA 545, 571 (2008) [Per J. Chico­Nazario,
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas’ appeal and affirmed
Third Division].
the trial court’s Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reason­
39  Id., at p. 108.
40  Id. _______________
 
  41  Id., at p. 105.
12 42  Id.
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 43  Id.
Ligtas vs. People 44  Id., at pp. 105­106.
plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of
45  Id., at p. 106.
the theft without the owner’s consent. 42 “The subject of the crime
need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in 46  Id.
order to consummate the crime of theft.”43 47  Id.
Furthermore,   Ligtas’   argument   that   the   abaca   did   not 48  Id., at pp. 107­108.
constitute as personal property under the meaning of Article 308 49  Id., at p. 107.
of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   was   erroneous. 44Following   the 50  Id., at p. 108.
definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was “capable of  
appropriation   [and]   [could]   be   sold   and   carried   away   from   one  
place to another.”45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 13
finding   that   about   1,000   kilos   of   abaca   were   already VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 13
harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under Article 308 of
Ligtas vs. People
the   Revised   Penal   Code   were   sufficiently   established   by   the
able   doubt   of   theft   under   Article   308   of   the   Revised   Penal
prosecution.
Code.51 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas’ defense of alibicould
WHEREFORE,   the   instant   Appeal   is DISMISSED.
not excuse him from criminal liability. 47 His alibi was doubtfully Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in
Criminal   Case   No.   R­225,   finding   accused­appellant   Monico
Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308
of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   is   hereby AFFIRMED   in   all
respects.
SO ORDERED.52
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 53 which the Court of
Appeals denied on February 2, 2012.54
II
On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court
of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution.55 This court required People
of the Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10
days from notice.56
_______________
51  Id., at p. 109.
52  Id.
53  Id., at pp. 112­115.
54  Id., at pp. 118­119.
55  Id.,   at   p.   21.   Petitioner   filed   a   Motion   for   Extension   of
Time to File Petition for Review for 30 days dated March 2, 2012
(id., at pp. 2­4), which the court granted (id., at p. 122).
56  Id., at  p. 122. The Resolution was dated March 4, 2013.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment on June 27, 2013 (id., at pp. 128­143). In the Resolution
(id.,   at   p.   145)   dated   August   14,   2013,   this   court   noted   the
Comment and required petitioner to file a Reply to the Comment.
Petitioner filed his Reply (id., at pp. 147­149) dated October 14,
2013, which we noted on January 15, 2014 (id., at p. 152). In the
Resolution  (id.,  at  pp.   165­167)  dated  July   14,   2014,   this   court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their   respective   Memoranda   within   30   days   from   notice.
Petitioner’s Memorandum (id., at pp. 184­201) dated October 8,
2014 was posted on October 10, 2014 (id., at p. 184). Re­
14
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
Second,   whether   the   DARAB   Decision,   finding   petitioner
Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by private complainant
Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan,
Sogod,   Southern   Leyte   is   conclusive   or   can   be   taken   judicial
notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
Third,   whether   the   Court   of   Appeals   committed   reversible
error when it upheld the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for
theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Petition is meritorious.
 
III
 
Petitioner   argues   that   the   findings   of   fact   of   both   the   trial
court   and   Court   of   Appeals   must   be   revisited   for   being
“conclusions  without  citation  of   specific   evidence  on  record   and
premised   on   the   supposed   absence   of   evidence   on   the   claim   of
petitioner [as] tenant.”57
Only   questions   of   law   are   allowed   in   a   petition   for   review
under   Rule  4558 of   the  Rules  of   Court. 59 Factual   findings   of  the
Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court
_______________
spondent   filed   its   Memorandum   (id.,   at   pp.   174­182)   dated
October 2, 2014 before this court on October 3, 2014 (id., at p.
174).
57  Id., at p. 190.
58  Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Filing   of   petition   with   Supreme   Court.—A
party   desiring   to   appeal   by certiorari from   a   judgment   or   final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law,   may   file   with   the   Supreme   Court   a   verified   petition   for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
59  See Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado v. People, G.R. No. 186030,
March   21,   2012,   668   SCRA   768,   778   [Per J. Reyes,   Second
Division].
 
 
15
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
when   affirmed   by   the   Court   of   Appeals. 60 This   court   has
differentiated between a question of law and question of fact:
A question   of   law exists   when   the   doubt   or   controversy
concerns   the   correct   application   of   law   or   jurisprudence   to   a
certain   set   of   facts;   or   when   the   issue   does   not   call   for   an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence
and   relevancy   of   specific   surrounding   circumstances   as   well   as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability
of the situation.61(Emphasis supplied)
 
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual
issues   that   are   beyond   the   scope   of   the   Rule   he   seeks   redress
from.62 However,   there   are   exceptions   to   the   rule   that   only
questions   of   law   should   be   the   subject   of   a   petition   for   review
under Rule 45:
(1)   when  the   findings   are  grounded   entirely   on   speculation,
surmises   or   conjectures,   (2)   when   the   inference   made   is
manifestly   mistaken,   absurd   or   impossible,   (3)   when   there   is
grave   abuse   of   discretion,   (4)   when   the   judgment   is   based   on
misapprehension   of   facts,   (5)   when   the   findings   of   fact   are
conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond
the   issues   of   the   case,   or   its   findings   are   contrary   to   the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the
CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are 
15
_______________
 60  See People v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342, March 21, 2012,
668   SCRA   827,   844­845   [Per J. Sereno   (now CJ.),   Second
Division].
61  Ruiz v. People, 512 Phil. 127, 135; 475 SCRA 476, 484­485
(2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], quoting Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,   425   Phil.   752,   765­766;   375   SCRA   145,   154
(2002) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
62  Rollo, p. 190.
 
16
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s   main   and   reply   briefs   are   not   disputed   by   the
respondent, (10)   when   the   findings   of   fact   are   premised   on   the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record,   or   (11)   when   the   CA   manifestly   overlooked   certain
relevant   facts   not   disputed   by   the   parties,   which,   if   properly
considered,   would   justify   a   different   conclusion. 63 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
 
This court has held before that a reexamination of the facts of
the   case   is   justified   “when   certain   material   facts   and
circumstances   had   been   overlooked   by   the   trial   court   which,   if
taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they
would   introduce   an   element   of   reasonable   doubt   which   would
entitle the accused to acquittal.”64
The   issue   of   tenancy,   in   that   whether   a   person   is   an
agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of fact. 65To be
precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal
conclusion   based   on   facts   presented   corresponding   to   the
statutory elements of tenancy.66
The   Court   of   Appeals   committed   reversible   error   in   its
assailed Decision when it held that all the essential elements of
the  crime  of  theft  were   duly   proven  by   the prosecution  despite
petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the
_______________
63  Supra note 59 at pp. 779­780.
64  Pit­og   v.   People,  268   Phil.  413,   420;   190   SCRA  386,   393
(1990) [Per CJ. Fernan, Third Division].
65  Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., supra note 38 at
p. 548; p. 567, citing Mon v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 65, 78;
427 SCRA 165, 173 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
66  See Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil.
113,   120;   518   SCRA   202,   210   (2007)   [Per J. Ynares­Santiago,
Third   Division]:   “Tenancy   is   not   a   purely   factual   relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
also a legal relationship[.]”
 
 
17
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 17
Ligtas vs. People
land from which he allegedly stole. 67 A review of the records of the
case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
 
IV
 Petitioner claims that private complainant’s filing of criminal
charges was motivated by ill will and revenge. 68The charges were
designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately
occupied as tenant.69 Telling  is  the  fact  that petitioner  filed his
Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the
Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70
Petitioner   argues   that   he   has   sufficiently   established   his
status as private complainant’s tenant. 71 The DARAB Decision is
entitled to respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian
Reform   is   the   administrative   agency   vested   with   primary
jurisdiction   and   has   acquired   expertise   on   matters   relating   to
tenancy relationship.72
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial
evidence.73 To   require   petitioner   to   prove   tenancy   relationship
through   evidence   other   than   the   DARAB   Decision   and   the
testimonies   of   the   witnesses   is   absurd   and   goes   beyond   the
required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74
Also,   according   to   petitioner,   the   DARAB   Decision   has
attained finality since private complainant did not file an ap­
_______________
67  Rollo, p. 33.
68  Id., at pp. 194­195.
69  Id., at p. 195.
70  Id., at p. 196.
71  Id., at p. 191.
72  Id.
73  Id., at pp. 193­194.
74  Id., at p. 194.
18
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
peal. The DARAB’s finding as to the parties’ tenancy relationship
constitutes as res judicata.75
On   the   other   hand,   respondent   argues   that   the   Court   of
Appeals   correctly   disregarded   the   DARAB   Decision. 76 The   trial
court could not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision:
While   the   DARAB   .   .   .   ruled   that   petitioner   is   a bona
fide tenant of Pacate, courts  are not authorized  to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such
cases   have   been   tried   or   are   pending   in   the   same   court,   and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or
are actually pending before the same judge.77 (Citation omitted)
 
Moreover,   according   to   respondent,   petitioner   invokes
conflicting   defenses:   that   there   is   a   legitimate   tenancy
relationship between  him and private complainant and that he
did   not   take   the   abaca   hemp.78 Nevertheless,   respondent
maintains   that   petitioner   failed   to   prove   all   the   essential
elements   of   a   tenancy   relationship   between   him   and   private
complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the alleged
tenancy  relationship.80 Petitioner  also failed to  provide evidence
as to any sharing of harvest between the parties. 81
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy
relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by
substantial evidence.
Generally,  decisions  in  administrative  cases  are  not  binding
on   criminal   proceedings.   This   court   has   ruled   in   a   number   of
cases that:
_______________
 75  Id., at p. 192.
76  Id., at p. 177.
77  Id., at p. 178.
78  Id., at p. 179.
79  Id., at pp. 179­180.
80  Id., at p. 180.
81  Id., at p. 178.
 
 
19
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative  cases   are  independent   from   criminal   actions   for
the  same  act  or  omission. Thus,   an  absolution  from   a  criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.
One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act.
. . . .
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence,
as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal   and   administrative   proceedings,   the   findings   and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may
not   necessarily   be   the   same   evidence   to   be   presented   in   the
criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
 
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge
stemming   from   the   same   set   of   facts   involved   in   a   criminal
proceeding.   This   is   not   a   case   where   one   act   results   in   both
criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII­319­
SL­2000   involves   a   determination   of   whether   there   exists   a
tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant,
while Criminal Case No. R­225 involves determination of whether
petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a
factor   in   determining   whether   all   the   elements   of   theft   were
proven by the prosecution.
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:
All   the   necessary   requisites   in   order   to   establish   tenancy
relationship   as   required   in   the   above   quoted   Supreme   Court
ruling,   has   been   established   by   the   evidence   submitted   by
plaintiff;   And   these   evidences   were   not   controverted   by   any
19 evidence submitted by the respondent.
_______________
82  Paredes v.  Court  of Appeals, 555  Phil. 538, 549­550; 528
SCRA 577, 587­589 (2007) [Per J. Chico­Nazario, Third Division].
20
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
In   fine,   this   board   found   plaintiff   a bona   fide tenant   of   the
land in question and as such is entitled to a security of tenure, in
which   case   he   shall   not  be   dispossessed   of   his   holdings  by   the
landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and only
after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is
authorized  by  the  Court  and  in  the  judgment  that  is  final   and
executory[.]83 (Citations omitted)
 
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:
 WHEREFORE,   premises   being   considered,   judgment   is
hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bona fide tenant of the
land subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3)
in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her
behalf to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession of the land
in dispute.
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the
cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call the parties and
assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the
land in dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call
of the said MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos representing the expenses incurred
by   plaintiff   in   vindicating   his   right   and   other   actual   expenses
incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
evidence.
No cost.
SO DECIDED.84
_______________
83  Rollo, p. 33.
84  Id., at pp. 33­34.
 
 
21
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB’s findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of
their quasi­judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by
substantial   evidence.85 This   court   is   not   tasked   to   weigh   again
“the   evidence   submitted   before   the   administrative   body   and   to
substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence.”86
 
V
 
The   DARAB   is   the   quasi­judicial   tribunal   that   has   the
primary   jurisdiction   to   determine   whether   there   is   a   tenancy
relationship between adverse parties.87 This court has held that
_______________
85  See Miro v. Mendoza Vda. de Erederos, G.R. Nos. 172532 &
172544­45, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 371, 383 [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].
86  See Autencio v. Mañara, 489 Phil. 752, 761; 449 SCRA 46,
56 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
87  Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 50 provides:
SEC. 50. Quasi­Judicial   Powers   of   the   DAR.—The   DAR   is
hereby   vested   with   primary   jurisdiction   to   determine   and
adjudicate   agrarian   reform   matters   and   shall   have   exclusive
original   jurisdiction   over   all   matters   involving   the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
21 It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
but   shall   proceed   to   hear   and   decide   all   cases,   disputes   or
controversies   in   a   most   expeditious   manner,   employing   all
reasonable   means   to   ascertain   the   facts   of   every   case   in
accordance   with   justice   and   equity   and   the   merits   of   the   case.
Toward   this  end,   it   shall   adopt   a   uniform   rule  of  procedure   to
achieve   a   just,   expeditious   and   inexpensive   determination   of
every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths,
take   testimony,   require   submission   of   reports,   compel   the
production   of   books   and   documents   and   answers   to
interrogatories   and   issue   subpoena,   and subpoena duces
tecum and
 
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
“judicial determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding
effect   as   judgments   and   orders   of   a   regular   judicial
body.”88 Disputes   under   the   jurisdiction   of   the   DARAB   include
controversies relating to:
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons
in   negotiating,   fixing,   maintaining,   changing   or   seeking   to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.89
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of
Agrarian   Reform’s   primary   jurisdiction   over   agrarian   disputes,
which includes the relationship between landowners
_______________
to   enforce   its   writs   through   sheriffs   or   other   duly   deputized
officers.   It   shall   likewise   have   the   power   to   punish   direct   and
indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same
penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
Responsible   farmer   leaders   shall   be   allowed   to   represent
themselves,   their   fellow   farmers,   or   their   organizations   in   any
proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there
are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives   should   choose   only   one   among   themselves   to
represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
of the DAR shall be immediately executory. (Emphasis supplied)
88  Martillano v. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil. 226, 236­237; 433
SCRA   195,   202   (2004)   [Per J. Ynares­Santiago,   First
Division], citing Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Secs. 50 and 51.
89  Suarez   v.   Saul,   510   Phil.   400,   409;   473   SCRA   628,   637
(2005)   [Per J. Ynares­Santiago,   First   Division], citing Rep.   Act
No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 3(d) in relation to Sec. 50 and DARAB Rules
of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 1.
90  596 Phil. 472; 576 SCRA 447 (2009) [Per J. Chico­Nazario,
Third Division].
23
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 23
Ligtas vs. People
and tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on
courts when supported by substantial evidence. 92 This court ruled
that administrative res judicata exists in that case:
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17
November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB Case # II­380­ISA’94;
consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res
judicata on   the   issue   of   petitioner’s   status   as   a   tenant   of
respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court
decisions   in   accordance   with   the   hierarchy   of   courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
judicata: “The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies  as  well to
the   judicial   and   quasi­judicial   facts   of   public,   executive   or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It
has   been   declared   that   whenever   final   adjudication   of   persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error
or   a certiorari,   such   final   adjudication   may   be   pleaded   as res
judicata.” To   be   sure,   early   jurisprudence   was   already   mindful
that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively
to  decisions  rendered  by  what  are  usually  understood  as  courts
without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that
the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to
decisions   of   bodies   upon   whom   judicial   powers   have   been
conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
 
In Encinas   v.   Agustin,   Jr.,94 this   court   clarified   that res
judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judi­
_______________
91  Id., at pp. 484­486; p. 457.
92  Id., at p. 489; p. 462.
93  Id., at pp. 488­489; p. 461.
94  G.R.   No.   187317,   April   11,   2013,   696   SCRA   240
[Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
 
 
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
cial or quasi­judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative
proceedings:
The   CA   was   correct   in   ruling   that   the   doctrine   of res
judicataapplies only to judicial or quasi­judicial proceedings, and
not   to   the   exercise   of   administrative   powers.   Administrative
powers   here   refer   to   those   purely   administrative   in   nature,   as
opposed   to   administrative   proceedings   that   take   on   a   quasi­
judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi­judicial proceeding involves (a)
taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon
the   evidence   presented;   and   (c)   rendering   an   order   or   decision
supported   by   the   facts   proved.   The   exercise   of   quasi­judicial
functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy,   of   what   the   law   is;   what   the   legal   rights   and
obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and
obligations of the parties.95 (Citations omitted)
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata:
bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social
Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association,
Inc.,   et   al.,96 this   court   discussed   and   differentiated   the   two
concepts of res judicata:
 Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment
as   enunciated   in   Rule   39,   Section   47(b)   of   the   Rules   of   Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section
47(c).
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first
case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that
is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
_______________
95  Id., at pp. 260­261.
96  665   Phil.   198;   650   SCRA   50   (2011)   [Per J. Perez,   First
Division].
 
 
25
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases,   but  no identity   of causes  of  action,  the  first  judgment  is
conclusive   only   as   to   those   matters   actually   and   directly
controverted   and   determined   and   not   as   to   matters   merely
involved   therein.   This   is   the   concept   of res   judicata known   as
“conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination   of   an   action   before   a   competent   court   in   which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment   therein   and   cannot   again   be   litigated   between   the
parties   and   their   privies,   whether   or   not   the   claim,   demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first   suit.  Identity  of  cause  of  action  is  not  required   but  merely
identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to
bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
on   the   merits;   and   (4)  there   must   be  as   between  the  first   and
second action, identity of parties,  subject matter,  and causes of
action. Should  identity   of   parties,   subject  matter,   and   causes  of
action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as
a   “bar   by   prior   judgment”   would   apply.   If   as   between   the   two
cases,   only   identity   of   parties   can   be   shown,   but   not   identical
25
causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment”
applies.97(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
_______________
97  Id., at pp. 205­206; pp. 56­58.
26
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
In Martillano   v.   Court   of   Appeals,98 the   DARAB   Decision
finding   for  the  existence  of  a  tenancy   relationship  between the
parties   was   declared   by   this   court   as   conclusive   on   the
parties.99 As   in   this   case,   the   DARAB
Decision100 in Martillano attained   finality   when   the   landowner
did not appeal the Decision.101 This court ruled that the doctrine
of res judicata applies:
Under the aforecited sections of RA 6657, the Department of
Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its adjudicating arm the
regional and provincial adjudication boards,  to resolve agrarian
disputes   and   controversies   on   all   matters   pertaining   to   the
implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides
that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days and no appeal was interposed therefrom by any
of the parties.
In   the   instant   case,   the   determination   of   the   DARAB   in
DARAB Case No. 062­Bul ‘89, there being no appeal interposed
therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the
status  of  Martillano  as a  tenant  farmer  and  the  validity  of  the
CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and
no longer open to doubt and controversy.
. . . .
We   recall   that   DARAB   Case   062­Bul   ‘89   was   for   the
cancellation of petitioner’s CLT and Emancipation pat­
_______________
98   Supra note 88.
99   Id., at pp. 236­237; p. 205.
100  Id., at pp. 229­230; p. 197. The DARAB Decision pertains
to   DARAB   Case   No.   062­Bul   ‘89,   which   resolved   Abelardo
Valenzuela, Jr.’s Complaint for “the cancellation of the Certificate
of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0­042751 and/or Emancipation Patent
Nos. A­308399 issued in favor of [petitioner] Nicanor Martillano.
On April 4, 1990, Valenzuela sold 19 parcels of land[,] . . . more or
less 1.3785 hectares[,] to private respondent [William] Po Cham.”
101  Id., at pp. 236­237; p. 202.
 
 
27
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 27
Ligtas vs. People
ents.   The  same  effect  is  sought  with  the  institution  of  DARAB
Case   No.   512­Bul   ‘94,   which   is   an   action   to   withdraw   and/or
cancel   administratively   the   CLT   and   Emancipation   Patents
issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB Case 062­Bul ‘89
has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512­
Bul   ‘94,   no   strenuous   legal   interpretation   is   necessary   to
understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB
Case No. 062­Bul ‘89, which have been resolved with finality, may
not be litigated anew.
The   instant   case   is   complicated   by   the   failure   of   the
complainant to include Martillano as party­defendant in the case
before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was
finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The   belated   inclusion   of   Martillano   as   respondent   in   the
petition will not affect the applicability of the doctrine of bar by
prior   judgment. What   is   decisive   is   that   the   issues   which   have
already   been   litigated   in   a   final   and   executory   judgment
precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of
the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of “law of
the case,” the re­litigation of the same issue in another action. It is
well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became
the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as
the   controlling   legal   rule   or   decision,   continues   to   be   binding
between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision
was   predicated,   continue   to   be   the   facts   of   the   case   before   the
court. Hence,   the   binding   effect   and   enforceability   of
that dictum can  no  longer  be  resurrected   anew   since  said  issue
had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the
principle   of res   judicata,   at   least   by   conclusiveness   of
judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
_______________
102  Id., at pp. 237­239; pp. 203­205.
 
 
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that “the doctrine of
conclusiveness   of   judgment   also   applies   in   criminal
cases.”104 Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of
Republic   Act   No.   1161,   as   amended,   for   the   alleged   non­
remittance of Social Security System contributions. 105 This court
upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission
in a separate case, which declared the absence of an employer­
employee relationship and had attained finality. 106 This court held
that:
The reasons for establishing the principle of “conclusiveness of
judgment” are founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable to
reason   back   from   a   judgment   to   the   basis   on   which   it   stands,
upon   the   obvious   principle   that   where   a   conclusion   is
indisputable,   and   could   have   been   drawn   only   from   certain
premises,   the   premises   are   equally   indisputable   with   the
conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the course of
a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in
accordance   therewith,   it   cannot   be   again   litigated   between   the
same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the
former decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does
not permit to be done.
Res   judicata has   two   concepts.   The   first   is   bar   by   prior
judgment   under   Rule   39,   Section   47(b),   and   the   second   is
conclusiveness   of   judgment   under   Rule   39,   Section   47(c).   Both
concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based
on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of
suits.   Like   the   splitting   of   causes   of   action, res   judicata is   in
pursuance   of   such   policy.   Matters   settled   by   a   Court’s   final
judgment   should   not   be   litigated   upon   or   invoked   again.   Re­
litigation of issues already settled merely burdens the
_______________
103  610 Phil. 60; 592 SCRA 381 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First
Division].
104  Id., at p. 69; p. 390.
105  Id., at pp. 63­64; p. 384.
106  Id., at p. 67; p. 387.
 
 
29
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 29
Ligtas vs. People
Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and
wastes   valuable   time   and   energy   that   could   be   devoted   to
worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted)
 
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,108 this   court   ruled   that   tenancy   relationship   must   be
duly proven:
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
evidence   to   prove   this   allegation.   The   principal   factor   in
determining   whether   a   tenancy   relationship   exists   is   intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
the   alleged   tenant   does   upon   the   land.   It   is   also   a   legal
relationship.109(Citation omitted)
 
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII­319­SL­2000, held that
all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven
by petitioner.110 It found that there  was substantial evidence to
support  petitioner’s  claim  as  tenant of  the land. 111 In  rendering
the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings
_______________
107  Id., at pp. 70­71; pp. 392­393.
108  480   Phil.   28;   436   SCRA   392   (2004)   [Per J. Callejo,   Sr.,
Second Division].
109  Id., at p. 35; p. 398.
110  Rollo,   p.   33.   See VHJ   Construction   and   Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, id., at p. 35; pp. 398­399: “The
requisites of a tenancy relationship are as follows: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land;   (3)   there   is  consent   by   the   landowner;   (4)  the  purpose   is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of the harvests.”
111  Rollo, p. 33. See Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Substantial   evidence.—In   cases   filed   before
administrative   or   quasi­judicial   bodies,   a   fact   may   be   deemed
established   if   it   is   supported   by   substantial   evidence,   or   that
amount   of   relevant   evidence   which   a   reasonable   mind   might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
 
 
 
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
and   affidavits   of   both   petitioner   and   private   complainant. 112 It
was convinced by petitioner’s evidence, which consisted of sworn
statements of petitioner’s witnesses that petitioner was installed
as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in 1993. 113 Petitioner and
Andres   Pacate   had   an   agreement   to   share   the   produce   after
harvest.114However,   Andres   Pacate   had   died   before   the   first
harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner’s share to private
complainant,   and   had   done   so   every   harvest   until   he   was
disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB,
private  complainant failed   to heed   the  Notices  sent  to  her  and
refused   to   attend   the   scheduled   hearings. 117The   DARAB   even
quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private complainant’s
counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as counsel:
That   as   early   as   the   preliminary   hearings   of   the   case,   the
respondent has already shown her intention not to participate the
proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her;
 That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood
pat with her decision not to participate in the proceedings of the
case;
That   in   view   of   this   predicament,   the   undersigned   can   do
nothing except to withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel
for the respondent of the above entitled case[.]118
_______________
112  Rollo, pp. 29­32.
113  Id., at pp. 29­30.
114  Id., at p. 30.
115  Id.
116  Id. The   DARAB   Decision   states   that   Ligtas   had
peacefully cultivated the land from 1993 to June 29, 2000, when
respondent Anecita Pacate ordered men to harvest abaca from the
land.
117  Id., at p. 28.
118  Id., at p. 29.
 
 
31
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial
notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases
that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge.119 In declaring that the DARAB’s findings on the
tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant
are   immaterial   to   the   criminal   case   for   theft,   the   Court   of
Appeals120 relied   on Cornes,   et   al.   v.   Leal   Realty   Centrum   Co.,
Inc.121
In Cornes,   petitioners,   who   were   farmers   of   a   21­hectare
agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar
and   rice   and   who   claim   the   rights   of   their   predecessors­in­
interest,   filed   separate   Complaints   before   the   Provincial
Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed
that   when   the   registered   owner   of   the   land,   Josefina   Roxas
Omaña, sold the land to respondents, respondents were aware of
the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas
Omaña.122
 
_______________
119  See Rules of Court, Rule 129, Secs. 1 and 2 provide:
SECTION 1. Judicial   notice,   when   mandatory.—A   court
shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the   existence   and   territorial   extent   of   states,   their   political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law
of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
their   seals,   the   political   constitution   and   history   of   the
Philippines,   the   official   acts   of   the   legislative,   executive   and
31
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SECTION 2. Judicial   notice,   when   discretionary.—A   court
may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable  of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to  be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.
See also Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 51, 56­57; 196
SCRA 650, 655­656 (1991) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
120  Rollo, p. 104.
 121  Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., supra note 38.
122  Id., at pp. 533­534; p. 551.
 
 
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in
exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights under the
Comprehensive   Agrarian   Reform   Law.   However,   they   failed   to
comply   with   their   obligations   under   the   terms   of   the
compensation   package.123Petitioners   then   filed   a   series   of
Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and
resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator.124
The   Provincial   Adjudicator   ruled,   among   other   things,   that
“there   was   no   tenancy   relationship   [that]   existed   between   the
parties.”125 He   found   that   petitioners   and   their   predecessors­in­
interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be
presumed from respondents’ offer of a compensation package.126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy between
the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more
than 30 years. They were entitled to security of tenure.127
The   Court   of   Appeals   reversed   the   DARAB   Decision   and
reinstated   the   Provincial   Adjudicator’s   Decision.   It   held   that
there was no substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites
of   tenancy   relationship   existed.   However,   despite   the   lack   of
tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must
be upheld.128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ Decision. 129 It held
that   petitioners   failed   to   overcome   the   burden   of   proving   the
existence of a tenancy relationship:
_______________
123  Id., at p. 534; pp. 551­552.
124  Id., at pp. 533­537; pp. 551­554.
125  Id., at p. 537; p. 554.
126  Id.
127  Id., at pp. 540­541; p. 559.
128  Id., at pp. 543­544; p. 560.
129  Id., at p. 558; p. 577.
33
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015 33
Ligtas vs. People
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner
and   the   tenants.   While   it   appears   that   there   was   personal
cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors­in­interest of the
subject  landholding,  what was established was that petitioners’
claim   of   tenancy   was   founded   on   the   self­serving   testimony   of
petitioner   Rodolfo   Cornes   that   his   predecessors­in­interest   had
been in possession of the landholding for more than 30 years and
had  engaged in a “50­50” sharing scheme with JOSEFINA  and
JOSEFINA’s   grandmother,   the   previous   owner   thereof.   Self­
serving   statements   in   pleadings   are   inadequate;   proof   must   be
adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to
support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to
prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they
failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie
must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a
civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same rule applies
to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent   is   under   no   obligation   to   prove   his   exception   or
defense. . . .
Neither   was   it   shown   to   the   satisfaction   of   this   Court   that
there  existed a  sharing  of harvests in the  context  of  a tenancy
relationship   between   petitioners   and/or   their   predecessors­in­
interest   and   JOSEFINA.   Jurisprudence   is   illuminating   to   the
effect   that   to   prove   such   sharing   of   harvests,   a   receipt   or   any
other evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts
were presented as testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests.
The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of
harvests   was   the   testimony   of   petitioner   Rodolfo   Cornes.   The
sharing   arrangement  cannot  be  deemed  to  have  existed  on  the
basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes’ claim. It is self­serving
and   is   without   evidentiary   value.   Self­serving   statements   are
deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all,
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship.
We   also   sustain   the   conclusion   reached   by   the   Provincial
Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli
Pascua,   an   employee   of   the   DAR   in   Victoria,   Tarlac,   that   the
subject   landholding   was   tenanted   cannot   overcome   substantial
evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance
may   be   made   upon   the   said   public   officer’s   testimony.   What
cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of this Court that the
findings  of  or certifications  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  Agrarian
Reform,   or   his   authorized   representative,   in   a   given   locality
concerning   the   presence   or   absence   of   a   tenancy   relationship
between   the   contending   parties,   are   merely   preliminary   or
provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling holds
with   greater   effect   in   the   instant   case   in   light   of   the   fact   that
petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of
all   the   indispensable   elements   of   tenancy.130(Emphasis   supplied,
citations omitted)
 
Thus, in Cornes, this court did not categorically hold that the
DARAB’s findings were merely provisional and, thus, not binding
on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of
tenancy was the testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform
employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further,
the   tribunals   had   conflicting   findings   on   whether   petitioners
were bona fidetenants.
In   this   case,   records   are   bereft   as   to   whether   private
complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed
that the Decision has long lapsed into finality.131It is also es­
_______________
130  Id., at pp. 550­552; pp. 568­571.
131  See Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 51 provides:
SEC. 51. Finality   of   Determination.—Any   case   or   controversy
before   it   shall   be   decided   within   thirty   (30)   days   after   it   is
submitted for resolution. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Any order, ruling or decision shall be final after
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
  
35
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
tablished   that   private   complainant   participated   in   the   initial
stages of the DARAB proceedings. 132 Therefore,  the issue of the
existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties.
We cannot collaterally review the DARAB’s findings at this stage.
The   existence   of   the   final   Decision   that   tenancy   exists   creates
serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
VI
 
According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308
of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   were   not   established   since   he   was
a bona   fide tenant   of   the   land.133 The   DARAB’s   recognition   of
petitioner   as   a   legitimate   tenant   necessarily   “implie[d]   that   he
ha[d]   the   authority   to   harvest   the   abaca   hemp   from   [private
complainant’s   land].”134 This   shows   that   petitioner   had   no
criminal intent.
As   to   the   existence   of   another   element   of   theft   —   that   the
taking was done without the consent of the owner — petitioner
argues   that   this,   too,   was   negated   by   his   status   as   private
complainant’s tenant:
The   purported   lack   of   consent   on   the   part   of   the   private
complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it
was   even   improper   for . . . Anecita   Pacate   to   stop   or   prevent
petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding because
as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right
entitled   him   to   continue   working   on   his   landholding   until   the
leasehold relation is terminated or until his eviction is authorized
by   the   DARAB   in   a   judgment   that   is   final   and
executory.135(Citation omitted)
35
_______________
132  Rollo, pp. 28­29 and 42.
133  Id., at p. 199.
134  Id.
135  Id.
 
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
Petitioner   argues   that   the   constitutional   presumption   of
innocence must be upheld:
Well­settled   is   the   rule   that   where   “inculpatory   facts   and
circumstances   are   capable   of   two   or   more   explanations,   one   of
which   is   consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the   test   of   moral   certainty   and   is   not   sufficient   to   support   a
conviction.” In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he
is lily­white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his
innocence  because  the prosecution’s evidence failed to show  his
guilt   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   For   that   is   what   the   basic   law
requires.   Where   the   evidence   is   insufficient   to   overcome   the
presumption   of   innocence   in   favour   of   the   accused,   then   his
“acquittal   must  follow   in  faithful   obeisance  to  the  fundamental
law.”136 (Citations omitted)
 
 The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of
the trial court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ARTICLE 308. Who   are   Liable   for   Theft.—Theft   is   committed
by   any   person   who,   with   intent   to   gain   but   without   violence
against   or   intimidation   of   persons   nor   force   upon   things,   shall
take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any   person   who,   after   having   maliciously   damaged   the
property   of   another,   shall   remove   or   make   use   of   the  fruits   or
object of the damage caused by him; and
_______________
136  Id., at pp. 199­200.
 
37
VOL. 767, AUGUST 17, 2015
Ligtas vs. People
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field
where   trespass   is   forbidden   or   which   belongs   to   another   and
without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same
or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
 
The   essential   elements   of   theft   are:   (1)   taking   of   personal
property; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking
was   done   without   the   owner’s   consent;   (4)   there   was   intent   to
gain;   and   (5)   the   taking   was   done   without   violence   against   or
intimidation of the person or force upon things.137
Tenants have been defined as:
persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from
within   their   immediate   farm   households   —   cultivate   the   land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under  the share  tenancy  system, or paying to the  landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under
the leasehold tenancy system.138 (Citation omitted)
 
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of
the   land   he   or   she   cultivates.   The   landowner’s   share   in   the
produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence,
the   harvesting   done   by   the   tenant   is   with   the   landowner’s
consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of
tenancy between petitioner and private complainant negates the
existence  of  the  element  that  the taking  was  done  without the
owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had
legitimate authority to harvest the abaca.
_______________
37
137  See Gan v. People, 550 Phil. 133, 159; 521 SCRA 550, 577
(2007) [Per J. Chico­Nazario, First Division]; United States v. De
Vera,   43   Phil.   1000,   1003   (1921)   [Per J. Villamor, En   Banc];
and People   v.   Yusay,   50   Phil.   598,   607   (1927)   [Per J. Villa­
Real, En Banc].
138  Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., supra note 38 at
p. 548; p. 566.
 
 
38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ligtas vs. People
The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of
theft.
In Pit­og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of
sugarcane   and   banana   crops   on   the   basis   of   reasonable
doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on
petitioner’s part.141 It failed to clearly identify “the person who, as
a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully  deprived of  a thing belonging to  him.” 142 There  were
doubts as to whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed
planted on private complainant’s lot when petitioner had planted
her own plants adjacent to it. 143 Thus, it was not proven beyond
reasonable   doubt   that   the   property   belonged   to   private
complainant. This court found that petitioner “took the sugarcane
and bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case,
she could not have had a criminal intent.”144
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he
was entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the
land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have
been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall
be presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. 145 “[I]t is
better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person.”146 Thus,   courts   must   consider   “[e]very   circumstance
against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]” 147 Equally settled is that
“[w]here the evidence admits of two in­
terpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other
with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt
and should be acquitted.”148
In view of petitioner’s acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we
find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE,   the   Petition   is GRANTED.   The   Court   of
Appeals’ Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated
February   2,   2012   are REVERSED and SET   ASIDE.   Petitioner
Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article
308   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code.   If   detained,   he   is   ordered
immediately RELEASED,   unless   he   is   confined   for   any   other
lawful   cause.   Any   amount   paid   by   way   of   a   bailbond   is
ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Petition   granted,   judgment   and   resolution   reversed   and   set
aside.   Petitioner   Monico   Ligtas   acquitted   and   ordered
immediately released.
Notes.—In   adjudicating   a   case   on   trial,   courts   are   not
authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the records
of   other   cases,   even   when   such   cases   have   been   tried   or   are
pending in the same court and notwithstanding that both cases
may   have   been   tried   or   are   actually   pending   before   the   same
judge;   Rule   admits   of   exceptions.   (Republic   vs.   Sandiganbayan
[Fourth Division], 662 SCRA152 [2011])
The Supreme Court takes judicial notice that proceedings at
the first level courts, especially in cities and capital towns, are
relatively slower than those at the Regional Trial Court because
of its more numerous pending cases. (Boto vs. Villena, 706 SCRA
1 [2013])
 ——o0o——
 
_______________
148  Id., at pp. 257­258; p. 271, citing People v. Mijares, 358
Phil.   154,   166;   297   SCRA   520,   534   (1998)   [Per J. Panganiban,
First Division]; People v. Corpuz, 459 Phil. 100, 113; 412 SCRA
479, 489 (2003) [Per J.Ynares­Santiago, First Division].
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 172953. April 30, 2008.*
JUNIE   MALILLIN   y   LOPEZ,   petitioner, vs.   PEOPLE   OF   THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Appeals; Although the trial court’s findings of
fact   are   entitled   to   great   weight   and   will   not   be   disturbed   on
appeal,   this   rule   does   not   apply   where   facts   of   weight   and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in
a case under appeal.—Although the trial court’s findings of fact
are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal,
this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal. In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from
that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Same;   Illegal   Possession   of   Prohibited   Drugs;   Chain   of
Custody Rule; The mere fact of unauthorized possession will not
suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required
to sustain a finding of guilt—more than just the fact of possession,
the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is
the   same   substance   offered   in   court   as   exhibit   must   also   be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite
to make a finding of guilt.—Prosecutions for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession
of   a   prohibited   substance   be   established   with   moral   certainty,
together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous   drug   itself   constitutes   the   very corpus   delicti of   the
offense   and   the   fact   of   its   existence   is   vital   to   a   judgment   of
conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity
of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it
may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to
create   in   a   reasonable   mind   the   moral   certainty   required   to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession,
the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is
the   same   substance   offered   in   court   as   exhibit   must   also   be
established   with   the   same   unwavering   exactitude   as   that
requisite   to   make   a   finding   of   guilt.   The   chain   of   custody
requirement performs this
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
620
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
20
Malillin vs. People
function   in   that   it   ensures   that   unnecessary   doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Same; Same; Same; As a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be  preceded  by  evidence  sufficient  to  support  a  finding   that  the
matter   in   question   is   what   the   proponent   claims   it   to   be;   The
likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit
is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics   fungible   in   nature   and   similar   in   form   to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives.—As a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support   a   finding   that   the   matter   in   question   is   what   the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’  possession,   the  condition  in  which  it  was  received  and
the  condition  in  which  it  was  delivered   to the  next  link  in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item  and   no   opportunity   for   someone  not   in   the  chain   to  have
possession of the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is
not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not   readily   identifiable,   or   when   its   condition   at   the   time   of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe
its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the
evidence   is   susceptible   to   alteration,   tampering,   contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s
level   of   susceptibility   to   fungibility,   alteration   or   tampering—
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not
—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake
with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small
and   is   one   that   has   physical   characteristics   fungible   in   nature
and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.621
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 621
Malillin vs. People
Same;   Same;   Same;   A   unique   characteristic   of   narcotic
substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are   subject   to   scientific   analysis   to   determine   their   composition
and nature—hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are
readily   identifiable   must   be   applied,   a   more   exacting   standard
that   entails   a   chain   of   custody   of   the   item   with   sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item
has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or
tampered with.—A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is
that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court   cannot   reluctantly   close   its   eyes   to   the   likelihood,   or   at
least   the   possibility,   that   at   any   of   the   links   in   the   chain   of
custody   over   the   same   there   could   have   been   tampering,
alteration   or   substitution   of   substances   from   other   cases—by
accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in
which   similar   evidence   was   submitted   for   laboratory   testing.
Hence,   in   authenticating   the   same,   a   standard   more   stringent
than   that   applied   to   cases   involving   objects   which   are   readily
identifiable   must   be   applied,   a   more   exacting   standard   that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness
if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.
Same;  Same;  Same;   Section  21  of   the  Implementing  Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post­seizure
procedure in taking custody of seized drugs—it mandates that the
officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant
must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the
item at the place where the warrant has been served.—Section 21
of   the   Implementing   Rules   and   Regulations   of   R.A.   No.   9165
clearly   outlines  the  post­seizure  procedure   in  taking   custody   of
seized   drugs.   In   a   language   too   plain   to   require   a   different
construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody
of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing
and   the   physical   inventory   of   the   item   at   the   place   where   the
warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure.
It   was   elicited   from   him   that   at   the   close   of   the   search   of
petitioner’s house, he brought the seized items immediately to the
police station for the alleged purpose of making a “true inventory”
thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory
could not be made in petitioner’s house when in 622
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
22
Malillin vs. People
fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the
seized   items   and   there   and   then   prepare   a   seizure   receipt
therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough
opportunity   to  cause   the  issuance   of  the  warrant  which  means
that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation.
While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to
excuse   non­compliance   therewith,   the   same   cannot   benefit   the
prosecution   as   it   failed   to   offer   any   acceptable   justification   for
Esternon’s course of action.
Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The approval by
the   court   which   issued   the   search   warrant   is   necessary   before
police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they
would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so
to deliver the same to another agency—mere tolerance by the trial
court   of   a   contrary   practice   does   not   make   the   practice   right
because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law
and   it   thereby   defeats   the   very   purpose   for   the   enactment.—
Esternon’s   failure   to   deliver   the   seized   items   to   the   court
demonstrates   a   departure   from   the   directive   in   the   search
warrant   that   the   items   seized   be   immediately   delivered   to   the
trial   court   with   a   true   and   verified   inventory   of   the   same,   as
required by Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. People v.
Go,   411   SCRA   81   (2003) characterized   this   requirement   as
mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering
with   said   items   by   interested   parties.   Thus,   as   a   reasonable
safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo, 439 SCRA 601 (2004) declared
that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is
necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and
without   it,   they   would   have   no   authority   to   retain   possession
thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. Mere
tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make
the   practice   right   because   it   is   violative   of   the   mandatory
requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose
for the enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption
of Regularity; The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a
mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth,
and it cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails   if   not   overthrown   by   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt.—
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the
standard   and   normal   procedure   in   the   implementation   of   the
warrant and in tak­623
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008
Malillin vs. People
ing post­seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of
regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced.
The   presumption   of   regularity   is   merely   just   that—a   mere
presumption   disputable   by   contrary   proof   and   which   when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof   beyond   reasonable  doubt.   In   the   present   case   the   lack   of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which
the same were placed under police custody before offered in court,
strongly militates a finding of guilt.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Equipoise Rule; In
dubio pro reo—when moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the
balance,   acquittal   on   reasonable   doubt   inevitably   becomes   a
matter   of   right.—In   our   constitutional   system,   basic   and
elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the
strength   of   its   own   evidence   and   not   on   the   weakness   of   the
defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of
the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until
the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as
to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Lynette J. Tan for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
623
TINGA, J.:
The   presumption   of   regularity   in   the   performance   of   official
functions   cannot   by   its   lonesome   overcome   the   constitutional
presumption   of   innocence.   Evidence   of   guilt   beyond   reasonable
doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness.
And this burden is met not by bestowing dis­624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
trust   on   the   innocence   of   the   accused   but   by   obliterating   all
doubts as to his culpability.
In   this   Petition   for   Review1 under   Rule   45   of   the   Rules   of
Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision2 of
the   Court   of   Appeals   dated   27   January   2006   as   well   as   its
Resolution3 dated   30   May   2006   denying   his   motion   for
reconsideration.   The   challenged   decision   has   affirmed   the
Decision4 of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of   Sorsogon   City,
Branch 525 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of  illegal   possession  of  methamphetamine  hydrochloride,  locally
known as shabu,a prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by
the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers
raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay  Tugos,  Sorsogon
City   on   4   February   2003.   The   team   was   headed   by   P/Insp.
Catalino   Bolanos   (Bolanos),   with   PO3   Roberto   Esternon
(Esternon),   SPO1   Pedro   Docot,   SPO1   Danilo   Lasala   and   SPO2
Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The search—conducted
in   the   presence   of barangay   kagawad Delfin   Licup   as   well   as
petitioner   himself,   his   wife   Sheila   and   his   mother,   Norma—
allegedly   yielded   two   (2)   plastic   sachets   of shabu and   five   (5)
empty   plastic   sachets   containing   residual   morsels   of   the   said
substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section
11,7 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8­22.
2 In CA­G.R. No. 28915. Penned by Associate Justice Renato
C.   Dacudao   and   concurred   in   by   Associate   Justices   Lucas   P.
Bersamin and Celia C. Librea­Leagogo. CA Rollo, pp. 81­90.
3 Id., at p. 109.
4 In Criminal Case No. 2003­5844. Records, pp. 114­119.
5 Presided by Judge Honesto A. Villamor.
6 Records, pp. 11­12.
7 Sec. 11. Possession  of Dangerous Drugs.—The penalty  of life
imprisonment   to   death   and   a   fine   ranging   from   Five   hundred
thou­
625
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 625
Malillin vs. People
as   The   Comprehensive   Dangerous   Drugs   Act   of   2002,   in   a
criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads:
_______________
sand   pesos   (P500,000.00)   to  Ten   million   pesos   (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall   possess   any   dangerous   drug   in   the   following   quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof;
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu”;
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but
not   limited   to,   methylenedioxymethamphetamine   (MDMA)   or
“ecstasy,”   paramethoxyamphetamine   (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine   (TMA),   lysergic   acid   diethylamide
(LSD),   gamma   hydroxybutyrate   (GHB),   and   those   similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond   therapeutic   requirements,   as   determined   and
promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI
of this Act.
 Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life   imprisonment   and   a   fine   ranging   from   Four
hundred   thousand   pesos   (P400,000.00)   to   Five   hundred
thousand   pesos   (P500,000.00),   if   the   quantity   of
methamphetamine   hydrochloride   or   “shabu”   is   ten   (10)
grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day
to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred
thousand   pesos   (P400,000.00)   to   Five   hundred   thousand
pesos  (P500,000.00),   if  the  quantities   of  dangerous  drugs
are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
“That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45
in  the  morning   in Barangay   Tugos,  Sorsogon  City,   Philippines,
the   said   accused   did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously   have   in   his   possession,   custody   and   control   two   (2)
plastic  sachets   of   methamphetamine  hydrochloride   [or]   “shabu”
with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets
containing   “shabu”   residue,   without   having   been   previously
authorized by law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”8
Petitioner entered a negative plea. 9 At the ensuing trial, the
prosecution   presented   Bolanos,   Arroyo   and   Esternon   as
witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding
team,  testified  on  the  circumstances  surrounding  the search  as
follows: that he and his men were allowed entry
_______________
or   “shabu,”   or   other   dangerous   drugs   such   as,   but   not
limited   to,   MDMA   or   “ecstasy,”   PMA,   TMA,   LSD,   GHB,
and   those   similarly   designed   or   newly   introduced   drugs
and   their   derivatives,   without   having   any   therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements;  or three  hundred (300) grams or more but
less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12 years and one (1) day
to   twenty   (20)   years   and   a   fine   ranging   from   Three
hundred   thousand   pesos   (P300,000.00)   to   Four   hundred
thousand   pesos   (P400,000.00),   if   the   quantities   of
dangerous   drugs   are   less   than   five   (5)   grams   of   opium,
morphine,   heroin,   cocaine   or   cocaine   hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride   or   “shabu,”   or   other   dangerous   drugs   such
as,   but   not   limited   to,   MDMA   or   “ecstasy,”   PMA,   TMA,
LSD,   GHB,   and   those   similarly   designed   or   newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300)
grams of marijuana.
8 Records, p. 2.
9 Id., at pp. 41, 43.
627
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 627
 Malillin vs. People
into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search
warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon
and barangay   kagawad Licup,   whose   assistance   had   previously
been requested in executing the warrant, to conduct the search;
that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the
house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the
conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search
conducted   inside   the   bedroom   of   petitioner   yielded   five   empty
plastic   sachets   with   suspected shabu residue   contained   in   a
denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched
by   Esternon—a   discovery   that   was   made   in   the   presence   of
petitioner.10 On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during
the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioner’s mother,
Norma,   but   that   at   the   same   time   his   eyes   were   fixed   on   the
search being conducted by Esternon.11
Esternon  testified  that  the  denim  bag  containing   the  empty
plastic sachets was found “behind” the door of the bedroom and
not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets
under  a  pillow  on the bed  and forthwith  called on  Gallinera to
have the items recorded and marked. 12 On cross, he admitted that
it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was
standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and
that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which
included   the   pillow   in   which   the   two   sachets   of shabu were
kept;13 that   he   brought   the   seized   items   to   the   Balogo   Police
Station   for   a   “true   inventory,”   then   to   the   trial   court 14 and
thereafter to the laboratory.15
_______________
10 TSN, 22 April 2003, pp. 6­9.
11 Id., at pp. 15­16.
12 TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 6­7, 10.
13 Id., at pp. 16­17.
14 TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13­15.
15 Id., at p. 9.
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
Supt.   Lorlie   Arroyo   (Arroyo),   the   forensic   chemist   who
administered the examination on the seized items, was presented
as   an   expert   witness   to   identify   the   items   submitted   to   the
laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive
of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance. 16 She further admitted
that   all   seven   sachets   were   delivered   to   the   laboratory   by
Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was
executed   except   that   it   was   not   she   but   rather   a   certain   Mrs.
Ofelia   Garcia   who   received   the   items   from   Esternon   at   the
laboratory.17
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the
search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner
testified   that   Esternon   began   the   search   of   the   bedroom   with
Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily
interrupted   when   one   of   the   police   officers   declared   to   Bolanos
that petitioner’s wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search
of Sheila’s body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in
his   presence   that   Sheila   was   searched   by   the   lady   officer.
Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told
that nothing was found on Sheila’s body.18 Sheila was ordered to
transfer to the other bedroom together with her children. 19
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was
summoned   by   Esternon   to   the   bedroom   and   once   inside,   the
officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the
bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped
_______________
16 TSN,   28   May   2003,   p.   14.   The   results   of   the   chemical
analysis   are   embodied   in   Chemistry   Report   No.   D­037­03.   See
Records, p. 18.
17 Id., at p. 3.
18 TSN, 2 December 2003, pp. 6­10.
19 Id., at p. 13.
629
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 629
Malillin vs. People
him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that
instant, Esternon showed him “sachet of shabu” which according
to him came from a pillow on the bed. 20Petitioner’s account in its
entirety   was   corroborated   in   its   material   respects   by
Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies.
Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in
the   house   for   the   entire   duration  of   the  search   because   at   one
point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while
Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. 21 Licup for his part
testified  on  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  discovery   of  the
plastic  sachets.   He  recounted that  after  the  five  empty  sachets
were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room
and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the
bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.22
On   20   June   2004   the   trial   court   rendered   its   Decision
declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12)
and   one   (1)   day   to   twenty   (20)   years   and   to   pay   a   fine   of
P300,000.00.23 The   trial   court   reasoned   that   the   fact
that shabu was   found   in   the   house   of   petitioner   was prima
facie evidence of petitioner’s animus possidendi sufficient to
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 11­12.
21 TSN, 11 November 2003, p. 3; TSN, 23 March 2004, p. 4.
22 TSN, 4 February 2004, pp. 4­5, 9.
23 Records, p.   119.   The   dispositive   portion   of   the   decision
reads:
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Court   finds
accused   Junie   Malillin   y   Lopez   guilty   beyond   reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 11, Article II of R.A.
No.   9165   otherwise   known   as   the   Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and he is hereby sentence[d]
to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
Twenty (20) years and fine of P300,000.00.
The shabu recovered is hereby ordered forfeited in favor
of the government and the same shall be turned over to the
Board for proper disposal without delay.
SO ORDERED.
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
convict   him   of   the   charge   inasmuch   as   things   which   a   person
possesses   or   over   which   he   exercises   acts   of   ownership   are
presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner’s failure to
ascribe   ill   motives   to   the   police   officers   to   fabricate   charges
against him.24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.25 In his Appeal
Brief26 filed   with   the   Court   of   Appeals,   petitioner   called   the
attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by
which  the  search  of  his  house  was  conducted.   For  its  part,   the
Office   of   the   Solicitor   General   (OSG)   advanced   that   on   the
contrary,   the   prosecution   evidence   sufficed   for   petitioner’s
conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show
that the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated
to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that
they had regularly performed their duties should prevail.27
On   27   January   2006,   the   Court   of   Appeals   rendered   the
assailed   decision   affirming   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   but
modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve
(12)   years   as   minimum   to   seventeen   (17)   years   as
maximum.28 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 117­118.
25 Id., at p. 121.
26 CA Rollo, pp. 35­47.
27 Id., at pp. 65­73.
28 Id., at p. 89. The Court of Appeals disposed of the appeal as
follows:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS,
the   appeal   is   DISMISSED   for   lack   of   merit,   and   the
judgment   appealed   from   is   hereby   AFFIRMED   with
MODIFICATION in the sense that the accused­appellant is
hereby   sentenced   to  suffer   an  indeterminate  prison   term
ranging from twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment
appealed   from   is   hereby   MAINTAINED.   Costs   against
accused­appellant.
SO ORDERED.
631
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 631
Malillin vs. People
same   was   denied   by   the   appellate   court. 29 Hence,   the   instant
petition which raises substantially the same issues.
In its Comment,30 the OSG bids to establish that the raiding
team   had   regularly   performed   its   duties   in   the   conduct   of   the
search.31 It  points  to  petitioner’s   incredulous   claim   that  he  was
framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the
two   filled   sachets   was   made   in   his   and   Licup’s   presence.   It
likewise   notes   that   petitioner’s   bare   denial   cannot   defeat   the
positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not
suffice   to   overcome   the prima   facie existence   of animus
possidendi.
This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed
by the records.
Prefatorily,   although   the   trial   court’s   findings   of   fact   are
entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this
rule   does   not   apply   where   facts   of   weight   and   substance   have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal.32 In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from
that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutions   for   illegal   possession   of   prohibited   drugs
necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral certainty, together with the
fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of
_______________
29 Id., at p. 109.
30 Rollo, pp. 102­112.
31 Id., at p. 107.
32 People   v.   Pedronan,   G.R.   No.   148668,   17   June  2003,   404
SCRA   183,   188; People   v.   Casimiro,   G.R.   No.   146277,   20   June
2002,   383  SCRA  390,   398; People v.  Laxa,  G.R.  No.  138501,   20
July 2001, 361 SCRA 622, 627.
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity
of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. 34 Be that as it
may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to
create   in   a   reasonable   mind   the   moral   certainty   required   to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession,
the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is
the   same   substance   offered   in   court   as   exhibit   must   also   be
established   with   the   same   unwavering   exactitude   as   that
requisite   to   make   a   finding   of   guilt.   The   chain   of   custody
requirement   performs   this   function   in   that   it   ensures   that
unnecessary   doubts  concerning   the  identity  of   the evidence  are
removed.35
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule   requires   that   the   admission   of   an   exhibit   be   preceded   by
evidence   sufficient   to   support   a   finding   that   the   matter   in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. 36 It would include
testimony   about  every   link   in  the  chain,   from   the   moment   the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how   and   from   whom   it   was   received,   where   it   was   and   what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the
_______________
33 People   v.   Simbahon,   G.R.   No.   132371,   9   April   2003,   401
SCRA 94, 100; People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, 20 July 2001, 361
SCRA 622, 634; People v. Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51 (1994); People v.
Mapa, 220 SCRA 670 (1993).
34 People   v.   Simbahon,   G.R.   No.   132371,   9   April   2003,   401
SCRA 94, 100; People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004,
428 SCRA 51, 70.
35 An   Analytical   Approach   to   Evidence, Ronad   J.   Allen,
Richard B. Kuhns, by Little Brown & Co., USA, 1989, p. 174.
36 United States v. Howard­Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366; United
States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58.
633
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 633
Malillin vs. People
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.37
While   testimony   about   a   perfect   chain   is   not   always   the
standard   because   it   is   almost   always   impossible   to   obtain,   an
unbroken chain of custody becomes  indispensable and  essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical,   or   when   a   witness   has   failed   to   observe   its
uniqueness.38 The   same   standard   likewise   obtains   in   case   the
evidence   is   susceptible   to   alteration,   tampering,
contamination39 and   even   substitution   and   exchange.40 In   other
words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration
or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent
or   otherwise   not—dictates   the   level   of   strictness   in   the
application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed,   the   likelihood   of   tampering,   loss   or   mistake   with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is
one   that   has   physical   characteristics   fungible   in   nature   and
similar   in   form   to   substances   familiar   to   people   in   their   daily
lives.41 Graham   vs.   State42 positively   acknowledged   this   danger.
In   that   case   where   a   substance   later   analyzed   as   heroin—was
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however
did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the
exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from
the prosecution evidence,  the  court pointing out that  the white
powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been
sugar or baking powder. It ruled
_______________
37 Evidence Law, Roger C. Park, David P. Leonard, Steven H.
Goldberg, 1998, 610 Opperman Drive, St. Paul Minnesota, p. 507.
38 Evidence Law, Roger C. Park, David P. Leonard, Steven H.
Goldberg, 1998, 610 Opperman Drive, St. Paul Minnesota, p. 507;
29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 946.
39 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 946.
40 See Graham v. State, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655.
41 Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.
42 Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652.
634
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
that   unless   the   state   can   show   by   records   or   testimony,   the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it
came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in
the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state
as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.43
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are
not   readily   identifiable   as   in   fact   they   are   subject   to   scientific
analysis  to  determine  their  composition  and   nature.   The  Court
cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over
the   same   there   could   have   been   tampering,   alteration   or
substitution   of   substances   from   other   cases—by   accident   or
otherwise—in   which   similar   evidence   was   seized   or   in   which
similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating   the   same,   a   standard   more   stringent   than   that
applied to  cases  involving  objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render
it improbable that  the original  item has  either been exchanged
with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant
doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized
from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with
the   seized   objects,   only   Esternon   and   Arroyo   testified   for   the
specific   purpose   of   establishing   the   identity   of   the   evidence.
Gallinera,   to   whom   Esternon   supposedly   handed   over   the
confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia,
the   person   to   whom   Esternon   directly   handed   over   the   seized
items   for   chemical   analysis   at   the   crime   laboratory,   were   not
presented   in   court   to   establish   the   circumstances   under   which
they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then
ask the question: Are the
_______________
43 Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.
635
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008
Malillin vs. People
sachets   of shabu allegedly   seized   from   petitioner   the  very   same
objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
The   prosecution’s   evidence   is   incomplete   to   provide   an
affirmative   answer.   Considering   that   it   was   Gallinera   who
recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is
crucial   to   affirm   whether   the   exhibits   were   the   same   items
handed   over   to   him   by   Esternon   at   the   place   of   seizure   and
acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is
true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify
on  the  circumstances  under  which  she  received  the  items  from
Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in
her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for
analysis.
The   prosecution   was   thus   unsuccessful   in   discharging   its
burden of establishing the identity of the seized items because it
failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but
also any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is
no   reasonable   guaranty   as   to   the   integrity   of   the   exhibits
inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of
the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This
holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also
to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also,   contrary   to   what   has   been   consistently   claimed   by   the
prosecution   that   the   search   and   seizure   was   conducted   in   a
regular   manner   and   must   be   presumed   to   be   so,   the   records
disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers
from the commencement of the search of petitioner’s house until
the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis.
The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner,
635 corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of the
two   filled   sachets   petitioner   was   sent   out   of   his   house   to   buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of
Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team
at the door of peti­636
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malillin vs. People
tioner’s   house   in   order   to   forestall   the   likelihood   of   petitioner
fleeing   the   scene.   By   no   stretch   of   logic   can   it   be   conclusively
explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand
when   in   the   first   place   the   police   officers   were   in   fact
apprehensive   that   he   would   flee   to   evade   arrest.   This   fact
assumes   prime   importance   because   the  two  filled   sachets   were
allegedly   discovered   by   Esternon   immediately   after   petitioner
returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able
to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial
interlude that he was away.
It   is   also   strange   that,   as   claimed   by   Esternon,   it   was
petitioner himself who handed to him the items to be searched
including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly
fell.   Indeed,   it   is   contrary   to   ordinary   human   behavior   that
petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing
fully  well that  illegal drugs  are concealed  therein.  In the same
breath,   the   manner   by   which   the   search   of   Sheila’s   body   was
brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious
doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the
police   officers   that   he   saw   Sheila   tuck   something   in   her
underwear   certainly   diverted   the   attention   of   the   members   of
petitioner’s household away from the search being conducted by
Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be
omitted,   the Court  likewise  takes   note  of  Esternon’s  suspicious
presence  in the bedroom while Sheila was being  searched  by  a
lady   officer.   The   confluence   of   these   circumstances   by   any
objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecution’s claim
of regularity in the exercise of duty.
Moreover,   Section   2144 of   the   Implementing   Rules   and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post­seizure
_______________
44 Section 21. Custody   and   Disposition   of   Confiscated,
Seized   and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant   Sources   of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—x x x
637
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008
Malillin vs. People
procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too
plain   to   require   a   different   construction,   it   mandates   that   the
officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant
must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the
item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon
deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the
close   of   the  search   of   petitioner’s   house,   he   brought   the  seized
items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of
making   a   “true   inventory”   thereof,   but   there   appears   to   be   no
reason   why   a   true   inventory   could   not   be   made   in   petitioner’s
house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and
mark   the   seized   items   and   there   and   then   prepare   a   seizure
receipt therefor.  Lest it  be  forgotten, the raiding team  has had
enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which
means   that   it   has   had   as   much   time   to   prepare   for   its
implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules
would   appear   to   excuse   non­compliance   therewith,   the   same
cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable
justification for Esternon’s course of action.
Likewise, Esternon’s failure to deliver the seized items to the
court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search
warrant   that   the   items   seized   be   immediately   delivered   to   the
trial   court   with   a   true   and   verified   inventory   of   the  same, 45 as
required by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v.
Go47 characterized   this   requirement   as   mandatory   in   order   to
preclude   the   substitution   of   or   tampering   with   said   items   by
interested  parties.48 Thus,  as a  reasonable  safeguard, People vs.
Del   Castillo49 declared   that   the   approval   by   the   court   which
issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can
retain   the   property   seized   and   without   it,   they   would   have   no
637 authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the
same to another agency.50 Mere tolerance by the trial court of a
contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is
violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby
defeats the very purpose for the enactment.51
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the
standard   and   normal   procedure   in   the   implementation   of   the
warrant and in taking post­seizure custody of the evidence, the
blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of
 Malillin vs. People
police   duty   is   manifestly   misplaced.   The   presumption   of
regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by
contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot
be   regarded   as   binding   truth. 52 Suffice   it   to   say   that   this
presumption   cannot   preponderate   over   the   presumption   of
innocence   that   prevails   if   not   overthrown   by   proof   beyond
reasonable   doubt.53 In   the   present   case   the   lack   of   conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner,
coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same
were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly
militates a finding of guilt.
In   our   constitutional   system,   basic   and   elementary   is   the
presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused
lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own
evidence   and   not   on   the   weakness   of   the   defense.   The   rule   is
invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the
law   presumes   his   innocence   unless   and   until   the   contrary   is
shown.54 In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs   in   the   balance,   acquittal   on   reasonable   doubt   inevitably
becomes a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment
of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch
52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration
thereof,   are   REVERSED   and   SET   ASIDE.   Petitioner   Junie
Malillin   y   Lopez   is   ACQUITTED   on   reasonable   doubt   and   is
accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he
is being lawfully held for another offense.
_______________
52 People   v.   Ambrosio,   G.R.   No.   135378,   14   April   2004,   427
SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
53 People   v.   Ambrosio,   G.R.   No.   135378,   14   April   2004,   427
SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
54 People v. Laxa, id., at p. 627; People v. Diopita, 4 December
2000,   346   SCRA   794; People   v.   Malbog,   12   October   2000,   342
SCRA 620; People v. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94 (1998).
 
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
 
 
 
G.R. No. 179029. August 9, 2010.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs. FELIMON
PAGADUAN y TAMAYO, appellant.
Criminal   Law;   Dangerous   Drugs   Act;   Illegal   Sale   of
Prohibited Drug; Evidence; To remove any doubt or uncertainty on
the   identity   and   integrity   of   the   seized   drug,   evidence   must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under Republic Act
(R.A.)   No.   9165   fails.—In   a   prosecution   for   illegal   sale   of   a
prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer
and   the   seller,   the   object,   and   the   consideration;   and   (2)   the
delivery   of   the   thing   sold   and   the   payment   therefor.   All   these
require   evidence   that   the   sale   transaction   transpired,   coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body
or   substance   of   the   crime   that   establishes   that   a   crime   has
actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the
illegal   transaction.   To  remove   any   doubt   or   uncertainty   on   the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely
show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal
drug   actually   recovered   from   the   appellant;   otherwise,   the
prosecution   for   possession   or   for   drug   pushing   under   R.A.   No.
9165 fails.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Required procedure on the seizure
and   custody   of   drugs   is   embodied   in   Section   21,   paragraph   1,
Article   II   of   Republic   Act   (R.A.)   No.   9165.—The   required
procedure   on   the   seizure   and   custody   of   drugs   is   embodied   in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
309
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201
People vs. Pagaduan
having   initial   custody   and   control   of   the   drugs shall,
immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the   same   in   the   presence   of   the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or   seized,   or   his/her   representative   or   counsel,   a
representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice
(DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be  required   to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   Strict   compliance   with   the
prescribed   procedure   is   required.—Strict   compliance   with   the
prescribed   procedure   is   required   because   of   the   illegal   drug’s
unique   characteristic   rendering   it   indistinct,   not   readily
identifiable,   and   easily   open   to   tampering,   alteration   or
substitution either by accident or otherwise.  The records of the
present   case   are   bereft   of   evidence   showing   that   the   buy­bust
team   followed   the   outlined   procedure   despite   its   mandatory
terms.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedural lapses however must
be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds,
and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must
be  shown to  have  been  preserved.—We  recognize  that the  strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
may   not   always   be   possible   under   field   conditions;   the   police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend
to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated
evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the implementing
rules   provides   that   “non­compliance   with   these   requirements
under   justifiable   grounds,   as   long   as   the   integrity   and   the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
309 such   seizures   of   and   custody   over   said   items[.]”   Thus,
noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165   is   not   necessarily   fatal   to   the   prosecution’s   case;   police
procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have
some   lapses,   as   in   the   present   case. These   lapses,   however,
must   be   recognized   and   explained   in   terms   of   their
justifiable   grounds,   and   the   integrity   and   evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved.
 Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   The   justifiable   ground   for
noncompliance   must   be   proven   as   a   fact.   The   court   cannot
presume   what   these   grounds   are   or   that   they   even   exist.—We
emphasize that for the
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pagaduan
saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution
explain the  reasons behind  the  procedural  lapses,   and that  the
integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved. In
other   words,   the   justifiable   ground   for   noncompliance   must   be
proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds
are or that they even exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Definition
of   Chain   of   Custody.—Section   1(b)   of   Dangerous   Drugs   Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165
defines “Chain of Custody” as follows: “Chain of Custody” means
the   duly   recorded   authorized   movements   and   custody   of   seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or   laboratory   equipment   of   each   stage,   from   the   time   of
seizure/confiscation   to   receipt   in   the   forensic   laboratory   to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of   movements   and   custody   of   seized   item   shall   include   the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody
of   the   seized   item,   the   date   and   time   when   such   transfer   of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   Chain   of  Custody   explained   in
Malillin v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008).—In Malillin v. People,
553   SCRA   619   (2008),   the   Court   explained   that   the   chain   of
custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched it would describe how and from whom it was received,
where   it   was   and   what   happened   to   it   while   in   the   witness’
possession,   the   condition   in   which   it   was   received   and   the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Evidentiary   presumption   that   official
duties have been regularly performed cannot by itself overcome the
constitutional   presumption   of   innocence.—In   sustaining   the
appellant’s   conviction,   the   CA   relied   on   the   evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.
This   presumption,   it   must   be   emphasized,   is   not   conclusive.   It
cannot,   by   itself,   overcome   the   constitutional   presumption   of
innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and   should   make   the   presumption   unavailable.   In   the   present
case, the failure of the apprehending
311
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201 311
People vs. Pagaduan
team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this
Act effectively negates this presumption.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
 
BRION, J.:
 
We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­
G.R. CR­H.C. No. 01597 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the
Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC),   Branch   27,   Bayombong,   Nueva
Vizcaya,   in Criminal   Case  No.   4600,   finding  appellant  Felimon
Pagaduan y Tamayo (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.)   No.   9165   or   the Comprehensive   Dangerous   Drugs   Act   of
2002.
Background Facts
The  prosecution  charged  the  appellant  before  the  RTC  with
violation   of   Section   5,   Article   II   of   R.A.   No.   9165   under   an
Information that states:
“That on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 o’clock (sic)
in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,   the   above­named   accused   did   then   and   there   willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver and give
away 0.01
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a
member   of   this   Court),   and   concurred   in   by   Associate   Justice
Arcangelita   Romilla   Lontok   and   Associate   Justice   Romeo   F.
Barza; Rollo, pp. 2­15.
2 Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales; CA Rollo, pp. 9­15.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pagaduan
gram, more or less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, as contained in a heat­sealed transparent plastic
sachet to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who posed as a buyer of shabu in
the   amount   of   P200.00,   to   the   damage   and   prejudice   of   the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the
merits, thereafter, followed.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts.
After   having   received   information   that   the   appellant   was
selling   illegal   drugs   in   Nueva   Vizcaya,   Captain   Jaime  de   Vera
called,   on   his   cellular   phone,   PO3   Peter   Almarez   and   SPO1
Domingo Balido—who were both in Santiago City—and informed
them of a planned buy­bust operation. They agreed to meet at the
SSS   Building   near   LMN   Hotel   in   Bayombong,   Nueva
Vizcaya.4 On   their   arrival   there,   Captain   de   Vera   conducted   a
briefing   and   designated   PO3   Almarez   as   the poseur buyer.
Thereafter,   Captain   de   Vera   introduced   PO3   Almarez   to   the
police informant (tipster),5and gave him (PO3 Almarez) two P100
bills   (Exhibits   “D”   and   “E”)   which   the   latter   marked   with   his
initials.6
After this briefing, the buy­bust team went to Bintawan Road,
Solano,   Nueva   Vizcaya   to   conduct   the   entrapment
operation.7 PO3 Almarez and the informant rode a tricycle, while
Captain   de   Vera   and   SPO1   Balido   followed   on   board   a   tinted
van.8 The buy­bust team arrived at the target area at
_______________
3 Id., at p. 8.
 4 TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 3­4; TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 3; see also
Joint Affidavit, Records, p. 4.
5 TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 4; Records, p. 4.
6 TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 7, 13­14; TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 11;
Records, p. 4.
7 TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 4.
8 TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 4 and 6.
313
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201 313
People vs. Pagaduan
around 4:30 p.m., and saw the appellant already waiting for the
informant.   The   informant   approached   the   appellant   and
introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a buyer. PO3 Almarez told the
appellant  that  he   needed shabu worth   P200,   and   inquired  from
him (appellant) if he had a “stock.” The appellant replied in the
affirmative, and then handed one heat­sealed transparent plastic
sachet   containing   white   crystalline   substance   to   PO3   Almarez.
PO3 Almarez, in turn, gave the two pre­marked P100 bills to the
appellant.9Immediately   after,   PO3   Almarez   made   the   pre­
arranged   signal   to   his   companions,   who   then   approached   the
appellant.   Captain   de   Vera   took   the   marked   money   from   the
appellant’s right pocket, and then arrested him.10 PO3 Almarez,
for his part, marked the sachet with his initials. 11Thereafter, the
buy­bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station
for investigation.12
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for
laboratory   examination   (Exh.   “C”).13 The   appellant   was
transferred   to   the   Diadi   Municipal   Jail   where   he   was
detained.14 Two   days   later,   or   on   December   29,   2003,   PO3
Almarez   transmitted   the   letter­request,   for   laboratory
examination,   and   the   seized   plastic   sachet   to   the   PNP   Crime
Laboratory,   where   they   were   received   by   PO2   Fernando
Dulnuan.15 Police   Senior   Inspector   (PSI)   Alfredo   Quintero,   the
Forensic   Chemist   of   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory,   conducted   an
examination   on   the   specimen   submitted,   and   found   it   to   be
positive for the presence of shabu (Exh. “B”).16
_______________
9   TSN,   July   5,   2004,   pp.   6­8;   TSN,   July   19,   2004,   pp.   5­6;
Records, p. 4.
10 TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 9; TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 16­17.
11 TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 5.
12 TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 10.
13 Id., at pp. 10­11.
14 Id., at p. 10; TSN, July 19, 2004, p. 11; Records, pp. 23­24.
15 Records, p. 5.
16 TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 22­23; Records, p. 12.
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pagaduan
 
On the hearing of August 13, 2004, the prosecution offered the
following as exhibits:
Exhibit “A”—the shabu confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit “B”—the report by the PNP Crime Laboratory
Exhibit “C”—the request for laboratory examination
Exhibits “D” and “E”—the buy­bust money
Exhibit   “F”—the   request   for   laboratory   examination
received by Forensic Chemist Quintero
 
The   defense   presented   a   different   version   of   the   events,
summarized as follows:
 At around 4:30 p.m. of December 27, 2003, Jojo Jose came to
the appellant’s house and informed him that Captain de Vera was
inviting him to be an “asset.” The appellant and Jojo boarded a
tricycle   and   proceeded   to   the   SSS   Building   where   Captain   de
Vera   was   waiting   for   them. 17 As   the   tricycle   approached   the
Methodist   Church   along   Bintawan   Road,   Jojo   dropped   his
slippers and ordered the driver to stop. Immediately after, a van
stopped in front of the tricycle; Captain de Vera alighted from the
van and handcuffed the appellant. Captain de Vera brought the
appellant   inside   the   van,   frisked   him,   and   took   P200   from   his
pocket.18 Afterwards, Captain de Vera took the appellant to the
SSS   Building,   where   he   (Captain   de   Vera)   and   the   building
manager   drank   coffee.   Captain   de   Vera   then   brought   the
appellant to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained for
almost two days.19
On   the   morning   of   December   29,   2003,   the   appellant   was
transferred to the Provincial Jail. He signed a document without
the assistance of a lawyer after being told that it would result in
his immediate release.20
_______________
17 TSN, September 13, 2004, pp. 5­6.
18 Id., at pp. 7­8.
19 Id., at pp. 8­9.
20 Id., at p. 10.
315
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201
People vs. Pagaduan
The RTC,   in its  decision21 of August  16,  2005,  convicted  the
appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty   of   life   imprisonment.   The   RTC   likewise   ordered   the
appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA­G.R. CR­
H.C.   No.   01597.   The   CA,   in   its   decision 22 dated   May   22,   2007,
affirmed the RTC decision.
The   CA   found   unmeritorious   the   appellant’s   defense   of
instigation,   and   held  that  the  appellant  was   apprehended   as  a
result of a legitimate entrapment operation. It explained that in
inducement or instigation, an innocent person is lured by a public
officer or private detective to commit a crime. In the case at bar,
the   buy­bust   operation   was   planned   only   after   the   police   had
received information that the appellant was selling shabu.
The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a
prior   surveillance   on   the   appellant   was   not   fatal   to   the
prosecution’s case. It reasoned out that the police are given wide
discretion to select effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A
prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary, especially when the
police are already accompanied by their informant.
The   CA   further   ruled   that   the   prosecution   was   able   to
sufficiently prove an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It
explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the plastic sachet seized from
the appellant, marked it with his initials, and transmitted it to
the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory   for   examination.   PSI   Quintero
conducted   a   qualitative   examination   and   found   the   specimen
positive   for   the   presence   of shabu.   According   to   the   CA,   the
prosecution was able to prove that the substance seized was the
same   specimen   submitted   to   the   laboratory   and   presented   in
315 court, notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to the
crime laboratory only after two days.
_______________
 21 Supra note 2.
22 Supra note 1.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pagaduan
 
In his brief,23 the appellant claims that the lower courts erred
in convicting him of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He harps on
the fact that the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him
before conducting the buy­bust operation.
The appellant further contends that the prosecution failed to
show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized
drug.   He  claims  that  there   was   no  evidence  to  show   when  the
markings were done. Moreover, a period of two days had elapsed
from   the   time   the shabuwas   confiscated   to   the   time   it   was
forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the
argument that the chain of custody of the shabu was sufficiently
established. It explained that the shabu was turned over by the
police officers to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where it was found
by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The OSG likewise claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by
the police. The OSG further added that a prior surveillance is not
indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale of drugs.24
 
The Court’s Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for
the   prosecution’s   failure   to   prove   his   guilt   beyond   reasonable
doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police
complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.
_______________
23 CA Rollo, pp. 30­44.
24 Id., at pp. 57­70.
317
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201 317
People vs. Pagaduan
The   Comprehensive   Dangerous   Drugs
Act: A Brief Background
 
R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the State’s policy
to “safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well­being of its
citizenry   particularly   the   youth,   from   the   harmful   effects   of
dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well­being, and to
defend  the  same against acts  or  omissions  detrimental   to  their
development and preservation.”
R.A. No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known
as  the  Dangerous  Drugs  Act  of 1972.  Realizing  that  dangerous
drugs   are   one   of   the   most   serious   social   ills   of   the   society   at
present, Congress saw the need to further enhance the efficacy of
the law against dangerous drugs. The new law thus mandates the
government   to   pursue   an   intensive   and   unrelenting   campaign
against   the   trafficking   and   use   of   dangerous   drugs   and   other
similar   substances   through   an   integrated   system   of   planning,
implementation   and   enforcement   of   anti­drug   abuse   policies,
programs and projects.25
 
Illegal   Sale   of   Drugs   under   Section   5
vis­à­vis   the   Inventory   and   Photograph
Requirement under Section 21
 
In   a   prosecution   for   illegal   sale   of   a   prohibited   drug   under
Section   5   of   R.A.   No.   9165,   the   prosecution   must   prove   the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus   delicti,   i.e.,   the   body   or   substance   of   the   crime   that
establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown
by presenting the object of the
_______________
25 Integrity of Evidence in Dangerous Drugs Cases by Justice
(ret.) Josue N. Bellosillo, 596 SCRA 278 (2009).
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pagaduan
illegal transaction.26 To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely
show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal
drug   actually   recovered   from   the   appellant;   otherwise,   the
prosecution   for   possession   or   for   drug   pushing   under   R.A.   No.
9165 fails.27
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is
embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the   drugs shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically   inventory and photograph the   same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
This   is   implemented   by   Section   21(a),   Article   II   of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which
reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control   of   the   drugs shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically   inventory and photograph the   same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided,   that   the   physical   inventory   and   photograph
shall   be   conducted   at   the   place   where   the   search   warrant   is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided,
_______________
26 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580
SCRA 259, 266.
27 See People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009,
596 SCRA 257, 267.
319
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201
People vs. Pagaduan
further,   that   non­compliance   with   these   requirements   under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value   of   the   seized   items   are   properly   preserved   by   the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]
Strict   compliance   with   the   prescribed   procedure   is   required
because   of   the   illegal   drug’s   unique   characteristic   rendering   it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering,
alteration  or   substitution  either  by   accident   or  otherwise. 28 The
records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the
buy­bust   team   followed   the   outlined   procedure   despite   its
mandatory   terms.   The   deficiency   is   patent   from   the   following
exchanges at the trial:
PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:
Q: After you handed this buy­bust money to the accused, what
happened next?
[PO3 ALMAREZ:]
A: When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the
money[,]  I  signaled   the  two,   Captain  Jaime  de  Vera   and
SPO1 Balido, sir.
x x x x
Q: After you gave that signal, what happened?
A: Then   they   approached   us   and   helped   me   in   arresting
Felimon Pagaduan, sir.
Q: After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?
A: After   arresting   Pagaduan[,]   we   brought   him   directly   in
Diadi Police Station, sir.
Q: What happened when you brought the accused to the Police
Station in Diadi?
A: When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put
319 him in jail in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya,
sir.
_______________
28 People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610
SCRA 295.
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pagaduan
Q: What did you do with the shabu?
A: The request for laboratory examination was prepared
and was brought to the Crime Lab. of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, sir.
x x x x
Q: After making the request, what did you do next[,] if
any[,] Mr. Witness?
A:  After submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,]
we prepared our joint affidavit for submission of the
case to the Court, sir.29
From the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that
the   apprehending   team,   upon   confiscation   of   the   drug,
immediately   brought  the  appellant  and  the  seized  items  to  the
police station, and, once there, made the request for laboratory
examination. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items were taken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a
representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice,
and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on cross­examination, was
unsure   and   could   not   give   a   categorical   answer   when   asked
whether   he   issued   a   receipt   for   the shabu confiscated   from   the
appellant.30 At any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory
appears in the records.
In   several   cases,   we   have   emphasized   the   importance   of
compliance   with   the   prescribed   procedure   in   the   custody   and
disposition of the seized drugs. We have repeatedly declared that
the deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises
the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales,31 we acquitted
the accused for failure of the buy­bust team to photograph and
inventory the seized items, without giving any justifiable ground
for   the   non­observance   of   the   required   procedures. People   v.
Garcia32likewise resulted in an acquit­
_______________
29 TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 9­13.
30 TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 17­18.
31 G.R. No. 172873, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 223.
32 Supra note 26.
321
VOL. 627, AUGUST 9, 201
People vs. Pagaduan
tal   because   no   physical   inventory   was   ever   made,   and   no
photograph   of   the   seized   items   was   taken   under   the
circumstances   required   by   R.A.   No.   9165   and  its   implementing
rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,33 we also acquitted the accused for
the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph
the seized items, without justifiable grounds.
We   had   the   same   rulings   in People   v.   Gutierrez,34 People   v.
Denoman,35 People   v.   Partoza,36 People   v.   Robles,37 and People   v.
dela  Cruz,38 where  we  emphasized   the  importance   of  complying
with the required mandatory procedures under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under
field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and
cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in
the   handling   of   confiscated   evidence.   For   this   reason,   the   last
sentence of the implementing rules provides that “non­compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items   are
properly   preserved   by   the   apprehending   officer/team,   shall   not
render  void  and  invalid  such   seizures  of  and  custody   over  said
items[.]” Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s
case;   police   procedures   in   the   handling   of   confiscated   evidence
may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses,
however,   must   be   recognized   and   explained   in   terms   of
their   justifiable   grounds,   and   the   integrity   and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to
have been preserved.39
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any
321 explanation   to   justify   the   failure   of   the   police   to   conduct   the
required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs.
The   apprehending   team   failed   to   show   why   an   inventory   and
photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place   of   seizure   and   arrest   or   at   the   nearest   police   station   (as
required   by   the   Implementing   Rules   in   case   of   warrantless
arrests). We emphasize that for the saving clause to apply,
it   is   important   that   the   prosecution   explain   the   reasons
behind   the  procedural  lapses,   and that   the  integrity  and
value of the seized evidence had been preserved. 40 In other
words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be
proven   as   a   fact.   The   court   cannot   presume   what   these
grounds are or that they even exist.41

The “Chain of Custody” Requirement
 
Proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   demands   that   unwavering
exactitude   be   observed   in   establishing   the corpus   delicti—the
body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus,
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy­
bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.42
 
Black’s Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
“In   evidence,   the   one   who   offers   real   evidence,   such   as   the
narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the custody of
the   evidence   from   the  moment   in  which   it  reaches   his   custody
until   the   moment   in   which   it   is   offered   in   evidence,   and   such
evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V.
White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.”
 
Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No.   1,   Series  of   2002   which   implements   R.A.   No.   9165   defines
“chain of custody” as follows:
“Chain   of   Custody”   means   the   duly   recorded   authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage,   from   the   time   of   seizure/confiscation   to   receipt   in   the
forensic   laboratory   to   safekeeping   to   presentation   in   court   for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature   of the person who held
temporary   custody   of   the   seized   item,   the   date   and  time   when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]”
In Malillin v. People,43 the Court explained that the chain of
custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched it would describe how and from whom it was received,
where   it   was   and   what   happened   to   it   while   in   the   witness’
possession,   the   condition   in   which   it   was   received   and   the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
In   the   present   case,   the   prosecution’s   evidence   failed   to
establish   the   chain   that   would   have   shown   that   the shabupre­
sented   in   court   was   the   very   same   specimen   seized   from   the
appellant.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of
the heat­sealed plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez
mentioned on cross­examination that he placed his initials on the
confiscated   sachet   “after   apprehending”   the   appellant.   Notably,
this   testimony   constituted   the   totality   of   the   prosecution’s
evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarez’s
testimony, however, lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet
and who witnessed the marking. In People v. Sanchez, we ruled
that the “marking” of the seized items—to truly ensure that they
are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the
ones offered in evidence—should be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. In
the present case, nothing in the records gives us an insight on the
manner   and   circumstances   that   attended   the   marking   of   the
confiscated  sachet.  Whether  the marking  had  been  done in the
presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that
merely mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the
appellant’s apprehension.
 The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the
apprehending team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified
that the appellant was brought to the Diadi Police Station after
his   arrest.   However,   he   failed   to   identify   the   person   who   had
control   and   possession   of   the   seized   drug   at   the   time   of   its
transportation   to   the   police   station.   In   the   absence   of   clear
evidence,   we   cannot   presume   that   PO3   Almarez,   as
the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet—to the exclusion of
others—during   its   transfer   from   the   place   of   arrest   and
confiscation to the police station. The prosecution likewise failed
to  present   evidence  pertaining   to  the  identity   of  the  duty   desk
officer who received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the
buy­bust   team.   This   is   particularly   significant   since   the   seized
specimen   was   turned   over   to   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory only
after  two  days.   It  was   not,   therefore,   clear  who  had  temporary
custody   of   the   seized   itemsduring   this   significant   intervening
period  of  time.   Although  the  records  show   that the  request  for
laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared
by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he was the
official who received the marked plastic sachet from the buy­bust
team.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records
show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to
the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was
received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero.
However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized
illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified.
As   earlier   discussed,   the   identity   of   the   duty   desk   officer   who
received   the shabu,   as   well   as   the   person   who   had   temporary
custody of the seized items for two days, had not been established.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps
in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the
drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs
that   were   brought   to   the   crime   laboratory   for   chemical
analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the
absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold,
the   body   of   the   crime—the corpus   delicti—has   not   been
adequately proven.44 In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove
the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt on
the appellant’s criminal liability.
 
Presumption   of   Regularity   in   the
Performance of Official Duties
 
In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the
evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed. This presumption, it must be empha­
_______________
sized,   is   not   conclusive.45 It   cannot,   by   itself,   overcome   the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. In the present case, the failure of the apprehending
team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act
effectively negates this presumption. As we explained in Malillin
v. People:46
“The   presumption   of   regularity   is   merely   just   that—a   mere
presumption   disputable   by   contrary   proof   and   which   when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof   beyond   reasonable  doubt.   In   the   present   case   the   lack   of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which
the same were placed under police custody before offered in court,
strongly militates a finding of guilt.”
We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our
society;   they   are   lingering   maladies   that   destroy   families   and
relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the
agencies   concerned   in   pursuing   an   intensive   and   unrelenting
campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much
we want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection
provided by the Constitution, most particularly the presumption
of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt,   or   that   quantum   of   proof   sufficient   to   produce   moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those
who   act   in   judgment,   is   indispensable   to   overcome   this
constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in
the  first place,  all the  elements of  the crime charged, which in
this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less
than an acquittal.
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   we   hereby   REVERSE
and   SET   ASIDE   the   May   22,   2007   Decision   of   the   Court   of
Appeals   in   CA­G.R.   CR­H.C.   No.   01597.   Appellant   Felimon
Pagaduan y Tamayo   is   hereby   ACQUITTED   for   failure   of   the
prosecution   to   prove   his   guilt   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   He   is
ordered   immediately   RELEASED   from   detention   unless   he   is
confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau
of  Corrections,  Muntinlupa  City  for  immediate  implementation.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio­Morales   (Chairperson),   Bersamin,
Abad  and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
**
Judgment reversed and set aside, appellant FelimonPagaduan
y Tamayo acquitted. 
Note.—The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official   duty   cannot   by   itself   overcome   the   presumption   of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People
vs. Agulay, 566 SCRA 571 [2008])
 
——o0o——
G.R. No. 180284. September 11, 2013.*
NARCISO   SALAS,   petitioner, vs.   ANNABELLE   MATUSALEM,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; In personal actions,
the Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of
them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found.―It is a legal truism that the rules on the
venue   of   personal   actions   are   fixed   for   the   convenience   of   the
plaintiffs   and   their   witnesses.   Equally   settled,   however,   is   the
principle   that   choosing   the   venue   of   an   action   is   not   left   to   a
plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can
file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or
(2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the
place where the action has been instituted at the time the action
is commenced.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court before the 1997
amendments,   an   objection   to   an   improper   venue   must   be   made
before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed
waived.―Petitioner   raised   the   issue   of   improper   venue   for   the
first   time   in   the   Answer   itself   and   no   prior   motion   to   dismiss
based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before
the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be
made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be
deemed   waived.   Not   having   been   timely   raised,   petitioner’s
objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
Same;   Same;   Motion   for   Postponement;   A   motion   for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request
addressed   to   the   sound   discretion   of   the   court.―A   motion   for
continuance   or   postponement   is   not   a   matter   of   right,   but   a
request   addressed   to   the   sound   discretion   of   the   court.   Parties
asking for postponement have
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
561
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
Salas vs. Matusalem
absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be
granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.
Indeed,   an order declaring  a party  to  have  waived  the right  to
present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial
court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.
Due Process; Where a party was afforded an opportunity to
participate   in   the   proceedings   but   failed   to   do   so,   he   cannot
complain   of   deprivation   of   due   process.―With   our   finding   that
there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the
motion for postponement filed by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s
contention that he was deprived of his day in court must likewise
fail.   The   essence   of   due   process   is   that   a   party   is   given   a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one’s defense. Where a party was afforded
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do
so,   he   cannot   complain   of   deprivation   of   due   process.   If   the
opportunity   is   not   availed   of,   it   is   deemed   waived   or   forfeited
without violating the constitutional guarantee.
Civil   Law;   Persons   and   Family   Relations;   Filiation;
Illegitimate Children; Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way   and   on   the   same   evidence   as   legitimate   children.―Under
Article   175   of   the Family   Code   of   the   Philippines,   illegitimate
filiation  may  be  established  in the  same  way  and  on  the  same
evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of
the   Philippines states:   The   filiation   of   legitimate   children   is
established   by   any   of   the   following:   (1)   The   record   of   birth
56 appearing   in   the   civil   register   or   a   final   judgment;   or   (2)
An admission   of   legitimate   filiation in   a   public   document   or
a private   handwritten   instrument   and   signed   by   the   parent
concerned.   In   the   absence   of   the   foregoing   evidence,   the
legitimate   filiation   shall   be   proved   by:   (1)   The open   and
continuous  possession  of the  status  of a legitimate  child; or  (2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 Same;   Same;   Paternity;   Evidence;   Birth   Certificates;   A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that   the   putative   father   had   a   hand   in   the   preparation   of   the
certificate.―We   have   held   that   a   certificate   of   live   birth
purportedly identifying the
562
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
62
Salas vs. Matusalem
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in
the   birth   certificate,   the   placing   of   his   name   by   the   mother,
doctor,   registrar,   or   other   person   is   incompetent   evidence   of
paternity.   Neither   can   such   birth   certificate   be   taken   as   a
recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value
to establish filiation to the alleged father.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   Baptismal   Certificates;   While
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments
on   the   dates   so   specified.   They   are   not   necessarily   competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s
paternity.―As   to   the   Baptismal   Certificate   (Exhibit   “B”)   of
Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we
have ruled   that  while  baptismal   certificates  may   be  considered
public   documents,   they   can   only   serve   as   evidence   of   the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They
are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
Same;   Same;   Evidence;   Pictures;   Pictures   taken   of   the
mother   and   her   child   together   with   the   alleged   father   are
inconclusive   evidence   to   prove   paternity.―Pictures   taken   of   the
mother   and   her   child   together   with   the   alleged   father   are
inconclusive   evidence   to   prove   paternity.   Exhibits   “E”   and   “F”
showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment
unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account
(Exhibit “C”) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent   herself   was   indicated   as   the   payee   is   likewise
incompetent   to   prove   that   petitioner   is   the   father   of   her   child
notwithstanding   petitioner’s   admission   in   his   answer   that   he
shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as
an act of charity.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Handwritten   Notes;   As   to   the
handwritten   notes   of   petitioner   and   respondent   showing   their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these are not
sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as
they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child.―As to
the handwritten notes (Exhibits “D” to “D­13”) of petitioner and
respondent   showing   their   exchange   of   affectionate   words   and
romantic trysts, these, too, are not suffi­
563
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 56
3
Salas vs. Matusalem
cient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as
they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus,
even   if   these   notes   were   authentic,   they   do   not   qualify   under
Article   172   (2)   vis­à­vis   Article   175   of   the   Family   Code   which
admits   as   competent   evidence   of   illegitimate   filiation   an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent concerned.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Filiation;   Illegitimate   Children;   An
illegitimate   child   is   now   also   allowed   to   establish   his   claimed
filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a   family   Bible   in   which   his   name   has   been   entered,   common
reputation   respecting   his   pedigree,   admission   by   silence,   the
testimonies   of   witnesses,   and   other   kinds   of   proof   admissible
under  Rule   130   of  the  Rules  of   Court.―An   illegitimate  child   is
now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his   name   has   been   entered,   common   reputation   respecting   his
pedigree,  admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other  kinds of proof admissible  under  Rule 130  of the  Rules  of
Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s
evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of
Christian Paulo. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to
the   circumstances   of   the   birth   of   Christian   Paulo,   petitioner’s
financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment
and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete
with   details,   do   not   approximate   the   “overwhelming   evidence,
documentary and testimonial” presented in Ilano.
Same; Same; Same; Paternity; The Supreme Court has ruled
that a  high  standard  of  proof  is required to  establish paternity
and filiation.―Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.
An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.564
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
64
Salas vs. Matusalem
Same;   Same;   Support;   Illegitimate   Children;   The   death   of
the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during
his   lifetime   by   one   claiming   to   be   his   illegitimate   child.―The
action   for   support   having   been   filed   in   the   trial   court   when
petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) of
the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative
father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by
one claiming to be his illegitimate child. The rule on substitution
of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus applies. SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.
—Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the   court   within   thirty   (30)   days   after   such   death   of   the   fact
thereof,   and   to   give   the   name   and   address   of   his   legal
representative   or   representatives.   Failure   of   counsel   to   comply
with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs
of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without   requiring   the   appointment   of   an   executor   or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the   minor   heirs.   The   court   shall   forthwith   order   said   legal
representative   or   representatives   to   appear   and   be   substituted
within   a   period   of   thirty   (30)   days   from   notice.   If   no   legal
representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or
if   the   one   so   named   shall   fail   to   appear   within   the   specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified
time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the  estate  of the  deceased  and  the  latter  shall  immediately
appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring  such appointment, if defrayed by  the opposing party,
may be recovered as costs.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Jennifer Patacsil­Arceo for petitioner.
  Oscar C. Sahagun for respondent.
565
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 565
Salas vs. Matusalem
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before   the   Court   is   a   petition   for   review   on certiorariwhich
seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated July 18, 2006
and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA­G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a
complaint3 for   Support/Damages   against   Narciso   Salas
(petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City
(Civil Case No. 2124­AF).
Respondent   claimed   that   petitioner   is   the  father   of   her   son
Christian   Paulo   Salas   who   was   born   on   December   28,   1994.
Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she
was   then   only   24   years   old,   making   her   believe   that   he   is   a
widower.   Petitioner   rented   an   apartment   where   respondent
stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child,
including   the   cost   of   caesarian   operation   and   hospital
confinement.   However,   when   respondent   refused   the   offer   of
petitioner’s   family   to   take   the   child   from   her,   petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of
relatives   and   friends.   Respondent   further   alleged   that   she
attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly
support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 75­84. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M.
Romilla­Lontok   with  Associate   Justices   Roberto  A.   Barrios   and
Mario L. Guariña III, concurring.
2 Id.,   at   p.   93.   Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Arcangelita   M.
Romilla­Lontok with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and
Lucenito N. Tagle.
3 Records, pp. 1­6.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
Petitioner   filed   his   answer4 with   special   and   affirmative
defenses and counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman
of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock
when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the
country,   respondent   spent   time   riding   on   petitioner’s   jeepney
which   was   then   being   utilized   by   a   female   real   estate   agent
named Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior
police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against
said   police   officer   was   later   withdrawn   in   exchange   for   the
quashing of drug charges against respondent’s brother­in­law who
was   then   detained   at   the   municipal   jail.   It   was   at   that   time
respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for
charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied
paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no
other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder
the   expenses   for   the   delivery   of   said   child,   unaware   of
respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in
exchange for financial favor.
At   the   trial,   respondent   and   her   witness   Grace   Murillo
testified.   Petitioner   was   declared   to   have   waived   his   right   to
present   evidence   and   the   case   was   considered   submitted   for
decision based on respondent’s evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house
of   his   “kumadre”   Felicisima   de   Guzman   at   Bgy.   Malapit,   San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner
told her he is already a widower and he has no more companion in
life because his children are all grown­up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing
subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family­owned Ma.
Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is
a   single  mother   as  she  had  a  child   by   her   former  boyfriend   in
Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take
care
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 24­26.
567
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
Salas vs. Matusalem
of   her   and   marry   her.   She   believed   him   and   yielded   to   his
advances,   with  the  thought  that  she   and  her  child  will   have  a
better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner
gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with
petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact
not   a   widower.   She   wanted   to   abort   the   baby   but   petitioner
opposed it because he wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an
apartment where she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided
for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December
28,   1994   at  the   Good   Samaritan  Hospital   in   Cabanatuan   City.
Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room
and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his
wife. She filled out the form for the child’s birth certificate and
wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was
also   petitioner   who   paid   the   hospital   bills   and   drove   her   baby
home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced
age   who   is   his   “look­alike,”   and   this   was   witnessed   by   other
boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s
birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check­up. He
confessed   to   her   daughter   and   eventually   his   wife   was   also
informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family
then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so
she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped
seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived
through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to
commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital
by   Murillo   who   paid   the   bill.   Murillo   sought   the   help   of   the
Cabanatuan   City   Police   Station   which   set   their   meeting   with
petitioner. However, it was only peti­
567
_______________
5 TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 21; TSN, November 17, 1995, pp. 4­
7, 13; TSN, March 22, 1996, pp. 14­25; TSN, June 3, 1996, pp. 19­
29, 33­37.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
tioner’s   wife   who   showed   up   and   she   was   very   mad,   uttering
unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo   corroborated   respondent’s   testimony   as   to   the
payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to
respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and
after   delivery   of   respondent’s   baby,   respondent’s   attempted
suicide   through   sleeping   pills   overdose   and   hospitalization   for
which   she   paid   the   bill,   her   complaint   before   the   police
authorities   and   meeting   with   petitioner’s   wife   at   the
headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor
of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   judgment   is
hereby  rendered in favor  of the  plaintiff  and  against  the
defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support
of   TWO   THOUSAND   (P2,000.00)   PESOS   for   the   child
Christian Paulo through the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court
decided   the   case   without   affording   him   the   right   to   introduce
evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 8­21; id., at pp. 10­12; id., at pp. 7­11; id., at pp. 9­
10, 14­18, 43­46; TSN, February 19, 1996, pp. 6, 10­12.
7 TSN, July 8, 1996, pp. 5­11; TSN, November 29, 1996, pp. 4­
9, 15­26.
8 Rollo, pp. 65­73. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Johnson
L. Ballutay.
9 Id., at pp. 72­73.
569
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
Salas vs. Matusalem
in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo
and ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s
appeal. The appellate court found no reason to disturb the trial
court’s   exercise   of   discretion   in   denying   petitioner’s   motion   for
postponement  on  April   17,   1998,   the  scheduled   hearing   for  the
initial   presentation  of  defendant’s  evidence,   and  the  motion  for
reconsideration   of   the   said   order   denying   the   motion   for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling
that respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation
of   her   son   Christian   Paulo,   and   consequently   no   error   was
committed by the trial court in granting respondent’s prayer for
support. The appellate court thus held:
Christian   Paulo,   in   instant   case,   does   not   enjoy   the
benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry which bears
acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim
open   and   continuous   possession   of   the   status   of   an
illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however,
that   during   her   pregnancy,   Annabelle   was   provided   by
Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00
which he paid  for (TSN,  October  6,  1995,  p.  18).  Narciso
provided   her   with   a   household   help   with   a   salary   of
P1,500.00  a  month  (TSN,  October  6,  1995,   ibid).   He also
provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid,
p.  18).  Narciso was with Annabelle at  the  hospital  while
the   latter   was   in   labor,   “walking”   her   around   and
massaging   her   belly   (Ibid,   p.   11).   Narciso   brought   home
569 Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelle’s
discharge   from   the   hospital.   People   living   in   the   same
apartment   units   were   witnesses   to   Narciso’s   delight   to
 father a son at his age which was his “look alike”. It was
only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him
Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him
and his mother.570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
Said   testimony   of   Annabelle   aside   from   having   been
corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
which   Narciso   rented,   was   never   rebutted   on   record.
Narciso   did   not   present   any   evidence,   verbal   or
documentary, to repudiate plaintiff’s evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez
vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it clear
that   Article   172   of   the   Family   Code   is   an   adaptation   of
Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides
that   the   father   is   obliged   to   recognize   the   child   as   his
natural child x x “3) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father”.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258­259), it was
held that—
“The   last   paragraph   of   Article   283   contains   a
blanket provision that practically covers all the other
cases   in   the   preceding   paragraphs.   ‘Any   other
evidence or proof’ that the defendant is the father is
broad   enough   to   render   unnecessary   the   other
paragraphs   of   this   article.   When   the   evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is
not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first
three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the
last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation   evidence,   as   provided   in   the   Rules   of
Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.”
As   a   necessary   consequence   of   the   finding   that
Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso Salas, he is
entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
It “shall be demandable from the time the person who
has the right to recover the same needs it for maintenance
x x.” (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 82­83.
571
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 571
Salas vs. Matusalem
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:
1. THE   VENUE   OF   THE   CASE   WAS   IMPROPERLY   LAID
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN
CITY   CONSIDERING   THAT   BOTH   PETITIONER   AND
RESPONDENT   ARE   ACTUAL   RESIDENTS   OF   BRGY.
MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE   HONORABLE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERRED   IN
PRONOUNCING   THAT   PETITIONER   WAS   AFFORDED   THE
FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND   IN   UPHOLDING   THAT   THE   TRIAL   COURT   DID   NOT
GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR   EXCESS   OF   JURISDICTION   WHEN   IT   DECIDED   THE
INSTANT   CASE   WITHOUT   AFFORDING   PETITIONER   THE
RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.
3. THE   HONORABLE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERRED   IN
HOLDING   THAT   THE   FILIATION   OF   CHRISTIAN   PAULO
WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN
RELATION   TO   ARTICLE   172   OF   THE   FAMILY   CODE   AND
EXISTING   JURISPRUDENCE   AND   THEREFORE   ENTITLED
TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It  is a  legal  truism that the rules on the venue  of  personal
actions are  fixed  for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their
witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing
the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter
is regulated by the Rules of Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 180­181.
12 Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA
699, 705, citing Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar
Elevators,   Phils.,   Inc.,   510   Phil.   467,   476;   473   SCRA   705,   714
(2005).
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them
resides,   or   (2)   where   the   defendant   or   any   of   the   defendants
resides or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the
time the action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the
first   time   in   the   Answer   itself   and   no   prior   motion   to   dismiss
based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before
the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be
made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be
deemed   waived.15 Not   having   been   timely   raised,   petitioner’s
objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his
counsel   for   the   resetting   of   the   initial   presentation   of   defense
evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time
petitioner’s   motion   for   postponement   was   denied   by   the   trial
court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony
of respondent’s last witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court
as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for
the   reception   of   evidence   for   the   defendant   (petitioner)   on
January   27,   February   3,   and   February   10,   1997.   In   the   Order
dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with
his   evidence   at   those   hearing   dates   earlier   scheduled.   At   the
hearing  on  January   27,   1997,   petitioner’s  former  counsel,  Atty.
Rolando S. Bala, requested for the can­
_______________
13 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Section 2.
14 Ang v. Ang, supra note 12, at pp. 705­706, citing Baritua v.
Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 12, 15­16; 267 SCRA 331, 335 (1997).
15 Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, 374 Phil. 668,
677; 316 SCRA 326, 334 (1999), citing Rule 14, Section 4 of the
pre­1997   Rules   of   Court   which   provides   that   “[w]hen   improper
venue   is   not   objected   to   in   a   motion   to   dismiss,   it   is   deemed
waived.” The Complaint in this case was filed on May 26, 1995
and the Answer was filed on July 3, 1995.
573
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 573
Salas vs. Matusalem
cellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give
him time to prepare for his defense, which request was granted by
the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14
and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty.
Bala   and   without   objection   from   respondent’s   counsel,   Atty.
Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March
14 and 17, 1997. With the nonappearance of both petitioner and
Atty.   Bala   on   March   14,   1997,   the   trial   court   upon   oral
manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver
of their right to present evidence and accordingly deemed the case
submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner
and   Atty.   Rafael   E.   Villarosa   filed   his   appearance   as   his   new
counsel   on   July   21,   1997.   On   the   same   date   he   filed   entry   of
appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of
the   March   14,   1997   Order   pleading   for   liberality   and
magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation
for Atty.  Bala’s  failure  to  appear  for  the  initial  presentation  of
their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its March
14,   1997  Order,   finding  it  better  to  give  petitioner  a   chance  to
present his evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received
a   notice   of   hearing   for   the   presentation   of   their   evidence
scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial
court   received   his   motion   requesting   that   the   said   hearing   be
reset to October 10, 1997 for the reason that he had requested the
postponement of a hearing in another case which was incidentally
scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the
trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997. On said date,
however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On
February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April
17,   1998  since  it  was  unclear  whether  Atty.   Wycoco  received  a
copy of the motion.17
_______________
16 Records, pp. 81­83, 109, 111 and 113.
17 Id., at pp. 115­126, 128 and 130.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear
but the trial court received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to
cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the
latter   was   the   scheduled   hearing   on   the   issuance   of   writ   of
preliminary   injunction  in  another  case  under  the  April  8,  1998
Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in
Civil Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was
the   plaintiffs   therein   who   requested   the   postponement   of   the
hearing   and   it   behoved   Atty.   Villarosa   to   inform   the   RTC   of
Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that the
April   17,  1998   hearing  was scheduled  as  early   as February  16,
1998.   Acting   on   the   motion   for   postponement,   the   trial   court
denied for the second  time petitioner’s motion for postponement.
Even   at   the   hearing   of   their   motion   for   reconsideration   of   the
April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed
to appear and instead filed another motion for postponement. The
trial court thus ordered that the case be submitted for decision
stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner
and  his   counsel   have  been  given  opportunities  to  present  their
evidence. It likewise denied a second motion for reconsideration
filed   by   Atty.   Villarosa,   who   arrived   late   during   the   hearing
thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Parties   asking   for   postponement   have   absolutely   no   right   to
assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be
prepared on the day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 131­138, 140 and 142­146.
19 Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 454; 398 SCRA 323, 341
(2003), citing Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 558, 571; 304
SCRA 216, 229 (1999); Pepsi­Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 359 Phil. 859, 867; 299 SCRA 518, 525 (1998); Republic
of   the   Philippines   v.   Sandiganbayan,   361   Phil.   186,   196;   301
SCRA 237, 246 (1999) and Iriga Telephone Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 350
Phil. 245, 252; 286 SCRA 600, 606 (1998).
575
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 575
Salas vs. Matusalem
order   declaring   a   party   to   have   waived   the   right   to   present
evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court’s
duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20
Atty.   Villarosa’s  plea   for  liberality   was  correctly   rejected  by
the trial court in view of his own negligence in failing to ensure
there   will   be   no   conflict   in   his   trial   schedules.   As   we   held
in Tiomico v. Court of Appeals:21
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon
by   Courts   if   there   is   evidence   of   bad   faith,   malice   or
inexcusable   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   movant.   The
inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take note
of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court
of   any   conflict   in   his   schedules   of   trial   or   court
appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should
be  borne  in  mind  that  a  client  is  bound   by   his  counsel’s
conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the
trial   court’s   denial   of   the   motion   for   postponement   filed   by
petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived
of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence of due process
is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation
of due process. If the opportunity is
_______________
20 Memita   v.   Masongsong,   G.R.   No.   150912,   May   28,   2007,
523   SCRA   244,   254,   citing Rockwell   Perfecto   Gohu   v.   Spouses
Gohu, 397 Phil. 126, 135; 343 SCRA 114, 122 (2000).
21 Supra note 19.
22 Id., at p. 572, citing Cing Hong So v. Tan Boon Kong, 53
Phil. 437 (1929) and Suarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91133,
March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 274, 279.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating
the constitutional guarantee.23
We  now proceed to the  main issue  of whether the trial and
appellate   courts   erred   in   ruling   that   respondent’s   evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate
child of petitioner.
Under   Article   175   of   the Family   Code   of   the   Philippines,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2)    An admission   of   legitimate   filiation in   a   public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent   presented   the  Certificate  of   Live  Birth 24(Exhibit
“A­1”) of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner
appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly,
it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the
said document though she claims it
_______________
23 Memita v. Masongsong, supra note 20, at p. 253, citing Air
Phils.   Corp.   v.   International   Business   Aviation   Services   Phils.,
Inc., 481 Phil. 366, 386; 438 SCRA 51, 66­67 (2004) and Tiomico
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at pp. 570­571; p. 228.
24 Records, p. 88.
577
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 577
Salas vs. Matusalem
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein. 
We   have   held   that   a   certificate   of   live   birth   purportedly
identifying   the   putative   father   is   not   competent   evidence   of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did
not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence
of   paternity.26 Neither   can   such   birth   certificate   be   taken   as   a
recognition in a public instrument 27 and it has no probative value
to establish filiation to the alleged father. 28
As   to   the   Baptismal   Certificate29 (Exhibit   “B”)   of   Christian
Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled
that   while   baptismal   certificates   may   be   considered   public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration
of   the   sacraments   on   the   dates   so   specified.   They   are   not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein
with respect to the child’s paternity.30
_______________
25 Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 42, 51; 441 SCRA
96, 103 (2004).
26 Berciles, et al. v. GSIS, et al., 213 Phil. 48, 71; 128 SCRA
53, 77 (1984); Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil.
1050, 1054 (1958).
27 Reyes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 220 Phil. 116, 128
(1985), citing Intestate Estate of Pareja v. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167, 172
(1954).
28 See Nepomuceno   v.   Lopez,   G.R.   No.   181258,   March   18,
2010, 616 SCRA 145, 153 and Puno v. Puno Enterprises, Inc., G.R.
No. 177066, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 585, 590­591.
29 Records, p. 90.
30 Fernandez v. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322, 339; 363 SCRA 811,
825­826 (2001); Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108366,
February 16, 1994, 230 SCRA 130, 136; Reyes, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., supranote 27; Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals,
No. L­49542, September 12, 1980, 100 SCRA 73, 84.
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
The   rest   of   respondent’s   documentary   evidence   consists   of
handwritten   notes   and   letters,   hospital   bill   and   photographs
taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment
unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged   father   are   inconclusive   evidence   to   prove
paternity.31 Exhibits   “E”   and   “F”32 showing   petitioner   and
respondent   inside   the   rented   apartment   unit   thus   have   scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account 33(Exhibit “C”) from
the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself
was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that
petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s
admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the
delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.  finding   that   private   respondent’s   evidence   to   establish   her
As   to   the   handwritten   notes34 (Exhibits   “D”   to   “D­13”)   of
petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate
words   and   romantic   trysts,   these,   too,   are   not   sufficient   to
establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these
notes were  authentic, they do not qualify under Article  172  (2)
vis­à­vis   Article   175   of   the   Family   Code   which   admits   as
competent   evidence   of   illegitimate   filiation   an   admission   of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.35
Petitioner’s   reliance   on   our   ruling   in Lim   v.   Court   of
Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the handwritten letters
_______________
31 Fernandez   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   id.,   at   pp.   135­136,
citing Tan   v.   Trocio,   A.C.   No.   2115,   November   27,   1990,   191
SCRA 764, 769.
32 Records, pp. 103­104.
33 Id., at p. 92.
34 Id., at pp. 93­102.
35 Nepomuceno v. Lopez, supra note 28.
36 G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997, 270 SCRA 1, 5­7.
579
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
Salas vs. Matusalem
of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of
private respondent’s daughter and were signed by him. The Court
therein   considered   the   totality   of   evidence   which   established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of
private   respondent’s   daughter.   On   the   other   hand,   in Ilano   v.
Court   of   Appeals,37 the   Court   sustained   the   appellate   court’s
filiation   with   and   paternity   of   petitioner   was   overwhelming,
particularly   the   latter’s   public   acknowledgment   of   his   amorous
relationship   with   private   respondent’s   mother,   and   private
respondent   as   his   own   child   through   acts   and   words,   her
testimonial   evidence   to   that   effect   was   fully   supported   by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had
adduced  sufficient  proof  of  continuous  possession of  status  of  a
spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not
claim open and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate
child,   it   nevertheless   considered   the   testimonial   evidence
sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An   illegitimate   child   is   now   also   allowed   to   establish   his
claimed   filiation   by   “any   other   means   allowed   by   the   Rules   of
Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common   reputation   respecting   his   pedigree,   admission   by
silence, the   testimonies   of   witnesses,   and   other   kinds   of   proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 38 Reviewing the
records, we find the totality of respondent’s evi­
_______________
37 G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994, 230 SCRA 242.
38 Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012, 678
SCRA 436, 443, citing Cruz v. Cristobal, 529 Phil. 695, 710­711;
579
498   SCRA   37,   51   (2006), Heirs   of   Ignacio   Conti   v.   Court   of
Appeals,   360   Phil.   536,   548­549;   300   SCRA   345,   357   (1998)
and Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 12, 32­33; 289 SCRA
188, 206­207 (1998); Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, 258­A Phil.
467, 472­473; 178 SCRA 684, 689­690 (1989).
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
dence   insufficient   to   establish   that   petitioner   is   the   father   of
Christian Paulo.
The   testimonies   of   respondent   and   Murillo   as   to   the
circumstances   of   the   birth   of   Christian   Paulo,   petitioner’s
financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment
and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete
with   details,   do   not   approximate   the   “overwhelming   evidence,
documentary and testimonial” presented in Ilano. In that case, we
sustained the appellate court’s ruling anchored on the following
factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length
in the ponencia:
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery
of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital.
Prior   to   the   delivery,   Leoncia   underwent   prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74).
After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA
in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id., at p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of “Ilano” since birth
without any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that
since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always
known and called Artemio as her “Daddy” (TSN, pp. 28­29,
10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he
would   play   with   Merceditas   (sic),   take   her   for   a   ride   or
restaurants   to   eat,   and   sometimes   sleeping   with
Merceditas (sic) (id., at p. 34) and does all what a father
should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies,
toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys
which  Artemio  gives  to  Merceditas   (sic)   (TSN,   pp.   38­39,
5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the
child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special
attention is called to Exh. “E­7” where Artemio was telling
Leoncia   the   need   for   a   “frog   test”   to   know   the   status   of
Leoncia.
Plaintiff   pointed   out   that   the   support   by   Artemio   for
Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of
cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio,
thru Elynia (Exhs. “E­2” and “E­3”, and “D­6”), 
581
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 581
Salas vs. Matusalem
or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and
sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that
of   Artemio   because   Artemio   often   gives   her   checks   and
Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio
sign   the   check   (TSN,   p.   49,   7/18/73).   Both   Artemio   and
Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of
Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living
as  husband  and wife,  Artemio  has  shown  concern  as  the
father   of   Merceditas   (sic).   When   Merceditas   (sic)   was   in
Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed
the   Report   Card   of   Merceditas   (sic)   (Exh.   “H”)   for   the
fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. “H­1” and “H­2”) as
the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio
 [were]   both   identified   by   Leoncia   and   Merceditas   (sic)
because   Artemio   signed   Exh.   “H­1”   and   “H­2”   at   their
residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of
Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
When   Artemio   run   as   a   candidate   in   the   Provincial
Board  of  Cavite[,]  Artemio  gave  Leoncia   his  picture  with
the   following   dedication:   “To   Nene,   with   best   regards,
Temiong”. (Exh. “I”). (pp. 19­20, Appellant’s Brief)
The   mere   denial   by   defendant  of   his   signature   is  not
sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably
showing   that   the   signature   thereon   belongs   to   him.   The
entry   in   the   Certificate   of   Live   Birth   that   Leoncia   and
Artemio   was   falsely   stated   therein   as   married   does   not
mean   that   Leoncia   is   not   appellee’s   daughter.   This
particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself
in order to avoid embarrassment.39
_______________
39 Supra note 37, at pp. 255­256.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salas vs. Matusalem
In   sum,   we   hold   that   the   testimonies   of   respondent   and
Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of paternity and
the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that
it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.40
Finally,   we   note   the   Manifestation   and   Motion 41 filed   by
petitioner’s counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died
on May 6, 2010. 
The   action   for   support   having   been   filed   in   the   trial   court
when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175
(2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the
putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his
lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. 43 The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
_______________
40 Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25, at p. 50; pp.
102­103,   citing Baluyut   v.   Baluyut,   G.R.   No.   33659,   June   14,
1990,  186 SCRA  506,  513  and Constantino  v.  Mendez, G.R. No.
57227, May 14, 1992, 209 SCRA 18, 23­24.
41 Rollo, pp. 212­213.
42 ART. 175. x x x
The   action   must   be   brought   within   the   same   period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the   second   paragraph   of   Article   172,   in   which   case   the
action  may   be  brought  during   the  lifetime  of   the  alleged
parent.
43 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 278 Phil. 687, 694; 201 SCRA
675,   682   (1991),   citing Masecampo   v.   Masecampo,   11   Phil.   1,   3
(1908).
583
VOL. 705, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 583
Salas vs. Matusalem
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of
 the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his  584
legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel 584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary Salas vs. Matusalem
action. Notes.―To   be   entitled   to   legal   support,   petitioner   must,   in
The   heirs   of   the   deceased   may   be   allowed   to   be
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same
substituted   for   the   deceased,   without   requiring   the
is   not   admitted   or   acknowledged;   Illegitimate   children   are
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
be duly proved. (Dolina vs. Vallecera,638 SCRA 707 [2010])
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of
or  representatives to  appear and be substituted within a
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
support   may   create   an   unwholesome   situation   or   may   be   an
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be
the   deceased   party,   or   if   the   one   so   named   shall   fail   to
issued   only   if   paternity   or   filiation   is   established   by   clear   and
appear within the specified period, the court may order the
convincing evidence. (Perla vs. Baring, 685 SCRA 101 [2012])
opposing   party,   within   a   specified   time   to   procure   the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate ――o0o――
of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
and   on   behalf   of   the   deceased.   The   court   charges   in
reserved.
procuring   such   appointment,   if   defrayed   by   the   opposing
party, may be recovered as costs.
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   for   review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and
Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA­
G.R.   CV   No.   64379   are   hereby REVERSED and SET   ASIDE.
Civil   Case   No.   2124­AF   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno   (CJ.,   Chairperson),   Leonardo­De   Castro,
Bersamin and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition   granted,   judgment   and   resolution   reversed   and   set
aside.

G.R. No. 209588. February 18, 2015.*
 
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­appellee, vs.ERIC
ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, accused­appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Where there is
no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some
material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Supreme
Court (SC) will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts
and the credibility of the witnesses since the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial.—It is apropos to reiterate here that where
there   is   no   showing   that   the   trial   court   overlooked   or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment
of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was
in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented
during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the
appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on
this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
_______________
*  FIRST DIVISION.
205
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 205
People vs. Rosauro 
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy­Bust Operations;
Decoy Solicitation; It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime
that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way,
or   that   the   criminal   act   was   done   at   the   “decoy   solicitation”   of
persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity   in   the   act   were   present   and   apparently   assisting   its
commission.—The   RTC   and   the   CA   both   found   the   arrest   of
accused­appellant   to   be   the   result   of   a   legitimate   entrapment
procedure,   and  we  find  nothing   in the  records  as  to  warrant  a
contrary   finding.   In People   v.   Bartolome, 690   SCRA   159   (2013),
we   had   the   occasion   to   discuss   the   legitimacy   of   a   “decoy
solicitation,” to wit: It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime
that   facilities   for   its   commission   were   purposely   placed   in   his
way, or that the criminal act was done at the “decoy solicitation”
of   persons   seeking   to   expose   the   criminal,   or   that   detectives
feigning   complicity   in   the   act   were   present   and   apparently
assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases   where   the   office   is   one   habitually   committed,   and   the
solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. As
here,   the   solicitation   of   drugs   from  appellant  by   the  informant
utilized   by   the   police   merely   furnishes   evidence   of   a   course   of
conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant
has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by   utilizing   an   informant   to   effect   a   drug   transaction   with
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the
appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
Same;   Same;   Informants;   As   a   rule,   the   informant   is   not
presented   in   court   for   security   reasons,   in   view   of   the   need   to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested
through his efforts.—Similarly, the presentation of an informant
as  witness is not regarded  as indispensable  to  the success of a
prosecution of a drug­dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is
not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested
through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s
identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law
enforcement.   Only   when   the   testimony   of   the   informant   is
considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the
culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded. In
the present case, as the buy­bust operation was duly witnessed by
the   Provincial   Anti­Illegal   Drugs­Special   Operation   Task   Unit
(PAID­SOTU) elements led by SPO4
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro  regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (the
 Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their
testimonies   can   take   the   place   of   that   of   the   confidential
informant.
Same; Same; Buy­Bust Operations; The delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur­buyer and the receipt of the marked money by
the seller successfully consummate the buy­bust transaction.—In a
catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be
duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving
the   illegal   sale   of   dangerous   or   prohibited   drugs,   like shabu,
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity
of   the   buyer   and   the   seller,   the   object   of   the   sale,   and   the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor.   Briefly,   the   delivery   of   the   illicit   drug   to   the   poseur­
buyer   and   the   receipt   of   the   marked   money   by   the   seller
successfully   consummate   the   buy­bust   transaction.   What   is
material,   therefore,   is   the   proof   that   the   transaction   or   sale
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.
Same;  Same;  Same;   Chain  of   Custody;   The  identity  of   the
prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also
be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance
bought or seized during the buy­bust operation is the same item
offered   in   court   as   exhibit.—Indeed,   as   we   held   in People   v.
Torres, 697   SCRA   452   (2013),   equally   important   in   every
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the
presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral
certainty.   It   must   also   be   established   with   the   same   degree   of
certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy­bust
operation   is   the   same   item   offered   in   court   as   exhibit.   In   this
chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of
the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody; The prosecution’s failure to
submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165,   will   not   render   the   accused’s   arrest   illegal   or   the   items
seized  from   him  inadmissible.—This   Court  has,   in  many   cases,
held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality   it   is   “almost   always   impossible   to   obtain   an   unbroken
chain.”   The   most   important   factor   is   the   preservation   of   the
integrity and the eviden­
207
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
People vs. Rosauro  No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
tiary   value   of   the   seized   items   as   they   will   be   used   to
determine   the   guilt   or   innocence   of   the   accused.   Hence,   the
prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21
of R.A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the
items seized from him inadmissible. The chain of custody is not
established   solely   by   compliance   with   the   prescribed   physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence
of   the   enumerated   persons.   The   Implementing   Rules   and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of
seized   dangerous   drugs   states:   x x x Provided,   further,   that
noncompliance   with   these   requirements   under   justifiable
grounds,   as   long   as   the   integrity   and   evidentiary   value   of   the
seized   items   are   properly   preserved   by   the   apprehending
officer/team,   shall   not   render   void   and   invalid   such   seizures   of
and custody over said items.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
For   the   consideration   of   the   Court   is   an   appeal   of   the
Decision1 dated   19   June   2013   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   (CA)   in
C.A.­G.R.   CR­H.C.   No.   00552­MIN,   which   affirmed   the
Judgment2 dated 24 November 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),   Cagayan   de   Oro   City,   Branch   25   in   Criminal   Case   No.
2004­856,   finding   accused­appellant   Eric   Rosauro yBongcawil
(accused­appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale
207 of shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
 
_______________
1  Rollo,   pp.   3­17;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Henri   Jean
Paul B. Inting, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and
Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurring.
2  CA Rollo, pp. 72­75; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro 
2002,   sentencing   him   to   suffer   the   penalty   of   life
imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
In an Amended Information dated 21 February 2005, 3accused­
appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No.
9165, to wit:
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon,   more   or   less,   at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality   of   Villanueva,   Province   of   Misamis   Oriental,
Republic   of   the   Philippines,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, not being authorized
by   law   to  possess  and   to  sell   any   dangerous  drugs,   knowingly,
willfully and feloniously, did then and there, sell and convey to a
third person, who acted as a decoy in a buy­bust operation, one (1)
sachet of shabu, containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which when
examined   gave   POSITIVE   result   to   test   for   the   presence   of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.4
 
Upon re­arraignment, accused­appellant pleaded not guilty to
the  crime  charged.5 Thereafter,   pretrial  and  trial   on  the  merits
ensued.
_______________
3  Records, p. 1; The Original Information dated 21 September
2004 reads:
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon,   more   or   less,   at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality   of   Villanueva,   Province   of   Misamis   Oriental,
Republic   of   the   Philippines,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, not being authorized
by   law   to  possess  and   to  sell   any   dangerous  drugs,   knowingly,
willfully and feloniously did then and there sell and convey to a
third person one (1) sachet of Shabu, containing 0.08 grams (sic)
of shabu, which when examined gave POSITIVE result to the test
for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug.
4  Rollo, p. 6; CA Decision.
5  CA Rollo, p. 72; RTC Judgment.
 
209
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
People vs. Rosauro 
Based on the records, the prosecution’s version of the facts is
as follows:
On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that
accused­appellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro for brevity) was selling
and distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of
Misamis   Oriental   conducted   a   test­buy   operation   in   the
Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a confidential
agent.   The   confidential   agent   bought shabu from   Rosauro
at Purok 2, Barangay Katipunan,   Villanueva,   Misamis   Oriental.
The substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP
crime   laboratory   and   yielded   a   positive   result   for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).
On  July   3,  2004,  the  police authorities  received  information
that   again   drugs   were   being   distributed
at Purok 3, BarangayPoblacion,   Villanueva,   Misamis   Oriental.
Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti­Illegal
Drugs­Special   Operation   Task   Unit   (PAID­SOTU)   elements   led
by   SPO4   Lorenzo   Larot   and   PO3   Juancho   Dizon   positioned
themselves in the house of their confidential agent.
There, the PAID­SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with
the   confidential   agent.   In   exchange   for   the   one   (1)   sachet
of shabu given   by   Rosauro   to   the   confidential   agent,   the   latter
gave him a marked 100­peso bill with serial number YZ712579.
After   the   transaction,   Larot   and   Dizon   came   out   of   their
hiding   place   and  arrested   Rosauro.   Thereafter,   the  confidential
agent handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, marked it with
the marking “Exhibit A,” and placed it inside his pocket. He also
took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he
prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory
Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over
209 to the Crime laboratory.
On   the   basis   of   the   request   made   by   Larot,   Police   Chief
Inspector Ma. Leocy Mag­abo, the Forensic Chemi­
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro 
 cal Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a laboratory
examination on the contents of the sachet, on accused­appellant,
and   the   marked   money.   The   examination   of   the   seized   item
yielded   positive   result   for   methamphetamine   hydrochloride
(shabu);   while   the   accused­appellant   and   the   marked   money
tested positive for the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. 6
 
For his part, accused­appellant claims that he was merely a
victim of instigation:
Accused­appellant Rosauro, on the other hand, tells a different
tale. He testified that on July 3, 2004, the police asset went to his
house four (4) times and convinced him to do an errand for him.
Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not know where to buy
one. It was the confidential informant who told him to buy the
prohibited   drug   from   a   certain   “Kael”   and   to   deliver   it   to   the
former’s house. It was also the informant who gave the money to
Rosauro to buy the shabu. But Rosauro was not able to meet or
buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who got and
handed to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the
house of the confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested
by   SPO4   Larot   and   Dizon.   The   sachet   of shabu was   not   even
recovered from him but from the confidential informant.7
 
Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish
the guilt of accused­appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of
conviction, viz.:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby
renders   Judgment   finding   accused   ERIC
ROSAURO yBONGCAWIL,   “guilty”   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of
the crime charged in the information for selling and delivering a
sachet   of shabu to   the   poseur­buyer   a   Violation   of   Section   5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and imposes
_______________
6  Rollo, p. 3­5; CA Decision.
7  Id., at p. 5.
211
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 211
People vs. Rosauro 
a   penalty   of   life   imprisonment   and   a   fine   of   Five   Hundred
Thousand (Php500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the cost.
The   accused   ERIC   B.   ROSAURO   who   has   undergone
preventive  imprisonment  shall   be  credited  in  the  service  of  his
sentence  consisting   of  deprivation  of  liberty,   with  the  full   time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted prisoners, except
those disqualified by law.
The sachet of shabu, Exh. “A” is confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government to be destroyed in accordance with law. 8
 
Accused­appellant   appealed   before   the   CA,   assigning   a   lone
error:
I
THE   COURT A   QUO GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   CONVICTING
THE   ACCUSED­APPELLANT   WHEN   HIS   GUILT   WAS   NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
 
After   a   review   of   the   records,   the   CA   affirmed   the   RTC
Judgment. The appellate court ruled that what transpired in the
case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation; 10that all
the elements of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs were
duly proven;11 that the nonpresentation of the confidential agent
in court is not fatal;12 that the inconsistencies in the testimony of
the lone witness of the prosecution do not affect the result of the
case;13 and that the apprehending
_______________
8   CA Rollo, pp. 74­75; RTC Judgment.
9   Id., at p. 49; Brief for the Accused­Appellant.
10  Rollo, p. 8; CA Decision.
11  Id., at pp. 11­12.
12  Id., at p. 12.
13  Id., at p. 13.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro 
 
 
team was able to preserve the integrity of the subject drug and
that the prosecution was able to present the required unbroken
chain in the custody of the subject drug.14Thus, the CA held:
WHEREFORE,   the   Judgment   dated   November   24,   2006   of
the   Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch   25,   Cagayan   de   Oro   City   in
Criminal Case No. 2004­856 is hereby AFFIRMED.15
 
Accused­appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of
his conviction.
After a thorough review of the records, however, we dismiss
the appeal.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing
that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material
facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not
disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility
of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess
and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the
rule   that   the   factual   findings   of   the   appellate   court   sustaining
those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a
clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error.16
The   RTC   and   the   CA   both   found   the   arrest   of   accused­
appellant to be the result of a legitimate entrapment procedure,
and   we   find   nothing   in   the   records   as   to   warrant   a   contrary
finding. In People v. Bartolome,17 we had the occasion to discuss
the legitimacy of a “decoy solicitation,” to wit:
_______________
14  Id., at p. 15.
15  Id., at p. 17.
16  People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 200304, 15 January 2014, 714
SCRA 78, 101.
17  G.R.   No.   191726,   6   February   2013,   690   SCRA   159,   172,
citing People v. Sta. Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 528­529; 516 SCRA 621,
628 (2007).
213
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 213
People vs. Rosauro 
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for
its   commission   were   purposely   placed   in   his   way,   or   that   the
criminal   act   was   done   at   the   “decoy   solicitation”   of   persons
seeking   to   expose   the   criminal,   or   that   detectives   feigning
complicity  in  the  act were  present  and  apparently   assisting   its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where
the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As   here,   the   solicitation   of   drugs   from   appellant   by   the
informant  utilized   by   the  police  merely   furnishes   evidence   of  a
course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that
appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly
acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction
with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced
the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
 
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not
regarded   as   indispensable   to   the   success   of   a   prosecution   of   a
drug­dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in
court   for   security   reasons,   in   view   of   the   need   to   protect   the
informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his
efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s identity is
protected   in   deference   to   his   invaluable   services   to   law
enforcement.   Only   when   the   testimony   of   the   informant   is
considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the
culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded. 18 In
the present case, as the buy­bust operation was duly witnessed by
the   Provincial   Anti­Illegal   Drugs­Special   Operation   Task   Unit
(PAID­SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot)
and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the place of
that of the confidential informant.
As   to   whether   accused­appellant’s   guilt   was   established
beyond reasonable doubt, we rule in the affirmative.
_______________
18  Id., at p. 175.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro  moral certainty. It must also be established with
In   a   catena   of   cases,   this   Court   laid   down   the   essential
elements   to   be   duly   established   for   a   successful   prosecution   of
offenses   involving   the   illegal   sale   of   dangerous   or   prohibited
drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to
wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to
the   poseur­buyer   and   the   receipt   of   the   marked   money   by   the
seller successfully consummate the buy­bust transaction. What is
material,   therefore,   is   the   proof   that   the   transaction   or   sale
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.19
Verily,   all   the   elements   for   a   conviction   of   illegal   sale   of
dangerous   or   prohibited   drugs  were   proven   by   the  prosecution:
the   identity   of   accused­appellant   as   the   seller,   and   that   of   the
confidential informant as poseur­buyer were established, as well
as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the marked money. It
was also ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu,
a dangerous drug, and that the same item was properly identified
in   open   court   by   SPO4   Larot.   Moreover,   the   P100.00­bill   with
serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as
the living body of the accused­appellant revealed a positive result
for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Accused­appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to
prove   the corpus   delicti,   and   that   the   statutory   safeguards
provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.
Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,20 equally important in
every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs
is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus
delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with
_______________
19  People v. Torres, G.R. No. 191730, 5 June 2013, 697 SCRA
452, 462­463.
 20  Id., at p. 464.
215
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
People vs. Rosauro 
the   same   degree   of   certitude   that   the   substance   bought   or
seized during the buy­bust operation is the same item offered in
court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of   R.A.   No.   9165   (the   chain   of   custody   rule)   provides   for
safeguards   for   the   protection   of   the   identity   and   integrity   of
dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody   and   Disposition   of   Confiscated,   Seized,
and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant Sources   of
Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and EssentialChemicals, Instrumen
ts/Paraphernalia   and/or   Laboratory   Equipment.—The   PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources  of  dangerous  drugs,   controlled precursors  and  essential
chemicals,   as   well   as   instruments/paraphernalia   and/or
laboratory equipment so  confiscated,  seized  and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of   the   drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the   accused   or   the   person/s   from   whom   such   items   were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice
(DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be  required   to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
 
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the
chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is “almost
always   impossible   to   obtain   an   unbroken   chain.”   The   most
important   factor   is   the   preservation   of   the   integrity   and   the
evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items   as   they   will   be   used   to
215 determine   the   guilt   or   innocence   of   the   accused.   Hence,   the
prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs as required under
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Rosauro 
Article   21   of   R.A.   No.   9165,   will   not   render   the   accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.21
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance
with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the
seized   drugs   in   the   presence   of   the   enumerated   persons.   The
Implementing   Rules   and   Regulations   of   R.A.   No.   9165   on   the
handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:
x x x Provided,   further,   that   noncompliance   with   these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by   the   apprehending   officer/team,   shall   not   render   void   and
invalid   such   seizures   of   and   custody   over   said   items. 22 (Italics,
emphasis, underscoring omitted)
 
In   the   case   at   bar,   after   the   sale   was   consummated,   the
confidential informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who
placed   tape   on   the   sachet   and   marked   it   “Exhibit   A.”   Upon
reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate
of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination.
The   request,   the   specimen,   as   well   as   the   marked   money   and
accused­appellant   were   then   brought   to   the   PNP   Crime
Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo
Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office,
who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo
Mag­abo,   the   Forensic   Chemical   Officer   of   the   PNP   Crime Informants are usually not presented in court because of the
Laboratory.23 Moreover,   the   seized   item   was   duly   identified   by need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service
SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from accused­ to the police. (Id.)
appellant. ——o0o––—
Accused­appellant’s guilt having been established, we likewise _______________
affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA.
_______________ 24  Supra note 19 at p. 469.
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
21  People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013, 711 reserved.
SCRA 187, 196­197.
22  Supra note 19 at pp. 465­466.
23  Rollo, p. 15; CA Decision.
217
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 18, 2015 217
People vs. Rosauro 
Under the law, the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with
it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity and purity of
the substance.24 Thus, the RTC and CA were within bounds when
they imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   present   appeal
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno   (CJ.,   Chairperson),   Leonardo­De   Castro,
Bersamin and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed.
Notes.—The presentation of an informant is not a requisite
for   the   prosecution   of   drug   cases.   (Quinicot   vs.   People,   590
SCRA 458 [2009])

 
G.R. No. 203984. June 18, 2014.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.MEDARIO   CALANTIAO   y   DIMALANTA,   accused­
appellant.  whether it  be  a  warrant  for  another object,  hot pursuit, search
Constitutional   Law;   Criminal   Procedure;   Warrantless
Searches   and   Seizures;   The   purpose   of   allowing   a   warrantless
search  and  seizure incident  to  a  lawful  arrest  is  “to  protect  the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach.”—The purpose of allowing
a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is “to
protect   the   arresting   officer   from   being   harmed   by   the   person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.” It is
therefore   a   reasonable   exercise   of   the   State’s   police   power   to
protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on
them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety
of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under
the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Plainview   Doctrine;   The   Plain   View
Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained   in   a   warrantless   search   incident   to   a   lawful   arrest
outside   the   suspect’s   person   and   premises   under   his   immediate
control.—The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility   of   evidence   obtained   in   a   warrantless   search
incident   to   a   lawful   arrest   outside   the   suspect’s   person   and
premises   under   his   immediate   control.   This   is   so   because
“[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.” “The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer  is  not  searching   for  evidence  against  the  accused,
but   nonetheless   inadvertently   comes   across   an   incriminating
object   x x x.   [It]   serves   to   supplement   the   prior   justification   —
incident   to   lawful   arrest,   or   some   other   legitimate   reason   for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the ac­
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
21cused — and permits the warrantless seizure.” The Plain
View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation
because   the   police   officers   purposely   searched   him   upon   his
arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately
opened   it,   as   part   of   the   search   incident   to   Calantiao’s   lawful
arrest.
Criminal   Law;   Dangerous   Drugs   Act;   Chain   of   Custody
Rule;   Marking;   The   failure   to   strictly   comply   with   Section   21,
Article  II  of Republic Act (R.A.) No.  9165,  such as  immediately
marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity
of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.—This Court has held that the
failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not
automatically   impair   the   integrity   of   chain   of   custody   because
what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized   in   the   determination   of   the   guilt   or   innocence   of   the
accused. Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention “marking.”
What they require  are (1)  physical inventory, and (2) taking of
photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia, 706 SCRA
312   (2013):   What   Section   21   of   R.A.   No.   9165   and   its
implementing   rule   do   not   expressly   specify   is   the   matter   of
“marking” of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure
that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence
subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest.
Consistency   with   the   “chain   of   custody”   rule   requires   that   the
“marking” of the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the
same   items   that   enter   the   chain   and   are   eventually   the   ones
offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
Same; Same; Same; Unless it can be shown that there was
bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption
that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain.—
Unless   it   can   be   shown   that   there   was   bad   faith,   ill   will,   or
tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of
the   evidence   has   been   preserved   will   remain.   The   burden   of
showing   the   foregoing   to   overcome   the   presumption   that   the
police officers handled the seized
22drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged
their   duties   is  on   Calantiao.   Unfortunately,   Calantiao  failed   to
discharge such burden.
Same;   Same;   Marking;   Denial;   Frame­Up;   The  defenses  of
denial   and   frame­up   have   always   been   frowned   upon   by   the
Supreme Court (SC).—His theory, from the very beginning, was
that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for having
offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one
of   denial   and   frame­up.   However,   those   defenses   have   always
been frowned upon by the Court, to wit: The defenses of denial
and   frame­up   have   been   invariably   viewed   by   this   Court   with
disfavor   for   it   can   easily   be   concocted   and   is   a   common   and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame­
up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the
cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in
support of his claims. Aside from his self­serving assertions, no
plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations. Hence, as
Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the
apprehending   officers   were   stirred   by   illicit   motive   or   failed   to
properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith
and credit. 
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant. 
LEONARDO­DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 17, 2012 Decision 1 of the
Court   of   Appeals  in  C.A.­G.R.   CR­H.C.   No.   04069,   affirming in
toto the July 23, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
_______________
1 Rollo,   pp.   2­18;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Amelita   G.
Tolentino with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Samuel
H. Gaerlan, concurring.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 22­29; penned by Judge Victoriano B. Cabanos
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 69566.
23Court   (RTC)   of   Caloocan   City,   Branch   127,   finding   accused­
appellant   Medario   Calantiao   y   Dimalanta   (Calantiao)   guilty
beyond   reasonable   doubt   of   violating   Section   11,   Article   II   of
Republic  Act No.  9165 or  the  Comprehensive Dangerous  Drugs
Act of 2002.
 On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC
of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in an
Information,3 the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable   Court,   the   above   named   accused,   without   any
authority   of   law,   did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously   have   in   his   possession,   custody   and   control   two   (2)
bricks   of   dried   marijuana   fruiting   tops   with   a   total   weight   of
997.9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
The   facts,   as   synthesized   by   the   RTC   and   adopted   by   the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon,
while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ
were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office
and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per
report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck
and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a
traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to
follow   said   vehicle   until   they   reached   along   8th  Avenue   Street
corner C­3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said
taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired
their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued
his   driving   until   he   reached   a   police   station   nearby   where   he
reported the incident.
3 Records, p. A.  date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C­3
24
The   police   officers   on   duty   then   were   PO1   NELSON
MARIANO   and   PO3   EDUARDO   RAMIREZ.   PO1   Mariano
testified  that  they   immediately   responded   to  said  complaint  by
proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where
they  found  the  white  taxi.  While  approaching  said  vehicle,  two
armed   men   alighted   therefrom,   fired   their   guns   towards   them
(police  officers)  and   ran  away.   PO1   Mariano  and   PO3   Ramirez
chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from
Calantiao   a   black   bag   containing   two   (2)   bricks   of   dried
marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with
ammos,   while   PO3   Ramirez   recovered   from   Calantiao’s
companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over
to   SPO3   PABLO   TEMENA,   police   investigator   at Bagong
BarrioPolice   Station   for   investigation.   Thereat,   PO1   Mariano
marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his
initials, “NM.” Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the
PNP Crime  Laboratory for chemical  analysis.  The  result of the
examination   conducted   by   P/SINSP.   JESSSE   DELA   ROSA
revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated
by   PO3   RAMIREZ   who   testified   that   he   personally   saw   those
bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed
that   he   was   with   PO1   Mariano   when   they   apprehended   said
accused and his companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano
recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on
his part, he confiscated from accused’s companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the
suspects boarded was also presented in open court and testified as
to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that
Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away.
25
Aside   from   the   oral   testimonies   of   the   witnesses,   the
prosecution   also   offered   the   following   documentary   evidence   to
boost their charge against the accused:
 Exh.   “A”   –   Request   for   Laboratory   Examination   dated
November 12, 2003
Exh. “B” – Physical Sciences Report No. D­1423­03 dated
November 12, 2003
Exh.   “C­1”   –   Picture   of   First   brick   of   marijuana   fruiting
tops
Exh. “C­2” – Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting
tops
Exh. “D” – Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003
Exh.   “E”   –   Pinagsamang   Sinumpaang   Salaysay   dated
November   12,   2003   of   PO3   Eduardo   Ramirez   and   PO1
Nelson Mariano
Exh. “E­1” – Their respective signatures
Exh.   “F”   –   Sinumpaang   Salaysay   of   Crisendo   Amansec
(Erroneously marked as Exh. “E”)
 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
The accused offered a different version of the story. According
to   his   testimony,   this   instant   case   originated   from   a   traffic
mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were
riding almost  collided with  another car.  Reyes then opened  the
window and made a “fuck you” sign against the persons on board
of  that  car.   That  prompted  the  latter  to  chase  them  and  when
they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the
persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi.
Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter
and uttered, “Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba
ako kilala?” Said police officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and
when   Calantiao   tried   to   grab   it,   the   gun   fired.   Calantiao   and
Reyes   were   then   handcuffed   and   were   brought   to   the   police
station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking
26and their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then
prepared some documents and informed them that they will be
charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown
to   them   and   said   police   officer   told   them   that   it   would   be
sufficient   evidence   against   them.   They   were   detained   and
subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for
inquest at the prosecutor’s office.4 
Ruling of the RTC
On   July   23,   2009,   the   RTC   rendered   its   Decision   giving
credence to the prosecution’s case. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   judgment   is   hereby
rendered   declaring   accused   MEDARIO   CALANTIAO   y
DIMALANTA, GUILTY   BEYOND   REASONABLE   DOUBT of
the  offense  of  Violation  of  Section  11,   Article  II,  R.A.   9165,  for
illegally   possessing   997.9   grams   of   marijuana   fruiting   tops.
Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php500,000.00).5
In   convicting   Calantiao,   the   RTC   held   that   the   illegal   drug
seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a
body   search   after   Calantiao   was   caught in   flagrante   delicto of
possessing a gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the
RTC   found   all   the   elements   of   the   offense   to   have   been   duly
established by the prosecution.6
Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed7 his conviction to the Court of
Appeals, assigning the following errors:
_______________
4 CA Rollo, pp. 23­24.
5 Id., at p. 29.
 6 Id., at p. 28. 9 Rollo, pp. 7­10.
7 Records, p. 326. 28Finding   that   all   the   elements   of   the   charge   of   illegal
27 possession   of   dangerous   drugs   to   be   present   and   duly
I proven,10 the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012, promulgated
THE   COURT A   QUO GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   FINDING   THE its Decision, affirming in toto the RTC’s ruling.
ACCUSED­APPELLANT   GUILTY   BEYOND   REASONABLE Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an
DOUBT   FOR   VIOLATION   OF   SECTION   11,   ARTICLE   II, acquittal,   adding   the   following   arguments   in   support   of   his
REPUBLIC   ACT   NO.   9165,   NOTWITHSTANDING   THE   FACT position:
THAT THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search
IN EVIDENCE. incident to a valid warrantless arrest.
II x x x x
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE Second,   Calantiao   did   not   waive   the   inadmissibility   of   the
ACCUSED­APPELLANT   DESPITE   THE   ARRESTING seized items.
OFFICERS’   PATENT   NONCOMPLIANCE   WITH   THE x x x x
REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  PROPER   CUSTODY  OF   SEIZED Finally, the seized items’ custodial chain is broken.11
DANGEROUS DRUGS. In   essence,   Calantiao   is   questioning   the   admissibility   of
III the marijuana found  in  his  possession,   as  evidence against him
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or
ACCUSED­APPELLANT   DESPITE   THE   PROSECUTION’S because its custodial chain was broken.
FAILURE TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF Ruling of this Court
THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.8 This Court finds no merit in Calantiao’s arguments.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Search   and   Seizure   of 
The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s Marijuana valid
conviction. It found that there was sufficient reason to justify a This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the
warrantless   arrest,   as   the   police   officers   were   acting   on   a marijuana   in   his   possession   cannot   be   admitted   as   evidence
legitimate   complaint   and   had   a   reasonable   suspicion   that   the against  him  because  it  was  illegally   discovered  and   seized,   not
persons   identified   at   the   scene   were   the   perpetrators   of   the having been within the apprehending officers’ “plain view.”12
offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and _______________
subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and 10 Id., at p. 13.
valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.9 11 Id., at pp. 37­39.
_______________
12 CA Rollo, pp. 50­52.
8 CA Rollo, p. 46.
 29 Searches   and   seizure   incident   to   a   lawful   arrest   are
governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Section 13. Search   incident   to   lawful   arrest.—A   person
lawfully   arrested   may   be   searched   for   dangerous   weapons   or
anything   which  may   have  been  used  or  constitute  proof  in  the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The   purpose   of   allowing   a   warrantless   search   and   seizure
incident to a lawful arrest is “to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed   weapon,   and   to   prevent   the   latter   from   destroying
evidence within reach.”13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of
the   State’s   police   power   to   protect   (1)   law   enforcers   from   the
injury   that   may   be   inflicted   on   them   by   a   person   they   have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and
the   integrity   of   the   evidence   under   the   control   and   within   the
reach of the arrestee.
In Valeroso v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court had the occasion
to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid warrantless search
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz.:
When   an   arrest   is   made,   it   is   reasonable   for   the   arresting
officer   to   search   the   person   arrested   in   order   to   remove   any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect
his   escape.   Otherwise,   the   officer’s   safety   might   well   be
endangered,   and   the   arrest   itself   frustrated.   In   addition,   it   is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any   evidence   on   the   arrestee’s   person   in   order   to   prevent   its
concealment or destruction.
_______________
13 Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, 614 Phil. 236, 252; 598 SCRA
41, 58 (2009).
14 Id., at p. 251; pp. 55­56.
30
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search
not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible
area   within  the  latter’s   reach.   Otherwise   stated,   a   valid  arrest
allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the
person   of   the   one   arrested   or   within   the   area   of   his   immediate
control.   The   phrase   “within   the   area   of   his   immediate   control”
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer
in   front   of   one   who   is   arrested   can   be   as   dangerous   to   the
arresting   officer   as  one  concealed  in  the  clothing   of  the  person
arrested. (Citations omitted)
 In Valeroso,   however,   the   Court   held   that   the   evidence
searched   and   seized   from   him   could   not   be   used   against   him
because they were discovered in a room, different from where he
was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area
searched   could   not   be   considered   as   one   within   his   immediate
control that  he could take any  weapon or  destroy  any  evidence
against him.15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in
Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could
have   easily   taken   any   weapon   from   the   bag   or   dumped   it   to
destroy   the   evidence   inside   it.   As   the   black   bag   containing
the marijuana was   in   Calantiao’s   possession,   it   was   within   the
permissible   area   that   the   apprehending   officers   could   validly
conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiao’s   argument   that   the marijuana cannot   be   used   as
evidence against him because its discovery was in violation of the
Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
 The   Plain   View   Doctrine   is   actually   the   exception   to   the
inadmissibility   of   evidence   obtained   in   a   warrantless   search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
_______________
15 Id., at p. 252; p. 57.
31premises   under   his   immediate   control.   This   is   so   because
“[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.”16 “The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer  is  not  searching   for  evidence  against  the  accused,
but   nonetheless   inadvertently   comes   across   an   incriminating
object   x x x.   [It]   serves   to   supplement   the   prior   justification   —
whether it  be  a  warrant  for  another object,  hot pursuit, search
incident   to   lawful   arrest,   or   some   other   legitimate   reason   for
being   present   unconnected   with   a   search   directed   against   the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure.”17
The   Plain   View   Doctrine   thus   finds   no   applicability   in
Calantiao’s   situation   because   the   police   officers   purposely
searched   him   upon   his   arrest.   The   police   officers   did   not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s
possession;   they   deliberately   opened   it,   as   part   of   the   search
incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
Inventory   and   Chain  
Custody of Evidence
Calantiao   claims   that   even   if   the   search   and   seizure   were
validly   effected,   the marijuana is   still   inadmissible   as   evidence
against   him   for   failure   of   the   apprehending   officers   to   comply
with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the
police station.18
_______________
16 People v. Leangsiri, 322 Phil. 226, 248; 252 SCRA 213, 230
(1996).
17 Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13 at p. 253; p. 58,
citing People v. Cubcubin, Jr., 413 Phil. 249, 271­272; 360 SCRA
690, 709 (2001); People v. Leangsiri, supra at pp. 249­250; p. 231.
18 CA Rollo, p. 53.
32The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide
as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant   Sources   of
Dangerous   Drugs,   Controlled   Precursors   and   Essential
Chemicals,   Instruments/Paraphernalia   and/or   Laboratory
Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous   drugs,   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs,   controlled
precursors   and   essential   chemicals,   as   well   as
instruments/paraphernalia   and/or   laboratory   equipment   so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,  for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The   apprehending   team   having   initial   custody   and
control   of   the   drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence  of  the  accused  or  the  person/s  from  whom  such  items
of
were   confiscated   and/or   seized,   or   his/her   representative   or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody   and   Disposition   of   Confiscated,
Seized   and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant   Sources   of
Dangerous   Drugs,   Controlled   Precursors   and   Essential
Chemicals,   Instruments/Paraphernalia   and/or   Laboratory
Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous   drugs,   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs,   controlled
precursors   and   essential   chemicals,   as   well   as
instruments/paraphernalia   and/or   laboratory   equipment   so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,  for proper disposition in
the following manner:33
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control   of   the   drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence  of  the  accused  or  the  person/s  from  whom  such  items
were   confiscated   and/or   seized,   or   his/her   representative   or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided,   that   the   physical   inventory   and   photograph
shall   be   conducted   at   the   place   where   the   search   warrant   is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures;  Provided, further, that noncompliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as   the   integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   seized
items   are   properly   preserved   by   the   apprehending
officer/team,   shall   not   render   void   and   invalid   such
seizures   of   and   custody   over   said   items[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
This   Court   has   held   that   the   failure   to   strictly   comply
with   Section   21,   Article   II   of   Republic   Act   No.   9165,   such   as
immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair
the   integrity   of   chain   of   custody   because   what   is   of   utmost
importance   is   the   preservation   of   the   integrity   and   the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 19
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention “marking.” What
they   require   are   (1)   physical   inventory,   and   (2)   taking   of
photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia:20
_______________
19 People v. Ocfemia, G.R. No.  185383, September 25, 2013,
706 SCRA 312.
20 Id.
34
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do
not   expressly   specify   is   the   matter   of   “marking”   of   the   seized
items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized
upon  apprehension is the same  evidence  subjected  to inventory
and   photography   when   these   activities   are   undertaken   at   the
police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with
the   “chain   of   custody”   rule   requires   that   the   “marking”   of   the
seized items — to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence —
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of
the seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated
it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to
the   time   it   was   brought   to   the   forensic   chemist   for   laboratory
examination.21 This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the
seized   drugs   to   have   not   been   broken   so   as   to   render
the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith,
ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the
integrity   of   the   evidence   has   been   preserved   will   remain.   The
burden   of   showing   the   foregoing   to   overcome   the   presumption
that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity,
and  that  they  properly  discharged their duties  is on Calantiao.
Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.22
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by
Calantiao on his appeal. He himself admits this.23His
_______________
21 Rollo, p. 14.
22 People v.  Amansec, G.R.  No.  186131,  December 14,  2011,
662 SCRA 574, 594­595.
23 Rollo, p. 40
35theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and
that he was being framed for having offended the police officers.
Simply   put,  his defense  tactic  was  one  of  denial   and  frame­up.
However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the
Court, to wit:
The   defenses   of   denial   and   frame­up   have   been   invariably
viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
violation   of   Dangerous   Drugs   Act.   In   order   to   prosper,   the
defenses of denial and frame­up must be proved with strong and
convincing   evidence.   In   the   cases   before   us,   appellant  failed   to
present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from
his   self­serving   assertions,   no   plausible   proof   was   presented   to
bolster his allegations.24
Hence,   as   Calantiao   failed   to   show   clear   and   convincing
evidence   that   the   apprehending   officers   were   stirred   by   illicit
motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit.25
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Court
hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.­G.R. CR­H.C. No. 04069.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno   (CJ.,   Chairperson),   Bersamin,   Villarama,   Jr.   and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed. 
_______________
24 People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009,
604 SCRA 250, 269.
25 People v. Valencia, 439 Phil. 561, 568; 390 SCRA 696, 702
(2002).
36
Notes.—As   an   incident   to   the   lawful   arrest   of   the   accused
after the consummation of the buy­bust operation, the arresting
officers   had   the   authority   to   search   the   person   of   the   accused.
(People vs. Mantalaba, 654 SCRA 188 [2011])
The   “plain   view”   doctrine   applies   when   the   following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence   has   a   prior   justification   for   an   intrusion   or   is   in   a
position   from   which   he   can   view   a   particular   area;   (b)   the
discovery   of   evidence   in   plain   view   is   inadvertent;   (c)   it   is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
(Miclat, Jr. vs. People, 656 SCRA 539 [2011])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
 
G.R. No. 199689. March 12, 2014.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs. HERMANOS   CONSTANTINO,
JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a.“JOJIT,” accused­appellant. 
 Criminal   Law;   Denials;   Denial   is   an   inherently   weak
defense, consistently viewed with disfavor by the courts, being a
self­serving   negative   evidence.—Admittedly,   denial   is   an
inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor by the
courts, being a self­serving negative evidence. In view, however,
of   the   constitutional   presumption   that   an   accused   is   innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt, the burden
lies   on   the   prosecution   to   overcome   such   presumption   by
presenting   the   required   quantum   of   evidence.   In   so   doing,   the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the
weakness of the defense.
Same;   Dangerous   Drugs   Act;   Illegal   Sale   of   Shabu;   In
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation   in   court   of   the corpus   delicti as   evidence.—In   a
prosecution   for   the   sale   of   a   dangerous   drug,   the   following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing   sold   and   the   payment   therefor.   Simply   put,   “[in]
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.” And in the
prosecution   of   these   offenses,   the   primary   consideration   is   to
ensure   that   the   identity   and   integrity   of   the   seized   drugs   and
other   related   articles   have   been   preserved   from   the   time   they
were   confiscated   from   the   accused   until   their   presentation   as
evidence in court.
Same; Same; Evidence; Chain of Custody Rule; Words and
Phrases;   Chain  of  Custody  means   the   duly   recorded  authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
_______________  
* FIRST DIVISION.
178stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.—Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, series of 2002, defines “chain of custody” as follows: Chain
of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of   movements   and   custody   of   seized   item   shall   include   the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody
of   the   seized   item,   the   date   and   time   when   such   transfer   of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Links That Must be Established
in the Chain of Custody in a Buy­Bust Situation.—The following
links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy­bust
situation: first,   the   seizure   and   marking,   if   practicable,   of   the
illegal   drug   recovered   from   the   accused   by   the   apprehending
officer; second,   the   turn   over   of   the   illegal   drug   seized   by   the
apprehending  officer  to the investigating officer; third,  the  turn
over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and
submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marking; Crucial in proving the
chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or
other   related   items   immediately   after   they   are   seized   from   the
accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as
reference   point.—The   Court   already   emphasized   in People   v.
Zakaria, 686   SCRA   390   (2012),   the   importance   of   marking   the
seized   item  right  after   seizure:   Crucial   in  proving   the  chain  of
custody   is  the  marking   of   the  seized   dangerous   drugs   or   other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused,
for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial
link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference
point.   Moreover,   the   value   of   marking   of   the   evidence   is   to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar
or   related   evidence   from   the   time   of   seizure   from   the   accused
until   disposition   at   the   end   of   criminal   proceedings,   obviating
switching, “planting” or contamination of evi­
179dence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial
custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law
requires.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure of the prosecution to
establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case as the
Court   can   no   longer   consider   or   even   safely   assume   that   the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug
were   properly   preserved.—The   failure   of   the   prosecution   to
establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case as the
Court   can   no   longer   consider   or   even   safely   assume   that   the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug
were properly preserved. In light of the foregoing, Constantino is
acquitted   of   the   crime   charged,   not   because   the   Court   accords
credence to his defense of frame­up, but because the prosecution
failed   to   discharge   its   burden   of   proving   his   guilt   beyond
reasonable doubt. 
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
 
LEONARDO­DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal challenges the Decision[1] dated July 29, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CR­H.C. No. 03353, affirming the
Decision[2] dated   April   15,   2008   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court
(RTC), Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case
No.   10516,   which   found   accused­appellant   Hermanos
Constantino,   Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. “Jojit”   (Constantino),   guilty   of
the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, under Article
______________
[1] Rollo, pp.   2­16;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Ricardo   R.
Rosario   with   Associate   Justices   Hakim   S.   Abdulwahid   and
Danton Q. Bueser, concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 143­147; penned by Presiding Judge Jezarene
C. Aquino.
180II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information[3] filed before the RTC charged Constantino,
as follows:
That on January 20, 2005, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province
of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above­named accused, without authority of law and without
permit to sell, transport, deliver and distribute dangerous drugs,
did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   sell,
transport, distribute and deliver two (2) heat­sealed transparent
plastic   sachets   containing   0.14   gram   of   Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug to
a member of the PNP, Tuguegarao City who acted as a poseur­
buyer; that after receiving the two (2) plastic sachets, the poseur­
buyer simultaneously handed to the accused the marked money
consisting   of   one   (1)   piece   of   FIVE   HUNDRED   PESO   BILL
(P500.00) with Serial No. QP278070 and five (5) pieces of ONE
HUNDRED PESO BILL with Serial Nos. SM989053, PS724429,
XM484584,   BB048002,   and   EK6900025   or   a   total   of   P1,000.00
and   this   led   to   the   apprehension   of   the   accused   and   the
confiscation   of   the   dangerous   drug   together   with   the   buy­bust
money by the said apprehending law enforcers of the Tuguegarao
City Police Station who formed the buy bust team in coordination
with the PDEA.
When   arraigned   on   July   8,   2005,   Constantino   pleaded   not
guilty to the crime charged.[4] Thereafter, pre­trial and trial on
the merits ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of
events:
_______________
[3] Id., at p. 1.
[4] Id., at p. 36.
181
On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police
Superintendent   (P/Supt.)   Mariano   Rodriguez   (Rodriquez),   the
Chief   of   Police   of   Tuguegarao   City,   received   a   report   from   a
confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling illegal
drugs in the said city. P/Supt. Rodriguez immediately formed a
buy­bust   group   composed   of   Senior   Police   Officer   (SPO)2   Noel
Taguiam (Taguiam),  SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang),  SPO1
Arthur   Blaquera   (Blaquera),   Police   Officer   (PO)3   Edwin
Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando Domingo (Domingo).
PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur­buyer. The buy­bust
money, consisting of one P500.00 bill and five P100.00 bills, were
dusted   with   fluorescent   powder   and   their   respective   serial
numbers were recorded in the police blotter.[5]
Around   8:00   in   the   evening   of   the   same   day,   the   team
proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, the
place   where,   according   to   the   CI,   Jojit   was   selling shabu.   PO3
Domingo positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of
the team hid behind  a nearby  concrete fence.  After  waiting for
about 45 minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3
Domingo recognized Constantino as the Jojit described by the CI.
PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was
Jojit. When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo
next  asked,   “Mayroon   ka  bang stuff?”   (“Do  you  have  stuff?”)   In
response,   Constantino   inquired   of   PO3   Domingo   how   much   he
wanted to  buy. PO3  Domingo said he  wanted  to buy  P1,000.00
worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy­bust money
to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3
Domingo.   Thereupon,   PO3   Domingo  turned   his   cap   backwards,
the pre­arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing
the signal, the other members of the buy­bust team approached
the   scene   at   once   and   arrested   Constantino,   from   whom   SPO2
Taguiam recovered the buy­bust money.[6]
_______________
[5] TSN, July 25, 2006, pp. 8­9.
[6] Id., at pp. 11­16.
182Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station
where the recovered drugs and money  were  turned over to the
investigator,   SPO2   Tamang.[7] The   recovered   drugs   were   then
marked   with   the   initials   “A­1”   and   “A­2.”   The   incident   was
recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the recovered
drugs and money.[8]
Later that evening, at around ten o’clock, P/Supt. Rodriguez
and SPO2  Tamang submitted to  the  Philippine National  Police
(PNP)   Crime   Laboratory   Services,   Camp   Marcelo   Adduru,
Tuguegarao   City,   a   request   for   laboratory   examination   of   two
plastic sachets with white crystalline substance marked as “A­1”
and   “A­2”   to   determine   the   presence   of   dangerous   drugs;[9] as
well as both hands of Constantino, one piece P500.00 bill, and five
pieces P100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet
powder.[10] Per   Chemistry   Report   No.   D­08­2005[11] and
Physical   Identification   Report   No.   PI­04­2005,[12] prepared   by
Police   Senior   Inspector   (P/SInsp.)   Mayra   Matote   Madria,
[13]Forensic   Chemist,   the   contents   of   the   two   plastic   sachets
tested   positive   for   Methamphetamine   Hydrochloride;   while   the
other specimens tested positive for the presence of bright­yellow
ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted
that he was merely framed­up.
According   to  Constantino,   at  around  8:00  in  the  evening   on
January 20, 2005, he was enjoying a joyride with his friend, Jeff
Abarriao, on the latter’s motorcycle, within the vicinity of Caritan
Centro. After 30 minutes, Constantino decided to go
_______________
 [7] Id., at p. 17.
 [8] Id., at pp. 21­22.
 [9] Records, p. 54; Exhibit “F.”
[10] Id., at p. 55; Exhibit “F­1.”
[11] Id., at p. 56; Exhibit “D.”
[12] Id., at p. 53; Exhibit “C.”
[13] By the time P/SInsp. Madria testified before the RTC on
October   7,   2005,   she   already   got   married   and   was   using   her
married name Mayra Matote Madria Tulauan.
183home.   While   walking   along   Reyno   or   Reynovilla   St.,   two
vehicles suddenly stopped, one in front and the other behind him.
Five men, all in civilian clothes, alighted from the two vehicles.
Two of the men held Constantino’s hands, while another poked a
gun at him, asking him where he came from and ordering him to
bring out the shabu. Constantino answered that he did not know
what   the   men   were   talking   about.   The   men   then   forced
Constantino into one of the vehicles. Inside the vehicle, one of the
men frisked and searched Constantino, and told him that he was
being   arrested   for   selling shabu.   The   men,   who   were   now
apparently police officers, brought Constantino to the Tuguegarao
City Police Station. At the police station, the police officers took
Constantino’s cellphone and wallet. Also at the police station, one
of the arresting police officers brought out two pieces of plastic
sachets and money and turned it over to one of his companions.
At   around   9:30   in   the   evening,   the   police   officers   brought
Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory, but nothing happened
because he heard that the person who was supposed to conduct
the   examination   was   not   around,   so,   Constantino   was   brought
back to the police station.[14]
The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again
brought   Constantino   to   the   PNP   Crime   Laboratory.   Along   the
way, one of the police escorts forced Constantino to hold a certain
amount  of   money.   Constantino   tried  to   resist   but  he   could   not
really   do   anything   because   he   was   handcuffed.   After   his
examination, Constantino was detained and was told that he was
suspected of selling shabu.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on April 15, 2008, finding
Constantino   guilty   as   charged.   The   trial   court   rejected   the
arguments of the defense, thus: 
1. The   Prosecution   failed   to   give   a   detailed   account   of   the
arrangement with the accused for the purchase of the shabu.
_______________
[14] TSN, September 3, 2007, pp. 5­11. 
184
The   Court’s   response:   The   testimony   of   PO3   Domingo   was
detailed enough, corroborated by other witnesses. It is the defense
that has failed to show  in what  crucial detail the prosecution’s
account is wanting.
2. The   police   officers   categorically   admitted   that   they   did   not
personally know the accused until they were at the alleged place
of transaction.
The Court’s response: Substantive law does not require this; the
rules of evidence do not. Did they know he was Jojit? Yes, from
the description given the informant. Domingo asked whether he
was Jojit. He answered “Yes.”
3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements
of   Article   II,   Section   21   of   R.A.   9165   that   requires   that   an
inventory be taken and that photographs be taken of the items
seized.
The   Court’s   comment:   The   Police   Blotter   Entry   No.   0270
enumerates   the   items   seized.   This,   the   Court   holds   to   be
substantial compliance. Even assuming, without admitting, that
not all the requirements may not have been complied with, these
omissions   do   not   operate   to   exclude   the   evidence   nor   to   cause
suppression   thereof.   They   are   directory,   not   mandatory
provisions.
4. The chain of custody was not established with certainty.
The Court’s comment: The chain is not difficult to trace, and
has been established by evidence, thus:
a.       Exhibit   “B”:   The   police   blotter
recording   that   on   20   January   2005   at
2100 hours, mentioning the two sachets
of shabu which according to the blotter
the accused admitted he handed over to
Domingo;   Domingo   had   testified   that
the   markings   A­1   NBT   and   A­2   NBT
were   placed   on   the   sachets   by
Investigator Alexander Tamang;
b.       Exhibit “F”: Dated January 20, 2005, a request to
the PNP Crime Lab Services
185for  the  examination  of   “two  plastic   sachet   (sic)
with   white   crystalline   substance   marked   A1   and
A2”;
c.        Exhibit “D”: Chemistry Report No. D­
08­2005   completed   21   January   2005
reporting   a   qualitative   examination   of
the contents of two heat­sealed sachets
marked   as   A1   NBT   and   A2   NBT   and
identifying   the   substance   as
“Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.”
5. There was no prior coordination with PDEA.
The   Court’s   response:   None   was   needed.   Exhibit   “H”   clearly
evidences   that   SPO1   Blaquera   was   authorized   to  conduct   anti­
drug   operations.   Domingo   also   answered   the   question   about
coordination with PDEA when he testified: “During that time 3
representatives of the Intelligence Operatives were deputized in
the PDEA in the persons of Noel Taguiam, Arthur Blaquera and
the Chief of Police.”
Hermanos   testified   in   his   behalf   and   his   testimony   can   be
reduced to the following story:
1.       He went on a joy­ride that night with
his friend aboard a motorcycle;
2.       Tiring,   he   alighted   and   started   to   walk   along
Reyno Villa Street;
3.       He   was   accosted   by   police   officers   who,   at   the
time, he did not know to be police officers;
4.       They took him to the police station and produced
the sachets;
 5.       Next   day,   while   on   the   way   to   the   Crime   Lab,
they forced him to hold marked bills, although he
was cuffed.
All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the
circumstances around the accused’s arrest and apprehension. For
one thing, it is self­serving; for
186another, we are not told any reason why the police officers
should have wanted to apprehend him — a supposedly guiltless
man;   third,   the   Court   never   heard   the   testimony   of   his   friend
with whom he was supposed to have had a joy­ride that night. In
sum,   his   story   does   not   convince   this   Court.[15] (Citations
omitted.)
 
The RTC imposed the following sentence upon Constantino:
WHEREFORE,   the   Court   finds   the   accused   guilty   beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and
sentences   him   to   suffer   the   penalty   of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P500,000.00.[16]
Maintaining his innocence, Constantino appealed to the Court
of Appeals, arguing that:
 
1. The   trial   court   gravely   erred   in   giving   full   credence   to  the
testimonies   of   the   prosecution   witnesses   despite   the   patent
irregularities in the conduct of the buy­bust operation.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused­appellant
despite the prosecution’s failure to establish that chain of custody
of   the   drug   specimens   allegedly   confiscated   from   the   accused­
appellant.
3. The   trial   court   gravely   erred   in   convicting   the   accused­
appellant   despite   the   prosecution’s   failure   to   establish   the
identity of the prohibited drugs constituting the corpus delicti of
the offense.
 
In   its   Decision   dated   July   29,   2011,   the   Court   of   Appeals
affirmed in   toto the   judgment   of   conviction   of   the   RTC   against
Constantino. The appellate court held that Constantino’s defense
of frame­up was not worthy of credence as his version
_______________
[15] Records, pp. 145­147.
[16] Id., at p. 147.
187of the incident was not at all corroborated. Constantino was
caught in   flagrante   delicto selling shabu to   PO3   Domingo,   who
acted   as   the   poseur­buyer, therefore,   he   was   legally   arrested
without a warrant. The appellate court also found that the chain
of   custody   of   the shabu had   been   preserved   from   the  time   said
drugs   were   confiscated   from   Constantino   to  the  time  the  same
drugs   were   delivered   to   the   crime   laboratory   and   thereafter
retrieved and presented as evidence before the trial court. Lastly,
the   appellate   court   stressed   that   between   the   positive   and
categorical   declarations   of   the   prosecution   witnesses,   on   one
hand, and the unsubstantial denial or negative statements of the
appellant, on the other hand, the former generally prevails; and
that negative averments, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, deserve no weight in law, especially vis­à­vis the time­
tested presumption of regularity of performance of official duty on
the part of the apprehending officers.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the   Decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of
Tuguegarao   City,   Branch   5,   dated   15   April   2008,   in   Criminal
Case No. 10516, is AFFIRMED.[17]
Consequently,   Constantino   comes   before   this   Court   seeking
the reversal of his conviction by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
 In   his   Supplemental   Brief,   Constantino   contests   his
conviction,   averring   inconsistencies   in   the   testimonies   of   the
prosecution witnesses, particularly, on the circumstances of the
marking   of   the   two   plastic   sachets   containing shabu allegedly
confiscated   from   him.   Different   people   claim  to  have  made   the
marking   “NBT”   on   the   two   plastic   sachets   and   gave   various
explanations as to what the initials “NBT” stand for. In short,
_______________
[17] Rollo, p. 15.
188Constantino argues that the prosecution failed to establish a
crucial link in the chain of custody of the shabu in this case.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently
viewed with disfavor by the courts, being a self­serving negative
evidence. In view, however, of the constitutional presumption that
an   accused   is   innocent   until   the   contrary   is   proven   beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the prosecution to overcome
such   presumption   by   presenting   the   required   quantum   of
evidence. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits
and must not rely on the weakness of the defense.[18]
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing   sold   and   the   payment   therefor.   Simply   put,   “[in]
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.”[19] And in
the prosecution of these offenses, the primary consideration is to
ensure   that   the   identity   and   integrity   of   the   seized   drugs   and
other   related   articles   have   been   preserved   from   the   time   they
were   confiscated   from   the   accused   until   their   presentation   as
evidence in court.[20]
Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down
the   procedure   to   be   followed   in   the   seizure   and   custody   of
dangerous drugs:
_______________
[18] People   v.   Magpayo,   G.R.   No.   187069,   October   20,   2010,
634 SCRA 441, 447.
[19] People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 188107, December 5, 2012,
687 SCRA 318, 326­327.
[20] People v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, February 27, 2013, 692
SCRA 298, 307.
189
 
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant   Sources   of
Dangerous   Drugs,   Controlled   Precursors   and   Essential
Chemicals,   Instruments/Paraphernalia   and/or   Laboratory
Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous   drugs,   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs,   controlled
precursors   and   essential   chemicals,   as   well   as
instruments/paraphernalia   and/or   laboratory   equipment   so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,  for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The   apprehending   team   having   initial   custody   and
control   of   the   drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence  of  the  accused  or  the  person/s  from  whom  such  items
were   confiscated   and/or   seized,   or   his/her   representative   or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
 Article   II,   Section   21(a)   of   the   Implementing   Rules   and
Regulations   (IRR)   of   Republic   Act   No.   9165   describes   in   more
detail how the foregoing procedure is to be applied:
SECTION 21. Custody   and   Disposition   of   Confiscated,
Seized   and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant   Sources   of
Dangerous   Drugs,   Controlled   Precursors   and   Essential
Chemicals,   Instruments/Paraphernalia   and/or   Laboratory
Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous   drugs,   plant   sources   of   dangerous   drugs,   controlled
precursors   and   essential   chemicals,   as   well   as
instruments/paraphernalia   and/or   laboratory   equipment   so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,  for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control   of   the   drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the per­
190son/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or   his/her   representative   or   counsel,   a   representative   from   the
media   and   the   Department   of   Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected
public   official   who   shall   be   required   to   sign   the   copies   of   the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable,   in   case   of   warrantless   seizures; Provided,
further, that   noncompliance   with   these   requirements   under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value   of   the   seized   items   are   properly   preserved   by   the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]
 
While police officers are enjoined to strictly comply with the
procedure   prescribed   by   law,   the   IRR   also   explicitly   excuses
noncompliance under justifiable grounds, but only if the integrity
and   evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items   have   been   properly
preserved   by   the   apprehending   officers.   The   integrity   and
evidentiary   value  of  seized   items   are   properly   preserved   for   as
long as the chain of custody of the same are duly established.
Section   1(b)   of   Dangerous   Drugs   Board   Regulation   No.   1,
series of 2002,[21] defines “chain of custody” as follows:
Chain   of   Custody   means   the   duly   recorded   authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage,   from   the   time   of   seizure/confiscation   to   receipt   in   the
forensic   laboratory   to   safekeeping   to   presentation   in   court   for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall in­
_______________
[21] Guidelines   of   the   Custody   and   Disposition   of   Seized
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals
and Laboratory Equipment.
191clude   the   identity   and   signature   of   the   person   who   held
temporary   custody   of   the   seized   item,   the   date   and  time   when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In Malillin v. People,[22] the Court discussed how the chain of
custody of seized items is established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule   requires   that   the   admission   of   an   exhibit   be   preceded   by
evidence   sufficient   to   support   a   finding   that   the   matter   in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony   about  every   link   in  the  chain,   from   the   moment   the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how   and   from   whom   it   was   received,   where   it   was   and   what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy­bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending   officer; second,   the   turn   over   of   the   illegal   drug
seized   by   the   apprehending   officer   to   the   investigating
officer; third,   the   turn   over   by   the   investigating   officer   of   the
illegal   drug   to  the  forensic  chemist  for  laboratory   examination;
and fourth, the turn over and submission of the
_______________
[22] 576 Phil. 576, 587; 553 SCRA 619, 632­633 (2008).
192marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.[23]
After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses,   the   Court   finds   glaring   inconsistencies   affecting   the
integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino.
The inconsistent testimonies of PO3  Domingo,  PO3  Hernandez,
and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic
sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether
the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very
same ones confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings
already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very
early stage.
To   recall,   the   first   crucial   link   in   the   chain   of   custody   is
seizure   and   marking   of   the   illegal   drug.   In   this   case,   PO3
Domingo,   as   poseur­buyer,   received   two   plastic   sachets
of shabu from Constantino in exchange for P1,000. However, PO3
Domingo   himself   did   not   put   any   markings   on   the   two   plastic
sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy­bust team with
Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned over the
two  plastic  sachets  of shabu to  the investigator,   SPO2   Tamang,
who   was   also   a   member   of   the   buy­bust   team.   PO3   Domingo
testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking “NBT”
on  the said sachets of shabu. Below are  the excerpts from PO3
Domingo’s testimony: 
Q    If   that   plastic   sachets   which   was   sold   to   you   by
Hermanos Constantino is shown to you will you be able
to identify the same?
A        Yes, ma’am.
Q        How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?
A        There is an initials (sic), ma’am.
Q        What initials are you referring to?
A        A­1 initial NBT and A­2 initial NBT.
_______________
[23] People   v.   Enriquez,   G.R.   No.   197550,   September   25,
2013, 706 SCRA 337.
193
Q        Who placed those initials in the plastic sachets?
A        The Investigator, ma’am.
Q        And who is the investigator?
A        Alexander Tamang, ma’am.
Q        Where did he place those initials?
A    In   the   police   station   after   the   apprehension, ma’am.
[24] (Emphasis supplied.) 
 However,   PO3   Hernandez,   another   member   of   the   buy­bust x x x x
team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of
A     It was Noel B. Taguiam, sir.
the buy­bust team, as the one who put the marking “NBT” on the
The   witness   is   pointing   to   the   marking   NBT   partly
plastic sachets upon the team’s return to the police station, thus: 
hidden.
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q   During   the   buy   bust   operation   you   stated   that   the COURT:
accused  handed   to  the poseur  buyer  in the  person  of Q        Who is Noel B. Taguiam?
PO3   Rolando   Domingo  two  plastic   sachets  containing A        A member of the buy bust team also, sir.
as you claimed methamphetamine hydrochloride, have PROS. NICOLAS:
you seen these plastic sachets at that time when they
handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo? Q     You   stated   this   NBT   was   placed   by   one   Noel   B.
A        Yes, sir. Taguiam, why do you know that he was the one who
Q     If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again placed this?
today   will   you   be   able   to   tell   that   these   two   plastic A    Because I was present during that time when he placed
sachets   were   the   same   plastic   sachets   that   were his initial, sir.
handed by the accused to PO3 Rolando Domingo? Q    Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those
A      Yes, sir. initials on those two plastic sachets?
Q      I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly A     After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.
tell us if these are the plastic sachets that were handed Q     How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after
to PO3 Rolando Domingo? the conduct of the buy bust operation?
A      These are the ones, sir. A      After a few hours, sir.
Q     Why do you say that these are the two plastic sachets Q      Where did he place those initials?
handed by the accused? A      In our office, sir.[25] (Emphasis supplied.) 
_______________ To   complicate   things   even   further,   P/SInsp   Tulauan,[26]the
[24] TSN, July 25, 2006, pp. 20­21. Forensic Chemist, also declared before the trial court that the
194 _______________
A    Because I was there and I saw the accused handed the [25] TSN, April 2, 2007, pp. 13­14.
two plastic sachets to PO3 Rolando Domingo, sir. [26] See note 13.
Q  Why do you know that these are the same plastic sachets? 195marking   “NBT”   on   the   two   plastic   sachets   of shabu were
A     These are the ones, sir. made  by   SPO3   Nelson  B.   Tamaray   (Tamaray),   the  duty   officer
Q   Mr.   Witness,   there   are   markings   on   these   two   plastic who   received   the   specimens   at   the   crime   laboratory.   P/SInsp.
sachets, do you know whose markings are these? Tulauan testified: 
  
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q   When you received these two specimens Madam Witness,
will you please tell us the physical appearance of these
items when you received the same?
A    They were heat­sealed and with markings “A­1” and “A­
2,” your Honor.
Q        And   will   you   please   point   to   us   these   markings  Madam   Witness,   with   respect   to   that   marking   made
“A­1” and “A­2” when you received these items Madam
Witness?
A       This is the markings “A­1” and “A­2,” Ma’am.
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the markings “A­1” and “A­2”
with the use of a black pentel pen.
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q   There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam
Witness   marked   as   NBT,   what   is   this   marking   all
about?
A    That   is   the   marking   of SPO3   Nelson   B.   Tamaray,
Ma’am.
Q   Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which
was requested to be examined Madam Witness?
A  Yes,   Ma’am   because   he   is   the   one   who   received   the
specimen from the one who deliver it, Ma’am.
Q     In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you
identified earlier, that there is a marking “A­1,” there
is   another   marking   NBT,   what   is   this   marking   all
about Madam Witness?
A   That   is   the   marking   of SPO3   Nelson   B.   Tamaray,
Ma’am.[27](Emphases supplied.)
_______________
[27] TSN, October 7, 2005, pp. 20­21.
196
On   cross­examination,   P/SInsp.   Tulauan   confirmed   her
previous declaration that SPO3 Tamaray had claimed making the
marking on the sachets of shabu:
 
Atty. Aquino
which are “A1” and “A­2,” they are not your markings,
is it not?
A      Yes, sir.
Q      And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed
in that exhibit  which you have  earlier identified, you
did   not   see   this   duty   officer   placed   his   markings
thereon, is it not?
A     Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he
said that he was the one who placed the initial NBT,
sir.[28]
 
 
The   Court   already   emphasized   in People   v.   Zakaria[29]the
importance of marking the seized item right after seizure:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the
seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after
they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers
of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of
marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of
seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of
evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils   the   integrity   of   the   chain   of   custody   that   the   law
requires. (Citation omitted.)
_______________
[28] Id., at pp. 25­26.
[29] G.R. No. 181042, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 390, 403.
197    Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why
PO3   Domingo,   the   poseur­buyer,   despite   having   immediate
custody   of   the   two   plastic   sachets   of shabu purchased   from
Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before
turning   over   the   custody   of   the   same   to   another   police   officer.
This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt
as to the identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino
during the buy­bust and the ones presented before the trial court,
especially   considering   that   three   different   people,   during   the
interval, supposedly received and marked the same. To clarify the
matter,   the  prosecution  could  have  presented  as  witness  either
SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking
in   court,   but   unfortunately,   the   prosecution   chose   to   dispense
with  the   testimonies   of  both   officers.   This   omission   diminished
the   importance   of   the   markings   as   the   reference   point   for   the
subsequent   handling   of   the   evidence.   As   a   consequence,   an
objective   person   could   now   justifiably   suspect
the shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted
or contaminated.[30]
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain
of custody is fatal to its case as the Court can no longer consider
or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.[31]
In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime
charged, not because the Court accords credence to his defense of
frame­up,   but   because   the   prosecution   failed   to   discharge   its
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.­G.R. CR­H.C. No.
03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of
_______________
Notes.—While   a   perfect   chain   of   custody   is   almost   always
impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable
and   essential   in   the   prosecution   of   drug   cases   owing   to
susceptibility   to   alteration,   tampering,   contamination   and
even substitution   and   exchange—hence,   every   link   must   be
accounted for. (People vs. Gatlabayan,653 SCRA 803 [2011])
The presumption  of regularity  in the  performance of official
duty obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of
the   fact   that   the   law   enforcers   involved   deviated   from   the
standard   conduct   of   official   duty   as   provided   for   in   the   law—
otherwise,   where   the   official   act  in   question  is   irregular   on  its
face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. (People
vs. Lorena, 639 SCRA 139 [2011])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 212171. September 7, 2016.*
 
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.MERCURY   DELA   CRUZ alias “DEDAY,”   accused­
appellant.
Criminal   Law;   Dangerous   Drugs   Act;   Illegal   Sale   of
Dangerous Drugs;  The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur­
buyer   and   the   receipt   by   the   seller   of   the   marked   money
successfully   consummate   the   buy­bust   transaction.—We   have
consistently held that in order to secure a conviction for illegal
sale  of  dangerous drugs,  it is  necessary  that  the prosecution is
able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity
of   the   buyer   and   the   seller,   the   object   of   the   sale   and   its
consideration;   and   (2)   the   delivery   of   the   thing   sold   and   its
payment.  What is  material  is  the proof that  the  transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to
the   poseur­buyer   and   the   receipt   by   the   seller   of   the   marked
money successfully consummate the buy­bust transaction. Here,
all   the   aforesaid   elements   necessary   for   accused­appellant’s
prosecution   have   been   sufficiently   complied   with,   indubitably
establishing   that   she   has   indeed   committed   the   crime.   PO1
Reales   testified   in   detail   how   he   was   introduced   by   the
confidential   informant   to   accused­appellant.   The   confidential
informant, thereafter, manifested to the accused­appellant their
intention   to   buy   worth   P200.00.   Upon   giving   the   accused­
appellant the 2 marked P100.00 bills, she, in return, handed to
PO1   Reales   a   small   plastic   containing   white   crystalline
substance.   The   plastic   sachet   later   on   tested   positive   for   the
presence   of   Methamphetamine   Hydrochloride.   The   testimony
given by PO1 Reales was corroborated by SPO1 Batobalonos and
PO1 Bullido in all material details. It is therefore clear beyond
any   shadow   of   doubt   that   the   buy­bust   operation   had   been
substantially completed and consummated. The fact that accused­
appellant was able to evade the arrest immediately after the sale
and that she was arrested only after, by virtue of a warrant of
arrest,   did   not   change   the   fact   that   the   crime   she   committed
earlier had been consummated.
_______________
*  THIRD DIVISION.
 
 
382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dela Cruz
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; In the
absence of any intent or ill motive on the part of the police officers
to falsely   impute   commission   of   a   crime   against   the   accused­
appellant,   the   presumption   of   regularity   in   the   performance   of
official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail over
the   bare,   uncorroborated   denial   and   self­serving   claim   of   the
accused of frame­up.—We agree with the lower courts that in the
absence of any intent or ill motive on the part of the police officers
to   falsely   impute   commission   of   a   crime   against   the   accused­
appellant,   the   presumption   of   regularity   in   the   performance   of
official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail
over the bare, uncorroborated denial and self­serving claim of the
accused   of   frame­up.   Also,   we   reject   the   appellant’s   contention
that   the   police   officers   failed   to   comply   with   the   provisions   of
Section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, which provides for the
procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs.
Criminal   Law;   Dangerous   Drugs   Act;   Chain   of   Custody
Rule; To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to
present   through   records   or   testimony,   the   whereabouts   of   the
dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused
by the arresting officers; turned over to the investigating officer;
forwarded   to   the   laboratory   for   determination   of   their
composition;  and up to  the  time these  are offered  in evidence.—
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of
custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial compliance with
the   legal   requirements   on   the   handling   of   the   seized   item”   is
sufficient. This   Court   has   consistently   ruled   that   even   if   the
arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not
fatal   and   will   not   render   the   items   seized   inadmissible   in
evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the   accused. In   other   words,   to   be   admissible   in   evidence,   the
prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony,
the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were
seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned over to
the   investigating   officer;   forwarded   to   the   laboratory   for
determination of their composition; and up to the time these are
offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken,   as   in   this   case,   even   though   the   procedural
requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A.
 
383
VOL. 802, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016
People vs. Dela Cruz
No.   9165   were   not   faithfully   observed,   the   guilt   of   the
accused will not be affected.
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Presumption   of   Regularity;
Accused­appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence
was   tampered   or   meddled   with   in   order   to   overcome   the
presumption   of   regularity   in  the   handling   of   exhibits   by  public
officers   and   the   presumption   that   public   officers   properly
discharged   their   duties.—The   integrity   of   the   evidence   is
presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.
Accused­appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence
was   tampered   or   meddled   with   in   order   to   overcome   the
presumption  of regularity  in the  handling  of  exhibits  by  public
officers   and   the   presumption   that   public   officers   properly
discharged their  duties. Accused­appellant  in  this case  failed  to
present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of
the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending
officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, accused­appellant did
not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She
simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
   Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
We   resolve   the   appeal,   filed   by   accused­appellant   Mercury
Dela Cruz alias “Deday,” from the 27 September 2013 Decision 1 of
383 the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.­G.R. CR­H.C. No. 01103.
_______________
1  Rollo,   pp.   4­21;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Carmelita
Salandanan­Manahan,   with   Associate   Justices   Ramon   Paul   L.
Hernando and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano­Padilla, concurring.
  
 
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dela Cruz
In   a   Decision  dated   27   November   2008,   the   Regional   Trial
2 2  Records,   pp.   67­74;   docketed   as   Criminal   Case   No.   CBU­
Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, found the accused­appellant
guilty   of   illegal   sale   of shabu under   Section   5,   Article   II   of
Republic   Act   (R.A.)   No.   91653 and   sentenced   him   to   suffer   the
penalty life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The   RTC   gave   full   credence   to   the   testimonies   of   Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 2 Alejandro Batobalanos, Police Officer (PO)
1   Angsgar   Babyboy   A.   Reales,   and   PO1   Leopoldo   Bullido   who
conducted the buy­bust operation against the accused­appellant,
and   rejected   the   self­serving   defenses   of   denial   and alibi of
accused­appellant  and  her  live­in  partner.   The  RTC  noted  that
the   categorical   affirmation   of   accused­appellant   and   her   live­in
partner that the arresting officers did not demand anything from
them in exchange for the accused­appellant’s liberty created the
presumption   that   the   arresting   officers   were   performing   their
official functions regularly.4
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC’s ruling. The CA agreed with the RTC in giving weight to the
testimonies   of   the   prosecution   witnesses,   and   held   that   the
arresting   officers   complied   with   the   proper   procedure   in   the
custody and disposition of the seized drugs.
 
Our Ruling
 
We   dismiss   the   appeal   and   affirm   the   accused­appellant’s
guilt.
We find no reason to reverse the RTC’s findings, as affirmed
by the CA. In the same manner as the lower courts, we give full
credit to the positive, spontaneous and straightfor­
_______________
80787.
3  Otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.”
4  Records, pp. 73­74.
385
VOL. 802, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 385
People vs. Dela Cruz
ward   testimonies   of   the   police   officers   pointing   to   accused­
appellant as the seller and possessor of the confiscated shabu.
We have consistently held that in order to secure a conviction
for   illegal   sale   of   dangerous   drugs,   it   is   necessary   that   the
prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale
and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment.  What is  material  is  the proof that  the  transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to
the   poseur­buyer   and   the   receipt   by   the   seller   of   the   marked
money successfully consummate the buy­bust transaction. 5 Here,
all   the   aforesaid   elements   necessary   for   accused­appellant’s
prosecution   have   been   sufficiently   complied   with,   indubitably
establishing   that   she   has   indeed   committed   the   crime.   PO1
Reales   testified   in   detail   how   he   was   introduced   by   the
confidential   informant   to   accused­appellant.   The   confidential
informant, thereafter, manifested to the accused­appellant their
intention   to   buy   worth   P200.00.   Upon   giving   the   accused­
appellant the 2 marked P100.00 bills, she, in return, handed to
PO1   Reales   a   small   plastic   containing   white   crystalline
substance.   The   plastic   sachet   later   on   tested   positive   for   the
presence   of   Methamphetamine   Hydrochloride.   The   testimony
given by PO1 Reales was corroborated by SPO1 Batobalonos and
PO1 Bullido in all material details. It is therefore clear beyond
any   shadow   of   doubt   that   the   buy­bust   operation   had   been
substantially completed and consummated. The fact that accused­
appellant was able to evade the arrest immediately after the sale
and that she was arrested only after, by virtue of a warrant of
arrest,   did   not   change   the   fact   that   the   crime   she   committed
earlier had been consummated.
_______________
5  People v. Delos Santos, 645 Phil. 587, 601; 631 SCRA 350,
363 (2010), citing People v. Guiara, 616 Phil. 290, 302; 600 SCRA
310, 322­323 (2009), further citing People v. Gonzales, 430 Phil.
504, 513; 380 SCRA 689, 697 (2002).
 
 
386
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dela Cruz
We   agree   with   the   lower   courts   that   in   the   absence   of   any
intent   or   ill   motive   on   the   part   of   the   police   officers   to   falsely
impute commission of a crime against the accused­appellant, the
presumption of regularity  in the performance  of  official  duty  is
entitled  to  great  respect  and deserves  to  prevail   over  the  bare,
uncorroborated   denial   and   self­serving   claim   of   the   accused   of
frame­up.6
Also,   we   reject   the   appellant’s   contention   that   the   police
officers   failed   to   comply   with   the   provisions   of   Section   21,
paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, 7 which provides for the procedure
in the custody and disposition of seized drugs.
After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA
that   the   prosecution   had   established   the   unbroken   chain   of
custody over the seized drugs. This was established through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit: “At around 7:15
o’clock   in   the   evening   of   November   10,   2006,   PO3   Batobalonos,
PO1   Reales,   PO1   Bullido   and   their   civilian   asset   proceeded   to
Sitio  Cogon,  A.   Lopez  St.,   Barangay  Labangon.   When  the  team
went   inside   the   interior   portion   of   Sitio   Cogon,   PO1   Reales
together   with   the   civilian   asset   approached   the   house   of   Dela
Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido were strategically
hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. 
_______________
6  People v. Dumlao, 584 Phil. 732, 740; 562 SCRA 762, 769
(2008).
7  Section 21. Custody   and   Disposition   of   Confiscated,
Seized,   and/or   Surrendered   Dangerous   Drugs,   Plant   Sources   of
Dangerous   Drugs,   Controlled   Precursors   and   Essential
Chemicals,   Instruments/Paraphernalia   and/or   Laboratory
Equipment.—x x x
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the   drugs   shall   immediately   after   seizure   and   confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the   accused   or   the   person/s   from   whom   such   items   were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative   from   the   media   and   the   Department   of   Justice
(DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be  required   to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
387
VOL. 802, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 387
People vs. Dela Cruz
The civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy
shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a
small   plastic   containing   white   crystalline   substance   and   in
exchange he handed to the former the P200.00 bills. Upon getting
hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw
the consummation of the transaction rushed to  the  scene.  When
PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for help
and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team
chased   her,   however,   her   neighbor   Arthur   Tabasa   Ortega
(“Ortega”) blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as
policemen but Ortega did not listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a
warning shot as the people likewise started to gather around them.
Meanwhile,  Dela Cruz was able  to evade  arrest.  The team  then
arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice.
On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1
Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small plastic containing
white crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz.
Thereafter,   upon   arrival  at  the  police  station,   PO3   Batobalonos
marked the seized item with “DDM 11/10/06.”
Afterwards,   a   Request   for   Laboratory   Examination   of   the
seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. The Request and
the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office 7, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by
PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o’clock in the morning of November 11,
2006.
Thereafter   Forensic   Chemist   PCI   Salinas   issued   “Chemistry
Report No. D­1771­2006,”8 with the finding that the specimen gave
positive   result   for   the   presence   of   Methamphetamine
hydrochloride.9
_______________
8  Rollo, pp. 8­9. (Emphasis supplied)
9  Records,   p.   9;   as   evidenced   by   Chemistry   Report   No.   D­
1771­2006.
 
 
388
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dela Cruz
The   confiscated   dangerous   drug   which   also   constitutes
the corpus   delicti of   the   crime   was   validly   considered   by   the
courts in arriving at the decision despite the fact that the forensic
chemist  who  examined  it  did   not  testify   in  court.   The  relevant
portion of the RTC decision reads:
The presentation of the testimony of Forensic chemist PSI
MUTCHIT   G.   SALINAS was   dispensed   with,   the   defense
having ADMITTED:   the   existence   of   the   Letter   Request   dated
November 10, 2006 from the PNP Station 10; the existence of one
(1)   small   plastic   pack   containing   white   crystalline   substance
which is the subject for examination, however DENIED as to the
ownership of said evidence; the existence and due execution of the
Chemistry Report No. D­1771­2006 executed by witness Mutchit
G. Salinas; that the intended witness is and expert witness who
examined   the   specimen   found   to   contain   the   presence   of
Methylamphetamine   hydrochloride   locally   known   as shabu,   a
dangerous drug.10
 
Anent   accused­appellant’s   contention   that   the   drugs   were
marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at the
police station and that there was no physical inventory made on
the   seized   item   nor   was   it   photographed,   we   find   the   same
untenable.   The alleged  non  compliance   with  Section 21  of   R.A.
No.   9165   was   not   fatal   to   the   prosecution’s   case   because   the
apprehending   team   properly   preserved   the   integrity   and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs.11
Relevant to the instant case is the procedure to be followed in
the custody and handling of the seized dangerous drugs as
_______________
10  Id., at p. 67.
11  In People v.  Sanchez (590  Phil.  214,  234;  569  SCRA 194,
211­212   [2008]),   we   held   that   “noncompliance   with   the   strict
directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to
the prosecution’s case; [but these lapses] must be recognized and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity
and evidentiary  value of  the evidence seized  must  be shown to
have been preserved.”
 
 
389
VOL. 802, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 389
People vs. Dela Cruz
outlined   in  Section  21(a),   Article  II   of   the   Implementing   Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control   of   the   drugs   shall,   immediately   after   seizure   and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence  of  the  accused  or  the  person/s  from  whom  such  items
were   confiscated   and/or   seized,   or   his/her   representative   or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice   (DOJ),   and   any   elected   public   official   who   shall   be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided,   that   the   physical   inventory   and   photograph
shall   be   conducted   at   the   place   where   the   search   warrant   is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with
these   requirements   under   justifiable   grounds,   as   long   as   the
integrity   and   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items   are
properly   preserved   by   the   apprehending   officer/team,   shall   not
render  void  and  invalid  such   seizures  of  and  custody   over  said
items[.]
 
The   last   part   of   the   aforequoted   issuance   provided   the
exception   to   the   strict   compliance   with   the   requirements   of
Section   21   of   R.A.   No.   9165.   Although   ideally   the   prosecution
should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence,
“substantial   compliance   with   the   legal   requirements   on   the
handling   of   the   seized   item”   is   sufficient. 12 This   Court   has
consistently   ruled   that   even   if   the   arresting   officers   failed   to
strictly comply  with the  requirements under Section  21 of R.A.
No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render
the items seized inadmissible in evidence.13 What is of
_______________
12  People v. Cortez, 611 Phil. 360, 381; 593 SCRA 743, 764
(2009).
 13  People v. Almodiel, 694 Phil. 449, 467; 680 SCRA 306, 323
(2012); People v. Campos, 643 Phil. 668, 673; 629 SCRA 462, 468
 
 
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dela Cruz
utmost   importance   is   the   preservation   of   the   integrity   and
evidentiary   value   of   the   seized   items,   as   the   same   would   be
utilized   in   the   determination   of   the   guilt   or   innocence   of   the
accused.14 In   other   words,   to   be   admissible   in   evidence,   the
prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony,
the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were
seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned over to
the   investigating   officer;   forwarded   to   the   laboratory   for
determination of their composition; and up to the time these are
offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken,   as   in   this   case,   even   though   the   procedural
requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. 15
In   the   instant   case,   the   failure   to   strictly   comply   with   the
requirements   of   Sec.   21   of   R.A.   No.   9165   was   satisfactorily
explained   by   the   apprehending   officers.   They   testified   that   a
commotion erupted when accused­appellant resisted and shouted
for help while she was being arrested. The commotion eventually
gave accused­appellant the opportunity to run and elude arrest.
The   arresting   officers   further   alleged   that   the   people   who
gathered around them were already aggressive prompting them
to  decide  to  immediately   proceed   to  the  police   station  for  their
safety.16 In fact, the arresting officers even had to fire a warning
shot and arrest Arthur Tabasa Ortega,
_______________
(2010), citing People v. Concepcion, 578 Phil. 957, 971; 556 SCRA
421, 436­437 (2008).
14  People v. Magundayao, 683 Phil. 295, 321; 667 SCRA 310,
326 (2012); People v. Le, 636 Phil. 586, 598; 622 SCRA 571, 580
(2010),   citing People   v.   De   Leon,   624   Phil.   786,   801;   611   SCRA
118, 133 (2010), further citing People v. Naquita, 582 Phil. 422,
442; 560 SCRA 430, 448 (2008); People v. Concepcion, id.
15  People   v.   Manlangit,   654   Phil.   427,   440­441;   639   SCRA
455, 469­470 (2011), citing People v. Rosialda, 643 Phil. 712, 726;
629   SCRA   507,   522   (2010),   further   citing People   v.   Rivera,   590
Phil. 894, 912­913; 569 SCRA 879, 899 (2008).
16  TSN, 16 September 2008, p. 6; TSN, 21 October 2008, p. 6.
 
 
391
VOL. 802, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 391
People vs. Dela Cruz
the person who intervened in the arrest of accused­appellant, in
order for them to pacify the people around them.
The   integrity   of   the   evidence   is   presumed   to   have   been
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof
that   the   evidence   has   been   tampered   with.   Accused­appellant
bears the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or
meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity
in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption
that   public   officers   properly   discharged   their   duties.17 Accused­
appellant  in  this  case failed  to  present  any  plausible  reason  to
impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the
testimonies   of   the   apprehending   officers   deserve   full   faith   and
credit.18 In   fact,   accused­appellant   did   not   even   question   the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her
defense on denial and alibi.
We affirm the penalties imposed as they are well within the
ranges   provided   by   law.   Section   5,   Article   II   of   R.A.   No.   9165
prescribes   a   penalty   of   life   imprisonment   to   death 19 and   a   fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 for the sale of any
dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity or purity involved.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 27 September 2013 of the
Court   of   Appeals   in   C.A.­G.R.   CR­H.C.   No.   01103   is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta and Leonen,** JJ., concur.
_______________
17  People v. Miranda, 560 Phil. 795, 810; 534 SCRA 552, 568­
569 (2007).
18  See People v. Macabalang, 538 Phil. 136, 155; 508 SCRA
282, 300 (2006).
19  The imposition of the death penalty has been proscribed
with the effectivity of R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act
Prohibiting the imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.”
** Designated  additional   member  per  Raffle dated  8  August
2016.
 
 
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dela Cruz
Reyes, J., On Wellness Leave.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—The   lack   of   conclusive   identification   of   the   illegal
drugs  allegedly   seized  from  petitioner  due   to  the  failure  of  the
police   to   mark,   inventory   and   photograph   the   seized   plastic
sachet effectively negated the presumption of regularity. (People
vs. Sabdula, 722 SCRA 90 [2014])
 The   Prosecution   cannot   avoid   confronting   the   issue   of   the
broken   chain   of   custody   by   embellishing   its   case   with   the
presumption   of   regularity.   (People   vs.   Angngao, 752   SCRA 531
[2015])
 
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 181045. July 2, 2014.*
SPOUSES   EDUARDO   and   LYDIA   SILOS,   petitioners,   vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent.
Remedial   Law;   Civil   Procedure;   Appeals;   It   is   not   the
function   of   the   Supreme   Court   (SC)   to   reexamine   or
reevaluate   evidence   adduced   by   the   parties   in   the
proceedings   below.   The   rule   admits   of   certain   well­
recognized   exceptions.—Before   anything   else,   it   must   be
said that it is not the function of the Court to reexamine or
reevaluate   evidence   adduced   by   the   parties   in   the
proceedings   below.   The   rule   admits   of   certain   well­
recognized exceptions, though, as when the lower courts’
findings are not supported by the evidence on record or
are based on a misapprehension of facts, or when certain
relevant and undisputed facts were manifestly overlooked
that,   if   properly   considered,   would   justify   a   different
conclusion. This case falls within such exceptions.
Banks and Banking; Interest Rates; In a number of decided
cases, the Supreme Court (SC) struck down provisions in credit
documents   issued   by   Philippine   National   Bank   (PNB)   to,   or
required   of,   its   borrowers   which   allow   the   bank   to   increase   or
decrease interest rates “within the limits allowed by law at any
time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.”—A
not   factors   which   influence   the   fixing   of   interest   rates   to   be
imposed on him. Clearly, respondent’s method of fixing interest
rates based on  one­sided,  indeterminate, and  subjective criteria
such as profitability, cost of money, bank costs, etc. is arbitrary
for   there   is   no   fixed   standard   or   margin   above   or   below   these
considerations.
Same; Same; Any modification in the contract, such as the
interest rates, must be made with the consent of the contracting
parties.—Any   modification  in  the  contract,   such  as  the  interest
rates, must be made with the consent of the contracting parties.
The   minds   of   all   the   parties   must   meet   as   to   the   proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the
agreement. In the case of loan agreements, the rate of interest is
a principal condition, if not the most important component. Thus,
any   modification   thereof   must   be   mutually   agreed   upon;
otherwise, it has no binding effect.
Same;   Same;   Truth   in   Lending   Act   (R.A.   No.   3765);   The
Truth   in   Lending   Act,   or   Republic   Act   (R.A.)   No.   3765,   was
enacted “to protect citizens from a lack of awareness of the true
cost of credit to 
619
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 619
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
the user by using a full disclosure of such cost with a view of
preventing   the   uninformed   use   of   credit   to  the   detriment   of   the
national   economy.”—Accordingly,   petitioners   are   correct   in
arguing   that  estoppel   should   not   apply   to   them,   for   “[e]stoppel
cannot be predicated on an illegal act. As between the parties to a
contract,   validity   cannot   be   given   to   it   by   estoppel   if   it   is
prohibited by law or is against public policy.” It appears that by
its   acts,   respondent   violated   the   Truth   in   Lending   Act,   or
Republic   Act   No.   3765,   which   was   enacted   “to   protect   x x x
citizens from a lack of awareness of the true cost of credit to the
user   by   using   a   full   disclosure   of   such   cost   with   a   view   of
preventing the uninformed use of credit to the detriment of the
national economy.” The law “gives a detailed enumeration of the
specific information required to be disclosed, among which are the
interest   and   other   charges   incident   to   the   extension   of   credit.”
Section  4 thereof  provides  that a  disclosure  statement  must  be
furnished prior to the consummation of the transaction.
Same; Same; Same; By requiring the petitioners to sign the
credit   documents   and   the   promissory   notes   in   blank,   and   then
unilaterally   filling   them   up   later   on,   respondent   violated   the
Truth   in   Lending   Act,   and   was   remiss   in   its   disclosure
obligations.—By   requiring   the   petitioners   to   sign   the   credit
documents   and   the   promissory   notes   in   blank,   and   then
unilaterally   filling   them   up   later   on,   respondent   violated   the
Truth   in   Lending   Act,   and   was   remiss   in   its   disclosure
obligations.
Same; Same; Same; Loan and credit arrangements may be
made enticing by, or “sweetened” with, offers of low initial interest
rates, but actually accompanied by provisions written in fine print
that allow lenders to later on increase or decrease interest rates
unilaterally, without the consent of the borrower, and depending
on complex and subjective factors.—Loan and credit arrangements
may be made enticing by, or “sweetened” with, offers of low initial
interest rates, but actually accompanied by provisions written in
fine   print   that   allow   lenders   to   later   on   increase   or   decrease
interest rates unilaterally, without the consent of the borrower,
and depending on complex and subjective factors. Because they
have   been   lured   into   these   contracts   by   initially   low   interest
rates, borrowers get caught and stuck in the web of subsequent
steep rates and penalties, surcharges and the like. Being ordinary
individuals or entities, they naturally dread legal complications
and cannot afford court litiga­
620
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
20
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
tion; they succumb to whatever charges the lenders impose.
At the very least, borrowers should be charged rightly; but then
again this is not possible in a one­sided credit system where the
temptation   to   abuse   is   strong   and   the   willingness   to   rectify   is
made weak by the eternal desire for profit.
Same;   Same;   Starting   July  1,   2013,   the  prevailing   rate   of
interest shall be 6% per annum pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013)
and   Bangko  Sentral   ng   Pilipinas­Monetary   Board  Circular  No.
799.—With   regard   to   interest,   the   Court   finds   that   since   the
escalation clause is annulled, the principal amount of the loan is
subject   to   the   original   or   stipulated   rate   of   interest,   and   upon
maturity, the amount due shall be subject to legal interest at the
rate   of  12%  per   annum.   This   is  the   uniform   ruling   adopted   in
previous cases, including those cited here. The interests paid by
petitioners   should   be   applied   first   to   the   payment   of   the
stipulated or legal and unpaid interest, as the case may be, and
later, to the capital or principal. Respondent should then refund
the excess amount of interest that it has illegally imposed upon
petitioners; “[t]he amount to be refunded refers to that paid by
petitioners   when   they   had   no   obligation   to   do   so.”   Thus,   the
parties’   original   agreement   stipulated   the   payment   of   19.5%
interest; however, this rate was intended to apply only to the first
promissory   note  which  expired  on November  21,  1989  and  was
paid   by   petitioners;   it   was   not   intended   to   apply   to   the   whole
duration of the loan. Subsequent higher interest rates have been
declared   illegal;   but   because   only   the   rates   are   found   to   be
improper, the obligation to pay interest subsists, the same to be
fixed   at   the   legal   rate   of   12%   per   annum.   However,   the   12%
interest   shall   apply   only   until   June   30,   2013.   Starting   July   1,
2013,   the   prevailing   rate   of   interest   shall   be   6%   per   annum
pursuant to our ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439
(2013) and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas­Monetary Board Circular
No. 799.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is an elementary
principle in the subject of appeals that an appellee who does not
himself   appeal   cannot   obtain   from   the   appellate   court   any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
court below.—With regard to attorney’s fees, it was plain error for
the CA to have passed upon the issue since it was not raised by
the   petitioners   in   their   appeal;   it   was   the   respondent   that
improperly brought it up in
621
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 621
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
 its   appellee’s   brief,   when   it   should   have   interposed   an
appeal, since the trial court’s Decision on this issue is adverse to
it. It is an elementary principle in the subject of appeals that an
appellee   who   does   not   himself   appeal   cannot   obtain   from   the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in
the decision of the court below. x x x [A]n appellee, who is at the
same time not an appellant, may on appeal be permitted to make
counter   assignments   of   error   in   ordinary   actions,   when   the
purpose is merely to defend himself against an appeal in which
errors are alleged to have been committed by the trial court both
in the appreciation of facts and in the interpretation of the law, in
order   to   sustain   the   judgment   in   his   favor   but   not   when   his
purpose   is  to  seek  modification  or   reversal   of   the  judgment,   in
which   case   it   is   necessary   for   him   to   have   excepted   to   and
appealed from the judgment. Since petitioners did not raise the
issue   of   reduction   of   attorney’s   fees,   the   CA   possessed   no
authority to pass upon it at the instance of respondent. The ruling
of the trial court in this respect should remain undisturbed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Stephen C. Arceño for petitioners.
Lyna B. Brotarlo­Pasco for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In   loan   agreements,   it   cannot   be   denied   that   the   rate   of
interest   is   a   principal   condition,   if   not   the   most   important
component.   Thus,   any   modification   thereof   must   be   mutually
agreed  upon;  otherwise,   it has  no  binding  effect.   Moreover,   the
Court cannot consider a stipulation granting a party the option to
prepay   the   loan   if   said   party   is   not   agreeable   to   the   arbitrary
interest   rates   imposed.   Premium   may   not   be   placed   upon   a
stipulation   in   a   contract   which   grants   one   party   the   right   to
choose whether to continue with or withdraw from the agreement
if it discovers that what the other party has been doing all along
is improper or illegal.622
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 questions the May 8,
2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.­G.R. CV No.
79650, which affirmed with modifications the February 28, 2003
Decision3 and the June 4, 2003 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5975.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Eduardo and Lydia  Silos (petitioners)  have  been in
business for about two decades of operating a department store
and   buying   and   selling   of   ready­to­wear   apparel.   Respondent
Philippine   National   Bank   (PNB)   is   a   banking   corporation
organized and existing under Philippine laws.
To   secure   a   one­year   revolving   credit   line   of   P150,000.00
obtained   from   PNB,   petitioners   constituted   in   August   1987
a Real Estate Mortgage5 over a 370­square meter lot in Kalibo,
Aklan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T­14250.
In July 1988, the credit line was increased to P1.8 million and the
mortgage was correspondingly increased to P1.8 million. 6 And in
July   1989,   a Supplement to   the   Existing   Real   Estate
Mortgage7 was executed to cover the same credit line, which was
increased to P2.5 million, and additional security was given in the
form   of   a   134­square   meter   lot   covered   by   TCT   T­16208.   In
addition, petitioners issued eight
_______________ 
1 Rollo, pp. 9­45.
2 Id., at pp. 47­64; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P.
Acosta and concurred in by Executive Justice Arsenio J. Magpale
and Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon.
 3 Records, pp. 361­367; penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin.
4 Rollo, pp. 72­73.
5 Records, p. 94.
6 See Whereas Clause of Supplement to Existing Real Estate
Mortgage, id., at p. 10.
7 Id., at pp. 10­11.
623
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 623
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Promissory Notes8 and signed a Credit Agreement.9This July
1989 Credit Agreement contained a stipulation on interest which
provides as follows:
1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest
at the rate of 19.5% per annum. Interest shall be payable in
advance every one hundred twenty days at the rate prevailing at
the time of the renewal.
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the
interest   rate   in   the   Loan   depending   on   whatever   policy
the   Bank   may   adopt   in   the   future,   including   without
limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to
the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has
imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum, which is equal
to the Bank’s spread over the current floating interest rate, the
Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may, without need
of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its spread
over the  floating interest  rate at  any time depending on
whatever   policy   it   may   adopt   in   the   future.10 (Emphases
supplied)
   The eight Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a
stipulation granting PNB the right to increase or reduce interest
rates   “within   the   limits   allowed   by   law   or   by   the   Monetary
Board.”11 The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the same
right to increase or reduce interest rates “at any time depending
on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future.”12
Petitioners   religiously   paid   interest   on   the   notes   at   the
following rates:
1. 1st Promissory Note dated July 24, 1989 — 19.5%;
_______________ 
8 Rollo, p. 148.
9 Records, pp. 47­54.
10 Id., at p. 47.
11 Id., at p. 192.
12 Id., at p. 74, dorsal portion.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
2. 2nd Promissory Note dated November 22, 1989 — 23%;
3. 3rd Promissory Note dated March 21, 1990 — 22%;
4. 4th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1990 — 24%;
5. 5th Promissory Note dated December 17, 1990 — 28%;
6. 6th Promissory Note dated February 14, 1991 — 32%;
7. 7th Promissory Note dated March 1, 1991 — 30%; and
8. 8th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1991 — 24%.13
In   August   1991,   an Amendment   to   Credit
Agreement14 was   executed   by   the   parties,   with   the   following
stipulation regarding interest:
1.03. Interest   on   Line   Availments.   (a) The   Borrowers
agree to pay interest  on  each Availment from  date  of  each
Availment   up   to   but   not   including   the   date   of   full   payment
thereof at the rate per annum which is determined  by the
Bank to be prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of
the date of each Availment.15 (Emphases supplied)
  
Under   this   Amendment   to   Credit   Agreement,   petitioners
issued   in   favor   of   PNB   the   following   18   Promissory   Notes,
which petitioners settled — except the last (the note covering the
principal) — at the following interest rates:
 1. 9th Promissory Note dated November 8, 1991 — 26%;
 2. 10th Promissory Note dated March 19, 1992 — 25%;
 3. 11th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1992 — 23%;
 4. 12th Promissory Note dated November 10, 1992 — 21%;
 5. 13th Promissory Note dated March 15, 1993 — 21%;
 6. 14th Promissory Note dated July 12, 1993 — 17.5%;
 7. 15th Promissory Note dated November 17, 1993 — 21%;
_______________ 
13 Id., at pp. 192­199.
14 Id., at pp. 55­58.
15 Id., at p. 56.
625
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
 8. 16th Promissory Note dated March 28, 1994 — 21%;
 9. 17th Promissory Note dated July 13, 1994 — 21%;
10. 18th Promissory Note dated November 16, 1994 — 16%;
11. 19th Promissory Note dated April 10, 1995 — 21%;
12. 20th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1995 — 18.5%;
13. 21st Promissory   Note   dated   December   18,   1995   —
18.75%;
14. 22nd Promissory Note dated April 22, 1996 — 18.5%;
15. 23rd Promissory Note dated July 22, 1996 — 18.5%;
16. 24th Promissory Note dated November 25, 1996 — 18%;
17. 25th Promissory Note dated May 30, 1997 — 17.5%; and
18. 26th Promissory Note (PN 9707237) dated July 30, 1997
— 25%.16
The   9th up   to   the   17th promissory   notes   provide   for   the
payment of interest at the “rate the Bank may at any time without
notice, raise within the limits allowed by law x x x.”17 On the other
hand,   the   18th up   to   the   26thpromissory   notes   —   including   PN
9707237,   which   is   the   26th promissory   note   —   carried   the
following provision:
x x x For this purpose, I/We agree that the rate of interest
herein   stipulated   may  be  increased  or  decreased   for the
subsequent   Interest   Periods,   with   prior   notice   to   the
Borrower   in   the   event   of   changes   in   interest   rate
prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of the  Central
Bank   of  the Philippines,  or in  the  Bank’s  overall  cost   of
funds.   I/We   hereby   agree   that   in   the   event   I/we   are   not
agreeable to the interest rate fixed for any Interest Period,
I/we   shall   have   the   option   to   prepay   the   loan   or   credit
facility without penalty within ten (10)
625 _______________ 
16 Id., at pp. 174­191.
17 Id., at p. 191.
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
calendar   days   from   the   Interest   Setting
Date.18 (Emphasis supplied)
     Respondent   regularly   renewed   the   line   from   1990   up   to
1997,   and   petitioners   made   good   on   the   promissory   notes,
religiously paying the interests without objection or fail. But in
1997, petitioners faltered when the interest rates soared due to
the   Asian   financial   crisis.   Petitioners’   sole   outstanding
promissory note for P2.5 million — PN 9707237 executed in July
1997  and due  120  days  later or  on  October  28,  1997  —became
past   due,   and   despite   repeated   demands,   petitioners   failed   to
make good on the note.
Incidentally, PN 9707237 provided for the penalty equivalent
to 24% per annum in case of default, as follows:
Without need for notice or demand, failure to pay this note or
any installment thereon, when due, shall constitute default and
in   such   cases   or   in   case   of   garnishment,   receivership   or
bankruptcy or suit of any kind filed against me/us by the Bank,
the outstanding principal of this note, at the option of the Bank
and   without   prior   notice   of   demand,   shall   immediately   become
due and payable and shall be subject to a penalty charge of
twenty­four   percent   (24%) per   annum based   on   the
defaulted principal amount. x x x19 (Emphasis supplied)
     PNB prepared a Statement of Account 20 as of October 12,
1998, detailing the amount due and demandable from petitioners
in the total amount of P3,620,541.60, broken down as follows:
Principal                       P2,500,000.00
Interest                              538,874.94
_______________  the   Real   Estate   Mortgage   and   the   Supplement   thereto   did   not
18 Id., at p. 174.
19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 12.
627
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Penalties                                581,666.66
Total                                 P3,620,541.60
Despite   demand,   petitioners   failed   to   pay   the   foregoing
amount. Thus, PNB foreclosed on the mortgage, and on January
14, 1999, TCTs T­14250 and T­16208 were sold to it at auction for
the amount of P4,324,172.96.21 The sheriff’s certificate of sale was
registered on March 11, 1999.
More than a year later, or on March 24, 2000, petitioners filed
Civil  Case No.  5975,   seeking   annulment of  the foreclosure  sale
and an accounting of the PNB credit. Petitioners theorized that
after the first promissory note where they agreed to pay 19.5%
interest, the succeeding stipulations for the payment of interest in
their  loan  agreements  with  PNB  —  which   allegedly   left  to  the
latter the sole will to determine the interest rate — became null
and void. Petitioners added that because the interest rates were
fixed   by   respondent   without   their   prior   consent   or   agreement,
these rates are void, and as a result, petitioners should only be
made  liable  for  interest at the legal rate of  12%. They claimed
further that they overpaid interests on the credit, and concluded
that due to this overpayment of steep interest charges, their debt
should now be deemed paid, and the foreclosure and sale of TCTs
T­14250 and T­16208 became unnecessary and wrongful. As for
the imposed penalty of P581,666.66, petitioners alleged that since
include penalties as part of the secured amount, the same should
be excluded from the foreclosure amount or bid price, even if such
penalties   are   provided   for   in   the  final   Promissory   Note,   or   PN
9707237.22
In   addition,   petitioners   sought   to   be   reimbursed   an   alleged
627
overpayment of P848,285.00 made during the period August 21,
1991 to March 5, 1998, resulting from respondent’s impo­
_______________ 
21 Id., at p. 13.
22 Id., at pp. 68­70.
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
sition   of   the   alleged   illegal   and   steep   interest   rates.   They   also 25 Id., at p. 165.
prayed to be awarded P200,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees. 23 26 Id., at p. 149.
In its Answer,24 PNB denied that it unilaterally imposed or fixed 629
interest rates; that petitioners agreed that without prior notice,
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 629
PNB   may   modify   interest   rates   depending   on   future   policy
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
adopted  by   it;   and   that  the  imposition  of  penalties   was   agreed
all Promissory Notes she and Eduardo issued were always left in
upon   in  the  Credit  Agreement.   It  added  that  the  imposition  of
blank   when   they   executed   them,   with   respondent’s   mere
penalties   is   supported   by   the   all­inclusive   clause   in   the   Real
assurance that it would be the one to enter or indicate thereon the
Estate   Mortgage   agreement   which   provides   that   the   mortgage
prevailing interest rate at the time of availment; and that they
shall   stand   as   security   for   any   and   all   other   obligations   of
agreed to such  arrangement.  She further testified  that the two
whatever   kind   and   nature   owing   to   respondent,   which   thus
Real Estate Mortgage agreements she signed did not stipulate the
includes   penalties   imposed   upon   default   or   nonpayment   of   the
payment   of   penalties;   that   she   and   Eduardo   consulted   with   a
principal and interest on due date.
lawyer, and were told that PNB’s actions were improper, and so
On   pre­trial,   the   parties   mutually   agreed   to   the   following
on   March   20,   2000,   they   wrote   to   the   latter   seeking   a
material facts, among others:
recomputation of their outstanding obligation; and when PNB did
a) That since 1991 up to 1998, petitioners had paid PNB the
not oblige, they instituted Civil Case No. 5975.27
total amount of P3,484,287.00;25 and
On   cross­examination,   Lydia   testified   that   she   has   been   in
b) That PNB sent, and petitioners received, a March 10, 2000
business   for   20   years;   that   she   also   borrowed   from   other
demand letter.26
individuals and another bank; that it was only with banks that
During trial, petitioner Lydia Silos (Lydia) testified that the
she was asked to sign loan documents with no indicated interest
Credit   Agreement,   the   Amendment   to   Credit   Agreement,   Real
rate;   that   she   did   not   bother   to   read   the   terms   of   the   loan
Estate Mortgage and the Supplement thereto were all prepared
documents which she signed; and that she received several PNB
by respondent PNB and were presented to her and her husband
statements of account detailing their outstanding obligations, but
Eduardo only for signature; that she was told by PNB that the
she did not complain; that she assumed instead that what was
latter   alone   would   determine   the   interest   rate;   that   as   to   the
written therein is correct.28
Amendment to Credit Agreement, she was told that PNB would
For   his   part,   PNB   Kalibo   Branch   Manager   Diosdado   Aspa,   Jr.
fill   up   the   interest   rate   portion   thereof;   that   at   the   time   the
(Aspa),   the   sole   witness   for   respondent,   stated   on   cross­
parties executed the said Credit Agreement, she was not informed
examination that as a practice,  the  determination  of the  prime
about   the   applicable   spread   that   PNB   would   impose   on   her
rates of interest was the responsibility solely of PNB’s Treasury
account; that the interest rate portion of
Department   which   is   based   in   Manila;   that   these   prime   rates
_______________ 
were   simply   communicated   to   all   PNB   branches   for
23 Id., at p. 71.
implementation;   that   there   are   a   multitude   of   considerations
24 Id., at pp. 37­43.
which   determine   the   interest   rate,   such   as   the   cost   of   money,
foreign currency values, PNB’s spread, bank administrative costs,
profitability,   and   the   practice   in   the   banking   industry;   that   in
every repricing of each loan availment, the borrower has the right
to question the rates, but that this was
_______________  interest rates. An example of such a valid variable interest rate
27 Rollo, pp. 51­52.
28 Id., at p. 52.
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
not done by the petitioners; and that anything that is not found in
the   Promissory   Note   may   be   supplemented   by   the   Credit
Agreement.29
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On   February   28,   2003,   the   trial   court   rendered   judgment
dismissing Civil Case No. 5975.30 It ruled that:
1. While   the   Credit   Agreement   allows   PNB   to   unilaterally
increase   its   spread   over   the   floating   interest   rate   at   any   time
depending   on   whatever   policy   it   may   adopt   in   the   future,   it
likewise allows for the decrease at any time of the same. Thus,
such   stipulation   authorizing   both   the   increase   and   decrease   of
interest   rates   as   may   be   applicable   is   valid, 31 as   was   held   in
Consolidated   Bank   and   Trust   Corporation   (SOLIDBANK)   v.
Court of Appeals;32
_______________  petitioners’ loan, prevails over the Credit Agreement and the Real
29 Id., at pp. 52­53.
30 Records, pp. 361­367; penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin.
31 Id., at pp. 365­366.
32 408   Phil.   803,   811­812;   356   SCRA   671,   679   (2001).   The
Court therein held:
While   it   may   be   acceptable,   for   practical   reasons   given   the
fluctuating   economic   conditions,   for   banks   to   stipulate   that
interest   rates   on   a   loan   not   be   fixed   and   instead   be   made
dependent   upon   prevailing   market   conditions,   there   should
always   be   a   reference   rate   upon   which   to   peg   such   variable
was found in Polotan, Sr. v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the
contractual provision stating that “if there occurs any change in
the prevailing  market rates,  the new  interest  rate  shall be  the
guiding   rate   in   computing   the   interest   due   on   the   outstanding
obligation without need of serving notice to the Cardholder other
than the required posting on the monthly statement served to the
Cardholder” was considered valid. The aforequoted provision was
upheld notwithstanding that it may partake of the nature of an
escalation  clause, because at  the  same  time it  provides  for
the   decrease   in   the   interest   rate   in   case   the   prevailing
market rates dictate its reduction. In other words, unlike the
stipulation subject of the instant case, the interest rate 
631
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
      2. Banks   are   allowed   to   stipulate   that   interest   rates   on
loans   need   not   be   fixed   and   instead   be   made   dependent   on
prevailing rates upon which to peg such variable interest rates; 33
3. The Promissory Note, as the principal contract evidencing
Estate   Mortgage.   As   such,   the   rate   of   interest,   penalties   and
attorney’s   fees   stipulated   in   the   Promissory   Note   prevail   over
those   mentioned   in  the   Credit  Agreement   and   the   Real   Estate
Mortgage agreements;34
4. Roughly,   PNB’s   computation   of   the   total   amount   of
petitioners’ obligation is correct;35
 5. Because the loan was admittedly due and demandable, the
foreclosure was regularly made;36
6. By   the   admission   of   petitioners   during   pre­trial,   all
payments  made  to PNB  were properly applied  to the principal,
interest and penalties.37
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
IN   VIEW   OF   THE   FOREGOING,   judgment   is   hereby
rendered in favor of the respondent and against the petitioners by
DISMISSING the latter’s petition.
Costs against the petitioners.
_______________  Decision with the following decretal portion:
involved in the Polotan  case is  designed to  be based  on  the
prevailing   market   rate.   On   the   other   hand,   a   stipulation
ostensibly signifying an agreement to “any increase or decrease in
the interest rate,” without more, cannot be accepted by this Court
as valid for it leaves solely to the creditor the determination of
what   interest   rate   to   charge   against   an   outstanding   loan.
(Emphasis supplied)
33 Records, p. 365.
34 Id., at p. 366.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id., at p. 367.
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
 SO ORDERED. 38
   Petitioners   moved   for   reconsideration.   In   an   Order39dated
June 4, 2003, the trial court granted only a modification in the
award   of   attorney’s   fees,   reducing   the   same   from   10%   to   1%.
Thus,   PNB   was   ordered   to   refund   to   petitioner   the   excess   in
attorney’s fees in the amount of P356,589.90, viz.:
WHEREFORE,   judgment   is   hereby   rendered   upholding   the
validity of the interest rate charged by the respondent as well as
the   extrajudicial   foreclosure   proceedings   and   the   Certificate   of
Sale. However, respondent is directed to refund to the petitioner
the   amount   of   P356,589.90   representing   the   excess   interest
charged against the latter.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.40
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners appealed to the CA, which issued the questioned
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. The modified Decision of the Regional Trial
Court per Order dated June 4, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
1. [T]hat the interest rate to be applied after the expiration
of the first 30­day interest period for PN No. 9707237 should be
12% per annum;
2. [T]hat the attorney’s fees of 10% is valid and binding; and
_______________ 
38 Id.
39 Rollo, pp. 72­73.
40 Id., at p. 73.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
3. [T]hat [PNB] is hereby ordered to reimburse [petitioners]
the excess in the bid price of P377,505.99 which is the difference
between the total amount due [PNB] and the amount of its bid
price.
SO ORDERED.41
    On the other hand, respondent did not appeal the June 4,
2003   Order   of   the   trial   court   which   reduced   its   award   of
attorney’s fees. It simply raised the issue in its appellee’s brief in
the CA, and included a prayer for the reversal of said Order.
In effect,  the CA limited petitioners’ appeal to the following
issues:
1) Whether x x x the interest rates on petitioners’ outstanding
obligation were unilaterally and arbitrarily imposed by PNB;
2) Whether x x x the penalty charges were secured by the real
estate mortgage; and
3) Whether   x x x   the   extrajudicial   foreclosure   and   sale   are
valid.42
The CA noted that, based on receipts presented by petitioners
during trial, the latter dutifully paid a total of P3,027,324.60 in
interest for the period August 7, 1991 to August 6, 1997, over and
above the P2.5 million principal obligation. And this is exclusive
of payments for insurance premiums, documentary stamp taxes,
and penalty. All the while, petitioners did not complain nor object
to the imposition of interest; they in fact paid the same religiously
and without fail for seven years. The appellate court ruled that
petitioners are thus estopped from questioning the same.
The CA nevertheless noted that for the period July 30, 1997 to
August 14, 1997, PNB wrongly applied an interest
_______________  rate   to   be   reasonable   and   citing   the   Real   Estate   Mortgage
41 Id., at pp. 63­64.
42 Id., at p. 55.
634
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
rate   of   25.72%   instead   of   the   agreed   25%;   thus   it  overcharged
petitioners, and the latter paid, an excess of P736.56 in interest.
On the issue of penalties, the CA ruled that the express tenor
of   the   Real   Estate   Mortgage   agreements   contemplated   the
inclusion   of   the   PN   9707237   —   stipulated   24%   penalty   in   the
amount to be secured by the mortgaged property, thus —
For and in consideration of certain loans, overdrafts and other
credit accommodations obtained from the MORTGAGEE and to
secure   the   payment   of   the   same   and those   others   that   the
MORTGAGEE may extend to the MORTGAGOR, including
interest and expenses, and other obligations owing by the
MORTGAGOR   to   the   MORTGAGEE,   whether   direct   or
indirect,   principal   or   secondary,   as   appearing   in   the
accounts,   books   and   records   of   the   MORTGAGEE,   the
MORTGAGOR   does   hereby   transfer   and   convey   by   way   of
mortgage unto the MORTGAGEE x x x.43 (Emphasis supplied)
     The   CA   believes   that   the   24%   penalty   is   covered   by   the
phrase   “and   other   obligations   owing   by   the   mortgagor   to   the
mortgagee” and should thus be added to the amount secured by
the   mortgages.44The   CA   then   proceeded   to   declare   valid   the
foreclosure and sale of properties covered by TCTs T­14250 and T­
16208, which came as a necessary result of petitioners’ failure to
pay the outstanding obligation upon demand. 45 The CA saw fit to
increase the trial court’s award of 1% to 10%, finding the latter
agreement which authorized the collection of the higher rate.46
_______________ 
43 Records, p. 74.
44 Rollo, p. 61.
45 Id., at pp. 61­62.
46 Id., at p. 62.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
 Finally,   the   CA   ruled   that   petitioners   are   entitled   to
P377,505.09 surplus, which is the difference between PNB’s bid
price of P4,324,172.96 and petitioners’ total computed obligation
as  of  January   14,   1999,   or  the  date  of  the  auction  sale,   in  the
amount of P3,946,667.87.47
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
The following issues are raised in this Petition:
I II
A. THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS  AS  WELL   AS  THE  LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE INTEREST RATE
PROVISION IN THE CREDIT AGREEMENT DATED JULY 24,
1989   X X X   AND   IN   THE   AMENDMENT   TO   CREDIT
AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 21, 1991 X X X WHICH LEFT
TO   THE   SOLE   UNILATERAL   DETERMINATION   OF   THE
RESPONDENT   PNB   THE   ORIGINAL   FIXING   OF   INTEREST
RATE   AND   ITS   INCREASE,   WHICH   AGREEMENT   IS
CONTRARY TO LAW, ART. 1308 OF THE [NEW CIVIL CODE],
AS   ENUNCIATED   IN   PONCIANO   ALMEIDA   V.   COURT   OF
APPEALS,   G.R.   [NO.]   113412,   APRIL   17,   1996,   AND
CONTRARY   TO   PUBLIC   POLICY   AND   PUBLIC   INTEREST,
AND IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL ARISING
FROM   THE   ALLEGED   DELAYED   COMPLAINT   OF
PETITIONER[S], AND [THEIR] PAYMENT OF THE INTEREST
CHARGED.
B. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PNB IS
NOT   AT   ALL   ENTITLED   TO   ANY   INTEREST   EXCEPT   THE
LEGAL   RATE   FROM   DATE   OF   DEMAND,   AND   IN   NOT
APPLYING THE EXCESS OVER THE LEGAL
_______________  Credit Agreements and
47 Id., at p. 63.
636
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
RATE   OF   THE   ADMITTED   PAYMENTS   MADE   BY
PETITIONER[S] FROM 1991­1998 IN THE ADMITTED TOTAL
AMOUNT   OF   P3,484,287.00,   TO   PAYMENT   OF   THE
PRINCIPAL OF P2,500,000.[00] LEAVING AN OVERPAYMENT
OF   P984,287.00   REFUNDABLE   BY   RESPONDENT   TO
PETITIONER[S] WITH INTEREST OF 12% PER ANNUM.
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   AND   THE   LOWER   COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PENALTIES ARE INCLUDED IN
THE   SECURED   AMOUNT,   SUBJECT   TO   FORECLOSURE,
WHEN NO PENALTIES ARE MENTIONED [NOR] PROVIDED
FOR   IN   THE   REAL   ESTATE   MORTGAGE   AS   A   SECURED
AMOUNT AND THEREFORE THE AMOUNT OF PENALTIES
SHOULD   HAVE   BEEN   EXCLUDED   FROM   [THE]
FORECLOSURE AMOUNT.
III
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERRED   IN   REVERSING   THE
RULING   OF   THE   LOWER   COURT,   WHICH   REDUCED   THE
ATTORNEY’S FEES OF 10% OF THE TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS
CHARGED   IN   THE   X X X   EXTRAJUDICIAL   FORECLOSURE
TO ONLY 1%, AND [AWARDING] 10% ATTORNEY’S FEES.48
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist that the interest rate provision in the Credit
Agreement and the Amendment to Credit Agreement should be
declared null and void, for they relegated to PNB the sole power
to fix interest rates based on arbitrary criteria or factors such as
bank policy, profitability, cost of money, foreign currency values,
and bank administrative costs; spaces for interest rates in the two
_______________ 
 48 Id., at pp. 23­24.
637
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
the promissory notes were left blank for PNB to unilaterally fill,
and   their   consent   or   agreement   to   the   interest   rates   imposed
thereafter was not obtained; the interest rate, which consists of
the   prime   rate   plus   the   bank   spread,   is   determined   not   by
agreement of the parties but by PNB’s Treasury Department in
Manila.   Petitioners   conclude   that   by   this   method   of   fixing   the
interest rates, the principle of mutuality of contracts is violated,
and   public   policy   as   well   as   Circular   905 49 of   the   then   Central
Bank   had   been   breached.   Petitioners   question   the   CA’s
application of the principle of estoppel,  saying  that  no estoppel
can   proceed   from   an   illegal   act.   Though   they   failed   to   timely
question the imposition of the alleged illegal interest rates and
continued to pay the loan on the basis of these rates, they cannot
be deemed to have acquiesced, and hence could recover what they
erroneously paid.50
Petitioners argue that if the interest rates were nullified, then
their obligation to PNB is deemed extinguished as of July 1997;
moreover, it would appear that they even made an overpayment
to the bank in the amount of P984,287.00.
Next, petitioners suggest that since the Real Estate Mortgage
agreements   did   not   include   nor   specify,   as   part   of   the   secured
amount,   the   penalty   of   24%   authorized   in   PN   9707237,   such
amount   of   P581,666.66   could   not   be   made   answerable   by   or
collected   from   the   mortgages   covering   TCTs   T­14250   and   T­
16208.   Claiming   support   from Philippine   Bank   of
Communications [PBCom] v. Court of Appeals,51 petitioners insist
that the phrase “and other obligations owing by the
_______________ 
49 Which removed the ceiling on interest rates for secured and
unsecured loans, regardless of maturity (Section 1), but required
637 that   the   rate   of   interest   on   a   floating   rate   loan   during   each
interest period shall be stated on the basis of a reference rate plus
a margin as may be agreed upon by the parties (Section 7).
50 Rollo,   p.   167,   citing   United   Coconut   Planters   Bank   v.
Spouses Beluso, 557 Phil. 326; 530 SCRA 567 (2007).
51 323 Phil. 297; 253 SCRA 241 (1996).
638
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
mortgagor to the mortgagee”52 in the mortgage agreements cannot
embrace the P581,666.66 penalty, because, as held in the PBCom
case,   “[a]   penalty   charge   does   not   belong   to   the   species   of
obligations enumerated in the mortgage, hence, the said contract
cannot   be   understood   to   secure   the   penalty”;53 while   the
mortgages   are   the   accessory   contracts,   what   items   are   secured
may   only   be   determined   from   the   provisions   of   the   mortgage
contracts, and not from the Credit Agreement or the promissory
notes.
Finally,   petitioners   submit   that   the   trial   court’s   award   of   1%
attorney’s fees should be maintained, given that in foreclosures, a
lawyer’s work consists merely in the preparation and filing of the
petition, and involves minimal study. 54 To allow the imposition of
a   staggering   P396,211.00   for   such   work   would   be   contrary   to
equity.   Petitioners   state   that   the   purpose   of   attorney’s   fees   in
cases   of   this   nature   “is   not   to   give   respondent   a   larger
compensation   for   the   loan   than   the   law   already   allows,   but   to
protect it against any future loss or damage by being compelled to
retain   counsel   x   x   x   to   institute   judicial   proceedings   for   the
collection of its credit.”55 And because the instant case involves a
simple extrajudicial foreclosure, attorney’s fees may be equitably
tempered.
Respondent’s Arguments
For   its   part,   respondent   disputes   petitioners’   claim   that
interest rates were unilaterally fixed by it, taking relief in the CA
pronouncement   that   petitioners   are   deemed   estopped   by   their
failure to question the imposed rates and their contin­
_______________  never  raised in the  lower  court.  Besides,  documentary evidence
52 Records, p. 74.
53 Philippine   Bank   of   Communications   v.   Court   of
Appeals, supra note 51 at p. 313; p. 254.
54 Citing Mambulao Lumber Co. v. Philippine National Bank,
130 Phil. 366, 380­381; 22 SCRA 359, 372 (1968).
55 Citing New   Sampaguita   Builders   Construction,   Inc.   v.
Philippine National Bank, 479 Phil. 483, 510; 435 SCRA 565, 592
(2004).
639
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 639
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
ued payment thereof without opposition. It adds that because the
Credit   Agreement   and   promissory   notes   contained   both   an
escalation clause and a de­escalation clause, it may not be said
that   the   bank   violated   the   principle   of   mutuality.   Besides,   the
increase or decrease in interest rates have been mutually agreed
upon by the parties, as shown by petitioners’ continuous payment
without   protest.   Respondent   adds   that   the   alleged   unilateral
imposition of interest rates is not a proper subject for review by
the Court because the issue was never raised in the lower court.
As for petitioners’ claim that interest rates imposed by it are
null and void for the reasons that 1) the Credit Agreements and
the promissory notes were signed in blank; 2) interest rates were
at short periods; 3) no interest rates could be charged where no
agreement on interest rates was made in writing; 4) PNB fixed
interest rates on the basis of arbitrary policies and standards left
to   its  choosing;   and   5)   interest   rates   based   on  prime   rate  plus
applicable   spread   are   indeterminate   and   arbitrary   —   PNB
counters:
a. That Credit Agreements and promissory notes were signed
by petitioner[s] in blank — Respondent claims that this issue was
prevails over testimonial evidence; Lydia Silos’ testimony in this
regard is self­serving, unsupported and uncorroborated, and for
being the lone evidence on this issue. The fact remains that these
documents   are   in   proper   form,   presumed   regular,   and   endure,
against   arbitrary   claims   by   Silos   —   who   is   an   experienced
business person — that she signed questionable loan documents
whose provisions for interest rates were left blank, and yet she
continued   to pay   the  interests  without  protest  for   a  number  of
years.56
_______________ 
56 Rollo, pp. 100, 102.
640
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
    b. That interest rates were at short periods — Respondent
argues   that   the   law   which   governs   and   prohibits   changes   in
interest rates made more than once every twelve months has been
removed57 with the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 858.58
c. That no interest rates could be charged where no agreement
on interest rates was made in writing in violation of Article 1956
of the Civil Code,  which provides that no interest shall  be  due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing — Respondent
insists   that   the   stipulated   25% per   annum as   embodied   in   PN
9707237 should be imposed during the interim, or the period after
the loan became due and while it remains unpaid, and not the
legal interest of 12% as claimed by petitioners. 59
 d. That   PNB   fixed   interest   rates   on   the   basis   of   arbitrary
policies   and   standards   left   to   its   choosing   —   According   to
respondent,   interest   rates   were   fixed   taking   into   consideration
increases   or   decreases   as   provided   by   law   or   by   the   Monetary
Board, the bank’s overall costs of funds, and upon agreement of
the parties.60
e. That   interest   rates   based   on   prime   rate   plus   applicable
spread   are   indeterminate   and   arbitrary   —   On   this   score,
respondent   submits   there   are   various   factors   that   influence
interest rates, from political events to economic developments,
_______________  move   to   retain   ownership   over   these   properties,   because   they
57 Id., at p. 103.
58 Amending   Further   Act   Numbered   Two   Thousand   Six
Hundred   Fifty­Five,   as   Amended,   Otherwise   Known   as   the
“Usury Law.”
59 Rollo, pp. 103­104.
60 Id., at pp. 104­105.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
etc.;   the   cost   of   money,   profitability   and   foreign   currency
transactions may not be discounted.61
On   the   issue   of   penalties,   respondent   reiterates   the   trial
court’s finding that during pre­trial, petitioners admitted that the
Statement of  Account as of October 12,  1998 —  which detailed
and   included   penalty   charges   as   part   of   the   total   outstanding
obligation owing to the bank — was correct. Respondent justifies
the  imposition and  collection of a  penalty as  a normal banking
practice,   and   the   standard   rate   per   annum   for   all   commercial
banks, at the time, was 24%. Respondent adds that the purpose of
the   penalty   or   a   penal   clause   for   that   matter   is   to   ensure   the
performance of the obligation and substitute for damages and the
payment   of   interest   in   the   event   of   noncompliance. 62 And   the
promissory note — being the principal agreement as opposed to
the mortgage, which is a mere accessory — should prevail. This
being the case, its inclusion as part of the secured amount in the
mortgage agreements is valid and necessary.
Regarding   the   foreclosure   of   the   mortgages,   respondent
accuses petitioners of preempting consolidation of its ownership
over TCTs T­14250 and T­16208; that petitioners filed Civil Case
No.   5975   ostensibly   to   question   the   foreclosure   and   sale   of
properties covered by TCTs T­14250 and T­16208 in a desperate
failed to timely redeem them.
Respondent directs the attention of the Court to its petition in
G.R. No. 181046,63 where the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the
following issues is squarely raised:
_______________ 
61 Id., at pp. 106­107.
62 Citing Article 1226 of the Civil Code and Paras, Civil Code
of   the   Philippines   Annotated   (Commentaries)   Vol.   IV,   p.   298,
1989, 12th edition.
63 Philippine   National   Bank,   petitioner,   versus Spouses
Eduardo and Lydia Silos, respondents.
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642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
1. That the interest rate to be applied after the expiration of
the first 30­day interest period for PN 9707237 should be 12% per
annum; and
2. That  PNB  should  reimburse  petitioners  the  excess   in  the
bid price of P377,505.99 which is the difference between the total
amount due to PNB and the amount of its bid price.
Our Ruling
 The Court grants the Petition.
Before anything else, it must be said that it is not the function
of the Court to reexamine or reevaluate evidence adduced by the
parties in the proceedings below. The rule admits of certain well­
recognized exceptions, though, as when the lower courts’ findings
are not supported  by  the  evidence  on  record or are based on  a
misapprehension   of   facts,   or   when   certain   relevant   and
undisputed   facts   were   manifestly   overlooked   that,   if   properly
considered,   would   justify   a   different   conclusion.   This   case   falls
within such exceptions.
The   Court   notes   that   on   March   5,   2008,   a   Resolution   was
issued by the Court’s First Division denying respondent’s petition
in   G.R.   No.   181046,   due   to   late   filing,   failure   to   attach   the
required affidavit of service of the petition on the trial court and
the   petitioners,   and   submission   of   a   defective   verification   and
certification of nonforum shopping. On June 25, 2008, the Court
issued   another   Resolution   denying   with   finality   respondent’s
motion for reconsideration of the March 5, 2008 Resolution. And
on   August   15,   2008,   entry   of   judgment   was   made.   This   thus
settles the issues, as abovestated, covering a) the interest rate —
or 12% per annum — that applies upon expiration of the first 30
days interest period provided under PN 9707237, and b) the CA’s
decree that PNB should reimburse petitioner the excess in the bid
price of P377,505.09.
It   appears   that   respondent’s   practice,   more   than   once
proscribed by the Court, has been carried over once more to the
643
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
petitioners. In a number of decided cases, the Court struck down
provisions in credit documents issued by PNB to, or required of,
its   borrowers   which   allow   the   bank   to   increase   or   decrease
interest   rates   “within   the   limits   allowed   by   law   at   any   time
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.” Thus,
in Philippine   National   Bank   v.   Court   of   Appeals,64 such
stipulation and similar ones were declared in violation of Article
130865 of   the   Civil   Code.   In   a   second   case, Philippine   National
Bank v. Court of Appeals,66 the very same stipulations found in
the   credit   agreement   and   the   promissory   notes   prepared   and
issued   by   the   respondent   were   again   invalidated.   The   Court
therein said:
The Credit Agreement provided inter alia, that —
(a) The BANK reserves the right to increase the interest
rate   within   the   limits   allowed   by   law   at   any   time
depending   on   whatever   policy   it   may   adopt   in   the
future; Provided,   that   the   interest   rate   on   this
accommodation   shall   be   correspondingly   decreased   in   the
event that the applicable maximum interest is reduced by law
or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in
the   interest   rate   agreed   upon   shall   take   effect   on   the
effectivity  date  of  the  increase  or  decrease  in  the  maximum
interest rate.
The Promissory   Note,   in   turn, authorized   the   PNB   to
raise   the   rate   of   interest,   at   any   time   without   notice,
beyond   the   stipulated   rate   of   12%   but   only   “within   the
limits allowed by law.”
The Real Estate Mortgage contract likewise provided that—
_______________ 
643
64 273 Phil. 789, 796­797, 799; 196 SCRA 536, 543 (1991).
65 Art.    1308. The   contract   must   bind   both   contracting
parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one
of them.
66 G.R. No. 107569, November 8, 1994, 238 SCRA 20.
 644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
(k) INCREASE   OF   INTEREST   RATE: The   rate   of   interest
charged on the obligation secured by this mortgage as well as
the interest on the amount which may have been advanced by
the   MORTGAGEE,   in   accordance   with   the   provision
hereof, shall be subject during the life of this contract to
such an increase within the rate allowed by law, as the
Board of Directors of the MORTGAGEE may prescribe
for its debtors.
x x x x
In making the unilateral increases in interest rates, petitioner
bank   relied   on   the   escalation   clause   contained   in   their   credit
agreement which provides, as follows:
The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within
the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever
policy it may adopt in the future and provided, that, the
interest rate on this accommodation shall be correspondingly
decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest
rate is  reduced by law  or by the Monetary  Board.  In either
case,   the  adjustment  in  the   interest   rate  agreed   upon   shall
take effect on the effectivity date of the increase or decrease in
maximum interest rate.
This clause is authorized by Section 2 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1684 which further amended Act No. 2655 (“The Usury
Law”), as amended, thus:
Section 2. The  same  Act  is  hereby  amended   by   adding   a   new
section after Section 7, to read as follows:
Sec. 7­a. Parties   to   an   agreement   pertaining   to   a   loan   or
forbearance of money, goods or credits may stipulate that the rate
of interest agreed upon may be in645
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 645
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creased in the event that the applicable maximum rate of interest
is   increased   by   law   or   by   the   Monetary   Board; Provided,   That
such stipulation shall be valid only if there is also a stipulation in
the   agreement   that   the   rate   of   interest   agreed   upon   shall   be
reduced in the event that the applicable maximum rate of interest
is  reduced  by   law   or   by  the  Monetary   Board; Provided, further,
That the adjustment in the rate of interest agreed upon shall take
effect on or after the effectivity of the increase or decrease in the
maximum rate of interest.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1684 also empowered the Central Bank’s
Monetary Board to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for
loans and certain forbearances. Pursuant to such authority, the
Monetary   Board   issued   Central   Bank   (C.B.)   Circular   No.   905,
Series of 1982, Section 5 of which provides:
Sec. 5. Section   1303   of   the   Manual   of   Regulations   (for   Banks
and   Other   Financial   Intermediaries)   is   hereby   amended   to
read as follows:
Sec. 1303. Interest   and   Other   Charges.—The   rate   of   interest,
including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on
any   loan,   or   forbearance   of   any   money,   goods   or   credits,
regardless   of   maturity   and   whether   secured   or   unsecured,
shall   not   be   subject   to   any   ceiling   prescribed   under   or
pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended.
P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow
contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent
adjustment   in   the   interest   rate   that   shall   accrue   on   a   loan   or
forbearance of money, goods or
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
credits. In fine, they can agree to adjust, upward or downward,
the   interest   previously   stipulated. However,   contrary   to   the
stubborn  insistence  of  petitioner  bank,   the  said   law and
circular   did   not   authorize   either   party   to   unilaterally
raise the interest rate without the other’s consent.
It   is   basic   that   there   can   be   no   contract   in   the   true
sense   in   the   absence   of   the   element   of   agreement,   or   of
mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is wanting on
the   part   of   the   one   who   contracts,   his   act   has   no   more
efficacy   than   if   it   had   been   done   under   duress   or   by   a
person of unsound mind.
Similarly, contract   changes   must   be   made   with   the
consent   of   the   contracting   parties.   The   minds   of   all   the
parties   must   meet   as   to   the   proposed   modification,
especially   when   it   affects   an   important   aspect   of   the
agreement.   In   the   case   of   loan   contracts,   it   cannot   be
gainsaid   that   the   rate   of   interest   is   always   a   vital
component, for  it can  make or  break a  capital venture. Thus,
any change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is bereft
of any binding effect.
We   cannot   countenance   petitioner   bank’s   posturing
that the escalation clause at bench gives it unbridled right
to   unilaterally   upwardly   adjust   the   interest   on   private
respondents’ loan. That would completely take away from
private   respondents   the   right   to   assent   to   an   important
modification   in   their   agreement,   and   would   negate   the
element   of   mutuality   in   contracts.   In Philippine   National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, et al., 196 SCRA 536, 544­545 (1991) we
held—
x x x The unilateral action of the PNB in increasing the
interest rate on the private respondent’s loan violated the
mutuality of contracts ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil
Code:
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Art. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties;
its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the
force   of   law   between   the   parties,   there   must   be   mutuality
between the parties based on their essential equality. A contract
containing   a   condition   which   makes   its   fulfillment   dependent
exclusively upon the uncontrolled will  of one  of the  contracting
parties,   is  void  .   .   .   .   Hence,   even  assuming   that  the  .   .  .   loan
agreement between the PNB and the private respondent gave the
PNB a license (although in fact there was none) to increase the
interest   rate   at   will   during   the   term   of   the   loan,   that   license
would have been null and void for being violative of the principle
of   mutuality   essential   in  contracts.   It  would  have  invested   the
loan   agreement   with   the   character   of   a   contract   of   adhesion,
where   the   parties   do   not  bargain  on  equal   footing,   the   weaker
party’s (the debtor) participation being reduced to the alternative
“to take it or leave it” . . . . Such a contract is a veritable trap for
the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect against
abuse and imposition.67 (Emphases supplied)
     Then   again,   in   a   third   case, Spouses   Almeda   v.   Court   of
Appeals,68 the Court invalidated the very same provisions in the
respondent’s prepared Credit Agreement, declaring thus:
The   binding   effect   of   any   agreement   between   parties   to   a
contract   is   premised   on   two   settled   principles:   (1)   that   any
obligation arising from contract has the force
_______________ 
67 Id., at pp. 22­26.
 68 326 Phil. 309; 256 SCRA 292 (1996).
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
of law between the parties; and (2) that there must be mutuality
between   the   parties   based   on   their   essential   equality.   Any
contract which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of
the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is void. Any
stipulation  regarding   the validity   or  compliance  of  the  contract
which is left solely to the will of one of the parties, is likewise,
invalid.
It   is   plainly   obvious,   therefore,   from   the   undisputed
facts of the case that respondent bank unilaterally altered
the terms of its contract with petitioners by increasing the
interest rates on the loan without the prior assent of the
latter.   In   fact,   the   manner   of   agreement   is   itself   explicitly
stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides, in Article 1956 that
“No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated
in   writing.” What   has   been   “stipulated   in   writing”   from   a
perusal of interest rate provision of the credit agreement
signed between the parties is that petitioners were bound
merely to pay 21% interest, subject to a possible escalation
or de­escalation, when 1) the circumstances warrant such
escalation or de­escalation; 2) within the limits allowed by
law; and 3) upon agreement.
Indeed,   the  interest   rate   which   appears  to  have  been
agreed upon by the parties to the contract in this case was
the   21%   rate   stipulated   in   the   interest   provision.   Any
doubt   about   this   is  in   fact   readily   resolved   by   a   careful
reading of the credit agreement because the same plainly
uses the phrase “interest rate agreed upon,” in reference
to the original 21% interest rate. x x x
x x x x
Petitioners   never   agreed   in   writing   to   pay   the   increased
interest rates demanded by respondent bank in contravention to
the tenor of their credit agreement. That an increase in interest
rates   from   18%   to   as   much   as   68%   is   excessive   and
unconscionable   is   indisputable. Between   1981   and   1984,
petitioners   had   paid   an   amount   equivalent   to   virtually
half of the entire
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
principal   (P7,735,004.66)   which   was   applied   to   interest
alone.   By   the   time   the   spouses   tendered   the   amount   of
P40,142,518.00   in   settlement   of   their   obligations;
respondent bank was demanding P58,377,487.00 over and
above   those   amounts   already   previously   paid   by   the
spouses.
Escalation   clauses   are   not   basically   wrong   or   legally
objectionable so long as they are not solely potestative but based
on reasonable and valid grounds. Here, as clearly demonstrated
above,   not  only   [are]   the   increases   of  the  interest   rates   on  the
basis   of   the   escalation   clause   patently   unreasonable   and
unconscionable,   but   also   there   are   no   valid   and   reasonable
standards upon which the increases are anchored.
x x x x
In the face of the unequivocal interest rate provisions in the
credit agreement and in the law requiring the parties to agree to
changes   in   the   interest   rate   in   writing,   we   hold   that   the
unilateral and progressive increases imposed by respondent PNB
were   null   and   void.   Their   effect   was   to   increase   the   total
obligation   on   an   eighteen   million   peso   loan   to   an   amount   way
over   three   times   that   which   was   originally   granted   to   the
borrowers.   That   these   increases,   occasioned   by   crafty
manipulations   in   the   interest   rates   is   unconscionable   and
neutralizes   the   salutary   policies   of   extending   loans   to   spur
business cannot be disputed.69 (Emphases supplied)
    Still, in a fourth case, Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals,70 the above doctrine was reiterated:
The promissory note contained the following stipulation:
For   value   received,   I/we,   [private   respondents]   jointly   and
severally   promise   to   pay   to   the   ORDER   of   the   PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, at its office in San
_______________  provision   hereof, shall   be   subject   during   the   life   of   this
69 Id., at pp. 316­317, 322, 325; pp. 299­308.
70 328 Phil. 54; 258 SCRA 549 (1996).
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
Jose City, Philippines, the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND ONLY
(P15,000.00),   Philippine   Currency,   together with   interest
thereon   at   the   rate   of   12% per   annum until   paid,   which
interest   rate   the   Bank   may   at   any   time   without   notice,
raise within the limits allowed by law, and I/we also agree to
pay   jointly   and   severally   ____% per   annum penalty   charge,   by
way of liquidated damages should this note be unpaid or is not
renewed on due dated.
Payment of this note shall be as follows:
*THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE DAYS* AFTER DATE
On  the  reverse   side  of  the  note  the  following   condition  was
stamped:
All short­term loans to be granted starting January 1, 1978
shall   be   made   subject   to   the   condition   that   any   and/or   all
extensions hereof that will leave any portion of the amount still
unpaid after 730 days shall automatically convert the outstanding
balance into a medium or long­term obligation as the case may be
and give   the   Bank   the   right   to   charge   the   interest   rates
prescribed under its policies from the date the  account was
originally granted.
To   secure   payment   of   the   loan   the   parties   executed   a   real
estate mortgage contract which provided:
(k) INCREASE OF INTEREST RATE:
The rate of interest charged on the obligation secured by
this mortgage as well as the interest on the amount which may
have been advanced by the MORTGAGEE, in accordance with the
contract   to   such   an   increase   within   the  rate   allowed   by
law,   as   the  Board   of  Directors  of  the  MORTGAGEE   may
prescribe for its debtors.
x x x x
To begin with, PNB’s argument rests on a misapprehension of the
import   of   the   appellate   court’s   ruling.   The   Court   of   Appeals
nullified the interest rate increases651
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
not   because   the  promissory   note  did   not  comply   with   P.D.   No.
1684 by providing for a de­escalation, but because the absence of
such   provision   made   the   clause   so   one­sided   as   to   make   it
unreasonable.
That ruling is correct. It is in line with our decision in Banco
Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Navarro that although P.D.
No. 1684 is not to be retroactively applied to loans granted before
its effectivity, there must nevertheless be a de­escalation clause to
mitigate   the   one­sidedness   of   the   escalation   clause.   Indeed
because of concern for the unequal status of borrowers vis­à­vis
the banks, our cases after Banco Filipino have fashioned the rule
that any increase in the rate of interest made pursuant to
an   escalation   clause   must   be   the   result   of   agreement
between the parties.
Thus in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,
two   promissory   notes   authorized   PNB   to   increase   the
stipulated interest per annum “within the limits allowed
by law at  any time depending on whatever policy  [PNB]
may adopt in the future; Provided, that the interest rate
on   this   note   shall   be   correspondingly   decreased   in   the
event   that   the   applicable   maximum   interest   rate   is
reduced by law or by the Monetary Board.” The real estate
mortgage likewise provided:
The rate of interest charged on the obligation secured
by   this   mortgage   as   well   as   the   interest   on   the   amount
which may have been advanced by the MORTGAGEE, in
accordance   with   the   provisions   hereof,   shall   be   subject
during the life of this contract to such an increase within
the rate allowed by law, as the Board of Directors of the
MORTGAGEE may prescribe for its debtors.
Pursuant   to   these   clauses,   PNB   successively   increased   the
interest  from  18%  to  32%,   then  to  41%  and  then   to  48%. This
Court   declared   the   increases   unilaterally   imposed   by
[PNB]   to   be   in   violation   of   the   principle   of   mutuality as
embodied   in   Art.   1308   of   the   Civil   Code,   which   provides   that
“[t]he contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.” As the Court
explained:
In   order   that   obligations   arising   from   contracts   may
have the force of law between the parties, there must be
mutuality   between   the   parties   based   on   their   essential
equality.   A   contract   containing   a   condition   which   makes   its
fulfillment   dependent   exclusively   upon   the   uncontrolled   will   of
one of the contracting parties, is void (Garcia vs. Rita Legarda,
Inc., 21 SCRA 555). Hence, even assuming that the P1.8 million
loan   agreement   between   the   PNB   and   the   private   respondent
gave   the   PNB   a   license   (although   in   fact   there   was   none)   to
increase the interest rate at will during the term of the loan, that
license would have been null and void for being violative of the
principle   of   mutuality   essential   in   contracts.   It   would   have
invested the loan agreement with the character of a contract of
adhesion, where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the
weaker   party’s   (the   debtor)   participation   being   reduced   to   the
alternative “to take it or leave it” (Qua vs. Law Union & Rock
Insurance Co., 95 Phil. 85). Such a contract is a veritable trap for
the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect against
abuse and imposition.
A similar ruling was made in Philippine National Bank
v.   Court   of   Appeals.   The   credit   agreement   in   that   case
provided:
The   BANK   reserves   the   right   to   increase   the   interest
rate   within   the   limits   allowed   by   law   at   any   time
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future:
Provided, that the interest rate on this accommodation shall be
correspondingly   decreased   in   the   event   that   the   applicable
maximum interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. . .
.
As in the first case, PNB successively increased the stipulated
interest so that what was originally 12% per annum became, after
only two years, 42%. In declaring the increases invalid, we held:
653
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 653
 Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
We cannot countenance  petitioner bank’s posturing  that the
escalation clause at bench gives it unbridled right to unilaterally
upwardly adjust the interest on private respondents’ loan. That
would completely take away from private respondents the right to
assent   to   an   important   modification   in   their   agreement,   and
would negate the element of mutuality in contracts.
Only recently we invalidated another round of interest
increases decreed by PNB pursuant to a similar agreement
it had with other borrowers:
[W]hile the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by
C.B. Circular 905, nothing in the said circular could possibly
be   read   as   granting   respondent   bank   carte   blanche
authority   to   raise   interest   rates   to   levels   which   would
either enslave its borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of
their assets.
In this case no attempt was made by PNB to secure the
conformity   of   private   respondents   to   the   successive
increases in the interest rate. Private respondents’ assent
to   the   increases   cannot   be   implied   from   their   lack   of
response to the letters sent by PNB, informing them of the
increases.   For   as   stated   in   one   case,   no   one   receiving   a
proposal   to   change   a   contract   is   obliged   to   answer   the
proposal.71(Emphasis supplied)
     We   made   the   same   pronouncement   in   a   fifth   case, New
Sampaguita   Builders   Construction,   Inc.   v.   Philippine   National
Bank,72 thus—
Courts   have   the   authority   to   strike   down   or   to   modify
provisions   in   promissory   notes   that   grant   the   lenders
unrestrained power to increase interest rates, penalties and other
charges   at   the   latter’s   sole   discretion   and   without   giving   prior
notice   to   and   securing   the   consent   of   the   borrowers.   This
unilateral authority is anathema to the
_______________ 
71 Id., at pp. 56­57, 60­63; pp. 550­557.
72 Supra note 55.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
mutuality   of   contracts   and   enable   lenders   to   take   undue
advantage   of   borrowers.   Although   the   Usury   Law   has   been
effectively   repealed,   courts   may   still   reduce   iniquitous   or
unconscionable   rates   charged   for   the   use   of
money. Furthermore,   excessive   interests,   penalties   and
other charges not revealed in disclosure statements issued
by   banks,   even   if   stipulated   in   the   promissory   notes,
cannot   be   given   effect   under   the   Truth   in   Lending
Act.73 (Emphasis supplied)
    Yet again, in a sixth disposition, Philippine National Bank
v.   Spouses   Rocamora,74 the   above   pronouncements   were
reiterated to debunk PNB’s repeated reliance on its invalidated
contract stipulations:
We   repeated   this   rule   in   the   1994   case   of PNB   v.   CA   and
Jayme­Fernandez and the 1996 case of PNB v. CA and Spouses
Basco. Taking no heed of these rulings, the escalation clause
PNB   used   in   the   present   case   to   justify   the   increased   interest
rates   is   no   different   from   the   escalation   clause   assailed   in   the
1996 PNB case; in both, the interest rates were increased from
the agreed 12% per annum rate to 42%. x x x
x x x x
On the strength of this ruling, PNB’s argument — that
the   spouses   Rocamora’s   failure   to   contest   the   increased
interest   rates   that   were   purportedly   reflected   in   the
statements of account and the demand letters sent by the
bank amounted to their implied acceptance of the increase
— should likewise fail.
Evidently,   PNB’s   failure   to   secure   the   spouses   Rocamora’s
consent to the increased interest rates prompted the lower courts
to declare excessive and illegal the interest rates imposed. To go
around this lower court finding, PNB alleges that the P206,297.47
deficiency
_______________  over the  floating interest  rate at  any time depending on
73 Id., at p. 486; p. 571.
74 616 Phil. 369; 600 SCRA 395 (2009).
655
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 655
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
claim   was   computed   using   only   the   original   12% per
annum interest rate. We find this unlikely. Our examination of
PNB’s  own  ledgers,   included   in  the  records  of  the  case,   clearly
indicates that PNB imposed interest rates higher than the agreed
12% per   annum rate.   This   confirmatory   finding,   albeit   based
solely on ledgers found in the records, reinforces the application
in this case of the rule that findings of the RTC, when affirmed by
the CA, are binding upon this Court.75 (Emphases supplied)
    Verily,   all   these   cases,   including   the   present   one,   involve
identical   or   similar   provisions   found   in   respondent’s   credit
agreements   and   promissory   notes.   Thus,   the   July   1989   Credit
Agreement executed by petitioners and respondent contained the
following stipulation on interest:
1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the
rate of 19.5% [per annum]. Interest shall be payable in advance
every one hundred twenty days at the rate prevailing at the time
of the renewal.
(b) The   Borrower   agrees   that the   Bank   may   modify   the
interest   rate   in   the   Loan   depending   on   whatever   policy
the   Bank   may   adopt   in   the   future,   including   without
limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to
the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has
imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum which is equal
to the Bank’s spread over the current floating interest rate, the
Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may, without need
of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its spread
whatever   policy   it   may   adopt   in   the   future.76 (Emphases
supplied)
while   the   eight   promissory   notes   issued   pursuant   thereto
granted PNB the right to increase or reduce interest rates
_______________ 
75 Id., at pp. 382­383; 409­410.
76 Records, p. 74.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
“within the limits allowed by law or the Monetary Board”77 and
the Real Estate Mortgage agreement included the same right to
increase   or   reduce   interest   rates   “at   any   time   depending   on
whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future.”78
On   the   basis   of   the   Credit   Agreement,   petitioners   issued
promissory   notes   which   they   signed   in   blank,   and   respondent
later on entered their corresponding interest rates, as follows:
1st Promissory Note dated July 24, 1989 — 19.5%;
2nd Promissory Note dated November 22, 1989 — 23%;
3rd Promissory Note dated March 21, 1990 — 22%;
4th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1990 — 24%;
5th Promissory Note dated December 17, 1990 — 28%;
 6th Promissory Note dated February 14, 1991 — 32%;
7th Promissory Note dated March 1, 1991 — 30%; and
8th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1991 — 24%.79
On   the   other   hand,   the   August   1991   Amendment   to   Credit
Agreement contains the following stipulation regarding interest:
1.03. Interest   on   Line   Availments.   (a) The   Borrowers
agree to pay interest  on  each Availment from  date  of  each
Availment   up   to   but   not   including   the   date   of   full   payment
thereof at the rate per annum which is determined  by the
Bank to be prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of
the date of each Availment.80 (Emphases supplied)
and under this Amendment to Credit Agreement, petitioners
again executed and signed the following promissory notes in
_______________  the other hand, the 18th up to the 26th promissory notes — which
77 Id., at p. 192.
78 Id., at p. 74, dorsal portion.
79 Id., at pp. 192­199.
80 Id., at p. 56.
657
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 657
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
blank,   for   the   respondent   to   later   on   enter   the   corresponding
interest rates, which it did, as follows:
 9th Promissory Note dated November 8, 1991 — 26%;
10th Promissory Note dated March 19, 1992 — 25%;
11th Promissory Note dated July 11, 1992 — 23%;
12th Promissory Note dated November 10, 1992 — 21%;
13th Promissory Note dated March 15, 1993 — 21%;
14th Promissory Note dated July 12, 1993 — 17.5%;
15th Promissory Note dated November 17, 1993 — 21%;
16th Promissory Note dated March 28, 1994 — 21%;
17th Promissory Note dated July 13, 1994 — 21%;
18th Promissory Note dated November 16, 1994 — 16%;
19th Promissory Note dated April 10, 1995 — 21%;
20th Promissory Note dated July 19, 1995 — 18.5%;
21st Promissory Note dated December 18, 1995 — 18.75%;
22nd Promissory Note dated April 22, 1996 — 18.5%;
23rd Promissory Note dated July 22, 1996 — 18.5%;
24th Promissory Note dated November 25, 1996 — 18%;
25th Promissory Note dated May 30, 1997 — 17.5%; and
26th Promissory Note (PN 9707237) dated July 30, 1997 —
25%.81
The   9th up   to   the   17th promissory   notes   provide   for   the
payment   of   interest   at   the   “rate   the   Bank   may   at   any   time
without notice, raise within the limits allowed by law x x x.” 82 On
includes PN 9707237 — carried the following provision:
x x x For this purpose, I/We agree that the rate of interest
herein   stipulated   may  be  increased  or  decreased   for the
subsequent Interest Periods, with 
_______________ 
81 Id., at pp. 174­191.
82 Id., at p. 191.
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
prior   notice   to   the   Borrower   in   the   event   of   changes   in
interest rate prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of
the   Central   Bank   of   the   Philippines,   or   in   the   Bank’s
overall cost of funds. I/We hereby agree that in the event
I/we   are  not   agreeable   to   the   interest   rate   fixed   for   any
Interest Period, I/we shall have the option to prepay the
loan   or   credit   facility   without   penalty   within   ten   (10)
calendar  days  from   the  Interest   Setting  Date.83 (Emphasis
supplied)
 
These stipulations must be once more invalidated, as was done
in previous cases. The common denominator in these cases is the
lack of agreement of the parties to the imposed interest rates. For
this case, this lack of consent by the petitioners has been made
obvious by the fact that they signed the promissory notes in blank
for the respondent to fill. We find credible the testimony of Lydia
in   this   respect.   Respondent   failed   to   discredit   her;   in   fact,   its
witness PNB Kalibo Branch Manager Aspa admitted that interest
rates   were   fixed   solely   by   its   Treasury   Department   in   Manila,
which were then simply communicated to all PNB branches for
implementation.   If  this  were   the  case,   then  this  would   explain
why petitioners had to sign the promissory notes in blank, since
the imposable interest rates have yet to be determined and fixed
by respondent’s Treasury Department in Manila.
Moreover, in Aspa’s enumeration of the factors that determine
the   interest   rates   PNB   fixes   —   such   as   cost   of   money,   foreign
currency   values,   bank   administrative   costs,   profitability,   and
considerations which affect the banking industry — it can be seen
that considerations which affect PNB’s borrowers are ignored. A
borrower’s current financial state, his feedback or opinions, the
nature   and   purpose   of   his   borrowings,   the   effect   of   foreign
currency   values   or   fluctuations   on   his   business   or
borrowing, etc. — these are not factors which influ­
_______________  the LENDER (UCPB) after due consideration of all dealings with
83 Id., at p. 174.
659
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
ence the fixing of interest rates to be imposed on him. Clearly,
respondent’s method of fixing interest rates based on one­sided,
indeterminate, and subjective criteria such as profitability, cost of
money, bank costs, etc. is arbitrary for there is no fixed standard
or margin above or below these considerations.
The stipulation in the promissory notes subjecting the interest
rate to review does not render the imposition by UCPB of interest
rates on the obligations of the spouses Beluso valid. According to
said stipulation:
The interest rate shall be subject to review and may be increased
or   decreased   by   the   LENDER considering   among   others
the   prevailing   financial   and   monetary   conditions;   or
the rate of interest and charges which other banks or
financial   institutions   charge   or   offer   to   charge   for
similar   accommodations;   and/or   the   resulting
profitability to the LENDER after due consideration of all
dealings with the BORROWER.
It   should   be pointed   out   that  the authority to  review
the interest rate was given [to] UCPB alone as the lender.
Moreover,   UCPB   may   apply   the   considerations   enumerated   in
this   provision   as   it   wishes.   As   worded   in   the   above   provision,
UCPB   may   give   as   much   weight   as   it   desires   to   each   of   the
following   considerations:   (1)   the   prevailing   financial   and
monetary   condition;   (2)   the   rate   of   interest   and   charges   which
other banks or financial institutions charge or offer to charge for
similar accommodations; and/or (3) the resulting profitability to
the BORROWER (the spouses Beluso). Again, as in the case of
the interest rate provision, there is no fixed margin above
or below these considerations.
659
In view of the foregoing, the Separability Clause cannot save
either of the two options of UCPB as to the
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
interest   to   be   imposed,   as   both   options   violate   the   principle   of
mutuality of contracts.84 (Emphases supplied)
 
To  repeat what has been  said in  the above cited cases,   any
modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be
made with the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all
the parties must meet as to the proposed modification, especially
when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case
of loan agreements, the rate of interest is a principal condition, if
not   the   most   important   component.   Thus,   any   modification
thereof   must   be   mutually   agreed   upon;   otherwise,   it   has   no
binding effect.
What   is   even   more   glaring   in   the   present   case   is   that,   the
stipulations in question no longer provide that the parties shall
agree upon the interest rate to be fixed; instead, they are worded
in such a way that the borrower shall agree to whatever interest
rate   respondent   fixes.   In   credit   agreements   covered   by   the
abovecited cases, it is provided that:
The   Bank   reserves   the   right   to   increase   the   interest   rate
within   the   limits   allowed   by   law   at   any   time   depending   on
whatever   policy   it  may   adopt   in  the  future: Provided,   that,   the
interest   rate   on   this   accommodation   shall   be   correspondingly
decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest rate
is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the
adjustment in the interest rate agreed upon shall take effect
on the effectivity  date of the increase or decrease in  maximum
interest rate.85 (Emphasis supplied)
 
Whereas, in the present credit agreements under scrutiny, it
is stated that:
_______________ 
84 United   Coconut   Planters   Bank   v.   Spouses
Beluso, supra note 50 at pp. 342­343; p. 584.
85 See Philippine   National   Bank   v.   Court   of   Appeals, supra
note 66 at p. 22.
661
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 661
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
IN THE JULY 1989 CREDIT AGREEMENT
(b) The   Borrower   agrees that   the   Bank   may   modify   the
interest rate on the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank
may adopt in the future, including without limitation, the shifting
from the floating interest rate system to the fixed interest rate
system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan
interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Bank’s spread
over   the   current   floating   interest   rate, the   Borrower   hereby
agrees that   the   Bank   may, without   need   of   notice   to   the
Borrower,   increase   or   decrease   its   spread   over   the   floating
interest  rate  at any   time  depending   on  whatever  policy   it  may
adopt in the future.86 (Emphases supplied)
IN   THE   AUGUST   1991   AMENDMENT   TO   CREDIT
AGREEMENT
1.03. Interest   on   Line   Availments.   (a) The   Borrowers
agree to   pay   interest   on   each   Availment   from   date   of   each
Availment up to but not including the date of full payment thereof
at   the   rate per   annum which   is   determined   by   the   Bank   to   be
prime rate plus applicable spread in effect as of the date of each
Availment.87(Emphasis supplied)
 Plainly,   with   the   present   credit   agreement,   the   element   of
consent or agreement by the borrower is now completely lacking,
which   makes   respondent’s   unlawful   act   all   the   more
reprehensible.   clauses (1) and (2);
Accordingly,   petitioners   are  correct  in  arguing   that  estoppel
should not apply to them, for “[e]stoppel cannot be predicated on
an   illegal   act.   As   between   the   parties   to   a   contract,   validity
cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by
_______________  _______________
86 Records, p. 47.
87 Id., at p. 56.
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law   or   is   against   public   policy.”88 It   appears   that   by   its   acts,
respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, or Republic Act No.
3765, which was enacted “to protect x x x citizens from a lack of
awareness  of the  true  cost  of credit to the  user by  using  a full
disclosure of such cost with a view of preventing the uninformed
use of credit to the detriment of the national economy.” 89 The law
“gives a detailed enumeration of the specific information required
to be disclosed, among which are the interest and other charges
incident  to  the  extension  of  credit.”90 Section  4  thereof   provides
that   a   disclosure   statement   must   be   furnished   prior   to   the
consummation of the transaction, thus:
SEC. 4. Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom
credit is extended, prior to the consummation of the transaction, a
clear statement in writing setting forth, to the extent applicable
and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the
Board, the following information:
(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service
to be acquired;
(2) the   amounts,   if   any,   to   be   credited   as   down   payment
and/or trade­in;
(3) the   difference   between   the   amounts   set   forth   under
(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be
paid by such person in connection with the transaction but which
are not incident to the extension of credit;
(5) the total amount to be financed;
 
88 United   Coconut   Planters   Bank   v.   Spouses
Beluso, supra note 50 at p. 343; p. 585.
89 Section 2 thereof.
90 Heirs of Zoilo Espiritu v. Spouses Landrito, 549 Phil. 180,
190­191; 520 SCRA 383, 391­392 (2007).
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
(6) the   finance   charge   expressed   in   terms   of   pesos   and
centavos; and
(7) the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount
to   be   financed   expressed   as   a   simple   annual   rate   on   the
outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation.
 
Under Section 4(6), “finance charge” represents the amount to be
paid   by   the   debtor   incident   to   the   extension   of   credit   such   as
interest   or   discounts,   collection   fees,   credit   investigation   fees,
attorney’s   fees,   and   other   service   charges.   The   total   finance
charge   represents   the   difference   between   (1)   the   aggregate
consideration (down payment plus installments) on the part of the
debtor,   and   (2)   the   sum   of   the   cash   price   and   nonfinance
charges.91
 By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit documents and
the promissory notes in blank, and then unilaterally filling them
up later on, respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, and
was remiss in its disclosure obligations. In one case, which the
Court finds applicable here, it was held:
UCPB further argues that since the spouses Beluso were
duly   given   copies   of   the   subject   promissory   notes   after
their execution, then they were duly notified of the terms
thereof,   in   substantial   compliance   with   the   Truth   in
Lending Act.
Once more, we disagree. Section 4 of the Truth in Lending Act
clearly provides that the disclosure statement must be furnished
prior to the consummation of the transaction:
SEC. 4. Any   creditor   shall   furnish   to   each   person   to   whom
credit   is   extended,   prior   to   the   consummation   of   the
transaction, a clear statement in writing setting forth, to the
extent applicable and in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board, the following information:
_______________ 
91 Central Bank Circular No. 158.
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664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to
be acquired;
(2) the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or
trade­in;
(3) the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses
(1) and (2);
(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be
paid   by   such   person   in  connection   with   the   transaction   but
which are not incident to the extension of credit;
(5) the total amount to be financed;
(6) the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos;
and
(7) the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to
be   financed   expressed   as   a   simple   annual   rate   on   the
outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation.
The   rationale   of   this   provision   is   to   protect   users   of
credit  from a lack of awareness  of the true cost thereof,
proceeding   from   the   experience   that   banks   are   able   to
conceal such true cost by hidden charges, uncertainty of
interest   rates,   deduction   of   interests   from   the   loaned
amount,   and   the   like.   The   law   thereby   seeks   to   protect
debtors   by   permitting   them   to   fully   appreciate   the   true
cost of their loan, to enable them to give full consent to the
contract,   and   to   properly   evaluate   their   options   in
arriving   at   business   decisions.   Upholding   UCPB’s   claim   of
substantial compliance would defeat these purposes of the Truth
in   Lending   Act. The   belated   discovery   of   the   true   cost   of
credit will too often not be able to reverse the ill effects of
an already consummated business decision.
In addition, the promissory notes, the copies of which
were presented to the spouses Beluso after execution, are
not   sufficient   notification   from   UCPB.   As   earlier
discussed,   the   interest   rate   provision   therein   does   not
sufficiently indicate with particularity the interest rate to
be   applied   to   the   loan   covered   by   said   promissory
notes.92 (Emphases supplied)
 
However,   the   one­year   period   within   which   an   action   for
violation   of   the   Truth   in   Lending   Act   may   be   filed   evidently
prescribed   long   ago,   or   sometime   in   2001,   one   year   after
petitioners   received   the   March   2000   demand   letter   which
contained the illegal charges.
The fact that petitioners later received several statements of
account   detailing   its   outstanding   obligations   does   not   cure
respondent’s breach. To repeat, the belated discovery of the true
cost   of   credit   does   not   reverse   the   ill   effects   of   an   already
consummated business decision.93Neither may the statements be
considered   proposals   sent   to   secure   the   petitioners’   conformity;
they were sent after the imposition and application of the interest
rate,   and   not   before.   And   even   if   it   were   to   be   presumed   that
these   are   proposals   or   offers,   there   was   no   acceptance   by
petitioners.   “No   one   receiving   a   proposal   to   modify   a   loan
contract,   especially  regarding   interest,   is  obliged  to  answer  the
proposal.”94
Loan and credit arrangements  may  be made enticing  by,  or
“sweetened” with, offers of low initial interest rates, but actually
accompanied by provisions written in fine print that allow lenders
to   later   on   increase   or   decrease   interest   rates   unilaterally,
without the consent of the borrower, and depending on complex
and subjective factors. Because they have been lured into these
contracts by initially low interest rates, borrowers get caught and
stuck   in   the   web   of   subsequent   steep   rates   and   penalties,
surcharges and the like.  Being ordinary  individuals  or entities,
they naturally dread legal complica­
_______________ 
92 United   Coconut   Planters   Bank   v.   Spouses   Beluso,   supra
note 50 at pp. 356­358; p. 600.
93 Id., at p. 358; id.
94 Supra note 55 at p. 500; p. 583.
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666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
tions and cannot afford court litigation; they succumb to whatever
charges the lenders impose. At the very least, borrowers should
be charged rightly; but then again this is not possible in a one­
sided credit system where the temptation to abuse is strong and
the willingness to rectify is made weak by the eternal desire for
profit.
Given   the   above   supposition,   the   Court   cannot   subscribe   to
respondent’s argument that in every repricing of petitioners’ loan
availment, they are given the right to question the interest rates
imposed. The import of respondent’s line of reasoning cannot be
other than that if one out of every hundred borrowers questions
respondent’s   practice   of   unilaterally   fixing   interest   rates,   then
only the loan arrangement with that lone complaining borrower
will   enjoy   the   benefit   of   review   or   renegotiation;   as   to   the   99
others,   the   questionable   practice   will   continue   unchecked,   and
respondent   will   continue   to   reap   the   profits   from   such
unscrupulous practice. The Court can no more condone a view so
perverse.   This   is   exactly   what   the   Court   meant   in   the
immediately preceding cited case when it said that “the belated
discovery of the true cost of credit does not reverse the ill effects
of   an   already   consummated   business   decision”;95 as   to   the   99
borrowers who did not or could not complain, the illegal act shall
have   become   a fait   accompli—   to   their   detriment,   they
have already suffered the oppressive rates.
Besides, that petitioners are  given the right to  question the
interest rates imposed is, under the circumstances, irrelevant; we
have   a   situation   where   the   petitioners   do   not   stand   on   equal
footing with the respondent. It is doubtful that any borrower who
finds   himself   in   petitioners’   position   would   dare   question
respondent’s   power   to   arbitrarily   modify   interest   rates   at   any
time.   In   the   second   place,   on   what   basis   could   any   borrower
question such power, when the criteria or stan­
_______________ 
 95 Id.
667
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Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
dards — which are really one­sided, arbitrary and subjective —
for the exercise of such power are precisely lost on him?
For the same reasons, the Court cannot validly consider that,
as   stipulated   in   the   18th up   to   the   26th promissory   notes,
petitioners   are  granted   the   option  to  prepay   the   loan  or   credit
facility without penalty within 10 calendar days from the Interest
Setting Date if they are not agreeable to the interest rate fixed. It
has   been   shown   that   the   promissory   notes   are   executed   and
signed in blank, meaning that by the time petitioners learn of the
interest rate, they are already bound to pay it because they have
already   presigned   the   note   where   the   rate   is   subsequently
entered. Besides, premium may not be placed upon a stipulation
in a contract which grants one party the right to choose whether
to continue with or withdraw from the agreement if it discovers
that what the other party has been doing all along is improper or
illegal.
Thus   said,   respondent’s   arguments   relative   to   the   credit
documents   —   that   documentary   evidence   prevails   over
testimonial   evidence;   that   the   credit   documents   are   in   proper
form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by
petitioners,   experienced   business   persons   that   they   are,   they
signed questionable loan documents whose provisions for interest
rates were left blank, and yet they continued to pay the interests
without protest for a number of years — deserve no consideration.
With   regard   to   interest,   the   Court   finds   that   since   the
escalation clause is annulled, the principal amount of the loan is
subject   to   the   original   or   stipulated   rate   of   interest,   and   upon
maturity, the amount due shall be subject to legal interest at the
rate   of   12% per   annum.   This   is   the   uniform   ruling   adopted   in
previous cases, including those cited here. 96 The interests paid by
667 petitioners   should   be   applied   first   to   the   payment   of   the
stipulated or legal and unpaid interest, as the case may
_______________ 
96 See also Equitable PCI Bank v. Ng Sheung Ngor, 565 Phil.
520, 539; 541 SCRA 223, 241­242 (2007).
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668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
be, and later, to the capital or principal. 97 Respondent should then
refund the excess amount of interest that it has illegally imposed
upon petitioners; “[t]he amount to be refunded refers to that paid
by petitioners when they had no obligation to do so.” 98 Thus, the
parties’   original   agreement   stipulated   the   payment   of   19.5%
interest; however, this rate was intended to apply only to the first
promissory   note  which  expired  on November  21,  1989  and  was
paid   by   petitioners;   it   was   not   intended   to   apply   to   the   whole
duration of the loan. Subsequent higher interest rates have been
declared   illegal;   but   because   only   the   rates   are   found   to   be
improper, the obligation to pay interest subsists, the same to be
fixed   at   the   legal   rate   of   12% per   annum.   However,   the   12%
interest   shall   apply   only   until   June   30,   2013.   Starting   July   1,
2013,   the   prevailing   rate   of   interest   shall   be   6% per
annum pursuant   to   our   ruling   in Nacar   v.   Gallery
Frames99 and Bangko   Sentral   ng   Pilipinas­Monetary   Board
Circular No. 799.
Now to the issue of penalty. PN 9707237 provides that failure to
pay   it   or   any   installment   thereon,   when   due,   shall   constitute
default,   and   a   penalty   charge   of   24%  per   annum   based   on  the
defaulted   principal   amount   shall   be   imposed.   Petitioners   claim
that this penalty should be excluded from the foreclosure amount
or   bid   price   because   the   Real   Estate   Mortgage   and   the
Supplement thereto did not specifically include it as part of the
secured amount. Respondent justifies its inclusion in the secured
amount, saying that the purpose of the penalty or a penal clause
is to ensure the performance of the obligation and substitute for
damages and the payment
_______________  executed an amended mortgage agreement with the petitioners,
97 Hodges v. Salas, 63 Phil. 567, 574 (1936), citing Aguilar v.
Rubiato   and   Gonzalez   Vila,   40   Phil.   570   (1920); Go   Chioco   v.
Martinez, 45 Phil. 256, 279­282 (1923); Gui Jong & Co. v. Rivera
and Avellar, 45 Phil. 778, 784 (1924); Sajo v. Gustilo, 48 Phil. 451,
462 (1925).
98 See Philippine Savings Bank v. Castillo, G.R. No. 193178,
May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 527, 538.
99 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.
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of interest in the event of noncompliance. 100 Respondent adds that
the   imposition   and   collection   of   a   penalty   is  a   normal   banking
practice,   and   the   standard   rate per   annum for   all   commercial
banks, at the time, was 24%. Its inclusion as part of the secured
amount in the mortgage agreements is thus valid and necessary.
The Court sustains petitioners’ view that the penalty may not be
included as part of the secured amount. Having found the credit
agreements and promissory notes to be tainted, we must accord
the same treatment to the mortgages. After all, “[a] mortgage and
a note secured by it are deemed parts of one transaction and are
construed together.”101 Being so tainted and having the attributes
of a contract of  adhesion as the  principal  credit  documents,  we
must   construe   the   mortgage   contracts   strictly,   and   against   the
party who drafted it. An examination of the mortgage agreements
reveals that nowhere is it stated that penalties are to be included
in   the   secured   amount.   Construing   this   silence   strictly   against
the respondent, the Court can only conclude that the parties did
not intend to include the penalty allowed under PN 9707237 as
part of the secured amount. Given its resources, respondent could
have   —   if   it   truly   wanted   to   —   conveniently   prepared   and
thereby including penalties in the amount to be secured by the
encumbered properties. Yet it did not.
With regard to attorney’s fees, it was plain error for the CA to
have   passed   upon   the   issue   since   it   was   not   raised   by   the
petitioners in their appeal; it was the respondent that improperly
brought   it   up   in   its   appellee’s   brief,   when   it   should   have
interposed an appeal, since the trial court’s Decision on this issue
is adverse to it. It is an elementary principle in the
_______________ 
100 Citing Article 1226 of the Civil Code and Paras, Civil Code
of   the   Philippines   Annotated   (Commentaries)   Vol.   IV,   p.   298,
1989, 12th edition.
101 Philippine Bank  of Communications, supra note  51 at p.
314; p. 255.
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670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
subject of appeals that an appellee who does not himself appeal
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than those granted in the decision of the court below.
x x x [A]n appellee, who is at the same time not an appellant,
may on appeal be permitted to make counter assignments of error
in ordinary actions, when the purpose is merely to defend himself
against   an   appeal   in   which   errors   are   alleged   to   have   been
committed by the trial court both in the appreciation of facts and
in the interpretation of the law, in order to sustain the judgment
in his favor but not when his purpose is to seek modification or
reversal of the judgment, in which case it is necessary for him to
have excepted to and appealed from the judgment.102
     Since   petitioners   did   not   raise   the   issue   of   reduction   of
attorney’s fees, the CA possessed no authority to pass upon it at
the instance of respondent. The ruling of the trial court in this
respect should remain undisturbed.
For   the   fixing   of  the  proper   amounts   due   and   owing   to  the
parties — to the respondent as creditor and to the petitioners who
are   entitled   to   a   refund   as   a   consequence   of   overpayment
considering that they paid more by way of interest charges than
the   12% per   annum103 herein   allowed   —   the   case   should   be
remanded   to   the   lower   court   for   proper   accounting   and
computation, applying the following procedure:
1. The   1st Promissory   Note   with   the   19.5%   interest   rate   is
deemed proper and paid;
2. All   subsequent   promissory   notes   (from   the   2nd   to   the
26th promissory notes) shall carry an interest rate of only 12% per
annum.104 Thus, interest payment made
_______________  6. To this outstanding balance (3.), the interest (4.), penalties
102 Saenz v. Mitchell, 60 Phil. 69, 80 (1934).
103 Or 6% per annum, when applicable.
104 Id.
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in excess of 12% on the 2nd promissory note shall immediately be
applied   to  the  principal,   and   the  principal   shall   be  accordingly
reduced.   The   reduced   principal   shall   then   be   subjected   to   the
12%105 interest on the 3rd promissory note, and the excess over
12% interest payment on the 3rd promissory note shall again be
applied to the principal, which shall again be reduced accordingly.
The reduced principal shall then be subjected to the 12% interest
on   the   4th   promissory   note,   and   the   excess   over   12%   interest
payment on the 4th promissory note shall again be applied to the
principal,   which  shall   again  be  reduced  accordingly.   And  so   on
and so forth;
3. After   the   above   procedure   is   carried   out,   the   trial
court shall be able to conclude if petitioners a) still have
an   OUTSTANDING   BALANCE/OBLIGATION   or   b)   MADE
PAYMENTS   OVER   AND   ABOVE   THEIR   TOTAL
OBLIGATION (principal and interest);
4. Such outstanding balance/obligation, if there be any,
shall   then   be   subjected   to   a 12%   per   annum   interest from
October 28, 1997 until January 14, 1999, which is the date of the
auction sale;
5. Such  outstanding   balance/obligation  shall   also be  charged
a 24% per annum penalty from August 14, 1997 until January
14,   1999.   But   from   this   total   penalty,   the   petitioners’   previous
payment   of   penalties   in   the   amount   of   P202,000.00   made   on
January 27, 1998106 shall be DEDUCTED;
(5.),   and   the   final   and   executory   award   of 1%   attorney’s
fees shall be ADDED;
_______________ 
105 Id.
671 106 Rollo, p. 63.
 
7. The sum total of the outstanding balance (3.), interest (4.)
and   1%   attorney’s   fees   (6.)   shall   be   DEDUCTED   from   the   bid
price of P4,324,172.96. The penalties (5.) are not included because
they are not included in the secured amount;
 8. The difference in (7.) [P4,324,172.96 LESS sum total of the
outstanding balance (3.), interest (4.), and 1% attorney’s fees (6.)]
shall be DELIVERED TO THE PETITIONERS;
9. Respondent   may   then   proceed   to   consolidate   its   title   to
TCTs T­14250 and T­16208;
10. ON   THE   OTHER   HAND,   if   after   performing   the
procedure   in   (2.),   it   turns   out   that   petitioners   made
an OVERPAYMENT,   the   interest   (4.),   penalties   (5.),   and   the
award of 1% attorney’s fees (6.) shall  be  DEDUCTED from the
overpayment.   There   is   no   outstanding   balance/obligation
precisely because petitioners have paid beyond the amount of the
principal and interest;
11. If the overpayment exceeds the sum total of the interest
(4.), penalties (5.), and award of 1% attorney’s fees (6.), the excess
shall be RETURNED to the petitioners, with legal interest, under
the principle of solutio indebiti;107
12. Likewise, if the overpayment exceeds the total amount of
interest (4.) and award of 1% attorney’s fees (6.), the trial court
shall   INVALIDATE   THE   EXTRAJUDICIAL   FORECLOSURE
AND SALE;
13. HOWEVER, if the total amount of interest (4.) and award
of 1% attorney’s fees (6.) exceed petitioners’
_______________  WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Petition
107 Also,   under   the   Civil   Code,   Art.   1413,   interest   paid   in
excess of the interest allowed by the usury laws may be recovered
by the debtor, with interest thereon from the date of the payment.
673
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
overpayment, then the excess shall be DEDUCTED from the bid
price of P4,324,172.96;
14. The difference in (13.) [P4,324,172.96 LESS sum total of
the interest (4.) and 1% attorney’s fees (6.)] shall be DELIVERED
TO THE PETITIONERS;
15. Respondent   may   then   proceed   to   consolidate   its   title   to
TCTs   T­14250   and   T­16208.   The   outstanding   penalties,   if   any,
shall be collected by other means.
From the above, it will be seen that if, after proper accounting,
it turns out that the petitioners made payments exceeding what
they   actually   owe   by   way   of   principal,   interest,   and   attorney’s
fees,   then   the   mortgaged   properties   need   not   answer   for   any
outstanding secured amount, because there is not any; quite the
contrary,   respondent   must   refund   the   excess   to   petitioners.   In
such case, the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the properties
shall be declared null and void for obvious lack of basis, the case
being one of solutio indebiti instead. If, on the other hand, it turns
out that petitioners’ overpayments in interests do not exceed their
total   obligation,   then   the   respondent   may   consolidate   its
ownership   over   the   properties,   since   the   period   for   redemption
has  expired.  Its only  obligation  will  be  to  return  the  difference
between   its   bid   price   (P4,324,172.96)   and   petitioners’   total
obligation outstanding — except penalties — after applying the
latter’s overpayments.
is GRANTED. The May 8, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in   C.A.­G.R.   CV   No.   79650   is ANNULLED and SET   ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The interest rates imposed and indicated in the 2 nd up to the
673 26  Promissory   Notes   are  DECLARED   NULL   AND   VOID,   and
th
such notes shall instead be subject to interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum up to June 30, 2013, and starting July
1, 2013, six percent (6%) per annum until full satisfaction;
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
2. The   penalty   charge   imposed   in   Promissory   Note   No.
9707237 shall be EXCLUDED from the amounts secured by the
real estate mortgages;
3. The trial court’s award of one percent (1%) attorney’s fees
is REINSTATED;
4. The   case   is   ordered REMANDED to   the   Regional   Trial
Court,   Branch   6   of   Kalibo,   Aklan   for   the   computation   of
overpayments   made   by   petitioners   spouses   Eduardo   and   Lydia
Silos   to   respondent   Philippine   National   Bank,   taking   into
consideration   the   foregoing   dispositions,   and   applying   the
procedure hereinabove set forth;
5. Thereafter,   the   trial   court   is ORDERED to   make   a
determination as  to  the  validity  of   the extrajudicial  foreclosure
and sale, declaring the same null and void in case of overpayment
and   ordering   the  release   and   return   of   Transfer   Certificates   of
Title Nos. T­14250 and TCT T­16208 to petitioners, or ordering
the delivery to the petitioners of the difference between the bid
price and the total remaining obligation of petitioners, if any;
6. In the meantime, the respondent Philippine National Bank
is ENJOINED from consolidating title to Transfer Certificates of
Title   Nos.   T­14250   and   T­16208   until   all   the   steps   in   the
procedure above set forth have been taken and applied;
7. The   reimbursement   of   the   excess   in   the   bid   price   of
P377,505.99,   which   respondent   Philippine   National   Bank   is
ordered   to   reimburse   petitioners,   should   be HELD   IN
ABEYANCE until   the   true   amount   owing   to   or   owed   by   the
parties as against each other is determined;
8. Considering that this case has been pending for such a long
time   and   that   further   proceedings,   albeit   uncomplicated,   are
required, the trial court is ORDEREDto proceed with dispatch.
675
VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014 675
Silos vs. Philippine National Bank
SO ORDERED.
Carpio   (Chairperson),   Leonardo­De
**
Castro,  Perez and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside.
 
Notes.—Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is
as if there was no express contract thereon. (Macalinao vs. Bank
of the Philippine Islands, 600 SCRA 67 [2009])
The payment of interest in loans or forbearance of money is
allowed   only   if:   (1)   there   was   an   express   stipulation   for   the
payment  of  interest;   and   (2)  the  agreement  for   the payment  of
interest   was   reduced   in   writing.   (Prisma   Construction   &
Development Corporation vs. Menchavez, 614 SCRA 590 [2010])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 201001. November 10, 2014.*
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., petitioner, vs.
MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule;
Documentary Evidence; The Best Evidence Rule, a
basic postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.—The Best Evidence Rule, a basic
postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which provides: “Section 3. Original VELASCO, JR., J.:
document must be produced; exceptions.—When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no For consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review
evidence shall be admissible other than the original on Certiorari dated April 20, 20121 filed by MCMP
document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When
Construction Corp. under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot beThe petition seeks the reversal of the Decision dated
October 14, 20112 and Resolution dated March 9, 20123
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
the control of the party against whom the evidence is91860 entitled Monark Equipment Corporation v. MCMP
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after Construction Corporation. The CA Decision affirmed the
reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of Decision dated November 20, 20074 and Order dated
numerous accounts or other documents which cannot April 28, 20085 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
be examined in court without great loss of time and the
Branch 96 in Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No.Q-02-
fact sought to be established from them is only the 47092 entitled Monark Equipment Corporation v. MCMP
Construction Corporation.
general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is
a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
The facts of the case are as follows:
recorded in a public office.” MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision andequipment from Monark Equipment Corporation
resolution of the Court of Appeals. (Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Henry Ll. Yusingco, Jr. for petitioner. Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to
Pestelero Law Office for respondent. the project site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac,
_______________ Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as
* THIRD DIVISION. Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667 and
433 5706, received and signed by representatives of MCMP,
namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively. Notably,
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
the invoices state:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-25.
RESOLUTION 2 Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C.
Lantion, concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao (Chairperson, 17th Division) and Ramon A.
Cruz; id., at pp. 50-63.
3 Id., at pp. 65-69.
4 Penned by Judge Afable E. Cajigal; id., at pp. 26-
40.
5 Id., at pp. 41-48.
434
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
“Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date
of invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at 24% p.a.
on all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a
collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per
month penalty charge for late payment on amounts
overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal to 25% of
any amount due as attorney’s fees in case of suit, and
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for
any legal action arising from, this transactions.”
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated
in the invoices, MCMP failed to pay the rental fees.
Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount
due, partial payments were made in the amount of
Php100,000.00 on April 15, 2001 and Php100,000.00 on
August 15, 2001. Further demands went unheeded. As
of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of
Php1,282,481.83, broken down as follows:
Thus, on June 18, 2002, Monark filed a suit for a Sum of
Money with the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-
47092.7 In its Answer filed on July 5, 2002, 8 MCMP
alleged in defense that the complaint was premature as
Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of its
claims. MCMP further averred that it had an agreement
with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole
time that the leased equipment
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 28-29.
7 Id., at p. 51.
8 Id., at p. 9.
435
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
was in its possession but rather only for the actual time
that the equipment was used although still on the
project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this
agreement was not contained in the Contract.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses,
Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account
Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2)
original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark,
while the other was given to MCMP. He further testified
that Monark’s copy had been lost and that diligent
efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead,
Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which
he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the Contract arguing that there were no
diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably,
MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract
notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to
produce the same.9
On November 20, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision
finding for Monark as plaintiff, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
legal premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the
former:
1. Php1,282,481.83 as balance for the rental fees of the
subject heavy equipments (sic) as of April 30, 2002,
inclusive of the interests thereof;
2. Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the total amount to be
recovered as payment for the attorney’s fees; and
3. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 57-58.
436
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
From this Decision of the RTC, MCMP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 31, 2008 while Monark
interposed a Motion for Clarification and/or Partial
Reconsideration.10 On April 28, 2008, the RTC issued an
Order, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court finds
no reversible error in the assailed decision henceforth,
the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. On the other hand, the
plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and/or Partial
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED for being
meritorious. Therefore, in the dispositive portion of the
assailed decision dated 20 November 2007, the
following should be included:
‘The payment of interests, charges and fees due after
April 30, 2002 and up to the time when all the
obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff shall have
been fully paid, computed in accordance with the
stipulations entered into between the parties under
Exhibits “A” to “G,” and uniformly stated in the following
wise:
Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of
invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at 24% p.a. on
all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a
collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per
month penalty charge for late payment on amounts
overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal to 25% of
any amount due as attorney’s fees in case of suit, and
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila,
_______________
10 Dated January 29, 2008; id., at p. 55.
437
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Metro Manila, for any legal action arising from, this
transactions.’
SO ORDERED.”
Unsatisfied, MCMP appealed the RTC’s Decision and
Order to the Court of Appeals (CA). Eventually, the
appellate court, by a Decision dated October 14, 2011,
affirmed in toto the Decision and Order of the RTC.
MCMP’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 9,
2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the
appellate court should have disallowed the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence
Rule. MCMP specifically argues that based on the
testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently
search for the original copy of the Contract as
evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of
the document was not presented; 2) the alleged loss
was not even reported to management or the police;
and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the
document for the purposes of the instant case.
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the
production of the original document whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in
Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
“Section 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
438
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide
the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:
“Section 5. When original document is unavailable.—
When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse
party’s custody or control.—If the document is in the
custody or under the control of adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he
fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of its loss.”
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman ,11
the Court set down the requirements before a party
may present secondary evidence to prove the contents
of the original document whenever the original copy
has been lost:
_______________
11 G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011, 653 SCRA 765,
777.
439
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror,
the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the
above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC
gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the
original Contract in the possession of Monark has been
lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the
same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained
uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this
Court, “findings of facts and assessment of credibility
of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.”12
Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial
court on the credibility of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by
Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it
has failed to present a copy of the Contract even
despite the request of the trial court for it to produce
its copy of the Contract.13 Normal business practice
dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained
a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to
present the same and even explain its failure, not only
justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the
disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section
3(e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that “evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”
_______________
12 G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182.
13 Rollo, pp. 57-58.
440
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Next, MCMP claims that the pieces of equipment were
not actually delivered to it by Monark. It bears pointing 67, 76-78, citing Imperial v. Jaucian, G.R. No. 149004,
out, however, that the witnesses of MCMP itself, Jorge
Samonte, a Budget Supervisor of MCMP, and Engr.
Horacio A. Martinez, Sr., General Manager of MCMP,
both acknowledged the delivery of the equipment to the
project sites.14 Clearly, the contention of MCMP is false.
Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Nevertheless, the Court takes notice that the trial court
imposed upon MCMP a 24% per annum interest on the
rental fees as well as a collection fee of 1% per month
compounded monthly and a 2% per month penalty
charge. In all then, the effective interest rate foisted
upon MCMP is 60% per annum. On top of this, MCMP
was assessed for attorney’s fees at the rate of 25% of
the total amount due. These are exorbitant and
unconscionable rates and, following jurisprudence,
must be equitably reduced.
In Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands ,15 the
Court reduced the interest imposed by the bank of 36%
for being excessive and unconscionable:
“x x x Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not
the first time that this Court has considered the
interest rate of 36% per annum as excessive and
unconscionable. We held in Chua v. Timan:
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month
imposed on respondents’ loans must be equitably
reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum. We need
not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a plethora
of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per
_______________
14 Id., at p. 15.
15 G.R. No. 175490, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 517, Tongoy v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-45645, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 99.
441
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are
void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.
While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on
January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on
interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans,
regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular
could possibly be read as granting carte blanche
authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels
which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as
if there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts
may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity
demand.
The same is true with respect to the penalty charge.
Notably, under the Terms and Conditions Governing the
Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, it was also
stated therein that respondent BPI shall impose an
additional penalty charge of 3% per month. Pertinently,
Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the
penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there
has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
In exercising this power to determine what is iniquitous
and unconscionable, courts must consider the
circumstances of each case since what may be
iniquitous and unconscionable in one may be totally
just and equitable in another.”
442
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
In the more recent case of Pentacapital Investment
Corporation v. Mahinay,16 the Court reduced the interest
and penalties imposed in a contract as follows:
“Aside from the payment of the principal obligation of
P1,936,800.00, the parties agreed that respondent pay
interest at the rate of 25% from February 17, 1997 until
fully paid. Such rate, however, is excessive and thus,
void. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it
is as if there was no express contract thereon. To be
sure, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and
equity demand. In this case, 12% interest is reasonable.
The promissory notes likewise required the payment of
a penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per annum.
We find such rates unconscionable. This Court has
recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation
which the parties attach to a principal obligation for
the purpose of ensuring the performance thereof by
imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally
consisting of the payment of a sum of money) in case
the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled. However, a penalty charge of 3%
per month is unconscionable; hence, we reduce it to 1%
per month or 12% per annum, pursuant to Article 1229
of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the
penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there
has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Lastly, respondent promised to pay 25% of his
outstanding obligations as attorney’s fees in case of
nonpayment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in the
nature of liquidated damages. As long as said
stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public
order, it is strictly bind-
_______________
16 G.R. No. 171736,July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 284, 305-
306.
443
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
ing upon respondent. Nonetheless, courts are
empowered to reduce such rate if the same is
iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the above
quoted provision. This sentiment is echoed in Article
2227 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as
an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Hence, we reduce the stipulated attorney’s fees from
25% to 10%.”
Following the above principles previously laid down by
the Court, the interest and penalty charges imposed
upon MCMP must also be considered as iniquitous,
unconscionable and, therefore, void. As such, the rates
may validly be reduced. Thus, the interest rate of 24%
per annum is hereby reduced to 12% per annum.
Moreover, the interest shall start to accrue thirty (30)
days after receipt of the second set of invoices on
January 21, 2001, or March 1, 2001 in accordance with
the provisions in the invoices themselves.
Additionally, the penalty and collection charge of 3%
per month, or 36% per annum, is also reduced to 6%
per annum. And the amount of attorney’s fees is
reduced from 25% of the total amount due to 5%.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit with the
MODIFICATION that the dispositive portion of the RTC’s
Decision dated November 20, 2007, as amended in an
Order dated April 28, 2008, should read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal
premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the former:
1. Php765,380.33 representing the unpaid rental fees;
444
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
2. Interest of 12% per annum on the unpaid rental fees
to be computed from March 1, 200117 until payment;
3. Penalty and collection charge of 6% per annum on
the unpaid rental fees to be computed from March 1,
2001;
4. Attorney’s Fees of five percent (5%) of the total
amount to be recovered; and
5. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe** and
Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied with modification.
Notes.—Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d)
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. (Dimaguila vs. Monteiro, 714 SCRA
565 [2014])
When the subject of inquiry is the content of a
document, submission of a certified true copy is
justified only in clearly delineated instances. ( Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan, 722 SCRA 211 [2014])
——o0o——
_______________
17 Thirty (30) days from the date when the second
set of invoices were received by MCMP.
* * Acting member per Special Order No. 1866 dated  
November 4, 2014. G.R. No. 189404. December 11, 2013.*
WILGEN   LOON,   JERRY   ARCILLA,   ALBERT   PEREYE,
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights ARNOLD   PEREYE,   EDGARDO   OBOSE,   ARNEL   MALARAS,
reserved. PATROCINO   TOETIN,   EVELYN   LEONARDO,   ELMER
GLOCENDA, RUFO CUNAMAY, ROLANDO SAJOL, ROLANDO
ABUCAYON,   JENNIFER   NATIVIDAD,   MARITESS   TORION,
ARMANDO   LONZAGA,   RIZAL   GELLIDO,   EVIRDE   HAQUE,
[1]MYRNA   VINAS,   RODELITO   AYALA,   WINELITO   OJEL,
RENATO   RODREGO,   NENA   ABINA,   EMALYN   OLIVEROS,
LOUIE ILAGAN, JOEL ENTIG, ARNEL ARANETA, BENJAMIN
COSE,   WELITO   LOON   and   WILLIAM   ALIPAO,
petitioners, vs. POWER   MASTER,   INC.,   TRI­C   GENERAL
SERVICES,   and   SPOUSES   HOMER   and   CARINA  ALUMISIN,
respondents.
Labor Law; Appeals; Bond; Paragraph 2, Article 223 of the
Labor   Code   provides   that   “[i]n   case   of   a   judgment   involving   a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding   company duly   accredited   by   the   Commission in   the
amount   equivalent   to   the   monetary   award   in   the   judgment
appealed   from.”—Paragraph   2,   Article   223   of   the   Labor   Code
provides   that   “[i]n   case   of   a   judgment   involving   a   monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited  by  the Commission in  the  amount
equivalent   to   the   monetary   award   in   the   judgment   appealed
from.” Contrary to the respondents’ claim, the issue of the appeal
bond’s validity may be raised for the first time on appeal since its
proper   filing   is   a   jurisdictional   requirement.   The   requirement
that the appeal bond should be issued by an accredited bonding
company   is   mandatory   and   jurisdictional.   The   rationale   of
requiring   an   appeal   bond   is   to   discourage   the   employers   from
using an appeal to delay or evade the employees’ just and lawful
claims. It is in­
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
[1] Evirdly Haque in the Court of Appeals’ decision; Rollo, p.
55.
441tended to assure the workers that they will receive the
money   judgment   in   their   favor   upon   the   dismissal   of   the
employer’s appeal.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; In labor
cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not
required.   Time   and   again,   we   have   allowed   evidence   to   be
submitted  for  the  first  time   on appeal   with  the  National   Labor
Relations   Commission   (NLRC)   in   the   interest   of   substantial
justice.—In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of
procedure   is   not   required.   Time   and   again,   we   have   allowed
evidence   to  be  submitted   for   the  first   time   on  appeal   with   the
NLRC   in   the   interest   of   substantial   justice.   Thus,   we   have
consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, in
the  interest   of  due  process.  However,   this   liberal   policy   should
still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay.  The liberality of
procedural   rules   is   qualified   by   two   requirements:   (1)   a
party   should   adequately   explain   any   delay   in   the
submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently
prove  the  allegations  sought   to  be   proven.   The  reason  for
these   requirements   is   that   the   liberal   application   of   the   rules
before   quasi­judicial   agencies   cannot   be   used   to   perpetuate
injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is
the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of
procedure.
Same;   Evidence;   Documentary   Evidence;   Administrative
Proceedings; While   we   generally   admit   in   evidence   and   give
probative   value   to   photocopied   documents   in   administrative
proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt
the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection.
—Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of
documentary   evidence   were   not   presented   at   the   earliest
opportunity   is   a   serious   question   that   lends   credence   to   the
petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for
purposes   of   appeal. While   we   generally   admit   in   evidence
and   give   probative   value   to   photocopied   documents   in
administrative   proceedings,   allegations   of   forgery   and
fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the
respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where
the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead,
the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the
442opportunity   to   examine   and   controvert   the   alleged
spurious   evidence   by   not   adducing   the   originals.   This   Court   is
thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to
present   the   originals   raises   the   presumption   that   evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Same;   Burden   of   Proof;   Termination   of   Employment; In
termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for
dismissing   an   employee   from   his   employment   rests   upon   the
employer.—In termination cases, the burden of proving just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee from his employment rests
upon   the   employer.   The   employer’s   failure   to   discharge   this
burden   results   in   the   finding   that   the   dismissal   is   unjustified.
This is exactly what happened in the present case.
Same;   Same;   Payment;   As   in   illegal   dismissal   cases,   the
general   rule   is   that   the   burden   rests   on  the   defendant   to   prove
payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment of these
money claims.—As in illegal dismissal cases, the general rule is
that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment rather
than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment of these money claims.
The rationale for this rule is that the pertinent personnel files,
payrolls,   records,   remittances   and   other   similar   documents   —
which   will   show   that   differentials,   service   incentive   leave   and
other   claims   of   workers   have   been   paid   —   are   not   in   the
possession of the worker but are in the custody and control of the
employer.
Same;   Same;   Overtime   Pay;   Premium   Pay;   The   burden   of
proving entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for holidays
and rest days rests on the employee because these are not incurred
in   the   normal   course   of   business.—The   CA   was   correct   in   its
finding   that   the   petitioners   failed   to   provide   sufficient   factual
basis for the award of overtime, and premium pays for holidays
and rest days. The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay
and   premium   pay   for   holidays   and   rest   days   rests   on   the
employee because these are not incurred in the normal course of
business. In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any
evidence that would show that they actually rendered service in
excess of the regular eight working hours a day, and that they in
fact worked on holidays and rest days.443
Same; Attorney’s Fees; An employee is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of the
wages in actions for unlawful withholding of wages.—The award
of  attorney’s  fees  is  also  warranted  under the  circumstances  of
this case. An employee is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees
equivalent  to  ten  percent   (10%)   of  the  amount  of  the  wages  in
actions for unlawful withholding of wages.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Nenita C. Mahinay for petitioners. 
BRION, J.:
We   resolve   the   petition   for   review   on certiorari,[2] filed   by
petitioners   Wilgen   Loon,   Jerry   Arcilla,   Albert   Pereye,   Arnold
Pereye, Edgardo Obose, Arnel Malaras, Patrocino Toetin, Evelyn
Leonardo,   Elmer   Glocenda,   Rufo   Cunamay,   Rolando   Sajol,
Rolando   Abucayon,   Jennifer   Natividad,   Maritess   Torion,
Armando   Lonzaga,   Rizal   Gellido,   Evirde   Haque,   Myrna   Vinas,
Rodelito   Ayala,   Winelito   Ojel,   Renato   Rodrego,   Nena   Abina,
Emalyn   Oliveros,   Louie   Ilagan,   Joel   Entig,   Arnel   Araneta,
Benjamin   Cose,   Welito   Loon,   William   Alipao   (collectively,
the petitioners), to challenge the June 5, 2009 decision[3] and the
August 28, 2009 resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­
G.R. SP No. 95182.
_______________
[2] Rollo,  pp.   18­54;   dated October  23,  2009  and filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[3] Id.,   at   pp.   55­65;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Sixto   C.
Marella, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de
Guia­Salvador and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[4] Id., at pp. 66­67.
444
The Factual Antecedents  [6] Id., at p. 321.
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri­C General Services
employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen
in   various   Philippine   Long   Distance   Telephone
Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the
petitioners   filed   a   complaint   for   money   claims   against   Power
Master,   Inc.,   Tri­C   General   Services   and   their   officers,   the
spouses   Homer   and   Carina   Alumisin
(collectively, the respondents).   The   petitioners   alleged   in   their
complaint   that   they   were   not   paid   minimum   wages,   overtime,
holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month
pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign
blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended
their  complaint and  included illegal dismissal  as their cause of
action.   They   claimed   that   the   respondents   relieved   them   from
service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.
Notably,   the   respondents   did   not   participate   in   the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001
and May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on
the   respondents’   behalf.[5] The   respondents’   counsel   also
appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July
5,   2001.[6] However,   the   respondents   neither   filed   any   position
paper nor proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their
knowledge of the pendency of the case. 
The Labor Arbiter’s Ruling 
In   a   decision[7] dated   March   15,   2002,   Labor
Arbiter (LA) Elias   H.   Salinas   partially   ruled   in   favor   of   the
petitioners. The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential,
service   incentive   leave,   and   thirteenth   month   pays. In
awarding
_______________
[5] Id., at p. 407.
[7] Id., at pp. 405­413.
445these claims, the  LA stated that the  burden of proving the
payment of these money claims rests with the employer. The LA
also   awarded attorney’s   fees in   favor   of   the   petitioners,
pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code.[8]
However,   the   LA   denied   the   petitioners’   claims
for backwages,  overtime,  holiday,  and  premium  pays. The
LA   observed   that   the   petitioners   failed   to   show   that   they
rendered  overtime  work   and  worked  on  holidays  and  rest   days
without   compensation.   The   LA   further   concluded   that   the
petitioners   cannot   be   declared   to   have   been   dismissed   from
employment because they did not show any notice of termination
of   employment.   They   were   also   not   barred   from   entering   the
respondents’ premises.
 
The Proceedings before the NLRC  documentary evidence showing that the petitioners were
Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the National Labor
Relations Commission. The petitioners disputed the LA’s denial of
their claim for backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays.
Meanwhile,   the   respondents   questioned   the   LA’s   ruling   on   the
ground   that   the   LA   did   not   acquire   jurisdiction   over   their
persons.
The respondents insisted that they were not personally served
with summons and other processes. They also claimed that they
paid the petitioners minimum wages, service incentive leave and
thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied
and computerized copies of payroll 
_______________
[8] Article 111 of the Labor Code provides:
1. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable
party   may   be   assessed   attorney’s   fees   equivalent   to   ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered.  from November 1, 1998 to December 30, 1998; from November 1,
2. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept,
in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery
of   wages,   attorney’s   fees   which   exceed   ten   percent   of   the
amount of wages recovered.
446sheets to their memorandum on appeal.[9] They further
maintained   that   the   petitioners   were   validly   dismissed.   They
argued that the petitioners’ repeated defiance to their transfer to
different   workplaces   and   their   violations   of   the   company   rules
and   regulations   constituted   serious   misconduct   and   willful
disobedience.[10]
On   January   3,   2003,   the   respondents   filed   an   unverified
supplemental   appeal. They   attached   photocopied   and
computerized copies of list of employees with automated
teller   machine   (ATM) cards   to   the   supplemental
appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in
the   employees’   ATM   cards.[11] They   also   attached
dismissed for cause and had been accorded due process. 
On   January   22,   2003,   the   petitioners   filed   an Urgent
Manifestation   and   Motion[12] where   they   asked   for   the
deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it
allegedly   suffered   from   infirmities. First,   the   supplemental
appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months
from   the   filing   of   the   respondents’   notice   of   appeal   with
memorandum   on   appeal.   The  petitioners   pointed   out   that   they
only   agreed   to   the   respondents’   filing   of   a   responsive   pleading
until   December   18,   2002.[13] Third,   the   attached   documentary
evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged
signatures.
_______________
 [9] Id.,   at   pp.   781­879;   the   payroll   sheets   cover   the  periods
1999   to   December   30,   1999;   and   from   November   1,   2000   to
February 28, 2001.
[10] Id., at pp. 548­780.
[11] Id., at pp. 880­985; the payroll sheets cover the periods
from November 1, 2000 to December 30, 2000, and from January
1, 2001 to February 15, 2001.
[12] Id., at pp. 359­382.
[13] Id., at p. 360.
447
 They   reiterated   these   allegations   in   an Urgent   Motion   to
Resolve Manifestation and Motion (To Expunge from the
Records Respondents’ Supplemental Appeal, Reply and/or
Rejoinder) dated   January   31,   2003.[14] Subsequently,   the
petitioners   filed   an Urgent   Manifestation   with   Reiterating
Motion   to   Strike­Off   the   Record   Supplemental
Appeal/Reply,   Quitclaims   and   Spurious   Documents
Attached   to   Respondents’   Appeal dated   August   7,   2003.
[15] The petitioners argued in this last motion that the payrolls
should   not   be   given   probative   value   because   they   were   the
respondents’   fabrications.   They   reiterated   that   the   genuine
payrolls   bore   their   signatures,   unlike   the   respondents’
photocopies   of   the   payrolls.   They   also   maintained   that   their
signatures   in   the   respondents’   documents   (which   showed   their
receipt of thirteenth month pay) had been forged.
 
The NLRC Ruling  The  NLRC  further  ruled  that  the  petitioners   were lawfully
In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially
ruled   in   favor   of   the   respondents.[16] The   NLRC   affirmed   the
LA’s   awards   of holiday   pay   and   attorney’s   fees.   It   also
maintained that the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
the respondents through their voluntary appearance.
However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that
they   had   been   deprived   of   due   process. It   found   that   the
respondents  did  not  actually  receive  the  LA’s  processes.  It  also
admitted the respondents’ unverified supplemental appeal on the
ground that technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater
interest of substantial due
_______________
[14] Id., at pp. 384­389.
[15] CA Rollo, pp. 249­254.
[16] Rollo,   pp.   148­180.   Penned   by   Commissioner   Tito   F.
Genilo, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C.
Javier and Commissioner Ernesto C. Verceles.
448process. Furthermore, the Rules of Court do not require the
verification of a supplemental pleading.
The   NLRC   also   vacated   the   LA’s   awards   of salary
differential, thirteenth month and service incentive leave
pays.   In   so   ruling,   it   gave   weight   to   the   pieces   of   evidence
attached   to   the   memorandum   on   appeal   and   the   supplemental
appeal.   It   maintained   that   the   absence   of   the   petitioners’
signatures   in   the   payrolls   was   not   an   indispensable   factor   for
their   authenticity.   It   pointed   out   that   the   payment   of   money
claims was further evidenced by the list of employees with ATM
cards.   It   also   found   that   the   petitioners’   signatures   were   not
forged. It took judicial notice that many people use at least two or
more different signatures.
dismissed   on   grounds   of   serious   misconduct   and   willful
disobedience. It found that the petitioners failed to comply with
various   memoranda   directing   them   to   transfer   to   other
workplaces   and   to   attend   training   seminars   for   the   intended
reorganization and reshuffling.
The NLRC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
in a resolution dated April 28, 2006.[17]Aggrieved, the petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA.[18]
 
The CA Ruling 
The   CA   affirmed   the   NLRC’s   ruling.   The   CA   held   that   the
petitioners were afforded substantive and procedural due process.
Accordingly,   the   petitioners   deliberately   did   not   explain   their
side.   Instead,   they  continuously  resisted  their transfer  to  other
PLDT offices and violated company rules and regulations. It also This case presents to us the following issues:
upheld the NLRC’s findings on the petitioners’ monetary claims. 1)     Whether the CA erred when it did not find that the NLRC
_______________ committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course
[17] Id., at pp. 181­189. to the respondents’ appeal;
[18] Id., at pp. 128­144. a)   Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before
449 the NLRC; and
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a _______________
resolution   dated   August   28,   2009,   prompting   the   petitioners   to [19] Supra note 2.
file the present petition.[19]
[20] Ibid.
The Petition  [21] Rollo, pp. 475­502, 506­512.
450
In the petition before this Court, the petitioners argue that the b) Whether the NLRC properly allowed the respondents’
CA   committed   a   reversible   error   when   it   did   not   find   that  the supplemental appeal
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. They reiterate their
2) Whether   the   respondents   were   estopped   from   submitting
arguments before the lower tribunals and the CA in support of
pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal;
this conclusion. They also point out that the respondents posted a
bond from a surety that was not accredited by this Court and by 3)    Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed and are
the NLRC. In effect, the respondents failed to perfect their appeal thus entitled to backwages;
before the NLRC. They further insist that the NLRC should not 4) Whether   the  petitioners   are  entitled   to  salary   differential,
have admitted the respondents’ unverified supplemental appeal. overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and
[20] thirteenth month pays; and
5)  Whether the petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees.
The Respondents’ Position 
The Court’s Ruling 
In their Comments, the respondents stress that the petitioners
only raised the issue of the validity of the appeal bond for the first The   respondents   perfected   their
time  on appeal.  They   also  reiterate  their  arguments  before  the appeal   with   the   NLRC   because   the
NLRC and the CA. They additionally submit that the petitioners’ revocation   of   the   bonding   company’s
arguments have been fully passed upon and found unmeritorious authority   has   a   prospective
by the NLRC and the CA.[21] application 
The Issues 
 Paragraph 2, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that “[i]n
case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer   may   be   perfected   only   upon   the   posting   of   a   cash   or
surety   bond   issued   by   a   reputable   bonding   company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.”
Contrary   to   the   respondents’   claim,   the   issue   of   the   appeal
bond’s validity may be raised for the first time on appeal since its
proper filing is a jurisdictional requirement.[22] The requirement
that the appeal bond should be issued by an accredited bonding
company   is   mandatory   and   jurisdictional.   The   rationale   of
requiring   an   appeal   bond   is   to   discourage   the   employers   from
using an appeal to delay or evade the employ­
_______________
[22] Oca   v.  Court  of  Appeals,  428   Phil.  696,   702;   378   SCRA
642, 647 (2002).
451ees’   just   and   lawful   claims.   It   is   intended   to   assure   the
workers that they will receive the money judgment in their favor
upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal.[23]
In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued
by   Security   Pacific   Assurance   Corporation (Security   Pacific) on
June   28,   2002.   At   that   time,   Security   Pacific   was   still   an
accredited   bonding   company.   However,   the   NLRC   revoked   its
accreditation   on   February   16,   2003.[24]Nonetheless,   this
subsequent revocation should not prejudice the respondents who
relied  on  its  then  subsisting   accreditation  in  good  faith.   In Del
Rosario   v.   Philippine   Journalists,   Inc.,[25] we   ruled   that   a
bonding   company’s   revocation   of   authority   is   prospective   in
application.
However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by
an accredited bonding company in compliance with paragraph 4,
Section 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. This provision
states that “[a] cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective
from   the   date   of   deposit   or   posting, until   the   case   is   finally
decided, resolved or terminated or the award satisfied.”
The   CA   correctly   ruled   that   the
NLRC properly gave due course to the
respondents’ supplemental appeal 
The CA also correctly ruled that the NLRC properly gave due
course to the respondents’ supplemental appeal. Neither the laws
nor the rules require the verification of the supple­
_______________
[23] Catubay   v.   National   Labor   Relations   Commission,   386
Phil.   648,   657;   330   SCRA   440,   447   (2000);   and Borja   Estate   v.
Spouses Ballad, 498 Phil. 694, 706; 459 SCRA 657, 668 (2005).
[24] Per Certification dated August 22, 2013 of Mr. James D.V.
Navarrete, OCA Assistant Chief of Office, Legal Office.
[25] G.R. No. 181516, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 515, 522­
523.
452mental appeal.[26] Furthermore, verification is a formal, not
a   jurisdictional,   requirement.   It   is   mainly   intended   for   the
assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are true and
correct   and   not   of   mere   speculation.[27] Also,   a   supplemental
appeal is merely an addendum to the verified memorandum on
appeal   that   was   earlier   filed   in   the   present   case;   hence,   the
requirement for verification has substantially been complied with.
The respondents also timely filed their supplemental appeal
on   January   3,   2003.   The   records   of   the   case   show   that   the
petitioners   themselves   agreed   that   the   pleading   shall   be   filed
until December 18, 2002. The NLRC further extended the filing of
the   supplemental   pleading   until   January   3,   2003   upon   the
respondents’ motion for extension.
 A party may only adduce evidence
for   the   first   time   on   appeal   if   he
adequately   explains   his   delay   in   the
submission   of   evidence   and   he
sufficiently   proves   the   allegations
sought to be proven  [31]
In   labor   cases,   strict   adherence   to   the   technical   rules   of
procedure   is   not   required.   Time   and   again,   we   have   allowed
evidence   to  be  submitted   for   the  first   time   on  appeal   with   the
NLRC   in   the   interest   of   substantial   justice.[28] Thus,   we   have
consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use
_______________
[26] NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule 1, Section 3, in relation
to Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 4.
[27] Roy   Pasos   v.   Philippine   National   Construction
Corporation, G.R.   No.   192394,   July   3,   2013;   700   SCRA   608;
and Millennium   Erectors   Corporation   v.   Magallanes, G.R.   No.
184362,   November   15,   2010,   634   SCRA   708,   713­714,
citing Pacquing   v.   Coca­Cola   Philippines, Inc., G.R.   No.   157966,
January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 356­357.
[28] Casimiro v. Stern Real Estate Inc., 519 Phil. 438, 454­455;
484 SCRA 463, 479 (2006); and Iran vs. NLRC, 352 Phil. 264­265,
273­274; 289 SCRA 433, 442 (1998).
453all   reasonable   means   to   ascertain   the   facts   in   each   case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, in the interest of due process.[29]
However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of
reason   and   fairplay.  The   liberality   of   procedural   rules   is
qualified   by   two   requirements:   (1)   a   party   should
adequately   explain   any   delay   in   the   submission   of
evidence;   and   (2)   a   party   should   sufficiently   prove   the
allegations   sought   to   be   proven.[30] The   reason   for   these
requirements   is   that   the   liberal   application   of   the   rules   before
quasi­judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and
hamper   the   just   resolution   of   the   case.   Neither   is   the   rule   on
liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure.
Guided by these principles, the CA grossly erred in ruling that
the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily
admitting   and   giving   weight   to   the   respondents’   pieces   of
evidence for the first time on appeal.
A.     The   respondents   failed   to
adequately explain their delay
in the submission of evidence
We   cannot   accept   the   respondents’   cavalier   attitude   in
blatantly   disregarding   the   NLRC   Rules   of   Procedure.   The   CA
gravely erred when it overlooked that the NLRC blindly admitted
and arbitrarily gave probative value to the respondents’ evidence
despite   their   failure   to   adequately   explain   their   delay   in   the
submission   of   evidence.   Notably,   the   respondents’   delay   was
anchored on their assertion that they
_______________
[29] Iran v. NLRC, supra, at p. 274; p. 442.
[30] Tanjuan v. Phil. Postal Savings Bank, Inc., 457 Phil. 993,
1004­1005; 411 SCRA 168, 176 (2003).
[31] Favila v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil.
584, 593; 308 SCRA 303, 313 (1999).
454were oblivious of the proceedings before the LA. However, the
respondents   did   not   dispute   the   LA’s   finding   that   Mr.   Romulo
Pacia, Jr. appeared on their behalf on April 19, 2001 and May 21,
2001.[32] The  respondents   also  failed  to  contest  the  petitioners’
assertion that the respondents’ counsel appeared in a preliminary
mandatory conference on July 5, 2001.[33]
Indeed, the NLRC capriciously and whimsically admitted and
gave weight to the respondents’ evidence despite its finding that
they   voluntarily   appeared   in   the   compulsory   arbitration
proceedings.   The  NLRC  blatantly  disregarded  the  fact  that  the
respondents   voluntarily   opted   not   to   participate,   to   adduce
evidence in their defense and to file a position paper despite their
knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings before the LA. The
respondents were also grossly negligent in not informing the LA
of   the   specific   building   unit   where   the   respondents   were
conducting   their   business   and   their   counsel’s   address   despite
their knowledge of their non­receipt of the processes.[34]
B.     The   respondents   failed   to
sufficiently   prove   the
allegations sought to be proven
Furthermore, the respondents failed to sufficiently prove the
allegations   sought   to   be   proven.   Why   the   respondents’
photocopied   and   computerized   copies   of   documentary   evidence
were   not   presented   at   the   earliest   opportunity   is   a   serious
question   that   lends   credence   to   the   petitioners’   claim   that   the
respondents   fabricated   the   evidence   for   purposes   of
appeal. While   we   generally   admit   in   evidence   and   give
probative   value   to   photocopied   documents   in
administrative   proceedings,   allegations   of   forgery   and
fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original
_______________
[32] Supra note 5.
[33] Supra note 6.
[34] NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule 3, Sections 4 and 6(e).
455documents  for  inspection.[35] It  was  incumbent  upon  the
respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where
the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead,
the   respondents   effectively   deprived   the   petitioners   of   the
opportunity   to   examine   and   controvert   the   alleged   spurious
evidence   by   not   adducing   the   originals.   This   Court   is  thus   left
with no option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present
the   originals   raises   the   presumption   that   evidence   willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.[36]
It   was   also   gross   error   for   the   CA   to   affirm   the   NLRC’s
proposition that “[i]t is of common knowledge that there are many
people who use at least two or more different signatures.”[37] The
NLRC cannot take judicial notice that many people use at least
two   signatures,   especially   in   this   case   where   the   petitioners
themselves   disown   the   signatures   in   the   respondents’   assailed
documentary  evidence.[38] The NLRC’s  position  is  unwarranted
and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of
the employees. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the
employer’s   cause   can   only   succeed   on   the   strength   of   its   own
evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.[39]
The   petitioners   are   entitled   to
backwages 
Based on the above considerations, we reverse the NLRC and
the CA’s finding that the petitioners were terminated for
_______________
[35] Nicario v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 936, 941; 295 SCRA 619, 625
(1998).
[36] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(e).
[37] Rollo, p. 164.
[38] Rules of Court, Rule 129, Section 2.
 [39] The   Coca­Cola   Export   Corporation   v.   Gacayan, G.R.   No.
149433,   December   15,   2010,   638   SCRA   377,   400­401,   citations
omitted.
456just   cause   and   were   afforded   procedural   due   process.   In
termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for
dismissing   an   employee   from   his   employment   rests   upon   the
employer. The employer’s failure to discharge this burden results
in the finding that the dismissal is unjustified.[40] This is exactly
what happened in the present case.
The   petitioners   are   entitled   to
salary   differential,   service
incentive, holiday,   and   thirteenth
month pays
We   also   reverse   the   NLRC   and   the   CA’s   finding   that   the
petitioners   are   not   entitled   to   salary   differential,   service
incentive,   holiday,   and   thirteenth   month   pays.   As   in   illegal
dismissal cases, the general rule is that the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove
nonpayment of these money claims.[41] The rationale for this rule
is   that   the   pertinent   personnel   files,   payrolls,   records,
remittances and other similar documents — which will show that
differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers
have been paid — are not in the possession of the worker but are
in the custody and control of the employer.[42]
The petitioners are  not entitled to
overtime and premium pays  they were not part of the proceedings before the CA. Their failure
However, the CA was correct in its finding that the petitioners
failed to provide sufficient factual basis for the award of overtime,
and premium pays for holidays and rest days.
_______________
[40] Eastern   Overseas   Employment   Center,   Inc.   v.   Bea, 512
Phil. 749, 759; 476 SCRA 384, 394 (2005).
[41] Pigcaulan v. Security and Credit Investigation, Inc., G.R.
No. 173648, January 16, 2012, 663 SCRA 1, 14­15; and Building
Care  Corp.  v.  NLRC, 335  Phil.  1131,  1139;  268  SCRA 666,  672
(1997).
[42] Villar v. NLRC, 387 Phil. 706, 716; 331 SCRA 686, 695
(2000).
457The   burden   of   proving   entitlement   to   overtime   pay   and
premium  pay  for  holidays and  rest  days  rests on  the  employee
because these are not incurred in the normal course of business.
[43] In   the   present   case,   the   petitioners   failed   to   adduce   any
evidence that would show that they actually rendered service in
excess of the regular eight working hours a day, and that they in
fact worked on holidays and rest days.
The petitioners are  entitled
to attorney’s fees 
The   award   of   attorney’s   fees   is   also   warranted   under   the
circumstances of this case. An employee is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of
the wages in actions for unlawful withholding of wages.[44]
As a final note, we observe that Rodelito Ayala, Winelito Ojel,
Renato Rodrego and Welito Loon are also named as petitioners in
this   case.   However,   we   deny   their   petition   for   the   reason   that
to timely seek redress before the CA precludes this Court from
awarding them monetary claims.
All   told,   we   find   that   the   NLRC   committed   grave   abuse   of
discretion   in   admitting   and   giving   probative   value   to   the
respondents’ evidence on appeal, which errors the CA replicated upon   the   employer.   (Marc   II   Marketing,   Inc.   vs.   Joson,   662
when it upheld the NLRC rulings. SCRA 35 [2011])
WHEREFORE, based   on   these   premises, An   employer   has   the   right   to   require   the   performance   of
we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated June 5, 2009, overtime   service   in   any   of   the   situations   contemplated   under
and the resolution dated August 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals Article 89 of the Labor Code and an employee’s noncompliance is
in CA­G.R. SP No. 95182. This case is REMANDED to the Labor willful   disobedience.   (Realda   vs.   New   Age   Graphics,   Inc.,   671
Arbiter   for   the   sole   purpose   of   computing   petitioners’   (Wilgen
SCRA 410 [2012])
Loon, Jerry Arcilla, Albert Pereye, Arnold Pereye,
——o0o——
_______________
_______________
[43] Lagatic v. NLRC, 349 Phil. 172, 185­186; 285 SCRA 251, ** Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice
262 (1998). Jose P. Perez per Special Order No. 1627 dated December 6, 2013.
[44] Labor Code, Article 111.  
458Edgardo   Obose,   Arnel   Malaras,   Patrocino   Toetin,   Evelyn © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
Leonardo,   Elmer   Glocenda,   Rufo   Cunamay,   Rolando   Sajol, reserved.
Rolando   Abucayon,   Jennifer   Natividad,   Maritess   Torion,
Armando   Lonzaga,   Rizal   Gellido,   Evirdly   Haque,   Myrna   Vinas,
Nena   Abina,   Emalyn   Oliveros,   Louie   Ilagan,   Joel   Entig,   Arnel
Araneta,   Benjamin   Cose   and   William   Alipao)   full   backwages
(computed from the date of their respective dismissals up to the
finality   of   this   decision)   and   their   salary   differential,   service
incentive   leave,   holiday,   thirteenth   month   pays,   and   attorney’s
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the withheld wages. The
respondents   are   further   directed   to   immediately   post   a
satisfactory   bond   conditioned   on   the   satisfaction   of   the   awards
affirmed in this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 
Carpio   (Chairperson),   Del   Castillo,   Perlas­
 
Bernabe and Leonen,** JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.  G.R. No. 201011.  January 27, 2014.*
Notes.—In termination cases, the burden of proving just and THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO and
valid cause for dismissing an employee from his employment rests GLORIA,   all  surnamed   DIMAGUILA,   petitioners, vs. JOSE  and
SONIA A. MONTEIRO, respondents. 
 Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissions; Section 4 of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require
proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake.—Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may
be   contradicted   only   by   showing   that   it   was   made   through
palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was
the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the
answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.
Same; Same; Same; Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides
that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon
the   person   making   it,   and   cannot   be   denied   or   disproved   as
against the person relying thereon.—Article 1431 of the Civil Code
provides   that   through   estoppel,   an   admission   is   rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent
spouses   had  clearly   relied   on  the  petitioners’  admission  and   so
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery
of possession of a portion of the
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
566subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped
from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition
of the property. Considering that an admission does not require
proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient
to prove the partition even without the documents presented by
the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they
presented only served to corroborate the petitioners’ admission.
Same;   Same;   Best   Evidence   Rule;   Anent   the   best   evidence
rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when   the   subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a   document,   no
evidence   shall   be   admissible   other   than   the   original   document
itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office.—Anent the best
evidence   rule,   Section   3(d)   of   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court
provides   that   when   the   subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section
7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The rule provides that
entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.—As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
records   are   an   exception   to   the   rule.   The   rule   provides   that
entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts   therein   stated.   The   necessity   of   this   rule   consists   in   the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance
as   a   witness   to   testify   to   the   innumerable   transactions   in   the
course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
567
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Riguera & Riguera Law Office for petitioners.
  Edgardo M. Salandanan for respondents.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules  of Court assailing  the August  15, 2011  Decision1 and the
March 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA­
G.R.   CV   No.   92707,   which   affirmed   the   August   23,   2007
Decision3 of   the   Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch   27,   Santa   Cruz,
Laguna (RTC), in Civil Case No. SC­3108.
 
The Facts  During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were
On   July   5,   1993,   the   respondent   spouses,   Jose   and   Sonia
Monteiro (Spouses   Monteiro),   along   with   Jose,   Gerasmo,   Elisa,
and   Clarita   Nobleza,   filed   their   Complaint   for   Partition   and
Damages   before   the   RTC,   against   the   petitioners,   Theresita,
Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila (The
Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus,
Enrique,   Nina,   Princess   Arieta,   and   Evangelina   Borlaza.   The
complaint alleged that all the parties were co­owners and prayed
for   the   partition   of   a   residential   house   and   lot   located   at   Gat.
Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square meters, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored
their claim on a deed of sale
_______________
1 Rollo,   pp.   29­43;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Hakim   S.
Abdulwahid,   with   Associate   Justice   Ricardo   R.   Rosario   and
Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 44­45.
3 Id., at pp. 144­157.
568executed   in   their   favor   by   the   heirs   of   Pedro
Dimaguila (Pedro).
In   their   Answer,   the   Dimaguilas   and   the   other   defendants
countered that there was no co­ownership to speak of in the first
place.   They   alleged   that   the   subject   property,   then   owned   by
Maria   Ignacio   Buenaseda,   had   long   been   partitioned   equally
between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern­half portion
assigned to Perfecto and the northern­half portion to Vitaliano.
They   claimed   that   they   were   the   heirs   of   Vitaliano   and   that
Spouses  Monteiro  had  nothing   to  do   with  the  property   as they
were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
initiated, namely: (a) Motion to Dismiss for lack of legal capacity
to   sue   of   Spouses   Monteiro   and   for   lack  of   cause   of   action;   (b)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial thereof, which
was   denied;   (c)   Motion   for   Production   and   Inspection   of
Documents; (d) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting
the   same,   which   was   denied;   (e)   Motion   to   Defer   Pre­trial;   (f)
Notice of Consignation by the petitioners in the exercise of their
alleged   right   of   redemption   of   the   share   being   claimed   by   the
Spouses Monteiro in light of the deed of sale they produced and
claimed to have been executed by the heirs of Pedro in their favor;
(g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff, which
was   denied;   (h)   Motion   for   Reconsideration   thereof,   which   was
also   denied;   (i)   Motion   for   Clarification   and/or   Extended
Resolution;   and   (j)   Motion   to   Suspend   Proceedings   due   to   a
pending Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing several of
the RTC orders. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation
by   the   CA   of   its   April   5,   2000   Resolution   in   CA­G.R.   No.   SP
52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.
On   January   2,   2001,   upon   resumption   of   the   proceedings,
Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend
569and/or   Admit   Amended   Complaint.4 The   RTC   granted   their
motion. The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for
partition   and   instead   sought   the   recovery   of   possession   of   a
portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and
other defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the
heirs   of   Pedro.   Furthermore,   only   Spouses   Monteiro   were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.
In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the
Dimaguilas’ admission in their original answer that the subject
property   had   already   been   partitioned   between   Perfecto   and
Vitaliano,   through   a   Deed   of   Extrajudicial   Partition,   dated
October   5,   1945,   and   that   during   their   lifetime,   the   brothers
agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern­half
portion and Vitaliano of the northern­half portion, which division
was observed and respected by them as well as their heirs and
successors­in­interest.
Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived
by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the southern­
half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1/3
shares measuring 81.13 square meters each; that Pedro’s share
pertains to the 1/3 of the southern­half immediately adjacent to
the   northern­half   adjudicated   to   the   Dimaguilas   as   heirs   of
Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro’s share was sold by
his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan
(Bilihan) with   the   acquiescence   of   the   heirs   of   Esperanza   and
Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and
that   when   they   attempted   to   take   possession   of   the   share   of
Pedro,   they   discovered   that   the   subject   portion   was   being
occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In  their   Answer5 to  the  amended  complaint,   the  Dimaguilas
admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and
_______________
4 Records, Vol. II, pp. 289­308.
5 Id., at pp. 315­328.
570divided  equally   between  Perfecto  and   Vitaliano,   but  denied
the admission in their original answer that it had been actually
divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued
that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the
subject property “into two and share and share alike.” In effect,
they   argued   the   existence   of   a   co­ownership,   contrary   to   their
original   position.   The   Dimaguilas   further   argued   that
the Bilihandid not specify the metes and bounds of the property
sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even assuming
that   such   had   been   specified,   they   averred   that   the   sale   of   a
definite portion of a property owned in common was void since a
co­owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.
During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta,
brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who testified that Perfecto was
his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto’s death, he had
two properties,  one of which was the  subject property  in Liliw,
Laguna,   which   went   to   his   children,   Esperanza,   Leonardo   and
Pedro.   Pedro   was   survived   by   his   children   Pedrito,   Theresita,
Francisco,   and   Luis,   who,   in   turn,   sold   their   rights   over   the
subject property to Sonia.
Sonia   testified   that   she   was   approached   by   Pedro’s   son,
Francisco,   and   was   asked   if   she   was   interested   in   purchasing
Pedro’s 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na Bato,
and that he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partition executed
by   and   between   Perfecto   and   Vitaliano,   as   well   as   the   tax
declaration of the property to prove that the property had already
been partitioned between the two brothers.
Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic
engineer   hired   by   Spouses   Monteiro   to   survey   the   property   in
Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject
property, subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey
plan.
Crisostomo   Arves,   an   employee   from   the   Office   of   the
Municipal   Assessor,   presented   a   certified   true   copy   of   the
cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
571
Dominga   Tolentino,   a   record   officer   of   the   Department   of
Environment   and   Natural   Resources (DENR),   testified   that   as
part   of   her   duties,   she   certifies   and   safekeeps   the   records   of
surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region.
One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the
defendants. She testified that their first counsel made a mistake
when he alleged in their original answer that the property had
already   been   partitioned   into   northern   and   southern   portions
between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed
and   they   were   never   given   a   copy   of   it.   She   claimed   that   the
mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after
their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She further testified
that there was no intention to partition the “bahay na bato” which
stood on the subject property, in order to preserve its historical
and sentimental value.
 
Ruling of the RTC  Dimaguila (Buenaventura),   an   heir   of   Vitaliano,   and   Lot   877
In   its   August   23,   2007   Decision,   the   RTC   ruled   in   favor   of
Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the
possession of the subject 1/3 portion of the southern­half of the
property, to wit:  the  Dimaguilas themselves  in their  original answer.  It  gave no
WHEREOF,   judgment   is   hereby   rendered   in   favor   of   the
plaintiffs and against the defendants:
a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them to peacefully vacate and turnover possession of 1/3 of the
southern portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1453, specifically described as “A” of Lot 877 in the sketch
plan marked as Exhibit “I”, within 60 days from the finality of
this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;
b. Ordering   the   defendants   to   pay   the   plaintiffs,   jointly   and
solidarily, the
572amount of P500 per month in the form of rent for the
use   of  the  property   from  July   1993   until   the  property   is
vacated;
c. Ordering   the   defendants   to   pay   the   plaintiffs,   jointly   and
solidarily, attorney’s fees of P30,000 and litigation expense of
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.6
 
The   RTC   found   that   although   the   extrajudicial   partition
merely   divided   the   property   into   two   share   and   share   alike,
evidence aliunde was   appreciated   to   show   that   there   was   an
actual   division   of   the   property   into   south   and   north   between
Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and
honored   by   their   heirs.   These   pieces   of   evidence   were   the
cadastral   map   of   Liliw7 and   a   corresponding   list   of   claimants,
which showed that the subject property had long been registered
as   Lot   876   (northern­half),   claimed   by   Buenaventura
(southern­half), claimed by Perfecto.
 
The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by
credence  to  the  claim  of   Asuncion   that  such   admission  was   an
error  of  their  former  counsel  and that  she  was  unaware  of  the
contents of  their  original  answer.  It  noted  that  the  Dimaguilas
had strongly maintained their theory of partition from 1992 when
the complaint was first filed, and only changed their defense in
2001  when  Spouses  Monteiro filed  their  amended  complaint.  It
keenly   observed   that   it   was   precisely   their   admission   which
propelled Spouses Monteiro to amend their complaint from one of
partition to recovery of possession. Thus, the RTC concluded that
there was indeed a partition of the subject property into southern­
half and north­
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 156­157.
7 Records, Vol. I, Exhibit “A,” pp. 24­25.  11 235 Phil. 719; 151 SCRA 719 (1987).
573ern­half portions between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the
Dimaguilas were estopped from denying the same.
As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1/3 share of
Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro, the RTC found the document
to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the
contrary.   It   stated   that   the   proper   persons   to   contest   the   sale
were not the Dimaguilas, who were the heirs of Vitaliano, but the
heirs of Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs
of Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro’s siblings), had signified their
conformity to the partition and to the sale of Pedro’s 1/3 portion.
 
Ruling of the CA  as   compensatory   damages   since   Spouses   Monteiro   were
In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
The   CA   found   that   Spouses   Monteiro   had   established   their
case by a preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the
Deed   of   Extrajudicial   Partition,8 the   cadastral   map   and   the
municipal assessor’s records.9 It noted, more importantly, that the
Dimaguilas   themselves   corroborated   the   claim   of   partition   in
their original answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were
estopped   from   denying   their   admission   of   partition   after   the
respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission.
The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was
raised before the RTC, but not addressed, that the Bilihan should
not   have  been  admitted  as   evidence   for   lack  of   a   documentary
stamp   tax,   in   accordance   with   Section   201   of   the   National
Internal   Revenue   Code (NIRC).   Citing Gabucan   v.   Manta10 and
Del Rosario v. Hamoy,11 the CA, however, ruled
_______________
8  Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “J,” p. 519.
9  Records, Vol. I, Exhibit “A,” pp. 24­25.
10 184 Phil. 588; 95 SCRA 752 (1980).
574that   if   a   document   which   did   not   bear   the   required
documentary stamp was presented in evidence, the court should
require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp. The CA noted
that the RTC had failed to direct Spouses Monteiro to affix the
stamp   and   merely   reminded   the   presiding   judge   to   be   more
vigilant on similar situations in the future. Nonetheless, it held
that the petitioners did not possess the necessary personality to
assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro
because it pertained to the southern­half of the property to which
they had no claim.
The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals
wrongfully   deprived   of   possession   of   the   1/3   portion   of   the
southern­half of the subject property. It also upheld the award of
attorney’s  fees  and litigation  expenses  by  the  RTC,  considering
that   Spouses   Monteiro   were   compelled   to   litigate   and   incur
expenses to protect their rights and interest.
In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. 
 Assignment of Errors VII 
I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN IT   FAILED   TO   CONSIDER   THE   PETITIONERS’
FINDING   THAT   THERE   WAS   AN   ACTUAL SUPPLEMENTAL   ANSWER   TO   AMENDED
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX COMPLAINT   AND   TO   GRANT   THE
DECLARATION NO. 1453.  COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED THEREIN.12
II   
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding
FINDING   THAT   THE   1/3   PORTION   OF   THE the partition of the subject property into northern and southern
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD portions was a mistake of their former  counsel, and  it was not
TO THE RESPONDENTS. their intention to partition the property because to do so would
575 damage the house thereon. Even assuming an
III  _______________
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN 12 Rollo, pp. 13­14.
ADMITTING   IN   EVIDENCE   EXHIBIT   C,   THE 576admission was made, the petitioners aver that such was made
BILIHAN NG LAHAT NAMING KARAPATAN.  only by some, but not all, of the co­owners; and that partition can
only   be   made   by   all   co­owners,   and   allowing   the   admission   is
IV 
tantamount   to   effecting   partition   by   only   some   co­owners.
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
Spouses Monteiro themselves, in their original complaint, made
RULING   THAT   THE   RESPONDENTS   ARE
an   admission   that   they   were   co­owners   of   the   property   and
ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 asserted   that   there   was   no   partition.   The
PORTION   OF   THE   SOUTHERN   HALF   OF   THE
evidence aliunde considered   by   the   RTC,   consisting   of   the
PROPERTY. 
cadastral map and the list of claimants, were timely objected to
V  during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the best evidence
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN rule.
FINDING   THE   PETITIONERS   LIABLE   FOR The   petitioners   reiterate   that   the Bilihan should   not   have
RENTALS   FOR   THE   USE   OF   THE   PROPERTY been admitted into evidence because it lacked the documentary
FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.  stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC, providing that no
VI  document shall be admitted in evidence until the requisite stamps
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN have   been   affixed   thereto.   They   argue   that   the   ruling   of
HOLDING   THE   PETITIONERS   LIABLE   FOR petitioners’   lack   of   personality   to   assail   the   deed   of   sale   is
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.  different   from   the   issue   of   the   deed   of   sale’s   admissibility   as
evidence.   They   conclude   that   considering   that   no   documentary
stamp  was   ever  affixed  on   the  deed  of   sale,   such   should  never
have been admitted into evidence and consequently, should not
have been relied upon by the lower courts to prove the sale of 1/3
of the southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is
inadmissible as evidence, the respondent spouses have no basis
for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion of the southern­half of
the   property.   Thus,   they   insist   that   the   lower   courts   erred   in
awarding   to   Spouses   Monteiro   the   possession   of   the   subject
property, the rentals, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and
in   failing   to   rule   on   their   counterclaim   for   demolition   of
improvements and payment of damages.
The assignment of errors boils down to two main issues:
  1. Whether there was a partition of the subject property; and
577
   2. Whether  the  1/3  portion  of  the  southern­half  of  the  subject
property was sold to the respondent spouses.
 
Ruling of the Court  registered   as   Lot   Nos.   876   and   877;   and   (3)   the   Municipal
At   the   outset,   it   must   be   pointed   out   that   the   petitioners’
assignment   of   errors   calls   for   the   Court   to   again   evaluate   the
evidence   to   determine   whether   there   was   a   partition   of   the
property  and  whether  the  1/3   portion  of  the  southern  half  was
sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of
fact which are beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, especially considering that the findings of
fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. 13 On this ground alone,
the present petition must be denied. Nonetheless, the Court shall
delve into these factual issues to finally put this case to rest.
 
Partition of the Subject Property  prior to the original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that
Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the
burden   of   proof   to   establish   their   case   by   a   preponderance   of
evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence   on   either   side,   synonymous   with   the   term   “greater
weight   of   the   evidence.”   Preponderance   of   evidence   is   evidence
which  is  more  convincing   to  the  court  as  worthy   of  belief  than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.14
To   prove   their   claim   of   partition,   the   respondent   spouses
presented the following: (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
dated   October   5,   1945,   executed   by   and   between   the   brothers
Perfecto and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw
_______________
13 Heirs   of   Vda.   Dela   Cruz   v.   Heirs   of   Fajardo, G.R.   No.
184966, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 463, 470.
14 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca, 581 Phil.
188, 194; 559 SCRA 207, 215 (2008). 
578Cadm­484,15 dated August 6, 1976, showing that the subject
property had been divided into southern and northern portions,
Assessor’s records16 showing that the said lots were respectively
claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.
It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated
that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed “to divide between them into
two and share and share alike” the subject property, including the
house   situated   thereon.   It   appears,   however,   that   the   property
was actually partitioned into definite portions, namely, southern
and northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw,
which   were   respectively   claimed   by   an   heir   of   Vitaliano   and
Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears that the subject property had
already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20 years
such division had been observed by the brothers’ heirs. As earlier
pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact
in their original answer, to wit:  petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake
(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and
VITALIANO   DIMAGUILA   executed   a   deed   of
EXTRAJUDICIAL   PARTITION   of   the   aforedescribed
property   dividing   the   same   into   two   (2)   equal   parts   as
indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:
x x x
(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by
all the parties in this case from the beginning or as soon as
they   reached   the   age   of   discernment   PERFECTO
DIMAGUILA became the sole and exclusive owner of the
southern   half   of   the   aforedescribed   property   and
VITALIANO DIMAGUILA became the
_______________
15 Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “J,” p. 519.
16 Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “L,” p. 556.
579sole owner of the northern half of the same property;
the house that  was built  thereon and still  existing  up to
this time was likewise equally divided between the two (2)
DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial
partition of half equal shares;
x x x
2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA
in   the   above   described   property   has   already   been   long
segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well
known by all the parties in this case;17
x x x
(Emphases in the Original)  their original defense was a palpable mistake.
 
Section 418 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing   that   it   was   made   through   palpable   mistake.   The
of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of
which was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:
Q   So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?
A  May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed
the same without giving us a copy…19
_______________
17 Records, Vol. I, pp. 11­12.
18 Section 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or
written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the
same   case,   does   not   require   proof.   The   admission   may   be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
19 TSN, December 1, 2005, p. 15.
580
This   contention   is   unacceptable.   It   is   a   purely   self­serving
claim   unsupported   by   any   iota   of   evidence.   Bare   allegations,
unsubstantiated   by   evidence,   are   not   equivalent   to
proof.20 Furthermore,   the   Court   notes   that   this   position   was
adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their
original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint
of   the   respondent   spouses.   In   their   original   answer   to   the
complaint   for   partition,   their   claim   that   there   was   already   a
partition into northern­half and southern­half portions, was the
very   essence   of   their   defense.   It   was   precisely   this   admission
which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint.
The   petitioners   cannot   now   insist   that   the   very   foundation   of
Article 143121 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel,
an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.   The   respondent   spouses   had   clearly   relied   on   the
petitioners’   admission  and  so  amended   their   original   complaint
for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject   property.   Thus,   the   petitioners   are   now   estopped   from
denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the
property.
Considering   that   an   admission   does   not   require   proof,   the
admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove
the   partition   even   without   the   documents   presented   by   the
respondent   spouses.   If   anything,   the   additional   evidence   they
presented only served to corroborate the petitioners’ admission.
The   petitioners   argue   that   they   timely   objected   to   the
cadastral map and the list of claimants presented by the re­
_______________
20 Rosaroso   v.   Soria, G.R.   No.   194846,   June   19,   2013,   699
SCRA 232.
21 Art.    1431. Through   estoppel   an   admission   or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.  legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
581spondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule
on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents   of   a   document,   no   evidence   shall   be   admissible   other
than the original document itself, except when the original is a
public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.22 Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded   in   a   public   office,   its   contents   may   be   proved   by   a
certified   copy   issued   by   the   public   officer   in   custody
thereof.23Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents   may   be   evidenced   by   a   copy   attested   by   the   officer
having the legal custody or the record.24
_______________
22 Section 3. Original   document   must   be   produced;
exceptions.—When   the   subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
x x x
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
23 Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is
a public record.—When the original of document is in the custody
of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be   proved   by   a   certified   copy   issued   by   the   public   officer   in
custody thereof.
24 Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public
documents   referred   to   in   paragraph   (a)   of   Section   19,   when
admissible   for   any   purpose,   may   be   evidenced   by   an   official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept   is   in   foreign   country,   the   certificate   may   be   made   by   a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the   Philippines   stationed   in   the   foreign   country   in   which   the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
582
Certified   true   copies   of   the   cadastral   map   of   Liliw   and   the
corresponding  list  of  claimants  of the  area   covered  by   the  map
were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo
Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor’s Office, a repository of
such   documents.   The   second   was   Dominga   Tolentino,   a   DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps
and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public
records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court   similarly   provides   that   entries   in   official   records   are   an
exception to the rule.25 The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of
the   Philippines,   or   by   a   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined   by   law,   are prima   facie evidence   of   the   facts
therein   stated.   The   necessity   of   this   rule   consists   in   the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance
as   a   witness   to   testify   to   the   innumerable   transactions   in   the
course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.26
Cadastral   maps   are   the   output   of   cadastral   surveys.   The
DENR   is   the   department   tasked   to   execute,   supervise   and
manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. 27 It is, therefore, clear
that  the cadastral   map  and  the  corresponding   list  of  claimants
qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the
DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they
_______________
25 Section 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the   Philippines,   or   by   a   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined  by  law,  are  prima   facie  evidence  of  the  facts
therein stated.
26 Oscar   M.   Herrera,   Remedial   Law:   Vol.   V,   (Quezon   City,
Philippines, Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2004), p. 740.
27 DENR Admin. Order 2001­23.  28 Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “C,” p. 514.
583are   exceptions   to   the   hearsay   rule   and   are prima
facieevidence of the facts stated therein.
Even   granting   that   the   petitioners   had   not   admitted   the
partition, they presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of
the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the
petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence   that   there   had   indeed   been   a   partition   of   the   subject
property.
 
Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern­half 
To prove that 1/3 of the southern­half portion of the subject
property was sold to them, Spouses Monteiro presented a deed of
sale   entitled Bilihan   ng   Lahat   Naming   Karapatan,28 dated
September 29, 1992, wherein Pedro’s share was sold by his heirs
to   them,   with   the   acquiescence   of   the   heirs   of   Esperanza   and
Leandro   in   an   Affidavit   of   Conformity   and   Waiver. 29 The
petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted
into   evidence   because   it   lacked   the   documentary   stamp   tax
required by Section 201 of the NIRC.
On   August   29,   1994,   the   petitioners   filed   a   motion   for   the
production and/or inspection of documents,30 praying that Spouses
Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of sale, which they cited
as the source of their rights as co­owners. On November 20, 1995,
Spouses   Monteiro   submitted   their   compliance,31 furnishing   the
RTC and the petitioners with a copy 32 of the Bilihan. On January
3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation, 33manifesting
that they had attempted to exercise their right of redemption as
co­owners of the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the property
under Article
_______________
29 Records, Vol. I, pp. 303­305.
30 Id., at pp. 75­76.
31 Id., at p. 111.
 32 Id., at p. 112.
33 Id., at pp. 113­115.
584162334 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of
redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which was, however, returned.
By   filing   the   notice   of   consignation   and   tendering   their
payment for the redemption of the 1/3 portion of the southern­half
of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence,
due execution and validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are
now   estopped   from   questioning   its   admissiblity   in   evidence   for
relying   on   such   for   their   right  of   redemption.   Additionally,   the
Court   notes   that   the   copy35 of   the Bilihan which   was   originally
submitted   by   Spouses   Monteiro   with   its   compliance   filed   on
November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a documentary stamp tax. It
could only mean that the documentary stamp tax on the sale was
properly paid. The Bilihan was, therefore, properly admitted into
evidence and considered by the RTC.
In   any   case,   as   correctly   held   by   the   lower   courts,   the
petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano, who inherited the northern­half
portion   of   the   subject   property,   do   not   possess   the   necessary
personality to assail the sale of the southern­half portion between
Spouses   Monteiro   and   the   heirs   of   Pedro.   They   are   not   real
parties­in­interest   who   stand   to   be   benefited   or   injured   by   the
sale of the 1/3 portion of the southern­half over which they have
absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the courts below, only
fellow co­owners have the personality to assail the sale, namely,
the heirs of Pedro’s siblings, Esperanza and Leandro. They have,
however, expressly ac­
_______________
34 Art.   1623. The right of legal pre­emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The   right   of   redemption   of   co­owners   excludes   that   of
adjoining owners.
35 Records, Vol. I, p. 112. 
585quiesced to the sale and waived their right to the property in
the   affidavit   presented   by   Spouses   Monteiro. 36 As   such,   the
petitioners have no right to their counterclaims of demolition of
improvements and payment of damages.
With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim
over the subject 1/3 portion of the southern­half of the property
through   the Bilihan,   the   lower   courts   did   not   err   in   awarding
possession,   rentals,   attorney’s   fees,   and   litigation   expenses   to
them.
The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be
reckoned from January 2, 2001, the date the Spouses Monteiro
filed   their   Amended   Complaint   seeking   recovery   of   the   subject
portion.   Interest   at   the   rate   of 6%   per   annum shall   also   be
imposed   on   the   total   amount   of   rent   due   from   finality   of   this
Decision until fully paid.37
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is DENIED.   The   August   15,
2011 Decision and the March 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals,   in   CA­G.R.   CV   No.   92707   are AFFIRMED   with
MODIFICATION, in that:
a.    The award of rent at the rate of P500.00 per month shall
be   reckoned   from   January   2,   2001   until   the   property   is
vacated; and
b.    Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on
the total amount of rent due from finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 
 Velasco,   Jr.   (Chairperson),   Peralta,   Abad   and   Leonen,
JJ., concur. 
Petition   denied,   judgment   and   resolution   affirmed   with
modification.
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 303­304.
37 Nacar   v.   Gallery   Frames,   G.R.   No.   189871,   August   13,
2013, 703 SCRA 439. 
586
Notes.―Acts   of   facts   admitted   do   not   require   proof   and
cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Vidar vs. People, 611 SCRA 216 [2010])
Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the
course   of   the   trial   or   other   proceedings   in   the   same   case   are
conclusive   and   so   does   not   require   further   evidence   to   prove
them. (Philippine   Long   Distance   Telephone   Company   vs.
Pingol, 630 SCRA 413 [2013])
——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.

G.R. No. 201011.  January 27, 2014.*
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO and
GLORIA,   all  surnamed   DIMAGUILA,   petitioners, vs. JOSE  and
SONIA A. MONTEIRO, respondents. 
 Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissions; Section 4 of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require
proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake.—Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may
be   contradicted   only   by   showing   that   it   was   made   through
palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was
the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the
answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.
Same; Same; Same; Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides
that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon
the   person   making   it,   and   cannot   be   denied   or   disproved   as
against the person relying thereon.—Article 1431 of the Civil Code
provides   that   through   estoppel,   an   admission   is   rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent
spouses   had  clearly   relied   on  the  petitioners’  admission  and   so
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery
of possession of a portion of the
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
566subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped
from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition
of the property. Considering that an admission does not require
proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient
to prove the partition even without the documents presented by
the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they
presented only served to corroborate the petitioners’ admission.
Same;   Same;   Best   Evidence   Rule;   Anent   the   best   evidence
rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when   the   subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a   document,   no
evidence   shall   be   admissible   other   than   the   original   document
itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office.—Anent the best
evidence   rule,   Section   3(d)   of   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court
provides   that   when   the   subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section
7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The rule provides that
entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.—As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
records   are   an   exception   to   the   rule.   The   rule   provides   that
entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts   therein   stated.   The   necessity   of   this   rule   consists   in   the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance
as   a   witness   to   testify   to   the   innumerable   transactions   in   the
course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
567
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Riguera & Riguera Law Office for petitioners.
  Edgardo M. Salandanan for respondents.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules  of Court assailing  the August  15, 2011  Decision1 and the
March 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA­
G.R.   CV   No.   92707,   which   affirmed   the   August   23,   2007
Decision3 of   the   Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch   27,   Santa   Cruz,
Laguna (RTC), in Civil Case No. SC­3108.
 
The Facts  During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were
On   July   5,   1993,   the   respondent   spouses,   Jose   and   Sonia
Monteiro (Spouses   Monteiro),   along   with   Jose,   Gerasmo,   Elisa,
and   Clarita   Nobleza,   filed   their   Complaint   for   Partition   and
Damages   before   the   RTC,   against   the   petitioners,   Theresita,
Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila (The
Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus,
Enrique,   Nina,   Princess   Arieta,   and   Evangelina   Borlaza.   The
complaint alleged that all the parties were co­owners and prayed
for   the   partition   of   a   residential   house   and   lot   located   at   Gat.
Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square meters, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored
their claim on a deed of sale
_______________
1 Rollo,   pp.   29­43;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Hakim   S.
Abdulwahid,   with   Associate   Justice   Ricardo   R.   Rosario   and
Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 44­45.
3 Id., at pp. 144­157.
568executed   in   their   favor   by   the   heirs   of   Pedro
Dimaguila (Pedro).
In   their   Answer,   the   Dimaguilas   and   the   other   defendants
countered that there was no co­ownership to speak of in the first
place.   They   alleged   that   the   subject   property,   then   owned   by
Maria   Ignacio   Buenaseda,   had   long   been   partitioned   equally
between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern­half portion
assigned to Perfecto and the northern­half portion to Vitaliano.
They   claimed   that   they   were   the   heirs   of   Vitaliano   and   that
Spouses  Monteiro  had  nothing   to  do   with  the  property   as they
were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
initiated, namely: (a) Motion to Dismiss for lack of legal capacity
to   sue   of   Spouses   Monteiro   and   for   lack  of   cause   of   action;   (b)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial thereof, which
was   denied;   (c)   Motion   for   Production   and   Inspection   of
Documents; (d) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting
the   same,   which   was   denied;   (e)   Motion   to   Defer   Pre­trial;   (f)
Notice of Consignation by the petitioners in the exercise of their
alleged   right   of   redemption   of   the   share   being   claimed   by   the
Spouses Monteiro in light of the deed of sale they produced and
claimed to have been executed by the heirs of Pedro in their favor;
(g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff, which
was   denied;   (h)   Motion   for   Reconsideration   thereof,   which   was
also   denied;   (i)   Motion   for   Clarification   and/or   Extended
Resolution;   and   (j)   Motion   to   Suspend   Proceedings   due   to   a
pending Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing several of
the RTC orders. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation
by   the   CA   of   its   April   5,   2000   Resolution   in   CA­G.R.   No.   SP
52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.
On   January   2,   2001,   upon   resumption   of   the   proceedings,
Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend
569and/or   Admit   Amended   Complaint.4 The   RTC   granted   their
motion. The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for
partition   and   instead   sought   the   recovery   of   possession   of   a
portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and
other defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the
heirs   of   Pedro.   Furthermore,   only   Spouses   Monteiro   were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.
In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the
Dimaguilas’ admission in their original answer that the subject
property   had   already   been   partitioned   between   Perfecto   and
Vitaliano,   through   a   Deed   of   Extrajudicial   Partition,   dated
October   5,   1945,   and   that   during   their   lifetime,   the   brothers
agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern­half
portion and Vitaliano of the northern­half portion, which division
was observed and respected by them as well as their heirs and
successors­in­interest.
Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived
by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the southern­
half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1/3
shares measuring 81.13 square meters each; that Pedro’s share
pertains to the 1/3 of the southern­half immediately adjacent to
the   northern­half   adjudicated   to   the   Dimaguilas   as   heirs   of
Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro’s share was sold by
his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan
(Bilihan) with   the   acquiescence   of   the   heirs   of   Esperanza   and
Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and
that   when   they   attempted   to   take   possession   of   the   share   of
Pedro,   they   discovered   that   the   subject   portion   was   being
occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In  their   Answer5 to  the  amended  complaint,   the  Dimaguilas
admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and
_______________
4 Records, Vol. II, pp. 289­308.
5 Id., at pp. 315­328.
570divided  equally   between  Perfecto  and   Vitaliano,   but  denied
the admission in their original answer that it had been actually
divided into southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued
that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the
subject property “into two and share and share alike.” In effect,
they   argued   the   existence   of   a   co­ownership,   contrary   to   their
original   position.   The   Dimaguilas   further   argued   that
the Bilihandid not specify the metes and bounds of the property
sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even assuming
that   such   had   been   specified,   they   averred   that   the   sale   of   a
definite portion of a property owned in common was void since a
co­owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.
During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta,
brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who testified that Perfecto was
his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto’s death, he had
two properties,  one of which was the  subject property  in Liliw,
Laguna,   which   went   to   his   children,   Esperanza,   Leonardo   and
Pedro.   Pedro   was   survived   by   his   children   Pedrito,   Theresita,
Francisco,   and   Luis,   who,   in   turn,   sold   their   rights   over   the
subject property to Sonia.
Sonia   testified   that   she   was   approached   by   Pedro’s   son,
Francisco,   and   was   asked   if   she   was   interested   in   purchasing
Pedro’s 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na Bato,
and that he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partition executed
by   and   between   Perfecto   and   Vitaliano,   as   well   as   the   tax
declaration of the property to prove that the property had already
been partitioned between the two brothers.
Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic
engineer   hired   by   Spouses   Monteiro   to   survey   the   property   in
Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject
property, subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey
plan.
Crisostomo   Arves,   an   employee   from   the   Office   of   the
Municipal   Assessor,   presented   a   certified   true   copy   of   the
cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
571
Dominga   Tolentino,   a   record   officer   of   the   Department   of
Environment   and   Natural   Resources (DENR),   testified   that   as
part   of   her   duties,   she   certifies   and   safekeeps   the   records   of
surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region.
One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the
defendants. She testified that their first counsel made a mistake
when he alleged in their original answer that the property had
already   been   partitioned   into   northern   and   southern   portions
between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed
and   they   were   never   given   a   copy   of   it.   She   claimed   that   the
mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after
their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She further testified
that there was no intention to partition the “bahay na bato” which
stood on the subject property, in order to preserve its historical
and sentimental value.
 
Ruling of the RTC  Dimaguila (Buenaventura),   an   heir   of   Vitaliano,   and   Lot   877
In   its   August   23,   2007   Decision,   the   RTC   ruled   in   favor   of
Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the
possession of the subject 1/3 portion of the southern­half of the
property, to wit:  the  Dimaguilas themselves  in their  original answer.  It  gave no
WHEREOF,   judgment   is   hereby   rendered   in   favor   of   the
plaintiffs and against the defendants:
a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them to peacefully vacate and turnover possession of 1/3 of the
southern portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1453, specifically described as “A” of Lot 877 in the sketch
plan marked as Exhibit “I”, within 60 days from the finality of
this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;
b. Ordering   the   defendants   to   pay   the   plaintiffs,   jointly   and
solidarily, the
572amount of P500 per month in the form of rent for the
use   of  the  property   from  July   1993   until   the  property   is
vacated;
c. Ordering   the   defendants   to   pay   the   plaintiffs,   jointly   and
solidarily, attorney’s fees of P30,000 and litigation expense of
P20,000.
SO ORDERED.6
 
The   RTC   found   that   although   the   extrajudicial   partition
merely   divided   the   property   into   two   share   and   share   alike,
evidence aliunde was   appreciated   to   show   that   there   was   an
actual   division   of   the   property   into   south   and   north   between
Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and
honored   by   their   heirs.   These   pieces   of   evidence   were   the
cadastral   map   of   Liliw7 and   a   corresponding   list   of   claimants,
which showed that the subject property had long been registered
as   Lot   876   (northern­half),   claimed   by   Buenaventura
(southern­half), claimed by Perfecto.
 
The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by
credence  to  the  claim  of   Asuncion   that  such   admission  was   an
error  of  their  former  counsel  and that  she  was  unaware  of  the
contents of  their  original  answer.  It  noted  that  the  Dimaguilas
had strongly maintained their theory of partition from 1992 when
the complaint was first filed, and only changed their defense in
2001  when  Spouses  Monteiro filed  their  amended  complaint.  It
keenly   observed   that   it   was   precisely   their   admission   which
propelled Spouses Monteiro to amend their complaint from one of
partition to recovery of possession. Thus, the RTC concluded that
there was indeed a partition of the subject property into southern­
half and north­
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 156­157.
7 Records, Vol. I, Exhibit “A,” pp. 24­25.  11 235 Phil. 719; 151 SCRA 719 (1987).
573ern­half portions between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the
Dimaguilas were estopped from denying the same.
As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1/3 share of
Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro, the RTC found the document
to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the
contrary.   It   stated   that   the   proper   persons   to   contest   the   sale
were not the Dimaguilas, who were the heirs of Vitaliano, but the
heirs of Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs
of Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro’s siblings), had signified their
conformity to the partition and to the sale of Pedro’s 1/3 portion.
 
Ruling of the CA  as   compensatory   damages   since   Spouses   Monteiro   were
In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.
The   CA   found   that   Spouses   Monteiro   had   established   their
case by a preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the
Deed   of   Extrajudicial   Partition,8 the   cadastral   map   and   the
municipal assessor’s records.9 It noted, more importantly, that the
Dimaguilas   themselves   corroborated   the   claim   of   partition   in
their original answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were
estopped   from   denying   their   admission   of   partition   after   the
respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission.
The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was
raised before the RTC, but not addressed, that the Bilihan should
not   have  been  admitted  as   evidence   for   lack  of   a   documentary
stamp   tax,   in   accordance   with   Section   201   of   the   National
Internal   Revenue   Code (NIRC).   Citing Gabucan   v.   Manta10 and
Del Rosario v. Hamoy,11 the CA, however, ruled
_______________
8  Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “J,” p. 519.
9  Records, Vol. I, Exhibit “A,” pp. 24­25.
10 184 Phil. 588; 95 SCRA 752 (1980).
574that   if   a   document   which   did   not   bear   the   required
documentary stamp was presented in evidence, the court should
require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp. The CA noted
that the RTC had failed to direct Spouses Monteiro to affix the
stamp   and   merely   reminded   the   presiding   judge   to   be   more
vigilant on similar situations in the future. Nonetheless, it held
that the petitioners did not possess the necessary personality to
assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro
because it pertained to the southern­half of the property to which
they had no claim.
The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals
wrongfully   deprived   of   possession   of   the   1/3   portion   of   the
southern­half of the subject property. It also upheld the award of
attorney’s  fees  and litigation  expenses  by  the  RTC,  considering
that   Spouses   Monteiro   were   compelled   to   litigate   and   incur
expenses to protect their rights and interest.
In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. 
 Assignment of Errors VII 
I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN IT   FAILED   TO   CONSIDER   THE   PETITIONERS’
FINDING   THAT   THERE   WAS   AN   ACTUAL SUPPLEMENTAL   ANSWER   TO   AMENDED
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX COMPLAINT   AND   TO   GRANT   THE
DECLARATION NO. 1453.  COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED THEREIN.12
II   
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding
FINDING   THAT   THE   1/3   PORTION   OF   THE the partition of the subject property into northern and southern
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD portions was a mistake of their former  counsel, and  it was not
TO THE RESPONDENTS. their intention to partition the property because to do so would
575 damage the house thereon. Even assuming an
III  _______________
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN 12 Rollo, pp. 13­14.
ADMITTING   IN   EVIDENCE   EXHIBIT   C,   THE 576admission was made, the petitioners aver that such was made
BILIHAN NG LAHAT NAMING KARAPATAN.  only by some, but not all, of the co­owners; and that partition can
only   be   made   by   all   co­owners,   and   allowing   the   admission   is
IV 
tantamount   to   effecting   partition   by   only   some   co­owners.
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
Spouses Monteiro themselves, in their original complaint, made
RULING   THAT   THE   RESPONDENTS   ARE
an   admission   that   they   were   co­owners   of   the   property   and
ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 asserted   that   there   was   no   partition.   The
PORTION   OF   THE   SOUTHERN   HALF   OF   THE
evidence aliunde considered   by   the   RTC,   consisting   of   the
PROPERTY. 
cadastral map and the list of claimants, were timely objected to
V  during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the best evidence
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN rule.
FINDING   THE   PETITIONERS   LIABLE   FOR The   petitioners   reiterate   that   the Bilihan should   not   have
RENTALS   FOR   THE   USE   OF   THE   PROPERTY been admitted into evidence because it lacked the documentary
FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.  stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC, providing that no
VI  document shall be admitted in evidence until the requisite stamps
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN have   been   affixed   thereto.   They   argue   that   the   ruling   of
HOLDING   THE   PETITIONERS   LIABLE   FOR petitioners’   lack   of   personality   to   assail   the   deed   of   sale   is
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.  different   from   the   issue   of   the   deed   of   sale’s   admissibility   as
evidence.   They   conclude   that   considering   that   no   documentary
stamp  was   ever  affixed  on   the  deed  of   sale,   such   should  never
have been admitted into evidence and consequently, should not
have been relied upon by the lower courts to prove the sale of 1/3
of the southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is
inadmissible as evidence, the respondent spouses have no basis
for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion of the southern­half of
the   property.   Thus,   they   insist   that   the   lower   courts   erred   in
awarding   to   Spouses   Monteiro   the   possession   of   the   subject
property, the rentals, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and
in   failing   to   rule   on   their   counterclaim   for   demolition   of
improvements and payment of damages.
The assignment of errors boils down to two main issues:
  1. Whether there was a partition of the subject property; and
577
   2. Whether  the  1/3  portion  of  the  southern­half  of  the  subject
property was sold to the respondent spouses.
 
Ruling of the Court  registered   as   Lot   Nos.   876   and   877;   and   (3)   the   Municipal
At   the   outset,   it   must   be   pointed   out   that   the   petitioners’
assignment   of   errors   calls   for   the   Court   to   again   evaluate   the
evidence   to   determine   whether   there   was   a   partition   of   the
property  and  whether  the  1/3   portion  of  the  southern  half  was
sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of
fact which are beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, especially considering that the findings of
fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. 13 On this ground alone,
the present petition must be denied. Nonetheless, the Court shall
delve into these factual issues to finally put this case to rest.
 
Partition of the Subject Property  prior to the original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that
Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the
burden   of   proof   to   establish   their   case   by   a   preponderance   of
evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence   on   either   side,   synonymous   with   the   term   “greater
weight   of   the   evidence.”   Preponderance   of   evidence   is   evidence
which  is  more  convincing   to  the  court  as  worthy   of  belief  than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.14
To   prove   their   claim   of   partition,   the   respondent   spouses
presented the following: (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
dated   October   5,   1945,   executed   by   and   between   the   brothers
Perfecto and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw
_______________
13 Heirs   of   Vda.   Dela   Cruz   v.   Heirs   of   Fajardo, G.R.   No.
184966, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 463, 470.
14 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca, 581 Phil.
188, 194; 559 SCRA 207, 215 (2008). 
578Cadm­484,15 dated August 6, 1976, showing that the subject
property had been divided into southern and northern portions,
Assessor’s records16 showing that the said lots were respectively
claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.
It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated
that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed “to divide between them into
two and share and share alike” the subject property, including the
house   situated   thereon.   It   appears,   however,   that   the   property
was actually partitioned into definite portions, namely, southern
and northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw,
which   were   respectively   claimed   by   an   heir   of   Vitaliano   and
Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears that the subject property had
already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20 years
such division had been observed by the brothers’ heirs. As earlier
pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact
in their original answer, to wit:  petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake
(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and
VITALIANO   DIMAGUILA   executed   a   deed   of
EXTRAJUDICIAL   PARTITION   of   the   aforedescribed
property   dividing   the   same   into   two   (2)   equal   parts   as
indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:
x x x
(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by
all the parties in this case from the beginning or as soon as
they   reached   the   age   of   discernment   PERFECTO
DIMAGUILA became the sole and exclusive owner of the
southern   half   of   the   aforedescribed   property   and
VITALIANO DIMAGUILA became the
_______________
15 Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “J,” p. 519.
16 Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “L,” p. 556.
579sole owner of the northern half of the same property;
the house that  was built  thereon and still  existing  up to
this time was likewise equally divided between the two (2)
DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial
partition of half equal shares;
x x x
2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA
in   the   above   described   property   has   already   been   long
segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well
known by all the parties in this case;17
x x x
(Emphases in the Original)  their original defense was a palpable mistake.
 
Section 418 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing   that   it   was   made   through   palpable   mistake.   The
of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of
which was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:
Q   So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?
A  May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed
the same without giving us a copy…19
_______________
17 Records, Vol. I, pp. 11­12.
18 Section 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or
written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the
same   case,   does   not   require   proof.   The   admission   may   be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
19 TSN, December 1, 2005, p. 15.
580
This   contention   is   unacceptable.   It   is   a   purely   self­serving
claim   unsupported   by   any   iota   of   evidence.   Bare   allegations,
unsubstantiated   by   evidence,   are   not   equivalent   to
proof.20 Furthermore,   the   Court   notes   that   this   position   was
adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their
original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint
of   the   respondent   spouses.   In   their   original   answer   to   the
complaint   for   partition,   their   claim   that   there   was   already   a
partition into northern­half and southern­half portions, was the
very   essence   of   their   defense.   It   was   precisely   this   admission
which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint.
The   petitioners   cannot   now   insist   that   the   very   foundation   of
Article 143121 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel,
an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.   The   respondent   spouses   had   clearly   relied   on   the
petitioners’   admission  and  so  amended   their   original   complaint
for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject   property.   Thus,   the   petitioners   are   now   estopped   from
denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the
property.
Considering   that   an   admission   does   not   require   proof,   the
admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove
the   partition   even   without   the   documents   presented   by   the
respondent   spouses.   If   anything,   the   additional   evidence   they
presented only served to corroborate the petitioners’ admission.
The   petitioners   argue   that   they   timely   objected   to   the
cadastral map and the list of claimants presented by the re­
_______________
20 Rosaroso   v.   Soria, G.R.   No.   194846,   June   19,   2013,   699
SCRA 232.
21 Art.    1431. Through   estoppel   an   admission   or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.  legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
581spondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule
on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents   of   a   document,   no   evidence   shall   be   admissible   other
than the original document itself, except when the original is a
public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.22 Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded   in   a   public   office,   its   contents   may   be   proved   by   a
certified   copy   issued   by   the   public   officer   in   custody
thereof.23Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents   may   be   evidenced   by   a   copy   attested   by   the   officer
having the legal custody or the record.24
_______________
22 Section 3. Original   document   must   be   produced;
exceptions.—When   the   subject   of   inquiry   is   the   contents   of   a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
x x x
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
23 Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is
a public record.—When the original of document is in the custody
of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be   proved   by   a   certified   copy   issued   by   the   public   officer   in
custody thereof.
24 Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public
documents   referred   to   in   paragraph   (a)   of   Section   19,   when
admissible   for   any   purpose,   may   be   evidenced   by   an   official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept   is   in   foreign   country,   the   certificate   may   be   made   by   a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the   Philippines   stationed   in   the   foreign   country   in   which   the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
582
Certified   true   copies   of   the   cadastral   map   of   Liliw   and   the
corresponding  list  of  claimants  of the  area   covered  by   the  map
were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo
Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor’s Office, a repository of
such   documents.   The   second   was   Dominga   Tolentino,   a   DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps
and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public
records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court   similarly   provides   that   entries   in   official   records   are   an
exception to the rule.25 The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of
the   Philippines,   or   by   a   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined   by   law,   are prima   facie evidence   of   the   facts
therein   stated.   The   necessity   of   this   rule   consists   in   the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance
as   a   witness   to   testify   to   the   innumerable   transactions   in   the
course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.26
Cadastral   maps   are   the   output   of   cadastral   surveys.   The
DENR   is   the   department   tasked   to   execute,   supervise   and
manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. 27 It is, therefore, clear
that  the cadastral   map  and  the  corresponding   list  of  claimants
qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the
DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they
_______________
25 Section 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the   Philippines,   or   by   a   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined  by  law,  are  prima   facie  evidence  of  the  facts
therein stated.
26 Oscar   M.   Herrera,   Remedial   Law:   Vol.   V,   (Quezon   City,
Philippines, Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2004), p. 740.
27 DENR Admin. Order 2001­23.  28 Records, Vol. III, Exhibit “C,” p. 514.
583are   exceptions   to   the   hearsay   rule   and   are prima
facieevidence of the facts stated therein.
Even   granting   that   the   petitioners   had   not   admitted   the
partition, they presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of
the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the
petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence   that   there   had   indeed   been   a   partition   of   the   subject
property.
 
Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern­half 
To prove that 1/3 of the southern­half portion of the subject
property was sold to them, Spouses Monteiro presented a deed of
sale   entitled Bilihan   ng   Lahat   Naming   Karapatan,28 dated
September 29, 1992, wherein Pedro’s share was sold by his heirs
to   them,   with   the   acquiescence   of   the   heirs   of   Esperanza   and
Leandro   in   an   Affidavit   of   Conformity   and   Waiver. 29 The
petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted
into   evidence   because   it   lacked   the   documentary   stamp   tax
required by Section 201 of the NIRC.
On   August   29,   1994,   the   petitioners   filed   a   motion   for   the
production and/or inspection of documents,30 praying that Spouses
Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of sale, which they cited
as the source of their rights as co­owners. On November 20, 1995,
Spouses   Monteiro   submitted   their   compliance,31 furnishing   the
RTC and the petitioners with a copy 32 of the Bilihan. On January
3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation, 33manifesting
that they had attempted to exercise their right of redemption as
co­owners of the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the property
under Article
_______________
29 Records, Vol. I, pp. 303­305.
30 Id., at pp. 75­76.
31 Id., at p. 111.
 32 Id., at p. 112.
33 Id., at pp. 113­115.
584162334 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of
redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which was, however, returned.
By   filing   the   notice   of   consignation   and   tendering   their
payment for the redemption of the 1/3 portion of the southern­half
of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence,
due execution and validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are
now   estopped   from   questioning   its   admissiblity   in   evidence   for
relying   on   such   for   their   right  of   redemption.   Additionally,   the
Court   notes   that   the   copy35 of   the Bilihan which   was   originally
submitted   by   Spouses   Monteiro   with   its   compliance   filed   on
November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a documentary stamp tax. It
could only mean that the documentary stamp tax on the sale was
properly paid. The Bilihan was, therefore, properly admitted into
evidence and considered by the RTC.
In   any   case,   as   correctly   held   by   the   lower   courts,   the
petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano, who inherited the northern­half
portion   of   the   subject   property,   do   not   possess   the   necessary
personality to assail the sale of the southern­half portion between
Spouses   Monteiro   and   the   heirs   of   Pedro.   They   are   not   real
parties­in­interest   who   stand   to   be   benefited   or   injured   by   the
sale of the 1/3 portion of the southern­half over which they have
absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the courts below, only
fellow co­owners have the personality to assail the sale, namely,
the heirs of Pedro’s siblings, Esperanza and Leandro. They have,
however, expressly ac­
_______________
34 Art.   1623. The right of legal pre­emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The   right   of   redemption   of   co­owners   excludes   that   of
adjoining owners.
35 Records, Vol. I, p. 112. 
585quiesced to the sale and waived their right to the property in
the   affidavit   presented   by   Spouses   Monteiro. 36 As   such,   the
petitioners have no right to their counterclaims of demolition of
improvements and payment of damages.
With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim
over the subject 1/3 portion of the southern­half of the property
through   the Bilihan,   the   lower   courts   did   not   err   in   awarding
possession,   rentals,   attorney’s   fees,   and   litigation   expenses   to
them.
The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be
reckoned from January 2, 2001, the date the Spouses Monteiro
filed   their   Amended   Complaint   seeking   recovery   of   the   subject
portion.   Interest   at   the   rate   of 6%   per   annum shall   also   be
imposed   on   the   total   amount   of   rent   due   from   finality   of   this
Decision until fully paid.37
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is DENIED.   The   August   15,
2011 Decision and the March 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals,   in   CA­G.R.   CV   No.   92707   are AFFIRMED   with
MODIFICATION, in that:
a.    The award of rent at the rate of P500.00 per month shall
be   reckoned   from   January   2,   2001   until   the   property   is
vacated; and
b.    Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on
the total amount of rent due from finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 
 Velasco,   Jr.   (Chairperson),   Peralta,   Abad   and   Leonen,
JJ., concur. 
Petition   denied,   judgment   and   resolution   affirmed   with
modification.
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 303­304.
37 Nacar   v.   Gallery   Frames,   G.R.   No.   189871,   August   13,
2013, 703 SCRA 439. 
586
Notes.―Acts   of   facts   admitted   do   not   require   proof   and
cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Vidar vs. People, 611 SCRA 216 [2010])
Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the
course   of   the   trial   or   other   proceedings   in   the   same   case   are
conclusive   and   so   does   not   require   further   evidence   to   prove
them. (Philippine   Long   Distance   Telephone   Company   vs.
Pingol, 630 SCRA 413 [2013])
——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.

G.R. No. 181892. September 8, 2015.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS M.
MUPAS, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Republic vs. Mupas
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 117, Pasay City, and PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 209731. September 8, 2015.*

G.R. No. 209917. September 8, 2015.* PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.
petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, and COMMUNICATIONS, MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, AUTHORITY, TAKENAKA CORPORATION, and
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION, respondents.
TERMINALS COMPANY, INC., TAKENAKA CORPORATION Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Expropriation
and ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION, respondents. Proceedings; Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides
that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the
G.R. No. 209696. September 8, 2015.* commissioners’ final report on all interested parties
upon the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten
TAKENAKA CORPORATION and ASAHIKOSAN (10) days within which to file their objections to the
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE report’s findings.—Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
PHILIPPINES, represented by Executive Secretary provides that the clerk of court shall serve copies of
Eduardo Ermita, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION the commissioners’ final report on all interested parties
AND COMMUNICATIONS, MANILA INTERNATIONAL upon the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL days within which to file their objections to the report’s
AIR TERMINALS COMPANY, INC., respondents. findings. Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or
_______________ after all the parties have filed their objections and after
* EN BANC. hearing, the trial court may: (a) accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith; (b) for cause
shown, recommit the report to the commissioners for
385 further report of facts; (c) set aside the report and
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 appoint new commissioners; (d) partially accept the
report; and (e) make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation;
and to the defendant, the just compensation for the
property so taken.
Eminent Domain; Due Process; The procedural
due process requirements in an eminent domain case
are satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to domain is a fundamental state power that is
present their evidence before the commissioners
whose findings (together with the pleadings, evidence
of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are
reviewed and considered by the expropriation court.—
The essence of procedural due process is the right to
be heard. The procedural due process requirements in
an eminent domain case are satisfied if the parties are
given the opportunity to present their evidence before
the commissioners whose findings (together with the
pleadings, evidence of the parties,
386
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and
considered by the expropriation court. It is the parties’ the individual’s fundamental rights.
total failure to present evidence on just compensation
that renders the trial court’s ruling void. The
opportunity to present evidence during the trial
remains to be the vital requirement in the observance
of due process.
Same; Words and Phrases; Eminent domain is a
fundamental state power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property within its territorial
sovereignty to promote public welfare.—Eminent
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power of a
sovereign state to appropriate private property within
its territorial sovereignty to promote public welfare.
The exercise of this power is based on the State’s
primary duty to serve the common need and advance
the general welfare. It is an inherent power and is not
conferred by the Constitution. It is inalienable and no
legislative act or agreement can serve to abrogate the
power of eminent domain when public necessity and
convenience require its exercise. The decision to
exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the
legislature which has the exclusive power to prescribe
how and by whom the power of eminent domain is to be
exercised. Thus, the Executive Department cannot
condemn properties for its own use without direct
authority from the Congress. The exercise of eminent
domain necessarily derogates against private rights
which must yield to demand of the public good and the
common welfare. However, it does not confer on the
State the authority to wantonly disregard and violate
Same; Expropriation Proceedings; Just
Compensation; Words and Phrases; Just compensation
is defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.”—
Just compensation is defined as “the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.” The word “just” is used to qualify the
meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey the
idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On
the other hand, the word “compensation” means “a full
indemnity or remuneration for the loss or damage
sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for
public use.” Simply stated, just compensation
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Republic vs. Mupas
means that the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had
when the taking occurred. To achieve this monetary
equivalent, we use the standard value of “fair market
value” of the property at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking
of property, whichever is earlier.
Same; Same; Same; Fair Market Value; Words and
Phrases; Jurisprudence broadly defines “fair market
value” as the sum of money that a person desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received for a property.—Jurisprudence broadly
defines “fair market value” as the sum of money that a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received for a property. Fair
market value is not limited to the assessed value of the
property or to the schedule of market values
determined by the provincial or city appraisal
committee. However, these values may serve as factors
to be considered in the judicial valuation of the
property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In cases where the fair
market value of the property is difficult to ascertain,
the court may use other just and equitable market
methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair
market value of a property.— In cases where the fair
market value of the property is difficult to ascertain,
the court may use other just and equitable market
methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair
market value of a property.
Same; Same; Same; Replacement Cost; Words and
Phrases; Replacement cost is a different standard of
valuation from the fair market value; Replacement cost
is “the amount necessary to replace the
improvements/structures, based on the current market
prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor’s
profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation in
place of the affected improvements /structures.”—
Replacement cost is a different standard of valuation
from the fair market value. As we previously stated, fair
market value is the price at which a property may be
sold by a seller who is not compelled to sell and bought
by a buyer who is not compelled to buy. In contrast,

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38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
replacement cost is “the amount necessary to
replace the improvements/structures, based on the
current market prices for materials, equipment, labor,
contractor’s profit and overhead, and all other
attendant costs associated with the acquisition and
installation in place of the affected Phrases; Reproduction cost is the “estimated current
improvements/structures.” We use the replacement
cost method to determine just compensation if the
expropriated property has no market-based evidence of
its value.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The replacement cost
method is a cost approach in appraising real estate for building.”—Reproduction cost is the “estimated current
purposes of expropriation. This approach is premised
on the principle of substitution which means that “all
things being equal, a rational, informed purchaser
would pay no more for a property than the cost of
building an acceptable substitute with like utility.”—
The replacement cost method is a cost approach in
appraising real estate for purposes of expropriation.
This approach is premised on the principle of
substitution which means that “all things being equal, a
rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a
property than the cost of building an acceptable
substitute with like utility.” The cost approach
considers the principles of substitution, supply and
demand, contribution and externalities. “The value of
the land and the value of improvements are determined
separately according to their highest and best use.”
“Buyers assess the value of a piece of property not only
based on the existing condition of the property, but also
in terms of the cost to alter or improve the property to
make it functional specifically for the purposes of the
buyer’s use. This may include building new structures,
renovating existing structures, or changing the
components of an existing structure to maximize its
utility.”
Same; Same; Same; Reproduction Cost; Words and
cost to construct an exact replica of the subject
building, using the same materials, construction
standards, design, layout, and quality of workmanship;
and incorporating all the deficiencies,
superadequacies, and obsolescence of the subject
cost to construct an exact replica of the subject
building, using the same materials, construction
standards, design, layout, and quality of workmanship;
and incorporating all the deficiencies,
superadequacies, and obsolescence of the subject
building.” It is the cost of
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 Republic vs. Mupas
duplicating the subject property at current prices
or the current cost of reproducing a new replica of the
property being appraised using the same, or closely
similar, materials. In the United States, the recognized
and used method in eminent domain cases in
appraising specialized properties is the reproduction
cost less depreciation approach.
Same; Same; Same; Replacement Cost New;
Words and Phrases; Replacement cost new is “the
estimated cost to construct a building with utility
equivalent to the appraised building using modern
materials and current standards, design, and layout” or
“the current cost of a similar new property having the
nearest equivalent utility as the property being
valued.”—Replacement cost new is “the estimated cost
to construct a building with utility equivalent to the
appraised building using modern materials and current
standards, design, and layout” or “the current cost of a
similar new property having the nearest equivalent
utility as the property being valued.” It is the cost of
acquiring a modern, functional equivalent of the subject
property and “views the building as if reconstructed
with modern methods, design and materials that would
most closely replace the use of the appraised building
but provide the same utility.” Replacement cost does
not consider the most common forms of functional
obsolescence.
Same; Same; Same; Depreciated Replacement
Cost Approach; Words and Phrases; Depreciated
replacement cost approach is the “method of valuation
which provides the current cost of replacing an asset
with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all
physical deterioration and all relevant forms of
obsolescence and optimisation.”—Depreciated
replacement cost approach is the “method of valuation
which provides the current cost of replacing an asset
with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all
physical deterioration and all relevant forms of
obsolescence and optimisation.” Depreciated
replacement cost is a method of appraising assets that
are usually not exposed to the open market. A general
formula of this method is as follows: Cost of
constructing the building(s) (including fees) Plus: Cost
of the land (including fees) = Total Costs Less:
Allowance for age and depreciation = Depreciated
Replacement Cost Under this method, the appraiser
assesses the current
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39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
gross replacement of the assets, usually comprised of
the land and the building. If the asset is an
improvement, the appraiser assesses the cost of its
replacement with a modern equivalent and deducts
depreciation to reflect the differences between the
hypothetical modern equivalent and the actual asset.
The appraiser has to “establish the size and
specification that the hypothetical buyer ideally
requires at the date of valuation in order to provide the
same level of productive output or an equivalent
service.”
Same; Same; Same; Construction Cost; Attendant
Cost; Words and Phrases; Construction costs are “the
costs that are normally and directly incurred in the
purchase and installation of an asset, or group of
assets, into functional use.” On the other hand,
attendant costs are “the costs that are normally
required to purchase and install a property but that are
not usually included in the vendor invoice.”—
Construction costs are “the costs that are normally and
directly incurred in the purchase and installation of an
asset, or group of assets, into functional use.” On the
other hand, attendant costs are “the costs that are
normally required to purchase and install a property but
that are not usually included in the vendor invoice.”
Under Section 10 of the RA 8974 IRR, construction cost
is the current market price of materials, equipment,
labor, the contractor’s profit and overhead, while the
attendant cost is the cost associated with the
acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvement.
Same; Same; Same; Physical Obsolescence;
Words and Phrases; Physical obsolescence refers to
the “wear and tear over the years, which might be
combined with a lack of maintenance.”—Physical
obsolescence refers to the “wear and tear over the
years, which might be combined with a lack of
maintenance.” Physical depreciation is curable if
“capital investment can bring the building to a state in
which the degree of obsolescence is mitigated (e.g.,
standards of finishes and services).” It is incurable if
“no amount of capital investment can rectify the
[depreciation] (for example, building structural
flexibility).” Curable physical depreciation is measured
by the cost to cure or retrofitting which could extend
the life of the building. Incurable depreciation or
deterioration is estimated by a variety of age-life or
economic-age calculation methods.
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Republic vs. Mupas
Same; Same; Same; Functional Obsolescence;
Words and Phrases; Functional obsolescence “reflects
the advances in technology which allow for a more
efficient delivery of services and goods from a building
of different designs and specifications.”—Functional
obsolescence “reflects the advances in technology
which allow for a more efficient delivery of services
and goods from a building of different designs and
specifications.” “Functional obsolescence arises where
the design or specification of the asset no longer
fulfills the function for which it was originally
designed.”
Same; Same; Same; Economic Obsolescence;
Words and Phrases; Economic obsolescence results
from the impact of changing external macro- and micro-
economic conditions on the property and should not
include internal factors which affect the profitability of
the occupying business, the writing down of such
factors to reflect the profitability of the business being
a matter for the occupier.—Economic obsolescence
results from “the impact of changing external macro-
and micro-economic conditions on the property and
should not include internal factors which affect the
profitability of the occupying business, the writing
down of such factors to reflect the profitability of the
business being a matter for the occupier. Within
economic obsolescence, the prospect of extending the
life of the building by capital investment should be
considered, as well as the fact that lack of
maintenance can accelerate the rate of depreciation.”
Same; Same; Same; Just compensation must not
extend beyond the property owner’s loss or injury.—
Just compensation must not extend beyond the
property owner’s loss or injury. This is the only way for
the compensation paid to be truly just, not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but also to the
public who will shoulder the cost of expropriation. Even
as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his
property without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the
public.
Same; Same; Same; The determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is essentially
and exclusively a judicial function.—The determination
of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
essentially and exclusively a judicial function. Fixing
the formula with definitiveness and particularity in just
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39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Republic vs. Mupas
compensation is not the function of the executive nor
of the legislative branches, much less of the parties in
this case. Any valuation for just compensation laid
down in the statutes may not replace the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how this amount should be arrived at. Legislative
enactments, as well as executive issuances, providing
the method of computing just compensation are treated
as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just
compensation.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of
Appeals; Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA may receive
evidence.—Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules
of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the following
cases: (a) In actions falling within its original
jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, (2) annulment of judgment or final order, (3)
quo warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5) amparo, (6)
habeas data, (7) anti-money laundering, and (8)
application for judicial authorization under the Human
Security Act of 2007; (b) In appeals in civil cases
where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule
53 of the Rules of Court; (c) In appeals in criminal
cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule
124 of the rules of Court; and (d) In appeals involving
claims for damages arising from provisional remedies.
Same; Evidence; Equiponderance of Evidence
Rule; Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when
the scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and
nothing in the evidence inclines a conclusion to one (1)
side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.—
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the
scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and nothing in
the evidence inclines a conclusion to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant. If the facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with
the defense of the defendant, the evidence does not
fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence.
When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or
when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance
of evidence lies, the party with the burden
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Republic vs. Mupas
of proof fails. The reason for this rule is that the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim. Thus,
even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger
than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance
of evidence on his side when this evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best
Evidence Rule; Under the best evidence rule, when the
subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must
be produced in court.—Under the best evidence rule,
when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must
be produced in court. The best evidence rule ensures
that the exact contents of a document are brought
before the court. In deeds, wills, and contracts, a slight
variation in words may mean a great difference in the
rights and obligations of the parties. A substantial
hazard of inaccuracy exists in the human process of
making a copy by handwriting or typewriting. Moreover,
with respect to oral testimony purporting to give the
terms of a document from memory, a special risk of
error is present, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. The best
evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against
fraud. If a party is in the possession of the best
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with the item-
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
by-item court identification and authentication of
arises that the better evidence is withheld for voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and tedious for the parties and the court.
and defeat. The rule likewise protects against Same; Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule;
misleading inferences resulting from the intentional orWhenever a party seeks an exemption under the best
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a evidence rule pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the
larger set of writings. Rules of Court, he asks permission from the trial court
Same; Same; Same; Voluminous Exhibits; Section to produce a summary of numerous documents, whose
3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with theoriginals are available to the adverse party for
item-by-item court identification and authentication ofinspection.—Whenever a party seeks an exemption
voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3(c),
and tedious for the parties and the court.—We agree Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks permission from
with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and the trial court to produce a summary of numerous
voluminous invoices, official receipts, and other documents, whose originals are available to the
relevant documents before adverse party for inspection. He does not ask
permission from the trial court to present in evidence
the numerous non-original documents . Otherwise, the
394 very purpose of Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of
39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
non-original documents would be identified,
4
authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a
Republic vs. Mupas
tedious and protracted litigation. Thus, if a party
desires to present photocopies of the original
documents, he must first establish that the
the trial court to prove the attendant costs that it presentation of photocopies is justified under Section
incurred in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The 3(a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court . He
trial court may admit a summary of voluminous original must establish the presence of all the elements under
documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party these provisions.
has shown that the underlying writings are numerous Same; Same; Same; Same; Lost or Destroyed
and that an in-court examination of these documents Documents; Elements that Must be Proved Before
would be inconvenient. In other words, Section 3(c), Secondary Evidence of Lost or Destroyed Documents
are Admitted.—In the case of lost or destroyed
documents, the offeror of non-original documents must
first prove the following elements before secondary
evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence
or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
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Republic vs. Mupas
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on
the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. To conclude otherwise is to
allow the party to circumvent the best evidence rule
and the requirements under Section 3(a), (b), and (d),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court by merely invoking
Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Just Compensation; Just compensation must be
duly proven by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.—The mean percentage
range is highly speculative and devoid of any factual
basis. As a court of law, we should only measure just
compensation using relevant and actual evidence as
basis in fixing the value of the condemned property.
Just compensation must be duly proven by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.—In a case for
damages, we allow the party to receive temperate
damages in the absence of competent proof on the
amount of actual damages. Temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.
Same; A complaint for damages seeks to
vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may
be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or
exemplary.—An eminent domain case is different from a
complaint for damages. A complaint for damages is
based on tort and emanates from the transgression of a
right. A complaint for damages seeks to vindicate a
legal wrong through damages, which may be actual,
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable
with Article 19 of the Civil Code and other provisions on
human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise
results in the
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39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
 Republic vs. Mupas
damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the
wrongdoer is held responsible.
Eminent Domain; Expropriation Proceedings; Just
Compensation; Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the property sought to be expropriated shall be
appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is
earlier.—Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
the property sought to be expropriated shall be
appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is
earlier, thus: Section 4. Order of expropriation.—If the
objections to and the defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or
when no party appears to defend as required by this
Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of
the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first. A final order
sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining
the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of
such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to
dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Same; Same; Same; Interest Rates; Just
compensation would not be “just” if the State does not
pay the property owner interest on the just
compensation from the date of the taking of the
property.—Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “[n]o private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.” The 1987
Constitution thus commands the condemnor to pay the
property owner the full and fair equivalent of the
property from the date of taking. This provision likewise
presupposes that the condemnor incurs delay if it does
not pay the property owner the full amount of just
compensation on the date of taking. The reason is that
just compensation would not be “just” if the State does
not pay the property owner interest on the just
compensation from the date
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Republic vs. Mupas
of the taking of the property. Without prompt payment,
the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation
of both his land and its fruits or income . The owner’s
loss, of course, is not only his property but also its
income-generating potential.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Taking; When the
taking of the property precedes the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the Supreme Court (SC)
orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just
compensation from the date of taking whose interest
shall likewise commence on the same date. —When the
taking of the property precedes the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the Court orders the
condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation
from the date of taking whose interest shall likewise
commence on the same date. The Court does not rule
that the interest on just compensation shall commence
the date when the amount of just compensation
becomes certain, e.g., from the promulgation of the
Court’s decision or the finality of the eminent domain
case.
Interest Rates; Loans; On June 21, 2013, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Circular No.
799, pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No.
796 dated May 16, 2013, reducing the legal interest on
loans and forbearance of money from twelve percent
(12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. BSP Circular No.
799 took effect on July 1, 2013. —On June 21, 2013, the
BSP issued Circular No. 799, pursuant to MB Resolution
No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, reducing the legal interest
on loans and forbearance of money from 12% to 6% per
annum. BSP Circular No. 799 took effect on July 1,
2013.
Eminent Domain; Expropriation Proceedings;
Based on the clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is
the plaintiff — in this case, the Government — not the
property owner or third party intervenors, i.e., Takenaka
and Asahikosan, who shall shoulder the costs of the
expropriation before the court of origin. —Based on the
clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is the plaintiff — in
this case, the Government — not the property owner or
third party intervenors, i.e., Takenaka and Asahikosan,
who shall shoulder the costs of the expropriation
before the court of origin. Since the expenses of the
BOC form part of the costs of the suit — as these are
expenses necessary in prosecuting or defending an
action or a distinct proceeding within an action — the
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39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
Government solely bears the expenses of the BOC. The
property owner shall only bear the costs of the appeal
if he loses in his appeal.
Same; Same; Parties; Under Sections 8 and 14 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), in relation with Section 9, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, all persons who claim to have lawful
interest in the property to be condemned should be
included as defendants in the complaint for
expropriation.—The defendants in an expropriation
case are not limited to the owners of the property
condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying, or claiming to own the property. Under
Sections 8 and 14 of RA 8974 IRR, in relation with
Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, all persons
who claim to have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned should be included as defendants in the
complaint for expropriation.
Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation; All
persons who have lawful interest in the property
sought to be expropriated should be impleaded in the
complaint for purposes of determining who shall be
entitled to just compensation. —All persons who have
lawful interest in the property sought to be
expropriated should be impleaded in the complaint for
purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just
compensation. If a known owner is not joined as
defendant, he may intervene in the proceeding. If the
owner is joined but not served with process and the
proceeding is already closed before he came to know of
the condemnation, he may maintain an independent
suit for damages. Consequently, Takenaka and
Asahikosan are correct in invoking Section 9, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court for purposes of determining who
shall be entitled to just compensation in this case. This
rule is likewise their proper basis of intervention in the
RTC’s March 12, 2007 order in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; From the
express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8974, just compensation shall only be paid to the
property owner.—From the express provision of Section
4 of RA 8974, just compensation shall only be paid to
the property owner. We implead persons with lawful
interests in the property in order to determine the
person who shall receive just compensation.
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Republic vs. Mupas
Note that the last paragraph, Section 4 of RA 8974
states: “When the decision of the court becomes final
and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the
owner the difference between the amount already paid
and the just compensation as determined by the court.”
This provision thus envisions a situation where the
court determines with finality, for purposes of payment
of just compensation, the conflicting claims of the
defendants and intervenors.
Same; Same; The expropriation court’s
determination of the lawful property owner is merely
provisional; The Court’s disposition with respect to the
ownership of the property is not conclusive, and it
remains open to challenge through proper actions. —We
clarify that the expropriation court’s determination of
the lawful property owner is merely provisional. By
filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor merely
serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of
the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for
the taking. The Court’s disposition with respect to the
ownership of the property is not conclusive, and it
remains open to challenge through proper actions. The
court’s resolution of the title to the land at the time of
taking has no legal consequences beyond the eminent
domain proceedings. The court’s decision cannot be
pleaded as a defense of res judicata or collateral conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in
estoppel in any action to determine title to the all later suits on points and matters determined in the
property. former suit.
Same; Finality of Judgments; To avoid future Same; Expropriation Proceedings; Just
litigation, the Supreme Court (SC) emphasizes that a Compensation; Taking; To clarify and to avoid confusion
final disposition in the eminent domain case with in the implementation of our judgment, the full payment
respect to the order to pay a particular person shall be of just compensation is not a prerequisite for the
final and executory upon the lapse of relevant periods Government’s effective taking of the property; When
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. —To avoid future the taking of the property precedes the payment of just
litigation, we emphasize that a final disposition in the compensation, the Government shall indemnify the
eminent domain case with respect to the order to pay a property owner by way of interest. —To clarify and to
particular person shall be final and executory upon the avoid confusion in the implementation of our judgment,
lapse of relevant periods under Rule 39 of the Rules of the full payment of just compensation is not a
Court. The recourse of the person claiming ownership prerequisite for the Government’s effective taking of
over the expropriated property in any subsequent case the property. As discussed above, RA 8974 allows the
is against the adjudged property owner in the Government to enter the property and implement
expropriation case. The principle of res judicata appliesnational infrastructure projects upon the issuance of
in this particular matter because the issues on the the writ of possession. When the taking of the property
amount of just compensation precedes the payment of just compensation, the
Government shall indemnify the property owner by way
of interest.
400 Same; Same; Taking; Words and Phrases; “Taking”
under the power of eminent domain means entering
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
upon private property for more than a momentary
0
period, and under the warrant or color of legal
Republic vs. Mupas
authority, devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
and the person to be paid just compensation are deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
the central issues in the second phase of expropriation. —“Taking” under the power of eminent domain means
Based on this principle, a final judgment or decree on entering upon private property for more than a
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is momentary period, and under the warrant or color of
legal authority, devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. “Taking”
of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; (2) there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of the
value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the
ordinary use of the property, or (4) when he is deprived
of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his
property.
401
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Same; Same; Just Compensation; Writs of
Possession; Under Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of
possession upon initial payment of just compensation
to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of
a certificate of availability of funds.—Under Section 4 of
RA 8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of
possession upon initial payment of just compensation
to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of
a certificate of availability of funds. A writ of
possession does not transfer title to the Government; it
is “a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment
to recover the possession of land. It commands the
sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the
person entitled under the judgment.” Section 4 of RA
8974 further states that the writ of possession is an
order to take possession of the property and to start
the implementation of the project.
Same; Same; The Government is provisionally
authorized to take the property for public purpose or
public use whenever the court issues a writ of
possession in favor of the Government. —The
Government is provisionally authorized to take the
property for public purpose or public use whenever the
court issues a writ of possession in favor of the
Government. It may take possession of the property or
effectively deprive the property owner of the ordinary
use of the property. If the court, however, later on
determines that the State has no right of expropriation,
then the State shall immediately restore the defendant
of the possession of the property and pay the property
owner damages that he sustained.
Same; Same; The State’s taking of the property is
not based on trust or contract, but is founded on its
inherent power to appropriate private property for
public use.—The State’s taking of the property is not
based on trust or contract, but is founded on its
inherent power to appropriate private property for
public use. It is also for this reason — to compensate
the property owner for the deprivation of his right to
enjoy the ordinary use of his property until the naked
title to the property passed to the State — that the
State pays interest from the time of the taking of the
property until full payment of just compensation.

402
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Republic vs. Mupas
Expropriation Proceedings; Commissioner’s must be a definite and concrete dispute touching on
Report; Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the legal relations of the parties who have adverse
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may accept or reject,
whether in whole or in part, the Bureau of Custom’s
(BOC’s) report which is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character.—These developments
render the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III ineffective.
An appraiser is a person selected or appointed by
competent authority to ascertain and state the true
value of goods or real estate. The purpose of appointing
DG Jones and Partners as an independent appraiser
was to assist the BOC in appraising the NAIA-IPT III. In
fact, the BOC requested the RTC to engage the
services of an independent appraiser because the BOC
had no technical expertise to conduct the valuation of
the NAIA-IPT III. In turn, the BOC was to recommend to
the RTC the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III. Under
Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may
accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the BOC’s
report which is merely advisory and recommendatory in
character.
Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; An
actual case or controversy exists when there is a
conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe
for judicial resolution.—An actual case or controversy
exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an
assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties
that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. A
justiciable controversy must not be moot and academic
or have no practical use or value. In other words, there
legal interests. Otherwise, the Court would simply
render an advisory opinion on what the law would be on
a hypothetical state of facts. The disposition of the
case would not have any practical use or value as there
is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant
would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal or denial of the petition.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Eminent Domain; Expropriation Proceedings; View
that the improvements built by Philippine International
Air Terminals Co.,
403
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Inc. through its subcontractors may have been
private, but it was the product of a procurement
contract that would later be declared as illegal and
void ab initio. Thus, view that it is not the kind of
private property protected under Article III, Section 9
of the Constitution. It is not the kind of property that
should be the subject of expropriation.—I entertain
serious doubts about the propriety of the remedy
pursued by the government to comply with the Decision
of this court in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., 420 SCRA 575 (2004). The
improvements built by Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. through its subcontractors may have
been private, but it was the product of a procurement
contract that would later be declared as illegal and void
ab initio. Thus, in my view, it is not the kind of private
property protected under Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution. It is not the kind of property that should
be the subject of expropriation. Otherwise, the essence
of the illegality of the contract will be nullified.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; View that
instead of the fair market value of the property at the
time of the taking, the government would have had to
pay the value of the property based on its utility at
present.—Nonetheless, the rules on valuation will be
different should government be made to pay the owner
so that there is no unjust enrichment. Instead of the
fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking, the government would have had to pay the value
of the property based on its utility at present.
Same; Same; Same; View that while just
compensation must be the value of the property at the
time of the taking, the actual amount to be paid should
take into consideration the present value of the
property.—I reiterate the view that while just
compensation must be the value of the property at the
time of the taking, the actual amount to be paid should
take into consideration the present value of the
property. I had occasion to point this out in my
Separate Opinions in Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson , 700
SCRA 243 (2013), and Heirs of Spouses Tria v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, 700 SCRA 188 (2013).
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals; and SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Enrique W. Galang for Takenaka Corporation and
Asahikosan Corporation.
Quasha, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
Mario V. Andres and Katharina C. Cases-De Vera for
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide
(Fraport) Stockholder of PIATCO.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court are the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated
August 22, 2013, and the Resolution dated October 29,
2013, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
98029; and the petition for certiorari assailing the May
3, 2007; May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117,
in Civil Case No. 04-0876.1
_______________
 1 In G.R. No. 209917, the Government filed a petition
for review on certiorari seeking to partially reverse the
CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and October
29, 2013 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98029. In G.R.
No. 209696, Takenaka and Asahikosan filed a petition
for review on certiorari seeking to partially reverse the
same CA rulings. In G.R. No. 209731, PIATCO filed a
petition for review on certiorari filed seeking to reverse
the same CA rulings.
405
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
In G.R. No. 181892, the Government filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order assailing the January 7, 2008 order of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 in
Civil Case No. 04-0876.
In C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98029, the CA ordered petitioners
Republic of the Philippines, Department of
Transportation and Communications, and Manila
International Airport Authority ( Government for brevity)
to pay the Philippine International Airport Terminals
Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the amount of $371,426,688.24 with
interest at 6% per annum as just compensation for the
expropriation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport-
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III).2
In Civil Case No. 04-0876, the RTC appointed DG Jones
and Partners as an independent appraiser of the NAIA-
IPT III, and ordered the Government to submit a
Certificate of Availability of Funds to cover DG Jones
and Partners’ appraisal fee of $1,900,000.00.
For ease of presentation, the Court’s discussion shall
be under the following structure:
I. The Factual Antecedents
A. The NAIA-IPT IIII Contract and PIATCO
1. The NAIA-IPT III Contract
2. PIATCO
3. PIATCO and the Services of Takenaka and
Asahikosan
B. The Agan v. PIATCO Case, G.R. No. 155001
1. The Case and the Decision dated May 5, 2003
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution
dated January 21, 2004
C. The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 10-40; penned by Associate Justice
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and
Samuel J. Gaerlan.
406
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
D. The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
1. The Case and the Decision dated December 19, 2005
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution
dated February 1, 2006
E. Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876 after the
Finality of the Gingoyon Case
1. The Appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
Independent Appraiser
2. The BOC’s Expenses
F. The Parties and the BOC’s Appraisal of the NAIA-IPT
III
1. The Government’s Appraisal
2. PIATCO’s Appraisal
3. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s Appraisal
4. The BOC’s Appraisal
II. The RTC’s Rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876
A. The Main Decision
B. The RTC’s Interlocutory Order on the Validity of the
Escrow Account
1. The Government and the Creation of an Escrow
Account for the Payment of Just Compensation
2. The Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011
III. The CA’s Rulings
A. C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98029
B. C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 123221
IV. The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case
No. 06-171
V. The Parties’ Positions
A. The Government’s Position
B. PIATCO’s Position
C. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s Position
VI. The Issues
VII. The Court’s Rulings
A. G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696, and 209731
1. The parties were afforded procedural due process
despite their nonreceipt of the BOC Final Report prior
to the promulgation of the May 23, 2011 Decision in
Civil Case No. 04-0876.
2. Framework: Eminent domain is an inherent power of
the State
2.a. The power of eminent domain is a fundamental
state power that is inseparable from sovereignty
2.b. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from the owner by the condemnor
2.b.1. Fair market value is the general standard of value
in determining just compensation
2.b.2. Replacement cost is a different standard of value
from fair market value
2.b.3. Replacement cost is only one of the standards
that the Court should consider in appraising the NAIA-
IPT III

407 408

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Mupas 8
 Republic vs. Mupas
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
2.b.4. The use of depreciated replacement cost method
is consistent with the principle that the property owner
7. Interests, Fruits, and Income
should be compensated for his actual loss
7.a. Computation of Interests
3. Construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III
7.b. PIATCO is not entitled to the fruits and income of
3.a. The base valuation of the NAIA-IPT III
the NAIA-IPT III
3.b. Structural defects on the NAIA-IPT III
8. The BOC’s Expenses
3.b.1. The Court cannot consider the additional
8.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan should not share in the
evidence submitted by Takenaka and Asahikosan
BOC’s expenses
before the Court of Appeals
9. PIATCO as the Proper Recipient of Just
3.b.2. Equiponderance of evidence on the alleged
Compensation
structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III favors PIATCO,
9.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan’s intervention in the
Takenaka, and Asahikosan
case as unpaid subcontractors is proper
3.c. The unnecessary areas
9.b. The property owner is entitled to just
4. Attendant cost of the NAIA-IPT III
compensation
4.a. PIATCO’s attendant cost
9.c. A final disposition in the eminent domain case with
4.b. The BOC and the RTC’s attendant cost
respect to the order of payment to a particular person
4.c. The Government’s attendant cost
shall be final and executory
5. Deductions to the Replacement Cost of the NAIA-IPT
9.d. The determination of whether the NAIA-IPT III shall
III
be burdened by liens and mortgages even after the full
5.a. Depreciation should be deducted from the
payment of just compensation is premature
replacement cost
10. The exercise of eminent domain from the
5.b. Rectification for contract compliance should not be
perspective of “taking.”
deducted from the replacement cost
10.a. The Government may take the property for public
6. Adjustments to the Replacement Cost
purpose or public use upon the issuance and effectivity
6.a. The replacement cost should be adjusted to
of the writ of possession
December 2004 values
B. G.R. No. 181892
1. The issue on the appointment of an independent
409 appraiser is already moot and academic

410
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
I. The Factual Antecedents
A. The NAIA-IPT III Contract and PIATCO
1. The NAIA-IPT III Contract
On October 5, 1994, Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp.
(AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government — through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the
Manila International Airport Authority ( MIAA) — for the
construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under
a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The
DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit
competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC’s
unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law3
and its implementing rules.4
2. PIATCO
On September 20, 1996, Paircargo Consortium —
composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Grounds Services,
Inc. (PAGS), and Security Bank Corporation ( Security
Bank) — submitted its competitive proposal to the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).5
Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium offered to
build the NAIA-IPT III for at least $350 million at no
cost to the Government and to pay the Government: 5%
share in gross revenues for the first five years of
operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten
years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for
the last ten years of operation. However,
_______________
3 Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7718.
4 Agan v. PIATCO, 450 Phil. 789; 402 SCRA 612
(2003).
5 Id., at pp. 792-793; p. 635.
411
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the Government a
total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27
years while AEDC offered to pay the Government a total
of P135 million for the same period.6
After finding that Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid
superior to the AEDC’s unsolicited proposal and after
the AEDC’s failure to match the competitive bid, the
DOTC awarded, through a notice of award, the NAIA-IPT
III project to the Paircargo Consortium (that later
organized itself as PIATCO).7 3. PIATCO and the Services of Takenaka and
On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Asahikosan
Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of
construction, development, and operation of the NAIA-
IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme. On Takenaka, a local branch of a foreign corporation duly
November 26, 1998, the Amended and Restated organized under the laws of Japan and doing business
Concession Agreement (ARCA) superseded the 1997 in the Philippines, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT
Concession Agreement. The Government and PIATCO III under an Onshore Construction Contract.10
likewise entered into a series of supplemental On the same date, PIATCO, through an Offshore
agreements, namely: the First Supplement signed on Procurement Contract,11 likewise contracted the
August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement signed on services of Asahi-
September 4, 2000; and the Third Supplement signed on
_______________
June 22, 2001.8 10 This agreement was further supplemented by the
Under the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and following contracts:
the Supplemental Agreement (for brevity, PIATCO (a) First Supplement to the Agreement Re: the Ninoy
contracts), the Government authorized PIATCO to build,
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the Onshore Construction Contract dated January 26, 2001;
concession period of twenty-five (25) years.9 (b) Second Supplement Agreement Relating to the
_______________ Onshore Construction Contract Re: the Ninoy Aquino
6 Id., at p. 794; p. 636. International Airport Passenger Terminal III Onshore
7 Id., at pp. 794-795; p. 637. Construction Contract dated February 21, 2001;
8 Id., at pp. 795-796; p. 638. (c) Agreement between Takenaka and Asahikosan
9 Id., at p. 795; p. 637. and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide
Relating to the Deeds of Guaranteed Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated
412 February 21, 2001;
(d) Third Supplemental Agreement relating to the
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Onshore Construction Contract dated April 11, 2002;
2
and
Republic vs. Mupas
(e) Fourth Supplemental Agreement relating to the
Onshore Construction Contract dated September 11,
2002.
 See CA Rollo, Volume XXXII-Q, pp. 10-155, 183-201
and 381-398.
11 The Offshore Procurement Contract was
supplemented by the following agreements:
(a) First Supplement to the Agreement Re: the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
Offshore Procurement Contract dated January 26,
2001;
(b) Second Supplement Agreement relating to the
Offshore Procurement Contract Re: Ninoy Aquino
International
413
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
kosan, a foreign corporation duly organized under the
laws of Japan, for the design, manufacture, purchase,
test and delivery of the Plant12 in the NAIA-IPT III.
In May 2002, PIATCO defaulted on its obligation to pay
Takenaka and Asahikosan pursuant to their respective
contracts. To settle the problem, Takenaka and
Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until
June 2003, conditioned on their receipt of adequate
security from PIATCO as stipulated in the Fourth
Supplemental Agreement (relating to the Onshore
Construction Contract)13 and the Fourth Supplement
Agreement (relating to the Offshore Procurement
Contract), respectively.14
_______________
Airport Passenger Terminal III dated February 21, 2001;
and
(c) Agreement between Takenaka and Asahikosan and
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide
Relating to the Deeds of Guaranteed Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated
February 21, 2001;
(d) Third Supplement Agreement Relating to the
Offshore Procurement Contract Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated April
11, 2002;
(e) Fourth Supplement Agreement relating to the
Offshore Procurement Contract dated September 11,
2002.
Id., at pp. 183-201 and 238-398.
12Id.
13 Id., at pp. 214-237.
14 Id., at pp. 381-398.
414
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
Republic vs. Mupas
On November 29, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government
would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same
day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that
they were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT
III for PIATCO’s failure to provide adequate security.15
B. The Agan v. PIATCO Case, G.R. No. 155001
1. The Case and the Decision dated May 5, 2003
On September 17, 2002, petitioners Demosthenes
Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO
contracts, and to prohibit the DOTC and the MIAA from
implementing these contracts for being contrary to law.
The case, entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed as
G.R. No. 155001.16
On May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO
contracts after finding that Paircargo Consortium (that
later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly
prequalified bidder for failure to meet the minimum
equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project, as
required under the BOT Law and the Bid Documents.
The Court also ruled that Security Bank (member of the
Paircargo Consortium) invested its entire net worth in a
single undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of
Section 21-B of the General Banking Act (which limits a
commercial bank’s equity investment, whether allied or
non-allied, to fifteen percent (15%) of its net worth). 17
The
_______________
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume II, p. 415.
16 Supra note 4 at p. 797; p. 639.
17 The Court ruled in Agan that the maximum
amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the
Paircargo Consortium is only P528,525,656.55,
representing 15% of its entire net worth. We concluded
that the total net worth of the Paircargo Consortium —
after considering the maximum amounts that may be
validly invested by
415
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Court further found that the PIATCO contracts
contained provisions that substantially departed from
the draft Concession Agreement. These substantial
modification of the PIATCO contracts violated the
public policy for being repugnant to the principle that
all bidders must be on equal footing during the public
bidding.18
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution
dated January 21, 2004
We denied PIATCO, et al.’s motion for reconsideration in
our January 21, 2004 resolution. 19 Significantly, we
stated in the resolution that the Government should
first pay PIATCO as a prerequisite before taking
over the NAIA-IPT III, to wit:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that
the structures comprising the NAIA-IPT III facility are
almost complete and that funds have been spent by
PIATCO in their construction. For the Government to
take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.
The compensation must be just and in accordance with
law and equity for the Government cannot unjustly
enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.20 (Underlines and emphases ours)
_______________
each of its members — is P558,384,871.55 or only
6.08% of the project cost. This amount is substantially
less than the prescribed minimum equity investment
required for the project in the amount of
P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost.
18 Supra note 4 at pp. 744-841; p. 664.
19 Agan v. PIATCO, 465 Phil. 545, 586; 420 SCRA
575, 607 (2004).
20 Id., at p. 582; p. 603.
416
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
C. The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-087621
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a
complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before (G.R. No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 384-385.
the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117. The Government
informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) the amount of
P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT III’s
assessed value.22
On the same day, the RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of the Government. Citing City of
Manila v. Serrano,23 the RTC held that that it had the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession upon: (1)
the filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance, and (2) the Government’s deposit
of the amount equivalent to the property’s assessed
value, pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.24
On January 4, 2005, the RTC modified its
December 21, 2004 order and directed: (1) the Land
Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the amount of
US$62,343,175.7725 that would be deducted from the
just compensation; (2) the Gov-
_______________
21 The case is entitled “Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,
the Department of Transportation and Communications,
and the Manila International Airport Authority,
plaintiffs, -versus- Philippine Air Terminals Co., Inc.,
defendant.” See G.R. No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 363-383.
22 Republic v. Gingoyon, 514 Phil. 678; 478 SCRA
474 (2005). See also RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 1050-1066
and Rollo (G.R. No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 363-374.
23 411 Phil. 754, 765; 359 SCRA 231, 238 (2001).
24 Republic v. Gingoyon, supra at pp. 678-679; p.
595. See also RTC Rollo, Volume II, p. 1072 and Rollo
25 The MIAA held guaranty deposits in the sum of
$62,343,175.77 with Land Bank for purposes of
expropriating the NAIA-IPT III. See Rollo (G.R. No.
209731), Volume I, pp. 380-382.
417
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
ernment to submit to the RTC a Certificate of
Availability of Funds for the payment of just
compensation; and (3) the Government to maintain and
preserve the NAIA-IPT III pending the expropriation
proceedings and the full payment of just compensation.
The RTC likewise prohibited the Government from
performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III such
as awarding concessions or leasing any part of the
NAIA-IPT III to other parties.26
The Government sought reconsideration of the January
4, 2005 Order, arguing that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, and not RA 8974, applied to the case since the
NAIA-IPT III was not a national government
infrastructure project.27
RA 8974 is otherwise known as “An Act to Facilitate the
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and for
Other Purposes.”
The Government argued that under Section 2, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, it shall have the right to a writ of
possession upon deposit with the authorized
government depositary of an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation,
which amount shall be held by the depositary subject to
the orders of the court. In contrast, Section 4 of RA
8974, as a rule, requires the Government to immediately
pay the property owner the amount equivalent to 100%
of the value of the property based on the BIR’s relevant
zonal valuation and the value of the improvements/and
or structures, upon the filing of the complaint and after
due notice to the defendant.
_______________
26 Supra note 22 at pp. 679-680; pp. 509-510. See
also RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 818-821 and Rollo (G.R.
No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 390-396.
27 Id., at pp. 680-681; p. 568. See also RTC Rollo,
Volume II, pp. 823-829.
418
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
On January 7, 2005, the RTC appointed three
Commissioners28 to determine just compensation
without consulting the Government and PIATCO.29 Due
to these successive adverse rulings, the Government
sought to inhibit Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, the RTC’s
presiding judge, from hearing the case.30 (The judge
was ambushed and killed on December 31, 2005)31
On January 10, 2005, the RTC denied the Government’s
urgent motion for reconsideration and motion for
inhibition.32
On December 14, 2005, Asahikosan filed a motion for
leave to intervene in Civil Case No. 04-0876 (the
expropriation case).33 On the other hand, Takenaka filed
a Manifestation dated December 15, 2005, 34 with the
attached Manifestation and Motion dated December 14,
2005.35 Takenaka alleged that the Government
impleaded it as an additional defendant in an amended
complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III,
_______________
28 The RTC appointed Dr. Fiorello R. Estuar, Atty.
Sofronio B. Ursal, and Capt. Angelo I. Panganiban. Dr.
Estuar and Atty. Ursal were succeeded by Engr. Adam
Abinales and Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr., respectively.
29 Supra note 22 at pp. 680-681; p. 540. See also
RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 942-943 and Rollo (G.R. No.
181892), pp. 306-307.
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 397-398;
RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 944-950.
31 On January 20, 2006, Judge Jesus M. Mupas of
RTC-Pasay, Branch 119 was designated by the Supreme
Court to replace Judge Henrick Gingoyon in the
expropriation case. See RTC Rollo, Volume XXVI-A,
unpaged.
32 Supra note 22 at p. 681; p. 568. See also RTC
Rollo, Volume II, pp. 958-965 and Rollo (G.R. No.
209731), Volume I, pp. 399-406.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, pp. 266-286;
RTC Rollo, Volume IV, pp. 4244-4247.
34 Id., at pp. 229-231; id., at pp. 4224-4226.
35 RTC Rollo, Volume IV, pp. 4248-4264.
419
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
but was not served summons. Takenaka thus
manifested its voluntary appearance before the RTC.36
Takenaka and Asahikosan informed the RTC that they
had previously filed two collection cases against
PIATCO, docketed as Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-
269, before the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench
Division, Technology and Construction Court in London,
England, (London Court) on August 9, 2004.
In both instances, the London Court ruled in their favor.
The dispositive part of the judgment award in Claim No.
HT-04-248 provides:
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment be entered for the First Claimant 37 in the
sum of 6,602,971.00 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 116,825,365.34 Philippine
pesos up to and including 18 February 2005.
2. Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant 38 in
the sum of 8,224,236.00 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 2,947,564.87 United States
dollars up to and including 18 February 2005, being a
total of 11,171,800.87 United States dollars.
3. Save for the costs of and caused by the amendment
of the particulars of claim, which will be the subject of
a separate Order, the Defendant do pay the First
Claimant’s and the Second Claimant’s costs in the
action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not
agreed.
_______________
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, pp. 229-231;
id., at pp. 4224-4226.
37 The First Claimant refers to Takenaka
Corporation.
38 The Second Claimant refers to Asahikosan
Corporation.
420
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
DATED this 18th day of February 2005.39
On the other hand, the dispositive part of the judgment
award in Claim No. HT-05-269 states:
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment be entered for the First Claimant in the
sum of 21,688,012.18 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 6,052,805.83 United States
dollars.
2. Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant in the
sum of 30,319,284.36 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 5,442,628.26 United States 2007 Order, the RTC treated Takenaka’s Manifestation
dollars.
3. The defendant to pay the Claimants’ costs in the
action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not
agreed.
DATED this 2 (sic) day of December 2005.40
Takenaka and Asahikosan asked the RTC to: (a) hold in
abeyance the release of just compensation to PIATCO
until the London awards are recognized and enforced in
the Philippines; and (b) order that the just
compensation be deposited with the RTC for the
benefit of PIATCO’s creditors.4
During the hearing of the motions, the Government
clarified that it neither filed an amended complaint for
expropriation nor impleaded Takenaka as a necessary
party in the case.42
_______________
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, p. 245; RTC
Rollo, Volume IV, p. 4239.
40 Id., at p. 227; id., at p. 4241.
41 Id., at pp. 242-243 and 284.
42 Id., at pp. 332-333.
421
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
The RTC initially denied Takenaka and Asahikosan’s
respective motions43 in the August 8, 2006 Order, but
subsequently reconsidered its ruling.44 In a March 12,
with the attached Manifestation and Motion as a
motion to intervene and allowed Takenaka and
Asahikosan to intervene in the case as PIATCO’s
creditors.45
Pending the RTC’s resolution of Takenaka and
Asahikosan’s motions for leave to intervene in the
expropriation case, the Government went directly to
the Court seeking Judge Gingoyon’s inhibition from the
case; the nullification of the order of release of the sum
of $62.3 million to PIATCO; and the nullification as well
of the appointment of the commissioners.
D. The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
1. The Case and the Decision dated December 19,
2005
On January 12, 2005, the Government, et al., filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court assailing the
validity of the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the
RTC in the ex-
_______________
In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC
recognized the validity of the London awards in Claim
Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and declared these
awards as enforceable in the Philippine jurisdiction.
The RTC thus ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and
Asahikosan the sum of $85.7 million.
PIATCO appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the
RTC rulings in a decision dated March 13, 2012. The CA
likewise denied PIATCO’s motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated May 31, 2012.
43 RTC Rollo, Volume X, pp. 7548-7573.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 209731), Volume II, p. 1788.
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, pp. 332-333.
422
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Republic vs. Mupas
propriation case.46 The case, entitled Republic v.
Gingoyon, was docketed as G.R. No. 166429.
The Government argued that the RTC should not have
ordered the release of $62.3 Million since the NAIA-IPT
III’s assessed value was only P3 billion. Moreover, the
RTC’s prohibition against the Government to perform
acts of ownership on the NAIA-IPT III was contrary to
the essence of a writ of possession. It 47 asserted that
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governed the
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III since it was not a
national government infrastructure project.
The Government likewise contended that the
commissioners’ appointment was void. It claimed that
it had been deprived of due process since it was not
given the opportunity to contest the appointment of the
commissioners. The Government likewise sought Judge
Gingoyon’s inhibition from the case due to his alleged
manifest partiality to PIATCO.48
The Court partly granted the petition and rendered the
following rulings:
First, under the 2004 Resolution in Agan: (a) PIATCO
must receive payment of just compensation determined
in accordance with law and equity; and (b) the
Government is barred from taking over the NAIA-IPT III
until just compensation is paid.
Second, RA 8974 applies in the expropriation case
insofar as the law: (a) requires the Government to
immediately pay PIATCO at least the proffered value of
the NAIA-IPT III; and (b) provides valuation standards in
determining the amount of just compensation.
_______________
46 Supra note 22 at p. 681; p. 510.
47 For simplicity and ease of reading, the Court
shall use “it,” instead of “they.”
48 RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 971-1036.
423
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
RA 8974 is the governing law in cases where the
national government expropriates property for the
purpose of commencing national government
infrastructure projects such as the construction of the
NAIA-IPT III. However, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
applies in determining the assessed value and the
mode of deposit of just compensation if the national
government initiates the expropriation complaint for
purposes other than national infrastructure projects.
Under both Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and RA 8974,
the Government initiates the expropriation by filing an
expropriation complaint. However, the rules on the
mode of deposit differ because Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court merely requires the Government to deposit the
assessed value of the property sought to be
expropriated with an authorized government depositary
before the issuance of a writ of possession.
In contrast, RA 8974 commands the Government to
make a direct payment to the property owner prior to
the issuance of a writ of possession. Under RA 8974,
the payment shall be based on: (a) the BIR’s zonal
valuation in case of land; and (b) the value of the
improvements or structures under the replacement
cost method. If the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance and if there is no existing valuation of the
property, the implementing agency shall immediately
pay the proffered value of the property.49
_______________
49 Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with authorized government depository.—Upon the
filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and
after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such
424

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
Republic vs. Mupas
We thus observed that Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court is contrary to our January 21, 2004 Resolution
which required the Government to make prior payment
of just com-
_______________
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit
shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 states:
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.—
Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for
the right-of-way, site or location for any national
government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the
proper court under the following guidelines:
a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due
notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent
(100%) of the value of the property based on the
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7 hereof;
xxxx
c) In case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation of the
area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered
value taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines above mentioned,
the court shall immediately issue to the implementing
agency an order to take possession of the property and
start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the
implementing agency shall present to the court a
certificate of availability of funds from the proper
official concerned.
425
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
pensation to PIATCO before it could take over the NAIA-
IPT III.
The Court at the same time qualified the applicability
of RA 8974 to the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. We
held that the Congress may legislate on the valuation
standards of just compensation and the manner of its
payment since these are substantive matters. We made
clear, however, that the Congress cannot legislate on
the procedural aspects of expropriation since this
power lies with the Court. In fact, Section 14 of RA 8974
IRR provides that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall
apply to “all matters regarding defenses and objections
to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and
conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the
parties, and such other incidents affecting the
complaint.”
Third, we held in abeyance the implementation of the
writ of possession until the Government directly pays
to PIATCO the proffered value of P3 billion. The zonal
valuation method under Section 4 of RA 8974 shall not
apply since the Government owns the land on which
the NAIA-IPT III stands. Consequently, PIATCO should
only be paid the value of the improvements and/or
structures using the replacement cost method. 50
Pending the determination of just compensation, the
Government shall pay the sum of P3 billion as the
provisional amount of just compensation because there
was no expedited means by which the Government
could immediately take possession of the NAIA-IPT III.
We also stated that the replacement cost method is
only one of the factors to be considered in determining
just compensation. Equity should likewise be
considered in determining just compensation.
_______________
50 RA 8974 IRR, Section 7.
426
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
Fourth, we authorized the Government to perform acts
essential to the operation of the NAIA-IPT III as an
international airport terminal once the writ of
possession becomes effective. This authority covers
the repair, reconditioning, and improvement of the
complex; maintenance of the existing facilities and
equipment; installation of new facilities and equipment;
provision of services and facilities pertaining to the
facilitation of air traffic and transport; and other
services that are integral to a modern-day international
airport. This is consistent with Section 4 of RA 8974
which provides that “the court shall immediately issue
to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project” upon fulfillment of
certain conditions.
This ruling qualified the Court’s statement in its
January 21, 2004 Resolution that “[f]or the Government
to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.”
Nonetheless, we clarified that the title to the NAIA-IPT
III shall pass to the Government only upon full payment
of the just compensation since the proffered value is
merely a provisional determination of just
compensation.
Fifth, we ordered the RTC to complete its determination
of just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality
of our decision since it was no longer possible for the
RTC to determine just compensation within sixty (60)
days from the filing of the complaint under Section 4 of
RA 8974.
Sixth, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
appointing the commissioners. Neither Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court nor RA 8974 requires the RTC to consult
the parties in the expropriation case prior to the
appointment of commissioners. We also stated that
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall apply insofar as it is
consistent with RA 8974, the IRR, and the Court’s
rulings in Agan.
427
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Considering that the expropriation proceedings were
effectively suspended seven days after the
appointment of the commissioners, the parties may file
their objections with the RTC within five days from
finality of the decision in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Seventh, there was no ground to order Judge
Gingoyon’s inhibition since the Government failed to
show his alleged partiality.51
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with
respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005 and 10
January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated
21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending
payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of
Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the
proffered value of the NAIA-IPT III facilities;
2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of
Possession, are authorized [to] start the
implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport-International Passenger Terminal III project by
performing the acts that are essential to the operation
of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal
project;
3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60)
days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just
compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.
_______________
51 Supra note 22 at pp. 657-719; pp. 548-549.
428
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all
respects subject to the qualification that the parties
are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to
file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of
the commissioners decreed therein.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January
2005 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.52
53 Republic v. Gingoyon, 517 Phil. 7, 8; 481 SCRA
457, 463 (2006). See also RTC Rollo, Volume V, pp. 4446-
4487.
54 Id., at pp. 7-8; p. 464; id., at pp. 4547-4579 and
4665-4732.

2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution

dated February 1, 2006 429

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

On January 2, 2006, the Government, et al., filed a
Republic vs. Mupas
motion for partial reconsideration of the Court’s
December 19, 2005 Decision.53 Asahikosan,
Takenaka, and Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina also filed a
motion for leave to intervene and asked the Court’s peals55 as basis for their intervention. In that case, the
Court took the extraordinary step of allowing the
reconsideration of its December 19, 2005
Decision.54 motion for intervention even after the challenged order
of the trial court had already become final. On the other
The Government raised the question of who — between
PIATCO, on the one hand, and Takenaka and hand, Rep. Baterina invoked his prerogative as
legislator and taxpayer to curtail the payment of just
Asahikosan, on the other — was the NAIA-IPT III’s
builder. The Government informed the Court that compensation without any appropriation in PIATCO’s
favor.
Takenaka and Asahikosan, as the unpaid
contractors in the NAIA-IPT III project, claimed The Court denied the motions and held that the alleged
liens over the NAIA-IPT III have not been judicially
significant liens on the NAIA-IPT III. The
Government opined that it would end up established. Takenaka and Asahikosan were not parties
to Gingoyon and did not present their claims before the
expropriating the NAIA-IPT III with liens and claims
in excess of its actual value if the proffered value Court. The Court did not make any declaration
regarding Takenaka and Asahikosan’s rights to any form
would be directly released to PIATCO.
As PIATCO’s unpaid creditors, Takenaka and of compensation for the construction of the NAIA-IPT
III.
Asahikosan intervened in the case. They relied on
Mago v. Court of Ap- Moreover, the Court did not recognize the London
awards in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan. Under
_______________
52 Id., at pp. 718-719; pp. 549-550. Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign
judgment would not bind Philippine courts unless the
judgment is recognized and enforced in this
jurisdiction. Philippine courts may annul a foreign
judgment for lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, clear mistake of law or fact, or In G.R. No. 169914, AEDC filed a petition for mandamus
when the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy.
Even assuming that PIATCO is indeed liable to other
parties, the creditors have other judicial avenues to
ventilate and prove their claims against PIATCO.
The Court also categorically stated that PIATCO, as
builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive just
compensation in accordance with law and equity
before the Government may take over the NAIA-IPT III.
The Court likewise denied the motions for intervention
for serious procedural errors. Under Section 2, Rule 19
of the
_______________
55 363 Phil. 225, 338; 303 SCRA 600, 613 (1999).
430
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
Rules of Court, the motion to intervene should be filed
before the court’s rendition of judgment, and not after
the resolution of the case. Moreover, Takenaka and
Asahikosan failed to establish their legal interest in the to the recognition of the proponent as the original
case since their claims against PIATCO have not been
conclusively established in this jurisdiction.56
_______________
56 Another related case is Asia’s Emerging Dragon
Corp. v. DOTC, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169914 & 174166.
and prohibition before the Court: (a) seeking to compel
the Government to execute in its favor an approved
Draft Concession Agreement for the operation of the
NAIA-IPT III; and (b) seeking to prohibit the DOTC and
the MIAA from awarding the NAIA-IPT III project to or
negotiating into any concession contract with third
parties. The case, entitled AEDC v. DOTC, was docketed
as G.R. No. 169914.
AEDC contended that it had the exclusive, clear, and
vested statutory right to the award of the NAIA-IPT III
project on the ground that it remained the unchallenged
original proponent of the NAIA-IPT III project as a result
of the Court’s nullification of PIATCO contracts.
The Court denied the petition.
We noted that AEDC belatedly filed the petition
twenty months after the Court’s promulgation of Agan
in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the petition was barred by res judicata.
The RTC already dismissed Civil Case No. 66213 upon
the execution of a compromise agreement by AEDC, on
one hand, and the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC, on
the other hand.
Under Section 10.6 of the RA 6957 IRR, the
Government’s “acceptance” of the unsolicited proposal
is limited to its commitment to pursue the project and
proponent. Thus, the Government’s commitment is
limited to the pursuit of the project; it does not award
the project to the original proponent. The acceptance
of the unsolicited proposal only prevents the
Government from entertaining other similar proposals
until the solicitation of comparative proposals.
431
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
_______________
Upon the submission of comparative proposals, the
original proponent has the right to match the lowest or
most advantageous proposal within thirty working days
from notice thereof. If the original proponent is able to
match the lowest or most advantageous proposal
submitted, then the original proponent has the right to
the award of the project. The right to be awarded the
project, however, is contingent upon the original
proponent’s actual exercise of his right to match the
lowest or most advantageous proposal. In other words,
if the original proposal failed to match the most
advantageous comparative proposal, then the original
proponent has no right to be awarded the project.
AEDC failed to match PIATCO’s more advantageous
proposal. Consequently, AEDC had no enforceable right
to be awarded the NAIA-IPT III project. Moreover, the
nullification of the award to PIATCO neither revived the
proposal nor reopened the bidding.
The Court also stated that AEDC’s original proposal
was to undertake the building, operation, and transfer
to the Government of the NAIA-IPT III. This proposal
was no longer feasible since the NAIA-IPT III was
already substantially built. Furthermore, AEDC was not
financially qualified to undertake the NAIA-IPT III
project since it then had a paid-in capital of only
P150,000,000.00 at the time of the submission of the
bids.
In G.R. No. 174166, Congressman Baterina, et al., filed a
petition for certiorari opposing the expropriation
proceedings on the ground that the NAIA-IPT III is a
public property. They posited that PIATCO should not be
paid just compensation and was only entitled to
recovery on quantum meruit as the builder of the NAIA-
IPT III.
The Court denied the petition. We held that PIATCO was
entitled to just and equitable consideration for its
construction of the NAIA-IPT III. Furthermore, the
propriety of the expropriation proceedings was already
recognized and upheld by the Court in Agan and
Gingoyon.
In a resolution dated April 7, 2009, the Court denied
AEDC, et al.’s motion for reconsideration. The Court
stated that the project would be awarded to the original
proponent if there was no other competitive bid
submitted for the BOT project. However, if other
proponents
432
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2
Republic vs. Mupas
E. Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876after the
Finality of the Gingoyon Case
1. The Appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
Independent Appraiser
On April 11, 2006, the RTC ordered the BOC to
resume its duties. In compliance, the BOC submitted its
Inception Report and Inception Framework to the RTC.
On April 24, 2007, the parties and the BOC conferred to
set the ground rules and procedure in determining the
just compensation due to the NAIA-IPT III.
On April 26, 2006, the Government asked the RTC to
stop the payment of P3 billion proffered value in view of
an alleged supervening event — the collapse of the
ceiling of the arrival lobby section of the north side of
the NAIA-IPT III on March 27, 2006. The Government
claimed that the collapse created a 100-square foot
hole in the ceiling and caused heavy asbestos pipes to
fall on the floor of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government
likewise informed the Court that the MIAA requested
the Association of Structural Engineers of the
Philippines (ASEP) to investigate the cause of the
collapse.57 In its Final Report dated June 2006, the
ASEP identified the following factors that contributed
to the collapse:
a. Incomplete design coordination as shown by the
absence of detailed shop drawings during the
construction, an absence described as “unusual” for a
BOT project of this size.
_______________
submitted competitive bids, then the original proponent
must be able to match the most advantageous or
lowest bid to enjoy his preferential right to the award of
the project.
57 Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), pp. 68-69.
433
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
b. Wrong choice of ceiling and wall components and
fixing materials, e.g., use of rivets instead of clips,
screws or wire; use of furring channels instead of
stronger C channels; use of wall angles thinner than
required; and
c. Poor workmanship, e.g., uneven distribution and
improper attachment of rivets, lack of ceiling supports
in the presence of mechanical fixtures.58
The ASEP concluded that the likely cause of the
collapse was the “syncretic effect of all these factors
working over time since the construction of the
ceiling.”59
Upon the BOC’s request,60 on May 5, 2006, the RTC
ordered the engagement of the services of an
internationally accepted independent appraiser who this order, the Government tendered to PIATCO a P3
shall conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III.61 billion check on September 11, 2006. On the same day,
On May 23, 2006, the Government manifested that it the RTC reinstated the writ of possession in favor of
engaged the services of: (a) TCGI Engineer to the Government.63
determine the structural integrity of NAIA-IPT III; (b)
Thereafter, the Government and PIATCO submitted their
Ove Arup & Partners Massachusetts, Inc. (Ove Arup) to list of nominees for the appointment of an independent
conduct a design and technical review of the NAIA-IPT appraiser.64 On May 3, 2007, the RTC appointed DG
III and to conduct a peer review of TCGI Engineer’s Jones and Partners as independent appraiser.65
methodology and test results; and (c) Gleeds On May 18, 2007, the RTC directed the Government to
International to determine the value of the NAIA-IPT submit a Certificate of Availability of Funds to cover DG
III.62 Jones and Partners’ $1.9 Million appraisal fee.66
On June 20, 2006, the RTC ordered Land Bank to _______________
immediately release the amount of P3 billion to PIATCO. 63 Rollo (G.R. No 209696), Volume I, p. 331.
The RTC ruled that the collapse of a portion of the 64 Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), p. 174. After the conduct
NAIA-IPT III was of a Pre-Final Evaluation of Prequalification of
_______________ Consultant, the BOC shortlisted DG Jones and Partners
58 Id., at pp. 74-80. as well as Sallmans Far East Ltd. HK. ( Sallmans) as
59 Id., at pp. 68-69. independent appraisers.
60 Id., at pp. 16 and 61. 65 Prior to the appointment, Judge Mupas
61 Id., at p. 16. interviewed the representatives of DG Jones and
62 Id., at p. 150; RTC Rollo, Volume VIII, p. 5591.
Partners, and Sallmans. The RTC concluded that DG
Jones and Partners was more qualified than Sallmans
as independent appraiser since the former submitted a
434 lower appraisal fee of US$1,900,000.00 ($1.9 Million).
Moreover, DG Jones and Partners has a wide
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
experience and track record in the appraisal of airport
4
facilities. See Prior to the appointment, Judge Mupas
Republic vs. Mupas
interviewed the representatives of DG Jones and
Partners, and Sallmans. The RTC concluded that DG
Jones and Partners was more qualified than Sallmans
not a supervening event that would hinder the payment as independent appraiser since the former submitted a
of the proffered value to PIATCO. In compliance with lower appraisal fee of US$1,900,000.00 ($1.9 Million).
Moreover, DG Jones and Partners has a wide
experience and track record in the appraisal of airport
facilities.
See Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), pp. 64-66.
66 The appraisal fee is itemized as follows:
435
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
The Government sought the reconsideration of the May
3 and 18, 2007 orders. The Government complained that
the appointment of an appraiser apart from those hired
by the Government would result in the unnecessary
depletion of its funds since it would be compelled to
pay two appraisers.67
In response, PIATCO argued that the RTC has the
inherent power to appoint an independent appraiser
pursuant to Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC has
_______________
See Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), pp. 60 and 358.
67 The Government further argued that there were
no laws or rules that empowered the RTC and the BOC
to appoint an independent appraiser. The Government
opined that the RTC should exclusively choose among
its nominees pursuant to Section 7 of RA 8974 as well
as Sections 10 and 11 of RA 8974 IRR. Furthermore, the
appointment of an independent appraiser would only
result in the duplication of tasks since the BOC and the
independent appraiser essentially perform the same
function. The BOC would serve no purpose since the
appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III would be derived from the
findings of DG Jones and Partners.
It opined that the DG Jones and Partners’ appraisal
fee was unjust and exorbitant. The Government also
pointed out that PIATCO manifested its willingness to
share one-half of the expenses in the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III during the valuation hearings. The
Government further raised doubts on DG Jones and
Partners’ qualifications since the RTC allegedly
appointed the firm without disclosing DG Jones and
Partners’ qualifications and proposals.
Id., at pp. 170-182.
436
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
wide discretion on how it shall carry its mandate under to the engagement of the services of an appraiser. The
RA 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.68
In an order dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained
the appointment of DG Jones and Partners. The RTC
ruled that its power to appoint the members of the BOC Gensler.
under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court includes
the power to appoint an independent appraiser.69
_______________
68 PIATCO contended that the Government was
estopped from assailing the appointment of DG Jones
and Partners. The Government participated in the
appointment process by nominating other firms as an
independent appraiser. Furthermore, it would be
iniquitous for the Government to solely appraise the
replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III. PIATCO asserted
that the Government should solely bear the cost of the
appraisal. The Government should have anticipated the
appointment of an independent appraiser when it filed
a complaint for expropriation. Id., at pp. 183-190.
69 The RTC stated that it would be grossly unfair to
choose exclusively among the Government’s nominees;
otherwise, the independence of the appraiser would be
questionable. The Government pointed out that the
government tax assessors’ valuation of expropriated
property was not even conclusive on trial courts. In
fact, the BOC itself requested the appointment of an
independent appraiser since it had no technical
expertise to ascertain the just compensation due to
PIATCO.
The RTC also held that the Government was
estopped from objecting to the appointment of an
independent appraiser since it did not previously object
Government even nominated several firms for the
purpose of appointing an independent appraiser,
particularly, Gleeds International, Ove Arup, and
The RTC likewise imposed on the Government the
sole responsibility of paying the appraisal fee of DG
Jones and Partners. Under Section 12, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, the commissioners’ fees shall be taxed
as part of the costs of the proceedings. The plaintiff
shall pay all costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims. If the property owner appeals
from the expropriation court’s
437
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas

The Government directly challenged before the Court
the May 3, May 18, and January 7, 2008 orders in a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 181892.70
On January 9, 2008, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order against the implementation of the
May 3 and 18, 2007 Orders as well as the January 7,
2008 Order.71
_______________
judgment, he shall pay for the costs of the appeal.
According to the RTC, PIATCO should not shoulder the
appraisal fee since it is constitutionally entitled to just
compensation.
The RTC also affirmed DG Jones and Partners’
independence. The RTC impartially chose this firm upon
a thorough review of its qualifications and upon the
BOC’s recommendation. The Government would
likewise not directly communicate with and pay the
appraisal fee to DG Jones and Partners. The
Government shall deposit the appraisal fee with the
RTC who shall in turn pay DG Jones and Partners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC order provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Orders dated May 3, 2007 and May 18, 2007 are
affirmed without modification. Consequently,
Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion dated June 15, 2007
is denied. This expropriation having been
initiated in December 2004, the certificate of
availability of funds from Plaintiffs for the
necessary full compensation to PIATCO, the
costs and the expenses entailed in this
expropriation is clearly justified and should be
submitted to this Court within 15 days from
plaintiffs’ receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Id., at pp. 60-63.
70 Id., at pp. 2-54.
71 Id., at pp. 231-232.
438
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
2. The BOC’s Expenses
On June 15, 2006, the BOC filed a request for the
release of a mobilization fund of P1,600,000.00 to
support the discharge of its functions.72 The RTC
approved the request and directed the Government and
PIATCO to equally share the BOC’s expenses.73 The
Government and PIATCO complied with this order and
tendered the sum of P1,600,000.00 to the BOC.74
On November 24, 2009, the BOC requested
additional funds in the amount of P5,250,000.00. 75 On
December 7, 2010, the RTC directed the Government
and PIATCO to equally defray the BOC’s expenses. 76 The
Government contested this order and insisted that
Takenaka and Asahikosan should likewise shoulder the F. The Parties and the BOC’s Appraisalof the NAIA-
BOC’s expenses as intervenors in the case.77 IPT III
In an order dated March 11, 2011, the RTC ordered
Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the BOC’s After the Court issued the January 9, 2008
expenses. The RTC thus ordered each party to pay temporary restraining order, the parties and the BOC
P1,750,000.00. PIATCO complied with this order and conducted a preliminary conference on April 22, 2010,
paid the amount of P1,750,000.00 to the BOC.78 to adopt an alternative course of action to avoid further
Takenaka and Asahikosan sought the partial delay in the determination of just compensation.80
reconsideration of this order. They argued that they The Government manifested that it was ready to
should not be made to pay the BOC’s expenses since present its own valuation of the NAIA-IPT III and other
“their prayer to defer the release of a portion of the just supporting evidence. PIATCO, Takenaka, and
compensation pending the conclusion of the Asahikosan did not object to this manifestation.81
enforcement proceedings was addressed to the RTC[,] On August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the parties to
and not to the BOC.”79 submit their appraisal reports of NAIA-IPT III with
_______________ supporting documents and affidavits.82 The Government
72 Id., at p. 144. appraised the NAIA-IPT III at $149,448,037.00 while
73 Id., at p. 145. PIATCO concluded that its replacement cost was
74 Id., at p. 146; RTC Rollo, Volume XVII, pp. 11175- $905,867,549.47. On the other hand, Takenaka and
11181. Asahikosan claimed that the NAIA-IPT III’s construction
75 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume II, p. 576. cost amounted to $360,969,790.82.
76 Id., Volume I, pp. 80-81.
77 Id., at p. 81 1. The Government’s Appraisal
78 Id. Based on the Gleeds Report dated November 15,
79 Id. 2010, the Government computed the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III as follows: 83
December 2002 CCV December 200
439 Base valuation $USD @3Q01 $300,206,693 $300,206,693
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 Deterioration $USD @2Q09 $0 $1,738,318
Depreciation $USD 3Q01 $0 $35,076,295
Republic vs. Mupas
_______________
80 Id., Volume II, p. 576.
81 Id.
 82 Id., at p. 577. designated time and specific location, adding
83 Rollo (G.R. No. 209917), Volume II, pp. 1861-1899. the cost of works in, on, and around the
structure, and then accounting for inferior and
nonperforming works, and rectification of those
440 works.”84
• Gleeds arrived at the CCV by considering the rates
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and prices for the third quarter of 2001, which
0
represented the midpoint of the construction
Republic vs. Mupas
period from June 2000 (the commencement of
construction) to December 2002 (the suspension
of construction). It claimed that calculating the
cost of construction based on its midpoint was a
Total Base CCVs $USD $300,206,693 recognized standard practice in the construction
Rectification for Contract Compliance $USD industry. The base CCV excluded the following
@2Q09 items:
Not compliant with bid documents -$30,670,894 _______________
Inferior quality -$7,702,640 84 Gleeds Report dated November 15, 2010, p.8.
Additional areas to be built (63,490 m2) -$75,570,510
Total Contract Compliance -$113,944,044
Deductions $USD ___________ 441
Total CCVs $USD $186,262,649
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
• $300,206,693.00 as base current cost valuation Republic vs. Mupas
(CCV). Based on the Gleeds report, the
construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III as of
December 2002 was $300,206,693.00, consisting 1. Failed structural elements of the Terminal, as
of the cost of constructing the terminal building, identified in the Arup Seismic Evaluation Report and
aprons, car park, elevated roadways, and other Gravity Loading and Element Capacity Assessment;
related items. 2. The inferior quality of material used and works,
• Gleeds appraised the NAIA-IPT III by “multiplying the including floor tiling, plasterboard wall finishes and
structure’s dimensions (i.e., quantities) by a ceilings, internal and external metal paneling;
price (i.e., rate) for constructing the works at a 3. Constructed areas that are unnecessary to the
functioning of an international airport terminal and
therefore of no benefit to the Republic. These areas _______________
identified in the Arup Site Observation Report include
areas where the requirements stated in the Bid
Documents have been grossly overprovided. They also
include the multilevel retail mall that, with its own
internal circulation, is functionally separate from the
Terminal and accessible only through the multi-storey
car park (20,465 m2), and excess retail concession
space (1,727 m2);
4. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural
retrofits for the failed elements in the terminal
buildings and multi-storey car park structures, as those
retrofits are described in Arup’s Drawings listed in
Appendix ‘B’ Drawing List 2 and other rectification
works required to bring the terminal to compliance with
applicable building and airport codes (as indicated in
the Appendices of Arup’s Site Observation Report);
5. The cost of completing the items listed in the JAC
project status summary report of 28 February 2003; 85
and
_______________
85 Outstanding Project Works and Tests on
Completion Status:

442

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2
Republic vs. Mupas
 443

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

Republic vs. Mupas

_______________
 444

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

4
Republic vs. Mupas

_______________
 445

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

Republic vs. Mupas

6. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural

retrofits for the failed elements in the elevated roadway
structures as those retrofits were described in Arup’s
Drawings listed in Appendix ‘B’ Drawing List 3, Arup
Review on ‘TCGI Report of Civil Design Review and
Evaluation’ — Elevated Roadway, dated March 2009,
and other rectification works required to bring the
elevated roadways to compliance with applicable
building and airport codes (as indicated in the
Appendices of Arup’s Site Observation Report).86

• $263,392,081 as total base CCV as of December

2004. The Government asserted that the NAIA-
IPT III suffered from depreciation and
deterioration in the sum of US$36,814,612.00
from December 2002 until December 2004. The
base value CCV at the time of expropriation
should be US$263,392,081.00 after deducting
depreciation and deterioration.
• $113,944,044 as total contract compliance
deductions. The Government further deducted
items which
_______________
 b. Moving walkways underprovision
c. Sun shading to external glazing
d. Lack of 400hz PC air to loading bridges
e. Completion of testing, commissioning, and operation
of the facility
f. Provision of as-built documentation
The Government likewise deducted the replacement
cost of inferior quality items and additional areas that
the Government had to build to finish the NAIA-IPT III
project.87

2. PIATCO’s Appraisal

PIATCO claimed that the total replacement value of

the NAIA-IPT III as of December 31, 2010 amounted to
$905,867,550.00.
Actual Costs @ Inflation Base V
2002 Rate @ 2004
See CA Rollo, Volume 32-D, pp. 117-118. I. Materials, Equipment and
86 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), pp. 585-586. Labor Engineering & 360,969,791 1.0971 396,01
Procurement
II. Attendant Costs
446
Engineering and Architecture 19,372,539 1.0971 21,253
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Quality Assurance 6,923,720 1.0971 7,596,0
6 Construction Supervision 4,302,227 1.0971 4,719,9
Republic vs. Mupas Construction Insurance 4,329,272 1.0971 4,749,6
Site Development 8,358,169 1.0971 9,169,7

were noncompliant with bid documents, including,

among others:
a. FIDS monitors not flat screen

[G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997] RAFAEL S.
ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR
INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES
INOCENTES, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner
two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration
of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of
absolute sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628
provides in part:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS, receipt of which in full is
hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
subdivided portion of the property covered by TCT No.
258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino. whose marriage is under a
regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns."[1]
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 243273
provides:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS receipt of which in full is
hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
consolidated-subdivided portion of the property covered by
TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino, whose marriage is under a
regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or assigns.[2]
Private respondents received the payments for the above-
mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9,
1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles.
[3]
Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title
of the first lot is in the possession of another person, [4] and
petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain
conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific
performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim
private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditions[5] which were never reflected in the deeds of sale:[6]
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains
with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements
have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way
amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan
for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property
and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other
expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former
judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above
conditions,[7] although such conditions were not incorporated in the
deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground
that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol
evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and
eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence,
this petition.
We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol
evidence to establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a
contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on such
conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First,
private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming
from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as
written or documentary evidence.[8] Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
uniform language.[9] Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule
130[10] of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were
reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. [11] Considering that the written deeds
of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in
said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the
parties.[12] Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an
inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it
is the law between the parties.[13]
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely
on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia
Plantation[14] where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a
contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the
material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former,
the contract sought to be enforced [15] expressly stated that it is
subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which
were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in
this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other
agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own
terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would
vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument,
[16]
hence, contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to
show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or
different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.[17]
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a
contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake." [18] No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that
their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by
the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to
express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is
the following instance: admissible, it should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other
evidence appears from the record to sustain the existence of the
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in alleged conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes,
terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be was presented to testify on such conditions.
understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the
case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the records of this case REMANDED to the trial court for proper
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of disposition in accordance with this ruling.
the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they
entered into the contract may be received to enable the SO ORDERED.
court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." [19]
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms
thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention
that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record
shows[20] that private respondents did not expressly plead that the
deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention[21] of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private
respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." [22] Private
respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4)
conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence.
[23]
Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of
the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. [24] Their case is
covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the
only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering that
private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge)
he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and practices"
and was "expected to know the consequences" [25] of his signing a
deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize
the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the
transfer of title to said lots were conditional.[26]

G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004.*
LAPULAPU   FOUNDATION,   INC.   and   ELIAS   Q.   TAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and
ALLIED BANKING CORP., respondents.
Evidence; Parol   Evidence   Rule; No   other   evidence   to   be
received   other   than   the   contents   of   the   written   agreement.—The
parol   evidence   rule   likewise   constrains   this   Court   to   reject
petitioner   Tan’s   claim   regarding   the   purported   unwritten
agreement   between   him   and   the   respondent   Bank   on   the
payment   of   the   obligation   Section   9,   Rule   130   of   the   of   the
Revised   Rules   of   Court   provides   that   “[w]hen   the   terms   of   an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.”
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
329
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004  329 
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Parol   evidence   cannot   serve   the   purpose   of
incorporating   into   the   contract   additional   contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing.—Evidence of
a   prior   or   contemporaneous   verbal   agreement   is   generally   not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract.   While   parol   evidence   is   admissible   to   explain   the
meaning   of   written   contracts,   it   cannot   serve   the   purpose   of
incorporating   into   the   contract   additional   contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there
has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by
the petitioners in this case.
Corporation   Law; Corporate   Officers; Powers; If   a
corporation knowingly permits one of its officers to act within the
scope of an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as
possessing the power  to do  those acts.—It is a familiar doctrine
that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any
other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it
holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do those
acts; and thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in
good   faith   dealt   with   it   through   such   agent,   be   estopped   from
denying the agent’s authority.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Romeo D. Tagra for petitioners.
      Eduardo F. Rosello for private respondents. P/N No. Date of P/N Maturity Date Amount as of 
1/23/79
CALLEJO, SR.,  J.: BD No. 716  Dec. 12, 1977  Apr. 11, 1978  P122,322.21 
BD No. 839  Jan. 5, 1978  May 5, 1978  P120,455.542
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by As   of   January   23,   1979,   the   entire   obligation   amounted   to
the   Lapulapu   Foundation,   Inc.   and   Elias   Q.   Tan   seeking   to P493,566.61   and   despite   demands   made   on   them   by   the
reverse   and   set   aside   the  Decision1 dated   June   26,   1996   of   the respondent   Bank,   the   petitioners   failed   to   pay   the   same.   The
Court   of   Appeals   (CA)   in CA­G.R.   CV   No.   37162 ordering   the respondent Bank was constrained to file with the Regional Trial
petitioners,   jointly   and   solidarily,   to   pay   the   respondent   Allied Court of Cebu City, Branch 15, a complaint seeking payment by
Banking   Corporation   the   amount   of   P493,566.61   plus   interests the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61
and other charges. Likewise, sought to be reversed and set aside representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty
is the appellate court’s Resolution dated August 19, 1996 denying charges, attorney’s fees and costs.
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. In   its   answer   to   the   complaint,   the   petitioner   Foundation
The case stemmed from the following facts:  denied incurring indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging
that  the loans  were  obtained  by  petitioner  Tan  in  his  personal
_______________ capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the
personal   information   he   furnished   the   respondent   Bank.   The
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon­Magtolis with
petitioner   Foundation   maintained   that   it   never   authorized
Associate   Justices   Quirino   D.   Abad   Santos   and   Artemio   G.
petitioner   Tan   to   co­sign   in   his   capacity   as   its   President   any
Tuquero concurring.
promissory note and that the respondent Bank fully knew  that
330
the   loans   contracted   were   made   in   petitioner   Tan's   personal
330  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  capacity and for his own use and that the petitioner Foundation
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals never  benefited,   directly  or   indirectly   therefrom.   The  petitioner
Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the Foundation then interposed a cross­claim against petitioner Tan
co­petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from alleging that he, having exceeded his authority, should be solely
the   respondent   Allied   Banking   Corporation   covered   by   four liable for said loans, and a counterclaim against the respondent
promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. The details of Bank for damages and attorney’s fees.
the promissory notes are as follows:  For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the
P/N No. Date of P/N Maturity Date Amount as of  loans   from   the   respondent   Bank   in   his   personal   capacity.   The
1/23/79 parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the
BD No. 504  Nov. 7, 1977  Feb. 5, 1978  P123,377.76  pro­
BD No. 621  Nov. 28, 1977  Mar. 28, 1978  P123,411.10 
_______________
 2
 Rollo, p. 24.
s interest at 14% per annum, computed from January 24,
331
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004  331
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
ceeds of petitioner Tan’s shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu
Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered
by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (“rolled­
over”) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until
such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same from the
proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Bank’s employee
required   him  to  affix   two signatures  on  every   promissory   note,
assuring   him   that   the   loan   documents   would   be   filled   out   in
accordance with their agreement. However, after he signed and
delivered the loan documents to the respondent Bank, these were
filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such
that   the   petitioner   Foundation   was   included   as   party   thereto.
Further, prior to its filing of the complaint, the respondent Bank
made no demand on him.
After   due   trial,   the   court a   quo rendered   judgment   the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing   evidences   [sic],
arguments   and   considerations,   this   court   hereby   finds   the
preponderance   of   evidence   in   favor   of   the   plaintiff   and   hereby
renders judgment as follows:
1. “1.Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu
Foundation,   Inc.   [the   petitioners   herein]   to   pay   jointly
and solidarily to the plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation
[the   respondent   herein]   the   amount   of   P493,566.61   as
principal   obligation   for   the   four   promissory   notes,
including all  other charges included  in the same, with
1979,   until   the   same   are   fully   paid,   plus   2%   service
charges and 1% monthly penalty charges.
2. “2.Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and solidarily, attorney’s
fees in the equivalent amount of 25% of the total amount
due   from   the   defendants   on   the   promissory   notes,
including all charges;
3. “3.Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and solidarily litigation
expenses of P1,000.00 plus costs of the suit.3”
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the
court a quo by deleting the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the
respondent Bank for being without basis. 
_______________
3
 Id., at p. 25.
332
332  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
The   appellate   court   disbelieved   petitioner   Tan’s   claim   that   the
loans were his personal loans as the promissory notes evidencing
them showed upon their faces that these were obligations of the
petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan himself in
his “official and personal character.” Applying the parol evidence
rule,   the   CA   likewise   rejected   petitioner   Tan’s   assertion   that
there   was   an   unwritten   agreement   between   him   and   the
respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the proceeds
of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Further,   the  CA   found   that  demand   had  been   made   by   the
respondent   Bank   on   the   petitioners   prior   to   the   filing   of   the
complaint a  quo. It  noted  that  the  two  letters  of  demand   dated
January 3, 19794 and January 30, 19795asking settlement of the
obligation were sent by the respondent Bank. These were received
by   the   petitioners   as   shown   by   the   registry   return
cards6 presented during trial in the court a quo.
Finally, like the court a quo, the CA applied the doctrine of
piercing   the   veil   of   corporate   entity   in   holding   the   petitioners
jointly and solidarily liable. The evidence showed that petitioner
Tan  had represented  himself  as  the  President  of  the  petitioner
Foundation,   opened  savings  and  current  accounts   in  its  behalf,
and signed the loan documents for and in behalf of the latter. The
CA, likewise, found that the petitioner Foundation had allowed
petitioner Tan to act as though he had the authority to contract
the loans in its behalf. On the other hand, petitioner Tan could
not escape liability as he had used the petitioner Foundation for
his benefit.
Aggrieved,   the   petitioners   now   come   to   the   Court   alleging
that:
1. I.THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
HOLDING THAT THE LOANS SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE INSTANT PETITION ARE ALREADY DUE AND
DEMANDABLE   DESPITE   ABSENCE   OF   PRIOR
DEMAND.
2. II.THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
APPLYING THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE
DOCTRINE   OF   PIERCING   THE   VEIL   OF
CORPORATE ENTITY AS BASIS FOR ADJUDGING
_______________
4
 Exhibit “R.”
5
 Exhibit “S.”
6
 Exhibits “R­2” and “S­1.”
333
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004  333 
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
1. JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY ON THE PART OF
PETITIONERS   ELIAS   Q.   TAN   AND   LAPULAPU
FOUNDATION, INC.7
The petitioners assail the appellate court’s finding that the loans
had   become   due   and   demandable   in   view   of   the   two   demand
letters   sent   to   them   by   the   respondent   Bank.   The   petitioners
insist  that  there  was  no prior demand  as they  vigorously   deny
receiving   those   letters.   According   to   petitioner   Tan,   the
signatures on the registry return cards were not his.
The  petitioners’   denial   of  receipt  of   the  demand   letters  was
rightfully given scant consideration by the CA as it held:
Exhibits “R” and “S” are two letters of demand, respectively dated
January 3, 1979 and January 30, 1979, asking settlement of the
obligations covered by the promissory notes. The first letter was
written by Ben Tio Peng Seng, Vice­President of the bank, and
addressed to Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., attention of Mr. Elias Q.
Tan, President, while the second was a final demand written by
the appellee’s counsel, addressed to both defendants­appellants,
and giving them five (5) days from receipt within which to settle
or judicial action would be instituted against them. Both letters
were duly received by the defendants, as shown by the registry
return  cards,   marked   as  Exhibits  “R­2”  and   “S­1,”  respectively.
The allegation of Tan that he does not know who signed the said
registry return receipts merits scant consideration, for there is no
showing   that   the   addresses   thereon   were   wrong.   Hence,   the
disputable  presumption “that  a  letter  duly  directed  and  mailed
was received in the regular course of mail” (per par. V, Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) still holds.8
There   is   no   dispute   that   the   promissory   notes   had   already
matured. However, the petitioners insist that the loans had not
become   due   and   demandable   as   they   deny   receipt   of   the
respondent Bank’s demand letters. When presented the registry
return cards during the trial, petitioner Tan claimed that he did
not recognize the signatures thereon. The petitioners’ allegation
and denial are self­serving. They cannot prevail over the registry
return  cards which constitute  documentary  evidence and which
enjoy the presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, these were regularly issued by the postal officials
in the  allegation that he was made to sign blank loan documents and
_______________
7
 Rollo, p. 14.
8
 Id.,at p. 30.
334
334  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  showed   upon   their   faces   that   they   are   the   obligation   of   the
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
performance   of   their   official   duty   and   that   they   acted   in   good
faith.9 Further, as the CA correctly opined, mails are presumed to
have been properly delivered and received by the addressee “in
the   regular   course   of   the  mail.”10 As   the  CA   noted,   there   is  no
showing   that   the   addresses   on   the   registry   return   cards   were
wrong. It is the petitioners’ burden to overcome the presumptions
by sufficient evidence, and other than their barefaced denial, the
petitioners failed to support their claim that they did not receive
the   demand   letters;   therefore,   no   prior   demand   was   made   on
them by the respondent Bank.
Having   established   that   the   loans   had   become   due   and
demandable, the Court shall now resolve the issue of whether the
CA   correctly   held   the   petitioners   jointly   and   solidarily   liable
therefor.
In   disclaiming   any   liability   for   the   loans,   the   petitioner
Foundation  maintains   that   these  were   contracted   by   petitioner
Tan in his personal capacity and that it did not benefit therefrom.
On   the   other   hand,   while   admitting   that   the   loans   were   his
personal   obligation,   petitioner   Tan   avers   that   he   had   an
unwritten agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans
would   be   renewed   on   a   year­to­year   basis   and   paid   from   the
proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
These contentions are untenable.
The  Court  particularly   finds  as  incredulous   petitioner   Tan’s
that the phrase “IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY” was
superimposed   by   the   respondent   Bank’s   employee   despite
petitioner Tan’s protestation. The Court is hard pressed to believe
that a businessman” of petitioner Tan’s stature could have been
so careless as to sign blank loan documents.
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes 11clearly
petitioner   Foundation,   as   contracted   by   petitioner   Tan   “in   his
official   and   personal   capacity.”12 Moreover,   the   application   for
credit accommodation,13 the signature cards of the two accounts in
the name 
_______________
 9
 Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, 363 SCRA 262 (2001).
10
 Section 3(V), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
11
 Exhibits “H” to “L.”
12
 Rollo, p. 26.
13
 Exhibit “D.”
335
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004  335
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
of   petitioner   Foundation,14 as   well   as   New   Current   Account
Record,15 all accompanying the promissory notes, were signed by
petitioner   Tan   for   and   in   the   name   of   the   petitioner
Foundation.16 These   documentary   evidence   unequivocally   and
categorically   establish  that  the  loans  were  solidarily  contracted
by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this
Court   to   reject   petitioner   Tan’s   claim   regarding   the   purported
unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on
the payment of the obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the
Revised   Rules   of   Court   provides   that   “[w]hen   the   terms   of   an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.”17
In   this   case,   the   promissory   notes   are   the  law   between  the
petitioners   and   the   respondent   Bank.   These   promissory   notes
contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28,
1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these  be  made   to   vary   or   contradict   the   terms   and   conditions   in  the
_______________
14
 Exhibits “A” and “B.”
15
 Exhibit “C.”
16
 Ibid.
17
 The provision reads in full:
Sec.   9. Evidence   of   written   agreements.—When   the   terms   of   an
agreement   have   been   reduced   to   writing,   it   is   considered   as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleadings:
(a)   An   intrinsic   ambiguity,   mistake   or   imperfection   in   the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their   successors­in­interest   after   the   execution   of   the   written
agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
336
336  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
notes   were   to   be   paid   on   these   dates   is   clear   and   explicit.
Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a
year­to­year   basis   or   “rolled­over”   annually   until   paid   from   the
proceeds   of   petitioner   Tan’s   shares   in   the   Lapulapu   Industries
Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not
promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally   not   admissible   to   vary,   contradict   or   defeat   the
operation of a valid contract.18 While parol evidence is admissible
to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the
purpose   of   incorporating   into   the   contract   additional
contemporaneous   conditions   which   are   not   mentioned   at   all   in
writing,   unless   there   has   been   fraud   or   mistake.19 No   such
allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.
Finally,   the   appellate   court   did   not   err   in   holding   the
petitioners jointly and solidarily liable as it applied the doctrine of
piercing   the  veil   of  corporate  entity.   The  petitioner  Foundation
asserts that it has a personality separate and distinct from that of
its President, petitioner Tan, and that it cannot be held solidarily
liable for the loans of the latter.
The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners cannot hide
behind the corporate veil under the following circumstances:
The evidence shows that Tan has been representing himself as
the President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. He opened a savings
account and a current account in the names of the corporation,
and signed the application form as well as the necessary specimen
signature cards (Exhibits “A,” “B” and “C”) twice, for himself and
for   the   foundation.   He submitted   a   notarized   Secretary’s
Certificate   (Exhibit   “G”)   from   the   corporation,   attesting   that   he
has been authorized, inter alia, to sign for and in behalf of the
Lapulapu Foundation any and all checks, drafts or other orders
with   respect   to   the   bank;   to   transact   business   with   the   Bank,
negotiate   loans,   agreements,   obligations,   promissory   notes   and
other   commercial   documents;   and   to   initially   obtain   a   loan   for
P100,000.00   from   any   bank (Exhibits   “G­1”   and   “G­2”).   Under
these circumstances,   the defendant corporation  is liable  for the
transactions entered into by Tan on its behalf.20
_______________
18
 MC Engineering v. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 116 (2002).
19
 Ibid.
20
 Rollo, p. 31 (Italics ours.)
337
VOL. 421, JANUARY 29, 2004  337 
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Per   its   Secretary’s   Certificate,   the   petitioner   Foundation   had
given   its   President,   petitioner   Tan,   ostensible   and   apparent
authority   to inter   alia deal   with   the   respondent   Bank.
Accordingly,   the   petitioner   Foundation   is   estopped   from
questioning   petitioner   Tan’s   authority   to   obtain   the   subject—
loans from the respondent Bank. It is a familiar doctrine that if a
corporation   knowingly   permits   one   of   its   officers,   or   any   other
agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds
him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts;
and thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good
faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying
the agent’s authority.21
In   fine,   there   is   no   cogent   reason   to   deviate   from   the   CA’s
ruling that the petitioners are jointly and solidarily liable for the
loans contracted with the respondent Bank.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED
and   the   Decision   dated   June   26,   1996   and   Resolution   dated
August 19, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 37162
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
      Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria­Martinezand Ti
nga, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.
Note.—The so­called parole evidence rule forbids any addition
to   or   contradiction   of   the   terms   of   a   written   instrument   by
testimony of other evidence purporting to show that, at or before
the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the
written   contract.   (Manufacturers   Building,   Inc.   vs.   Court   of
Appeals, 354 SCRA 521 [2001])

——o0o——

_______________

G.R. No. 169985. June 15, 2011.*
MODESTO   LEOVERAS,   petitioner, vs. CASIMERO   VALDEZ,
respondent.
Property; Land Titles; Ownership; Reconveyance; An action
for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the
rightful   landowner,   whose   land   was   wrongfully   or   erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner
to   transfer   or   reconvey   the   land   to   him.—An   action   for
reconveyance   is   a   legal   and   equitable   remedy   granted   to   the
rightful   landowner,   whose   land   was   wrongfully   or   erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner
to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The plaintiff in this action
must allege and prove his ownership of the land in dispute and
the defendant’s erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of
the property.
_______________
** Per Special Order No. 1003 dated June 8, 2011.
*** Additional   member   per   Special   Order   No.   1000   dated
June 8, 2011.
* THIRD DIVISION.
62
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2 the absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted to him.—
Leoveras vs. Valdez
Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; To avoid the operation of the
parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence   modifying,   explaining   or   adding   to   the   terms   of   the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties.—To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the
Rules   of   Court   allows   a   party   to   present   evidence   modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud,
inequitable   conduct   or   accident,   which   nevertheless   did   not
prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
Property; Partition; Partition is the division between two or
more persons of real or personal property, owned in common, by
setting apart their respective interests so that they may enjoy and
possess   these   in   severalty,   resulting   in   the   partial   or   total
extinguishment   of   co­ownership.—The   Civil   Code   of   the
Philippines   defines   partition   as   the   separation,   division   and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong.Partition is the division between two or more persons
of real or personal property, owned in common, by setting apart
their   respective   interests   so   that   they   may   enjoy   and   possess
these in severalty, resulting in the partial or total extinguishment
of co­ownership.
Same;   Same;   One   of   the   legal   effects   of   partition   is   to
terminate the co­ownership  and to make the  previous co­owners
Contrary   to   the   petitioner’s   claim   that   his   actual   possession
determines   the   extent   of   his   ownership,   it   is   the
parties’ Agreement that defines  the extent of their  ownership in
the subject property. One of the legal effects of partition, whether
by agreement among the co­owners or by judicial proceeding, is to
terminate   the   co­ownership   and,   consequently,   to   make   the
previous co­owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share
allotted to him.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.63
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011 63
Leoveras vs. Valdez
  Aoanan Law Office for petitioner.
  Sheila Cresencia­Elasin for respondent.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1assailing
the   March   31,   2005   decision2 and   the   October   6,   2005
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­G.R. CV No. 68549.
The   CA   decision   reversed   the   June   23,   2000   decision 4 of   the
Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC),   Branch   46,   Urdaneta   City,
Pangasinan, dismissing respondent Casimero Valdez’s complaint
for   annulment   of   title,   reconveyance   and   damages   against
petitioner Modesto Leoveras.
Factual Antecedents
Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered
owners—three­fourths   (¾)   and   one­fourth   (¼) pro­indiviso,
respectively—of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag,
Pangasinan,   covered   by   Original   Certificate   of   Title   (OCT)   No.
24695, with an area of 28,171 square meters.5
In   September   1932,   Sta.   Maria   sold   her   three­fourths   (¾)
share   to   Benigna   Llamas.6 The  sale  was   duly   annotated   at  the
back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in 1944, 7she willed
her   three­fourths   (¾)   share   equally   to   her   sisters   Alejandra
Llamas and Josefa Llamas.8 Thus, Alejandra and
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Rollo, pp.   12­21;   penned   by   Associate   Justice   Vicente   S.E.
Veloso,   with   the   concurrence   of   Associate   Justices   Roberto   A.
Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
3 Id., at p. 10.
4 Id., at pp. 22­25; penned by Judge Modesto C. Juanson.
5 Annex “Q.”
6 Annex “Q­2.”
7 Annex “J.”
8 Annex “K,” par. 5, and Annex “C,” par. 3.
64
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
Josefa   each   owned   one­half   (½)   of   Benigna’s   three­fourths   (¾)
share.
On June  14, 1969, Alejandra’s heirs  sold  their predecessor’s
one­half (½) share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to
the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.9
Also on June 14, 1969, Josefa sold her own one­half (½) share
(subject   property)   to   the   respondent   and   the   petitioner,   as
evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. 10On even date, the
respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement,11 allotting
their portions of the subject property.
WITNESSETH
That we [petitioner and respondent] are the absolute owners
of   [the   subject   property]   which   is   particularly   described   as
follows:
xxx
That our ownership over the said portion mentioned above is
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale xxx
That   in   said   deed   of   sale   mentioned   in   the   immediate
preceding   paragraph,   our   respective   share   consist   of   5,282.13
[one­half of 10,564 square meters] square meter each.
That   we   hereby   agreed   and   covenanted   that   our   respective
share shall be as follows:
Modesto   Leoveras—3,020   square   meters   residential   portion 
                                     on   the   northern   part   near   the 
                                     Municipal   road   of   Poblacion   Pugaro, 
                                    Manaoag, Pangasinan;
_______________
 9   Annex   “A.”   The   deed   was   registered   in   the   Office   of   the
Register   of   Deeds   of   Lingayen,   Pangasinan   on   June   20,   1977,
under Entry No. 456592.
10 Annex   “C.”   The   deed   was   registered   in   the   Office   of   the
Register   of   Deeds   of   Lingayen,   Pangasinan   on   June   20,   1977,
under Entry No. 456594; Records, pp. 2­3.
11 Annex “D.”
65
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011
Leoveras vs. Valdez
Casimero   Valdez—7,544.2712 square   meters   of   the  to 7,544 sq. m.
                                   parcel of land described above.13
On June 8, 1977, the petitioner and the respondent executed
an   Affidavit   of   Adverse   Claim   over   the   subject   property. 14 The
parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject
property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.15
In   1996,   the   respondent   asked   the   Register   of   Deeds   of
Lingayen,   Pangasinan   on   the   requirements   for   the   transfer   of
title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To
his   surprise,   the   respondent   learned   that   the   petitioner   had
already   obtained   in   his   name   two   transfer   certificates   of   title
(TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812—covering an area of 3,020 square
meters;   and two,   TCT   No.   195813—covering   an   area   of   1,004
square meters (or a total of 4,024 square meters).
The Register of Deeds informed the respondent that they could
not  find   the  record  of  OCT   No.   24695;   instead,   the  Register  of
Deeds furnished the respondent with the following16 (collectively,
petitioner’s documents):
1. Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969,
both executed by Sta. Maria, purportedly conveying
an unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as follows:
a. 11, 568 square meters to the respondent and
petitioner17
_______________
12 The area of the subject property is 10,564 square meters.
The   Agreement   itself   states   that prior to   the   allotment   of   the
parties’   respective   portions,   the   parties   own   a pro­indiviso one­
65 half share, that is, 5,282 square meters of the subject land. The
RTC found that under the Agreement, the respondent is entitled
13 Supra note 11; Annex “O.”
14 The Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated at the back
of OCT No. 24695 as Entry No. 456593, Annex “N.”
15 Rollo, pp. 23­24.
16 Records, pp. 4­5.
17 Annex “F.”
66
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
b. 8,   689   square   meters   to   one   Virgilia   Li
Meneses18
2. Deed   of   Absolute   Sale (Benigna   Deed)   also   dated
June 14, 1969 executed by Benigna19 which reads:
I, Benigna Llamas, Fernandez xxx do sell xxx by way of
ABSOLUTE   SALE   unto   the   said   Casimero
Valdez, Modesto   Leoveras and   Virgilia   Meneses   their
heirs and assigns, 7,544 sq.m.; 4,024 sq. m. and 8,689 sq.
m.   more   or   less respectively of   a   parcel   of   land   which   is
particularly described as follows:
“A   parcel   of   land   xxx   covered   by   [OCT   No.]   24695.”
(Emphases added)
 3. Subdivision Plan of PSU 21864 of OCT No. 24695 20
4. Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision21 dated May
3, 1994 (Affidavit), which reads:
That   we,   Virgilia   Li   Meneses,   xxx   Dominga   Manangan;
Modesto Leoveras; and Casimero Valdez xxx
xxx are co­owners of a certain parcel of land with an area of
28,   171  sq.   m.  more  or  less  in  subdivision  plan  Psu 21864   xxx
covered by [OCT No.] 24695 situated at Poblacion (now Pugaro),
Manaoag, Pangasinan;
xxx   we   agree   xxx   to   subdivide   and   hereby   confirmed   the
subdivision in the following manner xxx:
Lot 2 with an area of 3, 020 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leo­
verasxxx;
Lot 3 with an area of 1,004 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leo­
veras xxx;
Lot 4 with an area of 7,544 sq. m. xxx to Casimero Valdez xxx;
Lot 5 with an area of 8,689 sq. m. xxx to Virgilia Meneses;
Lot 6 with an area of 7,043 sq. m. xxx to Dominga Manangan”
(Emphasis supplied.)
_______________
18 Annex “H.”
19 Annex “G.”
20 Annex “S.”
21 Annex “I.”
67
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011
Leoveras vs. Valdez
On   June   21,   1996,   the   respondent   filed   a   complaint   for
Annulment   of   Title,   Reconveyance   and   Damages   against   the
petitioner,   seeking   the   reconveyance   of   the   1,004­square   meter
portion  (disputed  property)  covered  by   TCT   No.   195813,   on   the
ground   that   the   petitioner   is   entitled   only   to   the   3,020   square
meters identified in the parties’ Agreement.
The   respondent   sought   the   nullification   of   the   petitioner’s
titles by contesting the authenticity of the petitioner’s documents.
Particularly,   the   respondent   assailed   the   Benigna   Deed   by
presenting   Benigna’s   death   certificate.   The   respondent   argued
that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to
convey   4,024   square   meters   to   the   petitioner,   in   1969   because
Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent added that neither
could Sta.  Maria  have sold  to the parties her  three­fourths (¾)
share in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna
in   1932.22 The   respondent   denied   his   purported   signature
appearing in the Affidavit,23 and prayed for:
a) xxx the cancellation of the [petitioner’s documents];
b) the cancellation   of   TCT   No.   195813   in   the   name   of
Modesto   Leoveras   and   that   it   be   reconveyed to   the
[respondent];
c) the cancellation   and   nullification   of   [TCT   No.
195812] covering an area of 3,020 square meters xxx;
d) [the issuance of] title xxx in the name of [respondent] over
an   area   of   17,104   square   meters   of   OCT
24695;24 (Underscoring supplied)
In his defense, the petitioner claimed that the parties already
had (i) delineated their respective portions of the subject property
even   before   they   acquired   it  in   1969   and   (ii)   agreed   that   upon
acquisition, each would own the portion as
67
_______________
22 TSN, September 9, 1996, p. 13.
23 TSN, September 4, 1996, p. 6.
24 Records, pp. 7­8.
68
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
delineated; that the area he actually possessed and subsequently
acquired   has   a   total   area   of   4,024   square   meters,   which   he
subdivided into two portions and caused to be covered by the two
TCTs   in   question.   The   petitioner   claimed   that   in   signing   the
Agreement,   he   was   led   to   believe,   based   on   the   parties’   rough
estimation,   that   the   area   he   actually   possessed   is   only   3,020
square   meters   contrary   to   the   parties’   real   intention—i.e.,   the
extent   of   their   ownership   would   be   based   on   their   actual
possession.25
The petitioner further claimed that the respondent voluntarily
participated   in   executing   the   Affidavit,   which   corrected   the
mistake   in   the   previously   executed   Agreement 26 and   confirmed
the   petitioner’s   ownership   over   the   disputed   property.   The
petitioner   asked   for   the   dismissal   of   the   complaint   and   for   a
declaration   that   he   is   the   lawful   owner   of   the   parcels   of   land
covered by his titles.
Rtc Ruling
The RTC  dismissed  the complaint.  The  court ruled  that the
respondent failed to preponderantly prove that the Benigna Deed
and   the   Affidavit   are   fabricated   and,   consequently,   no   ground
exists to nullify the petitioner’s titles. The court observed that the
respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the
signatures appearing in these documents.
CA Ruling
On   appeal,   the   CA  reversed   the  RTC   by   ruling   against   the
authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The CA gave
weight   to   Benigna’s   death   certificate   which   shows   the
impossibility of Benigna’s execution of the deed in 1969. The CA
also noted the discrepancy between the respondent’s signatures
as appearing in the Affidavit, on one hand, and the
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 72­73.
26 Id., at pp. 74­75.
69
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011 69
Leoveras vs. Valdez
documents   on   record,   on   the   other. 27 The   CA   added   that   the
respondent’s   failure  to  compare   his  genuine  signature   from   his
purported signatures appearing in the petitioner’s documents is
not fatal, since Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows
the court to make its own comparison. In light of its observations,
the CA ruled:
“As   the   totality   of   the   evidence   presented   sufficiently   sustains
[the respondent’s] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner]
were based on forged and spurious documents,  it behooves this
Court to annul these certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 23, 2000 is
SET ASIDE. Declaring TCT No. 195812 and TCT No. 195813 as
NULL   and   VOID, [the petitioner]   is   hereby   directed   to
reconvey   the   subject parcels of   land   to
[the respondent].”28 (Emphasis added.)
Unwilling to accept the CA’s reversal of the RTC ruling, the
petitioner filed the present appeal by certiorari, claiming that the
CA   committed   “gross   misappreciation   of   the   facts” 29 by   going
beyond what the respondent sought in his complaint.
 The Petition
The petitioner claims that the CA should not have ordered the
reconveyance   of   both   parcels   of   land   covered   by   the   TCTs   in
question since the respondent only seeks the reconveyance of the
disputed   property—i.e.,   the   parcel   of   land   covered   by   TCT   No.
195813.
_______________
27 These documents are: the Agreement, executed in 1994, the
respondent’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the portion sold to
him   by   the   heirs   of   Alejandra,   executed   in   1977,   and   the
Verification   and   Certification   against   Non­Forum   Shopping
attached to the Complaint.
28 Rollo, pp. 49­50.
29 Id., at p. 30.
70
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
The petitioner asserts that after the subject sale, the parties
physically   partitioned   the   subject   property   and   possessed   their
respective portions, thereby setting the limits of their ownership.
The petitioner admits that the Benigna Deed is “fabricated”
but hastens to add that it was only designed (i) to affirm the “true
intent   and   agreement”   of   the   parties   on   the   extent   of   their
ownership, as shown by their actual physical possession, and (ii)
as a “convenient tool” to facilitate the transfer of title to his name.
The Respondent’s Comment
The   respondent   claims   that   since   the   petitioner   himself
admitted  using   a   spurious   document   in  obtaining   his   titles   (as
alleged in the complaint and as found by the CA), then the CA
correctly cancelled the latter’s titles.30
The   petitioner   forged   the   respondent’s   signature   in   the
Affidavit   to   make   it   appear   that   he   agreed   to   the   division
indicated   in   the   document.   The   respondent   defended   the   CA’s
reconveyance of both parcels of land, covered by the petitioner’s
titles, to the respondent by arguing that if the distribution in the
Affidavit is followed, the “original intendment” of the parties on
their   shares   of   the   subject   property   would   be   “grievously
impaired”31
The Issues
The two basic issues32 for our resolution are:
1. Whether the CA erred in nullifying the petitioner’s titles.
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 122­123.
31 Id., at p. 124.
32 Id., at p. 122; the respondent’s Comment.
71
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011 71
Leoveras vs. Valdez
2. Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the
parcel of land covered by the petitioner’s titles.
The Ruling
We partially grant the petition.
 An   action  for   reconveyance   is   a   legal   and   equitable   remedy
granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or
erroneously   registered   in   the   name   of   another,   to   compel   the
registered  owner to  transfer  or reconvey  the  land to him. 33 The
plaintiff in this action must allege and prove his ownership of the
land   in   dispute   and   the   defendant’s   erroneous,   fraudulent   or
wrongful registration of the property.
We rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership
of the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit
of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties’ Agreement, which cover
the subject property.
The   petitioner   does   not   dispute   the   due   execution   and   the
authenticity   of   these   documents,34 particularly   the   Agreement.
However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the
true   intention   of   the   parties,   the   Affidavit   was   subsequently
executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention.
The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the
parol evidence rule,35 i.e., when the terms of an agreement
_______________
33 Esconde   v.   Barlongay,   No.   L­67583,   July   31,   1987,   152
SCRA 603.
34 In Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde (G.R. No.
140608, September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 1), the Court ruled that
the allegation that  the written agreement does not  express  the
true  intention of  the parties  does  not carry  with  it  the  specific
denial   of   the   genuineness   and   due   execution   of   the   written
instrument.
35 Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 9. Evidence   of   written   agreements.—When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is
72
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
are   reduced   to   writing,   the   written   agreement   is   deemed   to
contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms
can   be   admitted   other   than   what   is   contained   in   the   written
agreement.36 Whatever is not found in the writing is understood
to have been waived and abandoned.37
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of
Court allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or
adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement
to   express   the   true   intent   and   agreement   of   the   parties.   The
failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of
the   parties   is   either   by   reason   of   mistake,   fraud,   inequitable
conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting
of the minds of the parties.38
_______________
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be,   between   the   parties   and   their   successors   in   interest,   no
evidence   of   such   terms   other   than   the   contents   of   the   written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement;
 (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d)    The   existence   of   other   terms   agreed   to   by   the
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
36 Ortañez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107372, January 23,
1997, 266 SCRA 561.
37 Heirs of Carmen Cruz­Zamora v. Multiwood International,
Inc., G.R. No. 146428, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 137.
38 Article 1359 of the Civil Code of the Philippines reads:
When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties
to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in
73
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011
Leoveras vs. Valdez
At   the   trial,   the   petitioner   attempted   to   prove,   by   parol
evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting
the   Affidavit,   which   allegedly   corrected   the   mistake   in   the
previously  executed  Agreement  and  confirmed his  ownership  of
the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the petitioner’s
staunch assertion that the respondent co­executed this Affidavit
supposedly to reflect the parties’ true intention.
In   the   present   petition,   however,   the   petitioner   made   a
damaging   admission   that   the Benigna   Deed is fabricated,
thereby completely bolstering the respondent’s cause of action for
reconveyance   of   the   disputed   property   on   the   ground   of
fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects
what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner’s admission,
coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported signature in
the   Affidavit,   placed   in   serious   doubt   the   reliability   of   this
document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s defense.
Curiously,   if   the   parties   truly   intended   to   include   in   the
petitioner’s share the disputed property, the petitioner obviously
need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his
application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the
subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that
supposedly corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement) that
supports  the  petitioner’s  claim  that  the  partition  of the  subject
property is based on the parties’ actual possession.
Note   that   the   RTC   dismissed   the   complaint   based   on   the
respondent’s alleged failure to prove the spuriousness of the
_______________
the   instrument   purporting   to   embody   the   agreement,   by
73 reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of
the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the
end that such true intention may be expressed.
If   mistake,   fraud,   inequitable   conduct,   or   accident   has
prevented   a   meeting   of   the   minds   of   the   parties,   the   proper
remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the
contract.
74
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
documents submitted by the petitioner to the Register of Deeds.
However,   by   admitting   the   presentation   of   a   false   deed   in
securing   his   title,   the   petitioner   rendered   moot   the   issue   of
authenticity of the Benigna Deed and relieved the respondent of
the   burden   of   proving   its   falsity   as   a   ground   to   nullify   the
petitioner’s titles.
 By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title
over the disputed property in his name, the petitioner holds the
title   to   this   disputed   property   in   trust   for   the   benefit   of   the
respondent as the true owner; 39registration does not vest title but
merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper
from   the   true   owner,   nor   can   it   be   used   as   a   shield   for   the
commission   of   fraud,   or   to   permit   one   to   enrich   oneself   at   the
expense   of   others.40 Hence,   the   CA   correctly   ordered   the
reconveyance   of the   disputed   property,   covered   by   TCT   No.
195813, to the respondent.
The   parties’   Agreement   effectively
partitioned the subject property
The petitioner also relies on his alleged actual possession of
the disputed property to support his claim of ownership. Notably,
both   parties   make   conflicting   assertions   of   possession   of   the
disputed property.41 The petitioner testified on his possession as
follows:
_______________
39 Article 1456 of the Civil Code reads:
If   property   is   acquired   through  mistake  or   fraud,   the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
40 Lopez v. Lopez, G.R. No. 161925, November 25, 2009, 605
SCRA 358.
41 The respondent testified that he has been in possession of
“the land in litigation” since 1969. (TSN, September 9, 1996, p. 2.)
On the other hand, the petitioner testified that he has been in
possession of the “4,020 square meters.” (TSN, June 19, 1997, pp.
3­4.)
75
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011 75
Leoveras vs. Valdez
Q: How many square meters did you get from the land and how
many square meters was the share of [respondent]?
A: 4[0]20   square   meters   and   my   brother­in­law   6,000   plus
square meters.
xxx
Q: Was there a boundary between the 4,020 square meters and
the   rest   of   the   property   which   (sic)   designated   by   your
brother­in­law?
A: There is sir, and the boundary is the fence.
Q: When did you put up that fence which is the boundary?
A: After the deed of sale was made.
Q: And   that  boundary   fence   which   you  put   according   to  you
since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in 1969 up
to the present does it still exist?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Since the time you purchased the property according to you
you already divided the property, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And   that   as   of   today   who   is   in   possession   of   that   4,020
square meters?
A: I, sir.42
The petitioner and the respondent were originally co­owners of
the subject property when they jointly bought it from the same
vendor   in   1969.   However,   the   parties   immediately   terminated
this state of indivision by executing an Agreement, which is in the
nature of a partition agreement.
The   Civil   Code   of   the   Philippines   defines   partition   as   the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among   those   to   whom   it   may   belong.43 Partition  is  the   division
between two or more persons of real or personal property, owned
in common, by setting apart their respective interests so that they
may enjoy and possess these in sever­
_______________
42 TSN, June 19, 1997, pp. 3­4.
43 Article 1079.
76
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
alty,44 resulting   in   the   partial   or   total   extinguishment   of   co­
ownership.45
In the present case, the parties agreed to divide the subject
property   by   giving   the   petitioner   the   3,020   square   meters
“residential   portion   on   the   northern   part   near   the   Municipal
road.”46 There is no dispute that this 3,020­square meter portion
is the same parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2 (which is not the
subject   of   the   respondent’s   action for   reconveyance)   in   the
Affidavit   and   the   Subdivision   Plan   presented   by   the   petitioner
before the Register of Deeds. The fact that the Agreement lacks
technical description of the parties’ respective portions or that the
subject property was then still embraced by a single certificate of
title   could   not   legally   prevent   a   partition,   where   the   different
portions allotted to each were determined and became separately
identifiable, as in this case.47
What is strikingly significant is that even the petitioner’s own
testimony merely  attempted to confirm his  actual possession  of
the disputed property, without, however, supporting his claim—
contrary to the written Agreement—that the parties’ ownership of
the subject property would be co­extensive with their possession.
This is the core of the petitioner’s defense. At any rate, just as
non­possession   does   not   negate   ownership,   neither   does
possession automatically prove own­
_______________
44 Arturo   M.   Tolentino,   2 Commentaries   and   Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 210.
45 Article 494 of the Civil Code reads:
No co­owner shall be obliged to remain in the co­ownership.
Each co­owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
46 Supra note 11; Annex “O.”
47 De la Cruz v. Cruz, No. L­27759, April 17, 1970, 32 SCRA
307.
77
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011 77
Leoveras vs. Valdez
ership,48 especially   in   the   face   of   an   unambiguous   document
executed by the parties themselves. 
Contrary  to the petitioner’s claim that his actual possession
determines   the   extent   of   his   ownership,   it   is   the
parties’ Agreement that defines  the extent of their  ownership in
the subject property. One of the legal effects of partition, whether
by agreement among the co­owners or by judicial proceeding, is to
terminate   the   co­ownership   and,   consequently,   to   make   the
previous co­owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share
allotted to him.49
Parenthetically, the respondent declared for taxation purposes
the portion he claims in December 1987. 50 The total area (7,544
square meters) of the properties declared is equivalent to the area
allotted   to   the   respondent   under   the   Agreement.   On   the   other
hand, the petitioner declared the 1,004­square meter portion only
in September 1994, under Tax Declaration No. 9393, 51 despite his
claim of exclusive and adverse possession since 1969.
Nullification   of   the   petitioner’s   title   over
the 3,020 square meter portion
While the petitioner admitted using a spurious document in
securing   his   titles,   nonetheless,   he   questions   the   CA’s
nullification of TCT No. 195812 on the ground that, per the re­
_______________
48 Medina   v.   Greenfield   Development   Corporation,   G.R.   No.
140228, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 150.
49 Eduardo P. Caguioa, 2 Comments and Cases on Civil Law,
1966 ed., p. 151, citing Article 1091 of the Civil Code which reads:
A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
50 In the respondent’s Tax Declaration No. 3131 (Marked as
Annex   “E”),   he   declared   the  following   with   their   corresponding
area:   Residential—750   [square   meters];   Unirrig.   Rice   land—
4,794.27 [square meters]; Pasture Land—2000 [square meters].
51 Records, Annex “6.”
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Leoveras vs. Valdez
spondent’s own admission and the parties’ Agreement, he is the
rightful owner of the land covered by this title.
We disagree.
The petitioner’s  argument  confuses  registration  of title  with
ownership.52 While   the   petitioner’s   ownership   over   the   land
covered   by   TCT   No.   195812   is   undisputed,   his   ownership   only
gave him the right to apply for the proper transfer of title to the
property in his name. Obviously, the petitioner, even as a rightful
owner, must comply with the statutory provisions on the transfer
of registered title to lands.53 Section 53 of
_______________
52 Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration
under   the   Torrens   system   of   that   ownership   is   quite
another (Grande v. Court of Appeals, No. L­17652, June 30, 1962,
5 SCRA 524).
53 Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1529 reads:
Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An
owner   of   registered   land   may   convey,   mortgage,   lease,
charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with
existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in
law. xxx
Section 53 of P.D. 1529 reads:
Presentation   of   owner’s   duplicate   upon   entry   of   new
certificate.    No  voluntary  instrument  shall  be  registered
by   the   Register   of   Deeds,   unless   the   owner’s   duplicate
certificate   is   presented   with   such   instrument,   except   in
cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of
the court, for cause shown.
xxx
Section 57 of P.D. 1529 reads:
Procedure   in   registration   of   conveyances.     An   owner
desiring  to  convey his registered land in fee  simple  shall
execute   and   register   a   deed   of   conveyance   in   a   form
sufficient   in   law.   The   Register   of   Deeds   shall   thereafter
make out in the registration book a new certificate of title
to   the   grantee   and   shall   prepare   and   deliver   to   him   an
owner’s  duplicate  certificate.   The  Register  of   Deeds   shall
 note upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of
transfer, the volume and page of the
79
VOL. 652, JUNE 15, 2011
Leoveras vs. Valdez
Presidential   Decree   No.   1529   provides   that   the   subsequent
registration of title procured by the presentation of a forged deed
or   other   instrument   is   null   and   void.   Thus,   the   subsequent
issuance of TCT No. 195812 gave the petitioner no better right
than the tainted registration which was the basis for the issuance
of the same title. The Court simply cannot allow the petitioner’s
attempt  to  get  around  the  proper  procedure   for   registering   the
transfer of title in his name by using spurious documents.
Reconveyance   is   the   remedy   of   the
rightful owner only
While the CA correctly nullified the petitioner’s certificates of
title,   the   CA   erred   in   ordering   the   reconveyance   of
the entire subject   property   in   the   respondent’s   favor.   The
respondent himself admitted that the 3,020­square meter portion
covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioner’s just share in the
subject   property.54 Thus,   although   the   petitioner   obtained   TCT
No. 195812 using the same spurious documents, the land covered
by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of the respondent
since   he   is not   the   rightful  owner of   the  property   covered   by
this title.55
WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   partially   GRANTED.   The
assailed   decision   and   resolution   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   are
MODIFIED.   Accordingly,   the   petitioner   is   directed   to
RECONVEY to the respondent the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 195813. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio­Morales   (Chairperson),   Bersamin,   Villarama,
Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Petition partially granted, judgment and resolution modified.
79
Note.—The regime of co­ownership exists when ownership of
an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By the
nature  of  a   co­ownership,   a  co­owner  cannot  point  to  a  specific
portion of the property owned in common as his own because his
share therein remains intangible. (Dailisan vs. Court of Appeals,
560 SCRA 351 [2008])
——o0o—— 
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 171601. April 8, 2015.*
 
SPOUSES   BONIFACIO   and   LUCIA   PARAS,
petitioners, vs. KIMWA   CONSTRUCTION   AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Parol   Evidence   Rule;   Rule   130,
Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing;
Per   this   rule,   reduction   to   written   form,   regardless   of   the
formalities observed, “forbids any addition to, or contradiction of,
the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties,  varying the purport of the written contract.”—Rule 130,
Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an
agreement   have   been   reduced   to   writing,   it   is   considered   as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However,
a   party   may   present   evidence   to   modify,   explain   or   add  to  the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a)
An   intrinsic   ambiguity,   mistake   or   imperfection   in   the   written
agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity
of   the   written   agreement;   or   (d)   The   existence   of   other   terms
agreed to by the parties or their successors­in­interest after the
execution   of   the   written   agreement.   The   term   “agreement”
includes wills. Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless
of   the   formalities   observed,   “forbids   any   addition   to,   or
contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or
other   evidence   purporting   to   show   that   different   terms   were
agreed  upon   by   the  parties,  varying   the  purport  of  the  written
contract.”
_______________
*  SECOND DIVISION.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
Same; Same; Same; Two (2) things must be established for
parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of
the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading
or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that
the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis
of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.—Provided that
a   party   puts   in   issue   in   its   pleading   any   of   the   four   (4)   items
enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, “a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the agreement[.]” Raising any of these items as an issue in a
pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited to
the party initiating an action.  In Philippine National Railways v.
Court of First Instance of Albay, 83 SCRA 569 (1978), this court
noted that “if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that
the contract mentioned in the complaint does not express the true
agreement   of   the   parties,   then   parol   evidence   is   admissible   to
prove the true agreement of the parties[.]”  Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party’s failure
to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then
be entertained. Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally
imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced points
to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it.  That is, it
must be relevant, tending to “induce belief in [the] existence” of
the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by
the   party   seeking   to   introduce   parol   evidence.   In   sum,   two   (2)
things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first,
that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in
issue   in   a   party’s   pleading   or   has   not   been   objected   to   by   the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by
the presenting party.
 Same; Same; Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from
the   position   (unless   convincingly   shown   otherwise)   that
individuals   act   as   rational   human   beings,   i.e.,   “[t]hat   a   person
takes ordinary care of his concerns.”—Our evidentiary rules impel
us   to   proceed   from   the   position   (unless   convincingly   shown
otherwise)   that   individuals   act   as   rational   human   beings, i.e.,
“[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his concerns[.]” This basic
evidentiary   stance,   taken   with   the   supporting   evidence
petitioners   Spouses   Paras   adduced,   respondent   Kimwa’s
awareness of the conditions under which petitioner Lucia Paras
was bound, and the Agreement’s own text specifying exclusive
243
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
 allotment   for   respondent   Kimwa,   supports   petitioners
Spouses   Paras’   position  that   respondent   Kimwa   was  obliged   to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
As   it   admittedly   hauled   only   10,000   cubic   meters,   respondent
Kimwa is liable for breach of contract in respect of the remaining
30,000 cubic meters.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Escasinas Partner & Company for petitioners.
  P.B. Flores & Associates for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed
Decision2 dated   July   4,   2005   and   Resolution3 dated   February   9,
2006 of the Court of Appeals Special 20th Division in C.A.­G.R.
CV No. 74682 be reversed and set aside, and that the Decision 4 of
Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City dated May
16, 2001 in Civil Case No. MAN­2412 be reinstated.5
The   trial   court’s   May   16,   2001   Decision   ruled   in   favor   of
petitioners Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras (plaintiffs before
the Regional Trial Court) in their action for breach of contract
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 11­28.
2  Id.,   at   pp.   32­39.   The   Decision   was   penned   by   Associate
Justice Isaias P. Dicdican (Chair) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
243
3  Id., at pp. 47­48. The Resolution was penned by Associate
Justice Isaias P. Dicdican (Chair) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
4  Id., at pp. 66­70.
5  Id., at p. 26.
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
with   damages   against   respondent   Kimwa   Construction   and
Development Corporation (Kimwa).6
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside   the   trial   court’s   May   16,   2001   Decision   and   dismissed
Spouses   Paras’   Complaint.7 The   Court   of   Appeals’   assailed
Resolution denied Spouses Paras’ Motion for Reconsideration.8
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a “concessionaire of a sand and gravel
permit   at   Kabulihan,   Toledo   City[.]” 9 Kimwa   is   a   “construction
firm   that   sells   concrete   aggregates   to   contractors   and   haulers
in . . . Cebu.”10
 On   December   6,   1994,   Lucia   and   Kimwa   entered   into   a KIMWA   CONSTRUCTION   AND   DEVELOPMENT
contract   denominated   “Agreement   for   Supply   of   Aggregates” CORP., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
(Agreement)   where   40,000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates   were of the Philippines with office address at Subangdaku, Mandaue
“allotted”11 by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. 12 Kimwa was to pick City, hereinafter represented by its President MRS. CORAZON Y.
up   the   allotted   aggregates   at   Lucia’s   permitted   area   in   Toledo LUA,   of   legal   age,   Filipino   and   a   resident   of   Subangdaku,
City13 at P240.00 per truckload.14 Mandaue City[,] hereinafter referred to as the CONTRACTOR;
The entirety of this Agreement reads: W I T N E S S E T H:
 AGREEMENT FOR SUPPLY OF AGGREGATES   That the SUPPLIER is [sic] Special Permittee of (Rechanelling
 
Block # VI of Sapang Daco River along Barangay Ilihan) located
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
at Toledo City under the terms and conditions:
This Agreement made and entered into by and between:
1.   That   the   aggregates   is   [sic]   to   be   picked   up   by   the
LUCIA PARAS, of legal age, Filipino, married and resident of
Poblacion, Toledo City, Province of Cebu, hereinafter referred to CONTRACTOR at the SUPPLIER [sic] permitted area at the rate
as the SUPPLIER: of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (P240.00) PESOS per truck load;
_______________ 2. That   the   volume   allotted   by   the   SUPPLIER   to   the
CONTRACTOR is limited to 40,000 cu.m.;
6   Id., at p. 70. 3. That the said Aggregates is [sic] for the exclusive use of the
7   Id., at p. 38. Contractor;
8   Id., at p. 48. 4.  That  the  terms  of  payment is  Fifteen (15)  days  after  the
9   Id., at p. 32. receipt of billing;
10  Id. 5. That there is [sic] no modification, amendment, assignment
11  Id., at p. 36. or transfer of this Agreement  after acceptance  shall be  binding
upon the SUPPLIER unless agreed to in writing by and between
12  Id., at p. 33.
the CONTRACTOR and SUPPLIER.
13  Id.
IN   WITNESS   WHEREOF,   we   have   hereunto   affixed   our
14  Id., at p. 66. signatures this 6th day of December, 1994 at Mandaue City, Cebu,
  Philippines.
  246
245 246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 245
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation LUCIA PARAS (sgd.)       CORAZON Y. LUA (sgd.)
­ a n d ­ Supplier                                 Contractor15
 (Emphasis supplied) 23  Id.
  24  Id.
Pursuant   to   the   Agreement,   Kimwa   hauled   10,000   cubic 247
meters   of   aggregates.   Sometime   after   this,   however,   Kimwa
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 247
stopped hauling aggregates.16
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
Claiming   that   in   so   doing,   Kimwa   violated   the   Agreement,
Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was able
Lucia, joined by her husband, Bonifacio, filed the Complaint 17 for
to extract and haul 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates.  However,
breach   of   contract   with   damages   that   is   now   subject   of   this
after   extracting   and   hauling   this   quantity,   Kimwa   allegedly
Petition.
transferred to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela
In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in
Torre   in   violation   of   their   Agreement.   They   then   addressed
December 1994, Lucia was approached by Kimwa expressing its
demand   letters   to   Kimwa.   As   these   went   unheeded,   Spouses
interest to purchase gravel and sand from her.18 Kimwa allegedly
Paras filed their Complaint.25
asked   that   it   be   “assured”19 of   40,000   cubic   meters   worth   of
In   its   Answer,26 Kimwa   alleged   that   it   never   committed   to
aggregates.20 Lucia countered that her concession area was due to
obtain 40,000 cubic  meters  of aggregates from Lucia. It  argued
be   rechanneled   on   May   15,   1995,   when   her   Special   Permit
that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented
expires.21 Thus, she emphasized that she would be willing to enter
only   an   upper   limit   or   the   maximum   quantity   that   it   could
into  a  contract  with  Kimwa   “provided  the  forty   thousand  cubic
haul.27 It likewise claimed that it neither made any commitment
meter[s]   w[ould]   be   withdrawn   or completely extracted   and
to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates before May 15, 1995 nor
hauled before 15 May 1995[.]” 22 Kimwa then assured Lucia that it
represented that the hauling of this quantity could be completed
would take only two to three months for it to completely haul the
in   two   to   three   months.28 It   denied   that   the   hauling   of   10,000
40,000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates. 23Convinced   of   Kimwa’s
cubic meters of aggregates was completed in a matter of days and
assurances, Lucia and Kimwa entered into the Agreement.24
countered that it took weeks to do so. It also denied transferring
_______________
to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre.29
Kimwa  asserted  that the  Agreement  articulated the  parties’
15  RTC Records, p. 97.
true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and
16  Rollo, p. 33. that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol
17  Id., at pp. 56­59. Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from
18  Id., at p. 56. introducing   evidence   which   would   show   that   the   parties   had
19  Id. agreed differently.30
20  Id., at pp. 56­57. On   May   16,   2001,   the   Regional   Trial   Court   rendered   the
Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. The trial court noted that the
21  Id., at p. 57.
22  Id.
Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were set aside Hence, this Petition was filed.
exclusively for Kimwa. It reasoned that it was con­ The   issue   for   resolution   is   whether   respondent   Kimwa
_______________ Construction and Development Corporation is liable to petitioners
Spouses Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters
25  Id. of aggregates from petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area by May
26  Id., at pp. 60­63. 15, 1995.
To   resolve   this,   it   is   necessary   to   determine   whether
27  Id., at p. 60.
petitioners Spouses Paras were able to establish that respondent
28  Id., at pp. 60­61.
Kimwa   was   obliged   to   haul   a   total   of   40,000   cubic   meters   of
29  Id., at pp. 61­62. aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
30  Id., at pp. 62­63. _______________
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 31  Id., at p. 70.
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation 32  Id., at p. 96.
trary to human experience for Kimwa to have entered into an 33  Id., at p. 70.
Agreement with Lucia without verifying the latter’s authority as 34  Id., at pp. 36­37.
a concessionaire.31 Considering that the Special Permit32 granted
35  Id., at p. 48.
to   Lucia   (petitioners’   Exhibit   “A”   before   the   trial   court)   clearly
249
indicated that her authority was good for only six (6) months from
November 14, 1994, the trial court noted that Kimwa must have VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 249
been aware that the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates allotted to Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
it must necessarily be hauled by May 15, 1995. As it failed to do We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate
so, it was liable to Spouses Paras for the total sum of P720,000.00, that of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent Kimwa is liable for
the value of the 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates that Kimwa did failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged
not haul, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs of suit.33 to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial  
Court’s Decision. It faulted the trial court for basing its findings I 
on evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the  
Parol Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was clear that Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides
Kimwa was under  no obligation  to haul  40,000  cubic meters of for   the   Parol   Evidence   Rule,   the   rule   on   admissibility   of
aggregates by May 15, 1995.34 documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been
In   a   subsequent   Resolution,   the   Court   of   Appeals   denied reduced into writing:
reconsideration to Spouses Paras.35
 Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a)   An   intrinsic   ambiguity,   mistake   or   imperfection   in   the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their   successors­in­interest   after   the   execution   of   the   written
agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
 
Per   this   rule,   reduction   to   written   form,   regardless   of   the
formalities observed,36 “forbids any addition to, or contradict­
_______________
36  See Inciong, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 364, 371; 256
SCRA 578, 585 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
tion of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other
evidence   purporting   to   show   that   different   terms   were   agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.” 37
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to
the contracting parties’ articulated intent. In choosing to reduce
their  agreement into writing, they are  deemed  to have  done  so
meticulously and carefully, employing specific — frequently, even
technical — language as are appropriate to their context. From an
evidentiary standpoint, this is also because “oral testimony . . .
coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the
case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable
as   written   or   documentary   evidence.   Spoken   words   could   be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
uniform language.”38 As illustrated in Abella v. Court of Appeals:39
Without   any   doubt,   oral   testimony   as   to   a   certain   fact,
depending   as   it   does   exclusively   on   human   memory,   is   not   as
reliable as written or documentary evidence. “I would sooner trust
the   smallest   slip   of   paper   for   truth,”   said   Judge   Limpkin   of
Georgia,   “than   the   strongest   and   most   retentive   memory   ever
bestowed   on   mortal   man.”   This   is   especially   true   in   this   case
where such oral testimony is given by . . . a party to the case who
has an interest in its outcome, and by . . . a witness who claimed
to have received a commission from the petitioner. 40
_______________
38  Ortañez v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 514, 518; 266 SCRA
561, 565 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
39  327   Phil.   270;   257   SCRA   482   (1996)   [Per J. Francisco,
Third Division].
37  Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, 590 Phil.
410,   418;   569   SCRA   387,   395   (2008)   [Per J. Nachura,   Third
Division],   citing Edrada   v.   Ramos,   505   Phil.   672,   677­678;   468
SCRA 597, 604 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
40  Id., at p. 276; p. 487, citing De Leon v. Court of Appeals,
205   SCRA   612,   622­623   (1992)   [Per J. Cruz,   First   Division]
and Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341, 349.
 251
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party
puts in issue in its pleading any of the four (4) items enumerated
in   the   second   paragraph   of   Rule   130,   Section   9,   “a   party   may
present   evidence   to   modify,   explain   or   add   to   the   terms   of  the
agreement[.]”41 Raising   any   of   these   items   as   an   issue   in   a
pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited to
the party initiating an action. In Philippine National Railways v.
Court   of   First   Instance   of   Albay,42 this   court   noted   that   “if   the
defendant   set   up   the   affirmative   defense   that   the   contract
mentioned in the complaint does not express the true agreement
of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to prove the true
agreement   of   the   parties[.]”43 Moreover,   as   with   all   possible
objections to the admission of evidence, a party’s failure to timely
object   is   deemed   a   waiver,   and   parol   evidence   may   then   be
entertained.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative
that   the   parol   evidence   sought   to   be   introduced   points   to   the
conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be
relevant, tending to “induce belief in [the] existence”44
_______________
41  ACI   Philippines,   Inc.   v.   Coquia,   580   Phil.   275,   284;   558
SCRA 300, 310 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
42  173   Phil.   5;   83   SCRA   569   (1978)   [Per J. Aquino,   Second
Division].
43  Id., at  p.  11;  p.  576,  citing Enriquez v.  Ramos,  116  Phil.
525, 531; 6 SCRA 219, 220­221 (1962) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En
Banc], Philippine Sugar E. D. Co. v. Philippines, 62 L. Ed. 1177,
247 U.S. 385, Heirs of De la Rama v. Talisay­Silay Milling Co., 54
251 Phil.   580,   588   (1930)   [Per J.Romualdez, En   Banc],   and Land
Settlement   and   Development   Corporation   v.   Garcia   Plantation
Co.,   Inc.,   117   Phil.   761,   765;   7   SCRA   750,   752   (1963)
[Per J. Paredes, En Banc].
44  Rev. Rules on Evid., Rule 128, Secs. 3 and 4 provide:
Section 3. Admissibility of evidence.—Evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules.
Section 4. Relevancy;   collateral   matters.—Evidence   must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence   or   nonexistence.   Evidence   on   collateral   matters   shall
not be allowed,
252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
of   the   flaw,   true   intent,   or   subsequent   extraneous   terms
averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence
to   be   admitted: first,   that   the   existence   of   any   of   the   four   (4)
exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not
been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol
evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
 
II
 
Here, the Court of Appeals found fault in the Regional Trial
Court for basing its findings “on the basis of evidence presented in
violation   of   the   parol   evidence   rule.” 45 It   proceeded   to   fault
petitioners Spouses Paras for showing “no proof . . . of [respondent
Kimwa’s] obligation.”46 Then, it stated that “[t]he stipulations in
the   agreement   between   the   parties   leave   no   room   for
interpretation.”47
The Court of Appeals is in serious error.
At   the   onset,   two   (2)   flaws   in   the   the   Court   of   Appeals’
reasoning must be emphasized. First, it is inconsistent to say, on
one   hand,   that   the   trial   court   erred   on   the   basis   of   “evidence
presented”48 (albeit supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence
Rule), and, on the other, that petitioners Spouses Paras showed
“no  proof.”49 Second, without  even  accounting  for the exceptions
provided   by   Rule   130,   Section   9,   the   Court   of   Appeals
immediately   concluded   that   whatever   evidence   petitioners
Spouses Paras presented was in violation of the Parol Evidence
Rule.
_______________
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
45  Rollo, p. 36.
46  Id., at p. 37.
47  Id.
48  Id., at p. 36.
49  Id., at p. 37.
253
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 253
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
Contrary   to   the   Court   of   Appeal’s   conclusion,   petitioners
Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial
court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the
Agreement’s   failure   to   express   the   true   intent   of   the   parties.
Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded
to   petitioners   Spouses   Paras’   pleading   of   these   issues.   This   is,
thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.
Paragraphs 6 to 10 of petitioners’ Complaint read:
6. Sensing that the buyers­contractors and haulers alike could
easily   consumed   [sic]   the   deposits   defendant   proposed   to   the
plaintiff­wife that it be assured of a forty thousand (40,000) cubic
meter [sic];
7.   Plaintiff   countered   that   the   area   is   scheduled   to   be
rechanneled   on   15   May   1995   and   by   that   time   she   will   be
prohibited to sell the aggregates;
8. She further told the defendant that she would be willing to
enter into a contract provided the forty thousand cubic meter [sic]
will be withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15
May 1995, the scheduled rechanneling;
9. Defendant assured her that it will take them only two to
three months to haul completely the desired volume as defendant
has all the trucks needed;
10.   Convinced   of   the   assurances,   plaintiff­wife   and   the
defendant entered into a contract for the supply of the aggregates
sometime on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts, at a cost of Two
Hundred Forty (P240.00) Pesos per truckload[.]50
 
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint does not
specifically   state   words   and   phrases   such   as   “mistake,”
“imperfection,”   or   “failure   to   express   the   true   intent   of   the
parties.” Nevertheless, it is evident that the crux of petition­
_______________
50  Id., at pp. 56­57.
254
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
 ers   Spouses   Paras’   Complaint   is   their   assertion   that   the
Agreement   “entered   into   .   .   .   on   6   December   1994   or
thereabouts”51 was   founded   on   the   parties’   supposed
understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of
respondent  Kimwa  must  be  hauled  by  May  15,   1995,  lest  such
hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner
Lucia Paras’ permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation
of petitioners’ having come to court for relief.
Proof   of  how   petitioners  Spouses   Paras  successfully   pleaded
and   put   this   in   issue   in   their   Complaint   is   how   respondent
Kimwa   felt   it   necessary   to   respond   to   it   or   address   it   in   its
Answer. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of respondent Kimwa’s Answer read:
2. The allegation in paragraph six of the complaint is admitted
subject  to  the  qualification  that  when  defendant offered  to buy
aggregates from the concession of the plaintiffs, it simply asked
the plaintiff­concessionaire if she could sell a sufficient supply of
aggregates  to  be  used   in  defendant’s   construction  business   and
plaintiff­concessionaire agreed to sell to the defendant aggregates
from her concession up to a limit of 40,000 cubic meters at the
price of P240.00 per cubic meter.
3.   The   allegations   in   paragraphs   seven   and   eight   of   the
complaint are vehemently denied by the defendant. The contract
which   was   entered   into   by   the   plaintiffs   and   the   defendant
provides   only   that   the   former   supply   the   latter   the   volume   of
40,000.00   cubic   meters   of   aggregates.   There   is   no   truth   to   the
allegation that the plaintiff­wife entered into the contract under
the condition that the aggregates must be quarried and hauled by
defendant completely before May 15, 1995, otherwise this would
have been unequivocally stipulated in the contract.
_______________
51  Id., at p. 57.
255
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 255
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
4. The allegation in paragraph nine of the complaint is hereby
denied. The defendant never made any assurance to the plaintiff­
wife   that   it   will   take   only   two   to   three   months   to   haul   the
aforesaid volume of aggregates. Likewise, the contract is silent on
this aspect for in fact there is no definite time frame agreed upon
by   the   parties   within   which   defendant   is   to   quarry   and   haul
aggregates from the concession of the plaintiffs.
5.   The   allegation   in   paragraph   ten   of   the   complaint   is
admitted   insofar   as   the   execution   of   the   contract   is   concerned.
However, the contract was executed, not by reason of the alleged
assurances of the defendant to the plaintiffs, as claimed by the
latter, but because of the intent and willingness of the plaintiffs
to supply and sell aggregates to it. It was upon the instance of the
plaintiff that the defendant sign the subject contract to express in
writing   their   agreement   that   the   latter   would   haul   aggregates
from   plaintiffs’   concession   up   to   such   point   in   time   that   the
maximum   limit   of   40,000   cubic   meters   would   be   quarried   and
hauled   without   a   definite   deadline   being   set.   Moreover,   the
contract does not obligate the defendant to consume the allotted
volume of 40,000 cubic meters.52
 
Considering   how   the   Agreement’s   mistake,   imperfection,   or
supposed   failure   to   express   the   parties’   true   intent   was
successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint
(and even responded to by respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this
case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and
documentary   parol   evidence   sought   to   be   introduced   by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws
and what they aver to have been the parties’ true intent, may be
admitted and considered.
_______________
52  Id., at pp. 60­61.
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
III  53  Id., at p. 64.
 
Of course, this admission and availability for consideration is
no guarantee of how exactly the parol evidence adduced shall be
appreciated   by   a   court.   That   is,   they   do   not   guarantee   the
probative  value,   if any,  that  shall   be  attached   to them.   In  any
case,  we find that petitioners have  established  that respondent
Kimwa was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on
or before May 15, 1995. Considering its admission that it did not
haul   30,000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates,   respondent   Kimwa   is
liable to petitioners.
The   Pre­Trial   Order   issued   by   the   Regional   Trial   Court   in
Civil   Case   No.   MAN­2412   attests   to   respondent   Kimwa’s
admission that:
6)   Prior   to   or   during   the   execution   of   the   contract[,]   the
Plaintiffs   furnished   the   Defendant   all   the   documents   and
requisite papers in connection with the contract, one of which was
a   copy   of   the   Plaintiff’s   [sic]   special   permit  indicating   that  the
Plaintiff’s   [sic]   authority   was   only   good   for   (6)   months   from
November 14, 1994.53
 
This Special Permit was, in turn, introduced by petitioners in
evidence   as   their   Exhibit   “A,”54 with   its   date   of   issuance   and
effectivity   being   specifically   identified   as   their   Exhibit   “A­
1.”55 Relevant portions of this Special Permit read:
 
To All Whom It May Concern:
PERMISSION is hereby granted to:
Name   Address
LUCIA PARAS Poblacion, Toledo City
_______________
54  RTC Records, pp. 93 and 96.  
55  Id., at p. 93.
257
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 257
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
to undertake the rechannelling of Block No. VI of Sapang Daco
River   along Barangay Ilihan,   Toledo   City,   subject   to   following
terms and conditions:
1. That   the   volume   to   be   extracted   from   the   area   is
approximately 40,000 cubic meters;
. . . .
This permit  which is valid for six (6)  months from the  date
hereof is revocable anytime upon violation of any of the foregoing
conditions or in the interest of public peace and order.
Cebu Capitol, Cebu City, November 14, 1994.56
 
Having   been   admittedly   furnished   a   copy   of   this   Special
Permit, respondent Kimwa was well  aware that a  total of  only
about   40,000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates   may   be   extracted   by
petitioner   Lucia   from   the   permitted   area,   and   that   petitioner
Lucia   Paras’   operations   cannot   extend   beyond   May   15,   1995,
when the Special Permit expires.
The   Special   Permit’s   condition   that   a   total   of   only   about
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner
Lucia   Paras   from   the   permitted   area   lends   credence   to   the
position that the aggregates “allotted” to respondent Kimwa was
in   consideration   of   its   corresponding   commitment   to   haul   all
40,000   cubic   meters.   This   is   so,   especially   in   light   of   the
Agreement’s own statement that “the said Aggregates is for the
exclusive   use   of   [respondent   Kimwa.]”57 By   allotting   the   entire
40,000   cubic   meters,   petitioner   Lucia   Paras   bound   her   entire
business to respondent Kimwa. Rational human behavior dictates
that she must have done so  with the  corresponding  assurances
from it. It would have been irrational, if not ridiculous, of her to
oblige herself to make this allotment
_______________
56  Id., at p. 96.
57  Id., at p. 97.
258
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
without respondent Kimwa’s concomitant undertaking that it
would obtain the entire amount allotted.
Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid
for only six (6) months from November 14, 1994 lends credence to
petitioners   Spouses   Paras’   assertion   that,   in   entering   into   the
Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so
because   of   respondent   Kimwa’s   promise   that   hauling   can   be
completed   by   May   15,   1995.   Bound   as   she   was   by   the   Special
Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently clear
to   any   party   she   was   transacting   with   that   she   could   supply
aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and  that the  other party’s
hauling   must   be   completed   by   May   15,   1995.   She   was   merely
acting with due diligence, for otherwise, any contract she would
enter into would be negated;  any commitment she would make
beyond May 15, 1995 would make her guilty of misrepresentation,
and any prospective income for her would be rendered illusory.
Our evidentiary rules  impel us to proceed from the  position
(unless   convincingly   shown   otherwise)   that   individuals   act   as
rational human beings, i.e., “[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of
his   concerns[.]”58 This   basic   evidentiary   stance,   taken   with   the
supporting   evidence   petitioners   Spouses   Paras   adduced,
respondent   Kimwa’s   awareness   of   the   conditions   under   which
petitioner Lucia Paras was bound, and the Agreement’s own text
specifying   exclusive   allotment   for   respondent   Kimwa,   supports
petitioners Spouses Paras’ position that respondent Kimwa was
obliged   to   haul   40,000   cubic   meters   of   aggregates   on   or   before
May 15, 1995. As it admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters,
respondent Kimwa is liable for breach of contract in respect of the
remaining 30,000 cubic meters.
WHEREFORE, the   Petition   is GRANTED.   The   assailed
Decision   dated   July   4,   2005   and   Resolution   dated   February   9,
2006 of the Court of Appeals Special 20thDivision in C.A.­G.R. CV
No. 74682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deci­
_______________
58  Rev. Rules on Evid., Rule 131, Sec. 3(d).
259
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015 259
Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
sion of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City
dated   May   16,   2001   in   Civil   Case   No.   MAN­2412
is REINSTATED.
A legal interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on
the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until
full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
 Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Petition   granted,   judgment   and   resolution   reversed   and   set
aside.
Notes.—To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the
Rules   of   Court   allows   a   party   to   present   evidence   modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. (Leoveras
vs. Valdez, 652 SCRA61 [2011])
Unsubstantiated   testimony,   offered   as   proof   of   verbal
agreements   which   tend   to   vary   the   terms   of   the   written
agreement, is inadmissible under the rule. (Saraza vs. Francisco,
711 SCRA 95 [2013])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.

G.R. No. 205590. September 2, 2015.*
 
PHILIPPINE   NATIONAL   BANK,   petitioner, vs. LIGAYA   M.
PASIMIO, respondent.
 Remedial   Law;   Civil   Procedure;   Courts;   Court   of   Appeals;
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, categorically states that
the Court of Appeals (CA) has, inter alia, the power to try cases,
receive  function, but, perhaps worse, render useless one of the reasons for
_______________
*  THIRD DIVISION.
 
71
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual   issues   raised   in   cases   falling   within   its   original   and
appellate   jurisdiction.—Before   proceeding   to   the   main   issue   of
this   case,   there   is   a   need   to   clarify   the   assailed   decision’s
perplexing but flawed pronouncement that  the CA,  not being a
trier   of   facts,   is   without   competence   to   review   the   factual
determination of the RTC. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
129, otherwise known as theJudiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
categorically states that the CA has, inter alia, the power to try
cases, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve  factual   issues   raised  in  cases  falling   within  its  original
and appellate jurisdiction.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   The   parties   in   Rule   41   appeal
proceedings may raise questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and   law.—The   CA’s   regrettable   cavalier   treatment   of   PNB’s
appeal is inconsistent with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and with
the   usual   course   of   judicial   proceedings.   Be   reminded   that   the
parties in Rule 41 appeal proceedings may raise questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law. Thus, in insisting that it is not
a trier of facts and implying that it had no choice but to adopt the
RTC’s  factual   findings,   the  CA  shirked  from  its  function  as  an
appellate court to independently evaluate the merits of this case.
To   accept   the   CA’s   aberrant   stance   is   to   trivialize   its   review
its institution.
Same;   Evidence;   Preponderance   of   Evidence;   Words   and
Phrases; “Preponderance   of   evidence”   is   the   weight,   credit,   and
value   of   the   aggregate   evidence   on   either   side   and   is   usually
considered   to   be   synonymous   with   the   term   “greater   weight   of
71 evidence”   or   “greater   weight   of   credible   evidence.”—It   is   settled
that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right
and   the   quantum   of   evidence   required   by   law   in   civil   cases   is
preponderance   of   evidence.   “Preponderance   of   evidence”   is   the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and   is   usually   considered   to   be   synonymous   with   the   term
“greater   weight   of   evidence”   or   “greater   weight   of   credible
evidence.”
Same; Same; Just as settled is the rule that the plaintiff in
civil cases must rely on strength of his or her own evidence and
not upon the weakness of that of the defendant.—Just as settled is
the rule that the plaintiff in civil cases must rely on strength of
his or her
 
 
72
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
own   evidence   and   not   upon   the   weakness   of   that   of   the
defendant. In the case at bench, this means that on Pasimio rests
the   burden   of   proof   and   the onus to   produce   the   required
quantum of evidence to support her cause/s of action.
Same;   Same;   Clear   and   Convincing   Evidence;   The
employment   of   fraud,   duress,   or   undue   influence   is   a   serious
charge,   and   to   be   sustained   it   must   be   supported   by   clear   and
convincing   proof;   it   cannot   be   presumed.—The   employment   of
fraud, duress, or undue influence is a serious charge, and to be
sustained it must be supported by clear and convincing proof; it
cannot   be   presumed.There   is   no   allegation   or   evidence   that
Gregorio   and   Miranda   influenced   Pasimio   by   employing   means
she could not well resist, and which controlled her volition and
induced her to sign the loan documents and the April 10, 2003
Affidavit,   which   otherwise   she   would   not   have   executed.   Also,
there   was   no   evidence   showing   that   Gregorio   and   Miranda’s
influence   interfered   with   Pasimio’s   exercise   of   independent
discretion necessary to determine the advantage or disadvantage
of signing these documents.
Same; Same; Disputable Presumptions; Rule 131, Sec. 3 of
the   Rules   of   Court   specifies   that   a   disputable   presumption   is
satisfactory if uncontradicted and not overcome by other evidence.
—It is germane to observe at this juncture that PNB has, in its
favor,   certain   presumptions   which   Pasimio   failed   to   overturn.
Rule 131, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court specifies that a disputable
presumption is satisfactory if uncontradicted and not overcome by
other evidence.
Mercantile   Law;   Promissory   Notes;   A   promissory   note
represents   a   solemn   acknowledgment   of   a   debt   and   a   formal
commitment   to   repay   it   on   the   date   and   under   the   conditions
agreed upon by the borrower and the lender.—In upholding the
RTC’s   finding   respecting   Pasimio’s   never   having   received   any
loan proceeds, the CA doubtless disregarded the rule holding that
a   promissory   note   is   the   best   evidence   of   the   transaction
embodied therein; also, to prove the existence of the loan, there is
no need to submit a separate receipt to prove that the borrower
received the loan proceeds. Indeed, a promissory note represents
a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to
repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the
borrower and the lender. As has been held, a person who signs
such an instrument is bound to honor it as a le­
 
 
73
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 73
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
gitimate   obligation   duly   assumed   by   him   through   the
signature   he  affixes   thereto   as   a   token   of   his   good   faith.   If  he
reneges on his promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy
and   assistance   of   this   Court   and   deserves   instead   its   sharp
repudiation.
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Notarized   Documents;   Settled   is
the rule that a defective notarization will strip the document of its
public character and reduce it to a private instrument,  and the
evidentiary   standard   of   its   validity   shall   be   based   on
preponderance of evidence.—The absence of Pasimio’s community
tax   certificate   number   in:   said   loan   documents   neither   vitiates
the   transaction   nor   invalidates   the   document.   If   at   all,   such
absence renders the notarization of the loan documents defective.
Under the notarial rules at that time, i.e., Sec. 163(a) of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, where   an   individual   subject   to   the   community   tax
acknowledges any document before a notary public, it shall be the
duty   of   the   administering   officer   to   require   such   individual   to
exhibit the community tax certificate. The defective notarization
of the loan  documents only means that these  documents would
not   be   carrying   the   evidentiary   weight   conferred   upon   it   with
respect   to   its   due   execution;   that   they   should   be   treated   as   a
private document to be examined in appropriate cases under the
parameters   of   Sec.   20,   Rule   132   of   the   Rules   of   Court   which
provides that “before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting   of   the   maker   x x x.”   Settled   is   the   rule   that   a
defective   notarization   will   strip   the   document   of   its   public
character   and   reduce   it   to   a   private   instrument,   and   the
evidentiary   standard   of   its   validity   shall   be   based   on
preponderance of evidence.
Same; Same; Res Inter Alios Acta; Acts and declarations of
persons   strangers   to   a   suit   should,   as   a   rule,   be   irrelevant   as
evidence.—It   was   wrong   for   the   CA   to   make   the   foregoing
conclusions merely because another bank client, Virginia Pollard
(Pollard), testified to being a victim of irregular bank transactions
of   PNB   Sucat.   Even   if   Pollard   were   telling   the   truth,   her
testimony should not have been considered proof that what she
underwent   is   what   actually   transpired   between   Pasimio   and
PNB. Res   inter   alios   acta. Acts   and   declarations   of   persons
strangers to a suit should, as a rule, be ir­
 
 
74
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
relevant   as   evidence.   Pollard’s   transaction   with   PNB   is
entirely different and totally unrelated to Pasimio’s dealings with
the bank.
Same;   Same;   Parol   Evidence;   That   when   the   terms   of   an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing.—It is well to
consider   this   rule:   that   when   the   terms   of   an   agreement   have
been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all
such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and
their   successors­in­interest,   no   evidence   of   the   terms   of   the
agreement other than the contents of the writing. Under this rule,
parol   evidence   or   oral   evidence   cannot   be   given   to   contradict,
change   or   vary   a   written   document,   except   if   a   party   presents
evidence   to   modify,   explain,   or   add   to   the   terms   of   a   written
agreement   and   puts   in   issue   in   his   pleadings:   (a)   an   intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b)
the  failure of  the written agreement  to  express  the true  intent
and   agreement   of   the   parties;   (c)   the   validity   of   the   written
agreement; and (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties  or  their  successors­in­interest after  the execution of  the
written agreement.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Antonio   M.   Elicano   and   Salvador   J.   Ortega,   Jr. for
petitioner.
  Rondain & Mendiola for respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 In   this   petition   for   review   under   Rule   45,   the   Philippine
National Bank (PNB) assails and seeks to set aside the Janu­
 
75
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
ary 23, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.­G.R.
CV No. 94079 dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 196,
which ruled for respondent Ligaya Pasimio (Pasimio) in an action
for a sum of money she commenced thereat against the bank.
The Facts
 
From   the   petition,   the   comment   thereon,   their   respective
annexes,   and   other   pleadings   filed   by   the   parties,   the   Court
gathers the following relevant facts:
On   May   19,   2005,   Pasimio   filed   suit   against   PNB   for   the
recovery   of   a   sum   of   money   and   damages   before   the   RTC   of
Parañaque   City.   In   her   complaint,2 docketed   as   Civil   Case   No.
CV­05­0195 and eventually raffled to Branch 196 of the court, she
alleged having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB
in   the   total   amount   of   P4,322,057.57   and   US$5,170.80,
respectively; that both investment placements have matured; and
when   she   sought   to   withdraw   her   deposit   money   with   accrued
interests, PNB refused to oblige.
In   its   Answer   with   Counterclaim, 3 with   annexes,   PNB
admitted   the   fact   of   deposit   placement   for   the   amount
aforestated. But it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist
on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been
used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank.
PNB narrated how the setoff of sort came about: Pasimio and her
husband took out three “loans against deposit hold­out” 4 from the
PNB Sucat branch, as follows: a Three Million
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 8­24. Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes­
75 Carpio   and   concurred   in   by   Associate   Justices   Rosalinda
Asuncion­Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar­Padilla.
2  Id., at pp. 76­80.
3  Id., at pp. 81­95.
4  A “loan against deposit hold­out” is a PNB product where
the loan is secured by the PNB deposit of the borrower.
 
76
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
One   Hundred   Thousand   Peso   (P3,100,000)   loan   on   March   21,
2001; a One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Peso (P1,700,000)
loan on April 2, 2001; and a Thirty­One Thousand One Hundred
US Dollar (US$31,100) loan on December 7, 2001.
PNB   further   alleged   the   following:   (1)   each   loan
accommodation was secured by a deposit account of Pasimio; (2)
the proceeds of the first and second loans were released to and
received by the Pasimio spouses in the form of PNB Manager’s
Checks (MCs) while the proceeds of the third loan were released
and received in cash; (3) the loan proceeds were acknowledged by
Pasimio in corresponding notarized promissory notes (PNs) and
Disclosure   Statements   of   Loan/Credit   Transaction;   (4)   Pasimio
then re­lent the proceeds of the third loan to a certain Paolo Sun;
(5)   contrary   to   Pasimio’s   allegations   on   maturing   deposit
instruments,   she   in   fact   renewed/rolled   over   her   placements
several times; and (6) Pasimio had failed to pay her outstanding
loan   obligations   forcing   the   bank   to   apply   her   deposits   to   the
unpaid   loans   pursuant   to   the   legal   compensation   arrangement
embodied in the “hold­out” proviso under Clause 5 of the PN.5
To   this   answer,   Pasimio   filed   her   reply   and   answer   to
counterclaim alleging facts she would also later venture to prove.
During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied
obtaining   any   loan   from   PNB,   let   alone   receiving   the
corresponding   loan   proceeds.   While   conceding   signing   certain
documents   which   turned   out   to   be   the   Peso   Loans   Against
Peso/FX   Deposit   Loan   Applications,   the   Promissory   Notes   and
Hold­out   on   Savings   Deposit/Peso/FX   Time   Deposit   and
Assignment of Deposit Substitute and the Disclosure Statements
of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan Documents), she professed not
_______________
5  Clause   5   of   the   PNs   reads:   “By   virtue   of   the   Hold­
out/assignment,   the   BANK   has   the   right   to   offset   the   amount
assigned/held­out against this note without any need of notice to
or demand on the CLIENT/S in any of the following events (i) any
default   or   premature   acceleration   of   due   date   of   the   Loan   or
Other Obligation x x x.”
 
 
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VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
understanding what they really meant.  She agreed to  affix her
signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete
state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager,
Teresita   Gregorio   (Gregorio),   and   Customer   Relations   Officer,
Gloria Miranda (Miranda), led her to believe that what she was
signing were related to new high­yielding PNB products.
Pasimio would also deny relending the loan proceeds to Paolo
Sun.   She  asserted  in  this  regard  that  Gregorio  repaired  to  her
residence   with   a   duly   accomplished   affidavit   detailing   the
relending event and urged her to sign the same if she wished to
recover her placements.
In   all,   Pasimio   depicted   herself   as   victim   of   a   nefarious
lending scam,  orchestrated  by  Gregorio and Miranda  who PNB
had   ordered   dismissed   following   the   exposure   of   their
involvement   in   anomalous   loan   transactions   with   unsuspecting
PNB depositors.
Pasimio submitted the following as evidence:
1.   Passbook   for   PNB   Mint   Placement   No.   61281001164164
(same as PNB Mint Placement No. 6128100115590) — to
prove that she invested P3,100,000 with PNB­Sucat under
PNB Mint Placement No. 6128100115590;
2.   Passbook   for   PNB   Mint   Placement   No.   61281001164688
(same as PNB Mint Placement No. 6128100115632) — to
prove that she invested P1,700,000 with PNB­Sucat under
PNB Mint Placement No. 6128100115632;
3. Certificate of Time Deposit for $CTD No. 6628100116575 —
to   prove   that   she   invested   US$5,160.84   with   PNB­Sucat
under   Certificate   of   Time   Deposit   $CTD   No.
6628100116575;
4.   Letter   dated   April   22,   2004   addressed   to   the   PNB   Sucat
77 branch manager to prove that she made a demand for the
release of her investments;
5. Letters dated July 21, 2004 from PNB’s Internal Auditor to
Pasimio — to prove that PNB confirmed her deposits and
investment with PNB­Sucat but that she
 
 
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
corrected   entries   pertaining   to   their   amounts   and   denied
having a deposit hold­out on any of her investments;
6.   Engagement   letter   dated   February   2,   2005   from   the   law
firm Rondain & Mendiola;
7.   An   unsigned   affidavit   —   to   prove   that   Gregorio   had
prepared an affidavit to make it appear that Pasimio and
other   depositors   entered   into   loan   agreements   with   a
certain Paolo Sun, to cover her (Gregorio’s) illegal schemes
and  that  Gregorio  went  to  the homes  of  these depositors
begging them to sign the affidavit as she was already being
audited by PNB’s main office;6 and
8. A Memorandum on Irregular Lending Operation on Loans v.
Deposit Hold­Out (Sucat Branch) dated February 18, 2003
detailing   the   alleged modus   operandi of   Gregorio   and
Miranda   and   stating   that   the   latter   were   dismissed   for
their involvement in shady loan practices.7
 
On the other hand, PNB offered the following for purposes as
stated:
 
1. Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Application Form
dated March 21, 2001 — to prove that Pasimio applied for a
PNB loan and voluntarily executed a loan application form
dated March 21, 2001 for the amount of P3,100,000 secured
by her own PNB Mint Account No. 612810011393 as loan
collateral;
2. PN and Hold­out on Peso/FX Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time
Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute dated March
21,   2001   —  to  prove  that  Pasimio’s   P3,100,000   loan  was
supported   with   a   PN   which   she   and   her   husband
voluntarily signed and executed on
_______________
6  Records, pp. 349­352.
7  Id., at pp. 564­568.
 
 
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VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 79
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
March   21,   2001   and   that   she   renewed   the   said   loan   on
different dates;
3.   Disclosure   Statement   of   Loan/Credit   Transaction   dated
March   21,   2001   —   to   prove   that   Pasimio’s   loan   for
P3,100,000   was   also   supported   with   a   Disclosure
Statement,   a   copy   of   which   she   acknowledged   to   have
received   prior   to   the   consummation   of   the   credit
transaction, where she voluntarily agreed to the terms and
conditions of her loan by signing the said statement;
4. MC No. 0000166650 dated March 21, 2001 for P3,049,188.94
— to prove that Pasimio encashed this check and received
the proceeds of her P3,100,000 loan, net of bank charges;
5.   Peso   Loans   Against   Peso/FX   Deposit   Loan
Application/Approval Form dated April 2, 2001 — to prove
that Pasimio applied for another loan on April 2, 2001 in
the amount of P1,700,000 and that the same was secured
by Pasimio’s own PNB Mint Account No. 6128100113429.
As   in  the   first   loan,   Pasimio   also  voluntarily   affixed   her
signature on the document;
6. PN and Hold­out on Peso/FX Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time
Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute dated April
2, 2001 — to prove that Pasimio’s second loan of P1,700,000
is   supported   by   a   PN   which   she   voluntarily   signed   and
 executed on April 2, 2001 together with her husband and
that she renewed the said loan on different dates;
7.   Disclosure   Statement   of   Loan/Credit   Transaction   dated
April 2, 2001 — to prove that Pasimio’s loan for P1,700,000
was also supported with a Disclosure Statement, a copy of
which   she   acknowledged   to   have   received   prior   to   the
consummation   of   the   credit   transaction,   where   she
voluntarily agreed to the terms and conditions of her loan
by signing the said statement;
 
 
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
8. MC No. 0000166682 dated April 2, 2001 in the amount of
P1,672,797.50 — to prove that Pasimio encashed this check
and   received   the   proceeds   of   her   P1,700,000   loan,   net   of
bank charges;
9.   Peso   Loans   Against   Peso/FX   Deposit   Loan
Application/Approval   Form   dated   December   7,   200   —   to
prove that Pasimio applied for a US$31,100 loan which her
own PNB FX CTD No. 6628100115637 (US$20,393.78) and
CTD   No.   6628100115716   (US$10,766.25)   secured   as
collateral.   As   in   the   first   two   loans,   Pasimio   also
voluntarily affixed her signature on the document;
10.   PN   and   Hold­Out   on   Peso/FX   Savings   Deposit/Peso/FX
Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute dated
December   7,   2001   —   to   prove   that   Pasimio’s   US$31,100
loan is supported by a PN note which she and her husband
voluntarily signed and executed on December 7, 2001 and
that she renewed the said loan on different dates;
11.   Disclosure   Statement   of   Loan/Credit   Transaction   dated
December   7,   2001   —   to   prove   that   Pasimio’s   loan   for
US$31,100   was   also   supported   with   a   Disclosure
Statement,   a   copy   of   which   she   acknowledged   to   have
received   prior   to   the   consummation   of   the   credit
transaction, where she voluntarily agreed to the terms and
conditions of her loan by signing the said statement;
12.   Miscellaneous   Ticket   dated   December   7,   2001   in   the
amount of US$30,981.28 — to prove that Pasimio received
the proceeds of her US$31,100 loan, net of bank charges;
13. Bills Payment Form dated July 26, 2004 — to prove that
her   failure   to   settle   her   peso/dollar   loan   obligations   was
subsequently settled by offsetting the available balance of
her deposit accounts that were used as collaterals against
these loans, in accordance with the PNs she executed;
 
 
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VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 81
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
14.   Demand   letter   addressed   to   Pasimio  dated   July   5,   2004
signed by Noel R. Millares on behalf of the bank — to prove
that PNB demanded payment of her loans in the aggregate
amount   of   P4,623,458.03   and   US$5,277.34   which   had
already become due and payable;
15.   Pasimio’s   Affidavit   dated   April   10,   2003   —   to   prove
Pasimio’s   execution   of   an   affidavit   lending   US$31,100   to
Paolo Sun;
16. Pasimio’s letter dated February 25, 2003 — to prove that
the Pasimios effected a change in their PNB Mint Account
Nos. deposited at PNB Sucat from the old account number
6128100113393 to the new account number 6128100116464
(pertaining to the deposit of P3,100,000); and from the old
account   number   6128100113429   to   the   new   account
 number   6128100116488   (pertaining   to   the   deposit   of
P1,700,000);
17.   PNB   Mint   Savings   Account   Passbook   with   Serial   No.
046783   —   to   prove   that   the   deposit   covered   by   this
passbook   in   the   amount   of   P3,100,000   was   used   as
collateral   for   Pasimio’s   P3,100,000   loan.   As   proof   of   this
fact,   the  passbook   is  stamped   with   the  notation   “HOLD­
OUT” to indicate a withdrawal restriction on this account;
18. PNB Mint Savings Account Passbook with Serial Number
046781   —   to   prove   that   the   deposit   covered   by   this,
passbook   in   the   amount   of   P1,700,000   was   used   as
collateral   for   Pasimio’s   P1,700,000   loan.   As   proof   of   this
fact, the passbook is stamped with the notation “HOLD­­
OUT” to indicate a withdrawal restriction on this account;
19. Portion of PNB Mint Passbook stamped “Hold­Out” — to
prove that the savings account covered by this passbook is
under a hold­out restriction;
20.   Pasimio’s   Certificate   of   Time   Deposit   Ledger   for   PNBig
Savings Account No. 222­5476838­7 — to prove that
 
 
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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
Pasimio opened an account with PNB­Sucat on March 21,
2001   under   Account   No.   222­5476838­7   which   was
constituted as collateral of the P3,100,000 loan;
21. PNBig Savings Account from October 29, 2003 up to May
3, 2004 — to prove that Pasimio opened an account with
PNB­Sucat   under   Account   No.   281­5254913   which
constituted as collateral for the P1,700,000 loan;
22. The Certificate of Deposit Ledger from June 4, 2001 to July  
25,   2004   —   to   prove   that   the   amounts   covered   by   this
deposit   document   were   used   as   collateral   for   Pasimio’s
dollar loan of US$31,100;
23. CTD dated June 4, 2001 in the amount of US$34,030.18 —
to   prove   that   Pasimio   was   issued   a   Certificate   of   Time
Deposit   for   the  amount  of   US$34,030.18   with   an   annual
interest rate of 4.5%;
24. CTD dated July 27, 2001 in the amount of US$20,187.10 —
to   prove   that   Pasimio   was   issued   a   Certificate   of   Time
Deposit   for   the  amount  of   US$20,187.10   with   an   annual
interest rate of 4.125%;
25.   CTD   dated   December   23,   2003   in   the   amount   of
US$5,136.03   —   to   prove   that   Pasimio   had   an   existing
dollar time deposit with PNB which she used as collateral
for the dollar hold­out loan that she took out. The dollar
certificate is stamped with a notation that reads “HOLD­
OUT”;
26. Statement of Account (SOA) — to prove that PNB­Sucat
issued  a SOA for  Pasimio’s  Dollar Hold­Out  Loan,  which
showed an outstanding balance of US$5,100. This SOA was
used as basis for the offsetting of Pasimio’s past due loan
obligation with her PNB Mint Account as collateral; and
27. Statement of Account (SOA) — to prove that PNB­Sucat
issued  a SOA for  Pasimio’s  Dollar Hold­Out  Loan,  which
showed an outstanding balance of P4,321,781.06.
 
 
 
 
This SOA was used as basis for the offsetting of Pasimio’s
past   due   loan   obligation   with   her   PNB   Mint   Account   as
collateral.8
RTC’s Decision
  
On October 30, 2009, the RTC rendered judgment 9 in favor of
Pasimio, as plaintiff, disposing:
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   this   court   finds   the
Complaint   dated   May   16,   2005   with   merit,   and   Defendant,
Philippine National Bank is ordered to pay plaintiff, LIGAYA M.
P[A]SIMIO[,]   the   amount   of   x x x   (P3,100,000.00),   x x x
(P1,222,000.00)  and   x x x   (US$5,170),   respectively,   representing
her   peso/dollar   time   deposit   placements   with   said   bank,   with
legal   interest   on   said   amounts,   and   the   amount   of   x x x
(P180,000.00) representing attorney’s fees, and costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The   disposition   is   predicated   on   the   postulate   that   Pasimio
had proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any
loan accommodation from PNB. As a corollary, the trial court held
that there was no evidence  snowing  the release by  PNB of the
loan proceeds to Pasimio. Pushing the point, the RTC stated that
the   transaction   documents   were   highly   questionable   for   the
reasons stated in some detail in its decision to be reproduced by
the CA in its assailed decision.
Therefrom, PNB appealed to the CA, the recourse docketed as
C.A.­G.R. CV No. 94079.
_______________
8   Id., at pp. 446­452.
9   Rollo, pp. 104­120. Penned by Judge Brigido Artemon M.
Luna II.
10  Id., at p. 120.
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CA’s Decision
In   its   assailed   Decision   dated   January   23,   2013,   the   CA
affirmed that the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated   30   October   2009   rendered   by   the   [RTC],   Branch   196,
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 05­0195 is hereby AFFIRMED. 11
Even as it found and declared PNB’s bank personnel grossly
negligent   and   their   transactions   with   Pasimio   highly
unacceptable,12 the   appellate   court   held   that   no   loan   proceeds
were   ever   released   to   Pasimio,   thus   sustaining   the   RTC
appreciation   of   the   evidence   thus   presented   on   the   matter   by
Pasimio.13 The CA wrote:
Hence, We are one with the RTC when it ruled that there was
no   release   of   proceeds   of   bank   loans   to   plaintiff­appellee
[Pasimio], viz.:
No   release   of   proceeds   of   purported   bank   loans   to   plaintiff.
The evidence at hand does not show that any amount of the loans,
if there were any, were ever released by [PNB] to plaintiff.
The [PNB] presented a miscellaneous ticket dated December
7,   2001   for   the   discounted   amount   of   x x x   (US$30,981.28)
attending the release of such funds over the purported third loan
in the amount of x x x (US$31,100.00) extended to plaintiff and as
affecting her FX dollar time deposits. This document remains to
be   a   simple   ticket   advice   and   [would]   not   amount   to   fact   of
payment of loan proceeds in the absence of any cogent and better
evidence
_______________
 11  Id., at p. 23.
12  Id., at pp. 16­17.
13  Id., at p. 15.
 
 
 
 
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which is available to the bank. There is no statement of account
or a corresponding check document presented to compliment such
ticket   advice   to   clearly   show   an   amount   was   debited   from   the
account   of   the   bank   to   ably   pay   off   the   amount   of   the   loan
proceeds. The miscellaneous ticket standing by itself is no[t] an
adequate proof of fact of payment of a loan x x x.
The   [PNB]   presented   a   document   for   Manager   Check   No.
166650   dated   March   21,   2001   at   a   discounted   amount   of   x x x
(P3,049,188.94) to prove the possible release of proceeds of a first
loan   allegedly   secured   by   plaintiff   for   the   amount   of   x x x
(P3,100,000.00). Looking over the dorsal portion of the check, it is
highly unnatural  and irregular that the very check in question
does not have a machine printed validation of the transaction to
reflect the debit entry of the account from which the release of
funds   might   have   been   secured.   With   exception   to   the   stamp
marking and a few signatures at the back of the check, it becomes
highly   inconceivable   for   a   bank   teller   to   forget   a   machine
validation   of   a   check,   not   unless   the   checks   was   not   properly
cleared but was only received by the teller. The check standing
out as evidence docs not proffer that the amount indicated therein
was   properly   released   for   the   purpose,   to   only   draw   a   farce
conclusion that it was properly transacted and funds was indeed
released to plaintiff.
The   [PNB]   presented   a   document   for   Manager   Check   No.
166682   dated   April   2,   2001   in   the   discounted   amount   of   x x x
(P1,679,797.50)   to   prove   the   alleged   release   of   proceeds   of   a
second   loan   allegedly   secured   by   plaintiff   for   the   amount   x x x
85
(P1,700,000.00). Looking over the dorsal portion of the check, the
machine   validation   entry   by   the   teller   reads   of   entry ‘005   502
 281    02AP01   PCOUT 1,672,797.50
 
 
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86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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 A N   14021226’ in comparison with the front portion of the very
check   does   not   tally   with   the   check   no.   ‘166682’   neither   the
checking account from which the amount is drawn at reference
number   ‘00­281­022222­2’   which   makes   it   an  invalid   validation
entry and will not prove the fact that debited amounts were made
from   the   bank   account   number   ‘00­281­022222­2’   [to   cover   the
release to plaintiff of proceeds] of the second loan. There being no
explanation by the very bank employees presented by the bank on
the discrepancy of the teller validation entries with the checking
account used to possible pay off the release of loan proceeds, there
can   be   no   indication   that   the   loan   was   properly   paid   for   to
plaintiff.
 Simply   stated,   there   is   really   no   loan   ever   released   by
defendant bank in favor of plaintiff to engage the operative right
to hold­out on the deposits of the latter.14
 
On  a related  matter,  the CA  found,  as highly  irregular, the
PNB personnel’s act of securing Pasimio’s signature and consent
to have the proceeds of the US$31,100 loan re­lent to Paolo Sun.
It expounded:
Second, it can be gleaned from the facts of the case that [PNB]
was able to obtain the signature and assent of plaintiff­appellee
in relending the loan proceeds to a certain Paolo Sun, in a manner
not in accordance with the ordinary course of business of banks.
According to plaintiff­appellee, Bank Manager Gregorio went to
her house for her to sign a document, telling her that it was the
only way for plaintiff­appellee to get her money back by relending
her money deposits with [PNB] to a certain Paolo Sun whom she
does not know. Plaintiff­appellee also contends that she was not
aware that the document she signed was notarized.
 
 
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For that alone, the action performed by the bank manager in
the   transactions   is   definitely   exposed   to   a   high   incident   of
negligence.   It   bears   stressing   that   banks   must   exercise   the
highest degree of diligence and by doing the transactions outside
the bank without any proper explanation of the consequences of
the  document  to  be  signed  by  plaintiff­appellee  as client  of  the
bank is reprehensible x x x. The bank personnel misrepresented
the   true   nature   of   the   transaction   which   deprived   plaintiff­
appellee to evaluate the consequences of the transaction offered to
her by the bank personnel of [PNB].15
 
And   agreeing   with   the   RTC   on   what   it   viewed   as   the
questionable   nature   of   the  transactions   PNB   entered   into   with
Pasimio,   as   purportedly   evidenced   by   a   combination   of   related
circumstances reflecting documentary tampering, the CA quoted
with approval the ensuing excerpts from the RTC’s decision:
The transaction documents are highly questionable. The loan
application form dated March 21, 2001 over the purported first
peso   loan   in   the   amount   of   x x x   (P3,100,000.00)   which   was
verified with a notary public on April 30, 2001 did not utilize
any residence certificate of plaintiff x x x which also missed
out   for   a   residence   certificate   number   in   the   promissory   note
dated   March   21,   2001,the   same   former   document   carried
bolder typewritten entries for the names of depositors but
faint entries for the amount and the security deposit account
which only shows that such entries were made on different dates
using different typesets compounded by the column side for the
verified   balance   of   deposit   and   the   recommendation   of   interest
were left unfilled. Which circumstances bring in a question
87 on the validity and veracity of the loan documents when in
fact the entries and the missing items thereto [do] not speak well
of a fully accomplished and perfected loan document between the
parties. Sad to say, this court
 
 
88
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
cannot even believe [PNB’s] witness, Edna Palomares in stating
that she checked the entries [in] the loan approval form be lore
she   placed   her   signature   considering   there   are   valuable   and 16  Id., at pp. 19­20.
important   entries   that   are   left   unfulfilled   by   a   bank   officer   as  
herself   to   even   downgrade   her   line   of   credibility   on   the   true  
circumstances to the execution of such document. 89
The   same   circumstances   attend   the   loan   documents   that VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 89
allegedly   covered   the   second   loan   in   the   amount   of   x x x
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
(P1,700,000.00)   and   the   third   loan   in   the   amount   of   x x x
pected of officials and employees of the bank is far greater than
(US$31,100.00),   and   this   court   need   not   discuss   further   to
those   of   ordinary   officers   and   employees   in   the   other   business
emphasize   the   line   of   anomalous   circumstances   attending   the
firms.
execution and existence of such documents.16 (emphasis added)
Unquestionably,   [PNB]   x x x   had   the   direct   obligation   to
 
supervise   very   closely   the   employees   handling   its   depositors’
The   CA   explained   that   even   if   both   parties   may   have   been
accounts, and should always be mindful of the fiduciary nature of
negligent in the conduct of their respective affairs, PNB cannot
its relationship with the depositors. Such relationship required it
evade liability for its shortcomings. As stressed by the appellate
and   its   employees   to   record   accurately every single   transaction,
court,   the   banking   industry   is   impressed   with   public   interest.
and   as   promptly   as   possible,   considering   that   the   depositors’
Accordingly, all banks and their personnel are burdened with a
accounts   should   always   reflect   the   amounts   of   money   the
high level of responsibility and expected to be more careful than
depositors could dispose of as they saw fit x x x. If it fell short of
ordinary   persons.   The   CA   held   that   since   PNB   was   grossly
that   obligation,   it   should   bear   the   responsibility   for   the
negligent, it should bear the consequences:
consequences to the depositor x x x.
Third, although it may be argued that both parties seemed to
In this case, [PNB’s] personnel were in violation of their duties
have been negligent in their own affairs, [PNB] cannot put all the
and responsibilities as its employees. They have committed gross
blame to cover its negligence on plaintiff­appellee. The degree of
negligence in dealing with their bank transactions which connotes
care   is  more   paramount  and  expected  with  that  of   banks   than
“want of care in the performance of one’s duties.” [PNB’s] failure
that of an ordinary person.
to   observe   basic   procedure   constituted   serial   negligence.   The
As the banking industry is impressed with public interest, all
repealed  failure  to  carefully   observe  the duties  of  its  personnel
bank personnel are burdened with a high level of responsibility
clearly showed utter want of care. As gathered from the records of
insofar as care and diligence in the custody and management of
the case, it was shown that this is not an isolated transaction as
funds   are   concerned.   Banks   handle   transactions   involving
other clients of the bank have been likewise victimized. Witness
millions of pesos and properties x x x. Indeed, by the very nature
Virginia Pollard has stated in her testimony before the RTC that
of   their   work,   the   degree   of   responsibility,   care   and
at one point, she too, was a victim of irregular bank transactions
trustworthiness ex­
of   the   same   branch   of   [PNB]   as  offered   by   its  bank   personnel.
_______________
Thus,   it   was   [PNB’s]   action   that   defies   the   ordinary   banking
transactions   and   between   an   ordinary   person   like   plaintiff­
appellee   and   a   bank   like   [PNB],   [PNB]   carries   more   burden,
which unfortunately, it failed to overcome.
Verily, from the foregoing instances, (PNB] was indeed grossly
negligent   in   its   transactions   with   plaintiff­appellee.   Even
assuming that plaintiff­appellee was concocting her version of the
facts,   We   still   find   irregularities   and   inconsistencies   that   have
attributed to the un­
 
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justified refusal to return the investment placement and to the
commission of negligence.17
 
Finally,   the  CA   would   state  the   observation,   citingCitytrust
Banking   Corporation   v.   Cruz18 and Typoco   v.   Commission   on
Elections,19 that   the   errors   PNB   sought   reviewed   relate   to   the
RTC’s factual findings when the appellate court is not a trier of
facts, necessarily implying that it is improper for the CA under
the premises to do what PNB seeks. The CA explained that “the
stated doctrine regarding the factual findings of the RTC applies
within force in the instant case.”20
Issue
 
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
granting Pasimio’s complaint for a sum of money.
 
The Court’s Ruling
 
The   findings   of   Fact   of   the   CA   are   subject   to   well­defined
exceptions,21 among which are when such findings are not
_______________
17  Id., at pp. 20­22.
18  G.R. No. 157049, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 22.
19  G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 391.
20  Rollo, p. 23.
21  Development   Rank   of   the   Philippines   v.   Traders   Royal
Bank, G.R. No. 171982, 18 August 2010, 628 SCRA 404, 413­414.
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the
appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law and findings
of fact of the CA are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the
Court’s function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.
Nevertheless,   in   several   cases,   the   Court   enumerated   the
exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the CA are binding
on   the   Court:   (1)   when   the   findings   are   grounded   entirely   on
speculations,   surmises   or   conjectures;   (2)   when   the   inference
made   is   manifestly   mistaken,   absurd   or   impossible;   (3)   when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court
 
 
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supported   by   substantial   evidence,   grounded   on   surmises   or
conjectures or are patently arbitrary, binding and conclusive and
this   Court   will   not   review   them   on   appeal.   This   case   squarely
falls under the exceptions of the general rule.
The petition is impressed with merit.

The CA has the power
to resolve factual issues
 
Before  proceeding   to  the  main  issue  of   this  case,   there  is  a
need   to   clarify   the   assailed   decision’s   perplexing   but   flawed
pronouncement that the CA, not being a trier of facts, is without
competence   to   review   the   factual   determination   of   the   RTC.
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, categorically states that
the  CA  has, inter  alia,  the  power  to  try  cases,   receive  evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised   in   cases   falling   within   its   original   and   appellate
jurisdiction, thus:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.—The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
x x x x
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform
_______________
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8)
when   the   findings   are   conclusions   without   citation   of   specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by   the   evidence   on   record;   or   (11)   when   the   CA   manifestly
overlooked   certain   relevant   facts   not   disputed   by   the   parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
 
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any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power   to   grant   and   conduct   new   trials   or   further   proceedings.
Trials  or  hearings  in  the  Court   of  Appeals  must  be continuous
and must be completed within three (3) months unless extended
by the Chief Justice.
 
To  be  sure,   the  cases22 the  CA  cited   to  support   its  adverted
pronouncement   are   inapposite.   In   context,   the   issue   involved
in Citytrust and Typoco relates   to   the   nature   and   extent   of   this
Court’s,   and   not   the   CA’s,   power   to   review   factual   findings   of
lower courts and administrative agencies in petitions for review
and   in   original certiorariand   prohibition   cases.
Clearly, Citytrust and Typoco have   been   misread   and
consequently misapplied.
It is also worthy to note that the appellate court’s reliance on
the   factual   findings   of   the   trial   court   is   hinged   on   the   latter’s
firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their
demeanor during the trial. However, when such findings are not
anchored   on   their   credibility   and   their   testimonies,   but   on   the
assessment   of   documents   that   are   available   to   appellate
magistrates   and   subject   to   their   scrutiny,   reliance   on   the   trial
courts factual findings finds no application.23
The   CA’s   regrettable   cavalier   treatment   of   PNB’s   appeal   is
inconsistent   with   Rule   41   of   the   Rules   of   Court   and   with   the
usual course of judicial proceedings. Be reminded that the parties
in   Rule   41   appeal   proceedings   may   raise   questions   of   fact   or
mixed questions of fact and law.24 Thus, in insisting
_______________
22  Citytrust   Banking   Corporation   v.   Cruz, supra note
18; Typoco v. Commission on Elections, supra note 19.
23  Jimenez   v.   Commission   on   Ecumenical   Mission   and
Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA, G.R. No.
140472, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 326, 334.
24  Macawiwili   Gold   Mining   and   Development   Co.,   Inc.   v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA
602.
 
 
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that it is not a trier of facts and implying that it had no choice but
to   adopt   the   RTC’s   factual   findings,   the   CA   shirked   from   its
function   as   an   appellate   court   to   independently   evaluate   the
merits   of   this   case.   To   accept   the   CA’s   aberrant   stance   is   to
trivialize its review function, but, perhaps worse, render useless
one of the reasons for its institution.
 
Pasimio failed to prove her claim  94
by preponderance of evidence
 
It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who
asserts a right and the quantum of evidence required by law in
civil   cases   is   preponderance   of   evidence.   “Preponderance   of
evidence”   is   the   weight,   credit,   and   value   of   the   aggregate
evidence   on   either   side   and   is   usually   considered   to   be
synonymous   with   the   term   “greater   weight   of   evidence”   or
“greater weight of credible evidence.” 25 Section 1, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Preponderance   of   evidence,   how   determined.—In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his  case by  a  preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on
the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances   of   the   case,   the   witnesses’   manner   of   testifying,
their   intelligence,   their   means   and   opportunity   of   knowing   the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their   interest   or   want   of   interest,   and   also   their   personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial.   The   court   may   also   consider   the   number   of   witnesses,
93 though   the   preponderance   is   not   necessarily   with   the   greater
number.
_______________
25  Ogawa   v.   Menigishi, G.R.   No.   193089,   July   9,   2012,   676
SCRA 14, 22.
 
 
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
Just as settled is the rule that the plaintiff in civil cases must
rely   on   strength   of   his   or   her   own   evidence   and   not   upon   the
weakness   of   that   of   the   defendant.   In   the   case   at   bench,   this
means that on Pasimio rests the burden of proof and the onus to
produce the required quantum of evidence to support her cause/s
of action.26
 With   the   view   we   take   of   the   case,   Pasimio   has   failed   to
discharge this burden.
There can be no quibbling that Pasimio had, during the time
material, opened and maintained deposit accounts with PNB. For
this purpose, she submitted two passbooks and one certificate of
time deposit to establish her peso and dollar placements with the
bank. However, PNB also succeeded in substantiating its defense
for refusing to release Pasimio’s funds by presenting documents
showing   that   her   accounts   were,   pursuant   to   hold­out
arrangement, made collaterals for the loans she obtained from the
bank   and   were   eventually   used   to   pay   her   outstanding   loan
obligations. Unfortunately, Pasimio failed to trump PNB’s defense
after the burden of evidence shifted back to her.
To recall, PNB, to bolster its case, presented these documents:
loan application forms, PNs and disclosure statements to prove
that Pasimio obtained the disputed bank loans; manager’s checks
and   a   miscellaneous   ticket   to   establish   the   release   of   the   loan
proceeds to Pasimio; passbooks and a certificate of time deposit
with   the   stamp   “HOLD­OUT”   to   indicate   restrictions   on   the
withthrawal of Pasimio’s deposit; a bills payment form to prove
that   Pasimio’s   deposits   were   made   to   pay   for   her   outstanding
obligations   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   Pasimio’s
promissory notes; and a signed and notarized affidavit recounting
that she lent the proceeds of her dollar loan to Paolo Sun.
_______________
26  Vitarich Corporation v. Losin, G.R. No. 181560, November
15, 2010, 634 SCRA 671, 680.
 
 
95
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
On   the   witness   stand,   PNB’s   witness   Edna   Palomares,   the
bank’s Per Pro Officer, categorically testified having prepared and
processed all of Pasimio’s loan documents, and witnessed Pasimio
and   her   husband   signing   the   same. 27 Palomares   also   testified
about Pasimio’s receipt of the proceeds of the subject loans and
identified the signatures appearing on the dorsal portion of the
PNB manager’s checks and miscellaneous ticket covering the loan
processed as genuine signatures of Pasimio.28
Pasimio, on the other hand, denied applying for any loan with
PNB and receiving any loan proceeds or authorizing the bank to
use her deposit as collateral. While admitting to signing certain
papers, she professed unawareness that what she signed were in
fact loan documents as nobody came forward to explain what they
were, adding that she was convinced to sign them only because
she was made to believe by bank officers that the documents were
related to a new PNB high­yielding investment product.
Unfortunately, the courts a quo chose to disregard all of PNB’s
documentary evidence and ruled in favor of Pasimio. This to us is
a blatant mistake on the part of the RTC and the CA because all
that Pasimio put  forward against PNB’s evidence,  for  the most
part documentary, were unsubstantiated denials and bare, self­
serving   assertions.   To   borrow   from Pecson   v.   Commission   on
Elections,29 citingAlmeida v. Court of Appeals,30 the use of wrong
or irrelevant considerations, reliance on clearly erroneous factual
findings or giving too much weight to one factor in deciding an
issue  is  sufficient  to  taint a  decision­maker’s  action  with  grave
abuse of discretion.
As   between   Pasimio’s   barefaced   denials   and   Palomares’
positive assertions, the trial court ought to have accorded
_______________
95 27  TSN, September 9, 2008, pp. 11­31.
 28  TSN, March 27, 2007, pp. 14, 30­31, 19­22 and 23­25; TSN, A: That’s right.
May 22, 2007, pp. 31­32, 39­40, and 43­44. Q: Why is this so, Madam Witness?
29  G.R. No. 182865, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 634, 649. A: Because I trusted the bank, I trusted the employees of the
30  G.R. No. 159124, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 681. bank   having   been   a   depositor   for   the   past   two   (2)
  decades.
  _______________
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 31  Manalo   v.   Roldan­Confesor,   G.R.   No.   102358,   November
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio 19, 1992, 215 SCRA 808, 821.
greater   weight   to   Palomares’   testimony,   especially   considering 32  TSN, March 27, 2007, pp. 6­7, 18­19, 22­23; TSN, May 22,
that   Pasimio   never   put   in   issue   the   due   execution   and 2007, pp. 28, 30, 38, and 42.
authenticity   of   the   loan   documents.   As   between   a   positive   and 33  Id., at pp. 14, 30­31, 19­22 and 23­25; id., at pp. 31­32, 39­
categorical testimony which has a truth, on one hand, and a bare 40 and 43­44.
denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 31  
It   cannot   be   stressed   enough   that   Pasimio   unequivocally  
admitted   that   the   signatures   appearing   in   the   Loan 97
Application/Approval Forms dated March 21, 2001, April 2, 2001 VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 97
and December 7, 2001,32 in all three Promissory Notes, 33 and the Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
Disclosure Statement dated December 7, 2001 were hers and her Q: But you know, Madam Witness, the consequences of your
husband’s. She also was aware of the consequences of her act of acts in signing pro forma documents?
signing. Her testimonies on the matter are quoted hereunder:
A: Well, I trusted those people. So...
Q:   But   you   know   the   consequences   of   signing   blank
Atty. Banzuela:
documents?
Q: Thank you. Madam Witness, you testified that you signed
A: Yes.34
these documents which are blank in its details, what do
 
you mean by blank in details.
Pasimio had tagged as forgeries her signatures appearing in
A: Nothing. Blank as in it’s a pro forma form but blank. the Disclosure Statements of March 21, 2001 and April 2, 2001.
Q:   Madam   Witness,   but   you   read   what   these   documents She,   however,   never   presented   any   competent   proof   to
were? successfully  support  her contention.  While  testimonies of hand­
A: No, I did not read. writing experts are not a must to prove forgeries, Pasimio did not
Q: You entrusted to PNB that huge amount of US$31,100, submit any evidence for the RTC to consider and readily conclude
P1,700,000   and   US$3,100   without   going   through   the that the signatures in these Disclosure Statements were forged.
documents that you were signing with PNB?
 Likewise,   Pasimio   also   denied,   having   appeared   before   a
notary public to subscribe and swear to the loan documents, but
never substantiated this allegation. It is settled that a notarial
document,   guaranteed   by   public   attestation   in   accordance   with
the law, must be sustained in full force and effect, absent strong,
complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaw or defect provided by law.35
The   RTC   and   the   CA,   for   unexplained   reason,   ignored
Pasimio’s admissions in her April 10, 2003 Affidavit in which she
stated   that   she   re­lent   the   proceeds   of   the   US$31,100   loan   to
Paolo Sun. A portion of this affidavit reads:
2. I   agreed   to   lend   the   amount   of   Dollars:   Thirty­One
Thousand One Hundred Only ($31,100.00) to PAOLO SUN,
payable   on   an   agreed   maturity   date   and   at   an   agreed
interest rate out of a Loan Against Deposit Holdout that I
will secure from PNB using my time deposits as collateral.
_______________
34  TSN, May 22, 2007, pp. 48­49.
35  Sierra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90270, July 24, 1992,
211 SCRA 785, 793; citing Chilianchin v. Coquinco, 84 Phil. 714
(1949).
 
 
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
3. PAOLO SUN and I agreed that should I lend him the
proceeds of my Loan Against Deposit Hold­out from PNB,
he   would   pay   all   the  bank   charges   and   interest   on   such
PNB loan, which he agreed to do so by authorizing PNB to
debit his deposit account for such amount equivalent to the
charges/interest due on my loan.
4. PNB approved my loan application, and so, after I have
lent   the   loan   proceeds   to   PAOLO   SUN,   the   latter   has
dutifully and promptly paid all bank charges and interest
under the aforesaid arrangement.36
 
Again,   Pasimio   did   not   deny   the   due   execution   of   this
affidavit. Rather, she lamely insisted she was only forced to sign
this affidavit upon Gregorio’s representations that this was the
only way that she would recover her investments. Pasimio denied
knowing Paolo Sun and having loan arrangements with him. She
would   stick   to   her   story   that   she   signed   the   document   under
duress, needing, as she did at that time, money to support a dying
spouse. Gregorio also allegedly divulged that she needed Pasimio
to sign the Affidavit as she (Gregorio) was already being audited
and investigated by the PNB Main office.
As   between   Pasimio’s   empty   assertions   about   the   above
affidavit and its contents and the categorical statements in the
notarized   affidavit   detailing   her   arrangement   with   PNB   and
Paolo Sun, the choice as to which is more credible should be clear
and simple.  In fact,  Pasimio ought to  have been estopped  from
denying the contents of that affidavit.
Verily,   Pasimio’s  version  of  the  case  taxes  credulity.  By  her
own testimonial account, she is a holder of a BS Commerce degree
and   used   to   work   as   a   personnel   director   of   an   advertising
agency.37 It   is,   therefore,   not   believable   that   a   person   of   her
educational attainment and stature, who appeared to be of good
physical and mental health, would simply hand over
_______________
36  Rollo, p. 214.
37  TSN, March 27, 2007, pp. 4­5.
  
 
99
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
millions of  pesos,  no mean amount by  ordinary standards, to  a
bank   and   then   blindly   sign   documents   involving   her   money
without   exercising   a   modicum   of   care   by   verifying,   or   at   least
taking a cursory look at what these documents mean. And yet,
the courts a quo chose to close their eyes to these absurdities.
Lest it be overlooked, Pasimio’s husband Rene also affixed his
signature   on  the  subject  promissory   notes  and  loan  application
forms to signify his consent to his wife’s financial dealings. There
is   no   allegation,   let   alone   proof,   that   Rene   did   not   likewise
understand what he was signing and giving his consent to. These
loan   documents   have,   on   their   face,   the   words   “Peso   Loans
Against   Peso/FX   Deposit   Loan   Application/Approval   Form,”
“Promissory   Note   and   Hold­out   on   Peso/FX   Savings
Deposit/Peso/FX   Time   Deposit   and   Assignment   of   Deposit
Substitute,”   and   “Disclosure   Statements   of   Loan/Credit
Transaction”   printed   in   big   letters.   Thus,   it   is   reasonable   to
assume  that,   at first  glance,   Pasimio and  husband Rene  would
have been put on notice of what these documents were. What they
signed were pro forma bank documents, printed in full but with
blanks   to   be   filled   up   with   specific   terms   thereof   such   as   loan
amount, interest rate, and security, among others. They were not,
in fine, empty white sheets of paper. It may be that Pasimio was
indeed made to sign the blank spaces of the loan documents. Be
that as it may, it is well­nigh impossible that she had absolutely
no idea what they actually were, she having testified being a PNB
depositor   for   some   twenty   years.   Indeed,   the   Court   is   hard­
pressed to believe that she has not encountered these documents
before, just as it is also hard to imagine that her husband did not
notice the titles of these documents and had no clue what they
were.
99 Pasimio  would   parlay   the   idea   that  she   signed   certain  loan
documents and the April 10, 2003 affidavit under duress or undue
influence.   Like   her   other   unsubstantiated   assertions,   her
allegations of improper influence, duress or fraud prac­
 
 
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
tised on her by bank officers deserve scant consideration. Undue
influence is described under the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1337. There   is   undue   influence   when   a   person
takes   improper   advantage   of   his   power   over   the   will   of
another,   depriving   the   latter   of   a   reasonable   freedom   of
choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the
confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between
the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been
unduly influenced was suffering from menial weakness, or
was ignorant or in financial distress.
 
As regards fraud, the Civil Code says:
Art. 1338. There   is   fraud   when,   through   insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the
other   is   induced   to   enter   into   a   contract   which   without
them, he would not have agreed to.
Art. 1344. In   order   that  fraud   may   make   a   contract
voidable,   it   should   be   serious   and   should   not   have   been
employed by both contracting parties.
 
 The   employment   of   fraud,   duress,   or   undue   influence   is   a
serious charge, and to be sustained it must be supported by clear
and   convincing   proof;   it   cannot   be   presumed. 38There   is   no
allegation   or   evidence   that   Gregorio   and   Miranda   influenced
Pasimio by employing means she could not well resist, and which
controlled her volition and induced her to sign the loan documents
and the April 10, 2003 Affidavit, which otherwise she would not
have executed. Also, there was no evidence showing that Gregorio
and   Miranda’s   influence   interfered   with   Pasimio’s   exercise   of
independent discretion necessary to determine the advantage or
disadvantage of signing these documents.
_______________
38  Sierra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35.
 
101
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
Then, too, Pasimio failed to prove that Gregorio and Miranda
defrauded her. Taking into consideration the personal conditions
of Pasimio, there is no clear and convincing evidence establishing
serious fraud or deceit, insidious words or machinations on the
part of PNB or its officers, sufficient to impress or lead her into
error.39
It is germane to observe at this juncture that PNB has, in its
favor,   certain   presumptions   which   Pasimio   failed   to   overturn.
Rule 131, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court specifies that a disputable
presumption is satisfactory if uncontradicted and not overcome by
other evidence. Corollary thereto, paragraphs (r) and (s) thereof
read:
SEC. 3. Disputable   presumptions.—The   following
presumptions   are   satisfactory   if  uncontradicted,   but  may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x x
(r) That there was sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That   a   negotiable   instrument   was   given   or   indorsed
for a sufficient consideration.
 
and Sec. 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law reads:
SEC. 24. Presumption   of   consideration.—Every
negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been
issued   for   a   valuable   consideration;   and   every   person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party
thereto for value.
Pasimio   also   failed   to   overcome   the   presumptions   that   a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns,40 that private
101 _______________
39  Id.
40  Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3, par. (d).
 
 
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
transactions have been fair and regular, 41 and that the ordinary
course of business has been followed.42
Certainly,   the  trial  court  erred  in  saying   that  Pasimio  “had
proved by convincing evidence that she had not secured any loan
accommodations   from   the   defendant   bank   x x x   and,   thus,   is
entitled for the return of said deposit x x x” and that “[t]he factum
probans to   sustain   parties   cause   has   been   successfully   hurdled
and  undertaken   by   plaintiff,   in  contradistinction  to  defendant’s
mere   denial   of   a   transport   obligation,   the   latter   failing   to
overcome the quantum of evidence presented by plaintiff to tilt
the scale of justice in favor of plaintiff herein.” 43 In truth, other
than   her   self­serving   statements,   Pasimio   had   nothing   else   to
show   against   PNB’s   evidence.   The   greater   weight   of   credible
evidence as to whether Pasimio secured from PNB loans covered
by promissory notes with hold­out provisions is decidedly in favor
of petitioner bank.
To be sure, the RTC did not explain its reasons for coming up
with   these   conclusions   and   did   not   even   bother   to   discuss   its
evaluation   of   the   merits   of   Pasimio’s   evidence.   The   Court   also
notes   that   the   trial   court   never   even   declared   that,   indeed,
Pasimio   and   her   husband   were   fooled   into   signing   the   loan
documents   and   made   to   believe   that   the   loan   documents   were
related to a high­yielding PNB product.
Hence, it may be said that the trial court violated in a sense
the   constitutional   caveat   enjoining   courts   from   rendering   a
decision   “without   expressing   therein   clearly   and   distinctly   the
facts and the law on which it is based.” The RTC had failed to
discharge its duty to inform parties to litigation on how the case
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court.
_______________
41  Id., Rule 131, Sec. 3, par. (p).
42  Id., Rule 131, Sec. 3, par. (q).
43  Rollo, pp. 119­120.
 
 
103
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 103
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
 
The dismissal of PNB’s peti­
tion is based on mere specu­
lations and surmises
 
In   denying   Pasimio’s   appeal,   the   CA   adopted   verbatim   the
trial court’s findings that there was no evidence proving Pasimio’s
receipt  of  the  loan  proceeds   and   that  the  loan  documents   were
highly questionable. The appellate court also reasoned that since
PNB was grossly negligent in transacting with Pasimio, the bank
should suffer the consequences.
In   upholding   the   RTC’s   finding   respecting   Pasimio’s   never
having received any loan proceeds, the CA doubtless disregarded
the rule holding that a promissory note is the best evidence of the
transaction embodied therein; also, to prove the existence of the
loan, there is no need to submit a separate receipt to prove that
the  borrower  received the  loan  proceeds. 44 Indeed,   a  promissory
note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal
commitment   to   repay   it   on   the   date   and   under   the   conditions
agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has been held, a
person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a
legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the signature
he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his
promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of
this Court and deserves instead its sharp repudiation.45
The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt
of the loan, which is stated in a clear and unequivocal manner in
a   public   instrument,   is   not   sufficient   to   assail   its   validity.   To
overthrow the recitals of such instrument, convincing and more
than merely preponderant evidence is necessary. A contrary rule
would throw wide open doors to
_______________
44  Ycong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153758, February 22,
2006, 483 SCRA 72, 78.
45  Sierra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35 at p. 795.
 
 
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
fraud.46 Following   this   doctrine,   Pasimio’s   notarized   promissory
notes   bearing   her   signature   and   that   of   her   husband   must   be
upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of
their nullity.
The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio’s signature, speak for
themselves.   To   repeat,   Pasimio   has   not   questioned   the
genuineness   and   due   execution   of   the   notes.   By   signing   the
promissory   notes,   she   is   deemed   to   acknowledge   receipt   of   the
corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot plausibly set up
the defense that she did not apply for any loan, and receive the
value of the notes or any consideration therefor in order to escape
her liabilities under these promissory notes.47
But   the   foregoing   is   not   all.   PNB   presented   evidence   that
strengthened   its   allegation   on   the   existence   of   the   loan.   Here,
each   promissory   note   was   supported   by   a   corresponding   loan
application   form   and   disclosure   statement,   all   of   which   carried
Pasimio’s signatures. Isolated from each other, these documents
might   not   prove   the   existence   of   the   loan,   but   when   taken
together, collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary
steps to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their terms
and conditions.
Further,  this Court does not  agree  that the  loan documents
were   “highly   questionable.”   The   trial   court   arrived   at   this
conclusion upon observing that the March 21, 2001, April 2, 2001,
and   December   7,   2001   loan   application   forms   and   promissory
notes   did  not  bear   Pasimio’s  community   tax   certificate  number
and because it appeared that the blanks for the specific terms of
these loan documents were filled up on different dates considering
that   some   typewritten   entries   appeared   to   be   bolder   or   darker
than the others.
These reasons are specious as they are flimsy.
_______________
46  Id., at p. 793.
47  See Co v. Admiral United Savings Bank, G.R. No. 154740,
April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 472.
 
 
105
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 105
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
First, the authenticity of these loan documents should not be
affected merely because their blank spaces appeared to have been
filled up, if that be the case, on different dates, using different
typewriters. As PNB aptly puts it, there is nothing suspicious or
inherently wrong about  bank  forms being filled  up  on different
dates   since   these   are   usually
pretyped, with the blanks thereon to be filled up subsequently,
depending on the specific terms of the transaction with a client,
and thereafter presented to the latter for signing.
 Second,   the   absence   of   Pasimio’s   community   tax   certificate
number in: said loan documents neither vitiates the transaction
nor invalidates the document. If at all, such absence renders the
notarization of the loan documents defective. Under the notarial
rules   at   that   time, i.e.,   Sec.   163(a)   of   Republic   Act   No.   7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, where an
individual   subject   to   the   community   tax   acknowledges   any
document   before   a   notary   public,   it   shall   be   the   duty   of   the
administering   officer   to   require   such   individual   to   exhibit   the
community tax certificate. The defective notarization of the loan
documents   only   means   that   these   documents   would   not   be
carrying the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its   due   execution;   that   they   should   be   treated   as   a   private
document   to   be   examined   in   appropriate   cases   under   the
parameters   of   Sec.   20,   Rule   132   of   the   Rules   of   Court   which
provides that “before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting   of   the   maker   x x x.”   Settled   is   the   rule   that   a
defective   notarization   will   strip   the   document   of   its   public
character   and   reduce   it   to   a   private   instrument,   and   the
evidentiary   standard   of   its   validity   shall   be   based   on
preponderance of evidence.48
_______________
48  Heirs   of   Victorino   Sarili   v.   Lagrosa, G.R.   No.   193517,
January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 726, 736­737.
 
 
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  adverted  defective  notarization
should not have been made an issue at all in the first place, for
Pasimio already admitted executing the documents in question, or
to  put  it  in  another way,   she did  not deny   that  the  signatures
appearing   thereon   were   hers   and   her   husband’s.   Thus,   the
requirements of Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court have been
sufficiently met and all doubts as to their authenticity and due
execution should have been put to rest.
More   importantly,   the   records   do   not   show   that   Pasimio
alleged the regoing defects and presented any proof for the trial
court to consider and rule on.
Furthermore,   the   Court   does   not   find   sufficient   evidence   to
support the CA’s finding that PNB is guilty of gross negligence
and, thus, must suffer the consequences of its transactions with
Pasimio.   In   this   regard,   the   CA   explained   that   PNB   foiled   to
exercise the highest degree of diligence required of banks because
allegedly,   Gregorio   was   able   to   obtain   Pasimio’s   signature   and
assent   to   relend   the   dollar   loan   proceeds   to   Paolo   Sun   in
a manner not in accordance with the ordinary course of business
of   banks. Also,   the   appellate   court   found   PNB   reprehensible
for doing   transactions   outside   the   bank   without   any   proper
explanation   of   the   consequences   of   the   document   to   be   signed
by [Pasimio]   and   because   the bank   personnelmisrepresented   the
true nature of the transaction.49
There   is   no   sufficient   evidence   to   support   the   foregoing.   It
must   be   stressed   that   these   were   solely   drawn   from   Pasimio’s
testimony   that   Gregorio   went   to   her   house   for   her   to   sign   the
April 10, 2003 Affidavit and that the latter told her that the only
way   she   could   get   her   money   back   was   to   relend   her   money
deposits to Paolo Sun. Other than Pasimio’s story, the CA had no
other evidence to bolster these findings.
_______________
49  Rollo, p. 19.
 
 
107
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
Further,   the   CA’s   conclusions   that   PNB’s   personnel   werein
violation of their duties and responsibilities as its employees; that
they committed   gross   negligence   in   dealing   with   their   bank
transactions; and that the bank repeatedly failed to observe basic
procedures thus, was guilty of serial negligence, are not supported
by sufficient evidence.
It  was   wrong   for   the  CA  to  make   the   foregoing   conclusions
merely   because   another   bank   client,   Virginia   Pollard   (Pollard),
testified to being a victim of irregular bank transactions of PNB
Sucat.   Even   if   Pollard   were   telling   the   truth,   her   testimony
should not have been considered proof that what she underwent
is what actually transpired between Pasimio and PNB. Res inter
alios   acta.Acts   and   declarations   of   persons   strangers   to   a   suit
should, as a rule, be irrelevant as evidence. Pollard’s transaction
with PNB is entirely different and totally unrelated to Pasimio’s
dealings with the bank.
What may be true in the case of Pollard may not hold true for
Pasimio. It was quite erroneous for the appellate court to declare
PNB grossly negligent in its transactions with Pasimio when the
only   evidence   it   had   discussed   on   the   matter   was   Pollard’s
testimony. It may be true that the PNB was grossly negligent in
dealing with Pollard, but this does not automatically mean that
PNB was grossly negligent toward Pasimio as well. Hence, the CA
had no basis in saying that “[e]ven assuming that [Pasimio] was
concocting her version of the facts, [it] still find[s] irregularities
and inconsistencies that have attributed to the unjustified refusal
to   return   the   investment   placement   and   to   the   commission   of
negligence.”
Much   is   attempted   to   be   made   by   the Memorandum   on
107 Irregular Lending Operation on Loans v. Deposit Hold­Out (Sucat
Branch) dated   February   18,   2003.   The   memorandum   does   not
pertain   to   Pasimio   or   her   accounts   and   transactions   with   the
bank,   albeit   it   discusses   Garcia   and   Miranda’s   sham   dealings
with  other  bank  clients.   Hence,   the  memorandum  is  really   not
determinative of the critical question of whether or
 
108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
not Pasimio sought and eventually secured loan accommodations
from PNB.
Here, the RTC and the CA focused on finding trivial flaws and
weaknesses in PNB’s evidence and totally disregarded the bank’s
most telling proof, foremost of which are the notarized notes. Had
the   courts a   quo looked   at   and   considered   the   totality   of   the
bank’s evidence, then it would have realized how preposterous the
story that Pasimio spun was, a story featuring, at bottom, a well­
educated,   accomplished   woman   signing   several   pieces   of   bank
documents involving millions of pesos, without knowing, nay even
reading, what she is signing.
Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered
as   containing   all   such   terms,   and,   therefore,   there   can   be,
between the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence
of   the   terms   of   the   agreement   other   than   the   contents   of   the
writing.50
 
Under   this   rule,   parol   evidence   or   oral   evidence   cannot   be
given to contradict, change or vary a written document, except if a
party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of
a  written  agreement  and  puts  in  issue  in  his  pleadings:   (a)  an
intrinsic   ambiguity,   mistake,   or   imperfection   in   the   written
agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the
written agreement; and (d) the existence of other terms agreed to
by the parties or their successors­in­interest after the execution of
the written agreement.51
Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of
such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agree­
_______________
50  Norton Resources and Development Corporation v. All Asia
Bank   Corporation, G.R.   No.   162523,   November   25,   2009,   605
SCRA 370, 380.
51  Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 9.
 
 
109
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 109
Philippine National Bank vs. Pasimio
ment.52 Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the
documents embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be
upheld.
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   petition
isGRANTED. The   assailed   Decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals
dated   January   23,   2013   in   C.A.­G.R.   CV   No.   94079
isREVERSED and SET   ASIDE.   Respondent   Ligaya   M.
Pasimio’s   complaint   in   Civil   Case   No.   CV­05­0195   before   the
Regional   Trial   Court   of   Parañaque   City,   Branch   196
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Perez** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Under the Parol Evidence Rule, when the terms of an
agreement   have   been   reduced   to   writing,   it   is   considered   as
containing   all   the   terms   agreed   upon   and   there   can   be,   as
between the parties and their successors­in­interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
(Duvaz Corporation vs. Export and Industry Bank, 523 SCRA 405
[2007])
A disputable presumption is satisfactory if uncontradicted and
not   overcome   by   other   evidence.   (Siain   Enterprises,   Inc.   vs.
Cupertino Realty Corp., 590 SCRA 435 [2009])
 
 
——o0o——
_______________
52  Sierra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35 at p. 790.
**   Designated   acting   member   per   Special   Order   No.   2084
dated June 29, 2015.
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
692  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003.*
HEIRS   OF   LOURDES   SAEZ   SABANPAN:   BERNARDO   S.
SABANPAN,   RENE   S.   SABANPAN,   DANILO   S.   SABANPAN
and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA
SAEZ   TAPIZ,   MA.   VICTORIA   SAEZ   LAPITAN,   MA.   BELEN
SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ
GUTIERREZ:   ROY   SAEZ   GUTIERREZ   and   LUIS   SAEZ,   JR.,
petitioners, vs. ALBERTO   C.   COMORPOSA,   HERDIN   C.
COMORPOSA,   OFELIA   C.   ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS
COMORPOSA,   VIRGILIO   A.   LARIEGO,2 BELINDA   M.
COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.
Public   Land   Act; Jurisdiction; Homestead   Patent; Courts
have   no   jurisdiction   to   intrude   upon   matters   properly   falling
within   the   powers   of   the   Lands   Management   Bureau   (LMB).—
Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition
of public land is under the primary control of the director of lands
(now   the   director   of   the   Lands   Management   Bureau   or   LMB),
subject to review by the DENR secretary. As a rule, then, courts
have   no   jurisdiction   to   intrude   upon   matters   properly   falling
within the powers of the LMB. The powers given to the LMB and
the   DENR   to   alienate   and   dispose   of   public   land   does   not,
however,   divest   regular   courts   of   jurisdiction   over   possessory
actions   instituted   by   occupants   or   applicants   to   protect   their
respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine
who has actual physical possession or occupation of public land
and who has the better right of possession over it remains with
the courts. But once the DENR has decided, particularly through
the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate
of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail.
Evidence; Documentary   Evidence; Facsimiles; Pleadings
filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies.—Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered
originals   and   are   at   best   exact   copies.   As   such,   they   are   not
admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether
they are genuine or authentic.
Same; Offer   of   Evidence; Exception; Neither   the   rules   of
procedure   nor   jurisprudence   would   sanction   the   admission   of
evidence   that   has   not   been   formally   offered   during   the   trial.—
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction
the admission of evidence that has not been 
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
1
 Also spelled “Ariega” in the pleadings.
2
 Also spelled “Lariega” in the pleadings.
693
VOL. 408, AUGUST 12, 2003  693 
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule
on summary procedure—cases in which no full­blown trial is held.
Same; Admissibility; Probative   Value; Distinction; The
admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
value.—The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with
its   probative   value.   Admissibility   refers   to   the   question   of
whether   certain   pieces   of   evidence   are   to   be   considered   at   all,
while   probative   value   refers   to   the   question   of   whether   the
admitted   evidence   proves   an   issue.   Thus,   a   particular   item   of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends
on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
of evidence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution  ASIDE the  Decision  of the  Municipal   Trial   Court  of  Sta.  Cruz,
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Cariaga Law Offices for petitioners.
     William G. Carpentero for respondents.
PANGANIBAN,  J.:
The   admissibility   of   evidence   should   be   distinguished   from   its
probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does
not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the August 7, 2001 Decision and the
February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) in CA­
GR SP No. 60645. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   all   the   foregoing,   the   Court   hereby
AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22 June 2000 rendered by Branch
18   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Digos,   Davao   del   Sur,
REVERSING and SETTING 
_______________
3
 Rollo, pp. 11­37.
4
 Eighth   Division.   Written   by   Justice   Perlita   J.   Tria   Tirona
and   concurred   in   by   Justices   Eugenio   S.   Labitoria   (Division
chairman) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (member).
694
694  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  petitioners’ tolerance.
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
Davao del Su[r].”5
The   assailed   Resolution6 denied   petitioners’   Motion   for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The   CA   summarized   the   factual   antecedents   of   the   case   as
follows:
“A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
[petitioners] against [respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao
del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
“The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and
actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta.
Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died
leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
“In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of
Oboza   was   terminated   from   his   job.   The   termination   of   his
employment  caused  a   problem  in  relocating   his  house.   Being   a
close   family   friend   of   [Marcos]   Saez,   Francisco   Comorposa
approached   the   late   Marcos   Saez’s   son,   [Adolfo]   Saez,   the
husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and
for   humanitarian   consideration,   Adolfo   allowed   Francisco
Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut
was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the
land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by
several   people,   among   them,   Gloria   Leano   and   Noel   Oboza.
Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez’ property
without paying any rental.
“Francisco   Comorposa   left   for   Hawaii,   U.S.A.   He   was
succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did
not   pay   any   rental   and   are   occupying   the   premises   through
“On   7   May   1998,   a   formal   demand   was   made   upon   the
respondents   to   vacate   the   premises   but   the   latter   refused   to
vacate   the   same   and   claimed   that   they   [were]   the   legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises.
A [C]omplaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,]
Davao   del   Sur,   but   the   parties   failed   to   arrive   at   an   amicable
settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was
issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer
was filed by petitioners against respondents.
_______________
5
 Assailed Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 49.
6
 Rollo, p. 52.
695
VOL. 408, AUGUST 12, 2003  695
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
“Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of
the [C]omplaint and alleged that they entered and occupied the
premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants,
possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to
the   present   time;   that   they   have   acquired   just   and   valid
ownership   and   possession   of   the   premises   by   ordinary   or
extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the
DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the
land   in   question   when   it   ruled   that   they   [were]   the   rightful
claimants   and   possessors   and   [were],   therefore,   entitled   to   the
issuance of a title.
“The   Municipal   Trial   Court   of   Sta.   Cruz,   Davao   del   Sur
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial
Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside
the said decision. x x x”7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC),   the   CA   upheld   the
right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The appellate
court held that—although not yet final—the Order issued by the
regional executive director of the Department of Environment and
Natural   Resources   (DENR)   remained   in   full   force   and   effect,
unless   declared   null   and   void.   The   CA   added   that   the
Certification issued by the DENR’s community environment and
natural   resources   (CENR)   officer   was   proof   that   when   the
cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and
was not yet allocated to any person.
According   to   the   CA,   respondents   had   the   better   right   to
possess   alienable   and   disposable   land   of   the   public   domain,
because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open,
notorious,   exclusive,   continuous   and   uninterrupted   possession
thereof  since   1960.   The  appellate  court   deemed   as  self­serving,
and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Hence, this Petition.8
_______________
7
 Assailed Decision, pp. 2­3; Rollo, pp. 45­46.
8
 This case was deemed submitted for decision on January 15,
2003,   upon   the   Court’s   receipt   of   respondents’   Memorandum,
signed   by   Atty.   William   G.   Carpentero.   Petitioners’
Memorandum,   filed   on   January   10,   2003,   was   signed   by   Atty.
Oswaldo A. Macadangdang.
696
696  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for
the Court’s consideration:
“I
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in
sustaining the ruling of the Regional Trial Court giving credence
to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional executive
director?
“II
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err
in sustaining the Regional Trial Court’s ruling giving weight to
the CENR Officer’s Certification, which only bears the facsimile of
the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it
is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?
“III
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err
in   holding   that   the   land   subject   matter   of   this   case   has   been
acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?
“IV
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err
in   declaring   that,   ‘neither   is   there   error   on   the   part   of   the
Regional   Trial   Court,   when   it   did   not   give   importance   to   the
affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran
for allegedly being self serving?”9
To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall
be discussed in reverse sequence.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.  patent and
_______________
 Petitioners’   Memorandum,   p.   8;   Rollo,   p.   283.   Original   in
9
upper case.
697
VOL. 408, AUGUST 12, 2003  697 
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
First   Issue: 
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998
Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon  the April 2,
1998   Order   issued   by   the   regional   director   of   the   DENR   was
erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the
claim of respondents, was supposedly not yet final and executory.
Another Order dated August 23, 1999, 10 issued later by the DENR
regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of the
earlier one.
Under   the   Public   Land   Act,11 the   management   and   the
disposition   of   public   land   is   under   the   primary   control   of   the
director   of   lands12 (now   the   director   of   the   Lands   Management
Bureau or LMB),13 subject to review by the DENR secretary. 14 As
a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters
properly falling within the powers of the LMB.
The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and
dispose of public land does not, however, divest regular courts of
jurisdiction   over   possessory   actions   instituted   by   occupants   or
applicants   to   protect   their   respective   possessions   and
occupations.15 The   power   to   determine   who   has   actual   physical
possession or  occupation of public land and who  has the better
right of possession over it remains with the courts. 16 But once the
DENR has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead
 
_______________
10
 Annex I; Rollo, pp. 91­92.
 11
 Commonwealth Act 141 as amended.
12
 §4 of CA 141 as amended.
13
 The  LMB  absorbed  the  functions   of  the  Bureau  of  Lands,
which  was  abolished   by   Executive  Order  No.   131,   except   those
line functions that were transmitted to the regional field offices.
14
 §3 of CA 141 as amended.
15
 Omandam v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 483, January 18,
2001; Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 267, June
19, 1991; Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 138 Phil. 347; 28 SCRA 331, May 26,
1969; Molina   v.   Bacud, 126   Phil.   166; 19   SCRA   956,   April   27,
1967; Bohayang   v.   Maceren, 96   Phil.   390,   December   29,
1954; Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, September 17, 1952.
16
 Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, citing National
Development   Company   v.   Hervilla, 151   SCRA   520,   June   30,
1987; Espejo v. Malate, 205 Phil. 216; 120 SCRA 269, January 27,
1983.
698
698  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  mechanical
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
the issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these points
will normally prevail.17
Therefore,   while  the issue   as  to  who  among   the  parties  are
entitled to a piece of public land remains pending with the DENR,
the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a
matter that may be addressed to the courts.
Second   Issue:  20
CENR Officer’s Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22,
1997   is   a   sham   document,   because   the  signature   of   the   CENR
officer   is   a   mere   facsimile.   In   support   of   their   argument,   they
cite Garvida v. Sales, Jr. 18 and argue that the Certification is a
new   matter   being   raised   by   respondents   for   the   first   time   on
appeal.
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
“A   facsimile   or   fax   transmission   is   a   process   involving   the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning   an   original   copy,   one   elemental   area   at   a   time,   and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount
of electric current. x x x”19
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals
and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible
in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are
genuine or authentic.20
The   Certification,   on   the   other   hand,   is   being   contested   for
bearing   a   facsimile   of   the   signature   of   CENR   Officer   Jose   F.
Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which
is   alluded   to   in Garvida. The   one   mentioned   here   refers   to   a
facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
 
_______________
17
 Omandam v. Court of Appeals, supra.
18
 338 Phil. 484; 271 SCRA 767, April 18, 1997.
19
 Id.,   p.   496,   per   Puno, J.,   citing   Webster’s Third   New
International Dictionary (1976), p. 813.
 Ibid.
699
VOL. 408, AUGUST 12, 2003  699 
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business
transactions.21
 Note   that   the   CENR   officer   has   not   disclaimed   the
Certification.   In   fact,   the   DENR   regional   director   has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2,
1998:
“x   x   x.   CENR  Officer  Jose  F.   Tagorda,   in  a   ‘CERTIFICATION’
dated 22 July 1997, certified among others, that: x x x per records
available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not
allocated to any person x x x.”22
If  the  Certification  were   a   sham  as  petitioner  claims,   then  the
regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order.
Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR
officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the
former’s direct control and supervision.
Petitioners’ claim that the Certification was raised for the first
time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at
the   Municipal   Trial   Court   (MTC),   the   CENR   Certification   had
already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the
Pre­trial   Order.23 The   Certification   was   not   formally   offered,
however,   because   respondents   had   not   been   able   to   file   their
position paper.
Neither   the   rules   of   procedure24 nor   jurisprudence25would
sanction   the   admission   of   evidence   that   has   not   been   formally
offered   during   the  trial.   But   this  evidentiary   rule   is  applicable
only   to   ordinary   trials,   not   to   cases   covered   by   the   rule   on
summary procedure—cases in which no full­blown trial is held. 26
_______________
21
 “Facsimile   signature,” Webster’s   Third   New   International
Dictionary(1976), p. 813.
22
 Rollo, p. 104.
23
 Id., p. 121.
24
 §34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
25
 People v. Carino, 165 SCRA 664, September 26, 1988; Veran
v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 438, January 29, 1988.
26
 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA
633,   August   18,   1997; De   los   Reyes   v.   Intermediate   Appellate
Court, 176 SCRA 394, August 11, 1989.
700
700  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa
Third   Issue: 
Affidavit of Petitioners’ Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits
of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure
authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of
respondents   to   file   their   position   paper   and   counter­affidavits
before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether
certain   pieces   of   evidence   are   to   be   considered   at   all,   while
probative  value  refers  to  the  question  of  whether  the  admitted
evidence   proves   an   issue.27 Thus,   a   particular   item   of   evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation   within   the   guidelines   provided   by   the   rules   of
evidence.28
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses’ respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party
to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly
proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of
action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief. 29
Fourth   Issue:  G.R. No. 193531. December 6, 2011.*
Defense of Prescription
Petitioners   claim   that   the   court a   quo erred   in   upholding   the
defense of prescription proffered by respondents. It is the former’s
contention   that   since   the   latter’s   possession   of   the   land   was
merely   being   tolerated,   there   was   no   basis   for   the   claim   of
prescription. We disagree.
For   the   Court   to   uphold   the   contention   of   petitioners,   they
have   first   to   prove   that   the   possession   of   respondents   was   by
mere   tolerance.   The   only   pieces   of   evidence   submitted   by   the
former to support their claim were a technical description and a
vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22,
1936.30 Both of these were discredited by the CENR Certification,
which indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated
to any person when the survey was conducted. 31 The testimony of
petitioners’   witnesses   alone   cannot   prevail   over   respondents’
continued  and  uninterrupted  possession  of  the  subject  lot  for  a
considerable length of time.
Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45.32
WHEREFORE,   the   Petition   is   DENIED   and   the   assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (Chairman), Sandoval­Gutierrez, Corona and Carpi
o­Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Note.—The   burden   of   proof   in   land   registration   cases   is
incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real
and   absolute   owner   in   fee   simple   of   the   land   applied   for.
(Turquesa vs. Valera, 322 SCRA 573 [2000])
——o0o——
ELLERY   MARCH   G.   TORRES,   petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT   and   GAMING   CORPORATION,   represented   by
ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., respondent.
Civil   Procedure;   Pleadings   and   Practice;   Motion   for
Reconsideration; A motion for reconsideration may either be filed
by mail or personal delivery; Movant has 15 days from receipt of
the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal therefrom.—A motion for reconsideration may either be
filed   by   mail   or   personal   delivery.   When   a   motion   for
reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed
on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall
be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case
of   personal   delivery,   the   motion   is   deemed   filed   on   the   date
stamped   thereon   by   the   proper   office.   And   the   movant   has   15
days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Same; Same; Same; The mode used by petitioner in filing his
reconsideration   is   not   sanctioned   by   the   Uniform   Rules   on
Administrative   Cases   in   the   Civil   Service.—Even
assuming arguendo that   petitioner   indeed   submitted   a   letter
reconsideration   which   he   claims   was   sent   through   a   facsimile
transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration
is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service. As we stated
_______________
* EN BANC.
622
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
22
 Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in
two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; Electronic Commerce Act;
A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading; It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.—In Garvida
v.   Sales,   Jr.,   271   SCRA   767   (1997),   we   found   inadmissible   in
evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled
that:   x x x x x x   A   facsimile   is   not   a   genuine   and   authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of
an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining
on   its   face   whether   the   facsimile   pleading   is   genuine   and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel.
It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
Same;   Same;   Same;   A   facsimile   transmission   is   not
considered   as   an   electronic   evidence   under   the   Electronic
Commerce   Act;   The   terms   “electronic   data   message”   and
 “electronic document” as defined under the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.—A facsimile
transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the
Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation
v. Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408 (2007), We determined
the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are
“electronic  data  messages” or  “electronic documents”  within the
context   of   the   Electronic   Commerce   Act,   and   We   said:   We,
therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data message” and
“electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, do not include afacsimile transmission. Accordingly, a
facsimile   transmission   cannot   be   considered   as electronic
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under
the   Best   Evidence   Rule   and   is   not   admissible   as electronic
evidence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
  The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Jackson Visda Yabut for petitioner.
   Roderick   R.   Consolacion,   Arnold   Ferdinand   C.
Salvosa and Marianito V. Sagsagat for private respondent.
623
VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011 623
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner Ellery March G. Torres seeks to annul and set aside
the Decision1 dated April 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA­G.R.   SP   No.   110302,   which   dismissed   his   petition   seeking
reversal   of   the   Resolutions   dated   June   23,   2008 2 and   July   28,
20093 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Also assailed is the
CA Resolution4dated July 30, 2010 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS)
of   respondent   Philippine   Amusement   and   Gaming   Corporation
(PAGCOR).   On   the   basis   of   an   alleged   intelligence   report   of
padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines
at   PAGCOR­Hyatt   Manila,   then   Casino   Filipino­Hyatt   (CF
Hyatt),   which   involved   the   slot   machine   and   internal   security
personnel   of   respondent   PAGCOR,   and  in  connivance  with  slot
machine   customers,   respondent   PAGCOR’s   Corporate
Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to
verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme
of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the
first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit
before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with
an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the
amount of either P50,000.00 or P35,000.00.5 Based on the CIU’s
investigation  of   all   the  CMR  receipts  and   slot  machine  jackpot
slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March
2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were
responsible   for   such   CMR   padding,   which   included   herein
petitioner.6
_______________
1 Penned   by   Presiding   Justice   Andres   B.   Reyes,   Jr.,   with
Associate   Justices   Japar   B.   Dimaampao   and   Stephen   C.   Cruz,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 33­44.
2 Penned   by   Commissioner   Mary   Ann   Z.   Fernandez­
Mendoza; id., at pp. 62­73.
3 Id., at pp. 75­83.
4 Penned   by   Presiding   Justice   Andres   B.   Reyes,   Jr.,   with
Associate   Justices   Japar   B.   Dimaampao   and   Stephen   C.   Cruz,
concurring; id., at pp. 129­131.
5 CA Rollo, p. 84.
6 Id., at pp. 85­86.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
On   May   4,   2007,   the   CIU   served   petitioner   with   a
Memorandum   of   Charges7 for   dishonesty,   serious   misconduct,
fraud   and   violation   of   office   rules   and   regulations   which   were
considered   grave   offenses   where   the   penalty   imposable   is
dismissal. The summary description of the charges stated:
“Sometime   between   November   2006   and   March   2007,   you
facilitated   and   actively   participated   in   the   fraudulent   scheme
with respect to irregular manipulation of Credit Meter Reading
(CMR)   which,   in   turn,   led   to   the   misappropriation   of   money
earmarked   for   the   slot   machine   jackpot   at   CF   Hyatt   Manila.
These anomalous transactions were consummated through your
direct participation and active cooperation of your co­employees
and   customers.   With   malice   afterthought,   you   embezzled   and
stole   monies   from   PAGCOR,   thereby   resulting   in   substantial
losses to the proprietary interest of PAGCOR.”8
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges 9signed by
Rogelio   Y.   Bangsil,   Jr.,   Senior   Branch   Manager,   CF   Hyatt
Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of
dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner
was then required to explain in writing within seventy­two (72)
hours  from   receipt  thereof   why   he  should  not  be sanctioned   or
dismissed.   Petitioner   was   placed   under   preventive   suspension
effective immediately until further orders.
On   May   7,   2007,   petitioner   wrote   Manager   Bangsil   a   letter
explanation/refutation10 of   the   charges   against   him.   He   denied
any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation
of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked
for a formal investigation of the accusations against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter 11 dated August
2,   2007   from   Atty.   Lizette   F.   Mortel,   Managing   Head   of
PAGCOR’s
_______________
7  Rollo, p. 91.
8  Id.
9  Id., at p. 92.
10 Id., at pp. 93­94.
11 Id., at p. 95.
625
VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011 625
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him
from the service. The letter reads in part, to wit:
 “Please be informed that the Board of Directors, in its meeting _______________
on   July   31,   2007,   approved   the   recommendation   of   the 12 Id.
Adjudication Committee to dismiss you from the service effective 13 Id., at pp. 84­90.
upon approval due to the following offense: 626
Dishonesty, gross misconduct, serious violations of office rules
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
company and loss of trust and confidence, committed as follows:
and   manner   provided   by   the   Uniform   Rules   on   Administrative
For actively and directly participating in a scheme to defraud the
Cases in the Civil Service Law.
company in conspiracy with co­employees and SM customers by
 On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner’s complaint as
padding   slot   machine   Credit   Meter   Reading   (CMR)   receipts   in
an appeal from the PAGCOR’s decision dismissing petitioner from
favor of co­conspirator customers who had said (sic) CMR receipts
the   service,   issued   Resolution   No.   081204   denying   petitioner’s
paid   at   the   teller’s   booth   on   numerous   occasions   which   caused
appeal. The dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
substantial losses to the proprietary interests of PAGCOR.”12
“WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Ellery March G. Torres
On   September   14,   2007,   petitioner   filed   with   the   CSC   a
is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the decision contained in a letter
Complaint13 against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino
dated   August   2,   2007   of   Lizette   F.   Mortel,   Managing   Head,
for   illegal   dismissal,   non­payment   of   backwages   and   other
Human   Resource   and   Development   Department   (HRDD),
benefits. The complaint alleged among others: (1) that he denied
PAGCOR,   finding   him   guilty   of   Dishonesty,   Gross   Misconduct,
all   the   charges   against   him;   (2)   that   he   did   ask   for   a   formal
Serious   Violation   of   Office   Rules   and   Regulations,   Conduct
investigation of the accusations against him and for PAGCOR to
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Loss of Trust
produce   evidence   and   proofs   to   substantiate   the   charges,   but
and Confidence and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal
respondent PAGCOR did not call for any formal administrative
from the service, is hereby AFFIRMED. The penalty of dismissal
hearing;   (3)   that   he   tried   to   persuade   respondent   PAGCOR   to
carries with it the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated
benefits, cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from
August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of the
reemployment   in   the   government   service,   and   bar   from   taking
Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; and
future Civil Service Examination.”14
(4)   that   no   resolution   was   issued   on   his   letter   reconsideration,
In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was
thus,   the   filing   of   the   complaint.   Petitioner   claimed   that   as   a
whether   petitioner’s   appeal   had   already   prescribed   which   the
result   of   his   unlawful,   unjustified   and   illegal
former answered in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to
termination/dismissal, he was compelled to hire the services of a
petitioner’s   claim   that   he   sent   a   facsimile   transmission   of   his
counsel in order to protect his rights.
letter   reconsideration   within   the   period   prescribed   by   the
Respondent   PAGCOR   filed   its   Comment   wherein   it   alleged,
Uniform Rules  on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It
among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within
found   PAGCOR’s   denial   of   having   received   petitioner’s   letter
the period
more credible as it was supported by certifications issued by its
employees.   It   found   that   a   verification   of   one   of   the   telephone
numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration
disclosed   that   such   number   did   not   belong   to   the   PAGCOR’s
Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have
mentioned  about  the alleged facsimile  transmission  at  the  first
instance   when   he   filed   his   complaint   and   not   only   when
respondent   PAGCOR   raised   the   issue   of   prescription   in   its
Comment.
Petitioner’s motion for a reconsideration was denied in CSC
Resolution No. 09­1105 dated July 28, 2009.
_______________
14 Id., at p. 73.
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VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the twin resolutions
issued by the CSC.
On   April   22,   2010,   the   CA   issued   its   assailed   decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed
to   adduce   clear   and   convincing   evidence   that   he   had   filed   a
motion   for   reconsideration.   It   found   insufficient   to   merit
consideration   petitioner’s   claim   that   he   had   sent   through   a
facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated August 13,
2007 addressed to PAGCOR’s Chairman, members of the Board of
Directors   and   the   Merit   Systems   Protection   Board;   that
assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was indeed sent
through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is
inadmissible   as   electronic   evidence   under   the   Electronic
Commerce   Act   of   2000;   and   that  a   review   of   the  CSC   assailed
resolution revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner
claimed to be the recipient of the faxed document sent was not
that   of   PAGCOR’s   Office   of   Board   of   Directors.   The   CA   found
baseless   and   conjectural   petitioner’s   claim   that   PAGCOR   can
easily  deny  having  received the letter  by  giving  orders to their
employees to execute an affidavit of denial under pain and threat
of administrative sanction or termination from service.
The  CA   then  concluded   that  PAGCOR’s   decision  which  was
contained in a letter dated August 4, 2007 dismissing petitioner
from the service had already attained finality since there was no
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the manner and
within the period provided for under the Revised Uniform Rules
on the Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Petitioner’s   motion   for   reconsideration   was   denied   in   a
627 Resolution dated July 30, 2010.
Hence,   this   petition   where   petitioner   states   the   errors
committed by the CA in this wise:
“The first issue that should be resolved is:
1. Whether   or   not   the   Court   of   Appeals   erred   when   it
affirmed the dismissal of petitioner based merely on technicality
without considering the
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628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
allegations   on   summary   and   arbitrary   dismissal   based   on
fabricated and unfounded accusations.
Next to be raised were the issues propounded in petitioner’s
Memorandum dated 29 January 2010 but were not tackled upon
by the Court of Appeals, thus:
A. Whether   or   not   the   Civil   Service   Commission   erred   in
ruling that  there was  no valid letter/motion for reconsideration
submitted to reconsider petitioner’s dismissal from the service;
 B. Whether   or   not   the   Civil   Service   Commission   erred   in
giving   more   weight   to   PAGCOR’s   denial   of   having   received
petitioner’s letter of reconsideration;
C. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in not
acting/resolving   the Ex­Parte Motion   to   Issue Subpoena Duces
Tecum;
D.    Whether   or   not   the   Civil   Service   Commission  erred   in
ruling that petitioner’s failure to send his letter reconsideration
through mail or by personal service as set forth in the Rules of
Court, he forfeited his right to appeal; and
E. Whether   or   not   the   Civil   Service   Commission   erred   in
favoring   PAGCOR’s   dismissal   of   petitioner   from   employment
based on hearsay, imaginary and non­existent evidence.” 15
The   threshold   issue   for   resolution   is   whether   the   CA   erred
when it affirmed the CSC’s dismissal of the appeal for being filed
beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of
his dismissal16 on August 13, 2007, which was within the 15­day
period   for   filing   the   same;   and   that   he   did   so   by   means   of   a
facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR’s Office of the Board
of   Directors.   He   claims   that   the   sending   of   documents   thru
electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned
under   Republic   Act   No.   8792,   the   Electronic   Commerce   Act   of
2000.   Petitioner   further   contends   that   since   his   letter
reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his
complaint before the CSC.
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 10­11.
16 Id., at pp. 96­100.
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VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
We are not persuaded.
Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which are applicable to
this case, respectively provide, to wit:
“Section 37. Finality   of   Decisions.—A   decision   rendered   by
heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more
than thirty days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30)
days’ salary is imposed, shall be final and executory. However, if
the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty days, or fine
in   an   amount   exceeding   thirty   days’   salary,   the   same   shall   be
final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for
filing   a   motion   for   reconsideration   or   an   appeal   and   no   such
pleading has been filed.
Section 38. Filing of motion for reconsideration.—The party
adversely   affected   by   the   decision   may   file   a   motion   for
reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the
same within fifteen days from receipt thereof.
Section 39. When   deemed   filed.—A   motion   for
reconsideration  sent  by   mail  shall   be  deemed  filed  on  the  date
shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached
to the records of the case and in case of personal delivery, the date
stamped thereon by the proper office.
Section 43. Filing   of   Appeals.—Decisions   of   heads   of
departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days
suspension   or   fine   in   an   amount   exceeding   thirty   (30)   days’
salary, maybe appealed to the Commission Proper within a period
of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.”
Clearly,  a  motion  for  reconsideration  may   either  be  filed  by
mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was
629 sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by
the   postmark   on   the   envelope   which   shall   be   attached   to   the
records   of   the   case.   On   the   other   hand,   in   case   of   personal
delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon
by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of
the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on
August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have
been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before
August  19,  2007.   However,  records do  not  show  that  petitioner
had filed his
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630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non­
receipt of petitioner’s  letter reconsideration was duly supported
by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even   assuming arguendo that   petitioner   indeed   submitted   a
letter   reconsideration   which   he   claims   was   sent   through   a
facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the
period   to   appeal.   The   mode   used   by   petitioner   in   filing   his
reconsideration   is   not   sanctioned   by   the   Uniform   Rules   on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier,
the   motion   for   reconsideration   may   be   filed   only   in   two   ways,
either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,17 we found inadmissible in evidence
the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
“A   facsimile   or   fax   transmission   is   a   process   involving   the
transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning   an   original   copy,   one   elemental   area   at   a   time,   and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount
of   electric  current.   The  current  is  transmitted   as  a   signal   over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the
receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper
position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a
stylus   or   other   device   that  produces   a   printed   record   on   paper
referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at
best,   an   exact   copy   preserving   all   the   marks   of   an   original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham pleading. x x x”18
Moreover,   a   facsimile   transmission   is   not   considered   as   an
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC
Industrial   Sales   Corporation   v.   Ssangyong   Corporation,19 We
determined   the   question   of   whether   the   original   facsimile
transmissions   are   “electronic   data   messages”   or   “electronic
documents” within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act,
and We said:
_______________
17 G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 767.
18 Id., at p. 779. (Citations omitted.)
19 G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408.
631
VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011 631
Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
“We,   therefore,   conclude   that the   terms   “electronic   data
message”   and   “electronic   document,”   as   defined   under   the
Electronic   Commerce   Act   of   2000,   do   not   include a facsimile
transmission.   Accordingly,   a   facsimile   transmission   cannot   be
considered   as electronic   evidence.   It   is   not   the   functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.” (Italics ours.)20
 We, therefore, found no reversible error committed by the CA
when   it   affirmed   the   CSC   in   dismissing   petitioner’s   appeal.
Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint against PAGCOR and
its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non­payment of backwages and
other   benefits   on   September   14,   2007.   The   CSC   treated   the
complaint   as   an   appeal   from   the   PAGCOR’s   dismissal   of
petitioner. Under Section 43 which we earlier quoted, petitioner
had   15   days   from   receipt   of   the   letter   of   dismissal   to   file   his
appeal. However, at the time petitioner filed his complaint with
the   CSC,   which   was   considered   as   petitioner’s   appeal,   41   days
had   already   elapsed   from   the   time   he   received   his   letter   of
dismissal on August 4, 2007; hence, the CSC correctly found that
it   has   no   jurisdiction   to   entertain   the   appeal   since   petitioner’s
dismissal   had   already   attained   finality.   Petitioner’s   dismissal
from the service became final and executory after he failed to file
his   motion   for   reconsideration   or   appeal   in   the   manner   and
within the period provided for under the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Peña   v.   Government   Service   and   Insurance   System,21We
said:
“Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right   nor   a   part   of   due   process,   except   where   it   is   granted   by
statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is a
right of statutory and not of constitutional origin. The perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure
of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is
more   important  that  a  case  be  settled  than  it  be  settled   right.
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final
_______________
20 Id., at p. 455.
21 G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383.
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Torres vs. Philippines Amusement and Gaming Corporation
and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case.”22
WHEREFORE, the  petition is DENIED.  The  Decision  dated
April   22,   2010   and   the   Resolution   dated   July   30,   2010   of   the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona   (C.J.),   Carpio,   Leonardo­De   Castro,   Brion,
Bersamin,   Del   Castillo,   Abad,   Villarama,   Jr.,   Perez,   Mendoza,
Sereno, Reyes and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, does not make the internet a
medium for  publishing  laws,  rules and regulations.  (Garcillano
vs.   The   House   of   Representatives   Committees   on   Public
Information,   Public   Order   and   Safety,   National   Defense   and
Security,   Information   and   Communications   Technology,   and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, 575 SCRA 170 [2008]).
——o0o—— 
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 396­397. (Italics supplied.)
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 182835.  April 20, 2010.*
RUSTAN   ANG y PASCUA,   petitioner, vs.   THE   HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, respondents.
Criminal   Law;   Violence   against   Women;   Republic   Act   No.
9262;   Section   3(a)   of   R.A.   9262   provides   that   violence   against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship that include
any   form   of   harassment   that   causes   substantial   emotional   or
psychological   distress   to   a   woman.—Section   3(a)   of   R.A.   9262
provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a
person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or
dating   relationship.   Thus: “SEC. 3. Definition   of   Terms.—As
used   in   this   Act,   (a)   “Violence   against   women   and   their
children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual   or   dating   relationship,   or   with   whom   he   has   a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate,   within   or   without   the   family   abode,   which
result   in   or   is   likely   to   result   in   physical,   sexual,
psychological   harm   or   suffering,   or   economic   abuse
including threats of such  acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment   or   arbitrary   deprivation   of   liberty.   x   x   x
x Section   5   identifies   the   act   or   acts   that   constitute   violence
against  women and these  include any  form of harassment that
causes   substantial   emotional   or   psychological   distress   to   a
woman. Thus: “SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and
Their Children.—The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:   x   x   x   x   h.   Engaging   in   purposeful,   knowing,   or
reckless   conduct,   personally   or   through   another,   that
alarms   or   causes   substantial   emotional   or   psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts: x x x x 5. Engaging in
any form of harassment or violence.”
Same;   Same;   Same;   Elements   of   the   Crime   of   Violence
against Women.—The elements of  the crime  of violence  against
women   through   harassment   are:   1.   The   offender   has   or   had   a
sexual or
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
583
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010 583
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
dating   relationship   with   the   offended   woman;   2.   The
offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series
of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Words   and   Phrases;   “Dating
Relationship,”   Defined;   A   “dating   relationship”   includes   a
situation   where   the   parties   are   romantically   involved   over   time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.—
Section   3(e)   provides   that   a   “dating   relationship”   includes   a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
Thus: (e)   “Dating   relationship”   refers   to   a   situation
wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time
and   on   a   continuing   basis   during   the   course   of   the
relationship.   A   casual   acquaintance   or   ordinary
socialization   between   two   individuals   in   a   business   or
social context is not a dating relationship.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   “Sexual   Relations,”   Defined;
Sexual relations refers to a single sexual act which may or may
not result in the bearing of a common child.—R.A. 9262 provides
in Section 3 that “violence against women x x x refers to any act
or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x
with   whom   the   person   has   or   had
a sexual or dating relationship.”   Clearly,   the   law   itself
distinguishes   a   sexual   relationship   from   a   dating   relationship.
Indeed,   Section   3(e)   above   defines   “dating   relationship”   while
Section   3(f)   defines   “sexual   relations.”   The   latter   “refers   to   a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.” The dating relationship that the law contemplates
can,   therefore,   exist   even   without   a   sexual   intercourse   taking
place between those involved.
Same; Same; Same; Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes “any
act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against women—this
means   that   a   single   act   of   harassment,   which   translates   into
violence,   would   be   enough.—Section  3(a)   of   R.A.   9262   punishes
“any   act   or   series   of   acts”   that   constitutes   violence   against
women.   This   means   that   a   single   act   of   harassment,   which
translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is
to protect women  and  children.   Punishing only  violence  that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.594
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
94
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
Evidence;   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   (A.M.   01­7­01­SC);
The   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   applies   only   to   civil   actions,
quasi­judicial   proceedings,   and   administrative   proceedings.—
Rustan  claims that the  obscene picture sent to Irish  through a
text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should
be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M.
01­7­01­SC).  But, firstly, Rustan  is  raising this objection  to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit “A”, for the first time
before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected  to  the  admission  of  the  picture  on  such  ground  at  the
time   it   was   offered   in   evidence.   He   should   be   deemed   to   have
already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he
cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic   Evidence   applies   only   to   civil   actions,   quasi­judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
    Padilla,   Padolina,   Padilla,   Ignacio   &   Associates   Law
Offices for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
ABAD, J.:
This   case   concerns   a   claim   of   commission   of   the   crime   of
violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner­accused Rustan Ang
(Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
of   violation   of   the   Anti­Violence   Against   Women   and   Their
Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that
reads:595
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
“That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of
Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and
reckless   conduct,   sent   through   the   Short   Messaging
Service   (SMS)   using   his   mobile   phone,   a   pornographic
picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend,
whereby   the   face   of   the   latter   was   attached   to   a
completely   naked   body   of   another   woman   making   it   to
appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the
said   obscene   and   pornographic   picture   thereby   causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and
humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.”1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish
Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan
University   in   Aurora   Province.   Rustan   courted   Irish   and   they
became “on­and­off” sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live­in partner
(now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with
him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish
and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not
love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal
and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman
and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.
Rustan   used   two   cellphone   numbers   for   sending   his   messages,
namely, 0920­4769301 and 0921­8084768. Irish replied to his text
messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
595 In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman
with spread legs and with Irish’s face superim­
_______________
1 Docketed as Criminal Case 3493.
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
posed on the figure (Exhibit “A”). 2 The sender’s cellphone number,
stated   in   the   message,   was   0921­8084768,   one   of   the   numbers
that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her
face   from   a   shot   he   took   when   they   were   in   Baguio   in   2003
(Exhibit “B”).3
After   she   got   the   obscene   picture,   Irish   got   other   text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him
to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened
to  spread   the  picture  he   sent  through  the  internet.   One  of  the
messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand,
read: “Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede
ring send sa lahat ng chatter.”4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who
referred   her   to   the   police.   Under   police   supervision,   Irish
contacted   Rustan   through   the   cellphone   numbers   he   used   in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to
meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora,
and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked
towards   Irish   but   the   waiting   police   officers   intercepted   and
arrested him. They  searched  him and seized his Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: “Malandi ka
kasi!”
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and
computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one
to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on
the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be
manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that
the face and the body belonged to just one person.
_______________
2 Records, p. 69.
3 Id., at p. 70.
4 Exhibit “D” and sub­markings, id., at pp. 72­76.
597
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
Gonzales   testified  that  the  picture  in  question  (Exhibit  “A”)
had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to
the   body   and   the   face   had   a   lighter   color.   In   his   opinion,   the
picture   was   fake   and   the   face   on   it   had   been   copied   from   the
picture of Irish in Exhibit “B”. Finally, Gonzales explained how
this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a
cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began
visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted
until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation
ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004
but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his
wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking
him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in
selling  her  cellphone.  When  he  arrived  at the  place,   two  police
officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of
his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because
Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending
her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that
he   got   back   obscene   messages   from   the   prankster,   which   he
forwarded   to   Irish   from   his   cellphone.   This   explained,   he   said,
why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his
cellphone  number.   Rustan claims  that  it  was  Irish  herself  who
sent the obscene picture (Exhibit “A”) to him. He presented six
pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits “2” to
“7”).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was
sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received
597 the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit “8”)
_______________
 5 Id., at pp. 156­159.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did
not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the
pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as
in Exhibit “A”. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits “2”, “4”,
“5”   and   “6”   could   not   be   seen.   Irish   denied   that   she   was   the
woman  in  those   four   pictures.   As   for   Exhibits   “3”   and   “7”,   the
woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After   trial,   the   RTC   found   Irish’s   testimony   completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC
observed   that   she   wept   while   recounting   her   experience,
prompting   the   court   to   comment:   “Her   tears   were   tangible
expression   of   pain   and   anguish   for   the   acts   of   violence   she
suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the
victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her
charges   with   the   verity   borne   out   of   human   nature   and
experience.”6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC
found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter
rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8affirming the RTC
decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The   principal   issue   in   this   case   is   whether   or   not   accused
Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face
pasted   on   the   body   of   a   nude   woman,   inflicting   anguish,
psychological   distress,   and   humiliation   on   her   in   violation   of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 38.
7 Docketed as CA­G.R. CR 30567.
8   Penned by then Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(now   a   member   of   this   Court),   and   concurred   in   by   Associate
Justices Arcangelita Romilla­Lontok and Romeo F. Barza.
599
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010 599
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether   or   not   a   “dating   relationship”   existed   between
Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether   or   not   a   single   act   of   harassment,   like   the
sending   of   the   nude   picture   in   this   case,   already   constitutes   a
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was
obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he
has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
 “SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, 
(a) “Violence   against   women   and   their   children”
refers   to   any   act   or   a   series   of   acts   committed   by   any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against   a   woman with   whom   the   person   has   or   had   a
sexual   or   dating   relationship,   or   with   whom   he   has   a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate,   within   or   without   the   family   abode,   which
result   in   or   is   likely   to   result   in   physical,   sexual,
psychological   harm   or   suffering,   or   economic   abuse
including threats of such  acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.  includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved
x x x x”
Section   5   identifies   the   act   or   acts   that   constitute   violence
against  women and these  include any  form of harassment that
causes   substantial   emotional   or   psychological   distress   to   a
woman. Thus:600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
“SEC. 5. Acts   of   Violence   Against   Women   and   Their
Children.—The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:  601
x x x x
h. Engaging   in   purposeful,   knowing,   or   reckless
conduct,   personally   or   through   another,   that   alarms   or
causes  substantial  emotional or psychological distress to
the   woman   or   her   child.   This   shall   include,   but   not   be
limited to, the following acts: 
x x x x
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence”;
The   above   provisions,   taken   together,   indicate   that   the
elements   of   the   crime   of   violence   against   women   through
harassment are:
1. The   offender   has   or   had   a   sexual   or   dating
relationship with the offended woman;
2. The   offender,   by   himself   or   through   another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and
3. The   harassment   alarms   or   causes   substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.
One.   The   parties   to   this   case   agree   that   the   prosecution
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a “dating relationship”
with   Irish.   Section   3(e)   provides   that   a   “dating   relationship”
over   time   and   on   a   continuing   basis   during   the   course   of   the
relationship. Thus:
“(e) “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein
the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual   acquaintance   or   ordinary   socialization   between
two   individuals   in   a   business   or   social   context   is   not   a
dating relationship.” (Underscoring supplied.)
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010 601
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
Here,   Rustan   claims   that,   being   “romantically   involved,”
implies  that  the offender and the  offended  woman have or  had
sexual   relations.   According   to   him,   “romance”   implies   a   sexual
act.   He  cites  Webster’s  Comprehensive Dictionary   Encyclopedia
Edition  which provides a colloquial  or informal meaning  to  the
word “romance” used as a verb, i.e., “to make love; to make love
to” as in “He romanced her.”
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb “romance” that implies a sexual act. It did not say
that   the   offender   must   have   “romanced”   the   offended   woman.
Rather,   it   used   the   noun   “romance”   to   describe   a   couple’s
relationship, i.e., “a love affair.”9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against women
x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against   a   woman   x   x   x   with   whom   the   person   has   or   had
a sexual or dating relationship.”   Clearly,   the   law   itself
distinguishes   a   sexual   relationship   from   a   dating   relationship.
Indeed,   Section   3(e)   above   defines   “dating   relationship”   while
Section   3(f)   defines   “sexual   relations.”   The   latter   “refers   to   a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.” The dating relationship that the law contemplates
can,   therefore,   exist   even   without   a   sexual   intercourse   taking
place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish
and   him   was   of   the   “on­and­off”   variety   (away­bati),   their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed “over time and
on  a   continuing   basis.”  But  the  two  of  them  were  romantically
involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of
2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
mutual trust and love.
An “away­bati” or a fight­and­kiss thing between two lovers is
a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed
_______________
9 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Third Edition, p.
1164.
602
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what
“away­bati” meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could
not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That
was   all.   Indeed,   she   characterized   their   three­month   romantic
relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive
picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims
that   such   would   unduly   ruin   him   personally   and   set   a   very
dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes “any
act   or   series   of   acts”   that   constitutes   violence   against   women.
This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence,   would   be   enough.   The   object   of   the   law   is   to   protect
women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly
committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to
obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly
have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional
or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged
obscene   pictures   with   Irish   such   that   she   was   already
desensitized by them.
But, firstly,   the   RTC   which   saw   and   heard   Rustan   and   his
wife  give their  testimonies   was  not  impressed  with  their  claim
that   it   was   Irish   who   sent   the   obscene   pictures   of   herself
(Exhibits  “2­7”).  It is  doubtful if the woman in the picture was
Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other
pictures   that   Irish   sent,   except   Exhibits   “2”   to   “7”.   But   her
testimony did  not make sense.  She said  that she did not know
that Exhibits “2” to “7” had remained saved after she deleted the
pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
delete   them.11 And,   if   she   thought   that  she   had   deleted   all   the
pictures from the memory card, then she had
_______________
10 TSN, April 11, 2006, pp. 22­24.
11 TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 10­12.
603
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010 603
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would
have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures
remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want
to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in
not giving credence to her testimony.
Secondly,   the   Court   cannot   measure   the   trauma   that   Irish
experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral
sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances   of   each   case.   Here,   the   naked   woman   on   the
picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face,
was   clearly   an   obscene   picture   and,   to   Irish   a   revolting   and
offensive  one.   Surely,   any   woman   like  Irish,   who   is   not  in  the
pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that,
as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it
in   the   internet   for   all   to   see.   That   must   have   given   her   a
nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain
items were seized  from  him without any  warrant,  the evidence
presented  against  him  should  be  deemed  inadmissible.  But  the
fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the
cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him
at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items
to   prove   its   case.   Exhibit   “C”   for   the   prosecution   was   but   a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was
used,  which  cellphone Rustan admitted owning  during  the  pre­
trial conference.
Actually,   though,   the   bulk   of   the   evidence   against   him
consisted   in   Irish’s   testimony   that   she   received   the   obscene
picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone
numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously
in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan, Irish  and the  police  used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
604
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
did.  Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the
12
confiscated cellphone and SIM  cards  to  prove that Rustan sent
those messages.
Moreover,   Rustan   admitted   having   sent   the   malicious   text
messages   to   Irish.13 His   defense   was   that   he   himself   received
those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing
Irish   and   he   merely   forwarded   the   same   to   her,   using   his
cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of
the   unidentified   person   who   sent   the   messages   to   him   to
authenticate  the  same.   The  RTC  did  not  give  credence  to  such
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely
for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help
her identify the sender.
Four.   Rustan   claims   that   the   obscene   picture   sent   to   Irish
through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus,
it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided   under   Section   1,   Rule   5   of   the   Rules   on   Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01­7­01­SC).
But,   firstly,   Rustan   is   raising   this   objection   to   the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit “A”, for the first time
before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected  to  the  admission  of  the  picture  on  such  ground  at  the
time   it   was   offered   in   evidence.   He   should   be   deemed   to   have
already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action.   The   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   applies   only   to   civil
actions,   quasi­judicial   proceedings,   and   administrative
proceedings.15
_______________
12 TSN, April 11, 2006, p. 28.
13 TSN, June 27, 2006, pp. 23­24.
14 People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 180501,  December 24,  2008,
575 SCRA 616, 625­626.
15 A.M. No. 01­7­01­SC, Rule 1, Section 2.
605
VOL. 618, APRIL 20, 2010 605
Ang vs. Court of Appeals
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved
each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CR 30567 dated
January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio   (Chairperson),   Velasco,   Jr.,** Brion and Perez,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—A   facsimile   transmission   cannot   be   considered   as
electronic   evidence—it   is   not   the   functional   equivalent   of   an
original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic   evidence.   (MCC   Industrial   Sales   Corporation   vs.
Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408 [2007])
Since   a   facsimile   transmission   is   not   an   “electronic   data
message” or an “electronic document,” and cannot be considered
as   electronic   evidence   by   the   Court,   with   greater   reason   is   a
photocopy   of   such   a   fax   transmission   not   electronic   evidence.
(MCC   Industrial   Sales   Corporation   vs.   Ssangyong   Corporation,
536 SCRA 408 [2008])
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ‘‘[v]iolence against women
and their children’’ as “any act or a series of acts committed by
any   person   against   a   woman   who   is   his   wife,   former   wife,   or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating   relationship,   or   with   whom   he   has   a   common   child,   or
against   her   child   whether   legitimate   or   illegitimate,   within   or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or eco­ 
_______________
**   Designated   as   additional   member   in   lieu   of   Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per raffle dated September 14,
2009.
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 204894. March 10, 2014.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs.   NOEL
ENOJAS y HINGPIT,   ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS,
FERNANDO   SANTOS y DELANTAR   and   ROGER
JALANDONI y ARI, appellants.
 Criminal   Law;   Aggravating   Circumstances;   Aid   of   Armed
Men; Use of Unlicensed Firearms; In “aid of armed men,” the men
act   as   accomplices   only.   They   must   not   be   acting   in   the
commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal
accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co­principals or co­
conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is
a   special   aggravating   circumstance   that   is   not   among   the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as qualifying a homicide to murder.—In “aid of armed men,” the
men   act   as   accomplices   only.   They   must   not   be   acting   in   the
commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal
accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co­principals or co­
conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is
a   special   aggravating   circumstance   that   is   not   among   the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as qualifying a homicide to murder. Consequently, the accused in
this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the
use   of   unlicensed   firearms,   a   circumstance   alleged   in   the
information.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Text Messages; Text messages are
to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or has personal knowledge of them.—As to the admissibility
of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with
the  Court’s   earlier   Resolution  applying   the  Rules   on  Electronic
Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal   knowledge   of   them.   Here,   PO3   Cambi,   posing   as   the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused
in  order  to  identify   and  entrap  them.  As  the  recipient  of those
messages sent from and to the mobile
_______________  went down to relieve himself there. As he
* THIRD DVISION.
314phone   in   his   possession,   PO3   Cambi   had   personal
knowledge   of   such   messages   and   was   competent   to   testify   on
them.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for appellants.
 
ABAD, J.:
On   September   4,   2006   the   City   Prosecutor   of   Las   Piñas
charged   appellants   Noel   Enojas y Hingpit   (Enojas),   Arnold
Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos),
and   Roger   Jalandoni y Ari   (Jalandoni)   with   murder   before   the
Las Piñas Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06­0854.
[1]
PO2   Eduardo   Gregorio,   Jr.   (PO2   Gregorio)   testified   that   at
around   10:30   in   the   evening   of   August   29,   2006,   he   and   PO2
Francisco   Pangilinan   (PO2   Pangilinan)   were   patrolling   the
vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted
a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto
Glass   shop   near   the   intersection   of   BF   Almanza   and   Alabang­
Zapote   Roads.   The   officers   approached   the   taxi   and   asked   the
driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The
latter   complied   but,   having   entertained   doubts   regarding   the
veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with
them   to   the   police   station   in   their   mobile   car   for   further
questioning.[2]
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and
left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7­11 convenience store on the
Zapote­Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan
_______________
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] TSN, February 8, 2007, pp. 4­7.
 
315approached   the   store’s   door,   however,   he   came   upon   two
suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot
one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape.
But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at
an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He
saw another man, who came from the Jollibee outlet, run towards
Alabang­Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The
latter   returned   fire   but   the   men   were   able   to   take   a   taxi   and
escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the
taxi driver they had with them had fled.   interment services, and P50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery
P/Insp.   Ferjen   Torred   (Torred),   the   Chief   of   Investigation
Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson
Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s
urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who
fled,   was  involved  in  the  attempted   robbery,   they  searched   the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently
left   behind.   P/Ins.   Torred   instructed   PO3   Joel   Cambi   (PO3
Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.[3]
The   police   later   ascertained   that   the   suspect   whom   PO2
Pangilinan   had   killed   was   someone   named   Reynaldo   Mendoza
who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent
9   mm   and   M­16   rifle   shells   at   the   crime   scene.   Follow­up
operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body
of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical
Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.[4]
PO3   Cambi   and   PO2   Rosarito  testified   that  they   monitored
the   messages   in   accused   Enojas’   mobile   phone   and,   posing   as
Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police
_______________
[3] TSN, May 3, 2007, pp. 10­14.
[4] CA Rollo, p. 28.
316then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the
arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police
were   also   able   to   capture   accused   Enojas   and   Gomez.   The
prosecution   presented   the   transcripts   of   the   mobile   phone   text
messages between Enojas and some of his co­accused.[5]
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son
was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and was
receiving   police   pay   of P8,000.00   to P10,000.00   per   month.
Ricardo   spent P99,999   for   burial   expense, P16,000.00   for   the
lot.[6]
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce
any evidence or testify in the case,[7] the accused opted to instead
file   a   trial   memorandum   on   March   10,   2008   for   their   defense.
They   pointed   out   that   they   were   entitled   to   an   acquittal   since
they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text
messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
On   June  2,   2008   the   RTC  rendered   judgment,[8] finding   all
the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation
and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and
to   indemnify   the   heirs   of   PO2   Pangilinan   with P165,999.00   as
actual   damages, P50,000.00   as   moral   damages, P25,000.00   as
exemplary damages, and P2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss
of earning capacity.
 Upon review in CA­G.R. CR­H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the
Court   of   Appeals   (CA)   dismissed   the   appeal   and   affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused.[9] The CA, however, found
_______________
[5] Records, pp. 431­438.
[6] TSN, December 14, 2006, pp. 4­7.
[7] Rollo, p. 6.
[8] Id., at pp. 27­34.
[9] Id., at pp. 2­17.
317the   absence   of   evident   premeditation   since   the   prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before
committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court.
[10]
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present
direct   evidence   that   the   accused   Enojas,   Gomez,   Santos,   or
Jalandoni   took   part   in   shooting   PO2   Pangilinan   dead.[11] This
may   be   true   but   the   prosecution   could   prove   their   liability   by
circumstantial   evidence   that  meets   the  evidentiary   standard   of
proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   It   has   been   held   that
circumstantial   evidence   is   sufficient   for   conviction   if:
1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[12]
Here   the   totality   of   the   circumstantial   evidence   the
prosecution   presented   sufficiently   provides   basis   for   the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as
the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the
Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with
them   to   the   police   station   because   of   the   questionable
documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of
the   taxicab   yielded   Enojas’   mobile   phone   that   contained
messages  which  led  to  the  entrapment  and  capture  of  the
other accused who were also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas   fled   during   the   commotion   rather   than
remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was
about to be taken for questioning, tending to show
_______________
[10] Id., at p. 18.
[11] Bacolod v.   People,   G.R.   No.   206236,   July   15,   2013,   701
SCRA 229.
[12] People v. Garcia, 577 Phil. 483, 500; 554 SCRA 616, 633
(2008).
 
318that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go
to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim
his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as
one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the
shooting.
4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of
those   who   engaged   PO2   Pangilinan   in   the   shootout;   the
messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who was
hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor,
Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During   the   follow­up   operations,   the   police
investigators   succeeded   in   entrapping   accused   Santos,
Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the
text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from
the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7­11
 shootout   and  to  the  wounding   of  “Kua   Justin,”  one  of   the
gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused
were   members   of   an   organized   group   of   taxicab   drivers
engaged in illegal activities.   them.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in
possession   of   mobile   phones   with   call   numbers   that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the
mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.[13]
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that
the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use
of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to
murder. In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only.
They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the
same purpose as the principal accused,
_______________
[13] CA Rollo, pp. 32­33.
319otherwise   they   are   to   be   regarded   as   co­principals   or   co­
conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is
a   special   aggravating   circumstance   that   is   not   among   the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as qualifying a homicide to murder.[14]Consequently, the accused
in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by
the   use   of   unlicensed   firearms,   a   circumstance   alleged   in   the
information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted
them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying
the   Rules   on   Electronic   Evidence   to   criminal   actions.[15] Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.[16] Here,
PO3   Cambi,   posing   as   the   accused   Enojas,   exchanged   text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them.   As  the  recipient  of  those  messages  sent   from  and  to  the
mobile   phone   in   his   possession,   PO3   Cambi   had   personal
knowledge   of   such   messages   and   was   competent   to   testify   on
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid
warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a
ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting
any evidence that may have been taken from
_______________
[14] See People v. Candado, 174 Phil. 12, 27­28; 84 SCRA 508,
524 (1978).
[15] A.M.   No.   01­7­01­SC,   Re:   Expansion  of   the  Coverage   of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002.
Rule   1,   Sec. 2. Cases   covered.—These   Rules   shall   apply   to
the criminal and civil actions and proceeding, as well as quasi­
judicial and administrative cases.
[16] Id., Rule 11, Section 2:
Section 2. Ephemeral   electronic   communications.—
Ephemeralelectronic   communications   shall   be   proven   by   the
testimony   of   a   person   who   was   a   party   to   the   same   or   has
personal  knowledge  thereof.   In  the absence  or  unavailability  of
such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
320them   after   an   unauthorized   search   as   an   incident   of   an
unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a
crime had been committed — the killing of PO2 Pangilinan — and
the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.
[17] The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the
scene   by   accused   Enojas   provided   strong   leads   on   the
participation   and   identities   of   the   accused.   Indeed,   the   police
caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified
to conform to current jurisprudence.[18]
WHEREFORE,  the  Court MODIFIES the  Court  of  Appeals
Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA­G.R. CR­HC 03377. The Court
instead FINDS accused­appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold
Gomez y Fabregas,   Fernando   Santos y Delantar,   and   Roger
Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with
the   special   aggravating   circumstance   of   use   of   unlicensed
firearms.   Applying   the   Indeterminate   Sentence   Law,   the
Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum,   to   20   years   of reclusion   temporal, as   maximum.   The
Court   also MODIFIES the   award   of   exemplary   damages   by
increasing it to P30,000.00, with an additional P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
 
 
G.R. No. 200148. June 4, 2014.*
 
RAMON   A.   SYHUNLIONG,   petitioner, vs.   TERESITA   D.
RIVERA, respondent. 
Criminal   Law;   Prescription   of   Crimes;   Motion   to
Quash; Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence
partially provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action
or   liability,   e.g.,   prescription,   is   not   deemed   waived   even   if   the
accused   had   not   raised   the   same   in   a   motion   to   quash.—
While People   v.   Castro, 95   Phil.   462   (1954), is   an   old
jurisprudence,   it   still   finds   application   in   the   case   at   bench   in
view of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence
partially provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action
or   liability, e.g.,   prescription,   is  not   deemed   waived   even   if  the
accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash.  In Rivera’s
case,   the   issue   of   prescription  is   raised   in  her   comment   to   the
instant   petition   before   this   Court.   Syhunliong   does   not
specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Privileged   Communication; The
rule   on  privileged   communication  means   that   a   communication
made   in   good   faith   on   any   subject   matter   in   which   the
communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty,
is   privileged   if   made   to   a   person   having   a   corresponding   duty.
—“The   rule   on   privileged   communication   means   that   a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which
the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty,   is  privileged   if   made   to  a   person   having   a   corresponding
duty.” In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview
of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the
communication   had   a   legal,   moral,   or   social   duty   to   make   the
communication,   or   at   least,   had   an   interest   to   protect,   which
interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to  an  officer or  a  board,  or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has
the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements
in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
 163
 
Same;   Same;   Same;   Text   Messages;   Rivera’s   text   message
falls   within   the   ambit   of   a   qualified   privileged   communication
since she “was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own
interest]   and   not   out   of   an   intent   to   injure   the   reputation”   of
Syhunliong.—The   Court   thus   finds   no   error   in   the   CA’s
declaration that Rivera’s text message falls within the ambit of a
qualified   privileged   communication   since   she   “was   speaking   in
response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation” of Syhunliong. Besides, “[t]here
was   no   unnecessary   publicity   of   the   message   beyond   [that]   of
conveying it to the party concemed.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Cruz, Neria & Carpio Law Offices for petitioner.
  Ricardo M. Perez for respondent.
 
R E S O L U T I O N
 
REYES, J.:
 
For   review   is   the   instant   Petition1 filed   by   Ramon   A.
Syhunliong   (Syhunliong)   seeking   the   reversal   of   the
Decision2 rendered   on   July   11,   2011   and   Resolution3 issued   on
January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.­G.R. S.P.
No.   110335.   The   CA   set   aside   the   Orders   dated   December   4,
20084 and   June   18,   20095 of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of
Quezon City, Branch 84, which denied the Motion to Dis­
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8­27.
2 Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Mario L. Guariña   III,   with
Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Manuel M. Barrios,
concurring; id., at pp. 29­38.
3 Id., at pp. 40­41.
4 Issued by Presiding Judge Luisito G. Cortez; id., at pp. 56­
59.
5 Id., at pp. 60­63.
 
 
164miss/Quash   on   Jurisdictional   Challenge6 (Motion   to   Quash)
filed   by   the   herein   respondent,   Teresita   D.   Rivera   (Rivera),   in
Criminal Case No. Q­07­147802, an action for libel.
 
Antecedents 
 
Syhunliong   and   Rivera   are   respectively   the   private
complainant   and   defendant   in   Criminal   Case   No.   Q­07­
147802.  Syhunliong   is   the   President   of   BANFF   Realty   and
Development Corporation  (BANFF) and likewise  owns interests
in construction, restaurant and hospital businesses. On the other
hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She
was   hired   in   September   of   2002   with   a   monthly   salary   of
Php30,000.00.  
About   three   years   after,   Rivera,   citing   personal   and   family
matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3,
2006.   However,   Rivera   actually   continued   working   for   BANFF
until March of the same year to complete the turn over of papers
under   her   custody   to   Jennifer   Lumapas   (Lumapas),   who
succeeded her.
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request
for   the   payment   of   her   remaining   salaries,   benefits   and
incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be
paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned,
and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.7
On   April   6,   2006,   at   around   11:55   a.m.,   Rivera   sent   the
following text message to one of BANFF’s official cellular phones
held by Lumapas:
I   am   expecting   that[.] [G]rabe   talaga sufferings ko   dyan
hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I don’t deserve this [because] I
did my job when I [was] still there. God
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 46­54.
7 Id., at pp. 29­30.
 
 
165
bless   ras[.]8 [S]ana   yung   pagsimba   niya,   alam   niya real
meaning.9(Italics ours)
 
Minutes   later,   Rivera   once   again   texted   another   message,
which reads:
Kailangan release niya   lahat   [nang]   makukuha   ko
diyanincluding incentive up to the last date na nandyan ako para
di na kami abot sa labor.10 (Italics ours)
Subsequently,   on   December   of   2006,   Rivera   filed   before   the
National   Labor   Relations   Commission   a   complaint   against
Syhunliong   for   underpaid   salaries,   13 th to   16thmonth   and
incentive   pay,   gratuities   and   tax   refund   in   the   total   sum   of
Php698,150.48.11
On  April 16, 2007,12 pending the  resolution  of the  aforecited
labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for
libel,   the  origin   of   the   instant  petition.   The   information,   dated
June 21, 2007, charged Rivera with the following:
That on or about the 6th day of April, 2006, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, with malicious intent of impeaching
the   honor,   virtue,   character   and   reputation   of   one   RAMON   A.
SYHUNGLIONG [sic] and
_______________
8 The initials of Syhunliong.
9 Rollo, p. 30.
10 Id.
11 Id., at pp. 46­47.
12 Per   Syhunliong’s   narration   in   the   instant   petition,   the
complaint was filed on August 18, 2007 (id., at p. 14). However,
the information for libel filed with the RTC against Rivera was
dated June 21, 2007 (id., at p. 44). The said information could not
have   been   filed   earlier   than   Syhunliong’s   complaint.   The   CA
decision   and   the   orders   of   the   RTC   do   not   indicate   when
Syhunliong   filed   the   complaint.   However,   in   Rivera’s   Petition
for Certiorari filed   before   the   CA,   it   was   indicated   that
Syhunliong’s complaint was instituted on April 16, 2007 (id., at p.
68).
 
 
166
with   evident   intent   of   exposing   the   complainant   to   public
dishonor,   discredit,   contempt   and   ridicule,   did   then   and   there
willfully,   unlawfully,   feloniously   and   maliciously   publish   in  the
form   of   text   messages   and/or   caused   to   be   publish[ed]   the
following defamatory statements through the company’s cellular
phone, to wit:  
x x x x
that   with   the   said   text   message,   the   said   accused   meant   and
intended to convey as in fact she did mean and convey, malicious
and   offensive   insinuations   and   imputations   that   tends   [sic]   to
destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with
no   good   or   justifiable   motive   but   solely   for   the   purpose   of
maligning and besmirching the good name, honor, character and
reputation of the said complainant and to expose it, as in fact [he]
was   exposed   to   public   hatred,   contempt   and   ridicule,   to   the
damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
 
Rivera   filed   a   Motion   to   Quash 14 the   aforequoted
information.  She  argued   that  the  text  message,   which  was  the
subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress
she  had suffered due  to the delay  in  the release of her  unpaid
salaries,   benefits   and   incentives.  Further,   the   facts   charged   in
the   information   did   not   constitute   the   crime   of   libel   as   the
elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for
public   consumption   were   wanting.  Her   text   message   was   not
prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her
duty to defend her own interests.
During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a
plea of not guilty.15
_______________
13 Id., at p. 44.
14 Id., at pp. 46­54.
15 Id., at p. 55.
 
 
167
The Orders of the RTC 
 
On   December   4,   2008,   the   RTC   issued   an   Order 16denying
Rivera’s Motion to Quash on these grounds:
[T]he   grounds   raised   by   [Rivera]   in   the   motion   to   quash   [are]
evidentiary in nature[,] which can only be threshed out in a full
blown hearing to determine if said [t]ext message falls squarely
within   the   parameters   of   “Privileged   Communication”   or   the
elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code [are] not fully
established by the Prosecution’s evidence.
The   Rule   on   Criminal   Procedure   in   the   prosecution   of   any
felony or offense requires only the existence of probable cause in
order to indict an accused of the crime charged. x x x [P]robable
cause   was   established   seasonably   during   the   preliminary
investigation.   [Rivera]   should   have   participated   during
the  preliminary  investigation  or  filed  a  Motion   for   re­
investigation [if] she was not accorded such right and raised these
grounds, before she enter[ed] her plea during arraignment.   
The Supreme Court ruled that “[i]t should be noted that the
libelous material [or text] must be viewed as a whole. In order to
ascertain the meaning of [the] published article [or text message],
the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be
construed in the light of the entire publication.”
The Supreme Court held that “writing [or texting] to a person
other   than   the   person   defamed   is   sufficient   to   constitute
publication, for the person to whom the letter [text message] is
addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person
defamed therein. In this case, the wife of the complainant[,] who
received the unsealed letter[,] is held a third person to whom the
publication is made.[”]17 (Citations omitted)
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 56­59.
17 Id., at pp. 58­59.
 
168
The   RTC   thereafter   issued   an   Order18 on   June   18,   2009
denying   Rivera’s   motion   for   reconsideration   to   the
foregoing.  Citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong
Gui,19 the   RTC   explained   that   the   privileged   character   of   a
communication   merely   does   away   with   the   presumption   of
malice.  However, the plaintiff is not precluded from proving the
existence of such malice.  The RTC once again concurred with the
Public   Prosecutor’s   finding   that   there   was   probable   cause   to
indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of
a vice or defect, or for having committed an act, tending to cause
dishonor or discredit to the latter’s name.
Rivera   challenged   the   orders   issued   by   the   RTC   through   a
Petition for Certiorari20 filed before the CA. Quoting Article 354 of
the   Revised   Penal   Code   (RPC),   she   emphasized   that   “every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown,” except in “a private communication made by any person
to   another   in   the   performance   of   any   legal,   moral   or   social
duty.”21 Citing Brillante v. Court of Appeals,22 Rivera enumerated
the  requisites, compliance  with which  would  make a  statement
fall   within   the   purview   of   a   qualified   privileged
communication, viz.: (1) the person who made the communication
had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or
at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be
his own or of the one [for] whom it is made; (2) the communication
is  addressed   to an  officer   or  a  board,   or  superior,   having   some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish
the   protection   sought;   and   (3)   the   statements   in   the
communication   are   made   in   good   faith   and   without
malice.23 Rivera likewise
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 60­63.
19 76 Phil. 669 (1946).
20 Rollo, pp. 64­84.
21 Id., at p. 79.
22 483 Phil. 568; 440 SCRA 541 (2004).
23 Rollo, p. 80.
 
 
169stressed that under Sections 3(a)24 and 9,25 Rule 11726 of the
Rules of Court, an accused may move to quash the information
even   after   arraignment   if   the   facts   charged   therein   do   not
constitute an offense. She thus concluded that the text message
she sent to Lumapas was in the nature of a qualified privileged
communication, it  being  merely  an  expression  of her legitimate
grievances over the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries and
other entitlements. Rivera texted Lumapas because the latter was
in  the  best   position  to  help   expedite   the   release   of  the  checks.
Rivera had no intent to injure anyone’s reputation. Lastly, Rivera
labeled   as   erroneous   the   RTC’s   declaration   regarding   the
necessity   of   a   full   blown   trial   since   facts   sufficient   for   the
resolution   of   the   case   were   allegedly   already   extant   in   the
records.
 
The CA’s Ruling  been committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a
 
On   July   11,   2011,   the   CA   rendered   the   herein   assailed
Decision27 directing the dismissal of the information for libel filed
against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her argument that
when  the  facts  in  an  information fail   to  charge an offense,   the
said ground can be invoked by the accused in a
_______________
24 Sec. 3. Grounds.—The   accused   may   move   to   quash   the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
x x x x
25 Sec. 9.  Failure to move or quash or to allege any ground
therefor.—The   failure   of   the  accused   to   assert   any   ground   of   a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the  same  in  the  said   motion,   shall   be  deemed   a   waiver  of   any
objections   except   those   based   on   the   grounds   provided   for   in
paragraphs (a)  [the facts charged do not constitute  an  offense],
(b), (g) [the criminal action or liability has been extinguished] and
(i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
26 Motion to Quash.
27 Rollo, pp. 29­38.
170motion   to   quash   filed   even   after   arraignment.   The   CA
likewise explained that:
The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether
the facts charged in the information[,] as well as the undeniable
facts appearing on the record[,] show that an offense of libel has
definition of libel — It is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime,   or   of   a   vice   or   defect   ...   or   any   act,   omission,   condition,
status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of ... a person. x x x.
The   first   procedural   requisite   in   the   determination   of   the
existence of libel is whether there is a defamatory imputation. The
history of the law on libel abounds in examples of utterances or
statements  that are  not necessarily considered libelous because
they are a [sic] mere expression[s] of an [sic] opinion[s] of a [sic]
person[s] in connection with a [sic] plea[s] or grievance[s]. Libel is
inherently a limitation on the liberty of speech and press freedom,
and must be construed in a manner that does not trench upon
constitutionally protected freedoms.
x x x There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to
induce the hearer or reader to suppose and understand them as
impeaching   the   honesty,   virtue   or   reputation   of   another.   The
question is not what the writer or speaker meant by his words but
what they convey to those who heard or read them.
x x x x
We can break up the text message of [Rivera] to [Lumapas]
into three parts. The utterance is mercifully short so that it could
not be difficult to infer the whole sense and understanding of the
message from the standpoint of Lumapas to whom the message
was conveyed.  In context, [Rivera] was seeking  payment  of her
wage   claims   consequent   to   her   resignation   and   receiving
[BANFF’s]   response   through   Lumapas.   [Rivera]   retorted   with
three things in her message to Lumapas — (1) that she suffered a
lot in collecting her last pay from [BANFF]
  
 
171
Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay
ko.[;] (2) that she does not deserve to suffer this way [because she]
did   [her]   job   when   [she   was]   still   there[;]   and   (3)   turning   to
[Syhunliong] himself [she] said — God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung
pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.
If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or
defect to another, there can be no libel in the first two of the three
statements   which   announced   only   the   sufferings,   albeit
undeserved[,] of [Rivera]. The proposition gets to be dicey in the
third  statement  because  now   she  makes  a  distinct  reference  to
[Syhunliong][,] [b]ut is the imputation defamatory? We hesitate to
reach   this   conclusion,   and   all   doubts   in   criminal   law,   we   are
basically   taught,   must   be   resolved   in   favor   of   the   accused.   To
articulate the legal wisdom, [Rivera] has the right to express an
opinion in a matter in which she has an undeniable interest.
[Rivera   said]   in   the   last   part   of   the   text   that   [Syhunliong]
should understand the real meaning of the mass when he goes to
attend it. It is in this tail end of the message that [Syhunliong] is
mentioned. But what is conveyed by the words [“]sana alam niya
real   meaning?[”]   Does   it   impute   a   crime,   vice   or   defect   in
[Syhunliong],   either   directly   or   by   way   of innuendo?   But
the innuendo can only be explanatory of a libelous imputation and
cannot alter the sense of the words claimed to be libelous. If the
publication is not actionable per se, an innuendo cannot make it
so, and if the publication is actionable per se, the innuendo would
not even be necessary.
We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does
not   serve   to   cast   a   shadow   on   [Syhunliong’s]   character   and
integrity[,]   there   being   no   direct   and   personal   imputation   of   a
venality to him. At best, the statement that [Syhunliong] should
understand the meaning of the mass suggests that [Syhunliong]
should be more compassionate and caring to the employee. But is
being   the   converse   of compassionate and caring suggestive   of   a
vice or defect in the person alluded to? We do not think
 
 
172
so.   Otherwise,   even   courts   should   be   exposed   to   contempt   and
ridicule   for   reaching   at   times   decisions   in   favor   of   capital   and
against   labor.   x   x   x   To   follow   the   intent   of   the   message   as
ordinarily conveyed by the words and the context in which they
are said, it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera] to describe
[Syhunliong]   as   strict   and   selfish.   But[,]   there   are   legitimate
reasons why  a  person  who  acts  in the interest of the employer
may appear strict and selfish to the other side. One may have to
be   so   to   protect   the   interest   of   his   company   and,   indeed,   the
outcome   of   the   labor   case   vindicates   the   stand   of   [Syhunliong]
against giving [Rivera] the claims she sought after.
A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes
of   others   and   who   is   faced   with   criticism   such   as   in   this   case
should not be so onion­skinned as to react through the criminal
law. Instead, he should use methods of discussion and persuasion
to   dispel   the   misgivings   over   his   decisions.   He   should,   in
particular, explain through the same source that told him of the
comment why [BANFF] cannot satisfy all [of Rivera’s] claims.
x x x The matter contained in the text message is privileged
communication   under   Article   354   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code
which   [negates]   the   existence   of   malice   in   — a   private
communication made by any person to another in the performance
of any legal,[moral] or social duty. x x x It was Lumapas who told
her of the stand of [Syhunliong] on the matter of her wage claims,
and her reaction through the text message may be deemed a part
of her duty to seek redress of her grievances through the same
source. She was speaking in response to duty and not out of an
intent   to   injure   the   reputation   of   the   person   who   claims   to   be
defamed.   There   was   no   unnecessary   publicity   of   the   message
beyond   the   necessity   of   conveying   it   to   the   party
concerned.28 (Citations omitted and italics supplied)
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 33­37.
173
The CA denied Syhunliong’s motion for reconsideration to the
above through the herein assailed Resolution 29 dated January 6,
2012.
 
Issues and Arguments of the Parties  31 609 Phil. 31; 591 SCRA 244 (2009).
Undaunted, Syhunliong now presents to this Court the issues
of whether or not: (a) the trial court’s denial of a motion to quash
information may be validly assailed through a special civil action
for certiorari;   (b)  Rivera   may   validly   question  the  denial   of   her
motion to quash before the CA after voluntarily allowing herself
to   be   arraigned   even   during   the   pendency   of   such   motion   to
quash; (c) the CA may validly review on certiorari what was, at
best, an error of judgment made by the RTC; (d) the CA correctly
ruled that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
the offense of libel; and (e) the CA committed reversible error in
ordering the outright dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q­07­147802
on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages
were privileged communication.30
In support of the petition, Syhunliong cites Soriano, et al. v.
People,   et   al.31 where   the   Court   declared   that   in   assailing   the
denial of a motion to quash an information, the accused should
not  file a special civil action for certiorari. Instead, the accused
should   enter   a   plea,   go   to   trial sans prejudice   to   present   the
special defenses he or she had invoked in the motion to quash,
and if an adverse decision is rendered, file an appeal therefrom.
Syhunliong   further   avers   that   Rivera   was   arraigned   on
October 11, 2007. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that the accused may only be allowed to file a motion to
quash at any time before entering a plea. In
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 40­41.
30 Id., at pp. 16­17.
 
174Rivera’s   case,   she   had   already   voluntarily   entered   a   plea;
hence,   it   was   tantamount   to   an   effective   abandonment   of   her
motion to quash.
It   is   also   Syhunliong’s   argument   that   the   CA   improperly
arrogated unto itself the power to review the Public Prosecutor
and   RTC’s   uniform   finding   of   the   existence   of   probable
cause.  Even if it were to be assumed that the RTC erred in its
disposition, it was a mistake of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Syhunliong also refutes the CA’s finding that the facts charged
in the information did not constitute the crime of libel. The text
message   was   apparently   an   indictment   of   his   personality   and
character since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.
Lastly,   Syhunliong   invokes People   v.   Judge   Gomez32which
enunciated the doctrine that in a libel case, the privileged nature
of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash, but is
merely a matter of defense to be proven during the trial.
In   Rivera’s   Comment,33 she   reiterates   the   arguments   in   the
Motion to Quash filed with the RTC. Additionally, she contends
that   the   RTC   no   longer   had   jurisdiction   to   take   cognizance   of
Syhunliong’s complaint.  The text message was sent on April 6,
2006.   Per   Syhunliong’s   narration   in   the   instant   petition,   his
complaint   was   filed   on   August   18,   2007, 34 beyond   the   one   year
prescriptive period for instituting actions for libel provided for in
Articles 9035 and 9136 of the RPC.
_______________
32 187 Phil. 110; 98 SCRA 181 (1980).
33 Rollo, pp. 86­105.
34 Id., at p. 14.
35 Art. 90. Prescription of crime.—x x x
x x x x
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in
one year.
 
 
175
Further, the ground that the facts charged in the information
did not constitute an offense can be raised even after arraignment
and is broad  enough to cover  within its ambit lack of probable
cause. This, the court can reassess in the exercise of its inherent
power of judicial review.  
Rivera also laments that she was deprived of due process and
of   the   opportunity   to   submit   countervailing   evidence   during
preliminary investigation.
 
Our Ruling 
 
There is no merit in the instant petition. 
 
Prescription had set in. 
 
Syhunliong   raised   five   issues   before   this   Court,   but   the
Court’s resolution of the same would be a superfluity in the light
of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription had set in before
the complaint for libel was instituted.
In Romualdez   v.   Hon.   Marcelo,37 the   Court,   partially
quoting People   v.   Moran,38 stressed   the   reason   behind   and   the
character of prescription of penal offenses, to wit:
“Here   the   State   is   the   grantor,
surrendering   by   act   of   grace   its   rights   to
prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no
longer the subject of prosecution. The statute
is not a statute of process, to be scantily and
grudgingly   applied,   but   an   amnesty,
declaring that after a
_______________
 36 Art. 91. Computation   of   prescription   of   offenses.—The
period   of   prescription   shall   commence   to   run   from   the   day   on
which   the   crime   is   discovered   by   the   offended   party,   the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when   such   proceedings   terminate   without   the   accused   being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason
not imputable to him.
37 529 Phil. 90; 497 SCRA 89 (2006).
38 44 Phil. 387 (1923).
 
 
176
certain   time   oblivion   shall   be   cast   over
the   offence;   x x x   that   from   henceforth[,]   he
may   cease   to   preserve   the   proofs   of   his
innocence,   for   the   proofs   of   his   guilt   are
blotted   out.   Hence[,]   it   is   that   statutes   of
limitation   are   to   be   liberally   construed   in
favor of the defendant, not only because such
liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty   and   grace,   but   because   the   very
existence of the statute, is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that
time, while it gradually wears out proofs of
innocence,   has   assigned   to   it   fixed   and
positive periods in which it destroys proofs of
guilt. Independently of these views, it must
be   remembered   that   delay   in   instituting
prosecutions   is   not   only   productive   of
expense   to   the   State,   but  of   peril   to  public
justice   in   the   attenuation   and   distortion,
even   by   mere   natural   lapse   of   memory,   of
testimony.   It   is   the   policy   of   the   law   that
prosecutions   should   be   prompt,   and   that
statutes, enforcing such promptitude should
be   vigorously   maintained.   They   are   not
merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by
the   State   upon   itself,   to   exact   vigilant
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for
criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained.”  
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the
benefits   accruing   from   the   liberal   construction   of   prescriptive
laws   on   criminal   statutes.   Prescription   emanates   from
the liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be
resolved   in   favor   of   the   grantee   thereof,   the
accused.39 (Italics supplied)
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong
filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the
allegedly libelous message was sent to Luma­
_______________
39 Supra note 37 at pp. 112­113; pp. 111­112.
 
 
177pas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April
16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, 40 it would not alter the fact that its
institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for
in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason
why Rivera should be deprived of the benefits accruing from the
prescription of the crime ascribed to her.  
People v. Castro,41 on the other hand, is instructive anent the
effect in criminal proceedings of the failure of an accused to raise
prescription   as   a   ground   in   a   motion   to   quash   an
information, viz.:
Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading
constitute a waiver to raise the question of prescription at a later
stage of the case?
A   case   in   point   is People   vs.   Moran,   44   Phil.   387.
x x x   [T]he   court   ruled   that   the   crime   had   already   prescribed
holding that this defense can not [b]e deemed waived even if the
case had been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal
in the Supreme Court. The philosophy behind this ruling was aptly
stated as follows: “Although the general rule is that the defense of
prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower
court,   as   in   that   case   it   is   presumed   to   have   been   waived   and
cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always
of   absolute   application   in   criminal   cases,   such   as  that  in   which
prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State
not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor
to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding
the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the
penalty,   the   court   must   so   declare.”   And   elaborating   on   this
proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:  crimes.   Since,   under   the   Constitution,   the   Supreme   Court   has
“As prescription of the crime is the loss by
the   State   of   the   right   to   prosecute   and
punish   the   same,   it   is   absolutely
indisputable that from the moment the State
has lost or
_______________
40 Supra note 12.
41 95 Phil. 462 (1954).
 
178
waived such right, the defendant may, at any
stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that
the   same   be   finally   dismissed   and   he   be
acquitted   from   the   complaint,   and   such
petition   is   proper   and   effective   even   if   the
court   taking   cognizance   of   the   case   has
already   rendered   judgment   and   said
judgment is merely in suspense, pending the
resolution of a motion  for a  reconsideration
and new trial, and this is the more so since
in such a case there is not yet any final and
irrevocable judgment.”
The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present
case. Here, the rule provides that the plea of prescription should
be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the
charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as
was   well   said   in   the   Moran   case,   this   rule   is   not   of   absolute
application,   especially   when   it   conflicts   with   a   substantive
provisions of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of
only the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and   procedure,   and   the   admission   to   the   practice   of   law,   and
cannot cover substantive rights (Section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution), the rule we are considering cannot be interpreted
or   given   such   scope   or   extent   that   would   come   into   conflict   or
defeat an express provision of our substantive law. One of such Prescription   of   the   crime   is   already
provisions is article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides a   compelling   reason   for   this   Court   to
that   the   prescription   of   crime   has   the   effect   of   totally order   the   dismissal   of   the   libel   in­
extinguishing   the   criminal   liability.   And   so   we   hold   that formation,   but   the   Court   still
the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good even if it stresses   that   the   text   message   which
were   laid   down   before   the   adoption   of   the   present   Rules   of Rivera   sent   to   Lumapas   falls   within
Court.42 (Italics supplied)
the   purview   of   a   qualified   privileged
 
communication. 
While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application
in the case at bench in view of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of  
Court,   which   in   essence   partially   provides   that   the   defense   of
extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., pre­ “The   rule   on   privileged   communication   means   that   a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which
_______________ the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty,   is  privileged   if   made   to  a   person   having   a   corresponding
42Id., at pp. 464­466. duty.”43
  In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of
  a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the
179scription, is not deemed waived even if the accused had not following   requisites   must   concur:   (1)   the  person   who  made   the
raised the same in a motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue communication   had   a   legal,   moral,   or   social   duty   to   make   the
of prescription is raised in her comment to the instant petition communication, or at least, had an interest to pro­
before this Court.  Syhunliong does not specifically refute Rivera’s
averment, thus, it is deemed admitted. _______________
In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance
that  Rivera   availed  of   the  wrong   remedy   when  she  resorted  to 43 Novicio v. Aggabao, 463 Phil. 510, 517; 418 SCRA 138, 144
filing   a   petition   for certiorari before   the   CA   to   assail   the   RTC (2003).
orders denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove  
circuitous.  Even if the trial proceeds and an adverse decision is  
rendered against Rivera,  she  can  appeal  the  same,  but  the CA 180tect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to
and this Court would still be compelled to order the dismissal of whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer
the information on account of prescription of the crime.   or   a   board,   or   superior,   having   some   interest   or   duty   in   the
  matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;
and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice.44
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of
either  the  delay   or   denial   of  the  latter’s   claims  for  payment  of
salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed
through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At
that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite
the release of Rivera’s claims.
Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in
the CA’s declaration that Rivera’s text message falls within the
ambit   of   a   qualified   privileged   communication   since   she   “was
speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not
out of an intent to injure the reputation” 45 of Syhunliong. Besides,
“[t]here   was   no   unnecessary   publicity   of   the   message   beyond
[that] of conveying it to the party concemed.”46
IN   VIEW   OF   THE   FOREGOING, the   petition
is DENIED. The   Decision   rendered   on   July   11,   2011   and
Resolution issued on January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals in
C.A.­G.R.  S.P. No. 110335  ordering  the Regional  Trial  Court  of
Quezon City, Branch 84, to dismiss the information for libel filed
by   Ramon   A.   Syhunliong   against   Teresita   D.   Rivera
are AFFIRMED. 
G.R. No. 198240. July 3, 2013.*
LUISA   NAVARRO   MARCOS,**   petitioner, vs. THE   HEIRS   OF
THE   LATE   DR.   ANDRES   NAVARRO,   JR.,   namely   NONITA
NAVARRO,   FRANCISCA   NAVARRO   MALAPITAN,   SOLEDAD
NAVARRO   BROCHLER,   NONITA   BARRUN   NAVARRO,   JR.,
IMELDA   NAVARRO,   ANDRES   NAVARRO   III,   MILAGROS
NAVARRO   YAP,   PILAR   NAVARRO,   TERESA   NAVARRO­
TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN­REJUSO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words
and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.―Grave abuse of discretion
defies   exact   definition,   but   it   generally   refers   to   capricious   or
whimsical   exercise   of   judgment   as   is   equivalent   to   lack   of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner   by   reason   of   passion   and   hostility.   Grave   abuse   of
discretion   arises   when   a   lower   court   or   tribunal   violates   the
Constitution   or   grossly   disregards   the   law   or   existing
jurisprudence.
Same;   Evidence;   Witnesses;   Specific   rules   of   witness
disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason
of   mental   incapacity   or   immaturity.   Section   22   disqualifies   a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by
reason   of   death   or   insanity   of   the   adverse   party.   Section   24
disqualifies   a   witness   by   reason   of   privileged
communication.―In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and   Separation   Benefits   System   v.   Republic   of   the   Philippines,
694 SCRA 118 (2013), we said that a witness must only
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
**  Rollo, pp. 14, 42. While Lydia Navarro Grageda is named
as  co­petitioner  in  the  title  of  the  petition,   only   Luisa   Navarro
Marcos has verified it.
659
VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013 659
 Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
possess   all   the   qualifications   and   none   of   the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence provides: SEC. 20. Witnesses; their
qualifications.—Except   as   provided   in   the   next   succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or
political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of
a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground
for disqualification. Specific rules of witness disqualification are
provided   under   Sections   21   to   24,   Rule   130   of   the Rules   on
Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental
incapacity   or   immaturity.   Section   22   disqualifies   a   witness   by
reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of
death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a
witness by reason of privileged communication.
Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; Section 49, Rule 130
of   the   Rules   of   Evidence   is   clear   that   the   opinion   of   an   expert
witness   may   be   received   in   evidence.―Section   49,   Rule   130   of
the Rules   of   Evidence is   clear   that   the   opinion   of   an   expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit: SEC. 49. Opinion of
expert witness.—The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown
to possess, may be received in evidence. For instance, in Tamani
v.  Salvador,  647  SCRA  132  (2011),  we  were  inclined  to  believe
that   Tamani’s   signature   was   forged   after   considering   the
testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved
simulated   or   copied   forgery,   such   that   the   similarities   will   be
superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert   depends   not   upon   his   mere   statements   of   whether   a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford
in   pointing   out   distinguishing   marks,   characteristics   and
discrepancies   in   and   between   genuine   and   false   specimens   of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   Handwriting   Experts;
Jurisprudence   is   replete   with   instances   wherein   this   Court
dispensed   with   the   testimony   of   expert   witnesses   to   prove
forgeries.―Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein
this Court dispensed  with  the  testimony  of  expert  witnesses  to
prove   forgeries.   However,   we   have   also   recognized   that
handwriting   experts   are   often   offered   as   expert   witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in exam­
660
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
60
Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
ining   forged   documents.   More   important,   analysis   of   the
questioned signature in the deed of donation executed by the late
Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
  Ruben A. Songco and Ricardo Butalid for respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Luisa Navarro Marcos appeals the Decision 1dated
February   28,   2011   and   Resolution2 dated   July   29,   2011   of   the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­G.R. SP No. 92460.
The antecedent facts follow:
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina­Navarro
died   in   1958   and   1993,   respectively.   They   left   behind   several
parcels   of   land   including   a   108.3997­hectare   lot   (subject   lot)
located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.3
he spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro
Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the
heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres,
Jr. are the respondents herein.4
Petitioner   and   her   sister   Lydia   discovered   that   respondents
are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents
based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real
_______________
1 Id., at pp. 47­52. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez
with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon
and Franchito N. Diamante.
2 Id., at pp. 54­57.
3 Id., at p. 48.
4 Id.
661
VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013 661
Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
Property   dated   May   19,   1954   where   Andres,   Sr.   donated   the
subject lot to Andres, Jr.5
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through
Assistant   Fiscal   Andres   Marcos,   requested   a   handwriting
examination of the affidavit. The  PNP  handwriting expert PO2
Mary   Grace   Alvarez   found   that   Andres,   Sr.’s   signature   on   the
affidavit   and   the  submitted   standard   signatures   of  Andres,   Sr.
were not written by one and the same person.6
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the
deed   of   donation   before   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of
Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215. 7
After   the   pre­trial,   respondents   moved   to   disqualify   PO2
Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize
the   handwriting   examination   of   the   affidavit.   They   added   that
presenting   PO2   Alvarez   as   a   witness   will   violate   their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to
them before the examination was conducted.8 Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s
report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be
useless and irrelevant.9
In   its   Order10 dated   August   19,   2004,   the   RTC   granted
respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be
hearsay   as   she   has   no   personal   knowledge   of   the   alleged
handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez
to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness,
because her testimony is not yet needed.
_______________
5  Id.
6  Id.
7  Id.
8  Id., at pp. 48­49.
9  Id., at p. 211.
10 CA Rollo, pp. 24­25.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC
denied their motion in an Order11 dated October 11, 2005.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA,   which   however,   dismissed   their   petition   in   the   assailed
Decision   dated   February   28,   2011   on   the   ground   that   the
dismissal   of   Civil   Case   No.   5215   has   mooted   the   issue   of   PO2
Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration
in   its   Resolution   dated   July   29,   2011.   The   CA   refused   to   take
judicial   notice   of   the   decision   of   another   CA   Division   which
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice
cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending before
another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member.   The   CA   also   held   that   the   sisters   were   negligent   for
belatedly informing it that Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider
the assailed decision in light of the reinstatement of Civil Case
No. 5215. Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not ruling that the
RTC   committed   grave   abuse   of   discretion   in   disqualifying   PO2
Alvarez   as   a   witness.12 They   stress   that   PO2   Alvarez   will   be
presented as an expert witness to render an opinion on whether
the   disputed   handwriting   was   indeed   made   by   Andres,   Sr.   or
whether it is a forgery.13
In their comment,14 respondents counter that the CA properly
disqualified PO2 Alvarez. They also agreed with the CA that her
disqualification   was   mooted   by   the   dismissal   of   Civil   Case   No.
5215.
We find in favor of petitioner.
_______________
11 Id., at p. 26.
12 Rollo, p. 29.
13 Id., at p. 35.
14 Id., at pp. 530­532.
663
VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013
Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has
mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness
can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the CA ruling. While
we  agree  with  the  CA   in  considering   the  RTC’s   Orders 15 which
dismissed Civil Case No. 5215, we are unable to agree with its
refusal   to   take   judicial   notice   of   the   Decision 16 of   another   CA
Division   which   reinstated   Civil   Case   No.   5215.   Subsequent
proceedings were even held in the reinstated Civil Case No. 5215
per Orders17issued by the RTC which were already submitted to
the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that
cannot be ignored. 
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave
abuse   of   discretion   in   disqualifying   PO2   Alvarez   as   a   witness.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally
refers   to   capricious   or   whimsical   exercise   of   judgment   as   is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary   and   despotic   manner   by   reason   of   passion   and
hostility.18 Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or
existing jurisprudence.19
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits   System   v.   Republic   of   the   Philippines,20we   said   that   a
witness must only possess all the qualifications and
_______________
15 CA Rollo, pp. 262, 267­268.
16 Id., at pp. 297­306.
17 Id., at pp. 307­308.
663 18 Deutsche  Bank   AG   v.   Court   of  Appeals, G.R.   No.   193065,
February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 82, 100.
19 Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, et
al., G.R.   No.  174385,  February   20,  2013,   p.  10,   691  SCRA  306,
322.
20 G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013, p. 5; 694 SCRA 118, 125.
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
none   of   the   disqualifications   provided   in   the   Rules   of   Court.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
    provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses;   their   qualifications.—Except   as
provided   in   the   next   succeeding   section,   all   persons   who
can   perceive,   and   perceiving,   can   make   known   their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of
the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific   rules   of  witness   disqualification  are  provided  under
Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21
disqualifies   a   witness   by   reason   of   mental   incapacity   or
immaturity.   Section   22   disqualifies   a   witness   by   reason   of
marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or
insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by
reason of privileged communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held that the  specific
enumeration  of disqualified witnesses  excludes the  operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The
Rules   should   not   be   interpreted   to   include   an   exception   not
embodied therein. We said:
The   generosity   with   which   the   Rule   allows   people   to
testify   is   apparent.   Interest   in   the   outcome   of   a   case,
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and
religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections   19   and   20   of   Rule   130   provide   for   specific
disqualifications.   Section   19   disqualifies   those   who   are
mentally   incapacitated and  children  whose  tender age  or
immaturity   renders   them   incapable   of   being   witnesses.
Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest   or   on   relationship.   Section   21   provides   for
disqualification   based   on   privileged   communications.
Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification
_______________
21 238 Phil. 597, 602­603; 154 SCRA 610, 615­616 (1987).
665
VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013 665
Marcos vs. Heirs of the Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.
of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties
declared in default from taking the witness stand for non­
disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an
exception. The   specific   enumeration   of   disqualified
witnesses   excludes   the   operation   of   causes   of
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It
is   a   maxim   of   recognized   utility   and   merit   in   the
construction   of   statutes   that   an   express   exception,
exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. x x x
As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these
comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute
and   no   other   exception   will   be   implied.   x x x The   Rules
should   not   be   interpreted   to   include   an   exception
not   embodied   therein. (Emphasis   supplied;   citations
omitted.)
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely
perceive and make known her perception to others. We have no
doubt   that   she   is   qualified   as   a   witness.   She   cannot   be
disqualified   as   a   witness   since   she   possesses   none   of   the
disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion
to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was
not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC
rather   confused   the   qualification   of   the   witness   with   the
credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover,   Section   49,   Rule   130   of   the Rules
    of   Evidence  is
clear  that the  opinion  of  an  expert   witness  may  be  received  in
evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.—The opinion of a
witness   on   a   matter   requiring   special   knowledge,   skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess, may
be received in evidence.
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe
that   Tamani’s   signature   was   forged   after   considering   the
testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved
simulated   or   copied   forgery,   such   that   the   similarities   will   be
superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert   depends   not   upon   his   mere   statements   of   whether   a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford
in   pointing   out   distinguishing   marks,   characteristics   and
discrepancies   in   and   between   genuine   and   false   specimens   of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony
would   be   hearsay.   Under   Section   49,   Rule   130   of   the Rules   on
Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as
the   PNP   document   examiner   was   allowed   in   Tamani.   But   the
RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is
hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to
the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have
issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.
True,   the  use  of  the  word   “may”  in  Section  49,   Rule  130   of
the Rules   on   Evidence signifies   that   the   use   of   opinion   of   an
expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
courts.23 Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this
Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries.24 However,   we   have   also   recognized   that   handwriting
experts   are   often   offered   as   expert   witnesses   considering   the
technical   nature   of   the   procedure   in   examining   forged
documents.25 More   important,   analysis   of   the   questioned
signature   in   the   deed   of   donation   executed   by   the   late   Andres
Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as
a witness. She has the qualifications of witness and possess none
of   the   disqualifications   under   the   Rules.   The   Rules   allow   the
opinion   of   an   expert   witness   to   be   received   as   evidence.
In Tamani, we used the opinion of an expert witness. The value of
PO2   Alvarez’s   expert   opinion   cannot   be   determined   if   PO2
Alvarez   is   not   even   allowed   to   testify   on   the   handwriting
examination she conducted.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
(1) Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July
29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2)
Orders   dated   August   19,   2004   and   October   11,   2005   of   the
Regional   Trial   Court   in   Civil   Case   No.   5215.
We DENY respondents’   motion   to   disqualify   PO2   Mary   Grace
Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.
VOL. 427, APRIL 2, 2004  15 
People vs. Golimlim
G.R. No. 145225. April 2, 2004.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs. SALVADOR
GOLIMLIM @ “BADONG,” appellants.
Witnesses; Mental   Retardates; That   a   person   is   a   mental
retardate   does   not   disqualify   her   as   a   witness   nor   render   her
testimony   bereft   of   truth.—The   trial   judge’s   assessment   of   the
credibility   of   witnesses’   testimonies   is,   as   has   repeatedly   been
held   by   this   Court,   accorded   great   respect   on   appeal   in   the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the
advantage   of   actually   examining   both   real   and   testimonial
evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. In the present
case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure
from the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment
of Evelyn’s testimony. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not
disqualify   her   as   a   witness   nor   render   her   testimony   bereft   of
truth.
Same; Same; It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection
to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a
fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified
to.—In People   v. Trelles,   where  the  trial   court  relied  heavily   on
the   therein   mentally   retarded   private   complainant’s   testimony
irregardless   of   her   “monosyllabic   responses   and   vacillations
between   lucidity   and   ambiguity,”   this   Court   held:   A   mental
retardate   or   a   feebleminded   person   is   not, per   se, disqualified
from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of
her   credibility.   It   is   now   universally   accepted   that   intellectual
weakness,   no   matter   what   form   it   assumes,   is   not   a   valid
objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can
still   give   a   fairly   intelligent   and   reasonable   narrative   of   the
matter testified to.
Same; Same; To   be   sure,   modern   rules   on   evidence   have
downgraded   mental   incapacity   as   a   ground   to   disqualify   a
witness—the remedy of ex­
_______________
 THIRD DIVISION.
*
16
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
6 
People vs. Golimlim
cluding such a witness who may be the only person available
who knows the facts, seem inept and primitive.—It can not then be
gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on
his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her
testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be sure,
modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as
a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the
remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person
available  who knows  the  facts,  seems  inept  and  primitive.  Our
rules follow the modern trend of evidence. Thus, in a long line of
cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based
mainly   on   statements   given   in   court   by   the   victim   who   was   a
mental retardate.
Criminal   Law; Rape; Mental   Retardates; Statutory
Rape; Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate
constitutes  statutory rape which  does  not require proof  that  the
accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of
the   victim   for   conviction;   A   quantum   of   force   which   may   not
suffice   when   the   victim   is   a   normal   person   may   be   more   than
enough   when   employed   against   an   imbecile.—It   is   settled   that
sexual   intercourse   with   a   woman   who   is   a   mental   retardate
constitutes statutory rape which does not require proof that the
accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of
the victim for conviction. The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation
was   not,   however,   alleged   in   the   Information   and,   therefore,
cannot   be   the   basis   for   conviction.   Such   notwithstanding,   that
force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the
mode of commission alleged in the Information, was adequately
proven.   It   bears   stating   herein   that   the   mental   faculties   of   a
retardate   being   different   from   those   of   a   normal   person,   the
degree of force needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a
quantum   of   force   which   may   not   suffice   when   the   victim   is   a
normal person, may be more than enough when employed against
an imbecile.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,  prejudice.
Sorsogon, Br. 65.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for appellants.
CARPIO­MORALES,J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of June 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court   of   Sorsogon,   Sorsogon,   Branch   65   in   Criminal   Case   No.
241,  Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to
_______________
1
 Rollo at pp. 31­45.
17
VOL. 427, APRIL 2, 2004  17
People vs. Golimlim
finding appellant Salvador Golimlim alias “Badong” guilty beyond
reasonable   doubt   of   rape,   imposing   on   him   the   penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and holding him civilly liable in the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Information dated April 16, 1997 filed against appellant
reads as follows:
“That sometime in the month of August, 1996, at Barangay Bical,
Municipality   of   Bulan,   Province   of   Sorsogon,   Philippines   and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above­named
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and
intimidation,   did   then   and   there,   wilfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously,   have   carnal   knowledge   of   one   Evelyn   Canchela
against   her   will   and   without   her   consent,   to   her   damage   and
“Contrary to law.”2
Upon   arraignment   on   December   15,   1997, 3 appellant,   duly
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental
retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore
on   May   2,   1996   to   work   as   a   domestic   helper,   she   entrusted
Evelyn   to   the   care   and   custody   of   her   (Amparo’s)   sister   Jovita
Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at
Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.4
meet   a   certain   Rosing,5 leaving   Evelyn   with   appellant.   Taking
advantage   of   the   situation,   appellant   instructed   private
complainant to sleep,6 and soon after she had laid down, he kissed
her and took off her clothes.7 As he poked at her an object which
to Evelyn felt like a knife, 8he proceeded to insert his penis into
her vagina.9 His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep. 
_______________
2
 Id., at p. 10.
3
 Records at p. 29.
4
 TSN, August 12, 1998 at p. 12.
5
 TSN, October 14, 1998 at p. 6.
6
 TSN, January 27, 1999 at p. 9.
 7
 Id., at p. 6. FINDINGS:   LMP   [last   menstrual   period]:   Aug.   96   ? 
8
 Id., at p. 8.      Abd   [abdomen]:   7   months   AOG   [age   of   gestation] 
     FHT   [fetal   heart   tone]:   148/min 
9
 Id., at pp. 10 and 13.
     Presentation:   Cephalic 
18
     Hymen: old laceration at 3, 5, 7, & 11 o’clock position14
18  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
On   the   same   day,   the   sisters   went   back   to   the   Investigation
People vs. Golimlim Section of the Bulan Municipal Police Station before which they
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to executed their sworn statements.15
her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded
her.10 _______________
Sometime   in   December   of   the   same   year,   Lorna   Hachero,
Evelyn’s half­sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo 10
 Id., at p. 10.
instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to 11
 TSN, June 2, 1998 at p. 7.
stay   in   Novaliches,   Quezon   City   where   she   (Lorna)   resided. 12
 Id., at p. 8.
Dutifully,   Lorna   immediately   repaired   to   appellant’s   home   in 13
 TSN, August 12, 1998 at p. 3.
Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila. 14
 Exhibit “E,” Records at p. 16.
A   week   after   she   brought   Evelyn   to   stay   with   her,   Lorna 15
 Exhibit “B,” Records at p. 12.
suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing
19
belly.   She   thereupon   brought   her   to   a   doctor   at   the   Pascual
VOL. 427, APRIL 2, 2004  19 
General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check­up
and ultrasound examination. People vs. Golimlim
Lorna’s   suspicions   were   confirmed   as   the   examinations On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal
revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant.11 She thus asked her complaint for rape16 against appellant before the Municipal Trial
sister   how   she   became   pregnant,   to   which   Evelyn   replied   that Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.
appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.12 In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a
In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for girl, Joana Canchela, at Guruyan, Juban, Sorsogon.17
the purpose of filing a criminal complaint against appellant. The Appellant,   on   being   confronted   with   the   accusation,   simply
police   in   Bulan,   however,   advised   them   to   first   have   Evelyn said that it is not true “[b]ecause her mind is not normal,” 18 she
examined. Obliging, the two repaired on February 24, 1997 to the having “mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual
Municipal   Health   Office   of   Bulan,   Sorsogon   where   Evelyn   was intercourse with her.”19
examined   by   Dr.   Estrella   Payoyo.13 The   Medico­legal   Report Finding   for   the   prosecution,   the   trial   court,   by   the   present
appealed   Decision,   convicted   appellant   as   charged.   The
revealed the following findings, quoted verbatim:
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Salvador Golimlim People vs. Golimlim
having been found guilty of the crime of RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as Appellant argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is
amended   by   RA   7659)   beyond   reasonable   doubt   is   hereby replete with contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as to
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and his criminal culpability.
to indemnify the offended party Evelyn Canchela in the amount In giving credence to Evelyn’s testimony and finding against
of   P50,000.00   as   indemnity   and   another   P50,000.00   as   moral appellant,   the   trial   court   made   the   following   observations,
damage[s], and to pay the costs. quoted verbatim:
“SO ORDERED.”20
Hence, the present appeal, appellant assigning to the trial court 1. 1)Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was
the following errors: consistent in her claim that her Papay Badong (accused
Salvador   Golimlim)   had   carnal   knowledge   of   her   and
1. I.THE   COURT A   QUO GRAVELY   ERRED   IN   GIVING was the author of her pregnancy, and nobody else (See:
WEIGHT   AND   CREDENCE   TO   THE For comparison her Sworn Statement on p. 3/Record; her
CONTRADICTORY AND IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY narration   in   the   Psychiatric   Report   on   pp.   47   &
OF   EVELYN   CANCHELA,   A  MENTAL   RETARDATE, 48/Record; the TSNs of her testimony in open court);
[AND]
2. 2)She  remains   consistent  that  her  Papay   Badong   raped
2. II.THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING her only once;
THAT   THE   GUILT   OF   THE   ACCUSED­APPELLANT
FOR   THE   CRIME   CHARGED   HAS   BEEN   PROVEN 3. 3)That   the   contradictory   statements   she   made   in   open
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21 court   relative   to   the   details   of   how   she   was   raped,
although would  seem  derogatory  to her  credibility  and
_______________ reliability   as   a   witness   under   normal   conditions,   were
amply explained by the psychiatrist who examined her
16
 Records at p. 7. and supported by her findings (See: Exhibits “F” to “F­
17
 Exhibit “D,” Records at p. 127. 2”);
18
 TSN, September 20, 1999 at p. 4.
19
 Ibid. 4. 4)Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her
20
 Rollo at p. 45. (which   is   still   subject   to   question  considering   that   the
21
 Id., at p. 80. victim could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact
20 remains that she never pointed to anybody else as the
20  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  author of her pregnancy, but her Papay Badong. Which
 only   shows   that   the   trauma   that   was   created   in   her
mind   by   the   incident   has   remained   printed   in   her
memory   despite   her   weak   mental   state.   Furthermore,
granting for the sake of argument that other men also
laid on top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that
her Papay Badong (the accused) had sexual intercourse
with her.22
The   trial   judge’s   assessment   of   the   credibility   of   witnesses’
testimonies   is,   as   has   repeatedly   been   held   by   this   Court,
accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion   on   its   part,   it   having   had   the   advantage   of   actually
examining   both   real   and   testimonial   evidence   including   the
demeanor of the witnesses.23
In the  present  case,  no  cogent  reason  can  be appreciated  to
warrant   a   departure   from   the   findings   of   the   trial   court   with
respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.  In People v. Trelles,24 where the trial court relied heavily on the
_______________
 Id., at pp. 38­39.
22
 People  v.  De   Guzman, 372   SCRA  95,   101   (2001), People  v.
23
Balisnomo, 265 SCRA 98, 104 (1996) (citations omitted).
21
VOL. 427, APRIL 2, 2004  21
People vs. Golimlim
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a
witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide:
SEC. 20.  Witnesses; their qualifications.—Except as provided in
the   next   succeeding   section,   all   persons   who   can   perceive,   and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
x x x
SEC.   21.  Disqualification  by  reason  of  mental   incapacity   or
immaturity.—The following persons cannot be witnesses:
1. (a)Those   whose   mental   condition,   at   the   time   of   their
production   for   examination,   is   such   that   they   are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;
2. (b)Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
therein   mentally   retarded   private   complainant’s   testimony
irregardless   of   her   “monosyllabic   responses   and   vacillations
between lucidity and ambiguity,” this Court held:
A   mental   retardate   or   a   feebleminded   person   is   not, per
se,disqualified   from   being   a   witness,   her   mental   condition   not
being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted
that intellectual weakness,  no  matter  what form it assumes,  is
not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the
latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of
the matter testified to.25
It   can   not   then   be   gainsaid   that   a   mental   retardate   can   be   a
witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she
knows.26 If   his   or   her   testimony   is   coherent,   the   same   is
admissible in court.27
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental
incapacity   as  a   ground   to  disqualify   a   witness.   As   observed  by
McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be status examination for three (3) times and I tried to see the consistency in 
the only person available who  the narration but very poor (sic) in giving details. 
  x x x 
_______________
Q:  May we know what she related to you? 
24
 340 SCRA 652 (2000). A:  She related to me that she was raped by her uncle ‘Tatay Badong.’ What she
25
 Id., at p. 658 (citations omitted). mentioned was that, and I quote: ‘hinila ang panty ko, pinasok ang pisot at 
26
 People v. Delos Santos, 364 SCRA 142, 156 (2001). bayag niya sa pipi ko.’ She would laugh inappropriately after telling me that
27
 People   v.   Lubong, 332   SCRA   672,   690   (2000)   (citation particular incident. I also tried to ask her regarding the dates, the time of the 
omitted). incident, but she could not really . . . . I tried to elicit those important things,
22 but the patient had a hard time rememberi ng those dates. 
22  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
_______________
People vs. Golimlim
knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the
 People   v.   Espanola, 271   SCRA   689,   709   (1997)   (citations
28
modern trend of evidence.28
omitted).
Thus,   in   a   long   line   of   cases,29 this   Court   has   upheld   the
conviction   of   the   accused   based   mainly   on   statements   given   in
29
 People   v.   Agravante, 338   SCRA   13 (2000), People
court by the victim who was a mental retardate. v. Padilla, 301   SCRA   265 (1999), People   v.   Malapo, 294   SCRA
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is 579 (1998), People   v. Balisnomo, 265   SCRA   98 (1996), People
no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her testimony v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 (1991).
is   not   without   discrepancies,   given   of   course   her 30
 TSN, December 21, 1998 at p. 10.
feeblemindedness. 23
By   the   account   of   Dr.   Chona   Cuyos­Belmonte,   Medical VOL. 23 
Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical 427,
Center,   who   examined   Evelyn,   although   Evelyn   was   suffering
APRIL 2,
from   moderate   mental   retardation   with   an   IQ   of   46, 30 she   is
2004 
capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
Thus the doctor testified:  People vs. Golimlim
Q:  So do you try to impress that although she answers in general terms it does  Q:  But considering that you have evaluated her mentally, gave her I.Q. 
not necessarily mean that she might be inventing answers—only that she  test, in your honest opinion, do you believe that this narration by the 
could not go to the specific details bec ause of dullness?  patient to you about the rape is reliable? 
A:  I don’t think she was inventing her answer because I conducted mental  A:  Yes, sir. 
Q:  Why do you consider that reliable?  patient from answering questions. 
A:  Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of    x x x 
her answers during the time of the testing. She was not even  Q:  What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else, will she 
hesitating when she told me she was raped once at home by her  be able to answer the questions? 
Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me about how it  A:  Yes, she may be able to answer the questions, but you would notice 
was done on (sic) her. So, although she may be ina ppropriate but  the inconsistency of the answers because what we normally do is that
(sic) she was spontaneous, she was consistent.  we present the questions in different ways, and we expect the same 
Q:  Now, I would like to relate to you an incident that happened in this  answer. This is how we try to evaluate the
Court for you to give us your expert opinion. I tried to present the  24
victim in this case to testify. While she testified that she was raped  24  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
by her uncle Badong, when asked about the details, thereof, she  People vs. Golimlim
would not make (sic) the detail. She only answered ‘wala’ (no). I ask    patient. If the person, especially a retarded, is being coached by somebody, 
this question because somehow this seems related to your previous  the answers will no longer be consistent. 
evaluation that while she gave an answer, she gave no detail. Now, I  Q:  You also mentioned a while ago that the answers given by the patient, taken
was thinking because I am a man and I was the one asking and the  all in all, were consistent? 
Judge is a man also. And while the mother would say that she would  A:  Yes, sir.31 (Italics supplied) 
relate to her and she related to you, can you explain to us why when  As noted in the above­quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn
she was presented in court that occurrence, that event happened?  could give spontaneous and consistent answers to the same but
differently   framed   questions   under   conditions   which   do   not
A:  There are a lot of possible answers to that question; one, is the 
inhibit her from answering. It could have been in this light that
court’s atmosphere itself. This may have brought a little anxiety on 
Evelyn was able to relate in court, upon examination by a female
the part of the patient and this inhibits her from relating some of the  government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the
details relative to the incident­in­question. When I conducted my  proceedings,   on   Dr.   Belmonte’s   suggestion,32 how,   as   quoted
interview with the patient, there were only two (2) of us in the room.  below, she was raped and that it was appellant who did it: 
I normally do not ask this question during the first session with the  Q:  Lorna Hachero testified before this Court that you gave birth to a baby girl 
patient because these are emotionally leading questions, and I do not  named Johanna, is this true? 
expect the patient to be very trusting. So, I usually ask this type of  A:  (The witness nods, yes.) 
questions during the later part of my examination to make her relax    x x x 
during my evaluation. So in this way, she will be more cooperative  Q:  Who is the father of Johanna? 
with me. I don’t think that this kind of atmosphere within the  A:  Papay Badong 
courtroom with some people around, this could have inhibited the 
Q:  Who is this Papay Badong that you are referring to?  A:  I was scolded by the wife, Mamay Bita. 
A:  The husband of Mamay Bita.  Q:  I am referring to that very moment when you were undressed. 
Q:  Is he here in court?  Immediately after your Papay Badong undressed you, what did you
A:  He is here.  do? 
Q:  Please look around and point him to us.    x x x 
A:  (The witness pointing to the lone man sitting in the first row of the gallery  A:  He laid on top of me. 
wearing a regular prison orange t­shirt who gave his name as Salvador  Q:  What was your position when he laid on top of you? 
Golimlim when asked.)  A:  I was lying down. 
Q:  Why were you able to say that it is Papay Badong who is the father of your  Q:  Then after he went on top of you, what did he do there? 
child Johanna?  A:  He made (sic) sexual intercourse with me. 
A:  Because then I was left at Mamay Bita’s house, although I am not there  Q:  When you said he had a (sic) sexual intercourse with you, what did
now.  he do exactly? 
Q:  And that house where you were left is also the house of your Papay  A:  He kissed me. 
Badong?  Q:  Where? 
A:  Yes ma’am.  A:  On the cheeks (witness motioning indicating her cheeks). 
Q:  What else did he do? Please describe before this Honorable Court 
_______________ the sexual intercourse which you are referring to which the accused
did to you. 
 Id., at pp. 9­21.
31
A:  ‘Initoy’ and he slept after that.
 Id., at pp. 13­14.
32
  (to Court) 
25
  Nevertheless, may we request that the local term for sexual 
VOL. 427, 25
intercourse, the word ‘Initoy’ which was used by the witness be put
APRIL 2,
on the record, and we request judicial notice of the fact 
2004 
that ‘initoy’ is the local term for sexual intercourse. 
People vs. Golimlim
  x x x 
Q:  What did Salvador Golimlim or your Papay Badong do to you 
Q:  What did you feel when your Papay Badong had sexual intercourse
that’s why you were able to say that he is the father of your child? 
with you? 
A:  I was undressed by him. 
A:  I felt a knife; it was like a knife. 
  x x x 
Q:  Where did you feel that knife? 
Q:  What did you do after you were undressed? 
A:  I forgot. 
 Q:  Why did you allow your Papay Badong to have sexual intercourse  the crime was committed in 1996), the trial court did not specify
with you?  under   which   mode   the   crime   was   committed.   Under   the   said
A:  I will not consent to it.  article, rape is committed thus:
  x x x  ART. 335.  When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed
26 by   having   carnal   knowledge   of   a   woman   under   any   of   the
26  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  following circumstances.

People vs. Golimlim
1. 1.By using force or intimidation;
Q:  Did you like what he did to you? 
A:  I do not want it.  2. 2.When   the   woman   is   deprived   of   reason   or   otherwise
Q:  But why did it happen?  unconscious; and
A:  I was forced to. 
  x x x  _______________
Q:  Did you feel anything when he inserted into your vagina when your Papay 
Badong laid on top of you? 
33
 TSN, January 27, 1999 at pp. 4­13.
A:  His sexual organ/penis. 
34
 People   v.   De   Guzman, 372   SCRA   95,   111   (2001)   (citations
Q:  How did you know that it was the penis of your Papay Badong that was  omitted), People   v.   Glabo, 371   SCRA   567,   573   (2001)   (citations
entered into your vagina?  omitted), People   v.   Lalingjaman, 364   SCRA   535,   546   (2001)
A:  It was put on top of me.  (citations omitted), People v. Agravante, 338 SCRA 13, 20 (2000).
Q:  Did it enter your vagina?  27
A:  Yes, Your Honor.  VOL. 427, APRIL 2, 2004  27 
  x x x  People vs. Golimlim
Q:  Madam Witness, is it true that your Papay Badong inserted his penis into 
your vagina or sexual organ during that time that he was on top of you?  1. 3.When   the   woman   is   under   twelve   years   of   age   or   is
demented.
A:  (The witness nods, yes.)33 (Italics supplied) 
Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It
is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. It cannot thus The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly Whenever the crime of  rape  is committed with the use  of  a
identified him as her rapist.34 deadly   weapon   or   by   two   or   more   persons,   the   penalty   shall
In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal be reclusion perpetua or death.
Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 (the law in force when x x x
It   is   settled   that   sexual   intercourse   with   a   woman   who   is   a 72  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
mental   retardate   constitutes   statutory   rape   which   does   not Alvarez vs. Ramirez
require   proof   that   the   accused   used   force   or   intimidation   in
G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005.*
having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. 35 The fact of
MAXIMO   ALVAREZ,   petitioner, vs. SUSAN   RAMIREZ,
Evelyn’s   mental   retardation   was   not,   however,   alleged   in   the
Information   and,   therefore,   cannot   be   the   basis   for   conviction. respondent.
Such notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the Remedial   Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Words   and
commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the Phrases; Marital Disqualification; During their marriage, neither
Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the   husband   nor   the   wife   may   testify   for   or   against   the   other
the mental faculties of a retardate being different from those of a without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by
normal person, the degree of force needed to overwhelm him or
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
her is less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when
by   one   against   the   other   or   the   latter’s   direct   descendants   or
the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when
employed against an imbecile.36 ascendants.—Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
Still   under   the   above­quoted   provision   of   Art.   335   of   the provides:   “Sec.   22.   Disqualification   by   reason   of   marriage.—
Revised Penal Code, when the crime of rape is committed with During   their   marriage,   neither   the   husband   nor   the   wife   may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
the   use   of   a   deadly   weapon,   the   penalty   shall   be reclusion
spouse,   except in  a  civil  case  by  one  against  the  other,   or in a
perpetua to death. In the case at bar, however, although there is
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
adequate evidence showing that appellant indeed used force and
the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.” The reasons given
intimidation,   that   is   not   the   case   with   respect   to   the   use   of   a
for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband
deadly weapon.
and wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
WHEREFORE,   the   assailed   Decision   of   the   Regional   Trial
consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241
the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
finding   appellant,   Salvador   Golimlim   alias   “Badong,”   GUILTY
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
beyond reasonable doubt of rape, which this Court finds to have
unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility
been  committed   under   paragraph   1,   Article  335   of   the   Revised
there   is   danger   of   punishing   one   spouse   through   the   hostile
Penal   Code,   and   holding   him   civilly   liable   therefor,   is   hereby
testimony of the other.
AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.  PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      Marvin H. Mesia for petitioner. ATTY. MESIAH: (sic) 
     Ponce Enrile, Reyes & Manalastas for respondent.    Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of 
proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the 
_______________ crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour 

 THIRD DIVISION.
*
_______________
73
VOL. 473, OCTOBER 14, 2005  73 1
 Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Alvarez vs. Ramirez Procedure, as amended.
2
 Penned by Justice Portia Aliño­Hormachuelos and concurred
SANDOVAL­GUTIERREZ, J.: in by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria­Martinez (now a member of this
Court) and Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion.
Before   us   is   a   petition   for   review   on   certiorari 1 assailing   the
3
 Docketed   as   Criminal   Case   No.   19933­MN   and   captioned
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA­G.R. “People of the Philippines vs. Maximo Alvarez.”
SP   No.   56154,   entitled   “SUSAN   RAMIREZ,   petitioner,   versus, 74
HON.   BENJAMIN   M.   AQUINO,   JR.,   as   JUDGE   RTC, 74  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
MALABON, MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, respondents.” Alvarez vs. Ramirez
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness
  on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1­C, 
in   Criminal   Case   No.   19933­MN   for   arson 3 pending   before   the
Dagat­dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister­in­
Regional Trial Court,  Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is
Maximo   Alvarez,   herein   petitioner.   He   is   the   husband   of law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the 
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire;
On   June   21,   1999,   the   private   prosecutor   called   Esperanza that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of 
Alvarez   to   the   witness   stand   as   the   first   witness   against Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members 
petitioner,   her   husband.   Petitioner   and   his   counsel   raised   no of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the 
objection. accused; that as a consequence of the accused in successfully setting the 
Esperanza testified as follows:  fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and 
“ATTY. ALCANTARA:  together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and 
  We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor. others. 
COURT:  COURT: 
  Swear in the witness.    You may proceed. 
  x x x    x x x 
DIRECT EXAMINATION  Respondent   filed   an   opposition6 to   the   motion.   Pending
ATTY. ALCANTARA:  resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution
  x x x  to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned
Q:  When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of 
Order   disqualifying   Esperanza   Alvarez   from   further   testifying
that scent? 
and   deleting   her   testimony   from   the   records. 7 The   prosecution
A:  When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the  filed   a   motion   for   reconsideration   but   was   denied   in   the   other
house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside  assailed Order dated October 19, 1999.8
the court room).  This   prompted   respondent   Susan   Ramirez,   the   complaining
Q:  For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you  witness in Criminal Case No. 19933­MN, to file with the Court of
know?  Appeals a petition for certiorari 9 with application for preliminary
A:  He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez. injunction and temporary restraining order.10
On   May   31,   2000,   the   Appellate   Court   rendered   a   Decision
Q:  If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him? 
nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial
A:  Yes, sir. 
court.
Q:  If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?  Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
A:  Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name,  The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can
he gave his name as Maximo Alvarez.”4 testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933­MN. 

_______________ _______________
4
 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), June 21, 1999 at pp. 5
 Rollo at pp. 44­47.
3­7. 6
Id., at pp. 48­58.
75 7
 Id., at pp. 85­87.
VOL. 473, OCTOBER 14, 2005  75 8
 Id., at p. 88.
Alvarez vs. Ramirez 9
 Under Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, Procedure, as amended.
the   latter   showed   “uncontrolled   emotions,”   prompting   the   trial 10
 Rollo at pp. 101­134.
judge to suspend the proceedings. 76
On   June   30,   1999,   petitioner,   through   counsel,   filed   a
76  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
motion5 to   disqualify   Esperanza   from   testifying   against   him
Alvarez vs. Ramirez
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
disqualification.
“Sec.   22. Disqualification   by   reason   of   marriage.—During   their
marriage,   neither   the   husband   nor   the   wife   may   testify   for   or
against   the   other   without   the   consent   of   the   affected   spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s
direct descendants or ascendants.”
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. 1.There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. 2.If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
consequent danger of perjury;
3. 3.The   policy   of   the   law   is   to   guard   the   security   and
confidences   of   private   life,   even   at   the   risk   of   an
occasional   failure   of   justice,   and   to   prevent   domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and
4. 4.Where   there   is   want   of   domestic   tranquility   there   is
danger   of   punishing   one   spouse   through   the   hostile
testimony of the other.11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule
has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses
and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other.   Like   the  rule   itself,   the   exceptions   are   backed   by   sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of
the general rule. For instance,  where the marital and domestic
relations   are   so   strained   that   there   is   no   more   harmony   to   be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a
case, identity of in­
_______________
 People vs. Francisco, No. L­568, July 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 694,
11
and Cargill vs. State, 220, Pac., 64, 65; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A.L.R.,
133.
77
VOL. 473, OCTOBER 14, 2005  77 
Alvarez vs. Ramirez
terests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that  identity  is  non­existent.   Likewise,  in  such  a  situation,  the
security   and   confidences   of   private   life,   which   the   law   aims  at
protecting,   will   be   nothing   but   ideals,   which   through   their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.12
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
“We  think   that  the  correct   rule,   which  may   be  adopted   in  this
jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220
Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon
the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely
or   indirectly   affecting   domestic   harmony   comes   within   the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense
directly   attacks,   or   directly   and   vitally   impairs,   the   conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
not   be   a   witness   against   the   other   except   in   a   criminal
prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’ ”
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly
impairs   the   conjugal   relation   between   him   and   his   wife
Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed
against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such
as   trust,   confidence,   respect   and   love   by   which   virtues   the
conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
“The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his
sister­in­law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was
there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is
an  act  totally   alien   to  the  harmony   and   confidences   of   marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the  necessity.”
_______________
 People vs. Francisco, Id.
12
 No. L­39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270.
13
78
78  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED       Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio­Moralesand Ga
Alvarez vs. Ramirez
conjugal   relation.   It   underscored   the   fact   that   the   marital   and
domestic   relations   between   her   and   the   accused­husband   have
become   so   strained   that   there   is   no   more   harmony,   peace   or
tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in
such   a   case,   identity   is   non­existent.   In   such   a   situation,   the
security   and   confidences   of   private   life   which   the   law   aims   to
protect   are   nothing   but   ideals   which   through   their   absence,
merely   leave   a   void   in   the   unhappy   home.   (People   v.
Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504 [1997]). Thus, there is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.”
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the
commission   of   the   offense,   the   relationship   between   petitioner
and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence
and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between   petitioner   and   Esperanza   is   no   longer   an   interest   the
State aims to protect.
At   this   point,   it   bears   emphasis   that   the   State,   being
interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty
may   be   punished   and   the   innocent   exonerated,   must   have   the
right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the
objection   of   the   accused,   because   (as   stated   by   this   Court
in Francisco14),   “it   was   the   latter   himself   who   gave   rise   to   its
WHEREFORE,   the   Decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   is
AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is
ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner,
her   husband,   in   Criminal   Case   No.   19933­MN.   Costs   against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
rcia, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
_______________
14
 Supra.
562  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
No. L­46306. February 27, 1979.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   petitioner, vs. HON.
MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance   of   Pampanga,   Branch   III,   and   BENJAMIN   F.
MANALOTO, respondents.
Criminal   Procedure; Wife   may   testify   against   husband   for
crime of falsification of a deed of sale of conjugal house and lot
where wife was made to appear as having given far consent to the
sale.—With more reason must the exception apply to the instant
case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
be directly prejudic­      Fiscal   Regidor   Y.   Aglipay and Special   Counsel   Vicente
Macalino for petitioner.
_______________
     Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
 SECOND DIVISION.
*      Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
563
VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979  563 SANTOS, J.:
People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto,
ed   by   the   falsification   is   not   a   third   person   but   the   wife
herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged before
herself. And it is undeniable that the criminal act complained of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent
had   the   effect   of   directly   and   vitally   impairing   the   conjugal
Judge,   Hon,   Mariano   C.   Castañeda,   Jr.,   with   the   crime   of
relation.   This   is   apparent   not   only   in   the   act   of   the   wife   in
Falsification   of   Public   Document   committed,   according   to   the
personally lodging her complaint with the office of the Provincial
Information, as follows:
Fiscal,   but   also   in   her   insistent   efforts   in   connection   with   the
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of
instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying
San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the
jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused
actuations   of   the   witness­wife   underscore   the   fact   that   the
BEN­
martial   and   domestic   relations   between   her   and   the   accused­
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony
_______________
to   be   preserved   nor   peace   and   tranguility   which   may   be
disturbed.   In  such  a  case,  as  We  have  occasion  to  point  out  in 1
 See Annexes “A”, “B”, and “B­1” of the Petition (Rollo, pp, 11­
previous   decisions,   “identity   of   interests   disappears   and   the 15).
consequent   danger   of   perjury   based   on   that   identity   is 564
nonexistent.   Likewise,   in   such   a   situation,   the   security   and
564  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
void in the unhappy home.” Thus, there is no reason to apply the JAMIN   F.   MANALOTO,   with   deliberate   intent   to   commit
marital disqualification rule. falsification,   did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously   counterfeit,   imitate   and   forge   the   signature   of   his
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and  spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said
injunction. accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under
Doc.   No.   1957,   Page   No.   72,   Book   No.   LVII,   Series   of   1975,
notarized   by   Notary   Public   Abraham   Pa.   Gorospe,   thereby
making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her
marital  consent  to said  sale when  in  fact  and  in  truth  she  did
not.2
At  the  trial,  the prosecution  called  the  complainant­wife to  the
witness   stand   but   the   defense   moved   to   disqualify   her   as   a
witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.—
The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they
are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
xx     xx     xx     xx     xx
(b)   A   husband   can   not   be   examined   for   or   against   his   wife
without   her   consent;   nor   a   wife   for   or   against   her   husband
without   his   consent,   except   in   a   civil   case   by   one   against   the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground
that   the   case   falls   under   the   exception   to   the   rule,   contending
that it is a “criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the   other.”   Notwithstanding   such   opposition,   respondent   Judge
granted   the   motion,   disqualifying   Victoria   Manaloto   from
testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31,
1977. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by
respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.
Hence,   this   petition   for   certiorari   filed   by   the   office   of   the
Provincial   Fiscal,   on   behalf   of   the   People   of   the   Philippines,
seeking to set aside the aforesaid orders of the respondent Judge
and praying that a preliminary injunction or a tem­
_______________
2
 Annex “C” of the Petition (Rollo, pp. 16­17).
565
VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979  565 
People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
porary restraining order  be issued by this Court enjoining said
judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal
Case No. 1011.
On   June   20,   1977,   this   Court   resolved—(a)   to   issue   a
temporary   restraining   order,   and   (b)   to   require   the   Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the
Solicitor   General   filed   its   Notice   of   Appearance   on   June   27,
1977,4 and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August
30,   1977.5 The   respondents   filed   their   Memorandum   on
September   5,   1977.6 Whereupon,   the   case   was   considered
submitted for decision.7
From   the   foregoing   factual   and   procedural   antecedents
emerges the sole issues determinative of the instant petition, to
wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document   filed   against   herein   private   respondent   Benjamin   F.
Manaloto—who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria
M. Manaloto, in a dead of sale, thereby making it appear that the
latter   gave   her   marital   consent   to   the   sale   of   a   house   and   lot
belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth
she   did   not—may   be  considered   as  a   criminal  case   for  a   crime
committed   by   a   husband   against   his   wife,   and,   therefore,   an
exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner’s stand that the case is an exception to
the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime
committed by the accused­husband against the witnesswife.
1.   The   act   complained   of   as   constituting   the   crime   of
Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of
his wife’s signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear
therein that said wife  consented  to the sale  of  a house and lot
belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth
she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house
and lot, and the signing of the wile’s name by her hus­
_______________
3
 Rollo, p. 39.
4
 Ibid., p. 44.
5
 Ibid., p. 76.
6
 Ibid., p. 87.
7
 Ibid., p. 99.
566
566  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Applying   the   foregoing   criterion   in   mid   case   of Ordoño   v.
People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
band in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife,
no crime could have been charged against said husband. Clearly,
therefore, it is the husband’s breach of his wife’s confidence which
gave  rise  to the  offense  charged.   And  it  is  this  same  breach  of
trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed
the  aforesaid  criminal   ease   with  the  Court  of  First  Instance   of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one
for   a   crime   committed   by   one   spouse   against   the   other   is   to
advance   a   conclusion   which   completely   disregards   the   factual
antecendents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific
offense   may   be   classified   as   a   crime   committed   by   one   spouse
against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,
in   the   case   of Ordoño   v.   Daquigan,8 this   Court,   through   Mr.
Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be followed in
resolving the issue, stating that:
We   think   that   the   correct   rule,   which   may   be   adopted   in   this
jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR, 133.
220, Pac. 64, 26 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
“The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon
the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely
or   indirectly   affecting   domestic   harmony   comes   within   the
exception   is   too   broad.   The   better   rule   is   that,   WHEN   AN
OFFENSE   DIRECTLY   ATTACKS,   OR   DIRECTLY   AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES
WITHIN THE EXCEPTION, to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a
crime committed (by) one against the other.”
Daquigan,   this   Court   held   that   the   rape   committed   by   the
husband of the witness­wife against their daughter was a crime
committed by the husband against his wife. Although the victim
of the crime committed by the accused in that case was not 
_______________
8
 G.R. No. L­39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270, at 273.
567
VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 27, 1979  567 
People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the
exception   for   the   reason   that   said   criminal   act   “positively
undermine(d) the connubial relationship.”9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be
directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but
the   wife   herself.   And   it   is   undeniable   that   the   criminal   act
complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife
in   personally   lodging   her   complaint   with   the   Office   of   the
Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection
with   the   instant   petition,   which   seeks   to   set   aside   the   order
disqualifying   her   from   testifying   against   her   husband.   Taken
collectively, the actuations of the witness­wife underscore the fact
that   the   martial   and   domestic   relations   between   her   and   the
accused­husband have become so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquillity which may be
disturbed.   In  such  a  case,  as  We  have  occasion  to  point  out  in
previous   decisions,   “identity   of   interests   disappears   and   the
consequent   danger   of   perjury   based   on   that   identity   is
nonexistent.   Likewise,   in   such   a   situation,   the   security   and
confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home.”11 Thus, there is no reason to apply the
martial disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand
that the wife should not be disqualified from testifying  lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with
_______________
9
 Id., p. 274.
10
 Victoria   Manaloto,   through   her   counsel,   assisted   the
Provincial  Fiscal   of  Pampanga   in  filing   the instant  petition  for
certiorari (rollo, pp. 9­10). Furthermore, she filed on Aug. 22, 1977
a memorandum in support of the petition (rollo, pp. 68­74), and,
on Dec. 28, 1977, a pleading entitled “Chronologically—Effected
Observations   and   Circumstances   in   Support   of   or   to   Butress
Memorandum for Private Petitioner Victoria M. Manaloto, dated
August   18,   1977   “informing   this   Court   that   the   trouble   in   her
marital relation with her husband, the herein private respondent,
is “beyond repair.” (rollo, pp. 105­108).
11
 People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704 (cited in Ordoño vs.
Daquigan, supra.).
568
568  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Castañeda, Jr.
against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by
the   Solicitor   General,   “(t)o   espouse   the   contrary   view   would
spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many
falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter
in the anti­marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice
her in secret—all with unabashed and complete impunity.”
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower
court dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifying   for   or   against   her   husband,   Benjamin   Manaloto,   in
Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977,
denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby
the trial of the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against
her husband.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquinoand Con­
cepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Order set aside.
Note.—The husband’s sale of conjugal lot without the wife’s
consent is not valid. (Villocino vs. Doyon, 18 SCRA 1094; Reyes vs.
De Leon, 20 SCRA 369).
The wife may ask the court to renounce the administrative of
conjugal properties from the husband for her protection. (Ysasi
vs. Fernandez, 23 SCRA 1079).
 A   debt   contracted   by   the   wife   is   a   debt   of   the   conjugal
partnership   where   the   husband   was   negligent   in   allowing   the
wife to incur debts. (Garcia vs. Cruz, 25 SCRA 224).
An illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone over a
piece of land paraphernal in character cannot bind nor affect the
wife’s possession thereof. (Plata vs. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718).
——o0o——
569
234  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74306. March 16, 1992.*
ENRIQUE   RAZON,   petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE   COURT   and   VICENTE   B.   CHUIDIAN,   in   his
capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T.
CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315. March 16, 1992.*
VICENTE   B.   CHUIDIAN,   petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZON, and E. RAZON, INC.,
respondents.
Evidence; “Dead   man’s   statute.”—In   the   instant   case,   the
testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the
father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator
of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the
lifetime  of   Juan   Chuidian   that  the   1,500   shares   of   stock   in  E.
Razon,   Inc.   are   actually   owned   by   the   defendant   unless   the
deceased   Juan   Chuidian   opted   to   pay   the   same   which   never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of
the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly   owned   by   the   late   Juan   T.   Chuidian.   It   is   clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition   of   the   rule.   The   case   was   not   filed against the
administrator   of   the   estate,   nor   was   it   filed   upon
claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the
private   respondent   never   objected   to   the   testimony   of   the
petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the
late   elder   Chuidian.   The   petitioner’s   testimony   was   subject   to
cross­examination   by   the   private   respon­dent’s   counsel.   Hence,
granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition
of   Section   20(a),   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   the   private
Corporation Law; Transfer of stock certificates.—The law is
clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective,
the   certificate   must   be   properly indorsed and   that   title   to   such
certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of
the duly   indorsed certificate   of   stock.   (Section   35,   Corporation
Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500
shares of stock registered in the 
_______________
 THIRD DIVISION.
*
235
VOL. 207, MARCH 16, 1992  235 
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the
petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares
of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner’s asseveration that he
did not require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view
of his intimate friendship with the late Juan Chuidian can not
overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or
the proper conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate,
indorsement   of   the   certificate   of   stock   is   a   mandatory
requirement   of   law   for   an   effective   transfer   of   a   certificate   of
stock.
PETITIONS to review the decision and resolution of the then  236  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Rafael T. Durian for Enrique Razon.
     Manuel R. Singson for Vicente B. Chuidian.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The   main   issue   in   these   consolidated   petitions   centers   on   the
ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by
Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered
under   the   name   of   Juan   T.   Chuidian   in   the   books   of   the
corporation.   The   then   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Manila,   now
Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the
petitioner   in G.R.   No.   74306 is  the  owner   of   the  said   shares   of
stock.   The   then   Intermediate   Appellate   Court,   now   Court   of
Appeals,   however,   reversed   the   trial   court’s   decision   and   ruled
that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente
B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock.
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Enrique
Razon wanted the appellate court’s decision reversed and the trial
court’s  decision  affirmed while Vicente  Chuidian asked  that all
cash and stock dividends and all the pre­emptive rights accruing
to   the   1,500   shares   of   stock   be   ordered   delivered   to   him.   The
appellate court denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.
The relevant antecedent facts are as follows:
“In   his   complaint   filed   on   June   29,   1971,   and   amended   on
November 16, 1971, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants
Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de
Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and
Luis M. de 
236
 
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon,
Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the defendants from
disposing   of   the  said   shares   of  stock,   for   a   writ   of   preliminary
attachment   v.   properties   of   defendants   having   possession   of
shares of stock and for receivership of the properties of defendant
corporation x x x.
xxx      xxx      xxx
In   their   answer   filed   on   June   18,   1973,   defendants   alleged
that all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record
of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that
said shares are subject to the agreement between defendants and
incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and
remained in the possession of Razon. Appellees also alleged xxx
that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid
any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question x
x x.
xxx      xxx      xxx
The   evidence   of   the   plaintiff   shows   that   he   is   the
administrator of the intestate estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian
in   Special   Proceedings   No.   71054,   Court   of   First   Instance   of
Manila.
Sometime   in   1962,   Enrique   Razon   organized   the   E.   Razon,
Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South
Harbor,   Manila.   The   incorporators   consisted   of   Enrique   Razon,
Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim,
Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle.
 On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of
stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan T.
Chuidian.
On   the  basis   of  the   1,500   shares   of   stock,   the  late   Juan  T.
Chuidian and after him, the plaintiff­appellant, were elected as
directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and were
paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
“From   the   time   the   certificate   of   stock   was   issued   on   April
1966   up   to   April   1971,   Enrique   Razon   had   not   questioned   the
ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in question
and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock
over the said shares cancelled.
The   certificate   of   stock   was   in   the   possession   of   defendant
Razon who refused to deliver said shares to the plaintiff, until the
same   was   surrendered   by   defendant   Razon   and   deposited   in   a
safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce.
Defendants   allege   that   after   organizing   the   E.   Razon,   Inc.,
Enrique   Razon  distributed   shares   of   stock   previously   placed   in
the   names   of   the   withdrawing   nominal   incorporators   to   some
friends including Juan T. Chuidian.
Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon  the   petitioner   was   subjected   to   a   rigid   cross   examination
237
VOL. 207, MARCH 16, 1992  237
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
instruction of the late Chuidian on April 23, 1966 was personally
delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary
of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was himself an associate of
the   Chuidian   Law   Office   (Exhs.   C   &   11).   Since   then,   Enrique
Razon was in possession of said stock certificate even during the
lifetime   of   the   late   Chuidian,   from   the   time   the   late   Chuidian
delivered the said stock certificate to defendant Razon until the
time (sic) of defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties (sic)
delivered it for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of
the parties as confirmed by the trial court in its order of August 7,
1971.
Thus,   the  1,500   shares  of  stock  under   Stock   Certificate  No.
003   were   delivered   by  the  late  Chuidian  to  Enrique  because   it
was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of
stock   in   the   defendant   corporation   and   the   understanding   was
that  he  (defendant  Razon)  was the owner of the said shares of
stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he
was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders
(TSN., pp. 4, 8, 10, 24­25, 25­26, 28­31, 31­32, 60, 66­68, July 22,
1980, Exhs. “C”, “11”, “13” “14”).” (Rollo—74306, pp. 66­68)
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate
court’s decision  on its alleged misapplication of the dead man’s
statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
According to him, the “dead man’s statute” rule is not applicable
to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff
in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral
agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that
the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the
petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that
regarding such testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence) states:
“SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship—
The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they
are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a)   Parties   or   assignors   of   parties   to   a   case,   or   persons   in
whose   behalf   a   case   is   prosecuted, against   an   executor   or
administrator or   other   representative   of   a   deceased   person,   or
against   a   person   of   unsound   mind, upon   a   claim   or   demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing
before the death of such deceased  the administrator of   the   estate   of   the   late   Juan   Chuidian   to
238
238  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  late Juan T. Chuidian.
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
person or before such person became of unsound mind.” (Italics
supplied)
xxx      xxx      xxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this
wise:
“The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against
the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify
as to  the  supposed statements made by him (deceased  person),
many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased
persons   as   the   latter   can   no   longer   deny   or   refute   them,   thus
unjustly   subjecting   their   properties   or   rights   to   false   or
unscrupulous   claims   or   demands.   The   purpose   of   the  law   is   to
‘guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to
the transaction  in question  on the part of  the surviving  party.’
(Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et
al., 622 [1955])
The   rule,   however,   delimits   the   prohibition   it   contemplates   in
that   it   is   applicable   to   a   case against the   administrator   or   its
representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the
deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate
court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that
the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente
Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and
the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the
1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the
defendant unless the deceased Juan  Chuidian opted to  pay  the
same   which   never   happened.   The   case   was   filed   by
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not
within   the   prohibition   of   the   rule.   The   case   was   not
filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.
Furthermore,   the   records   show   that   the   private   respondent
never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the
true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The
petitioner’s testimony was subject to cross­examination by the 
239
VOL. 207, MARCH 16, 1992  239 
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
private   respondent’s   counsel.   Hence,   granting   that   the
petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed
to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of
Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
“It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which
would   ordinarily   be   incompetent   under   the   rules   but   has   been
rendered  admissible by  the  failure   of  a  party   to  object  thereto.
Thus:
“  ‘xxx The acceptance  of an incompetent  witness to testify in a
civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper questions that may
be   put   to   him   while   on   the   stand   is   a   matter   resting   in   the
discretion   of   the   litigant.   He   may   assert   his   right   by   timely
objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case
the option rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the
case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard
it for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had
been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion (Emphasis
supplied). (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)”
The   issue   as   to   whether   or   not   the   petitioner’s   testimony   is
admissible   having   been   settled,   we   now   proceed   to   discuss   the
fundamental issue on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock
in E. Razon, Inc.
E.   Razon,   Inc.   was  organized   in  1962  by  petitioner  Enrique
Razon   for   the   purpose   of   participating   in   the   bidding   for   the
arrastre   services   in   South   Harbor,   Manila.   The   incorporators
were   Enrique   Razon,   Enrique   Valles,   Luisa   M.   de   Razon,   Jose
Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de
Tagle. The business, however, did not start operations until 1966.
According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators withdrew
from   the   said   corporation.   The   petitioner   then   distributed   the
stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal
incorporators   to   some   friends,   among   them   the   late   Juan   T.
Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares of stock. The shares of
stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as nominal
stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock
were owned and held by the petitioner but Chuidian was given
the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement, Chuidian
in 1966 delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering
the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon,  Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the records
240
240  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Inc. Since then, the petitioner had in his possession the certificate
of   stock   until   the   time,   he   delivered   it   for   deposit   with   the
Philippine   Bank   of   Commerce   under   the   parties’   joint   custody
pursuant   to   their   agreement   as   embodied   in   the   trial   court’s
order.
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as
regards   the   true   nature   of   his   agreement   with   the   late   Juan
Chuidian   on   the   1,500   shares   of   stock   of   E.   Razon,   Inc.   is
sufficient  to  prove  his   ownership   over   the  said   1,500   shares   of
stock.
The petitioner’s contention is not correct.
In   the  case   of Embassy   Farms,   Inc.   v.   Court   of  Appeals(188
SCRA 492 [1990]) we ruled:
“xxx   For   an  effective   transfer   of   shares   of  stock   the  mode   and
manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be followed (Navea
v.   Peers   Marketing   Corp., 74   SCRA   65).   As   provided   under
Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation   Code   of   the   Philippines,   shares   of   stock   may   be
transferred by delivery to the transferee of the certificate properly
indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferee by the delivery of
the   duly   indorsed   certificate   of   stock   (18   C.J.S.   928,   cited
in Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no transfer shall
be   valid,   except   as   between   the   parties   until   the   transfer   is
properly   recorded   in   the   books   of   the   corporation”   (Sec.   63,
Corporation Code of the Philippines; Section 35 of the Corporation
Law)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500
shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan
show that during his lifetime Chuidian was elected member of the
was a stockholder of the corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation
Code)   From   the   point   of   view   of   the   corporation,   therefore,
Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a
case,   the   petitioner   who   claims   ownership   over   the   questioned
shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him
by proving that all the requirements for the effective transfer of
shares of stock in accordance with  the corporation’s  by  laws,  if
any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74
SCRA 65 [1976])  legal   services   to   the   corporation.   Petitioner   Razon   failed   to
241
VOL. 207, MARCH 16, 1992  241
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
or in accordance with the provisions of law.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not
present any by­laws which could show that the 1,500 shares of
stock were effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the
corporation’s   by   laws   or   rules   governing   effective   transfer   of
shares of stock, the provisions of the Corporation Law are made
applicable to the instant case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate
to be effective, the certificate must be properly indorsed and that
title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the
delivery   of   the duly   indorsedcertificate   of   stock.   (Section   35,
Corporation   Code)   Since   the   certificate   of   stock   covering   the
questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the late
Juan   Chuidian   was   never   indorsed   to   the   petitioner,   the
inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong
to Chuidian. The petitioner’s asseveration that he did not require
an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate
friendship   with   the   late   Juan   Chuidian   can   not   overcome   the
failure   to   follow   the   procedure   required   by   law   or   the   proper
conduct   of   business   even   among   friends.   To   reiterate,
indorsement   of   the   certificate   of   stock   is   a   mandatory
requirement   of   law   for   an   effective   transfer   of   a   certificate   of
stock.   Moreover,   the   preponderance   of   evidence   supports   the
appellate   court’s   factual   findings   that  the  shares   of   stock   were
given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the
legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We
give credence to the testimony of the private respondent that the
shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his
overcome this testimony.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that
the appellate court’s decision declaring his deceased father Juan
T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc.
should   have   included   all   cash   and   stock   dividends   and   all   the
preemptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre­emptive rights
are all incidents of stock ownership.
The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as fol­
242
242  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Razon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
lows:
x x x      x x x      x x x
“x   x   x   [F]irst,   to   have   a   certificate   or   other   evidence   of   his
status as stockholder issued to him; second, to vote at meetings of
the corporation;  third,   to receive his proportionate share  of  the
profits   of   the   corporation;   and   lastly,   to   participate
proportionately  in the distribution of the corporate assets  upon
the   dissolution   or   winding   up.   (Purdy’s   Beach   on   Private
Corporations, sec. 554)” (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82,
87)
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. a)In G.R.   No.   74306,   the   petition   is   DISMISSED.   The
questioned   decision   and   resolution   of   the   then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
 2. b)In G.R.   No.   74315,   the   petition   is   GRANTED.   The
questioned   Resolution   insofar   as   it   denied   the
petitioner’s   motion   to   clarify   the   dispositive   portion   of
the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate  Court,
now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in that
all cash and stock dividends as well as all pre­emptive
rights   that   have   accrued   and   attached   to   the   1,500
shares   in   E.   Razon,   Inc.,   since   1966   are   declared   to
belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
SO ORDERED.
     Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
     Feliciano, J., On leave.
G.R. No. 74306 dismissed; decision and resolution affirmed.
G.R. No. 74315, granted. Resolution and decision reversed and
set aside.
Note.—For an effective transfer of shares of stock, the mode
and manner of transfer as prescribed by law should be followed.
(Embassy Farms, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 492.)
——o0o——
243
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reserved.
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  249 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001.*
LILIBETH   SUNGA­CHAN   and   CECILIA   SUNGA,
petitioners, vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
Partnership; Contracts; A partnership may be constituted in
any   form,   except   where   immovable   property   or   real   rights   are
contributed  thereto,   in   which   case   a  public   instrument  shall  be
necessary.—A partnership may be constituted in any form, except
where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto,
in   which   case   a   public   instrument   shall   be   necessary.   Hence,
based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts
and   ascertained   from   their   language   and   conduct,   a   verbal
contract of partnership may arise. The essential points that must
be  proven  to  show   that  a   partnership   was  agreed  upon   are (1)
mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in
the profits. Understandably so, in view of the absence of a written
contract   of   partnership   between   respondent   and   Jacinto,
respondent   resorted   to   the   introduction   of   documentary   and
testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue
to settle then is whether or not the “Dead Man’s Statute”  became of unsound mind.”
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
250
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  counterclaim.—Two reasons forestall the application of the “Dead
50  Man’s Statute” to this case. First, petitioners filed a compulsory
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondent’s
testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
Same; Evidence; Dead   Man’s   Statute; Requirements; The
“Dead   Man’s   Statute”   provides   that   if   one   party   to   the   alleged
transaction   is   precluded   from   testifying   by   death,   insanity,   or
other   mental   disabilities,   the   surviving   party   is   not   entitled   to
undue   advantage   of   giving   his   own   uncontradicted   and
unexplained   account   of   the   transaction.—The   “Dead   Man’s
Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded   from   testifying   by   death,   insanity,   or   other   mental
disabilities,   the   surviving   party   is   not   entitled   to   the   undue
advantage   of   giving   his   own   uncontradicted   and   unexplained
account of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully
invoked   to   bar   the   introduction   of   testimonial   evidence,   it   is
necessary that: “1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to
a   case  or  persons   in  whose  behalf  a  case   is  prosecuted.   2.   The
action   is   against   an   executor   or   administrator   or   other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject­matter of the action is a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound
mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
Same; Same; Same; Same; When   it   is   the   executor   or
administrator   or   representatives   of   the   estate   that   sets   up   the
counterclaim,   the   plaintiff,   herein   respondent,   may   testify   to
occurrences   before   the   death   of   the   deceased   to   defeat   the
counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial
court,   and   with   the   filing   of   their   counterclaim,   petitioners
themselves  effectively   removed  this   case  from  the  ambit  of  the
“Dead Man’s Statute.” Well entrenched is the rule that when it is
the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that
sets   up   the   counterclaim,   the   plaintiff,   herein   respondent,   may
testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the   counterclaim.   Moreover,   as   defendant   in   the   counterclaim,
respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.
251
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  251 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
Same; Same; Words   and   Phrases; “Assignor”   of   a   party
means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the
assignor   of   a   right   assigned   before   any   cause   of   action   has
arisen.”—The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead
Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.” Records show that respondent offered the testimony
of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is
the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because
the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action
which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before
any cause of action has arisen.” Plainly then, Josephine is merely
a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
Same; Dissolution; The   Civil   Code   expressly   provides   that
upon   dissolution,   the   partnership   continues   and   its   legal
personality   is   retained   until   the   complete   winding   up   of   its
business   culminating   in   its   termination.—With   regard   to
petitioners’ insistence that laches and/or prescription should have
extinguished   respondent’s   claim,   we   agree   with   the   trial   court
and the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting filed by
respondent three (3) years after Jacinto’s death was well within
the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to
enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years while the right
to demand an accounting for a partner’s interest as against the
person continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution,
in the absence of any contrary agreement. Considering that the
death of a partner results in the dissolution of the partnership, in
this   case,   it   was   after   Jacinto’s   death   that   respondent   as   the
surviving partner had the right to an account of his interest as
against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto’s death
dissolved   the   partnership,   the   dissolution   did   not   immediately
terminate the partnership. The Civil Code expressly provides that
upon   dissolution,   the   partnership   continues   and   its   legal
personality   is   retained   until   the   complete   winding   up   of   its
business, culminating in its termination.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of  respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel T. Chan for petitioners.
     Pacatang Law Office for respondent. 
252
252  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
GONZAGA­REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
January   31,   2000   in   the   case   entitled   “Lamberto   T.   Chua   vs.
Lilibeth Sunga  Chan and  Cecilia   Sunga” and  of  the  Resolution
dated   May   23,   2000   denying   the   motion   for   reconsideration   of
herein   petitioners   Lilibeth   Sunga   Chan   and   Cecilia   Sunga
(hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent)
filed   a   complaint   against   Lilibeth   Sunga   Chan   (hereafter
petitioner   Lilibeth)   and   Cecilia   Sunga   (hereafter   petitioner
Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto
L.   Sunga   (hereafter   Jacinto),   for   “Winding   Up   of   Partnership
Affairs,   Accounting,   Appraisal   and   Recovery   of   Shares   and
Damages   with   Writ   of   Preliminary   Attachment”   with   the
Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch   11,   Sindangan,   Zamboanga   del
Norte.
Respondent alleged that in  1977, he  verbally entered into a
partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied
Petroleum   Gas   (LPG)   in   Manila.   For   business   convenience,
name   of   their   partnership,   SHELLITE   GAS   APPLIANCE
CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital
contribution   of   P100,000.00   to   Jacinto   while   the   latter   in   turn
produced  P100,000.00  as his  counterpart  contribution,  with  the
intention that the profits would be equally divided between them.
The   partnership   allegedly   had   Jacinto  as   manager,   assisted   by
Josephine   Sy   (hereafter   Josephine),   a   sister   of   the   wife   of
respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a
manager’s   fee   or   remuneration   of   10%   of   the   gross   profit   and
Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her
wages and other remuneration from the business.  of   P200,000.00   and   partially   paid   the   same   to   respondent.
_______________
 Per   Associate   Justice   Delilah   Vidallon­Magtolis   and
1
concurred   in   by   Associate   Justices   Bernardo   P.   Abesamis   and
Mercedes Gozo­Dadole, Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division.
253
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  253
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July
8, 1977, its business operation went quite well and was profitable.
Respondent claimed that he could attest to the success of their
business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled
Shellane   cylinder   tanks   supplied   by   Pilipinas   Shell   Petroleum
Corporation.   While   Jacinto   furnished   respondent   with   the
merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite
from   1977   to   1989,   respondent   however   suspected   that   the
amount   indicated   in   these   documents   were   understated   and
undervalued   by   Jacinto   and   Josephine   for   their   own   selfish
reasons and for tax avoidance.
Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of 1989, his surviving
wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner
Lilibeth,   took   over   the   operations,   control,   custody,   disposition
and   management   of   Shellite   without   respondent’s   consent.
Despite   respondent’s   repeated   demands   upon   petitioners   for
accounting,   inventory,   appraisal,   winding   up   and   restitution   of
his   net   shares   in   the   partnership,   petitioners   failed   to   comply.
Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite,
converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner
Lilibeth   ran   out   of   alibis   and   reasons   to   evade   respondent’s
demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount
Petitioner   Lilibeth   allegedly   informed   respondent   that   the
P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter’s share in
the partnership, with a promise that the former would make the
complete   inventory   and   winding   up   of   the   properties   of   the
business   establishment.   Despite   such   commitment,   petitioners
allegedly   failed   to   comply   with   their   duty   to   account,   and
continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to the
damage and prejudice of respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
on   the   ground   that   the   Securities   and   Exchange   Commission
(SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del
Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent  opposed the
motion to dismiss.
On   January   12,   1993,   the   trial   court   finding   the   complaint
sufficient in form and substance denied the motion to dismiss. 
254
254  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
On   January   30,   1993,   petitioners   filed   their   Answer   with
Compulsory   Counterclaims,   contending   that  they   are  not  liable
for   partnership   shares,   unreceived   income/profits,   interests,
damages   and   attorney’s   fees,   that   respondent   does   not   have   a
cause   of   action   against   them,   and   that   the   trial   court   has   no
jurisdiction   over   the   nature   of   the   action,   the   SEC   being   the
agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss
this   time   on   the   ground   that   the   claim   for   winding   up   of
partnership   affairs,   accounting   and   recovery   of   shares   in
partnership   affairs,   accounting   and   recovery   of   shares   in
partnership assets/properties should be dismissed and prosecuted
against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate
proceeding.
On August 16, 1993, the trial court denied the second motion
to dismiss for lack of merit.
On   November   26,   1993,   petitioners   filed   their   Petition   for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA­G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a
Motion to Suspend Pre­trial Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to
suspend pre­trial conference.
On   November   15,   1994,   the   Court   of   Appeals   denied   the
petition for lack of merit.
On   January   16,   1995,   this   Court   denied   the   petition   for
review, on certiorari filed by petitioner, “as petitioners failed to
show   that   a   reversible   error   was   committed   by   the   appellate
court.”2
On  February   20,   1995,   entry   of  judgment  was  made  by   the
Clerk of Court and the case was remanded to the trial court on
April 26, 1995.
On  September   25,   1995,   the  trial   court  terminated  the  pre­
trial conference and set the hearing of the case on January 17,
1996. 
_________________
2
 Rollo, p. 185.
255
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  255 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
Respondent   presented   his   evidence   while   petitioners   were
considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their
failure   to   attend   the   scheduled   date   for   reception   of   evidence
despite notice.
On   October   7,   1997,   the   trial   court   rendered   its   Decision
ruling   for   respondent.   The   dispositive   portion   of   the   Decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE,   judgment   is   hereby   rendered   in   favor   of   the
plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
1. (1)DIRECTING   them   to   render   an   accounting   in
acceptable   form   under   accounting   procedures   and
standards of the properties, assets, income and profits of
the   Shellite   Gas   Appliance   Center   since   the   time   of
death  of  Jacinto  L.   Sunga,   from   whom  they   continued
the business operations including all businesses derived
from   the   Shellite   Gas   Appliance   Center;   submit   an
inventory, and appraisal of all these properties, assets,
income,   profits,   etc.   to   the   Court   and   to   plaintiff   for
approval or disapproval;
2. (2)ORDERING   them   to   return   and   restitute   to   the
partnership any and all properties, assets, income and
profits they misapplied and converted to their own use
and advantage that legally pertain to the plaintiff and
account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on
pages 4­5 of this petition as basis;
 3. (3)DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff
1/2 shares and interest of the plaintiff in the partnership
of   the   listed   properties,   assets   and   good   will   (sic)   in
schedules A, B and C, on pages 4­5 of the petition;
4. (4)ORDERING   them   to   pay   the   plaintiff   earned   but
unreceived income and profits from the partnership from
1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the
closure  of  the  store  the  sum  of   P35,000.00   per  month,
with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
5. (5)ORDERING   them   to   wind   up   the   affairs   of   the
partnership   and   terminate   its   business   activities
pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the
1/2   interest,   shares,   participation   and   equity   in   the
partnership,   or the  value  thereof  in  money  or  money’s
worth, if the properties are not physically divisible;
6. (6)FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga­Chan guilty
of breach of trust and in bad faith and hold them liable
to   the   plaintiff   the   sum   of   P50,000.00   as   moral   and
exemplary damages; and,
7. (7)DIRECTING   them   to   reimburse   and   pay   the   sum   of
P25,000.00   as   attorney’s   (sic)   and   P25,000.00   as
litigation expenses.
256
256  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.
SO ORDERED.”3
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the
trial court, appealing the case to the Court of Appeals.
On   January   31,   2000,   the   Court   of   Appeals   dismissed   the
appeal. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE,   the   instant   appeal   is   dismissed.   The   appealed
decision is AFFIRMED in all respects.”4
On   May   23,   2000,   the   Court   of   Appeals   denied   the   motion   for
reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Hence,   this   petition   wherein   petitioner   relies   upon   the
following grounds:
1. “1.The   Court   of   Appeals   erred   in   making   a   legal
conclusion   that   there   existed   a   partnership   between
respondent   Lamberto   T.   Chua   and   the   late   Jacinto   L.
Sunga   upon   the   latter’s   invitation   and   offer   and   that
upon his death the partnership assets and business were
taken over by petitioners.
2. 2.The   Court   of   Appeals   erred   in   making   the   legal
conclusion that laches and/or prescription did not apply
in the instant case. Petitioners question the correctness
of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that   a   partnership   existed   between   respondent   and
Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto’s death. In the absence
of   any   written   document   to   show   such   partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that
these   courts   were   proscribed   from   hearing   the
testimonies of respondent and
3. 3.The   Court   of   Appeals   erred   in   making   the   legal
conclusion   that   there   was   competent   and   credible
evidence   to   warrant   the   finding   of   a   partnership,   and
 assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership,
the finding of highly exaggerated amounts or values in
the partnership assets and profits.”5
Petitioners   question   the   correctness   of   the   finding   of   the   trial
court   and   the   Court   of   Appeals   that   a   partnership   existed
between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto’s death.
In the ansence of any written document to show such partnership
between   respondent   and   Jacinto,   petitioners   argue   that   these
courts   were   proscribed   from   hearing   the   testimonies   of
respondent and  on  the  intention of  the parties,   as  gathered from the  facts  and
________________
3
 Records, pp. 75­76; Decision, pp. 25­26.
4
 Rollo, p. 46; Decision, p. 11.
5
 Rollo, pp. 13­14; Petition, pp. 6­7.
257
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  257
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
his   witness,   Josephine,   to   prove   the   alleged   partnership   three
years after Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners
invoke   the   “Dead   Man’s   Statute”   or   “Survivorship   Rule”   under
Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides: 
“SEC.   23. Disqualification   by   reason   of   death   or   insanity   of
adverse   party.—Parties   or   assignors   of   parties   to   a   case,   or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
against   a   person   of   unsound   mind,   upon   a   claim   or   demand
against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind.”
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of
respondent  and   his   alter   ego,   Josephine,   should   not   have   been
admitted   to   prove   certain   claims   against   a   deceased   person
(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
We are not persuaded.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where
immovable   property   or   real   rights   are   contributed   thereto,   in
which case a public instrument shall be necessary.6 Hence, based
ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of
partnership may arise.7 The essential points that must be proven
to   show   that   a   partnership   was   agreed   upon   are   (1)   mutual
contribution  to  a   common   stock,   and  (2)   a   joint  interest   in  the
profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of a written
contract   of   partnership   between   respondent   and   Jacinto,
respondent   resorted   to   the   introduction   of   documentary   and
testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue
to settle then is whether or not the 
________________
6
 JOSE   C.   VITUG, COMPENDIUM   OF   CIVIL   LAW   AND
JURISPRUDENCE, REV. ED. (1993), p. 712.
7
 RAMON   C.   AQUINO   AND   CAROLINA   C.   GRIÑO­
AQUINO, THE   CIVIL   CODE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   VOL.   3
(1990), p. 295.
8
 ARTURO   M.   TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES   AND
JURISPRUDENCE   ON   THE   CIVIL   CODE   OF   THE
PHILIPPINES, VOLUME 5 (1997), p. 320.
258
258  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
“Dead   Man’s   Statute”   applies   to   this   case   so   as   to   render
inadmissible   respondent’s   testimony   and   that   of   his   witness,
Josephine.
The  “Dead  Man’s  Statute”  provides  that  if  one  party   to  the
alleged   transaction   is   precluded   from   testifying   by   death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted
and unexplained account of the transaction. 9 But before this rule
can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial
evidence, it is necessary that:
1. “1.The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case
or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. 2.The  action   is  against   an  executor   or   administrator   or
other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind;
3. 3.The subject­matter of the action is a claim or demand
against   the   estate   of   such   deceased   person   or   against
person of unsound mind;
4. 4.His   testimony   refers   to   any   matter   of   fact   which
occurred   before   the   death   of   such   deceased   person   or
before such person became of unsound mind.”10
Two reasons forestall the application of the “Dead Man’s Statute”
to this case.
First,   petitioners   filed   a   compulsory   counterclaim 11against
respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the
filing   of   their   counterclaim,   petitioners   themselves   effectively
removed   this   case   from   the   ambit   of   the   “Dead   Man’s
Statute.”12 Well   entrenched   is   the   rule   that   when   it   is   the
executor   or   administrator   or   representatives   of   the   estate   that
sets   up   the   counterclaim,   the   plaintiff,   herein   respondent,   may
testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the  counterclaim.13 Moreover,   as  defendant  in  the  counterclaim,
respondent is not disqualified from 
________________
 Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 247 (1998), p. 258.
9
 OSCAR   M.   HERRERA, REMEDIAL   LAW,   REVISED
10
RULES ON EVIDENCE, VOL. V (1999), pp. 308­309.
11
 Records, pp. 47­51.
12
 See Goni vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 222 (1986).
13
 HERRERA, supra, p. 310.
259
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  259 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the
estate or representatives of the deceased.14
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead
Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.” Records show that respondent offered the testimony
of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is
the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because
the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action
which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before
any   cause   of   action   has   arisen.” 15 Plainly   then,   Josephine   is
merely   a   witness   of   respondent,   the   latter   being   the   party
plaintiff.
We   are   not   convinced   by   petitioners’   allegation   that
Josephine’s   testimony   lacks   probative   value   because   she   was
allegedly coerced by respondent, her brother­in­law, to testify in
his   favor.   Josephine   merely   declared   in   court   that   she   was
requested   by   respondent   to   testify   and   that   if   she   were   not
requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how
we   can   conclude   from   this   candid   admission   that   Josephine’s
testimony   is   involuntary   when   she   did   not   in   any   way
categorically   say   that   she   was   forced   to   be   a   witness   of
respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife
of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since
relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of
witnesses.16
Petitioners’   reliance   alone   on   the   “Dead   Man’s   Statute”   to
defeat respondent’s claim cannot prevail over the factual findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was
established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on
the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence
for  provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in
__________________
14
 Goni vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 233.
15
 RICARDO J. FRANCISCO, EVIDENCE, THIRD EDITION
(1996), p. 135.
16
 People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998), p. 32.
260
260  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership,
albeit an informal one.
Notably,   petitioners   did   not   present   any   evidence   in   their
favor during trial. By the weight of judicial precedents, a factual
matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between
respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on
review.17 This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs
presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to
ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one
party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out that petitioners
failed   to   attend   the   presentation   of   evidence   of   respondent.
Petitioners   cannot   now   turn   to   this   Court   to   question   the
admissibility   and   authenticity   of   the   documentary   evidence   of
respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of
the evidence at the time that such evidence was offered.19
With   regard   to   petitioners’   insistence   that   laches   and/or
prescription   should   have   extinguished   respondent’s   claim,   we
agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action
for accounting filed by respondent three (3) years after Jacinto’s
death   was   well   within   the   prescribed   period.   The   Civil   Code
six   (6)   years20 while   the   right   to   demand   an   accounting   for   a
partner’s interest as against the person continuing the business
accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement.21Consider­
________________
17
 Alicbusan vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 336 (1997), p. 341
18
 Ibid.
19
 See Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 356 (1999).
20
 ”The following actions must be commenced within six years:
 1. (1)Upon an oral contract; and
2. (2)Upon a quasi­contract.”
 Art. 1842, Civil Code:
21
“The   right   to   an   account   of   his   interest   shall   accrue   to   any
partner,   or   his   legal   representative   as   against   the   winding   up
partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership
continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence
of any ssagreement to the contrary.”
261
VOL. 363, AUGUST 15, 2001  261
Sunga­Chan vs. Chua
ing that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the
partnership,22 in   this   case,   it   was   after   Jacinto’s   death   that
respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an account of
his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while
Jacinto’s death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not
immediately   terminate   the   partnership.   The   Civil
Code23 expressly provides that upon dissolution, the partnership
continues and its legal personality is retained until the complete
winding up of its business, culminating in its termination. 24
In   a   desperate   bid  to   cast   doubt   on   the   validity   of  the  oral
partnership   between   respondent   and   Jacinto,   petitioners
maintain   that   said   partnership   that   had   an   initial   capital   of
P200,000.00 should have been registered with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  since  registration  is  mandated  by
the Civil Code. True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that
partnerships  with  a  capital  of  P3,000.00   or  more  must  register
with   the   SEC,   however,   this   registration   requirement   is   not
mandatory.   Article   1768   of   the   Civil   Code 25 explicitly   provides
that   the   partnership   retains   its   juridical   personality   even   if   it
fails to register. The failure to register the contract of partnership
does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as
the   contract   has   the   essential   requisites,   because   the   main
purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can
be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of
their   contract.26 In   the   case   at   bar,   noncompliance   with   this
directory provision of the law will not invalidate the partnership
considering that the totality of the evidence 
__________________
22
 Article 1830, Civil Code
24
 Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 328 (1999), p. 347.
23
 “Art. 1828. The dissolution of a partnership is the change in
the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be
associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding
up  of  the business. Art.  1829.  On  dissolution the partnership is
not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership
affairs is completed.”
25
 “The   partnership   has   a   juridical   personality   separate   and
distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to
comply with the requirements of article 1772, first paragraph.”
26
 TOLENTINO, supra, p. 325.
262
262  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Gold Line Transit, Inc. vs. Ramos
proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed forged the partnership
in question.
WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   petition   is
DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
     Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval­
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Dissolution   of   a   partnership   is   the   change   in   the
relation   of   the   parties   caused   by   any   partner   ceasing   to   be
associated in the carrying on, as might be distinguished from the
winding up, of its businesses. (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA
328 [1999])
The  partnership   although  dissolved,   continues   to  exist  until
its termination, at which time the winding up of its affairs should
have   been   completed   and   the   net   partnership   assets   are
partitioned   and   distributed   to   the   partners.   (Sy   vs.   Court   of
Appeals, 313 SCRA 328 [1999])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL. 374, JANUARY 25, 2002  555 
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112443.  January 25, 2002.*
TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS   OF   NICANOR   JAYME,   namely,   CANDIDA   FLORES,
EMANNUEL   JAYME,   DINA   JAYME   DEJORAS,   EVELIA
JAYME,   and   GESILA   JAYME;   AND   HEIRS   OF   ASUNCION
JAYME­BACLAY,   namely,   ANGELO   JAYME­BACLAY,
CARMEN   JAYME­DACLAN   and   ELNORA   JAYME   BACLAY,
respondents.
Appeals; Evidence; It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals upholding  those of  the  trial  court are  binding
upon the Supreme Court.—The contentions are without merit. It
is   doctrinal   that   findings   of   facts   of   the   Court   of   Appeals
upholding  those  of  the  trial  court are  binding  upon  this  Court.
While   there   are   exceptions   to   this   rule,   petitioner   has   not
convinced us that this case falls under one of them.
Land Registration; Land Titles; It is a settled rule that the
Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith,
and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the
commission   of   fraud,   or   as   a   means   to   enrich   oneself   at   the
expense of others.—The Court sees no reason to deviate from the
findings of the trial  court that  petitioner resorted  to fraud and
misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot
under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that
misrepresentation tainted petitioner’s application, insofar as her
declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed
by   any   other   person.   Her   declaration   is   belied   by   the   extra­
judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mother’s aborted
attempt   to   have   the   lot   registered,   private   respondents’
predecessors­in­interest’s   opposition   thereto,   and   by   the
occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his
family since 1945. It is a settled rule that the Land Registration
Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does not permit
its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or
as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.
Same; Same; Evidence; Dead Man’s Statute; The dead man’s
statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter   of   fact   coming   to   his   knowledge   in   any   other   way   than
through   personal   dealings   with   the   deceased   person,   or
communication made by the deceased to the witness.—As to the
alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that
said rule finds no application in the present case. The dead 
_______________
*
 FIRST DIVISION.
556
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  petitioner’s   mother,   second,   to   the   predecessors­in­interest   of
56 
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
man’s   statute   does   not   operate   to   close   the   mouth   of   a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any
other   way   than   through   personal   dealings   with   the   deceased
person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their
witnesses   in   the   present   case   is   based, inter   alia,   on   the   1947
Deed of Extra­judicial Partition and other documents, and not on
dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned
testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
Succession; In order that an heir may assert his right to the
property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship
is necessary.—Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that
private   respondents   are   not   legal   heirs   of   Nicanor   Jayme   and
Asuncion   Jayme­Baclay.   Other   than   their   bare   allegations   to
dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to
substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may
assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.
Evidence; Admissions   Against   Interest; Where   one   derives
title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while  holding  the  title, in relation to the property, is
evidence   against   the   former.—Anent   the   issue   of   identity,   the
disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799­C) vis­a­vis the
boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra­judicial
Partition can be explained by the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799­C) is
only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a
1/3 pro   indivisoportion   of   which   was   adjudicated   each   to,   first,
private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically
therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the
records   show   that   the   parcel   of   land   adjudicated   to   the
predecessors­in­interest of the parties herein was the lot found on
the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City.
As  admitted further by both  parties,  Lot No.  1242 (799­C) was
part of the land allotted to their predecessors­in­interest in the
1947   Deed   of   Extra­judicial   Partition.   Moreover,   petitioner’s
mother   acknowledged   in   her   application   for   registration   of   Lot
No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra­judicial Partition was the source
of   her   claim   over   the   lot   sought   to   be   registered.   She   further
admitted  that  the lot  now  known  as Lot  No.  1242   (799­C)  was
part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co­heirs, to the
extent   of   1/3   share   each.   Under   Section   31,   Rule   130,   of   the
Revised  Rules  on  Evidence,   where  one  derives  title  to  property
from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against
the former.
557
VOL. 374, JANUARY 25, 2002  557
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
Land   Titles; When   the   record   does   not  show   that   the   land
subject matter of action has been exactly determined, the action
cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff’s ownership rights in the
land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven
at   the   trial;   In   the   present   case,   while   it   is   true   that   private
respondents were not able to show the extent of their pro indiviso
right over a lot, they have nevertheless established their claim over
the same, the case should be remanded to the lower court for a new
trial.—In Beo  v.  Court of  Appeals, the  Court  held that in  order
that   an   action   for   recovery   of   possession   may   prosper,   it   is
indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed
by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that
when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the
action  has   been   exactly   determined,   the   action   cannot  prosper,
inasmuch as the plaintiff’s ownership rights in the land claimed
do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were
not able to show the extent of their 1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot
No. 1242 (799­C), they have nevertheless established their claim
over   the   said   lot.   Hence,   in   line   with   our   ruling   in   the   case
of Laluan v. Malpaya, the prudent recourse would be to remand
the case to the lower court for a new trial.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     V.L. Legaspi for petitioner.
     Pedro Albino for Rural Bank of Mandaue.
     Palma, Palma & Associates for private respondents.
YNARES­SANTIAGO,  J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 in CA­G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with modifica­
_______________
1
 Ninth Division, composed of Associate Justices Nathaniel P.
De Pano, Jr. (ponente and chairman), Jesus M. Elbinias (member)
and Angelina S. Gutierrez (member).
558
558  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
tion the Decision  of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch
2
28, in Civil Case No. MAN­386.
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No.
799­C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and located at Barrio
Looc,  Mandaue City. The  subject  lot  is  part of a parcel  of land
situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue
City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme
and   Margarita   Espina   de   Jayme.   In   1947,   an   extra­judicial
partition,3 written   in   the   Spanish   language   was   executed,
describing said parcel of land as—
2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe,
Cebu,  que  linda   al  N.  con  la  Calle  Mabini  y  propiodades  de  F.
Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S.
linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda
con   la   Calle  Plaridel.  La  propiodad  descrita   esta   avaluada,   con
todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS
........................................................ P1,050.00. 4
and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:
1. 1)1/3 in favor of—(a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the
deceased   spouse   of   private   respondent   Candida   Flores
and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina,
Evelia   and   Gesila,   all   surnamed   Jayme;   and   (b)   their
grandchild   Asuncion   Jayme­Baclay,   whose   heirs   are
private   respondents   Agelio   Baclay,   Elnora   Baclay   and
Carmen Jayme­Daclan;
2. 2)1/3   to   their   daughter   Elena   Jayme   Vda.   de   Perez,
mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and
3. 3)1/3 to an unidentified party.
_______________
 Penned by Judge Mercedes Gozo­Dadole.
2 Consequently,   Nicanor   Jayme   and   Asuncion   Jayme­Baclay
 “CONVENIO   DE   REPARTICION   Y   DISTRIBUCION
3 filed   their   opposition6 contending   that   said  application  included
EXTRAJUDICIALES DE LOS BIENES DE LOS ESPOSOS DON
CARMENO JAYME, Y DOÑA MARGARITA ESPINA DE JAYME
CELEBRADO   EL...   DE.......DE   1947,   POR   SUS   HIJOS,
MARIANO   JAYME,   SEGUNDO   JAYME,   ANDRES   JAYME,
GENEROSA   JAYME,   TEOFILA   JAYME   DE   OUANO,
FELECITAS JAYME DE LATONIO Y ELENA JAYME, VIUDA
DE   PEREZ,   CON   LA   CONCURRENCIA   DE   LOS   DOS
SOBRINOS   ASUNCION   JAYME   DE   BACLAY   Y   NICANOR
JAYME,   HIJOS   DE   LA   FINADA   ESPIRIDIONA   JAYME...”
(Exhibit “A,” Records, p. 76).
4
 Exhibit “A­2,” Records, p. 77.
559
VOL. 374, JANUARY 25, 2002  559 
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
Built   on   the   land   adjudicated   to   the   heirs   of   the   spouses   is
Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his family occupied since 1945.
Sometime   in   July   1964,   Elena   Jayme   Vda.   de   Perez,
petitioner’s mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch IV, an amended application for the registration 5 of the lot
described with the following boundaries:
N—Fruelana Jayme & Road
S—Felicitas de Latonio
E—Agustin de Jayme
W—Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana
Elena   Jayme   Vda.   de   Perez   alleged   that   the   lot   sought   to   be
registered   was   originally   a   part   of   a   land   owned   by   her   late
parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
Jayme;  and  that 1/3   of said  land  was  adjudicated  to  her  in  an
extra­judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the
lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with
her permission.
the   1/3   portion   inherited   by   them   in   the   1947   extra­judicial
partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of
the   parties.   Subsequently,   petitioner   filed   with   the   Bureau   of
Lands   of   Cebu   City   an   application 7 dated   January   10,   1979,
seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of
the aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known
as Lot No. 1242 (799­C), described as follows:
North:  Froilan Jayme and Road  3. 3)Lot   No.   1242­C   with   an   area   of   210   square   meters
East:  Agustin Jayme  covered   by   TCT   22773   in   the   name   of   Teresita   P.
South:  Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila  Bordalba;
West:  Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa8
4. 4)Lot   No.   1242­D   with   an   area   of   210   square   meters
_______________ covered by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita Bordalba;

5
 Exhibit “B”, Records, pp. 81­83.
6
 Exhibit “C”, Records, pp. 84­85.
7
 Exhibit “D”, Records, p. 86.
8
 Exhibit “3”, Records, p. 117.
560
560  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  covered  by  TCT  No.   22776  in  the  name  of  Teresita  P.
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
On   April   16,   1980,   petitioner   was   successfully   granted   Free
Patent No. (VII­I) 11421 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0­
571   (FP)   over   said   lot.9 Thereafter,   petitioner   caused   the
subdivision and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799­C),  into 6 lots, 10 as
well as the disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:
1. 1)Lot   No.   1242­A   with   an   area   of   581   square   meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) in
the   name   of   spouses   Genaro   U.   Cabahug   and   Rita
Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;
2. 2)Lot   No.   1242­B   with   an   area   of   420   square   meters
covered  by  TCT  No.   22772  in  the  name  of  Teresita  P.
Bordalba,   and   which   the   latter   mortgaged   with   the
Rural Bank of Mandaue;
5. 5)Lot   No.   1242­E   with   an   area   of   216   square   meters
covered   by   TCT   22775   in   the   name   of   Teresita   P.
Bordalba;
6. 6)Lot No. 1242­F with an area of 216 square meters and
Bordalba.
Upon   learning   of   the   issuance   in   favor   of   petitioner   of   the
aforesaid Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over Lot
No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving
the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant
complaint against petitioner Teresita  Bordalba, spouses Genaro
U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the
Director of the Bureau of Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free
Patent No. (VII­I) 11421 and OCT No. 0­571 (FP), as well as TCT
Nos. 22771­22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Private
respondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No.
1242   (799­C),   and   that   spouses   Genaro   V.   Cabahug   and   Rita
Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers
and 

_______________
  Exhibit “J”, Records, p. 96.
9
 Exhibit “K”, Records, p. 100 and Exhibits “L”­“Q”, Records,
10
pp. 101­107.
561
VOL. 374, JANUARY 25, 2002  561
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
mortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the
court to  award them actual, compensatory, and  moral damages
plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799­
C) was acquired by her through purchase from her mother, 11 who
was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947.
In her answer, petitioner traced her mother’s ownership of the lot
partly from the 1947 deed of extra­judicial partition presented by
private   respondents,12and   claimed   that   Nicanor   Jayme,   and
Candida   Flores   occupied   a   portion   of   Lot   No.   1242   (799­C)   by
mere   tolerance   of   her  mother.   On  cross­examination,   petitioner
admitted   that   the   properties   of   the   late   Carmeno   Jayme   and
Margarita   Espina   de   Jayme   were   partitioned   by   their   heirs   in
1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said
Deed   of  Extrajudicial   Partition.   She,   however,   identified  one  of
the   signatures   in   the   said   Deed   to   be   the   signature   of   her
mother.13
On   May   28,   1990,   the   trial   court,   finding   that   fraud   was
employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No. (VII­I) 11421
and OCT No. 0­571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and
ordered   its   cancellation.   However,   it   declared   that   spouses
Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of
Mandaue   are   purchasers   and   mortgagee   in   good   faith,
respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot No.
1242­A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to
spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage
of Lot No. 1242­B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural
Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by:
1. 1)declaring Free Patent No. (VII­I) 11421 as well as the
Original   Certificate   of   Title   No.   0­57   (FP)   and   all
subsequent   certificates   of   title   as   a   result   of   the
subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP)
as null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City to cancel them;
_______________
11
 Exhibit “2”, Records, p. 115.
12
 Records, p. 32.
13
 TSN, November 14, 1989, p. 18.
562
562  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
1. 2)declaring spouses defendants  Genaro  U. Cabahug  and
Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and are the legal and
rightful owners of Lot No. 1242­A as described in TCT
No. 22771 (FP);
2. 3)declaring   the   Rural   Bank   of   Mandaue,   Inc.   as
mortgagee   in   good   faith   and   the   mortgage   lien   in   its
favor   be   carried   over   to   and   be   annotated   in   the   new
certificate of title to be issued under the names of the
plaintiffs;
 3. 4)declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners
of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuance of the certificate of
title in their names;
4. 5)dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug
and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue,
Inc. for lack of merit;
5. 6)ordering   the   defendant   Teresita   Bordalba   to   pay
plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. (a)P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;
2. (b)P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and,
1. 7)ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Both   petitioner   Teresita   Bordalba   and   private   respondents
appealed   to   the   Court   of   Appeals,   which   affirmed   with
modification   the   decision   of   the   trial   court.   It   ruled   that   since
private   respondents   are   entitled   only   to   1/3   portion   of   Lot   No.
1242 (799­C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot
No. 1242 (799­C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of
the respondent court’s decision states:
WHEREFORE,   the   challenged   decision   is   MODIFIED   to   order
the reconveyance of one­third of the subject land in favor of the
plaintiff­appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of
Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in
its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.15
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of
the   Court   of   Appeals.   Petitioner   contends   that   the   testimonies
given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on 
_______________
 Records, pp. 205­206.
14
 Rollo, p. 33.
15
563
VOL. 374, JANUARY 25, 2002  563 
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
matters   occurring   prior   to   the   death   of   her   mother   should   not
have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the
dead   man’s   statute.   Likewise,   petitioner   questions   the   right   of
private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and
Asuncion   Jayme­Baclay,   as   well   as   the   identity   between   the
disputed   lot   and   the  parcel   of   land   adjudicated   in   the  Deed   of
Extra­judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court
are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this
rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one
of them.16
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the
trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud and misrepresentation
in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation
tainted   petitioner’s   application,   insofar   as   her   declaration   that
the  land  applied  for  was   not  occupied  or  claimed   by  any   other
person.   Her  declaration  is  belied   by  the  extra­judicial   partition
which she acknowledged, her mother’s aborted attempt to have
the lot registered, private respondents’ predecessors­in­interest’s
opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a portion of the said
lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only
holders of title in good faith, and does not permit its provision to
be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to
enrich oneself at the expense of others.17
As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, 18suffice it
to state that said rule finds no application in the present case.
The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any
other way  which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioner’s mother, second,
_______________
16
 Pua,  et  al.   v.  Court  of  Appeals,   et  al., 345  SCRA  233,  243
(2000);   citing Lagandaon   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 290   SCRA
330 (1998).
17
 Esquivias, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 272 SCRA 803,
816 (1997]; citing Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 444 (1938).
18
 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 23.
564
564  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Extra­judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
than   through   personal   dealings   with   the   deceased   person,   or
communication made by the deceased to the witness. 19
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of
their   witnesses   in   the   present   case   is   based, inter   alia,   on   the
1947 Deed of Extra­judicial Partition and other documents, and
not   on   dealings   and   communications   with   the   deceased,   the
questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise   untenable   is   the   claim   of   petitioner   that   private
respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion
Jayme­Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate
their  allegations. Besides, in order  that  an  heir may assert his
right   to   the   property   of   a   deceased,   no   previous   judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.20
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of
Lot No. 1242 (799­C) vis­a­vis the boundaries of the lot referred to
in the 1947 Deed of Extra­judicial Partition can be explained by
the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799­C) is only a portion of the entire
parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro indiviso portion of
to the predecessors­in­interest of private respondents, and third,
to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their boundaries will
not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of
land   adjudicated   to   the   predecessors­in­interest   of   the   parties
herein   was  the  lot   found   on  the  corner   of  Plaridel   and   Mabini
Streets   in   Looc,   Mandaue   City.   As   admitted   further   by   both
parties, Lot No. 1242 (799­C) was part of the land allotted to their
predecessors­in­interest   in   the   1947   Deed   of   Extra­judicial
Partition.   Moreover,   petitioner’s   mother   acknowledged   in   her
application   for   registration   of   Lot   No.   1242   that   the   Deed   of
sought  to  be  registered.   She  further  admitted  that  the  lot  now
known   as  Lot  No.   1242   (799­C)   was   part   of   the   parcel   of   land
inherited by her and her co­heirs, to 
_______________
 Volume V, Herrera, Remedial Law, p. 312 (1999).
19
 Heirs of Ignacio Conti, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA
20
345,   353   (1998),   citing Marabilles   v.   Quito, 110   Phil.   64 (1956)
and Hernandez v. Padua, 14 Phil. 194 (1909).
 565 boundary   of   the   parcel   of   land   adjudicated   in   the   Deed,   which
VOL. 374, JANUARY 25, 2002  565 they  claim  Lot No.  1242 (799­C) is  a part of,  the Court  cannot
Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242
the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the (799­C)  is  included.   Admittedly,   the  north  boundary   of  Lot  No.
Revised  Rules  on  Evidence,   where  one  derives  title  to  property 1242   (799­C)   (Property   of   Froilan   Jaime   and   Mabini   Street)   is
from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed.
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against With only one reference point, however, the south, east and west
the former. boundaries of 
Considering that Lot No. 1242 (799­C) is part of the parcel of 566
land  over  which private  respondents’ predecessors­in­interest is 566  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
entitled   to   1/3   pro­indiviso   share,   which   was   disregarded   by Bordalba vs. Court of Appeals
petitioner   when   she   secured   a   Free   Patent   and   Original Lot No. 1242 (799­C) cannot be established with certainty to be
Certificate   of   Title   in   her   name,   to   the   exclusion   of   private within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra­judicial
respondents’   predecessors­in­interest,   the   trial   court   and   the Partition.
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of In Beo v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that in order that
private respondents as co­owners, and ordering the petitioner to an   action   for   recovery   of   possession   may   prosper,   it   is
reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them. indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed
to   determine   what   part   of   Lot   No.   1242   (799­C)   is   within   the by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that
boundaries  of  the  parcel   of   land   inherited   in  the  1947   Deed  of when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the
Extrajudicial   Partition   by   the   predecessors­in­interest   of   the action  has   been   exactly   determined,   the   action   cannot  prosper,
parties   herein.   This   is   so   because   private   respondents   did   not inasmuch as the plaintiff’s ownership rights in the land claimed
show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.
Extrajudicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799­C). While In the present case, while it is true that private respondents
they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in were  not  able  to show   the extent  of  their  1/3 pro indiviso right
the Deed, to wit: over   Lot   No.   1242   (799­C),   they   have   nevertheless   established
North:  Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme  their claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the
East:  Propiodades de Fernando Antigua  case   of Laluan   v.   Malpaya,22 the   prudent   recourse   would   be   to
South:  Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme  remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
West:  Calle Plaridel  WHEREFORE,  in  view  of  all  the foregoing,  the  October  20,
they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 27419,
relation to the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799­C). Absent a fixed and   the   May   28,   1990   Decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN­386, insofar as
it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private respondents
over Lot No. 1242 (799­C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to
the trial court in order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242
(799­C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors­in­interest of
the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo,
JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed, case remanded to trial court.
against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent
inconsistency, and it is competent for the party against whom the
pleading   is   offered   to   show   that   the   statements   were
inadvertently made or were made under a mistake of fact. (Bitong
vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 503 [1998])
The object and purpose of the Dead Man’s Statute is to guard
against  the  temptation  to give  false  testimony  in  regard  of  the
transaction in question  on  the part  of  the  surviving party,  and
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in
regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. (Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 295 SCRA 247[1998])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013.*
JOSIELENE   LARA   CHAN,   petitioner, vs.   JOHNNY   T.   CHAN,
respondent.
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Physician­Patient   Privileged
Communication   Rule;   The   physician­patient   privileged
communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a
civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts
which   would   blacken   the   latter’s   reputation.―The   physician­
patient privileged communication rule  essentially means  that a
physician who gets information while professionally attending a
patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s
consent   as   to   any   facts   which   would   blacken   the   latter’s
reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open
up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give   him  access   to  his  body,   enabling   the   physician   to  make   a
correct   diagnosis   of   that   ailment   and   provide   the   appropriate
cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to
come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him
and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting
his own health at great risk.
Same;   Same;   Objection   to   Evidence;   Section   36,   Rule   132,
states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of
such evi­
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
77
VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013 77
Chan vs. Chan
dence   for   admission   in   court.―The   case   presents   a
procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they
are   offered.   The   offer   could   be   made   part   of   the   physician’s
testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in
those records that concern the patient’s health problems. Section
36,   Rule   132,   states   that   objections   to   evidence   must   be   made
after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus: SEC.
36. Objection.—Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately   after   the   offer   is   made.   Objection   to   a   question
propounded   in   the  course   of   the   oral   examination   of   a   witness
shall   be   made   as   soon   as   the   grounds   therefor   shall   become
reasonably   apparent.   An   offer   of   evidence   in   writing   shall   be
objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds
for the objections must be specified. Since the offer of evidence is
made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making
a   request   for   the   issuance   of   a   subpoena duces   tecumcovering
Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not
just   to   their   admission   in   evidence,   but   more   so   to   their
disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted
above is about non­disclosure of privileged matters.
Same;   Same;   Physician­Patient   Privileged   Communication
Rule;  To allow  the disclosure during  discovery  procedure of the
hospital records ― the results of tests that the physician ordered,
the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment
he   gave   him  ―  would   be   to   allow   access   to   evidence   that   is
inadmissible without the patient’s consent.―The right to compel
the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are “not privileged.” Josielene of course claims that the
hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is
the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded
as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician
“cannot   in   a   civil   case,   without   the   consent   of   the   patient,   be
examined”   regarding   their   professional   conversation.   The
privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but
only   the   examination   of   the   physician   at   the   trial.   To   allow,
however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records   —   the   results   of   tests   that   the   physician   ordered,   the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he
78
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Chan vs. Chan
gave   him   —   would   be   to   allow   access   to   evidence   that   is
inadmissible   without   the   patient’s   consent.   Physician
memorializes   all   these   information   in   the   patient’s   records.
Disclosing   them   would   be   the   equivalent   of   compelling   the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Physician­Patient   Privileged
Communication Rule; View that the hospital records of respondent
Johnny   Chan   may   not   be   produced   in   court   without   his/her
consent.―I agree that the hospital records of respondent Johnny
Chan   may   not   be   produced   in   court   without   his/her   consent.
Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for its production will violate
the physician­patient privilege rule under Rule 130, Sec. 24(c) of
the   Rules   of   Civil   Procedure.   However,   this   privilege   is   not
absolute.   The   request   of   petitioner   for   a   copy   of   the   medical
records has not been properly laid. Instead of a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, Josielene Lara Chan should
avail   of   the   mode   of   discovery   under   Rule  28   of   Rules   of  Civil
Procedure.   Rule   28   pertains   to   the   physical   or   mental
examination of persons. This may be ordered by the court, in its
discretion,   upon   motion   and   showing   of   good   cause   by   the
requesting   party,   in   cases   when   the   mental   and/or   physical
condition of a party is in controversy. Aside from showing good
cause, the requesting party needs only to notify the party to be
examined   (and   all   other   parties)   and   specify   the   time,   place,
manner, conditions, and scope of the examination, including the
name of the physician who will conduct the examination.
Same;   Same;   Same;   View   that   the   examined   party   may
obtain   a   copy   of   the   examining   physician’s   report   concerning
his/her   mental   or   physical   examination.―The   examined   party
may obtain a copy of the examining physician’s report concerning
his/her   mental   or   physical   examination.   The   requesting   party
shall deliver this report to him/her. After such delivery, however,
the   requesting   party   becomes   entitled   to   any   past   or   future
medical report involving the same mental or physical condition.
Upon motion and notice, the court may order the examined party
to   deliver   those   medical   reports   to   the   requesting   party   if   the
examined party refuses to do so. Moreover, if the examined party
requests a copy of the examining physician’s
79
VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013
Chan vs. Chan
report   or   if   he/she   takes   the   examining   physician’s
deposition,   the   request   waives   the   examined   party’s   privileges
when the testimony of any person who examined or will examine
his/her mental of physical status is taken in the action or in any
action involving the same controversy.
Same; Same; Same; View that the physician­patient privilege
does not cover information discovered under Rule 28 of the Rules
of   Court.―Discovery   procedures   provide   a   balance   between  the
need of the plaintiff or claimant to fully and fairly establish her
case   and   the   policy   to   protect  ―  to   a   certain   extent  ―
communications made between a patient and his doctor. Hence,
the   physician­patient   privilege   does   not   cover   information
discovered   under   Rule   28.   This   procedure   is   availed   with   the
intention  of  making   the  results   public   during   trial.   Along   with
other modes of discovery, this would prevent the trial from being
carried on in the dark.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Ubano, Sianghio, Lozada & Cabantac for petitioner.
  Fragante, Pooten, Ferrer, Fayre & Associates for respondent.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces
tecum for   the   production   and   submission   in   court   of   the
respondent husband’s hospital record in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as
a husband.
The Facts and the Case
On   February   6,   2006   petitioner   Josielene   Lara   Chan
(Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
79 City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nul­
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chan vs. Chan
lity   of   her   marriage   to   respondent   Johnny   Chan   (Johnny),   the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award
of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny
failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed   him   as   mentally   deficient   due   to   incessant   drinking
and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced
him   to   undergo   hospital   confinement   for   detoxification   and
rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who
failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to
marriage   counseling   but   when   he   and   Josielene   got   to   the
hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another
gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the
police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their
marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
During   the   pre­trial   conference,   Josielene   pre­marked   the
Philhealth  Claim  Form1 that  Johnny  attached  to his  answer  as
proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital.   The   form   carried   a   physician’s   handwritten   note   that
Johnny   suffered   from   “methamphetamine   and   alcohol   abuse.”
Following   up   on   this   point,   on   August   22,   2006   Josielene   filed
with   the   RTC   a   request   for   the   issuance   of   a   subpoena duces
tecum addressed   to   Medical   City,   covering   Johnny’s   medical
records   when   he   was   there   confined.   The   request   was
accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence”
the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records
were   covered   by   physician­patient   privilege.   On   September   13,
2006   the   RTC   sustained   the   opposition   and   denied   Josielene’s
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting
her to file a special civil action of certiorari
_______________
1 Annex “B.”
2 Rollo, pp. 69­72.
81
VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013
Chan vs. Chan
before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­G.R. SP 97913, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It
ruled   that,   if   courts   were   to   allow   the   production   of   medical
records,   then   patients   would   be   left   with   no   assurance   that
whatever   relevant   disclosures   they   may   have   made   to   their
physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not
only   testimonies,   but   also   affidavits,   certificates,   and   pertinent
hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive
the   privilege,   he   did   not   do   so   in   this   case.   He   attached   the
Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing
his alleged forcible confinement.
Question Presented
The central question presented in this case is:
Whether   or   not   the   CA   erred   in   ruling   that   the   trial   court
correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by
the privileged character of the physician­patient communication.
The Ruling of the Court
Josielene   requested   the   issuance   of   a   subpoena duces
tecum covering   the   hospital   records   of   Johnny’s   confinement,
which   records   she   wanted   to   present   in   court   as   evidence   in
support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity.
Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however,
invoking   the   privileged   character   of   those   records.   He   cites
Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:
_______________
3 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred
in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan
Vidal.
81 82
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Chan vs. Chan
SEC. 24. Disqualification   by   reason   of   privileged
communication.—The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
x x x x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the   patient,   be   examined   as   to   any   advice   or   treatment
given   by   him   or   any   information   which   he   may   have
acquired   in   attending   such   patient   in   a   professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to
act   in   that   capacity,   and   which   would   blacken   the
reputation of the patient.
The   physician­patient   privileged   communication   rule
essentially   means  that  a   physician  who  gets   information  while
professionally   attending   a   patient   cannot   in   a   civil   case   be
examined   without   the   patient’s   consent   as   to   any   facts   which
would   blacken   the   latter’s   reputation.   This   rule   is   intended   to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him
the   history   of   his   ailment,   and   give   him   access   to   his   body,
enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment
and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could
be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that
had  transpired between him  and the patient might  prompt the
latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. 4
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time
to   object   to   the   admission   of   evidence,   such   as   the   hospital
records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be
made   part   of   the   physician’s   testimony   or   as   independent
evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern
the patient’s health problems.
_______________
4 Francisco, The   Revised   Rules   of   Court   of   the   Philippines,
Volume VII, Part I, 1997 ed., p. 282, citing Will of Bruendi, 102
Wis. 47, 78 N.W. 169 and McRae v. Erickson, 1 Cal. App. 326.
83
VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013 83
Chan vs. Chan
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must
be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.
Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.—Objection   to   evidence   offered
orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the
oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An   offer   of   evidence   in   writing   shall   be   objected   to
within   three   (3)   days   after   notice   of   the   offer   unless   a
different period is allowed by the court.
In   any   case,   the   grounds   for   the   objections   must   be
specified.
Since   the   offer   of   evidence   is   made   at   the   trial,   Josielene’s
request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to
wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecumcovering Johnny’s hospital records. It is
when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that
Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but   more   so   to   their   disclosure.   Section   24(c),   Rule   130   of   the
Rules   of   Evidence   quoted   above   is   about   non­disclosure   of
privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records
as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection;  order.—
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party
to   produce   and   permit   the   inspection   and   copying   or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, ac­
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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chan vs. Chan
counts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession,   custody   or   control;   or   (b)   order   any   party   to
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession   or   control   for   the   purpose   of   inspecting,
measuring,   surveying,   or   photographing   the   property   or
any   designated   relevant   object   or  operation  thereon.   The
order shall specify the time, place and manner of making
the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis
supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has
a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of
this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of
the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of
Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without
the   consent   of   the   patient,   be   examined”   regarding   their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover   the   hospital   records,   but   only   the   examination   of   the
physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure
of the hospital records — the results of tests that the physician
ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to evidence
that   is   inadmissible   without   the   patient’s   consent.   Physician
memorializes   all   these   information   in   the   patient’s   records.
Disclosing   them   would   be   the   equivalent   of   compelling   the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer
to   the   petition   before   the   RTC   that   he   had   been  confined   in  a
hospital against his will and in fact attached to his an­
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VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013 85
Chan vs. Chan
swer   a   Philhealth   claim   form   covering   that   confinement,   he
should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its
records.   Josielene  invokes   Section  17,   Rule  132  of  the  Rules  of
Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record
given in evidence, the remainder admissible.—When part of
an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given
in   evidence   by   one   party,   the   whole   of   the   same   subject
may be inquired into by the other,  and when a detached
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record necessary to its understanding may also be given
in evidence.
But,   trial   in   the   case   had   not   yet   begun.   Consequently,   it
cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth
claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would
justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his
hospital   confinement.   Johnny   was   not   yet   bound   to   adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for
disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
For   all   of   the   above   reasons,   the   CA   and   the   RTC   were
justified  in  denying  Josielene  her  request  for  the  production  in
court of Johnny’s hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY,   the   Court DENIES the   petition
and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R.
SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco,   Jr.   (Chairperson),   Peralta and Mendoza,   JJ.,
concur.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concuring Opinion.
86
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chan vs. Chan
CONCURRlNG OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur but add the following points:
I agree that the hospital records of respondent Johnny Chan
may not be produced in court without his/her consent. Issuance of
a   subpoena duces   tecum for   its   production   will   violate   the
physician­patient privilege rule under Rule 130, Sec. 24(c) 1 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
However,   this   privilege   is   not   absolute.   The   request   of
petitioner for a copy of the medical records has not been properly
laid.
Instead   of   a   request   for   the   issuance   of   a   subpoena duces
tecum, Josielene Lara Chan should avail of the mode of discovery
under Rule 28 of Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule   28   pertains   to   the   physical   or   mental   examination   of
persons. This may be ordered by the court, in its discretion, 2 upon
motion   and   showing   of   good   cause3 by   the   requesting   party,   in
cases when the mental and/or physical condition of a party is in
controversy.4 Aside   from   showing   good   cause,   the   requesting
party needs only to notify the party to be examined (and all other
parties) and specify the time, place, man­
_______________
1 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24(c) provides:
A person authorized to practice surgery or obstetrics cannot in
a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to
any advice or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in
that   capacity,   and   which   would   blacken   the   reputation   of   the
patient.
2 Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 1.
3 Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 2.
4 Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 1.
87
VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013 87
Chan vs. Chan
ner, conditions, and scope of the examination, including the name
of the physician who will conduct the examination.5
The   examined   party   may   obtain   a   copy   of   the   examining
physician’s   report   concerning   his/her   mental   or   physical
examination.6 The   requesting   party   shall   deliver   this   report   to
him/her.7 After   such   delivery,   however,   the   requesting   party
becomes entitled to any past or future medical report involving
the same mental or physical condition. 8 Upon motion and notice, Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
the court may order the examined party to deliver those medical Notes.―For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of
reports to the requesting party if the examined party refuses to do negligence committed by members of the medical profession, such
so.9 claim   for   damages   is   almost   always   anchored   on   the   alleged
Moreover,   if   the   examined   party   requests   a   copy   of   the violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code; In medical negligence
examining   physician’s   report   or   if   he/she   takes   the   examining cases,   also   called   medical   malpractice   suits,   there   exist   a
physician’s deposition, the  request waives  the examined party’s physician­patient relationship between the doctor and the victim.
privileges when the testimony of any person who examined or will (Lucas vs. Tuaño, 586 SCRA 173 [2009])
examine his/her mental of physical status is taken in the action or When   a   patient   engages   the   services   of   a   physician,   a
in any action involving the same controversy.10 physician­patient relationship is generated; Thus, in treating his
Discovery procedures provide a balance between the need of patient,   a   physician   is  under   a   duty   to   exercise   that  degree   of
the plaintiff or claimant to fully and fairly establish her case and care,   skill   and   diligence   which   physicians   in   the   same   general
the   policy   to   protect  ―  to   a   certain   extent  ―  communications neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily
made   between   a   patient   and   his   doctor.   Hence,   the   physician­
possess   and   exercise   in   like   cases.   (Jarcia,   Jr.   vs.   People,   666
patient   privilege   does   not   cover   information   discovered   under
SCRA 336 [2012])
Rule 28. This procedure is availed with the intention of making
――o0o―― 
the   results   public   during   trial.   Along   with   other   modes   of
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
discovery, this would prevent the trial from being carried on in
the dark.11  reserved.
_______________
5  Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 2.
6  Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 3.
7  Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 3.
8  Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 3.
9  Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 3.
10 Rules of Court, Rule 28, Sec. 4.
11 Republic   v.   Sandiganbayan,   Tantoco   and   Santiago,   G.R.
No. 90478, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 212. 
89
VOL. 702, JULY 24, 2013 89
Chan vs. Chan
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DENY the petition.
 
 Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with
violation of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff

Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful
detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). 4 The
Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor
of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting
as pairing judge.

THIRD DIVISION On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution")

reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. 5 The
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006 dispositive portion reads:

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated
Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court
Branch 30, Complainant, a quo dated July 22, 1997.
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO- Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to
JACOBA, Respondents. CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico
Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No.
DECISION T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square
meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the
house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-
CARPIO, J.:
01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and
Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house
The Case covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October SO ORDERED.6

2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against
respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with
Request for Inhibition)7 dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"),
pertinent portions of which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as
it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE!
The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in
Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower
Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a
very questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and
SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon.
Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions
in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious,
hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established
and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded"
in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an
INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial
Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding
That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential
LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the
Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x
This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously
in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took
Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the
Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows
that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the
COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed
up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge
Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00
to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of
the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing
Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price
of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding
Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution
should be slain on sight!8
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit
himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the
Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the
Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to
appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in
contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her
Explanation, Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that
"His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject
Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not
actually or actively participate in this case."12 Velasco-Jacoba
disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor
and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the
respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice." 13She rationalized as
follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some
sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick
such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-
side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic
picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a
staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to
be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just
articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the
sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just
cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe
that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more
no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor
marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x 14
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize
"for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of
unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line and
gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly
contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty
of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a
fine of P1,000.16
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September
2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said
"O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it
is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading
handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her
husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and
future."17 This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion
which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
suspension from the practice of law.18
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty
of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge
Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her
imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP
Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother
many times over."19At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should
have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because
"[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the
Ombudsman."20
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the
Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an
affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly
rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and
ignorance21 and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge
became the subject of a preliminary investigation23 by the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion
set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed on 28 August
2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this
time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in
contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion
for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30
July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating
him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. 26 Judge
Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint
against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at
the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP
Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice.28
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of
10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from
the practice of law for six months.29 IBP Commissioner Navarro
found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and
derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and
disrespect for authority."30 Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as a
judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole." 31
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP
Commissioner Navarro’s Report and Recommendation, except for
the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its
recommendation to this Court, together with the documents
pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP
Board decision, thus:33
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the
present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the
same issues involved in this case are raised before the
Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory
Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom
before the Supreme Court involving the same issues we
raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in
view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of
Appeals;
 5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court
of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be
dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the
certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34(Emphasis supplied)
The Court’s Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that
the present complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the
petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary
injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-
Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders
issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders
dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13
September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of
contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with
grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court."36
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing
on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither
identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this
complaint. Judge Lacurom’s orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not
be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a
petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an
appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the
aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality.
Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or judgment
is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether
the judge is administratively liable.37
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of
this case. The corresponding implications of their actions also give
rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against
Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba
appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility
as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by
the party or counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule,
or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect
certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it
was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied
the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap
of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001
motion only because of her husband’s request but she did not know
its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each
other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the
spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for
each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she]
already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is
signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission,
therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of
falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other
ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. 39
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does
not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility
of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of the
motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer
with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s
account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion
by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental." 40
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more
plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was
immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was
raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption
of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for
Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s
assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution
of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836,
praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for
certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. 41 This
petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise
that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.42
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived
by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any
conduct that may be construed as implied consent. 43 This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July
2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly
exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s
cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba
acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total
and utter disrespect."44
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that
every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We
disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.45 However, even
the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack
made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution.
On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided
the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a
lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we
are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.47
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely
enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the client’s
cause through fair and honest means, thus:
Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its
resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative
cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case
No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s sala. The
Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of
these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that
the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a
repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again
we are faced with the question of whether respondents have
conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them
as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents
to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice
of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We
also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law
for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision.
We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or
similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents’ personal records as
attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative

cases before this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we
suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months
because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession
of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by
him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff’s fees." 48 In
Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss
in his duties when he failed to file the appellant’s brief, resulting in
the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed the penalty of one
year suspension.49

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for
appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party,
knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the
Local Government Code.50

 
A.C. No. 5439. January 22, 2007.*
CLARITA   J.   SAMALA,   complainant, vs. ATTY.   LUCIANO   D.
VALENCIA, respondent.
Legal   Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict   of   Interest; Test; A   lawyer
may not undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than
he may represent antagonistic interests, a stern rule founded on
the principles of public policy and good taste; One of the tests of
inconsistency   of   interests   is   whether   the   acceptance   of   a   new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double­dealing in the performance of that duty.
—Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the  client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
2
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  client   against   a   former   client   when   the   subject   matter   of   the
 
Samala vs. Valencia
Code  of  Professional  Responsibility   provides  that  a  lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer
may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel   for   a   person   whose   interest   conflicts   with   that   of   his
present or former client. He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic
interests.  This stern rule is founded on  the principles  of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and
client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected
not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double­dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which   is   of   paramount   importance   in   the   administration   of
justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client
or   invite   suspicion   of   unfaithfulness   or   double­dealing   in   the
performance of that duty.
Same; Same; Same; The   bare   attorney­client   relationship
with   a   client   precludes   an   attorney   from   accepting   professional
employment from the client’s adversary either in the same case or
in a different but related action.—An attorney owes loyalty to his
also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. The
bare   attorney­client   relationship   with   a   client   precludes   an
attorney from accepting professional employment from the client’s
adversary   either  in  the  same case  or  in  a  different  but  related
action.   A   lawyer   is   forbidden   from   representing   a   subsequent
present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject
matter   of   the   previous   litigation   in   which   he   appeared   for   the
former client.
Same; Same; Same; Knowledge   acquired   by   a   lawyer   from
his client’s case learning the weak points of the action as well as
the strong ones, must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
—Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional   Responsibility   which   states   that   “a   lawyer   shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney­client   relation   is   terminated.”   The   reason   for   the
prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
one of trust and confidence  and   arriving   at   correct   conclusion.—In Young   v.   Batuegas,   403
3 SCRA   123  (2003),   we  held  that  a  lawyer  must  be a   disciple  of
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will “do no
Samala vs. Valencia
of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the
facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client
the weak  points  of the  action as well  as the strong  ones.  Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
Same; Same; Falsehood; It   matters   not   that   the   trial   court
was not misled  by  a lawyer’s submission of  a certificate of title
which was already cancelled and a new one issued in the name of
some other person—what is decisive in this case is his intent in
trying to mislead the court.—Respondent cannot feign ignorance
of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in
lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof
of the latter’s ownership. Respondent failed to comply with Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that
a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any   in   court;   nor   shall   he   mislead,   or   allow   the   Court   to   be
mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not
misled   by   respondent’s   submission   of   TCT   No.   273020   in   the
name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002
dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this
case   is   respondent’s   intent   in   trying   to   mislead   the   court   by
presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was
already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already
issued in the name of Alba.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall
“conduct   himself   as   a   lawyer   according   to   the   best   of   his
knowledge   and   discretion   with   all   good   fidelity   as   well   to   the
courts as to his clients.” He should bear in mind that as an officer
of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon
the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client’s  rights and is expected  to display  the utmost
zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at
the expense of truth. A lawyer is the ser­
4
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 
Samala vs. Valencia
vant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice. As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for
others to emulate.
Same; Same; Administrative   Complaints; The   filing   of   an
administrative case against a lawyer for protecting the interest of
his   client   and   his   own   right   would   be   putting   a   burden   on   a
practicing   lawyer   who   is   obligated   to   defend   and   prosecute   the
right  of   his   client.—Respondent  filed  I.S.   Nos.   00­4439   and   01­
036162 both entitled “Valencia v. Samala” for estafa and grave
coercion,   respectively,   to   protect   his   client’s   rights   against
complainant who filed I.S. No. 00­4306 for estafa against Lagmay,
and   I.S.   No.   00­4318   against   Alvin   Valencia   for   trespass   to
dwelling. We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The
act   of   respondent   of   filing   the   aforecited   cases   to   protect   the
interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the
other,   cannot   be   made   the   basis   of   an   administrative   charge
unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to
abuse   judicial   processes   to   commit   injustice.   The   filing   of   an
administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest
of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a
practicing   lawyer  who  is  obligated  to  defend  and  prosecute  the
right of his client.
Same; Same; Immorality; Words   and   Phrases; It   may   be
difficult   to   specify   the   degree   of   moral   delinquency   that   may
qualify   an   act   as   immoral,   yet,   for   purposes   of   disciplining   a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that “conduct which
is   willful,   flagrant,   or   shameless,   and   which   shows   a   moral
indifference   to   the   opinion   of   respectable   members   of   the
community.”—Under   Canon   1,   Rule   1.01   of   the   Code   of
Professional   Responsibility,   a   lawyer   shall   not   engage   in
unlawful,   dishonest,   immoral   or   deceitful   conduct.   It   may   be
difficult   to   specify   the   degree   of   moral   delinquency   that   may
qualify   an   act   as   immoral,   yet,   for   purposes   of   disciplining   a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that “conduct which
is   willful,   flagrant,   or   shameless,   and   which   shows   a   moral
indifference   to   the   opinion   of   respectable   members   of   the
community.” Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to
discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores
and   sense   of   morality   of   the   community.   That   respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife
and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to
mitigate his liability.
5
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  5 
Samala vs. Valencia
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA­MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J.
Samala   (complainant)   against   Atty.   Luciano   D.   Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving
on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b)
knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence;   (c)   initiating   numerous   cases   in   exchange   for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being
immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After   respondent   filed   his   Comment,   the   Court,   in   its
Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar   of   the   Philippines   (IBP)   for   investigation,   report   and
recommendation.2
The   investigation  was   conducted   by   Commissioner   Demaree
Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their
respective  memoranda3 and  the  case  was  deemed submitted for
resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent
guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six
months.  docketed as SCA Case No. 99­341­MK. In his decision dated May
_______________
1
 Rollo, pp. 1­4.
2
 Id., at p. 106.
3
 Id., at pp. 118­125; 129­134.
4
 Id., at pp. 569­579.
6 _______________
6  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Samala vs. Valencia
In a minute Resolution5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension
from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as
to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records   show   that   in Civil   Case   No.   95­105­MK,   filed   in   the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled
“Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez” for nonpayment of rentals,
herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez,
also   acted   as   counsel   for   the   tenants   Lagmay,   Valencia,
Bustamante   and   Bayuga6 by   filing   an   Explanation   and
Compliance before the RTC.7
In Civil Case No. 98­6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled “Editha S. Valdez and
Joseph   J.   Alba,   Jr.   v.   Salve   Bustamante   and   her   husband”  for
ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante—
one   of   the   tenants   in   the   property   subject   of   the   controversy.
Defendants   appealed   to   the   RTC,   Branch   272,   Marikina   City
2,   2000,8 Presiding   Judge   Reuben   P.   dela   Cruz9 warned
respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95­105­MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000­657­MK, filed in the RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, entitled “Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba,
Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City,” 
5
 Id., at p. 568.
6
 Id., at pp. 411­417.
7
 Id., at pp. 5­7.
8
 Id., at pp. 11­13.
9
 Now Assistant Court Administrator.
7
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  7 
Samala vs. Valencia
respondent,   as   counsel   for   Valdez,   filed   a   Complaint   for
Rescission   of   Contract   with   Damages   and   Cancellation   of
Transfer   Certificate   of   Title   No.   275500   against   Alba,
respondent’s   former   client   in Civil   Case   No.   98­6804 and   SCA
Case No. 99­341­MK.
Records  further  reveal   that  at  the hearing   of  November   14,
2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95­105­MK, he
was   the   lawyer   for   Lagmay   (one   of   the   tenants)   but   not   for
Bustamante   and   Bayuga10 albeit   he   filed   the   Explanation   and
Compliance   for   and   in   behalf   of   the   tenants. 11 Respondent   also
admitted   that   he   represented   Valdez   in Civil   Case   No.   98­
6804 and SCA Case No. 99­341­MK against Bustamante and her
husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case
is  entitled   “Valdez and   Alba v.   Bustamante   and   her   husband,”
because   Valdez   told   him   to   include   Alba   as   the   two   were   the
owners of the property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the
complaint for ejectment.13 But, while claiming that respondent did
not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already
severed   his   representation   for   Alba   when   the   latter   charged
respondent with estafa.14 Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000­
657­MK against Alba.
Rule   15.03,   Canon   15   of   the   Code   of   Professional
Responsibility   provides   that   a   lawyer   shall   not   represent
conflicting   interests   except   by   written   consent   of   all   concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A   lawyer   may   not,   without   being   guilty   of   professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with   that   of   his   present   or   former   client. 15 He   may   not   also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he  to any of the privileged communications of his client.19
_______________
 Rollo, pp. 397­398; 407­410.
10
 Id., at pp. 11­13.
11
12
 Id., at p. 439.
13
 Id., at p. 441.
14
 Id., at p. 434.
15
 Frias   v.   Lozada, A.C.   No.   6656,   December   13,   2005, 477
SCRA 393, 400.
8
8  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Samala vs. Valencia
may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded
on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16It springs from
the   relation   of   attorney   and   client   which   is   one   of   trust   and
confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double­dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust   their   secrets   to   their   lawyers,   which   is   of   paramount
importance in the administration of justice.17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite   suspicion   of   unfaithfulness   or   double­dealing   in   the
performance of that duty.18
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs
from  the  attorney’s  duty   to  represent  his  client  with  undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence as well as
from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in
which   he   has   represented   him   but   also   after   the   relation   of
attorney   and   client   has   terminated.20 The   bare   attorney­client
relationship with  a client precludes  an attorney  from accepting
professional employment from the client’s adversary ei­
_______________
16
 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 6th Edition, pp. 219, 225; citing cases.
17
 Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).
 18
 Santos, Sr. v. Beltran, 463 Phil. 372, 383; 418 SCRA 17, 25­ representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
26 (2003). client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed
19
 Tiania   v.   Ocampo, A.C.   No.   2285,   August   12,   1991, 200 a   case   entitled   “Valdez and   Alba v.   Bustamante   and   her
SCRA 472, 479. husband,” is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
20
 Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Daria, Adm. Case No. 2736, interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent
May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 428, 435; Buted v. Hernando, Adm. Case cannot just claim that the lawyer­client 
No. 1359, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 1, 8.
9 _______________
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  9 21
 Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, 648 (1952).
Samala vs. Valencia 22
 Nombrado   v.   Hernandez, 135   Phil.   5,   9; 26   SCRA   13,   17
ther   in   the   same   case  or   in   a   different   but   related   action. 22A
21

(1968).
lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against
a   former   client   when   the   subject   matter   of   the   present
23
 Pormento,   Sr.   v.   Pontevedra, A.C.   No.   5128,   March   31,
controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 177­178.
of   the   previous   litigation   in   which   he   appeared   for   the   former
24
 Nombrado v. Hernandez, supra.
client.23 25
 Natan v. Capule, supra at p. 648.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez24 that the termination of 26
 Ibid., at p. 648.
the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a 10
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that 10  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s Samala vs. Valencia
confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without
the   professional   employment.25 Consequently,   a   lawyer   should observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the
not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do written consent of his client is required.
anything   which   will   injuriously   affect   his   former   client   in   any
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,27 citing the case of Quiambao v.
matter   in   which   he   previously   represented   him   nor   should   he
disclose   or   use   any   of   the   client’s   confidences   acquired   in   the Bamba,28 we held that:
previous relation.26 “The  proscription   against   representation   of   conflicting   interests
In this case, respondent’s averment that his relationship with applies   to   a   situation   where   the   opposing   parties   are   present
Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
over   the   proceeds   collected   in Civil   Case   No.   98­6804,   in moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client,
the   attorney­client   relationship   precludes   an   attorney   from or   that   there   would   be   no   occasion   to   use   the   confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as
the   two   actions   are   wholly   unrelated.   It   is   enough   that   the
opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present   clients   and   the   nature   or   conditions   of   the   lawyer’s
respective   retainers   with   each   of   them   would   affect   the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.” 29
Respondent   is   bound   to   comply   with   Canon   21   of   the   Code   of
Professional   Responsibility   which   states   that   “a   lawyer   shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney­client relation is terminated.”
The   reason   for   the   prohibition   is   found   in   the   relation   of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the
highest   degree.   A   lawyer   becomes   familiar   with   all   the   facts
connected   with   his   client’s   case.   He   learns   from   his   client   the
weak   points   of   the   action   as   well   as   the   strong   ones.   Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30
From   the   foregoing,   it   is   evident   that   respondent’s
representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her  Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00­7137 on
_______________
27
 A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 320.
28
 A.C. No. 6708, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 1.
29
 Id., at p. 11.
30
 Maturan   v.   Gonzales, 350   Phil.   882,   887; 287   SCRA   443,
446­447 (1998); U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500, 510 (1912).
11
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  11
Samala vs. Valencia
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is
a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding
sanction from  this Court.  Respondent  may  have withdrawn his
representation in Civil Case No. 95­105­MK upon being warned
by   the   court,31 but   the   same   will   not   exculpate   him   from   the
charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation
in Civil Case No. 2000­657­MK.
Respondent   is   reminded   to   be   more   cautious   in   accepting
professional   employments,   to   refrain   from   all   appearances   and
acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests,   and   to   behave   at   all   times   with   circumspection   and
dedication   befitting   a   member   of   the   Bar,   especially   observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32
On   knowingly   misleading   the   court   by   submitting
false documentary evidence.
Complainant  alleges  that  in Civil   Case  No.   00­7137 filed  before
MTC,   Branch   75   for   ejectment,   respondent   submitted   TCT   No.
273020 as evidence of Valdez’s ownership despite the fact that a
new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on
February 2, 1995.
November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of
Valdez’s ownership of the subject property.33During the hearing
before   Commissioner   Raval,   respondent   avers   that   when   the
Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came
to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that
when the court dismissed the com­
_______________
31
 Rollo, pp. 423­427.
32
 Gamilla v. Mariño, Jr., 447 Phil. 419, 432; 399 SCRA 308,
321 (2003).
33
 Rollo, pp. 30­32.
12
12  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  _______________
Samala vs. Valencia
plaint,   he   did   not   do   anything   anymore.34 Respondent   further
avers   that   Valdez   did   not   tell   him   the   truth   and   things   were
revealed   to   him   only   when   the   case   for   rescission   was   filed   in
2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case
No.   2000­657­MK for   rescission   of   contract   and   cancellation   of
TCT   No.   275500   was   also   filed   on  November   27,   2000, 35 before
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of
respondent that he came to know of Alba’s title only in 2002 when
the   case   for   rescission   was   filed.   It   was   revealed   during   the
hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00­7137
and   2000­657­MK were   filed   on   the   same   date,   although   in
different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the
title   he   submitted   was   already   cancelled   in   lieu   of   a   new   title
issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter’s
ownership.
Respondent   failed   to   comply   with   Canon   10   of   the   Code   of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
do any falsehood,  nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.
It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent’s
submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown
by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint
for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent’s intent
in   trying   to   mislead   the   court   by   presenting   TCT   No.   273020
despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new
one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young   v.   Batuegas,37 we   held   that   a   lawyer   must   be   a
disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that 
34
 Id., at pp. 459­474.
35
 Id., at pp. 14­16; 471­473.
36
 Id., at pp. 127­128.
37
 451 Phil. 155; 403 SCRA 123 (2003).
13
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  13 
Samala vs. Valencia
he will “do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court”
and he shall “conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts   as   to   his   clients.”38 He   should   bear   in   mind   that   as   an
officer   of  the   court   his   high   vocation  is   to   correctly   inform  the
court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice   and   arriving   at   correct   conclusion.39 The   courts,   on   the
other   hand,   are   entitled   to   expect   only   complete   honesty   from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has
the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to
display   the   utmost   zeal   in   defense   of   his   client’s   cause,   his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession
to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.40 As such, he should make himself more
an exemplar for others to emulate.41
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment
of rental fees.
Complainant   alleges   that   respondent   filed   the   following   cases:
(a) Civil Case No. 2000­657­MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil
Case No. 00­7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00­
4439 and 01­036162 both entitled “Valencia v. Samala” for estafa
and   grave   coercion,   respectively,   before   the   Marikina   City
Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were The   filing   of   an   administrative   case   against   respondent   for
filed   in   retaliation   for   the   cases   she   filed   against   Lagmay protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be
docketed   as   I.S.   No.   00­4306   for   estafa   and   I.S.   No.   00­4318 putting   a   burden   on   a   practicing   lawyer   who   is   obligated   to
against   Alvin   Valencia   (son   of   respondent)   for   trespass   to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
dwelling.  On   having   a   reputation   for   being   immoral   by   siring 
illegitimate children.
_______________ We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.
38
 Id., at p. 161; p. 126. During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three
39
 Ibid., at p. 161; pp. 126­127. children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years 
40
 Ting­Dumali   v.   Torres, A.C.   No.   5161,   April   14,   2004, 427
SCRA 108, 117. _______________
41
 Ibid., at p. 117.
14
42
 Rollo, p. 485.
14  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
43
 Id., at pp. 144­146.
Samala vs. Valencia
44
 Id., at p. 100.
As   culled   from   the   records,   Valdez   entered   into   a   retainer
45
 Id., at pp. 41­43.
agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was 46
 Id., at pp. 44­45.
allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his 47
 Son   of   respondent   and   one   of   the   tenants   in   the   subject
office pursuant to their retainer agreement.42 property.
Respondent   filed   I.S.   Nos.   00­443943 and   01­03616244both 15
entitled   “Valencia   v.   Samala”   for   estafa   and   grave   coercion, VOL. 512, JANUARY 22, 2007  15 
respectively, to protect his client’s rights against complainant who Samala vs. Valencia
filed I.S. No. 00­430645 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00­ of age,48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that
431846 against Alvin Valencia47 for trespass to dwelling. he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married
respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of Lagmay in 1998.49 Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was
his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant.
be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be However,   he   does   not   consider   his   affair   with   Lagmay   as   a
clearly   shown   that   the   same   was   being   done   to   abuse   judicial relationship50and   does   not   consider   the   latter   as   his   second
processes to commit injustice. family.51 He   reasoned   that   he   was   not   staying   with   Lagmay
because  he  has  two houses,   one  in  Muntinlupa   and   another   in
Marikina.52
In   this   case,   the   admissions   made   by   respondent   are   more
than   enough   to   hold   him   liable   on   the   charge   of   immorality.
During   the   hearing,   respondent   did   not  show   any   remorse.   He
even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have
any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired
three   children   by   the   latter,   he   does   not   consider   them   as   his
second   family.   It   is   noted   that   during   the   hearing,   respondent
boasts   in   telling   the   commissioner   that   he   has   two   houses—in
Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where
Lagmay   lives.53 It   is   of   no   moment   that   respondent   eventually
married Lagmay after the death  of his first wife. The fact  still
remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard
of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.
Under   Canon   1,   Rule   1.01   of   the   Code   of   Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral   or   deceitful   conduct.   It  may   be   difficult   to  specify   the
degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral,
yet,  for purposes of disciplining  a lawyer,  immoral  conduct  has
been defined as that “conduct which is willful, 
_______________
48
 Rollo, pp. 514­515.
49
 Id., at pp. 517­519.
50
 Id., at p. 521.
51
 Id., at p. 524.
52
 Id., at pp. 520­524.
53
 Id., at pp. 520­521.
16
16  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Samala vs. Valencia
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of respectable members of the community.” 54 Thus, in
several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for
keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality
of   the   community.55 That   respondent   subsequently   married
Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his
first   infraction   as   regards   immorality   serve   to   mitigate   his
liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10
and   1   of   the   Code   of   Professional   Responsibility.   He   is
SUSPENDED   from   the   practice   of   law   for   three   (3)   years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let   copies   of   this   Resolution   be   furnished   all   courts   of   the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it
be entered in respondent’s personal records.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares­Santiago, Sandoval­
Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio­Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico­Nazario, Garcia and Velasco,   Jr.,   JJ.,
concur.
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia suspended from practice of law for
three (3) years for misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and
1 of Code of Professional Responsibility.
_______________
 Rau   Sheng   Mao   v.   Velasco, 459   Phil.   440,   445; 413   SCRA
54
108, 112 (2003).
  Mendoza v. Mala, A.C. No. 1129, July 27, 1992, 211 SCRA
55
839,   841; Vda.   de   Mijares   v.   Villaluz, A.C.   No.   4431,   June   19,
1997, 274   SCRA   1,   6; Paras   v.   Paras, 397   Phil.   462,   475; 343
SCRA   414,   426   (2000); Cambaliza   v.   Cristal­Tenorio, A.C.   No.
6290, July  14,  2004, 434  SCRA 288, 294; Go v.  Achas,  MTJ­04­
1564,   March   11,   2005, 453   SCRA   189,   201; Zaguirre   v.
Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, August 3, 2005, 465 SCRA 520, 530.
17
VOL. 512, JANUARY 22,
2007  similar   excuse   can   be   made   for   a   privilege   resting   on   other
286  SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 95367. May 23, 1995.*
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ,
NERIO   ROGADO,   and   ELISA   RIVERA,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE   CONRADO   M.   VASQUEZ   and
CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.
Ombudsman; At   common   law   a   governmental   privilege
against   disclosure   is   recognized   with   respect   to   state   secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters.—At common
law   a   governmental   privilege   against   disclosure   is   recognized
with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and
similar  matters.   This  privilege  is  based   upon   public  interest   of
such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the
individual   interests   of   a   private   citizen,   even   though,   as   a
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
Same; In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.—In the case at bar, there
is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
Indeed,   EIIB’s   function   is   the   gathering   and   evaluation   of
intelligence  reports  and information  regarding  “illegal activities
affecting   the   national   economy,   such   as,   but   not   limited   to,
economic   sabotage,   smuggling,   tax   evasion,   dollar   salting.”
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient  to determine from the  circumstances of the case that
there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
17 expose   military   matters   without   compelling   production,   no
considerations.
Same; Neither is there any law or regulation which considers
personnel records of the EIIB as classified information.—Nor has
our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers
personnel   records   of   the   EIIB   as  classified  information.   To   the
contrary, COA Circular No. 88­293, which petitioners invoke to
support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against
misuse   of   public   funds,   provides   that   the   “only item   of
expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential” is that
which   refers   to   the   “purchase   of   information   and   payment   of
rewards.”
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
287
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  287 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
Same; The statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners do
not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the
proper  authorities.—The other statutes  and regulations invoked
by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents
sought   in   the   subpoena duces   tecum of   the   Ombudsman   are
classified   merely   indicate   the   confidential   nature   of   the   EIIB’s
functions,   but   they   do   not   exempt   the   EIIB   from   the   duty   to
account for its funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying
that there were savings made from certain items in the agency
and   alleging   that   the   DBM   had   released   to   the   EIIB   only   the
allocations   needed   for   the   947   personnel   retained   after   its
reorganization,   petitioners   in   effect   invited   inquiry   into   the
veracity  of their claim.  If, as petitioners claim,  the  subpoenaed
records have been examined by the COA and found by it to be
regular   in   all   respects,   there   is   no   reason   why   they   cannot   be
shown   to   another   agency   of   the   government   which   by
constitutional   mandate   is   required   to   look   into   any   complaint
concerning public office.
Same; The Ombudsman and his Deputies are designated by
the  Constitution  “protectors of the people”  and as  such  they are
required   by   it   “to   act   promptly   on   complaints   in   any   form   or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision,  agency or  instrumentality thereof, including
government­owned   or   controlled   corporation.”—On   the   other
hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several
items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the
allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes.
The   plantilla   and   other   personnel   records   are   relevant   to   his
investigation.   He   and   his   Deputies   are   designated   by   the
Constitution   “protectors   of   the   people”   and   as   such   they   are
required   by   it   “to   act   promptly   on   complaints in   any   form   or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government­owned or controlled corporation.”
Same; The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to
act on any complaint filed “in any form or manner” concerning
official acts or omissions.—Petitioners contend that under Art. XI,
§ 13(4) the Ombudsman  can  act only  “in any  appropriate  case,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law” and
that   because   the   complaint   in   this   case   is   unsigned   and
unverified,   the   case   is   not  an  appropriate  one.   This   contention
lacks merit. As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins
the  Ombudsman  to  act  on  any   complaint  filed   “in  any   form  or
manner” concerning official acts or omissions.
288
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
88 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
Same; Testimony   given   at   a   fact­finding   investigation   and
charges   made   in   a   pleading   in   a   case   in   court   constituted   a
sufficient   basis   for   the   Ombudsman   to   commence   investigation,
because   a   formal   complaint   was   really   not   necessary.—
Accordingly,   in Diaz   v.   Sandiganbayan the   Court   held   that
testimony given at a fact­finding investigation and charges made
in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for
the   Ombudsman   to   commence   investigation,   because   a   formal
complaint was really not necessary.
Same; The phrase “in an appropriate case” means any case
concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be “illegal,
unjust,   improper   or   inefficient.”—Rather   than   referring   to   the
form of complaints, therefore, the phrase “in an appropriate case”
in Art. XI, § 12 means any case concerning official act or omission
which  is  alleged  to  be  “illegal,  unjust,  improper,   or inefficient.”
The  phrase   “subject  to  such   limitations  as  may   be provided  by
law” refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or,
in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be imposed by
the courts. Such limitations may well include a requirement that
the   investigation   be   conducted in   camera,   with   the   public
excluded, as exception to the general nature of the proceedings in
the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is thereby made
between the demands of national security and the requirement of
accountability enshrined in the Constitution.
Same; The general investigation in the Ombudsman’s office
is   precisely   for   the   purpose   of   protecting   those   against   whom  a
complaint   is   filed   against   hasty,   malicious   and   oppressive
prosecution   as   much   as   securing   the   State   from   useless   and
expensive   trials.—What   has   been   said   above   disposes   of
petitioners’   contention   that   the   anonymous   letter­complaint
against   them   is   nothing   but   a   vexatious   prosecution.   It   only
remains   to   say   that   the   general   investigation   in   the
Ombudsman’s   office   is   precisely   for   the   purpose   of   protecting
those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious,
and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from
useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting
from   such   limited in   camera inspection   in   terms   of   increased
public   confidence   that   the   privilege   is   not   being   abused   and
increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring.
KAPUNAN, J, Dissenting Opinion:
Ombudsman; EIIB’s   functions   are   related   to   matters
affecting   national   security.—Disclosure   of   the   documents   as
required by the Ombudsman would necessarily defeat the legal
mandate   of   the   EIIB   as   the   intelligence   arm   of   the   executive
branch of government relating to  withhold   information  under   certain   circumstances,   particularly,
289
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  289 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
matters affecting the economy of the nation. As such, EIIB’s
functions are related to matters affecting national security. In the
performance   of   its   function   in   relation   with   the   gathering   of
intelligence   information   executive   privilege   could   as   well   be
invoked by the EIIB, especially in relation to its covert operations.
Same; Court cannot interfere with a determination, properly
made, on a question affecting economic security lest it is prepared
to   ride   roughshod   over   certain   prerogatives   of   our   political
branches.—The determination, by the executive branch, through
its appropriate agencies, of a question as affecting the national
security is a policy decision for which this Court has neither the
competence nor the mandate to infringe upon. In the absence of a
clear   showing   a   grave   abuse   of   discretion   on   the   part   of   the
Executive, acting through its (national security) agencies, I am of
the   opinion   that   we   cannot   interfere   with   a   determination,
properly made, on a question affecting economic security lest we
are prepared to ride roughshod over certain prerogatives of our
political branches.
Same; The   constitutional   right   allowing   disclosure   of
governmental documents, i.e., the right to information on matters
of   public   concern   is   not   absolute.—The   constitutional   right
allowing disclosure of governmental documents, i.e., the right to
information on matters of public concern is not absolute. While
access   to   official   records   may   not   be   prohibited,   it   may   be
regulated.   Regulation   includes   appropriate   authority   to
determine what documents are of public concern, the manner of
access   to   information   contained   in   such   documents   and   to
as   in   this   case,   those   circumstances   affecting   the   national
security.
PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the  1. 1.These are the things that I have been observing. During
Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Valmonte Law Offices for petitioners.
MENDOZA, J.:
This   is   a   petition   for   certiorari,   prohibition,   and   mandamus   to
annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent
Ombudsman,   requiring   petitioners   Nerio   Rogado   and   Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of
the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to  Agents” (EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has a biggest
290
290  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
produce “all  documents relating  to Personal  Services Funds for
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the
whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin him from enforcing
his orders.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the
EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB’s Budget and
Fiscal   Management   Division.   The   subpoena duces   tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of
an   anonymous   letter   alleging   that   funds   representing   savings
from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the
EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of
Finance,   with   copies   furnished   several   government   offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
The letter reads in pertinent parts:
the   implementation   of   E.O.   127   on   May   1,   1988,   one
hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed. Before
that   implementation,   we   had   a   monthly   savings   of
P500,000.00   from   unfilled   plantilla   position   plus   the
implementation of RA 6683 wherein seventy (70) regular
employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was
saved   from   the   government   monthly.   The   question   is,
how do they used or disbursed this savings? The EIIB
has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division
who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so
called   “ghost   agents”   or   the   “Emergency   Intelligence
share on this. Among his activities are:
1. a)Supporting   RAM   wherein   he   is   involved.   He
gives   big   amount   especially   during   the   Dec.   Failed
coup.
2. b)Payment for thirty five (30) mini UZI’s.
3. c)Payment   for   the   purchased   of   Maxima   ‘87   for
personal used of the Commissioner.
4. d)Another observation  was  the agents under the
Director of NCR EIIB is the sole operating unit within
Metro Manila which was approved by no less than the
Commissioner  due   to anomalous  activities  of   almost
all agents assigned at the central office directly under
the Commissioner. Retired Brig. Gen. Almonte as one
of the Anti­Graft board member of the Department of
Finance   should   not   tolerate   this.   However,   the
 Commissioner   did   not   investigate   his   own   men
instead, he placed them under the 15­30 payroll.
291
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  291
Almonte vs. Vasquez
1. e)Many more which are personal.
1. 2.Sir, my question is this. Can your good office investigate
EIIB   intelligence   funds   particularly   Personal   Services
(01) Funds? I wonder why the Dep’t of Budget & Mgmt.
cannot   compel   EIIB   to   submit   an   actual   filled   up
position   because   almost   half   of   it   are   vacant   and   still
they   are   releasing   it.   Are   EIIB   plantilla   position
classified?   It   is   included   in   the   Personal   Services
Itemization (PSI) and I believe it is not classified and a
ruling from Civil  Service Commission that  EIIB  is not
exempted from Civil Service. Another info, when we had
salary differential last Oct ‘88 all money for the whole
plantilla   were   released   and   from   that   alone,   Millions
were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA.
2. 3.Another   thing   that   I   have   observed   was   the   Chief
Budget Division possesses high caliber firearms such as
a   mini   UZI,   Armalite   rifle   and   two   (2)   45   cal.   pistol
issued to him by the Assistant Commissioner wherein he
is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such according
to   memorandum   order   number   283   signed   by   the
President of the Republic of the Philippines effective 9
Jan.   1990.Another   observation   was   when   EIIB   agents
apprehended a certain civilian who possesses numerous
assorted   high   powered   firearms.   Agents   plus   one
personnel   from   the   legal   proclaimed   only   five   (5)
firearms   and   the   remaining   was   pilfered   by
them.Another   observation   is   almost   all   EIIB   agents
collects   payroll   from   the   big   time   smuggler   syndicate
monthly   and   brokers   every   week   for   them   not   to   be
apprehended.Another   observation   is   the   commissioner
allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to the
media to sustain their good image of the bureau.
In   his   comment1 on   the   letter­complaint,   petitioner   Almonte
denied that as a result of the separation of personnel, the EIIB
had made some savings. He averred that the only funds released
to   his   agency   by   the   Department   of   Budget   and   Management
(DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which
were filled. He also denied that there were “ghost agents” in the
EIIB   and   claimed   that   disbursements   for   “open”   (i.e.,   “overt”
personnel) and “closed” (i.e., “covert” personnel) plantillas of the
agency had been cleared by the Commission on Audit (COA); that
the case of the 30 Uzis had already been investigated by 
_______________
1
 Rollo, pp. 36­37.
292
292  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
Congress, where it was shown that it was not the EIIB but an
agent who had spent for the firearms and they were only loaned
to the EIIB pending appropriation by Congress; that, contrary to
the charge that a Maxima car had been purchased for his use, he
was using a government issued car from the NICA; that it was his
prerogative as Commissioner to “ground” agents in the EIIB main
office   so   that   they   could   be   given   reorientation   and   retraining;
that   the   allegation   that   the   EIIB   operatives   pilfered   smuggled
firearms was without factual basis because the firearms were the
subject   of   seizure   proceedings   before   the   Collector   of   Customs,
Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been uncompromising toward
employees   found   involved   in   anomalous   activities;   and   that
intelligence funds had not been used for media propaganda and if
media   people   went   to   the   EIIB   it   was   because   of   newsworthy
stories. Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and the
case considered closed.
Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied in
his comment2 dated April 3, 1990 that savings had been realized
from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM provided
allocations for only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that the
disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for “overt” and
“covert”   personnel   had   been   cleared   by   the   COA   and   that   the
high­powered firearms had been issued for the protection of EIIB
personnel   attending   court   hearings   and   the   Finance   Officer   in
withdrawing funds from the banks.
The   Graft   Investigation   Officer   of   the   Ombudsman’s   office,
Jose   F.   Saño,   found   the   comments   unsatisfactory,   being
“unverified  and  plying   only   on  generalizations   without  meeting
specifically the points raised by complainant as constitutive of the
alleged anomalies.”3 He, therefore, asked for authority to conduct
a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request,
he issued a subpoena4 to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring
them to submit their counter­affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum5 to the  he   could   not   do   directly, i.e.,   compelling   them   (petitioners
_______________
2
 Id., p. 38.
3
 Id., p. 39.
4
 Id., p. 41.
5
 Id., p. 42.
293
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  293 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
Chief of the EIIB’s Accounting Division ordering him to bring “all
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988
and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla
of EIIB for 1988.”
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena
and   the   subpoena duces   tecum.   In   his   Order   dated   June   15,
1990,6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the
subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed
against   petitioners.   But   he   denied   their   motion   to   quash   the
subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being
forced   to   produce   evidence   against   themselves,   since   the
subpoena duces   tecum was   directed   to   the   Chief   Accountant,
petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the
Chief of the Records Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera,
to   produce   before   the   investigator   “all   documents   relating   to
Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents,
salary   vouchers   for   the   whole   plantilla   of   the   EIIB   for   1988,
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.”
Petitioners   Almonte   and  Perez   moved   for   a   reconsideration,
arguing that Rogado and Rivera were EIIB employees under their
supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what
Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence against themselves.
Petitioners’   motion   was   denied   in   respondent   Ombudsman’s
order dated August 6, 1990. Hence, this petition which questions
the  orders  of  June  15,   1990   and  August  6,   1990  of  respondent
Ombudsman.
To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset
that  it does not concern  a demand by a  citizen for  information
under   the   freedom   of   information   guarantee   of   the
Constitution.7 Rather  it  concerns  the  power  of   the Office   of  the
Ombudsman   to   obtain   evidence   in   connection   with   an
investigation conducted by  (SALARY)   FOR   THE   WHOLE   PLANTILLA   OF   EIIB
_______________
6
 Id., pp. 53­54.
7
 Art. III, § 7 provides: “The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
294
294  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  is  resisted   on  the ground  that  “knowledge  of  EIIB’s  documents
Almonte vs. Vasquez
it vis­a­vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government.
Thus petitioners raise the following issues.8
1. I.WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY
AN   UNSIGNED   AND   UNVERIFIED   LETTER
COMPLAINT IS AN “APPROPRIATE  CASE” WITHIN
THE CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE PETITIONERS
BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO
PRODUCE   TO   HIM   “ALL   DOCUMENTS   RELATING
TO   PERSONAL   SERVICES   FUNDS   FOR   THE   YEAR
1988   AND   ALL   EVIDENCES,   SUCH   AS   VOUCHERS
(SALARY)   FOR   THE   WHOLE   PLANTILLA   OF   EIIB
FOR 1988.”
2. II.WHETHER OR NOT “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO   PERSONAL   SERVICES   FUNDS   FOR   THE   YEAR
1988   AND   ALL   EVIDENCE,   SUCH   AS   VOUCHERS
FOR   1988”   ARE   CLASSIFIED   AND,   THEREFORE,
BEYOND   THE  REACH OF  PUBLIC RESPONDENT’S
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
I.
There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the
principal ones revolve on the question whether petitioners can be
ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and
salary   vouchers   of   EIIB   employees   on   the   plea   that   such
documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in question
relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will
necessarily   [lead   to]   knowledge   of   its   operations,   movements,
targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being” and this
could “destroy the EIIB.”9
Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to
issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or materiality of
the   documents   required   to   be   produced,   to   the   pending
investigation in the Ombudsman’s office. Accordingly, the focus of
discussion should be on the Government’s claim of privilege. 
________________
8
 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 6.
 9
 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 27. Thus,   the   Court   for   the   first   time   gave   executive   privilege   a
295 constitutional status and a new name, although not necessarily a
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  295 new birth.12
Almonte vs. Vasquez “The confidentiality of judicial deliberations” mentioned in the
opinion of the Court referred to the fact that Justices of the U.S.
A. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have tradition­

At   common   law   a   governmental   privilege   against   disclosure   is _______________

recognized   with   respect   to   state   secrets   bearing   on   military,
diplomatic   and   similar   matters.   This   privilege   is   based   upon
10
 Anno., Government   Privilege   Against   Disclosure   of   Official
public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself Information, 95 L.Ed. §§ 3­4 and 7, pp. 427­29, 434.
transcending   the   individual   interests   of   a   private   citizen,   even 11
 418 U.S. 683, 708­9, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039, 1061­4 (1973).
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his 12
 Freund, The   Supreme   Court   1973   Term—Foreword:   On
legal rights.10 Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 18­35 (1974).
In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena 296
in   1973,   the   U.S.   Supreme   Court   recognized   the   right   of   the
296  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
President   to   the   confidentiality   of   his   conversations   and
Almonte vs. Vasquez
correspondence, which it likened to “the claim of confidentiality of
ally   treated   their   working   papers   and   judicial   notes   as   private
judicial deliberations.” Said the Court in United States v. Nixon:11
property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. Congress that Justices and
The   expectation   of   a   President   to   the   confidentiality   of   his
judges of lower federal courts “should be encouraged to make such
conversations   and   correspondence,   like   the   claim   of
arrangements   as   will   assure   the   preservation   and   eventual
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the
availability   of   their   personal   papers,   especially   the   deposit   of
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens
their papers in the same depository they select for [their] Public
and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the
Papers”13 was   rebuffed   by   the   Justices   who,   in   a   letter   to   the
public   interest   in   candid,   objective,   and   even   blunt   or   harsh
Chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Regulation  and  Government
opinions in Presidential decision­making. A President and those
Information   of   the   U.S.   Senate,   referred   to   “difficult   concerns
who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process
respecting   the  appropriate  separation  that  must  be  maintained
of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
between the legislative branch and this Court.”14
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are
There  are,   in addition  to such  privileges,   statutorily­created
the   considerations   justifying   a   presumptive   privilege   for
ones such as the Government’s privilege to withhold the identity
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
of persons who furnish information of violations of laws.15
operation   of   the   government   and   inextricably   rooted   in   the
separation of powers under the Constitution . . . .
 With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule
was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to
the caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say
that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to
the   judge   before   the   claim   of   privilege   will   be   accepted   in   any
case.   It   may   be   possible   to   satisfy   the   court,   from   all   the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in
the  interest  of  national  security,  should  not  be  divulged.  When
this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and
the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant   to   protect   by   insisting   upon   an   examination   of   the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers . . . . In each case,
the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far
the  court  should  probe  in  satisfying  itself  that  the  occasion  for
invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a 
_______________
13
 Final Report of the National Study Commission on Records
and   Documents  of  Federal   Officials (March  31,   1977),  quoted in
BLOCH   &   KRATTENMAKER,   SUPREME   COURT   POLITICS:
THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 677­87 (1994).
14
 Letter of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dated June 7,
1993 to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Regulation and Government Information, U.S. Senate, quoted in
BLOCH & KRATTENMAKER, id., at 687­8.
15
 COA Circular No. 88­293.
297
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  297
Almonte vs. Vasquez
strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be
lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is
dubious,   a   formal   claim   of   privilege,   made   under   the
circumstances of this case, will have to prevail.16
On  the  other  hand,   where  the  claim  of  confidentiality   does  not
rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security   secrets   but   on   a   general   public   interest   in   the
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in
the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a
subpoena   considered   essential   to   the   enforcement   of   criminal
laws.17
________________
16
 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10­11, 97 L.Ed. 727,
734­35  (1953).  In  this  case  the  U.S.   Supreme  Court  reversed a
lower court order requiring the government to produce documents
relating   to   the   crash   of   a   military   aircraft   which   had   been
engaged in a secret mission to test electronic equipment. The fact
conceded  by   the  respondents,   that  the  aircraft   was  on  a  secret
military   mission,   justified   nonproduction   of   the   report   of   the
accident. It was apparent the report contained state secrets which
in the interest of national security could not be divulged even in
the chambers of the judge or in camera. There was “a reasonable
danger that the investigation report would contain references to
the secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of
the mission.”
17
 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039
(1974), the Court, while acknowledging that the President’s need
“for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great
deference   from   the   courts,”   nonetheless   held   that   such
generalized   claim   of   confidentiality   could   not   prevail   over   the
“specific   need   for   evidence   in   a   pending   criminal   trial.”
Accordingly   the   Court   ordered   the   tapes   of   conversations   of
President   Nixon   to   be   turned   over   to   the   trial   judge   for in
camerainspection to determine  whether they were relevant and
admissible   apart   from   being   privileged.   Similarly   in Nixon   v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 53 L.Ed.2d 867
(1977)   it   was   held   that   the   mere   screening   of   tapes   and   other
records of President Nixon’s conversations with employees of the
Federal Government, to be done by professional archivists for the
purpose   of   “legitimate   historical   and   governmental   purpose,”
constituted   “a   very   limited   intrusion   .   .   .   into   executive
confidentiality comparable to those held to justify in
298
298  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  expenditures   are   to   be   considered   unclassified   supported   by
Almonte vs. Vasquez
B.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic
secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to
the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
“illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited   to,   economic   sabotage,   smuggling,   tax   evasion,   dollar
salting.”18 Consequently,   while   in   cases   which   involve   state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances
of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence   will   expose   military   matters   without   compelling
production,19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting
on other considerations.
Nor   has   our   attention   been   called   to   any   law   or   regulation
which   considers   personnel   records   of   the   EIIB   as   classified
information.   To   the   contrary,   COA   Circular   No.   88­293,   which
petitioners   invoke   to   support   their   contention   that   there   is
adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that
the   “only item   of   expenditure   which   should   be   treated   strictly
confidential” is that which refers to the “purchase of information
and   payment   of   rewards.”   Thus,   part   V,   No.   7   of   the   Circular
reads:
The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly
confidential   because   it   falls   under   the   category   of   classified
information   is   that   relating   to   purchase   of   information   and
payment   of   rewards.   However,   reasonable   records   should   be
maintained and kept for inspection of the Chairman, Commission
on   Audit   or   his   duly   authorized   representative.   All   other
invoices, receipts and other documents, and, therefore, subject to
reasonable   inquiry   by   the   Chairman   or   his   duly   authorized
representative.20
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camera inspection.” 433 U.S. at 451­52, 53 L.Ed.2d. at 896­97.
Accordingly   the   validity   of   the   law,   entitled   “Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,” was upheld against
the claim that “the Presidential privilege shields the records from
archival scrutiny.”
18
 E.O. No. 127.
19
 United States v. Reynolds, supra, note 16.
20
 Quoted in Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 27.
299
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  299 
 Almonte vs. Vasquez
It should be noted that the regulation requires that “reasonable
records” be kept justifying the confidential or privileged character
of   the   information   relating   to   informers.   There   are   no   such
reasonable   records   in   this   case   to   substitute   for   the   records
claimed to be confidential.
The other statutes and regulations21 invoked by petitioners in
support   of   their   contention   that   the   documents   sought   in   the
subpoena duces   tecum of   the   Ombudsman   are   classified   merely
indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB’s functions, but they
do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to
the proper authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings
made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the DBM
had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947
personnel   retained   after  its  reorganization,   petitioners   in  effect
invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim. If, as petitioners
claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA
and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason
why they cannot be shown to another agency of the  into any complaint concerning public office.
_______________
 Petitioners   cite   in   their   Memorandum,   at   p.   19,   the
21
following:
§ 19. Release of Intelligence and Confidential Funds.—Intelligence
and   confidential   funds   provided   for   in   the   budgets   of
departments,   bureaus,   offices   or   other   agencies   of   the   national
government, including   amounts   from   savingsauthorized   by
Special   Provisions   to   be   used   for   intelligence   and   counter­
intelligence activities, shall be released only upon approval of the
President of the Philippines. (RA 6642­GAA for CY 1988)
Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release
of   intelligence   funds   shall   indicate   in   full   detail   the   specific
purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the
circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and
the particular aims to be accomplished. (Letter of Instructions No.
1282 dated January 12, 1983).
Any disbursement of intelligence funds should not be allowed
in audit, unless it is in strict compliance with the provisions of
Letters of Instruction No. XXX and 1282. Any officer or employee
who   violates   the   provisions   of   the   aforementioned   Letter   of
Instruction shall be dealt with administratively without prejudice
to   any   criminal   action   that   may   be   warranted.   (Memorandum
Circular No. 1290 of the Office of the President dated August 19,
1985).
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300  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
government which by constitutional mandate is required to look
On   the   other   hand,   the   Ombudsman   is   investigating   a
complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used
for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are
relevant to his investigation. He and his Deputies are designated
by the Constitution “protectors of the people” and as such they are
required   by   it   “to   act   promptly   on   complaints in   any   form   or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government­owned or controlled corporation.”22
His   need   for   the   documents   thus   outweighs   the   claim   of
confidentiality   of   petitioners.   What   is   more,   while   there   might
have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988
when it was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years later, these
reasons   may   have   been   attenuated,   if   they   have   not   in   fact
ceased.  The agents  whose  identities  could not then  be revealed
may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert
missions to which  they  might have been  deployed might either
have  been  accomplished   or  abandoned.   On  the  other   hand,   the
Ombudsman’s duty to investigate the complaint that there were
in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding
was received by its officials and put to illegal use, remains.
Above all,  even if the subpoenaed documents  are treated  as
presumptively privileged, this decision would only justify ordering
their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However,
as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to
be sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the
examination   of   records   in   this   case   should   be   made   in   strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to
the  documents in any  decision or order  which the Ombudsman
may render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal
covert   activities   of   the   agency.   Above   all,   there   must   be   a
scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.
With   these   safeguards   outlined,   it   is   believed   that   a
satisfactory resolution of the conflicting claims of the parties is
achieved.  26
_______________
 Art. XI, § 12.
22
301
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  301
Almonte vs. Vasquez
It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security have
been   inquired   into   in   appropriate in   cameraproceedings   by   the
courts.   In Lansang   v.   Garcia23 this   Court   held   closed   door
sessions,   with   only   the   immediate   parties   and   their   counsel
present, to determine claims that because of subversion there was
imminent  danger to public safety warranting  the suspension  of
the   writ   of habeas   corpus in   1971.   Again   in Marcos   v.
Manglapus24 the   Court   met   behind   closed   doors   to   receive
military briefings on the threat posed to national security by the
return to the country of the former President and his family. In
the United States, a similar inquiry into the danger to national
security as a result of the publication of classified documents on
the Vietnam war was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.25 We see
no reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an
agency of the Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to
carry out its constitutional duty to protect public interests 26 while
insuring the 
_______________
23
 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
24
 117 SCRA 668 (1989).
25
 New York Times Co. v. United States [The Pentagon Papers
Case], 403 U.S. 713, 29 L.Ed. 2d 822 (1971).
 Art. XI, § 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
1. (1)Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or   agency,   when   such   act   or   omission   appears   to   be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
2. (2)Direct,   upon   complaint   or   at   its   own   instance,   any
public   official   or   employee   of   the   Government,   or   any
 subdivision,   agency   or   instrumentality   thereof,   as   well
as  of  any   gov­ernment­owned   or  controlled  corporation
with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or
duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. (3)Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against   a   public   official   or   employee   at   fault,   and
recommend   his   removal,   suspension,   demotion,   fine,
censure,   or   prosecution,   and   ensure   compliance
therewith.
4. (4)Direct   the  officer  concerned,   in  any  appropriate  case,
and  subject to such limitations  as  may be provided by
law, to
302
302  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to
Almonte vs. Vasquez
confidentiality of classified documents.
C.
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman
can   act   only   “in   any   appropriate   case,   and   subject   to   such
limitations   as   may   be   provided   by   law”   and   that   because   the
complaint in this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not
an   appropriate   one.   This   contention   lacks   merit.   As   already
stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act
on any complaint filed “in any form or manner” concerning official
acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, § 12 provides:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall   act   promptly   on   complaints filed   in   any   form   or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government­owned   or   controlled   corporations   and   shall
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken
and the result thereof. (Emphasis added)
Similarly,   the   Ombudsman   Act   of   1989   (Rep.   Act   No.   6770)
provides in § 26(2):
The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any
source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It
shall 
_______________
furnish   it   with   copies   of   documents   relating   to   contracts   or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5)   Request   any   government   agency   for   assistance   and
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and
to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
....
(7)   Determine   the   causes   of   inefficiency,   red   tape,
mismanagement,  fraud,   and  corruption  in the  Government  and
make recommendations or their elimination and the observance
of high standards of ethics and efficiency. In the performance of
his functions the Ombudsman is given under Rep. Act No. 6770, §
15(8) the power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum.
303
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  303 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely
baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of
such dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable
ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent
public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and
require him to submit a written answer within seventy­two hours
from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall
dismiss the case. (Emphasis added)
Accordingly,   in Diaz   v.   Sandiganbayan 27 the   Court   held   that
testimony given at a fact­finding investigation and charges made
in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for
the   Ombudsman   to   commence   investigation,   because   a   formal
complaint was really not necessary.
Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the
phrase “in an appropriate case” in Art. XI, § 12 means any case
concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be “illegal,
unjust,   improper,   or   inefficient.”28The   phrase   “subject   to   such
limitations as may be provided by law” refers to such limitations
as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such
limitations   as   may   be   imposed   by   the   courts.   Such   limitations
may   well   include   a   requirement   that   the   investigation   be
conducted in camera, with the public excluded, as exception to the
general   nature   of   the   proceedings   in   the   Office   of   the
Ombudsman.29 A   reconciliation   is   thereby   made   between   the
demands   of   national   security   and   the   requirement   of
accountability   enshrined   in   the   Constitution. 30 What   has   been
said above disposes of petitioners’ contention that the anonymous
letter­complaint   against   them   is   nothing   but   a   vexatious
prosecution. It only remains to say that the general investigation
in the Ombudsman’s office is precisely for the  In   the   first   place,   there   can   be   no   objection   to   this   procedure
_______________
27
 219 SCRA 675 (1993).
28
 Art. XI, § 13(1).
29
 Art.   XI,   §  13(6)  requires   the  Office   of   the   Ombudsman  to
“publicize   matters   covered   by   its   investigation   when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.”
30
 Art. XI, § 1 provides: “Public office is a public trust. Public
officers  and  employees  must  at all   times  be  accountable  to  the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and  efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead  modest
lives.”
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304  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
purpose   of   protecting   those   against   whom   a   complaint   is   filed
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as
securing the State from useless and expensive trials. There may
also be benefit resulting from such limited in camera inspection in
terms   of   increased   public   confidence   that   the   privilege   is   not
being   abused   and   increased   likelihood   that   no   abuse   is   in   fact
occurring.
II.
Nor is there violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection
of the laws. Petitioners complain that “in all forum and tribunals .
. . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their
verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully
disclosed,”   while   in   proceedings   before   the   Office   of   the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.
because   it   is   provided   in   the   Constitution   itself.   In   the   second
place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in
any form and in a manner,” the framers of the Constitution took
into account the well­known reticence of the people which keep
them   from   complaining   against   official   wrongdoings.   As   this
Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of
the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them.31 On the other
hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk
who cannot afford to hire lawyers.32
III.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces
tecum would violate petitioners’ right against self­incrimination.
It is enough to state that the documents required to be  postulate   that   the   Economic   Intelligence   and   Investigation
_______________
31
 Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545, 551 (1990).
32
 2   RECORD   OF   THE   CONSTITUTIONAL   COMMISSION,
pp. 369­370.
305
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  305
Almonte vs. Vasquez
produced in this case are public records and those to whom the
subpoena duces   tecum is   directed   are   government   officials   in
whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as
petitioners   claim   the   disbursement   by   the   EIIB   of   funds   for
personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no
reason   why   they   should   object   to   the   examination   of   the
documents by respondent Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed
that   the   inspection   of   subpoenaed   documents   be   made
personally in   camera by   the   Ombudsman,   and   with   all   the
safeguards outlined in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug,   JJ.,
concur.
     Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.
     Francisco, J., On leave.
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The   well­written ponencia of   Mr.   Justice   Mendoza   would
Bureau (EIIB) documents relating to the Personal Services Funds
for the year 1988 and all documentary evidence, including salary
vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988 be produced
before   the   Ombudsman   over   the   objections   of   the   EIIB
Commissioner on the ground that the documents contain highly
confidential   matters,   apart  from  the  fact  that  the  expenditures
had been cleared in audit by the Commission on Audit (COA). The
reasons   relied   upon   in   the ponencia are   a)   that   the   EIIB
documents at issue are not classified under COA (Commission on
Audit)   Circular   No.   88­293,   Part   V   No.   7   which   limits   such
matters   exclusively   to   expenditures   relating   to   the   purchase   of
information   and   payments   of   rewards;   and   b)   the   documents
relating   to   disbursement   and   expenditures   of   the   EIIB   for
personal   funds had   already   been   previously   examined by   the
Commission on Audit when such outlay had been passed upon in 
306
306  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 Almonte vs. Vasquez
audit   in   the   said   Office,   such   that   there   is   no   confidentiality
privilege to protect.
With due respect, I beg to disagree.
Disclosure of the documents as required by the Ombudsman
would   necessarily   defeat  the   legal   mandate  of   the  EIIB   as  the
intelligence arm of the executive branch of government relating to
matters   affecting   the   economy   of   the   nation.   As   such,   EIIB’s
functions are related to matters affecting national security. In the
performance   of   its   function   in   relation   with   the   gathering   of
intelligence   information   executive   privilege   could   as   well   be
invoked by the EIIB, especially in relation to its covert operations.
The   determination,   by   the   executive   branch,   through   its
appropriate   agencies,   of   a   question   as   affecting   the   national
security is a policy decision for which this Court has neither the
competence nor the mandate to infringe upon. In the absence of a
clear  showing of a grave  abuse  of discretion on  the part  of the
Executive, acting through its (national security) agencies, I am of
the   opinion   that   we   cannot   interfere   with   a   determination,
properly made, on a question affecting economic security lest we
are prepared to ride roughshod over certain prerogatives of our
political   branches.   In   an   area   obviously   affecting   the   national
security, disclosure of confidential information on the promptings
of   some   dissatisfied   employees   would   potentially   disturb   a
number of carefully laid­out operations dependent on secrecy and
I   am   not   prepared   to   do   this.   The   characterization   of   the
documents as classified information is not a shield for wrongdoing
but   a   barrier   against   the   burdensome   requests   for   information
which necessarily interfere with the proper performance of their
duties. To give in, at every turn, to such requests would be greatly
disruptive of governmental functions. More so in this case, since
expenditures   of   the   EIIB   for   personal   funds   had   already   been
previously examined and passed upon in audit by the Commission
on Audit. There has been no allegation of any irregularity in the
COA’s earlier examination, and in the absence of substantiated
allegations, the previous determination ought to be accorded our
respect unless we want to encourage unnecessary  and tiresome
forays and investigations into government activities which would
not only end up nowhere but which would also disrupt or derail
such activities. 
307
VOL. 244, MAY 23, 1995  307 
Almonte vs. Vasquez
The   confidentiality   privilege   invoked   by   petitioners   attaches   in
the exercise of the functions of the EIIB, as presidential immunity
is   bestowed   by   reason   of   the   political   functions   of   the   Chief
Executive, as a separate and co­equal branch of government. By
the   same   parity   of   reasoning,   the   disclosure   of   the   EIIB
documents   required   to   be   examined   by   the   Ombudsman   even
in camera proceedings will under the pretext of ascertaining the
proper disbursements of the EIIB funds will unnecessarily impair
the   performance   by   the   EIIB   of   its   functions   especially   those
affecting national security.
The constitutional  right allowing disclosure of governmental
documents,   i.e.,   the   right   to   information   on   matters   of   public
concern is not absolute. While access to official records may not be
prohibited, it may be regulated. 1Regulation includes appropriate
authority to determine what documents are of public concern, the
manner of access to information contained in such documents and
to   withhold   information   under   certain   circumstances,
particularly,   as   in   this   case,   those   circumstances   affecting   the
national security.2
Besides,   as   I   emphasized   earlier,   the   determination   of   the
legality   of   EIIB’s   disbursements   of   funds   allocated   to   it   are
properly   within   the   competence   of   the   Commission   on   Audit,
which as the ponencia of Justice Mendoza finds, has been cleared
in audit. The Commission on Audit had adopted, as in the past,
measures   to   protect   “classified   information”   pertaining   to
examination   of   expenditures   of   intelligence   agencies.   In   the
present case, disclosure of information to any other agency would
unnecessarily   expose   the   covert   operations   of   EIIB,   as   a
government agency charged with national security functions.
I, therefore, vote to give due course to the petition.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—The   constitutional   provision   on   the   right   to   public
records is self­executory and supplies the rules by which the 
_______________
1
 BERNAS, I THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, 265 (1987).
2
 See id., at 267.
308
308  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been made,
Fortune Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
right  to  information  may   be  enjoyed  by   guaranteeing   the  right
and mandatory the duty to afford access to sources of information.
(Aquino­Sarmiento vs. Morato, 203 SCRA 515[1991])
———o0o———
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 181508. October 2, 2013.*
OSCAR   CONSTANTINO,   MAXIMA   CONSTANTINO   and
CASIMIRA   MATURINGAN,   petitioners, vs.   HEIRS   OF   PEDRO
CONSTANTINO,   JR.,   represented   by   ASUNCION
LAQUINDANUM, respondents.
In Pari Delicto Doctrine; Under the in pari delicto doctrine,
the   parties   to  a  controversy   are  equally   culpable  or   guilty,   they
shall   have   no   action   against   each   other,   and   it   shall   leave   the
parties   where   it  finds  them.—Latin  for  “in  equal   fault,”  in  pari
delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty
of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant
and   both   parties   stand   in pari   delicto.   Under   the in   pari
delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable
or   guilty,   they   shall   have   no   action   against   each   other,   and   it
shall leave the parties where it finds them.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
581
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 581
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
This doctrine finds expression in the maxims “ex dolo malo
non   oritur   actio”   and   “in   pari   delicto   potior   est   conditio
defendentis.”
 Same;   In   pari   delicto   situations   involve   the   parties   in   one
contract who are both at fault, such that neither can recover nor
have any action against each other.—Finding the inapplicability
of   the   in   pari   delicto   doctrine,   We   find   occasion   to   stress   that
Article 1412 of the Civil Code that breathes life to the doctrine
speaks of the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract
with   an   illegal   cause   or   object   which   does   not   constitute   a
criminal   offense.   It   applies   to   contracts   which   are   void   for
illegality of subject matter and not to contracts rendered void for
being simulated, or those in which the parties do not really intend
to be bound thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve
the   parties   in   one   contract   who   are   both   at   fault,   such   that
neither can recover nor have any action against each other.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Privies; Words and
Phrases; By the term “privies” is meant those between whom an
action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to
the  said action.—By the term “privies” is  meant those between
whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally
parties  to  the  said  action.   This   Court,   in Correa  v.   Pascual,   99
Phil.   696   (1956)   had   occasion   to  explain  that  “privity   in   estate
denotes   the   privity   between   assignor   and   assignee,   donor   and
donee,   grantor   and   grantee,   joint   tenant   for   life   and
remainderman   or   reversioner   and   their   respective   assignees,
vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A
privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the
property in question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance.” In
fine,   respondents,   as   successors­in­interest,   derive   their   right
from and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose
shoes they now stand.
Same;   Evidence;   Judicial  Admissions;   Judicial  admissions
are legally binding on the party making the admissions.—Judicial
admissions   are   legally   binding   on   the   party   making   the
admissions.   Pre­trial   admission   in   civil   cases   is   one   of   the
instances   of   judicial   admissions   explicitly   provided   for   under
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the
contents of the pre­trial order shall control the subsequent course
of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
In Bayas, et al. v. Sandi­
582
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
82
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
ganbayan,   et   al.,   391   SCRA   415   (2002)   this   Court
emphasized that: Once the stipulations are reduced into writing
and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding
on   the   parties   who   made   them. They   become   judicial
admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a
disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind
them   unilaterally,   it   must   assume   the   consequences   of   the
disadvantage.
Same;   Same;   Same;   The   general   rule   regarding
conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and
the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is
shown that the admission  was  made  through  palpable mistake,
and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
—Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that: An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings   in   the   same   case,   does   not   require   proof.   The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of
Court,   the   general   rule   regarding   conclusiveness   of   judicial
admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof
admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that
no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Jeffery C. Cruz for petitioners.
  Burgos and Villabert Law Office for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 31 May 2007583
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CV No. 81329,
1
which   reversed   the   27   October   2003   Decision2 of   the   Regional
Trial   Court   (RTC),   Branch   18   of   Malolos   City,   Bulacan,   in   a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of “Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman,”   Tax   Declaration   Nos.   96­10022­02653   &   1002655,
With   Prayer   for   a   Writ   of   Preliminary   Injunction   &   Damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 630­M­99.
The Facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be
part  of   an  estate  which  needed  to  be proportionally   subdivided
among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners
and respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is an
unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under
Tax Declaration 208143 consisting of 240 square meters situated
at   Sta.   Monica,   Hagonoy,   Bulacan.   Pedro,   Sr.,   upon   his   death,
was   survived   by   his   six   (6)   children,   namely:   1)   PEDRO
CONSTANTINO,   JR.   (Pedro,   Jr.),   the   grandfather   of   the
respondents;   2)   ANTONIA   CONSTANTINO,   who   later   died
without  issue;   3)   CLARA   CONSTANTINO,   who  also  later   died
without issue; 4) BRUNO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by
his   6   children   including   petitioner   Casimira   Constantino­
Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived by
his   daughter   Maura;   and   6)   SANTIAGO   CONSTANTINO,   who
was   survived   by   his   five   (5)   children   which   includes   petitioner
Oscar Constantino.4
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo­Zenarosa and
concurred   in   by   Associate   Justices   Portia   Aliño­Hormachuelos
and Edgardo F. Sundiam. CA Rollo, pp. 40­53.
2 Penned by Judge Victoria C. Fernandez­Bernardo, records,
583 pp. 190­194.
3 Exhibit “F,” id., at p. 10.
4 Id., at pp. 3­4.
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
On   17   June   1999,   respondents   Asuncion   Laquindanum
(Asuncion) and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great grandchildren
of   Pedro   Sr.,   in   representation   of   Pedro,   Jr.   filed   a
complaint5 against   petitioners   Oscar   Constantino,   Maxima
Constantino   and   Casimira   Maturingan,   grandchildren   of   Pedro
Sr.,   for   the   nullification   of   a   document   denominated   as
“Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” dated 10 August 1992,6 Tax
Declaration   Nos.   96­10022   (02653) 7 and   96­10022   (02655)8 and
reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro
Sr.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in
October 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over
the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to
the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof.
Upon   verification,   respondents   learned   that   a   Tax   Declaration
No.   02010­2170­33235   in   the   name   of   petitioner   Oscar
Constantino and his cousin Maxima Constantino was unlawfully
issued, which in effect canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the
name   of   their   ancestor   Pedro   Sr.   The   issuance   of   the   new   tax
declaration   was   allegedly   due   to   the   execution   of   a   simulated,
fabricated and fictitious document denominated as “Pagmamana
sa Labas ng Hukuman,” wherein the petitioners misrepresented
themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further
alleged that subsequently, the subject land was divided equally
between petitioners Oscar and Maxima resulting in the issuance
of   Tax   Declaration   No.   96­10022­0265310 in   the   name   of   Oscar,
with   an   area   of   120   sq   m   and   the   other   half   in   the   name   of
Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96­10022­02652. 11
_______________
5  Id., at pp. 2­8.
6  Exhibit “E,” id., at p. 11.
7  Exhibit “C,” id., at p. 14.
8  Exhibit “D,” id., at p. 16.
9  Exhibit “F,” id., at p. 10.
10 Id., at p. 98.
11 Id., at p. 99.
585
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
The   share   of   Maxima   was   eventually   conveyed   to   her   sister,
petitioner Casimira in whose name a new Tax Declaration No. 96­
10022­0265512 was issued.
Thus, respondents sought to annul the “Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman” as well as the Tax Declarations that were issued on
the basis of such document.
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer
With Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr., upon his death, left several
parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered
by Tax Declaration No. 20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq m
also   situated   at   Sta.   Monica,   Hagonoy,   Bulacan,   previously
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3) an agricultural land
with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or less. The petitioners
claimed that the document “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman”
pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it
was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and
among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Further,   petitioners   alleged   that   the   respondents   have   no
cause   of   action   against   them   considering   that   the   respondents’
lawful   share   over   the   estate   of   Pedro   Sr.,   had   already   been
transferred   to   them   as   evidenced   by   the   Deed   of   Extrajudicial
Settlement   with   Waiver14 dated   5   December   1968,   executed   by
Angelo   Constantino,   Maria   Constantino   (mother   of   respondent
Asuncion),   Arcadio   Constantino   and   Mercedes   Constantino,   all
heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed, respondents adjudicated unto
themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land with
an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were “the only
legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed that in the
manner   similar   to   the   assailed   “Pagmamana   sa   Labas   ng
Hukuman,” they as­
585
_______________
12 Id., at p. 101.
 13 Id., at pp. 24­28.
14 Id., at pp. 30­31.
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
serted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot
without damage to the respondents.
In   essence,   petitioners   position   was   that   the   Deed   of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of
Tax Declaration No. 9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of
Pedro   Sr.,   including   the petitioners,   on  the  understanding  that
the   respondent   heirs   of   Pedro   Jr.   would   no   longer   share   and
participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot
covered by the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.”
On   15   August   2000,   pre­trial   conference15 was   conducted
wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as
well as identification of the issues to be litigated.
Thereupon,   trial   on   the   merits   ensued.On   27   October   2003,
the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding
that:
As   a   result   of   execution   of   “Extrajudicial   Settlement
with Waiver” dated December 5, 1968 (Exh. “2”) executed
by   the Heirs   of   Pedro   Constantino,   Jr.,   a   son   of   Pedro
Constantino, Sr. and the subsequent execution of another
deed denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman”
dated August 10, 1992 (Exh. “E”) executed by the heirs of
Santiago and Bruno Constantino, also other sons of Pedro
Constantino,   Sr.,   to   the   exclusion   of   the   other   heirs,
namely,   those   of   ANTONIA,   CLARA,   and   EDUARDO
CONSTANTINO,   both   plaintiffs   and   defendants   acted
equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law
leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one
of   them.   (See: Yu   Bun   Guan   v.   Ong,   367   SCRA   559).
Parties   who   are   equally   guilty   cannot   complain   against
each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 70­71.
16 Id., at pp. 190­194.
587
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 587
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Supplementing   the   law   on   the   matter,   that   is,   the
provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code whereby every
person   must,   in   the   exercise   of   his   rights   and   in   the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith, is the legal
maxim that “he who comes to court to demand equity must
come   with   clean   hands.”   (LBC   Express,   Inc.   v.   Court   of
Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
Although,   plaintiffs­heirs   of   Pedro   Constantino,   Jr.,
including   Asuncion   Laquindanum   and   Josefina   Cailipan,
are   not   parties   or   signatories   to   the   “Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver” dated December 5, 1968, they are
successors­in­interest   of   Pedro   Constantino,   Jr.   They   are
considered   “privies”  to   said   deed,   and   are   bound   by   said
extrajudicial settlement. (See: Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA
400).   In   other   words,   they   are   “PRIVIES   IN   ESTATE”.
(Correa v. Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703).
Consequently,   plaintiffs   are   now   estopped   from
claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA 357). They
are estopped to share in the real property subject matter of
this case. In fine, they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed
 for. (Communication Materials  & Design, Inc. v.  CA, 260
SCRA 673).
With  respect  to  alleged  damages  claimed  by  plaintiffs
against defendants in their Complaint and counterclaim for
damages by defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer,
both claims are hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual
and legal foundations
Disposition
WHEREFORE,   in  view   of  the  foregoing  premises  and
disquisition,   the   deed   denominated   as   “Pagmamana   sa
Labas   ng   Hukuman”   of   August   10,   1992   and   Tax
Declaration   No.   96­10022­02653   in   the   name   of   Oscar
Constantino   and   Tax   Declaration   No.   96­10022­02655   in
the   name   of   Casimira   C.   Maturingan   (from   Maxima
Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand. Plaintiffs’
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Complaint for nullification thereof with damages is hereby
DISMISSED.17
Not   convinced,   the   respondents   appealed   the   aforequoted
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising, among others, the
erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of “in pari
delicto” in declaring the validity of the document “Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman.”
In   its   31   May   2007   Decision,18 the   CA   ruled   in   favor  of   the
respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the “Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver” dated 5 December 1968 they executed
covering the 192 sq m lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not
part of the estate of Pedro Sr. The CA rationated in this wise:
The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the
“Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” dated 5 December
1968 among the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria,
Arcadio and Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr.
although there is a typographical error in that the name of
Pedro   Jr.   was   inadvertently   typed   only   as Pedro
Constantino. It is clear from the reading of the document
that a typographical error was committed because the four
(4)   children   of   Pedro   Jr.   by   Felipa   dela   Cruz   were
specifically identified. Further, during the presentation of
evidence of the plaintiffs­appellants, it was rebutted that
Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate children namely: Pedro Jr.,
Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo19 and Pedro
Jr. had four (4).20
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of
Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto themselves to
the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr.
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 193­194.
18 Rollo, pp. 32­45.
19 TSN, 23 October 2000, pp. 4­7.
20 Rollo, p. 41.
589
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 589
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Rather, the adjudication in the document entitled “Extrajudicial
Settlement   with   Waiver   dated   5   December   1968   pertains   to   a
different   property   and   is   valid   absent   any   evidence   to   the
contrary. Hence, it is erroneous for the trial court to declare the
parties in pari delicto.
The Issue
The   petitioners   now   question   the   said   ruling   assigning   as
error,   among   others,   the   failure   of   the   CA   to   appreciate   the
existence   of   misrepresentation   in   both   documents,   thereby
ignoring   the   propriety   of   the   application   of   the in   pari
delicto doctrine. Likewise assailed is the erroneous disregard by
the   CA   of   stipulations   and   admissions   during   the   pre­trial
conference   on   which   the   application   of   the   doctrine   of in   pari
delicto was based.
Our Ruling
Latin for “in equal fault,” in pari delicto connotes that two or
more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of
law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when
an   illegal   agreement   has   been   made,   and   both   parties   stand
in pari delicto.21 Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a
controversy   are   equally   culpable   or   guilty,   they   shall   have   no
governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code, which state
action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it
that:
finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims “ex dolo
malo   non   oritur   actio”   and   “in   pari   delicto potior   est   conditio
defendentis.”22
When circumstances are presented for the application of such
doctrine, courts will take a hands off stance in interpreting the
contract for or against any of the parties. This is illus­
_______________
21 A law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of
the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.
22 Ubarra v. Mapalad, A.M. No. MTJ­91­622, 22 March 1993,
220 SCRA 224, 235.
590
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
trated   in   the   case   of Packaging   Products   Corporation   v.
NLRC,23 where this Court pronounced that:
This   Court   cannot   give   positive   relief   to   either
petitioner or respondent because we are asked to interpret
and   enforce   an   illegal   and   immoral   arrangement.   (See
Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of the Civil Code). Kickback
arrangements in the purchase of raw materials, equipment,
supplies   and   other   needs   of   offices,   manufacturers,   and
industrialists are so widespread and pervasive that nobody
seems to know how to eliminate them. x x x.
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in
pari   delicto.   Neither   one   may   expect   positive   relief   from
courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract. The
courts will leave them as they were at the time the case
was filed.24
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally
Article 1411. When   the   nullity   proceeds   from   the
illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes   a   criminal   offense,   both   parties   being   in  pari
delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and
both shall be prosecuted.
x x x x x x
Article 1412. If   the   act   in   which   the   unlawful   or
forbidden   cause   consists   does   not   constitute   a   criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:
x x x x x x
1. When   the   fault   is   on   the   part   of   both   contracting
parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of
_______________
23 236 Phil. 225; 152 SCRA 210 (1987).
24 Id., at pp. 234­235; p. 218.
591
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 591
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
 the   contract,   or   demand   the   performance   of   the   other’s
undertaking;
x x x x x x.
The   petition   at   bench   does   not   speak   of   an   illegal   cause   of
contract   constituting   a   criminal   offense   under   Article   1411.
Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although
such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code
speaks of contracts in general, as well as contracts which are null
and  void ab   initiopursuant  to  Article  1409  of  the  Civil  Code  —
such as the subject contracts, which as claimed, are violative of
the mandatory provision of the law on legitimes.
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they
separately executed deprived each other of rightful shares in the
two lots subject of the separate contracts — that is, if the two (2)
parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of
the late Pedro Sr.
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of
the   contract   denominated   as   “Pagmamana   sa   Labas   ng
Hukuman” which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an
underlying   agreement   with   the   other   heirs   including   Maria
Constantino,   daughter   of   Pedro   Jr.   and   grandmother   of
respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize
the   192   square   meters   lot   subject   matter   of   the   “Extrajudicial
Settlement   with   Waiver”   executed   in   1968   as   the   share   of   the
heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected
such agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her
heirs, herein respondents, were not disturbed in their possession
or ownership over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro
Jr. were said to have acquiesced 26 to the “Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman” and
_______________
25 Answer   with   Counterclaim   filed   by   defendants,   herein
petitioners, records, pp. 24­28.
26 Id., at p. 26.
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
the underlying agreement and therefore they have no recourse or
reason   to   question   it   taking   cue   from   the   doctrine   of in   pari
delicto.   This   was   the   basis   of   the   trial   court’s   findings   that
respondents are now estopped from claiming otherwise.27
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
This   is   not   to   say,   however,   that   the   CA   was   correct   in
upholding   the   validity   of   the   contract   denominated   as
“Pagmamana   sa   Labas   ng   Hukuman.”   The   CA   decision   being,
likewise, based on pari delicto, is also incorrect.
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We
find  occasion  to stress   that  Article  1412   of  the  Civil   Code  that
breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which
does   not   constitute   a   criminal   offense.   It   applies   to   contracts
which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts
rendered void for being simulated, 28 or those in which the parties
do   not   really   intend   to   be   bound   thereby.   Specifically, in   pari
delictosituations involve the parties in one contract who are both
at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action against
each other.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments
unto the signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor
common to them and another set of signatories likewise assigning
unto themselves portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds
came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in
both to exclude their co­heirs of their rightful share in the entire
estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an assignment  of specific
portions of the estate of Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful
partition of estate as both sets of heirs intended to exclude the
other heirs.
_______________
27 Page 5 of the Decision dated 27 October 2003, id., at p. 194.
28 Lecture Notes on Civil Code by Professor Ruben F. Balane,
p. 352.
593
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 593
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The
inapplicability is dictated not only by the fact that two deeds, not
one   contract,   are   involved,   but   because   of   the   more   important
reason that such an application would result in the validation of
both deeds instead of their nullification as necessitated by their
illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying agreement
resulting   in   the   execution   of   the   deeds   is   nothing   but   a   void
agreement. Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1409. The   following   contracts   are   inexistent   and
void from the beginning:
(1) Those   whose   cause,   object   or   purpose   is   contrary   to
law; morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
x x x x x x  x x x
Corollarily,   given   the   character   and   nature   of   the   deeds   as
being void and inexistent, it has, as a consequence, of no force and
effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and
which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. 29
That   said,   we   cannot   give   credence   to   the   contention   of
respondents that no fault can be attributed to them or that they
are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
supposed   unlawful   agreement   entered   into   between   Maria
Laquindanum, their predecessor­in­interest, and the other heirs,
including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect
to them. Respondents argued and set forth as an issue during the
trial   that   they   were   not   signatories   to   any   of   the   contract   or
privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that
respondents are successors­in­
_______________
29 Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, Tolentino, 1973 Ed.,
p. 592, also cited in Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 208 Phil. 95, 113;
123 SCRA 99, 119 (1983).
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
interest   of   Maria   Laquindanum,   one   of   the   signatories   in   the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver who was also allegedly in
agreement with the petitioners.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents
are   “privies”   to   Maria   Laquindanum.   By   the   term   “privies”   is
meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although
they are not literally parties to the said action. 30 This Court, in
Correa v. Pascual,31 had occasion to explain that “privity in estate
denotes   the   privity   between   assignor   and   assignee,   donor   and
donee,   grantor   and   grantee,   joint   tenant   for   life   and
remainderman   or   reversioner   and   their   respective   assignees,
vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A
privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the
property in question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance.” In
fine,   respondents,   as   successors­in­interest,   derive   their   right
from and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose
shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents’ situation
is   analogous   to   that   of   a   transferee pendente   lite illustrated
in Santiago   Land   Development   Corporation   v.   Court   of
Appeals,32 reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz33 where this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in
interest,   the   original   defendant,   and   is   bound   by   the
proceedings   had   in   the   case   before   the   property   was
transferred   to   him.   He   is   a   proper,   but   not   an
indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been
bound by the judgment against his predecessor. 34 
_______________
30 Cabresos v. Judge Tiro, 248 Phil. 631, 636­637; 166 SCRA
400, 405 (1988).
31 99 Phil. 696, 703 (1956) quoting 50 C.J., 407 and 33 Words
and Phrases, 800.
32 334 Phil. 741, 747; 267 SCRA 79, 87 (1997).
33 44 Phil. 691 (1923).
34 Id., at p. 694.  A   portion   of   the   admission   and   stipulations   made   by   both
595
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement
precipitating   the   execution   of   the   Deed   of   Extrajudicial
Settlement   with   Waiver   which   was   binding   upon   Maria
Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely succeeded
Maria.
This   notwithstanding,   it   must   however   be   shown   that   the
Deed   of   Extrajudicial   Settlement   with   Waiver,   referred   to   a
property owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of
this case.
The   records   show   that   apart   from   respondent   Asuncion
Laquindanums’s statement that the parcel of land subject matter
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of
the estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence
was   offered   to   support   it.   The   CA   in   giving   credence   to   the
respondents’   claim,   merely   relied   on   the   alleged   typographical
error   in   the   Deed.   The   basis   for   the   CA’s   conclusion   was   the
inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of their children, which
the CA considered as proof that the property was owned by Pedro
Jr. and not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the
petitioners, the mention of the names of the children of Pedro Jr.
in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of the
deed is the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other
heirs of Pedro Sr., only the children of Pedro Jr. appeared in the
Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.
Weak   as   the  reasoning   is,   the  CA  actually   contradicted   the
admissions made no less by the respondents during the pre­trial
conference  where  they   stipulated  that the  land   covered  by  Tax
Declaration   No.   9534   consisting   of   192   sq.   m   belongs   to   Pedro
Sr.35
parties during the pre­trial is hereunder quoted, thus:
595 Respondents’ admissions:
_______________
35 Records, pp. 70­71.
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
“1. That  the  land   covered  by  Tax Declaration  No.   9534
previously   owned   by   Pedro   Constantino,   Sr.   was
transferred   to   Maria   Constantino   under   Tax
Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per
Doc. No. 319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11, Series of 1968 by
Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr.”
 Clearly,   the   above   stipulation   is   an   admission   against
respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro, Sr. of the
192   sq   m  lot   covered   by   Tax   Declaration   No.   9534,   which   was
transferred   to   respondents’   mother,   the   daughter   of   Pedro,   Jr.
Such that, in one of the issues submitted to be resolved by the
trial   court,   this   was   included:   “Whether   or   not   the   “Deed   of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” is enforceable against the
plaintiffs,   thus   curing   the   legal   infirmities,   if   any,   of   the
“Pagmamana   sa   Labas   ng   Hukuman”36 —   an   issue   earlier
mentioned.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making
the   admissions.   Pre­trial   admission   in   civil   cases   is   one   of   the
instances   of   judicial   admissions   explicitly   provided   for   under
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the
contents of the pre­trial order shall control the subsequent course
of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
In Bayas, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,37 this Court emphasized
that:
Once   the   stipulations   are   reduced   into   writing   and
signed   by   the   parties   and   their   counsels,   they   become
binding   on   the   parties   who   made   them. They   become
judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated.38
_______________
36 Id., at p. 71.
37 440 Phil. 54; 391 SCRA 415 (2002).
38 Id., at p. 69; p. 426, citing Schreiber v. Rickert, 50 NE 2d
879, 13 October 1943.
597
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may
not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume
the consequences of the disadvantage.39 (Highlighting ours)
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
A   party   who   judicially   admits   a   fact   cannot   later
challenge   the  fact   as  judicial   admissions   are  a   waiver   of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy.   Consequently,   an   admission   made   in   the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission   and   are   conclusive   as   to   such   party,   and   all
proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored,   whether   objection   is   interposed   by   the   party   or
not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in
a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot   subsequently   take   a   position   contrary   of   or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.41(Citations omitted)
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of
the   Rules   of   Court   serves   as   a   caveat   for   the   rule   of
conclusiveness   of   judicial   admissions   —   for,   in   the   interest   of
justice, issues that may arise in the course of the proceedings but
which may not have been taken up in the pre­trial can still be
taken up.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Record of pre­trial.—The proceedings in the
pre­trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof,
the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail
the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken
thereon, the amendments allowed to the
597
_______________
39 Id.
40 520 Phil. 982; 486 SCRA 451 (2006).
 41 Id., at p. 991; pp. 459­460.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the
parties   as   to   any   of   the   matters   considered.   Should   the
action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and
limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified
before trial to prevent injustice.
In   addition,   Section   4   of   Rule   129   of   the   Rules   of   Court,
provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules
of   Court,   the   general   rule   regarding   conclusiveness   of   judicial
admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof
admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that
no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission.42
However,   respondents   failed   to   refute   the   earlier
admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While denying
ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion
Laquindanum,   when   placed   on   the   stand,   offered   a   vague
explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro
Jr. A portion of her testimony43is hereto reproduced as follows:
_______________
42 Florentino Atillo, III v. Court of Appeals, et al., 334 Phil.
546, 552; 266 SCRA 596, 602 (1997).
43 TSN, 23 November 2000, p. 6.
599
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 599
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
“ATTY. DOMINGO:
Q: Do   you   know   if   as   part   of   the   estate   of   the   late   Pedro
Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of land also situated at
Sta. Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square
meters?
A: It   is   not   owned   by   Pedro   Constantino,   Sr.,   sir.   It   is   our
property   owned   by   Pedro   Constantino,   Jr.   that   was
inherited by my mother Maria Constantino.
Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired
that parcel of land, the one that you mentioned a while
ago?
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa
na yon e amin.” (Highlighting ours)
The   above   assertion   of   denial   is   simply   a   self­serving
declaration unsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive the
stipulations made during the pre­trial conference. Consequently,
respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which
they based their right over the property subject matter thereof.
Considering   that   the   infirmities   in   the   two   deeds   relate   to
exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heir’s right to his or her
legitime, it is apt to reiterate our ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji
Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:
Hence, in the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement
of   the   Estate   with   Absolute   Deed   of   Sale   in   favour   of
spouses   Uy,   all   the   heirs   of   Anunciation   should   have
participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were
 admittedly excluded   and   that   then   minors   Rosa  and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the
settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting ours)
_______________
44 G.R. No. 194366, 10 October 2012, 683 SCRA 553, 560.
600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
Further highlighting  the effect of excluding  the heirs  in  the
settlement   of   estate,   the   case   of Segura   v.   Segura,45elucidated
thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs   were   concerned.   The  rule  covers   only   partition.
The   partition   in   the   present   case   was   invalid   because   it
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares   in   the   partitioned   property.   Under   the   rule   “no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.”
As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold
that their right to  challenge  the partition  had prescribed
after two years from its execution x x x.
In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation
of   the   law   on   legitimes,   the pari   delicto rule,   expressed   in   the
maxims   “Ex   dolo   malo   non   oritur   action”and   “in   pari   delicto
potior est condition defendentis,” which refuses remedy to either
party   to   an   illegal   agreement   and   leaves   them   where   they
are, does   not   apply   in   this   case.   (Underline   supplied)46 As   held
in De Leon v. CA:47
In   the   ultimate   analysis,   therefore,   both   acted   in
violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule expressed
in   the   maxims “Ex   dolo   malo   non   oritur   action”   and   “in
pari delicto potior est condition defendentis,” which refuses
remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves
them where they are does not apply in this case.
_______________
45 Id., at p. 561 citing Segura v. Segura, 247­A Phil. 449, 456;
165 SCRA 368, 373 (1988).
46 De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80965, 6 June 1990,
186 SCRA 345, 359.
47 Id.
601
VOL. 706, OCTOBER 2, 2013 601
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
x x x x x x x x x
Since the Letter­Agreement was repudiated before the
purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari
delicto   rule   in   this   case   is   to   put   a   premium   to   the
circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted
to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be
placed   in   the   position   in   which   she   was   before   the
transaction was entered into.
Accordingly,   in   order   not   to   put   a   premium   to   the
circumvention of the laws as contemplated by the parties in the
instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any
circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.48
WHEREFORE,   the   31   May   2007   Decision   of   the   Court   of
Appeals   in   CA­G.R.   CV   No.   81329   is   hereby REVERSED.
The Pagmamana   sa   Labas   ng   Hukuman and   Extrajudicial
Settlement   with   Waiver   are   hereby   declared   void   without
prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr.
with the full participation of all the latter’s heirs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio   (Chairperson),   Brion,   Del   Castillo and Perlas­
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.
Notes.—Parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of
the   law;   the   courts   leave   them   as   they   are,   because   they   are
deemed in pari delicto or in equal fault. This rule, however, is not
absolute. Article 1142 of the Civil Code provides an exception, and
permits the return of that which may have been given under a
void   contract.   (Queensland­Tokyo   Commodities,   Inc.   vs.   George,
630 SCRA 304 [2010])
_______________
48 Magsulin v. National Organization of Working Men, et al.,
451 Phil. 254, 262; 403 SCRA 199, 205 (2003).
602
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.
 
The in pari   delicto rule   provides   that   when   two   parties   are
equally   at   fault,   the   law   leaves   them   as   they   are   and   denies
recovery by either one of them. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Poblete, 691 SCRA 613 [2013]) 520  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
——o0o—— 
People vs. Gaudia
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004.*
reserved.
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs. ROLENDO
GAUDIA @ “LENDOY” or “DODO”, appellant.
Criminal   Law; Circumstantial   Evidence; Requisites; The
ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with
each   other,   consistent   with   the   hypothesis   that   the   accused   is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.–Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court,
conviction   may   be   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   provided
three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts  from which the  inferences  are  derived  are  proven;
and   (c)   the   combination   of   all   the   circumstances   is   such   as   to
produce   a   conviction   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   The   ruling   case
law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
a conviction, all circumstances must be  argument.  Remelyn  had  told her  mother,  “Crazy Lendoy  forced
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
521
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  521
People vs. Gaudia
consistent  with  each   other,   consistent  with the  hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
Same; Witnesses; It   is   hoary   jurisprudence   that   mere
relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of any other
improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of
the witness.–First, appellant’s attempt to discredit the testimony
of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by affinity
of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere
relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of any other
improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of
the witness. In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill
motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Same; Rape; Child   Witnesses; Words   and   Phrases; Studies
show   that   children,   particularly   very   young   children,   make   the
“perfect victims” of rape; Certainly, children have more problems
in providing  accounts of  events because they do not understand
everything   they   experience;   Moreover,   children   have   a   limited
vocabulary;   It   must   also   be   considered   that   there   is   no   actual
counterpart   for   the   word   “rape”   in   Visayan   parlance.– Next,
appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made
any statement that he sexually molested her. This is a specious
me.” Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile
age,   she could  not  be expected  to  have  a comprehension  of  the
concept   of   rape.   Studies   show   that   children,   particularly   very
young children, make the “perfect victims”. They naturally follow
the   authority   of   adults   as   the   socialization   process   teaches
children   that   adults   are   to   be   respected.   The   child’s   age   and
developmental   level   will   govern   how   much   she   comprehends
about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child
is too young to understand what has happened to her, the effects
will   be   minimized   because   she   has   no   comprehension   of   the
consequences.   Certainly,   children   have   more   problems   in
providing   accounts   of   events   because   they   do   not   understand
everything   they   experience.   They   do   not   have   enough   life
experiences from which  to draw  upon in making  sense of  what
they   see,   hear,   taste,   smell   and   feel.   Moreover,   they   have   a
limited   vocabulary.   The   fact   that   Remelyn   called   appellant
“Buang” or crazy shows that he did something which she knew
was   not   right   or   proper.   By   saying   “iya   kong   lugos,”   Remelyn
clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her
limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of
relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also
be  considered   that  there   is  no  actual   counterpart  for   the   word
“rape” in Visayan parlance.
522
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Same; Same; Right   to   be   Informed; Pleadings   and
22  Practice; Where the Information merely described the rape victim
People vs. Gaudia
Same; Same; Witnesses; Hearsay; Offers of Compromise; Res
Inter   Alios   Acta   Principle; A   witness   can   only   testify   on   facts
which   are   based   on   his   personal   knowledge   or   perception;
Following   the   principle  of   res  inter  alios   acta   alteri  nocere  non
debet,   the   actions   of   the   accused’s   parents   in   offering   to
compromise cannot prejudice the accused, since he was not a party
to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the
offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim.–
Similarly,   appellant’s   charge   that   the   offers   of   compromise
allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by
the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been
taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not
exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made
by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and
of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the
alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which
allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can
only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or
perception.   The   offer   of   compromise   allegedly   made   by   the
appellant’s   parents   to   Amalia   may   have   been   the   subject   of
testimony of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents cannot
prejudice   the   appellant,   since   he   was   not   a   party   to   the   said
conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of
compromise   made   by   them   to   the   mother   of   the   victim.   They
cannot   be   considered   as   evidence   against   appellant   but   we
reiterate   that   these   errors   are   not   enough   to   reverse   the
conviction of the appellant.
as a “minor” and did not allege that she was below seven years
old, the accused was therefore charged with simple rape only.–We
now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the
case at bar, the Information states that appellant, “by means of
force and intimidation .  . .  willfully,  unlawfully  and feloniously
(had)   carnal   knowledge   with   Remelyn   Loyola,   a minor,   against
her   will   to   her   damage   and   prejudice.”   (emphasis   ours)   The
Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven years
old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with
simple   rape,   under   Section   335   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   as
amended   by   Republic   Act   No.   7659   (the   Death   Penalty   Law).
Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant
circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to
qualified rape, punishable by death. We again stress that these
new   attendant   circumstances   must   be   properly   pleaded   in   the
information  to  justify   the  imposition   of   the   death  penalty.   The
facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime for
which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.
The main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be
set   out  in  the   information  is  to   enable   the  accused   to   suitably
prepare   his   defense.   It   would   be   a   denial   of   the   right   of   the
accused   to   be   informed   of   the   charges   against   him   and,
consequently, a 
523
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  523 
People vs. Gaudia
 denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and
be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although
the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting
in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which
he was arraigned.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court  against her will to her damage and prejudice.”
of Digos, Davao del Sur, Br. 19.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
PUNO,  J.:
There can be no greater violation of a person’s right to feel safe
and   secure   than   the   crime   of   rape.   When   one   commits   such   a
horrible act on another, he degrades not only that person’s body;
more importantly, he defiles that person’s mind. When the victim
is   a   little   child,   the   act   and   the   perpetrator   himself   assume   a
bestiality   beyond   the   comprehension   of   normal   human   beings.
Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike,
even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision1 dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of
the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Digos,   Davao   del   Sur,   finding
appellant   Rolendo   Gaudia2 guilty   of   the   crime   of   rape,   meting
upon him the penalty of death, and ordering him to pay to private
complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00)   as   moral   damages,   thirty   thousand   pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused­appellant reads as
follows:
“That  on  or   about  March  24,   1997  at  about  6:30   o’clock  in  the
evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del
Sur,   Philippines,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable
Court,   the   abovenamed   accused,   by   means   of   force   and
intimidation,   did,   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor,
_______________
1
 Written by RTC Judge Hilario I. Mapayo.
2
 Also known by the name “Lendoy” or “Dodo”.
524
524  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Gaudia
The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as
its primary witness. Amalia testified that on 24 March 1997, she
left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) 3 and Kimberly (1
year   old)4 at   their   house   in   Clib,   Hagonoy,   Davao   del   Sur   to
gather   pigs’   food   at   Bulatukan.   At   the   time,   her   husband   was
working   in   Tulunan,   South   Cotabato.   At   about   4:00   in   the
afternoon,   Amalia   returned   home   and   could   not   find   Remelyn.
She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about
the   whereabouts   of   Remelyn.   Nobody   could   provide   her   any
information.   On   her   way   home,   she   shouted   and   called   out
Remelyn’s   name.   At   about   6:00   p.m.,   Amalia   heard   Remelyn
calling   out   to   her,   “Ma,   I   am   here,”   from   a   grove   of ipil­
ipil trees.5 Amalia   rushed   toward   the   place,   but   was   met   by
Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their
house.6 She   found   Remelyn   crying,   naked, nagbakaang (walking
with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her
body. Ipil­ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from
her   private   organ.   Amalia   brought   Remelyn   home   and   washed Police   officers   came   and   brought   Amalia,   Remelyn   and   two
her.   Upon   closer   inspection,   she   found   a   whitish   mucuslike barangay  officials  (kagawads) to the  police  precinct of Hagonoy
substance coming from Remelyn’s private organ.7 for investigation. Amalia’s statement was taken.12
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy
the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment. Health   Center   in   Davao   del   Sur.   Dr.   Patricio   Hernane,   the
Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and municipal   health   officer,13 conducted   a   genital   examination   of
parents of the appellant.8The quack doctor found both dried blood Remelyn, and made the following findings:
and   fresh   blood   oozing   in   Remelyn’s   vagina,   and   told
Amalia, “Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped.”9 At GENITAL EXAMINATION:
about   10:00   a.m.,   Tulon   Mik,   a   neighbor,   came   and   informed
Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted
Remelyn.10 At   this   point,   the   parents   of   appellant   told   Amalia, on the external genitalia. Dried blood are (sic) noted on the labia
“Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are minora.   Fresh   hymenal   lacerations   are   noted   at   12,   3,   6,   10
willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my o’clock (sic) are noted with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the
son committed.”11 posterior   commissure   but   not   extending   to   the   perineum.   No
lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
_______________ Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of
the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)
3
 TSN,   5   January   1998,   p.   4.   According   to   Amalia   Loyola, CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.14
Remelyn was born on 9 August 1993. The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by
4
 Id., at p. 5. the insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis of a man. 15 On
5
 Id., at p. 8. 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. 16 Amalia
6
 Id., at p. 7. stated therein that Remelyn had told her “Buang Lendoy iya kong
7
 Id., at pp. 5­7. lugos.”17 (Meaning   “crazy   lendoy   he   forced   me”   in   the   Visayan
8
 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 19. dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after
9
 Id., at p. 8. the  incident,   Remelyn  told  her,   “Ma,   Lendoy   is  crazy,   she  (sic)
10
 TSN,   5   January   1998,   pp.   14­15,   and   TSN,   26   February brought me to the ipil­ipil trees.”18
1998, pp. 4­5.  The   prosecution   also   presented   Tulon   Mik,   Remelyn’s
11
 Id., at p. 19. neighbor   and   a   barangay kagawad in   their   area.   Mik   testified
525 that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  525 on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. They
People vs. Gaudia
were   in   a   hurry   as   their   child   was   running   a   fever.   Mik   saw
appellant car­
_______________
12
 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 8.
13
 TSN, 8 December 1997, p. 4.
14
 Exhibits “A­2” and “A­3” for the prosecution, also Exhibit “1­
C” for the defense, p. 46 of the Original Records.
15
 TSN, 8 December 1997, pp. 7­8.
16
 Exhibit “B” for the prosecution, p. 5 of the Original Records.
17
 Id.
18
 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 9.
526
526  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt,
People vs. Gaudia
rying   a   small   girl   in   his   arms. 19 He   identified   the   little   girl   as
Remelyn   Loyola,   daughter   of   Amalia   Loyola.   Appellant   and
Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil­ipil trees.20
The   next   morning,   25   March   1997,   at   about   7:00   a.m.,   a
neighbor   informed   Mik   that   Remelyn   had   been   raped.   He
proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought
Remelyn for examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn
had been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the
crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud 21 and
the  other tanods of  the  incident.  They  were  instructed  to locate
the   appellant.   They   passed   to   the   police   the   information   that
appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and
took appellant for investigation.22
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of
alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he
went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the
National Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brother­in­
law   of   Amalia   Loyola.   They   finished   at   5:00   p.m.,   left   and
repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellant’s aunt, to ask
for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped
in vinegar). They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of
Catalina,   alone   at   her   house.   Daylen   was   crying,   hence,   they
brought   her   with   them   as   they   proceeded   to   the   place   where
Catalina   was   collecting tuba (fermented   coconut   wine).   It   was
appellant   who   carried   Daylen.23 They   reached   Catalina’s   place
after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant.
Dodo Malon and appellant’s parents were in the house. At around
9:00   p.m.,   Totong   and   Dodo   Malon   left,   after   partaking   of
the kinilaw. Appellant   stayed   home.   The   following   morning   (25
March 1997), appellant and Dodo Milon went to the river to fish.
Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by
the police and investigated.24 He claimed that it was Daylen and
not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying. 
_______________
19
 Exhibit “D” for the prosecution, p. 6 of the Original Records.
20
 TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 4­5.
21
 Id., at p. 9.
22
 Id., at p. 7.
23
 Id., at pp. 6­10.
24
 Id., at p. 10.
527
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  527 
People vs. Gaudia
As   corroborative   witness,   appellant   presented   Alex   “Totong”
Loyola.   Totong   testified   that   on   24   March   1997,   at   about   4:00
p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, (P50,000.00)   as   moral   damages,   thirty   thousand   pesos
they went home to appellant’s house, but again left to get vinegar (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit. 
from   his   aunt   Catalina   Cabano,   for   their kinilaw. In   Catalina’s
house, they found her drunk husband, her 10­year old daughter, _______________
and   her   3­year   old   grandchild   Daylen. 25 Catalina’s   daughter 25
 TSN, 16 July 1999, p. 7.
directed   them   to   the   place   where   she   was   gathering tuba. As
Daylen   was   crying,   appellant   carried   her   on   their   way   to
26
 Id., at pp. 4­7.
Catalina.   It   was   then   about   4:00   p.m.   After   Catalina   finished
27
 Id., at pp. 9­10.
gathering tuba, the four of them–appellant, Totong, Catalina and
28
 TSN, 16 July 1999, pp. 11­13.
Daylen,   left   together   and   repaired   to   Catalina’s   house   for   the
29
 Id., at p. 15.
vinegar.   Appellant   and   Totong   returned   to   appellant’s   house 528
where   they   spent   the  night.26 Totong   woke   up   at  6:00   a.m.   the 528  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
following day, and left appellant’s house. Totong came to know of People vs. Gaudia
appellant’s arrest the following day.27 In his Brief30 to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors
Catalina   Cabano   also   corroborated   appellant’s   story.   She in the judgment of the trial court:
relates that on 24 March 1997, she was gathering tuba, at a place
around   2   kilometers   from   her   house.   She   left   Maritess,   her I.
youngest   child   and   Daylen,   her   grandchild,   at   her   house. 28 At
about   5:30   p.m.,   appellant   and   Totong   arrived.   Appellant   was THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED­
carrying   Daylen.   They   waited   for   Catalina   to   finish APPELLANT,   ROLANDO   (sic)   GAUDIA   DESPITE   THE   FACT
gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the THAT   HIS   GUILT   WAS   NOT   PROVEN   BEYOND
former’s house,  had  a drinking  spree,  and  then parted ways  at REASONABLE DOUBT.
about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to
Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was looking for II.
Remelyn.   At   that   time,   appellant   was   already   at   the   house   of
Catalina’s younger sister, which is located across the river, about EVEN   GRANTING   WITHOUT   ADMITTING   THAT
4 kilometers away.29 ACCUSED­APPELLANT   IS   GUILTY   OF   THE   CRIME
After   trial,   the   trial   court   found   that   there   was   sufficient CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING
circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of rape THE   SUPREME   PENALTY   OF   DEATH   DESPITE   THE
with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven FAILURE   OF   THE   PROSECUTION   TO   STATE   WITH
years  of  age.   Appellant  was  sentenced  to  death  and  ordered  to CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN
indemnify   the   victim   the   sums   of   fifty   thousand   pesos THE INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under   Rule   133,   Section   4   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Court,
conviction   may   be   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   provided
three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts  from which the  inferences  are  derived  are  proven;
and   (c)   the   combination   of   all   the   circumstances   is   such   as   to
produce   a   conviction   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   The   ruling   case
law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
a   conviction,   all   circumstances   must   be   consistent   with   each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.31
The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the
testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on
24   March   1997,   he   saw   him   carrying   Remelyn   toward   the
direction   of   the ipil­ipil grove,   some   130   meters   from   her
house.32 As a neighbor and relative of Remelyn’s stepfather, Mik
had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility
that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
The  second   circumstantial   evidence   against   the  appellant  is
Amalia’s testimony that Remelyn emerged naked from the same  credibility   of   Mik   because   of   his   failure   to   confront   appellant
_______________
30
 Rollo, pp. 37­45.
31
 People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 (2000).
32
 TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 11.
529
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  529
People vs. Gaudia
ipil­ipil grove,   with ipil­ipil leaves   clinging   to   her   forehead.
Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart.
Remelyn’s   private   organ   was   bleeding   and   excreting   a   white
mucus­like substance.33
The   third   circumstantial   evidence   against   appellant   is
Remelyn’s statement to her mother that it was appellant who had
brought her to the ipil­ipil grove34 and forced her to do something
against her will.35
There   is   no   question   that   Remelyn   was   violated.   After
examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal Health
Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as
fresh vaginal lacerations.
From  these,  the culpability  of  the appellant  can  be  inferred
with moral certainty. All the aforementioned circumstances have
been   indubitably   proven,   both   by   the   testimonial   and
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the
inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.
The   attempt   of   appellant   to   discredit   the   circumstantial
evidence   against   him   is   futile.   Appellant   contends, first,   that
Tulon   Mik’s   testimony   is   weak,   on   the   ground   that   Mik   is   a
relative   of   the   husband   of   Amalia. 36 He   also   questions   the
when   he   saw   him   carrying   Remelyn.   Neither   did   Mik   inform
Amalia   about   what   he   saw   when   Amalia   was   looking   for
Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried
and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the fact that Remelyn did
not   make   any   categorical   statement   that   he   sexually   molested
her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of flight against him
is   false. Fourth,   he   avers   that   the   offer   of   compromise   by   his
parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against
him,37 while   the   offer   of   compromise   he   allegedly   made   to
Amalia’s husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should
be excluded as evidence for being hearsay.38 Finally, he  But   thereafter,   he   lost   no   time   in   reporting   the   matter   to   the
_______________
33
 TSN, 5 January 1998.
34
 Exhibit “B” for the prosecution, p. 5 of the Original Records.
35
 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 9.
36
 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 6, as quoted in p. 7 of Appellant’s
Brief, p. 38, Rollo.
37
 Sec. 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
38
 Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
530
530  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  bar, there is no irregularity in the assessment of evidence by the
People vs. Gaudia
submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and
Cabano should not be counted against him on the ground that any
finding   of   guilt   must   rest   on   the   strength   of   the   prosecution’s
evidence.
We reject appellant’s arguments.
First,   appellant’s   attempt   to   discredit   the   testimony   of   Mik
cannot   succeed.   It   is   true   that   Mik   is   a   relative   by   affinity   of
Amalia   Loyola.   It   is   hoary   jurisprudence,   however,   that   mere
relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of any other
improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of
the witness.39 In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill
motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why
he   was   carrying   Remelyn.   Also,   he   assails   Mik   for   failing   to
inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for
the inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever,
and he and his wife were hurrying home. 40 For this same reason,
he   revealed   the   fact   that   he   saw   appellant   carrying   Remelyn
toward the ipil­ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyn’s fate.
barangay chairman.41 As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in
the   pursuit   and   arrest   of   appellant   at   Barangay
Mahayahay.42These   subsequent   actions   strengthen   Mik’s
credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Mik’s narration of
the   events   over   the   testimonies   of   Cabano   and   Loyola.   It   is   a
cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge’s evaluation
of the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are accorded
not   only   the   highest   respect,   but   also   finality,   unless   some
weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which
could  alter  the  result  of the  judgment rendered.   In the case at
lower   court.   It   granted   utmost   credibility   to   Mik’s   testimony.
Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand,
the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor
and determine if 
_______________
39
 People vs. Antonio, 303 SCRA 414 (1999).
40
 TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 11.
41
 Id., at p. 6.
42
 Id., at p. 7.
531
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  531 
People vs. Gaudia
he   was   telling   the   truth   or   not. 43 The   trial   court   found   Mik’s
testimony   more   worthy   of   credence   over   those   of   Catalina   and
Loyola. We have no reason to reverse its findings.
 Next,  appellant tried to  capitalize on the  fact that Remelyn
never made any statement that he sexually molested her. This is
a   specious   argument.   Remelyn   had   told   her   mother,   “Crazy
Lendoy forced me.”44 Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At
such   an   infantile   age,   she   could   not   be   expected   to   have   a
comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that children,
particularly very young children, make the “perfect victims”. They
naturally   follow   the   authority   of   adults   as   the   socialization
process   teaches   children   that   adults   are   to   be   respected.   The
child’s   age   and   developmental   level   will   govern   how   much   she
comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects
her. If the child is too young to understand what has happened to
her,   the   effects   will   be   minimized   because   she   has   no
comprehension   of   the   consequences.   Certainly,   children   have
more problems in providing accounts of events because they do
not   understand   everything   they   experience.   They   do   not   have
enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense
of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have
a   limited   vocabulary.45 The   fact   that   Remelyn   called   appellant
“Buang” or crazy shows that he did something which she knew
was   not   right   or   proper.   By   saying   “iya   kong   lugos,”   Remelyn
clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her
limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of
relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also
be  considered   that  there   is  no  actual   counterpart  for   the   word
“rape” in Visayan parlance.
Appellant’s charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that
he fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to his guilt. There are
enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither  inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,49 the actions of his parents
_______________
43
 People   vs.   Manalo, G.R.   Nos.   144989­90,   31   January
2003, 396   SCRA   573; People   vs.   Glabo, 371   SCRA
567 (2001); People   vs.   Navida,346   SCRA   821 (2000); People   vs.
Valla, 323   SCRA   74 (2000); People   vs.   Lopez, 302   SCRA
669 (1999).
44
 Exhibit “B” for the prosecution, p. 5 of the Original Records.
45
 Goldstein, Seth L., “The Sexual Exploitation of Children, A
Practical   Guide   to   Assessment,   Investigation   and   Intervention,
2nd Edition,” CRC Press LLC: 1999.
532
532  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Gaudia
will   it   affect   the   penalty   or   the   award   of   damages   rendered
against him.
Similarly,   appellant’s   charge   that   the   offers   of   compromise
allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by
the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been
taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not
exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made
by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and
of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the
alleged offer,46 and she was not a party to the conversation which
allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can
only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or
perception.47 The   offer   of   compromise   allegedly   made   by   the
appellant’s   parents   to   Amalia   may   have   been   the   subject   of
testimony48 of   Amalia.   However,   following   the   principle   of res
cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the
said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer
of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They
cannot   be   considered   as   evidence   against   appellant   but   we
reiterate   that   these   errors   are   not   enough   to   reverse   the
conviction of the appellant.
Appellant’s defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note
that appellant and his witnesses claim that it was at around 5:00
p.m.   when   appellant   carried   the   child   Daylen   toward   her
grandmother   Catalina   at   the   place   where   she   was
gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when
he   saw   appellant   carrying   Remelyn   toward   the ipil­ipil grove.
Given the 130­meter distance between the ipil­ipil grove and the
houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant could have
easily   taken   Remelyn   from   her   house,   raped   her   at   the ipil­
ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes.
Sometime   past   4:00   p.m.,   he   could   then   have   returned   to   his
house,   and   together   with   Alex   Loyola,   proceeded   to   the
COMELEC office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he
claims to have done. 
_______________
46
 Id., at p. 20.
47
 Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.
48
 TSN, 25 January 1998, p. 19.
49
 As codified in Section 28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.
533
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  533
People vs. Gaudia
The   Court   also   notes   the   inconsistencies   in   the   testimonies   of
Catalina   and   Loyola.   The   discrepancies   in   the   witnesses’
narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where
Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own house,
and the time when Loyola  and appellant actually  parted  ways,
are not mere trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses
because   of   the   passage   of   time.   To   make   matters   worse,   the
appellant’s   testimony   was,   at   times,   contradicted   by   his   own
witnesses.   Particularly   telling   was   the   conflict   between
appellant’s statement that Totong had already left his house on
the   night   of   24   March   1997   and   Totong   and   Catalina’s   own
averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellant’s house.
These   contradictory   testimonies   only   made   more   incredulous
appellant’s tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant.
In   the   case   at   bar,   the   Information   states   that   appellant,   “by
means   of   force   and   intimidation   .   .   .   willfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously   (had)   carnal   knowledge   with   Remelyn   Loyola,
a minor,   against   her   will   to   her   damage   and
prejudice.”50 (emphasis  ours)The  Information  did  not  allege  that
Remelyn   was   below   seven   years   old   when   she   was   violated.
Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under Section
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659
introduced   seven   new   attendant   circumstances,   which   when
present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by
death. We again stress that these new attendant circumstances
must   be   properly   pleaded   in   the   information   to   justify   the
imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime for which the accused stands
charged   and  for  which   he  must   be  tried. 51The  main  purpose  of
requiring   all   the   elements   of   a   crime   to   be   set   out   in   the
information   is   to   enable   the   accused   to   suitably   prepare   his
defense.   It  would  be  a  denial   of  the  right  of  the  accused  to  be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial
of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted
of   its   qualified   form   punishable   with   death,   although   the
attendant   circumstance   qualifying   the   offense   and   resulting   in
capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he crime   of   simple   rape,   and   is   sentenced   to   suffer   the   penalty
was arraigned.52 of reclusion   perpetua. He   is   ordered   to   pay   to   complainant
Remelyn Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
_______________
delicto,P50,000.00   as   moral   damages,   and   P25,000.00   as
50
 Original Records, p. 2. Emphasis ours. exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.
51
 People vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).
52
 People vs. David Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997).
534
534  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Gaudia
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and
again, we have ruled that when there is a finding that rape had
been   committed,   the   award   of   civil   indemnity ex   delicto is
mandatory.53 If   the   death   penalty   has   been   imposed,   the
indemnity should be P75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled
to   P50,000.00   for   each   count   of   rape. 54Thus,   the   appellant   is
ordered   to   pay   the  amount   of   P50,000.00   as   civil   indemnity   to
Remelyn Loyola.55 VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005  373 
We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically Doldol vs. People
awarded in rape cases without need of further proof other than G.R. No. 164481. September 20, 2005.*
the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim
CONRADO   C.   DOLDOL,   petitioner, vs. PEOPLE   OF   THE
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.56
PHILIPPINES and  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
We  also find the award  of exemplary  damages  made by the
respondents.
lower   court   in   favor   of   complainant   as   proper   because
Criminal   Law; Malversation; Evidence; Admissions; Partial
complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the
offense   against   her   was   committed   with   the   aggravating restitution   of   the   cash   shortage   is   an   implied   admission   of
circumstance57 of   age.   However,   the   amount   awarded   must   be misappropriation   of   the   missing   funds.—Except   for   his   bare
reduced to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.58 testimony,   the   petitioner   offered   no   competent   and   credible
WHEREFORE,   the   judgment   of   conviction   of   the   Regional evidence   to   prove   that   the   missing   funds   were   actually   cash
Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del Sur in Criminal Case advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner could
No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of
the recipients and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do Urbiztondo,   Pangasinan.   The   audit   covered   the   General   Fund,
so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote  Special  Education  Fund  and  Trust  Fund in his custody  for the
period   of   November   30,   1994   to   June   8,   1995.   Doldol   and   the
_______________ Municipal Accountant were present during the audit. The State
Auditors discovered that Doldol had a  shortage  of  P801,933.26.
*
 SECOND DIVISION. They also noted that on June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals
374 from  the  municipality’s deposit  account with the Land  Bank  of
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  the   Philippines   (LBP)   amounting   to   P360,000.59.   The
74  withdrawal, purportedly for salaries, wages, allowances and mid­
Doldol vs. People year bonuses of municipal officers and employees, had not been
the   Provincial   Auditor   and   offered   to   refund   the   missing recorded in the General Fund Cashbook as of June 8, 1995. The
funds   as   follows:   P200,000.00   on   September   15,   1995, State Auditors also noted that Doldol made adjustments in the
P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on said   cashbook   on   June   8,   1995,   increasing   his   P801,933.26
November   30,   1995.   He   was   able   to   pay   only   P200,000.00   on shortage to P1,134,421.54. 
September   15,   1995,   and   failed   to   remit   the   balance   of   his
shortage.  Such partial  restitution  of  the  petitioners  of  the  cash _______________
shortage   is   an   implied   admission   of   misappropriation   of   the 1
 Exhibit “A.”
missing funds.
375
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of  VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005  375 
Appeals. Doldol vs. People
In a Letter  dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded the
2

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Villamor A. Tolete for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Conformably   to   the   Memorandum1 dated   April   6,   1995   of   the
Provincial Auditor, a team of State Auditors led by State Auditor
Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors Lydia Naoe and Beverly T.
Cruz   as   members,   conducted   an   audit   of   the   cash   and   cash
account   of   Conrado   C.   Doldol,   the   Municipal   Treasurer   of
immediate refund of the said amount, and for Doldol to submit
within   72   hours   a   written   explanation   on   the   said   shortage.
Doldol   failed   to   respond   and   was,   thereafter,   relieved   of   his
duties. On July 20, 1995, he was directed to transfer the account
to Assistant Municipal Treasurer Loida Cancino.
The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said
account, this time covering the period of June 8, 1995 to July 19,
1995.   They   discovered   that   Doldol   incurred   an   added   cash
shortage   of   P149,905.92.   In   a   Letter   to   Doldol   dated   July   27,
1995, the State Auditors demanded the immediate restitution of
the missing fund, and directed him to submit within 72 hours a
written explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol
failed to respond. The State Auditors submitted their Report to
the   Provincial   Auditor   on   their   examinations   showing   his
shortages. On August 3, 1995, the State Auditors submitted their
Memorandum   on   the   result   of   the   audits   to   the   Provincial
Auditor.
On   the   same   day,   Doldol   wrote   the   Provincial   Treasurer
requesting   that   a   re­audit   be   conducted   on   his   cash   and   cash
account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors.
Instead of pursuing his request for a re­audit, Doldol opted to
refund the missing funds.  On September 15,  1995,  he remitted
P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was
issued   Official   Receipt  No.   436756.   Doldol   promised  to  pay   the
balance  of  his  shortage,  as  follows:  P200,000.00   on  October  31,
1995, and P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However,
he reneged on his promise.
On February 6, 1996, the Provincial Auditor transmitted the
Memorandum and Consolidated Report of the State Auditors to
the Ombudsman, and requested that Doldol be  Pangasinan,   Philippines   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this
_______________
2
 Exhibit “E.”
376
376  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  wilfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously,   take,   misappropriate   and
Doldol vs. People
charged for malversation of public funds. Despite the extensions
given to him, Doldol failed to file his counter­affidavit.
Two informations for malversation of public funds were then
filed   against   Doldol   in   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of   San
Carlos City. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
SCC­2760, reads:
“That on or about June 8, 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto,   in  Urbiztondo,   Pangasinan,   Philippines   and  within  the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, CONRADO C. DOLDOL, a
public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality
of   Urbiztondo,   Pangasinan,   and   as   such   accountable   for   public
funds   received   and/or   entrusted   to   him   by   reason   of   his   office,
acting in relation of his office and taking advantage of the same,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, use and
benefit the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY­
FOUR   THOUSAND   FOUR   HUNDRED   TWENTY­ONE   PESOS
and   54/100   (P1,134,421.54)   from   such   public   funds   received   by
him by reason of his office, to the damage of the government in
the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
The   second   Information,   docketed   as   Criminal   Case   No.   SCC­
2763, reads:
“That   sometime   between   June   8,   1995   and   July   19,   1995   or
sometime   prior   or   subsequent   thereto,   in   Urbiztondo,
Honorable Court, CONRADO C. DOLDOL, a public officer, being
then   the   Municipal   Treasurer,   Municipality   of   Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan,   and   as   such   accountable   for   public   funds   received
and/or entrusted to him by reason of his office, acting in relation
of his office and taking advantage of the same, did then and there
convert   to   his   personal   use   and   benefit   the   amount   of   ONE
HUNDRED FORTY­NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIVE
PESOS and 92/100 (P149,905.92) from such public funds received
by him by reason of his office, to the damage of the government in
the amount aforestated.
_______________
 3
 Rollo, pp. 54­55. imposed   upon   him   which   includes   perpetual   absolute
377 disqualification (Art. 41, Rev. Penal Code) and to pay the costs.
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005  377 SO ORDERED.”5
Doldol vs. People On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Doldol alleged:
CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
Doldol   testified   that  the  funds   which   the   State  Auditors   found 1. 1.That the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses put
missing were, in fact, cash advances availed of by the municipal up by the accused as follows:
employees. He insisted that not a single centavo was used for his
personal benefit. He averred that the charges lodged against him _______________
were premature because the same were based on an incomplete
audit. 4
 Id., at pp. 57­58.
In a Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of the 5
 Rollo, pp. 87­88.
crimes charged. The fallo of the decision reads: 378
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Conrado Doldol 378  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
is hereby  found guilty beyond reasonable doubt  of the  crime of Doldol vs. People
Malversation of Public Funds in Criminal Case No. SCC­2760 and
in Criminal Case No. SCC­2763, as defined and penalized by Art. 1. a.The   evidence   shows   that   the   audits   were   not   yet
217 of the Revised Penal Code. In both cases, the amount involved completed when the letters of demand were served upon
is   more   than   P22,000.00,   as   such   the   penalty   to   be   imposed him to produce the alleged missing funds.
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
Considering   that   the   accused   surrendered   to   the   police   in 2. b.He   was   not   given   the   chance   to   further   verify   the
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan (See Exh. “4”) and being entitled to the records despite his request to that effect.
provision   of   [the]   Indeterminate   Sentence   Law,   he   is   hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years, 1 day 3. c.There is no evidence that he took the money from the
of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years, 8 months of reclusion vault or brought it home.
temporal as   maximum   in   each   of   the   two  cases.   Further,   he   is
ordered to pay the amount of P1,134,421.54 in Criminal Case No. d.The missing funds, if any, were cash advances of certain
SCC­2760 and another amount of P149,905.92 in Criminal Case municipal employees.
No.   SCC­2763   minus,   of   course,   his   advance   payment   of
P200,187.80.   In   addition,   he   should   be   made   to   suffer   the 4. e.His having borrowed money from the bank negates the
accessory   penalties   corresponding   to   the   principal   penalty charge of misappropriation of public funds.
 1. 2.That   the   trial   court   erred   in   convicting   the   accused
based   on   the   testimonies   of   the   auditors   and   the
documentary evidence adduced by them.
2. 3.That the trial court erred in sentencing the accused to
suffer   the   penalties   imposed   by   the   assailed   joint
decision.6
On February 11, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
appealed   decision,   and,   likewise,   denied   Doldol’s   motion   for
reconsideration thereof.
Doldol, now the petitioner, forthwith filed the present petition
for review on certiorari, faulting the CA as follows:
1. 1.In   affirming   the   joint   decision   of   the   Regional   Trial
Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City, Pangasinan in Crim.
Case Nos. SCC­2760 and SCC­2763;
2. 2.In convicting the accused­petitioner on the basis of an
erroneous and incomplete audit;
3. 3.In   not   dismissing   the   cases   against   the   accused­
petitioner.7
The   petitioner   reiterates   his   arguments   that   the   audit   of   his
accountabilities   had   not   been   completed   because   the   State
Auditors had yet to conduct a verification of their initial findings
based on the cashbook and a reconciliation of the bank  OSG   maintains   that   the   prosecution   adduced   proof   beyond
_______________
6
 Id., at p. 64.
7
 Rollo, p. 15.
379
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005  379 
Doldol vs. People
deposits of the municipality. The petitioner insists that the State
Auditors did not submit any bank reconciliation statement. The
petitioner argues that he was never given a chance to explain and
point out that he did not incur any shortage of public funds, and
that the charges against him should be dismissed. To bolster his
claim,   he   cites   the   ruling   of   this   Court   in Dumagat   v.
Sandiganbayan8 and Section 560 of the Manual of Instructions to
Treasurers   and   Auditors   and   other   Guidelines   to   bolster   his
claim.
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that
the public funds were for his personal use. In fact, the petitioner
insists, the evidence shows that the alleged missing funds were
unliquidated  cash advances of employees.  Hence,  the petitioner
concludes, the prima faciepresumption under the last paragraph
of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply.
In   its   comment   on   the   petition,   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor
General (OSG) asserts that the issues raised by the petitioner are
factual and, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be raised. The OSG posits that the findings of facts of
the   trial   court,   as   affirmed   by   the   CA,   are   conclusive   on   this
Court,   absent   a   showing   that   the   trial   court   ignored,
misconstrued   or   misunderstood   cogent   facts   and   circumstances
which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. The
reasonable doubt that the petitioner malversed the public funds
subject   of   the   two   Informations.   Moreover,   the   petitioner’s
contention that the charges against him were premature, because
the audit of his accountabilities had not yet been completed and
he   was   not   given   a   chance   to   explain   the   whereabouts   of   the
subject funds before the said charges were filed, is belied by the
fact that he even made a partial restitution of the public funds.
The  OSG  notes   that  as  found  by  the  trial   court,   the petitioner
even failed to specify the  with the Manual of  Instructions  to Treasurers and Auditors as
_______________
8
 G.R. No. 96915, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 171.
380
380  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  funds amounting to P1,134,421.54 and P149,905.92. There was,
Doldol vs. People
names of the employees who were granted cash advances and the
accounts of the said advances. It further avers that the ruling of
this Court in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan9does not apply because:
In his vain attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability,
petitioner invokes the doctrine established in Dumagat vs. Sandi­
ganbayan,   et   al.,   [211   SCRA   171,   177   (1992)],   wherein   this
Honorable   Court   acquitted   the   accused   of   the   crime   of
malversation   of   public   funds,   holding   that   “[s]ince   the   audit
examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and
completeness as there were accounts which were not considered,
the same cannot be made the basis for holding petitioner liable for
malversation.”
It   is   submitted   that   the   ruling   in Dumagat   vs.
Sandiganbayan(supra) is not applicable to the instant case as the
two cases are based on different factual circumstances.
In the first place, in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan (supra, at p.
178), there was a finding that the “haphazard examination of the
cash   accountability   of   petitioner”   was   made   by   the   auditor   “in
violation   of   the   Manual   of   Instructions   to   Treasurers   and
Auditors”   and   that   “the   ‘missing’   funds   would   have   been
‘discovered’   if   only   the   auditor   took   into   consideration   the
contents of the two vaults in Sindangan and Tampisilan and the
fact that her collection in Di­polog City were deposited with the
NFA cashier.” In the instant case, there was sufficient compliance
the two (2) auditing teams had completed their examination and,
thereafter,   required  herein  petitioner  to  produce   or  explain  the
shortages of funds in his custody. Notwithstanding the demand
for   him  to   explain   the  shortages,   petitioner   totally   disregarded
the same and further failed to produce upon demand the missing
thus,  nothing  left for  the  team  of auditors to  do in the instant
case.   If   at   all,   State   Auditor   Ritua   requested   for   the   return   of
petitioner’s   cashbook   and   passbooks   merely   to   reconcile   and
confirm the correctness of their findings.10
The petition has no merit. 
_______________
9
 Ibid.
10
 Rollo, pp. 139­140.
381
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005  381 
Doldol vs. People
The   evidence   on  record   shows   that  the  team  of   State   Auditors
conducted its first audit of cash and cash accounts of the General
Fund, Special Education Fund and Trust Fund in the custody of
the   petitioner,   and   discovered   that   he   had   a   shortage   of
P1,134,421.54.11
In a Letter12 dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded
that  the  petitioner   immediately   produce   the   missing   funds.   He
was   also   required   to   submit   within   72   hours   a   written
explanation   why   the   shortage   occurred.   In   the   meantime,   the
State   Auditors   conducted   another   audit   of   the   cash   and   cash
accounts of the petitioner  during  the period of June  8,  1995  to
July   19,   1995,   and   he   was   found   to   have   a   shortage   of
P149,905.92.   The   petitioner   was   informed   of   the   results   of   the
audit in a Letter dated July 27, 1995, where he was directed to
refund   his   shortage   of   P149,905.92   and   to   submit   a   written
explanation   thereon   within   72   hours.13 However,   the   petitioner
failed   to   respond   to   such   demand,   and   failed   to   object   to   the
findings and conclusions of the State Auditors. It bears stressing
that the petitioner was present during the said audit.
While it is true that the petitioner requested for a re­audit on
August 3, 1995 and objected to some of the findings of the audit
team, he addressed the letter­request to the Provincial Treasurer,
and not to  the  Provincial  Auditor of Pangasinan.  We note that
while the Provincial Auditor had already signed the Transmittal
Letter dated August 3, 1995 on the State Auditor’s Report and
request for the petitioner’s prosecution for malversation of public
funds, it was filed only on February 6, 1996. In the meantime, the
Provincial Auditor never received any letter from the petitioner
requesting for a re­audit of his account.  records and provide an acceptable reason behind the shortages in
_______________
11
 Exhibit “F.”
12
 Exhibit “E.”
13
 Ibid.
382
382  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  required to submit his counter­affidavit, but requested for time to
Doldol vs. People
Admittedly,   State   Auditor   Ritua   conducted   an   audit   of   the
General   Fund,   the   Special   Education   Fund   and   Trust   Fund
Passbook, and the LBP and DBP Passbooks on July 11, 1995 for
verification and reconciliation purposes. However, the petitioner
was   not   barred   from   examining   and   receiving   the   same,
preparatory   to   the   submission   of   his   explanation   to   the   State
Auditors’ demand­letters. Indeed, the petitioner was even able to
write the Provincial Treasurer on August 3, 1995, and requested
his   objection   to   such   findings.   The   following   findings   and
ratiocination of the CA, as supported by the evidence on record,
negate the submission of the petitioner:
.   .   .   [T]he   records   at   the   depository   banks   confirmed   the
correctness   of   the   COA’s   findings   that   there   were,   indeed,
shortages in the funds under appellant’s control, thus, rendering
appellant’s   request   for   a   re­audit   as   a   mere   superfluous   and
redundant   procedure   (TSN,   Amando   T.   Sison;   Emelie
Ritua, supra).
Appellant’s   contention   that   he   was   not   given   the   chance   to
verify   the   records   under   audit   despite   a   request   to   that   effect
deserves   scant   consideration.   The   records   show   that   appellant
was twice afforded ample opportunity to replenish the funds or
explain the reason for its disappearance. Verily, this could have
been   the   perfect   opportunity   for   the   appellant   to   verify   the
the  municipal   funds  under   his   custody.   Appellant,   however,   on
both instances failed to reply to the demands given by the COA.
For   having   refused   “to   face   the   music,”   so   to   speak,   and
disregarded   the  demands   sent   by   the   COA,   appellant   has   only
himself to blame if he has lost any opportunity to further verify
the financial records of the municipality.14
The   record   of   the   Ombudsman   shows   that   the   petitioner   was
do so, on his representation that his request to the Commission
on Audit for a re­audit was still pending. It turned out that the
petitioner made no such request. Moreover, the petitioner failed
to   submit   his   counter­affidavit   to   the   Ombudsman.   Thus,   the
petitioner’s submission that the 
_______________
 Rollo, pp. 38­39.
14
383
VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005  383
Doldol vs. People
audit of his account had not been completed before the report of
the State Auditors was referred to the Ombudsman is not correct.
Except   for   his   bare   testimony,   the   petitioner   offered   no
competent and credible evidence to prove that the missing funds
were   actually   cash   advances   of   employees   in   the   municipality.
The   petitioner   could   have   offered   in   evidence   the   documents
evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of the cash
advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the
Provincial   Auditor   and   offered   to   refund   the   missing   funds   as
follows:  P200,000.00  on September 15,  1995,  P200,000.00  on or
before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995.
He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and
failed   to   remit   the   balance   of   his   shortage.   Such   partial
restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied
admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. The ruling of
the CA on this matter is correct:
As We have already stated hereinabove, on September 15, 1995,
not   too   long   after   the   shortages   in   the   municipal   funds   were
discovered, appellant made a partial payment/settlement in the
amount of 200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
436756 (Exhibit “8,” Record, Volume III, p. 6). With respect to the
balance of the missing funds, appellant promised to pay the same
in installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his
undertaking (Record, Volume I, p. 457; TSN, Amando T. Sison,
July   27,   1998,   pp.   32­33).   Said   payment   is   of   no   moment   and
could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the
contrary,   as   guided   by   Section   27,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   on
Evidence, We hold that said payment, particularly when taken in
conjunction   with   appellant’s   commitment   to   gradually   pay   the
remainder   of   the  missing   funds,   is  a   clear   offer   of   compromise
which   must   be   treated   as   an   implied   admission   of   appellant’s
guilt   that   he   embezzled   or   converted   the   missing   funds   to   his
personal use.15
_______________
 Rollo, p. 40.
15
384
384  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Manly Sportwear Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Dadodette Enterprises
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R.
CR No. 25845 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (Chairman), Austria­Martinez, Tinga and Chico­
Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—The   act   of   encashing   a   check   intended   for   a
particular   project   and   subsequently   using   the   money   for   some
other   purpose   constitutes   misappropriation.   (Nizurtado   vs.
Sandiganbayan, 239 SCRA 33 [1994])
One essential element of the crime of malversation is that a
public   officer   must   take   public   funds,   money   or   property,   and
misappropriate it for his own private use or benefit. (Aquino vs.
Olivares, 399 SCRA 475 [2003])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  419
Ladiana vs. People
G.R. No. 144293. December 4, 2002.*
JOSUE   R.   LADIANA,   petitioner, vs. PEOPLE   OF   THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal   Law; Homicide; Rights   of   the   Accused; Custodial
Investigations; Extra­Judicial Confessions or Admissions; Indeed,
the rights enumerated in the constitutional provision “exist only in
custodial   interrogations,   or   in­custody   interrogation   of   accused
persons.”—It   is   well­settled   that   the   foregoing   legal   formalities
required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra­
judicial confessions or admissions obtained during 
_______________
10
 Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 322 (1998).
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
420
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
20 
Ladiana vs. People
custodial investigations.   Indeed,   the   rights   enumerated   in
the constitutional provision “exist only in custodial interrogations,
or in­custody interrogation of accused persons.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition.—Custodial
interrogationis   the   questioning   initiated   by   law   enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinguished   from   Preliminary
Investigation;   Definition.—A preliminary   investigation is   an
inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well­founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The   Court   has
unequivocally   declared   that   a   defendant   on   trial   or   under
preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation.—
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before
the   public   prosecutor   cannot   be   considered   as   being   under
custodial   investigation.   In   fact,   this   Court   has   unequivocally
declared   that   a   defendant   on   trial   or   under   preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. It explained as
follows:   “His   [accused]   interrogation  by   the  police,   if  any   there
had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing
of   the  criminal   case  in  court  (or   the   public   prosecutor’s   office).
Hence,   with   respect   to   a   defendant   in   a   criminal   case   already
pending   in   court   (or   the   public   prosecutor’s   office),   there   is   no
occasion to speak of his right while under ‘custodial interrogation’
laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer
under ‘custodial interrogation.’”
Same; Same; Same; The   accused—whether   in   court   or
undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor
—unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded.—The
accused—whether   in   court   or   undergoing   preliminary
investigation   before   the   public   prosecutor—unquestionably
possess  rights  that  must   be  safeguarded.   These  include:   1)  the
right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any
prejudice   whatsoever   imputed   to   them   by   such   refusal;   3)   the
right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross­examination
by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to
answer   a   specific   question   that   tends   to   incriminate   them   for
some crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.
421
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  421
Ladiana vs. People
Same; Same; Evidence; Admissions   Distinguished   from
Confessions; Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence distinguish one from the other.—Sections 26 and 33
of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from
the other as follows: “SEC. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given   in   evidence   against   him.   “SEC.   33. Confession.—The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged,  or  of any offense  necessarily  included therein,  may be
given   in   evidence   against   him.”   In   a   confession,   there   is   an
acknowledgment   of   guilt;   in   an   admission,   there   is   merely   a
statement   of   fact   not   directly   involving   an   acknowledgment   of
guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one
is charged.
Same; Same; Same; Admissions; In general, admissions may
be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were
made   by   mistake.—In   general,   admissions   may   be   rebutted   by
confessing   their   untruth   or   by   showing   they   were   made   by
mistake.   The   party   may   also   establish   that   the   response   that
formed   the   admission   was   made   in   a   jocular,   not   a   serious,
manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true
state   of   facts.   Yet,   petitioner   never   offered   any   rationalization
why   such   admissions   had   been   made,   thus,   leaving   them
unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the
case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant.
They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
Same; Same; Justifying   Circumstances; Self­Defense; It   is
hornbook doctrine that self­defense must be proved with certainty
by  sufficient,  satisfactory  and  convincing   evidence  that  excludes
any   vestige   of   criminal   aggression   on   the   part   of   the   person
invoking   it.—It   is   hornbook   doctrine   that   self­defense   must   be
proved   with   certainty   by   sufficient,   satisfactory   and   convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the
part  of   the person   invoking   it.   It  cannot  be  entertained   if it  is
uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is competent   and   independent   counsel   during
also   doubtful.   The   question   whether   the   accused   acted   in   self­ a custodial investigation. However, a counter­affidavit voluntarily
defense is essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the presented   by   the   accused   during   the preliminary investigation,
lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan. even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
Same; Same; Mitigating   Circumstances; Voluntary evidence against the affiant.
Surrender; Elements.—For   voluntary   surrender   to   mitigate The Case
criminal   liability,   the   following   elements   must   concur:   1)   the Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
offender   has   not   been   actually   arrested,   2)   the   offender Court, assailing the April 10, 2000 Decision1 and August 4, 2000
surrenders   himself   to   a   person   in   authority   or   to   the   latter’s Resolution2 of   the Sandiganbayan (First   Division)   in   Criminal
agent,   and   3)   the   surrender   is   voluntary.   To   be   sufficient,   the Case No. 16988. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
surrender   must   be  spontaneous   and   made   in  a   manner   clearly reads as follows:
indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, “WHEREFORE,   judgment   is   hereby   rendered   finding   accused
either because they  JOSUE   R.   LADIANA   GUILTY   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of   the
422 crime   of   homicide   and,   in   the   absence   of   any   modifying
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  circumstance,   sentencing   the   said   accused   to:   (a)   suffer   an
22  indeterminate   sentence   of   imprisonment   of   ten   (10)   years
Ladiana vs. People of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum[;] (b) suffer all the 
trouble   and   the   expense   that   will   necessarily   be   incurred   in
searching for and capturing them. _______________

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution  1
of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Jose A. Almo and Angel R. Purisima III for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement
extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of
 Annex “A” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 71­85. Penned by Justice
Gregory   S.   Ong   with   the   concurrence   of   Justices   Francis   E.
Garchitorena (then Division chairman and presiding justice) and
Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. (member).
2
 Annex “C” of the Petition; id., pp. 93­101.
423
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  423 
Ladiana vs. People
appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Francisco San Juan, in the total amount of
Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay
the costs.”3
The   assailed   Resolution   denied   petitioner’s   Motion   for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner   was   originally   charged   with   murder   before
the Sandiganbayan in   an   Information4 dated   August   5,   1991.
However, the anti­graft court issued an Order 5 dated October 14,
1991,   noting   that   “besides   the   allegation   that   the   crime   was
allegedly   committed   by   the   accused   while   he   was   ‘taking
advantage   of   his   official   position,’   nothing   else   is   in   the
Information   to   indicate   this   fact   so   that,   as   the   Information
stands,   nothing   except   a   conclusion   of   fact   exists   to   vest
jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the crime for
which he is charged.”
Further,   the   Order   gave   the   government   sufficient   time   to
amend   the   Information   to   show   adequate   facts   to   vest
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently,
an Amended Information,6 still charging petitioner with murder,
was   filed   on   April   1,   1992.   The   accusatory   portion   reads   as
follows:
“That   on   or   about   the   29th   day   of   December   1989,   in   the
Municipality   of   Lumban,   Laguna,   Philippines,   and   within   the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above­named accused, a
public   officer,   being   then   a   member   of   the   Integrated   National
Police   (INP   now   PNP)   assigned   at   the   Lumban   Police   Station,
Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily
to   enforce   peace   and   order   within   his   jurisdiction,   taking
advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan
why   the   latter   was   removing   the   steel   pipes   which   were
previously   placed   to  serve   as  barricade  to  prevent  the  entry   of
vehicles   along   P.   Jacinto   Street,   Barangay   Salac,   Lumban,
Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along
the  said  street  and   when  Francisco   San  Juan   told   the  accused
that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who
was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery,
did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   attack
and sho[o]t Fran­
_______________
3
 Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 13; id., p. 84.
4
 Records, pp. 1­2.
5
 Id., p. 56.
6
 Id., pp. 88­89. This was signed by Special Prosecution Officer
Fidel D. Galindez and approved by then Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez.
424
424  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ladiana vs. People
cisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his
head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing
the death of Francisco San Juan.”7
During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by
his   counsel de   parte,8 pled   not   guilty.9 After   due   trial,
the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts
In   their   Memoranda,   both   the   prosecution   and   the   defense
substantially   relied   upon   the Sandiganbayan’s   narration   of   the
facts as follows:
“The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M.
San  Juan,   PO2  Leopoldo  Cacalda,  Dr.  Rogelio  M.  Javan,   SPO2
Percival   A.   Gabinete,   and   Maria   T.   Cortez.   Their   respective
testimonies, in essence are as follows, to wit:
“1.   CARIDAD   MARGALLO   SAN   JUAN   (hereinafter,
‘Caridad’)   declared   that   she   is   the   wife   of   Francisco   San   Juan
(hereinafter   ‘Francisco’),   the  victim  in  the  case  at bar.   Caridad
testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Salac, Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused
Ladiana,   who   happens   to   be   also   a   distant   relative   of   the
decedent.
“Caridad recounted that, on December 29,  1989,  she was in
her house when an unidentified woman came and told her that
her   husband   was   killed   by   accused   Ladiana.   She   immediately
called up her sister­in­law before rushing to Jacinto Street where
the gruesome incident allegedly transpired. Thereat, many people
were   milling   around,   and   Caridad   saw   the   lifeless   body   of
Francisco lying in the middle of the road and being examined by
[SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
“Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 o’clock a.m. when
she   reached   the   place   of   the   subject   incident.   At   that   point   in
time, she was not even allowed by the police to touch, much less
get  near  to,   the  cadaver of  Francisco.   Caridad,   expectedly,  was
crying and one of her aunts advised her to go home.
_______________
7
 Amended Information, p. 1; id., p. 88.
8
 Atty. Balagtas P. Ilagan.
9
 See Certificate of Arraignment; Records, p. 100.
425
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  425
Ladiana vs. People
“Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was
killed   by   accused   Ladiana   because   this   was   what   the   woman
actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself
up to the police authorities.
“Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she
was at the police station, where she gave her written statement
before   police   investigator   PFC   Virgilio   Halili   (hereinafter,
‘Halili’).
“Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her
husband   and   testified   that   he   was   eventually   buried   at   the
Lumban   Cemetery.   She   declared   that   she   had   incurred   about
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial and
other incidental expenses by reason of the death of Francisco.
“On   cross­examination,   Caridad   testified   that,   on   December
29,   1989,  she  was  in  her  house  and  that  she  did  not  hear  any
gunshot   between   10:30   and   11:00   o’clock   a.m.   Caridad   also
admitted she did not witness the killing of her husband.
“On   questions   propounded   by   the   Court,   Caridad   narrated
that her husband suffered two gunshot wounds—one on the upper
right temple and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad
stated that she was told that the wounds were the entry and the
exit points. She also told the Court that her husband was wearing
short   pants   at   the   time   of   his   death   and   that   she   found   some
bruises on his knees.
“Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her
husband was with his close friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and
some other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair
the steel humps which were used to block the street during school
days for the protection and safety of the school children.
“2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter,
‘CACALDA’)   declared   that   he   is   a   policeman   assigned   at   the
Lumban   Police   Station   in   Lumban,   Laguna.   He   has   been
designated as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
“Cacalda   recounted   that,   on   December   29,   1989,   at   around
11:00   o’clock   a.m.,   somebody,   whose   name   he   could   no   longer
recall,   reported   to   him   about   an   existing   trouble   along   Jacinto
Street   in   Barangay   Salac.   Cacalda   responded   by   going   to   the
scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member
of   the   CAGFIL.   Thereat,   Cacalda   saw   the   lifeless   body   of
Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not examine the
body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2]
Percival A. Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived.
“Cacalda   had   gathered   from   the   people   milling   around   the
body of Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who shot and killed
Francisco.  markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The
426
426  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  centimeter in diameter and situated two (2) inches behind the left
Ladiana vs. People
Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However,
he eventually saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of the
police   station   and   thereafter   learned   that   said   accused   had
surrendered to the police authority.
“Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili
because he was the responding policeman who went to the scene
of   the   incident.   Consequently,   Cacalda   executed   a   written
statement in relation to the subject incident.
“On cross­examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio
operator   and   not   an   investigator   of   the   police   station.   He   also
testified that he did not witness the incident subject matter of the
case at bar.
“Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the
place of the incident told him that accused Ladiana had already
left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused
Ladiana’a   house   but   was   told   that   he  had   already   gone   to   the
police   station.   Cacalda   accordingly   went   to   the   police   station
where he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He
also saw a stab wound on accused Ladiana’s right bicep but he did
not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury.
“3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, ‘Javan’)
declared that he is a physician and the Municipal Health Officer
of Lumban, Laguna.
“Javan   recounted   that   he   was   the   one   who   performed   the
necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and that he had prepared
the   corresponding   reports   and/or   documents   relating   thereto.
Javan   made   a   sketch   representing   the   anterior   and   posterior
views   of   the   body   of   Francisco,   and   labeled   and   placed   red
marking ‘Gunshot wound A’ is the point of entry, which is one (1)
ear.   The   marking   ‘Gunshot   wound   B’   is   the   point   of   exit   of
‘Gunshot wound A,’ which is two (2) centimeters in diameter and
found above the right cheekbone and one (1) inch below the right
eye. Javan also testified that there is another gunshot wound and
the point of entry and exit are labeled as ‘Gunshot wound C’ and
‘Gunshot wound D,’ respectively. ‘Gunshot wound D’ is one and
one­half  (1­1/2)  centimeters   in  diameter  and  located   at  the  left
cheek, three and one­half (3­1/2) centimeters below the left eye,
while ‘Gunshot wound C’ is one (1) centimeter in diameter and
found at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the
adam’s apple.
“According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim
when he inflicted ‘Gunshot wound A.’ As regards ‘Gunshot wound
C,’ the assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance
of more than twenty­four (24) inches away.
427
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  427 
Ladiana vs. People
“Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet
during   the  examination.   However,   judging   from   the  size  of   the
wound and the point of entry, Javan opined that the firearm used
was probably a caliber 38.
“On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that
‘Gunshot   wound   A’   could   have   been   fired   first   because   the
trajectory is on the same level so much so that the assailant and
the   victim   could   have   been   both   standing.   Javan   inferred   that
‘Gunshot wound C’ could have been inflicted while the victim was
already falling down. Javan then stressed that both wounds are
fatal in nature.
“4.   SPO2   PERCIVAL   AMBROSIO   GABINETE   (hereinafter,
‘Gabinete’) declared that he is a police officer and a resident of No.
4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
“The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with,
upon the admission of the defense that he was part of the group of
policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and
that   he   found   the   body   of   Francisco   lying   along   the   road.
Additionally,   the   defense   admitted   the   existence   of   the   receipt
issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990 in the sum of
Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
“5.   MARIO   TALAVERA   CORTEZ   (hereinafter,   ‘Cortez’)
declared that he is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna.
“Prior to the conduct of the examination­in­chief on Cortez, the
defense   counsel   made   an   admission   as   to   the   authorship,
authenticity, and  voluntariness of the execution of the counter­
affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to
before Cortez. In said counter­affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly
admitted   to   making   the   fatal   shots   on   Francisco.   However,
accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self­defense as Francisco was
then   purportedly   attacking   accused   Ladiana   and   had,   in   fact,
already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.
“However,   Cortez   emphasized   that  he   was   not  the  one   who
conducted the  preliminary investigation of  the complaint  which
led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified
that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the
affiant  in   the  said   counter­affidavit,   but  maintained   that   there
was   a   person   who   appeared   and   identified   himself   as   Josue
Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter­affidavit.
“After   the   presentation   of   Cortez,   the   prosecution   filed   its
formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
“On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all
the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution.
428
428  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ladiana vs. People
“On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of
Court   to   File   Demurrer   to   Evidence   dated   August   16,   1995,
claiming   that:   (i)   a   review   of  the   documentary   and   testimonial
evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed to show that
the   accused   is   guilty   of   the   offense   charged;   (ii)   at   best,   the
evidence submitted  by  the  prosecution  are allegedly  hearsay  in
character, considering that the supposed eyewitness in the person
of   Rodolfo   Cabrera   was   never   presented   in   court;   and   (iii)   the
prosecution was allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death of
the   victim,   but   not   the  identity   of  the  person   who  caused   said
death.
“On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date
holding   that   the   filing   of   a   demurrer   to   evidence   is   no   longer
appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of
this Court’s resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of
the prosecution’s documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995.
“On   September   2,   1996,   in   view   of   his   perception   that   the
evidence submitted by the prosecution is allegedly inadequate to
sustain a  conviction,  accused  Ladiana,  through  counsel,  waived
his right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for
time to file a written memorandum. Thus, both parties were given
time within which to do so, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.
“Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail
the Memorandum for the defense. As for the prosecution, it opted
not to file any.”10 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan prosecutor   who   had   administered   the   oath   on   the
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to Counter­affidavit filed by petitioner­accused.
establish   the   guilt   of   petitioner   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   The
court a   quo held   that   his   Counter­Affidavit,11 in   which   he   had 2. “II.Whether   or   not   the   prosecution   has   presented   proof
admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the constitutional
death,12 may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the presumption  of  innocence   of  the  accused  and  his   right
admission   made   by   the   defense   as   to   the   authorship,   the against  self­incrimination  on  the basis  of  the  Counter­
authenticity   and   the   voluntariness   of   the   execution   of   the affidavit whose execution was admitted by the counsel of
Counter­Affidavit.13 In   short,   it   ruled   that   the   document   had the petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
sufficiently established his respon­
3. “III.Whether or not the Counter­affidavit of the accused­
_______________ petitioner   which   was   considered   by
the Sandiganbayan in   its   decision   as   similar   to   an
10
 Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 2­9; Rollo, pp. 73­80. extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted against him
11
 Exhibit “H”, prosecution’s exhibits folder. as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he
12
 Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 81. was   not   assi[s]ted   then   by   counsel   and   while   he   was
under custodial investigation.
13
 Ibid.
429
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  429 4. “IV.Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally
and   legally   correct   in   issuing   the  Order   of   August   23,
Ladiana vs. People
1996   denying   the   Motion   for   Leave   of   Court   to   File
sibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no evidence
Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995 filed by the
of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.14
accused  in  accordance  with  Sec.   15  of  Rule  120   of  the
Hence, this Petition.15
1985   Rules   on   Criminal   Procedure   in   relation   to   Rule
Issues
XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this
Court’s consideration:
_______________

1. “I.Whether   or   not   the Sandiganbayan may   convict   the

 Ibid.
14
accused­petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
 This  case was deemed  submitted  for  resolution  on May 9,
15
of homicide even in the absence of any eyewitness who
2001, upon receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Jose A.
personally   saw   the   sho[o]ting   of   the   victim   by   the
Almo   and   Angel   R.   Purisima   III.   Respondent’s   Memorandum,
accused,   basing   it   only   on   the   testimony   of   the
filed   on   April   18,   2001,   was   signed   by   Special   Prosecutor
Leonardo P. Tamayo, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos,
Acting ASAB Director Rodrigo V. Coquia, and Special Prosecution
Officer   Manuel   T.   Soriano,   Jr.   of   the   Office   of   the   Special
Prosecutor (OSP).
430
430  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.” 18
Ladiana vs. People
1. “V.Whether   or   not  accused   is  entitled   to  the  mitigating
circumstance   of   voluntary   surrender   which   fact   was
admitted by the prosecution as it even used the same as
proof of the guilt of the accused.”16
In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal:
(1)   whether   the   Counter­Affidavit   he   executed   during   the
preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing
his complicity in the crime, (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred
in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence,
and (3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First   Issue: 
Admissibility of Counter­Affidavit
Undeniably,   the   resolution   of   this   case   hinges   mainly   on   the
admissibility   of   the   Counter­Affidavit17 submitted   by   petitioner
during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel
was present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his
argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
“SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain   silent   and   to   have   competent   and   independent   counsel
preferably   of   his   own   choice.   If   the   person   cannot   afford   the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x      x x x      x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
_______________
16
 Petitioner’s   Memorandum,   pp.   5­6;   Rollo,   pp.   169­170;
original in upper case.
17
 Exh. “H” of the prosecution’s evidence.
18
 Art. III, §12, 1987 Constitution.
431
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  431 
Ladiana vs. People
It is well­settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by
the   fundamental   law   of   the   land   apply   only   to   extra­judicial
confessions   or   admissions   obtained
during custodial investigations.  Indeed,   the   rights   enumerated
19
in   the   constitutional   provision   “exist   only   in   custodial
interrogations, or in­custody interrogation of accused persons.” 20
Custodial   interrogation is   the   questioning   initiated   by   law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise   deprived   of   his   freedom   of   action   in   any   significant
way.21
In   the   present   case,   petitioner   admits   that   the   questioned
statements were made during the preliminary investigation, not
during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the
right to competent and independent counsel also applies during
preliminary investigations.
 We   disagree.   A preliminary   investigation is   an   inquiry   or   a
proceeding   to   determine   whether   there   is   sufficient   ground   to
engender a well­founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.22
Evidently,   a   person   undergoing   preliminary   investigation
before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under
custodial   investigation.   In   fact,   this   Court   has   unequivocally
declared   that   a   defendant   on   trial   or   under   preliminary
investigation is  not under custodial  interrogation.23 It explained
as follows:
“His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been
would already have  been  ended at  the time  of the  filing  of the
criminal case in court (or the public prosecutor’s office). Hence,
with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court   (or   the   public   prosecutor’s   office),   there   is   no   occasion   to
speak of his right while under ‘custodial interrogation’ laid down
by the second and subsequent sentences of  refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross­
_______________
19
 People   v.   Salonga, G.R.   No.   131131,   June   21,   2001, 359
SCRA 310.
20
 People   vs.   Ayson, 175   SCRA   216,   230,   July   7,   1989,   per
Narvasa, J. (later, C.J.).
21
 People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565, September 20, 1994; People
v.   Logronio,214   SCRA   519,   October   13,   1992; People   v.   Ayson,
supra.
22
 Rule 112, §1, 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
23
 People v. Ayson, supra.
432
432  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ladiana vs. People
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that
he is no longer under ‘custodial interrogation.’ ”24
There   is   no   question   that   even   in   the   absence   of   counsel,   the
admissions  made  by   petitioner   in  his  Counter­Affidavit  are  not
violative   of   his   constitutional   rights.   It   is   clear   from   the
undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he
was   under   custody   or   interrogation.   Hence,   the   constitutional
rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in
this case.
However,   the   accused—whether   in   court   or   undergoing
preliminary   investigation   before   the   public   prosecutor—
unquestionably  possess  rights that  must be safeguarded.  These
include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right
not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such
examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right
to refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate
them   for   some  crime  other   than  that   for   which   they   are  being
prosecuted.25
We   do   not,   however,   agree   with   the   Sandiganbayan’s
characterization   of   petitioner’s   Counter­Affidavit   as   an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and
33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one
from the other as follows:
“SEC.   26.  Admissions   of   a   party.—The   act,   declaration   or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.
“SEC.   33.  Confession.—The   declaration   of   an   accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily   included   therein,   may   be   given   in   evidence   against
him.”
In   a   confession,   there   is   an   acknowledgment   of   guilt;   in   an
admission,   there   is   merely   a   statement   of   fact   not   directly
involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the
_______________
 Id., p. 232.
24
 Id., p. 234.
25
433
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  433
Ladiana vs. People
offense with  which  one  is  charged. 26 Thus,   in  the  case  at bar,  a
statement   by   the   accused   admitting   the   commission   of   the   act
charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal
intent is an admission, not a confession.27
The Counter­Affidavit in question contains an admission that
petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking
him. We quote the pertinent portion:
“[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako
sa   may   leeg   ng   aking   suot   na   T­shirt   upang   ako   ay   muling
saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila
ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa
kanya;   sa   bilis   ng   pangyayari   ay   hindi   ko   alam   na   siya   ay
tinamaan;”28
Through   the   above   statement,   petitioner   admits   shooting   the
victim—which   eventually   led   to   the   latter’s   death—but   denies
having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did
it   in   self­defense.   Nevertheless,   whether   categorized   as   a
confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against
him.
Further,   we  do   not  doubt  the  voluntariness  of  the  Counter­
Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public prosecutor
to   justify   his   actions   in   relation   to   the   charges   hurled   against
him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document
that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in
his defense.
In   general,   admissions   may   be   rebutted   by   confessing   their
untruth   or   by   showing   they   were   made   by   mistake.   The   party
may also establish that the response that formed the admission
was   made   in   a   jocular,   not   a   serious,   manner;   or   that   the
admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. 29 Yet,
petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions
had   been   made,   thus,   leaving   them   unrebutted.   In   addition,
admissions made un­
_______________
26
 People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624, January 26, 1995.
27
 Francisco, The   Revised   Rules   of   Court   in   the   Philippines
Evidence,Vol. VII, Part I, 1997 ed., p. 303.
28
 Petitioner’s   Counter­Affidavit,   p.   2;   Exhibit   “H”,
prosecution’s exhibits folder.
29
 Francisco, supra, p. 319.
434
434  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ladiana vs. People
der   oath,   as   in   the   case   at   bar,   are   evidence   of   great   weight
against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a
mistake.30
 Petitioner   contends   that   nowhere   in   the   transcripts   of   this 32
 Ramos   v.   Dajoyag,   Jr., AC   5174,   February   28,   2002, 378
case can it be found that he has admitted to the authorship, the SCRA   229; Villanueva   v.   People, 330   SCRA   695,   April   12,
authenticity   or   the   voluntariness   of   the   Counter­Affidavit.   We
2000; Sublay v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 188, January 31, 2000; Alarcon
quote verbatim the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan: 
v.   CA, 323   SCRA   716,   January   28,   2000; Velasquez   v.   CA, 309
“PJ GARCHITORENA  SCRA 539, June 30, 1999.
      Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you  33
 People   v.   Remudo, G.R.   No.   127905,   August   30,   2001, 364
deny that it was your client who took the oath before the Fiscal at the 
SCRA   61; Gold   Line   Transit,   Inc.   v.   Ramos, G.R.   No.   144813,
preliminary investigation? 
August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 262; People v. Villanueva, 339 SCRA
ATTY. ILAGAN  482, August 31, 2000.
  We will admit that, your Honor.  435
PJ GARCHITORENA  VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  435 
  So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity  Ladiana vs. People
and the voluntariness of the execution of the counter­affidavit dated July 31, may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the
1990? Companiero?  relevance of evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the
ATTY ILAGAN  introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence,
  Admitted, your Honor.”31 or the manner of arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be several times that those are not even proper grounds for a new
any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is trial, unless the counsel’s incompetence is so gross that the clients
that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions are prevented from fairly presenting their case.34
of  their  counsels,  save  when the  latter’s  negligence is  so  gross, Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner
reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that
in   court.32 Also,   clients,   being   bound   by   the   actions   of   their the   latter   incurred   no   criminal   liability   therefor.35 Petitioner
counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on
have been different  had  their lawyers  proceeded  differently. 33 A the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be
counsel  weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing.36
_______________ Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly
raised the issue of self­defense. Hence, he could not be bound by
30
 Ibid. it.   This   argument   deserves   scant   consideration.   As   discussed
31
 TSN, April 18, 1995, pp. 4­5. earlier,   the   declarations   contained   in   his   Counter­Affidavit   are
admissions   that   may   be   used   as   evidence   against
him.37 The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had
indeed raised  the theory of self­defense,  because this argument
had   already   been   laid   out   in   his   Counter­Affidavit.   No
presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and
unequivocal.
Neither   do   we   believe   petitioner’s   claim   that   the   anti­graft
court “miserably failed to give equal effect or treatment to all the
allegations   found   therein   (Counter­Affidavit)   choosing
deliberately   and   without   reasonable   basis   the   parts   which   are
incriminating in  requisites of self­defense enumerated in the law. 42 Had petitioner
_______________
34
 Abrajano v. CA, 343 SCRA 68, October 13, 2000; People v.
Salido,258 SCRA 291, July 5, 1996.
35
 People   v.   Obzunar, 265   SCRA   547,   December   16,
1996; People v. Doepante, 263 SCRA 691, October 30, 1996.
36
 People v. Damitan, G.R. No. 140544, December 7, 2001, 371
SCRA   629; People   v.   Iglesia, G.R.   No.   132354,   September   13,
2001, 365 SCRA 156; People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., 298 SCRA 450,
November 11, 1998; People v. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621, March 12,
1996.
37
 §26, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
436
436  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  39
Ladiana vs. People
character,   and   ignoring   without   sufficient   legal   basis   the
exculpatory assertions of the accused.”38
The   unsubstantiated   and   uncorroborated   statements   of
petitioner   in   his   Counter­Affidavit   are   utterly   insufficient   to
discharge   his   burden   of   proving   that   the   act   of   killing   was
justified. It is hornbook doctrine that self­defense must be proved
with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the
person   invoking   it.39 It   cannot   be   entertained   if   it   is
uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is
also doubtful.40 The question whether the accused  acted in self­
defense is essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the
lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan.41
By itself, the Counter­Affidavit miserably fails to establish the
been   more   vigilant   in   protecting   his   rights,   he   could   have
presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those elements. But,
as found  by  the  court a  quo,he not only  failed to discharge the
burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance of
self­defense;   he  did  not  even bother to  present  any  evidence  at
all.43 So, we do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been
selective in its treatment of his Counter­Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving
the   existence   of   self­defense   or   of   any   other   circumstance   that
eliminates   criminal   liability,   his   conviction   shall   of   necessity
follow, on 
_______________
38
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 173.
 People   v.   Suyum, G.R.   No.   137518,   March   6,   2002, 378
SCRA   415; People   v.   Sanchez, 308   SCRA   264,   June   16,
1999; People v. Balamban,264 SCRA 619, November 21, 1996.
40
 People v. Suyum, supra; People v. Sarabia, 317 SCRA 684,
October 29, 1999.
41
 People   v.   Suyum,   supra; People   v.   Dano, 339   SCRA   515,
September 1, 2000; People v. Sarabia, supra.
  Art. II, Revised Penal Code.
42 44
 People v. Suyum, supra; People v. Templa, G.R. No. 121897,
 Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 11, Rollo, p. 82.
43
August 16, 2001, 363 SCRA 291; People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA
437 267, July 28, 1998; People v. Vallador, 257 SCRA 515, June 20,
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 4, 2002  437 1996.
Ladiana vs. People 45
 People v. Gemoya, 342 SCRA 63, October 4, 2000.
the basis of his admission of the killing. 44 Upholding this principle 46
 Exh. “B” of the prosecution’s evidence.
does  not  in  any   way   violate  his  right  to  be  presumed  innocent 47
 Exh. “E” of the prosecution’s evidence.
until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed the victim, 48
 Exh. “F” of the prosecution’s evidence.
the  burden   of  proving   his  innocence  fell   on  him.   It  became his 49
 People v. Gemoya, supra.
duty   to   establish   by   clear   and   convincing   evidence   the   lawful 50
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 15; Rollo, p. 179.
justification for the killing. 51
 Bernardo v. CA, 278 SCRA 782, September 5, 1997.
Therefore,  petitioner can no longer  invoke his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged. 45 As far as he
52
 Bernardo   v.   CA,   supra; People  v.   Mercado, 159   SCRA  453,
is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of March 30, 1988.
death and its cause were established by his admissions coupled 438
with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of 438  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Death,46the   Certificate   of   Post­Mortem   Examination47 and   the Ladiana vs. People
Medico­Legal Findings.48 The intent to kill is likewise presumed Final   Issue: 
from the fact of death.49 Voluntary Surrender
Second   Issue:  After   vigorously   arguing   against   his   own   Counter­Affidavit,
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor, implores this Court to
Petitioner   then   argues   that   the Sandiganbayan erred   in   not consider   his   voluntary   surrender   to   the   police   authorities   as   a
giving   due   course   to  his   Motion   for   Leave   to   File  Demurrer   to mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution
Evidence.   He  brands   this  denial   as  legally   and   constitutionally witnesses   testified   that   he   had   surrendered   to   the   police
wrong.50 authorities   after   the   shooting   incident. 53 To   buttress   his
We   disagree.   Prior   leave   to   file   a   demurrer   to   evidence   is argument, he  contends that the “main  reason for his  voluntary
discretionary   upon   the   trial   court.51 And,   unless   there   is   grave surrender   is   that   he   sincerely   believe[d]   that   he   was   legally
abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the
trial court’s resolution may not be disturbed.52 victim   after   he   was   attacked   by   the   latter.” 54 It   goes   without
saying   that   this   statement   only   reaffirms   the   admissions
_______________ contained in his Counter­Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried
to discredit.
 For   voluntary   surrender   to   mitigate   criminal   liability,   the
following   elements   must   concur:   1)   the   offender   has   not   been
actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person
in   authority   or   to   the   latter’s   agent,   and   3)   the   surrender   is
voluntary.55 To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous
and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused
to   surrender   unconditionally,   either   because   they   acknowledge
their   guilt   or   wish   to   save   the   authorities   the   trouble   and   the
expense   that   will   necessarily   be   incurred   in   searching   for   and
capturing them.56
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary
surrender   made   by   petitioner   are   statements   made   by   two   (2)
prosecution   witnesses   that   they   were   allegedly   told   by   other
people that he had already gone to the police station. There is no
showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went
to   the   police   station,   he   surrendered   himself   to   a   person   in
authority.   Neither   is   there   any   finding   that   he   has   evinced   a
desire to own to any complicity in the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to
the police headquarters merely to report the shooting incident did
not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus,
he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. 57 In the
absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence
of  indispensable  circumstances,  we cannot  appreciate voluntary
surrender to mitigate petitioner’s penalty.
WHEREFORE,   the   Petition   is   DENIED   and   the   assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Sandoval­Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio­Morales,
JJ., concur.
     Puno (Chairman), J., Abroad on Official Business.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
374  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
G.R. Nos. 131799­801.  February 23, 2004.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELICIANO
ULIT y TAMPOY, appellant.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The appeal in a criminal case
is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned
errors–an   appeal   opens   the   whole   case   for   review,   and   the
appellate   tribunal   may   consider   and   correct   errors   though
unassigned and even reverse the decision of the trial court on the
grounds   other   than   those   the   parties   raised   as   errors.– The
appellant   does   not   contest   his   conviction   for   rape   in   Criminal
Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­386, and the validity of the proceedings
in the said 
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
375
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  375 
People vs. Ulit
cases   in   the   trial   court.   He   pleads,   however,   that   he   be
spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful
for   the   crimes   he   committed   and   that   he   pleaded   guilty   in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­387; he no longer presented
any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97­388 so that the proceedings
before the court would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless,
the appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is
not   limited   to   the   assigned   errors.   An   appeal   thus   opens   the
whole case  for  review, and  the appellate tribunal may consider
and   correct   errors   though   unassigned   and   even   reverse   the
decision  of  the  trial  court  on  the  grounds other  than  those  the
parties raised as errors.
Same; Guilty Pleas; Capital Offenses; When the accused in a
capital offense informs the trial court of his decision to change his
plea of “not guilty” to “guilty,” it behooves the trial court to conduct
a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequence of his plea.–In Criminal Case No. 97­385, the
appellant   was   charged   with   qualified   rape, i.e.,   the   rape   of   his
niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital offense.
When   the   appellant   informed   the   trial   court   of   his   decision   to
change his plea of “not guilty” to “guilty,” it behooved the trial
court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated
by   Section   6,   Rule   116   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Criminal
Procedure.   In People   vs.   Camay,   this   Court   enumerated   the
following   duties   of  the   trial   court   under   the   rule:   1.   The   court
must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea; 2.
The   court   must   require   the   prosecution   to   present   evidence   to
prove   the   guilt   of   the   accused   and   precise   degree   of   his
culpability;   and   3.   The   court   must   require   the   prosecution   to
present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
Same; Same; Same; Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital
offense   on   the   part   of   the   accused   must   be   averted   since   by
admitting his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit
his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance   and   the   dire   consequences   of   his   plea.–The raison
d’etre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme
care where the imposable penalty is death, considering that the
execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown
that   even   innocent   persons   have   at   times   pleaded   guilty.
Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the
accused must be averted since by admitting his guilt before the
trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without
having   fully   understood  the  meaning,   significance  and   the  dire
consequences of his plea.
376
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
76 
People vs. Ulit
Same; Same; Same; Guidelines   in   Conducting   Searching
Inquiry; The focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of
his plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that it is based on a
free and informed judgment.– There is no hard and fast rule as to
how the trial judge may conduct a searching inquiry. It has been
held,   however,   that   the   focus   of   the   inquiry   must   be   on   the
voluntariness of the plea and the full or complete comprehension
by the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that
it   is   based   on   a   free   and   informed   judgment.   In People   vs.
Aranzado,we   formulated   the   following   guideline   as   to   how   the
trial court may conduct its searching inquiry: (1) Ascertain from
the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of
the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what   conditions   he   was   detained   and   interrogated   during   the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent or avenging quarters. (2) Ask the defense counsel
a series of  questions as to whether he  had conferred with, and
completely   explained   to,   the   accused   the   meaning   and People vs. Ulit
consequences of a plea of guilty. (3) Elicit information about the Criminal   Law; Rape; Guiding   Considerations   in
personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic
Determining Guilt in Rape Cases.–In determining the guilt of the
status,   and   educational   background,   which   may   serve   as   a
accused   in   rape   cases,   the   Court   is   guided   by   the   following
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea
considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with
of guilty. (4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment
facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person
or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
accused,   though   innocent,   to   disprove;   (b)   that   in   view   of   the
will   serve   such   sentence.   Not   infrequently   indeed   an   accused
intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons,
pleads   guilty   in   the   hope   of   a   lenient   treatment   or   upon   bad
the   testimony   of   the   complainant   must   be   scrutinized   with
advice  or because  of promises  of the  authorities or parties of a
extreme   caution;   and   (c)   that   the   evidence   for   the   prosecution
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the
must  stand  or  fall   on  its  own  merits  and  cannot  be allowed  to
duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
these   mistaken   impressions.   (5)   Require   the   accused   to   fully
It,   likewise,   bears   stressing   that   in   all   criminal   prosecutions,
narrate   the   incident   that   spawned   the   charges   against   him   or
without regard   to  the nature  of  the  defense  which  the  accused
make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime,
may   raise,   the   burden   of   proof   remains   at   all   times   upon   the
or cause him to supply missing details or significance.
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Where the trial court receives,
Same; Same; Due   Process; Evidence; Hearsay
independently of the plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether
Evidence; Words and Phrases; By hearsay evidence is meant that
the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree
kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the
of  his  criminal  culpability  therefor,  he   may  still  be  convicted   if
credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in
there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty,
part on the veracity and competence of some persons from whom
on  which  to  predicate  conviction.–As   a   rule,   this  Court  has  set
the witness has  received the information;  In  criminal cases, the
aside   convictions   based   on   pleas   of   guilty   in   capital   offenses
because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the admission   of   hearsay   evidence   would   be   a   violation   of   the
sole   basis   of   the   condemnatory   judgment.   However,   where   the constitutional   provision   guaranteeing   the   accused   the   right   to
trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence confront and cross­examine the witness testifying against him.–We
to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of
and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may the sworn statement of Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she
still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent did   not   testify   thereon   and   merely   identified   her   signatures
on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate conviction. therein.   By   hearsay   evidence   is   meant   that   kind   of   evidence
377 which   does   not   derive   its   value   solely   from   the   credence   to   be
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  377 attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the
veracity and competence of some persons from whom the witness
has received the information. It signifies all evidence which is not
founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom
it   is   elicited,   and   which,   consequently,   is   not   subject   to   cross­
examination. The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact
that such testimony is not subject to the test which can ordinarily
be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the
declarant is not present and available for cross­examination. In
criminal   cases,   the   admission   of   hearsay   evidence   would   be   a
violation   of   the   constitutional   provision   that   the   accused   shall
enjoy   the   right   to   confront   and   cross­examine   the   witness
testifying  against  him. Generally, the affidavits  of persons who
are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof
are hearsay evidence. Such affidavit must be formally offered in
evidence   and   accepted   by   the   court;   otherwise,   it   shall   not   be
considered by the court for the simple reason that the court shall
consider such evidence formally offered and accepted.
Custodial   Investigations; Right   to   Counsel; Exclusionary
Rule; The barangay chairman is not  deemed  a law  enforcement
officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution–a suspect’s
378
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
78  show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age; 3.
People vs. Ulit
uncounselled   statement   before   the   barangay   chairman   is
admissible.– Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel
at the time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman and
when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against
him   because   he   was   not   under   arrest   nor   under   custodial
investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule
is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into
an   unfamiliar   atmosphere   and   runs   through   menacing   police
interrogation   procedures   where   the   potentiality   for   compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by
the   1971   Constitutional   Convention,   this   covers   “investigation
conducted by police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such
other police agencies in our government.” The barangay chairman
is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section   12(1)   and   (3)   of   Article   III   of   the   Constitution.   Under
these   circumstances,   it  cannot  be   successfully   claimed   that  the
appellant’s   statement   before   the barangay chairman   is
inadmissible.
Criminal   Law; Qualified   Rape; Guidelines   in   Appreciating
Age,   Either   as   an   Element   of   the   Crime   or   as   a   Qualifying
Circumstance.–The same cannot, however, be said with respect to
the age of the victim. In People v. Pruna, the Court, after noting
the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases,
set   out   certain   guidelines   in   appreciating   age,   either   as   an
element of the crime or as qualifying circumstance: 1. The best
evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party; 2.
In   the   absence   of   a   certificate   of   live   birth,   similar   authentic
If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have   been   lost   or   destroyed   or   otherwise   unavailable,   the
testimony,   if   clear   and   credible,   of   the   victim’s   mother   or   a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified   to   testify   on   matters   respecting   pedigree   such   as   the
exact   age   or   date   of   birth   of   the   offended   party   pursuant   to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be
below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old;   4.   In   the   absence   of   a   certificate   of   live   birth,   authentic
document,   or   the   testimony   of   the   victim’s   mother   or   relatives
concerning   the   victim’s   age,   the   complainant’s   testimony   will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused; 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object
to   the   testimonial   evidence   regarding   age   shall   not   be   taken
against him; 6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.
379
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  379
People vs. Ulit
Same; Same; Same; The fact that there was no objection from
the defense regarding the victim’s age cannot be taken against the
accused since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the same.–In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar
authentic   document   was   presented   and   offered   in   evidence   to
prove Lucelle’s age. While the victim testified that she was born
on February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant
twice raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not
expressly and clearly admit the same as required by Pruna. The
corroboration of Lucelle’s mother as to her age is not sufficient
either, as  there is  no evidence that the  said  certificate of  birth
was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the
prosecution. The fact that there was no objection from the defense
regarding the victim’s age cannot be taken against the appellant
since   it   is   the   prosecution   that   has   the   burden   of   proving   the
same. Moreover, the trial court did not make a categorical finding
of   the   victim’s   minority,   another   requirement   mandated
by Pruna.
Same; Same; Alternative Circumstances; Relationship; While
it   is   true   that   the   alternative   circumstance   of   relationship   is
always   aggravating   in   crimes   against   chastity,   it   is   only   taken
into   consideration   under   Article   15   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code
“when   the   offended   party   is   the   spouse,   ascendant,   descendant,
legitimate,   natural   or   adopted   brother   or   sister,   or   relative   by
affinity   in   the   same   degree   of   the   offender”–the   relationship   of
uncle   and   niece   is   not   covered   by   any   of   the   relationships
mentioned.–In   the   determination   of   whether   the   death   penalty
should   be   imposed   on   the   appellant,   the   presence   of   an
aggravating   circumstance   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   is
crucial. In the cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and
niece between the appellant and the victim has been duly proven,
the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance   against   the   appellant.   While   it   is   true   that   the
alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in
crimes against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a
relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only
taken  into  consideration  under   Article  15   of  the  Revised  Penal
Code   “when   the   offended   party   is   the   spouse,   ascendant,
descendant,   legitimate,   natural   or  adopted  brother  or   sister,   or
relative   by   affinity   in   the   same   degree   of   the   offender.”   The
relationship   of   uncle   and   niece   is   not   covered   by   any   of   the
relationships mentioned.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court 
of Makati City, Br. 62.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.  of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,   who   is   the
380
380  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
CALLEJO, SR.,  J.:
Before   the   Court   on   automatic   review   is   the   Decision1 dated
December  17, 1997  of the  Regional  Trial  Court  of Makati City,
Branch   62,   in   Criminal   Cases   Nos.   97­385   to   97­388   finding
appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of   two   counts   of   qualified   rape.2 In   the   same   decision,   the
appellant  was  convicted of  two  counts of  acts  of  lasciviousness.
For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the
supreme   penalty   of   death,   while   for   each   count   of   acts   of
lasciviousness,   the   appellant   was   sentenced   to   suffer
imprisonment “from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen
(15)   years,   six   (6)   months   and   twenty   (20)   days   of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum.” The appellant was,
likewise,   ordered   to   indemnify   the   victim   Lucelle   Serrano,   the
amount of P50,000 for each count of rape and P20,000 for each
count of acts of lasciviousness.
The Indictments
Upon   the   sworn   complaint   of   the   victim   Lucelle   Serrano,   four
Informations   were   filed   against   her   uncle,   the   appellant.   The
docket   number   and   the   accusatory   portion   of   each   Information
reads:
Criminal Case No. 97­385
“That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
uncle of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence,
her relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree, while
armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   have
carnal   knowledge   of   the   complainant   LUCELLE   SERRANO   y
ULIT,   an   eleven   (11)   year   old   girl,   without   her   consent   and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
_______________
1
 Penned by Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
2
 Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­386.
3
 Records, p. 2.
381
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  381 
People vs. Ulit
Criminal Case No. 97­386
“That  sometime  in  the  month  of  February   1997,   in  the City   of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,   who   is   the
uncle  of  complainant  LUCELLE  SERRANO   y   ULIT,   hence   her
relative   by   consanguinity   within   the   third   civil   degree,   while
armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   have
carnal   knowledge   of   the   complainant   LUCELLE   SERRANO   y
ULIT,   an   eleven   (11)   year   old   girl,   without   her   consent   and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
 “CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
Criminal Case No. 97­387
“That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,   with   lewd
design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   commit   acts   of
lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT,
an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there kissing her and
touching her sexual organ, without her consent and against her
will, to her damage and prejudice.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”5
Criminal Case No. 97­388
“That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,   with   lewd
design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   commit   acts   of
lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT,
an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there dragging her inside
a   bathroom   and   repeatedly   kissing   her   on   her   checks   [sic],
without   her   consent   and   against   her   will,   to   her   damage   and
prejudice.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”6
The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases ensued. 
_______________
4
 Id., at p. 4.
5
 Id., at p. 6.
6
 Id., at p. 8.
382
382  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment
at   the   Philippine   General   Hospital.   On   May   5,   1997,   the
prosecution presented her as its first witness.
On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on
February 19, 1986.7 In November 1996, her uncle, the appellant,
did   something   to   her.   When   the   prosecution   asked   her   what
happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she wanted to
continue with her testimony, again, she did not respond. The trial
was reset to June 2 and 9, 1997. When trial resumed on June 9,
1997,   Lucelle   was   questioned   by   the   prosecution   on   direct
examination, but still, she gave no answer. She cried profusely in
open   court.   When  asked  by   the  court  if  she  wanted   to  proceed
with the trial, she remained silent. The trial was reset anew to
July 9 and 14, 1997.
In   the   meantime,   the   trial   court   ordered   that   Lucelle   be
subjected   to   physical   and   psychological   examinations   at   the
National   Center   for   Mental   Health   (NCMH).   Dr.   Rochelflume
Samson   examined   Lucelle   and   submitted   her   Report   dated
August 29, 1997 with the following remarks and recommendation:
Based   on   clinical   history,   mental   status   examination   and
psychological   evaluation,   this   patient   is   suffering   from   Post­
Traumatic   Stress   Disorder.   This   illness   is   characterized   by
intense fear and feeling of helplessness whenever she recalls her
traumatic   experience   of   being   raped.   It   causes   her   intense
psychological   distress   whenever   asked   to   talk   about   the   rape
scene or incident. Thus, she avoids recollections of the trauma.
 At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above.
She   would   be   having   difficulties   testifying   in   court   because   of
this.   She   requires   psychiatric   treatment   at   the   Out­Patient
Section.8
During   the   trial   on   July   14,   1997,   Lucelle   refused   to   take   the
witness stand. The trial was reset to July 21, 1997.
During   the   hearing   on   October   20,   1997,   the   prosecution
presented Lucelle anew to continue with her testimony on direct
examination.   She   declared   that   the   appellant   raped   her   in
November 1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence
at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Makati City. Instead of asking
questions to elicit the facts and circumstances before and during
the commis­
_______________
7
 Annex “A,” Records, p. 13.
8
 Id., at p. 67.
383
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  383
People vs. Ulit
sion  of the  crimes, the  prosecutor asked Lucelle to  identify her
signature in her sworn statement9 and to affirm the truth of its
contents.   She   did   so.   The   public   prosecutor   then   marked   the
sworn statement in evidence as Exhibit “H,” and then manifested
to  the  court   that  he  had  no  more  questions   for   the  witness  on
direct examination.
On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that
she was born on February 19, 1986. The appellant mounted her,
removed her pants, poked a knife at her and threatened her. 10
On cross­examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was
her   mother’s   older   brother.   In   November   1996,   she   was   not
enrolled in any school. Her father was working at a construction
firm,   the   appellant   was   employed   at   the   Department   of
Environment   and   Sanitation   in   Makati   City,   while   her
grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a maid in Bel Air
Subdivison. Her mother worked for one of her father’s cousins. On
re­direct examination, the prosecution elicited from Lucelle that
the appellant raped her in November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside
the room of her aunt Marina in her grandmother’s house at No.
7104   San   Maximo   Street,   Olympia,   Makati   City,   and   that   her
aunt, Marina, and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When
asked where her aunt and Ate Sharon were when she was being
raped in her aunt’s room, Lucelle did not respond. When asked
why   she   did   not   respond   to   the   questions   propounded   to   her
during   the   previous   hearings   and   why   she   had   been   crying   in
open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her uncle, the
appellant.
In   her   sworn   statement,11 Lucelle   alleged   that   sometime   in
November 1996, she was sleeping in a room in the house. It was
about 6 o’clock in the evening. She was awakened when she felt
someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes, she
saw   her   uncle,   the   appellant,   armed   with   bladed   weapon
(balisong). He poked the weapon on the left side of her neck. He
warned  her  that  if  she  told  her  parents,  he  would  kill  her.   He
removed   her   panties,   undressed   himself   and   mounted   her.   He
then   inserted   his   penis   into   her   vagina.   She   felt   pain   in   her
private part and cried. The appellant, thereafter, left the room.
Also during the month of No­
_______________
9
 Exhibit “H,” Records, p. 80.
10
 TSN, 20 October 1997, pp. 5­6.
11
 Exhibit “H.”
384
384  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  in the evenings in the sala of the house–while Marina slept in her
People vs. Ulit
vember 1996, the appellant continued kissing her whenever her
parents were out of the house.
In   December   1996,   Lucelle   was   in   the   room   when   the
appellant entered and kissed her and mashed her private parts.
Sometime   in   February   1997,   the   appellant   again   abused   her
(sinalbahe)   while   she   was   in   the   same   room.   It   was   about   11
o’clock in the evening. He again warned her not to divulge to her
parents   what   he   did   to   her.   At   9:00   p.m.   on   March   2,   1997,
Lucelle urinated in the bathroom and when she was about to go
out, the appellant entered, pushed her inside and kissed her on
her cheeks several times.
Celso   Serrano,   Lucelle’s   father,   testified   that   sometime   in
November   1996,   at   dawn,   he   was   in   bed   and   noticed   that   the
appellant   was   in   the   bedroom   of   his   cousin­in­law.   Sometime
later, he went to the bathroom. He then heard his wife ask the
appellant where he had come from and the latter replied that he
just came from the roof of the house. On another occasion, one
early Sunday morning, he noticed blood stains on Lucelle’s short
pants. When she declared that she had her monthly period,  he
gave   her   P5.00   with   which   to   buy   sanitary   napkins.   Lucelle
refused to accept the money. He suggested that she wash herself
but she just nodded her head. When he asked her why she refused
to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell
him because she might be killed.
Lourdes   Serrano   testified   that   she   was   Lucelle’s   mother.
Lucelle was born on February 19, 1986. 12 She and her husband
Celso   Serrano   and   their   daughter   Lucelle   resided   with   her
mother,   Guadalupe   Ulit,   at   No.   7104   San   Maximo   Street,
Olympia, Makati City. Her sister Marina and the appellant, her
brother, also resided in the same house. The family slept together
bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece Lucelle to sleep in
her bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes noticed
that Lucelle was not at her side. The appellant, who usually also
slept in the sala, was not there either Lourdes went to Marina’s
bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a blanket.
Beside  her  was  the  appellant  who  was  wearing  a  pair  of  short
pants and undershirt. When the appellant saw Lourdes, he slid
down from the bed, went under the papag, and furtively left the
room. When Lourdes removed the 
_______________
 Exhibit “A,” Records, p. 71 (Certificate of Baptism).
12
385
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  385 
People vs. Ulit
blanket, she saw Lucelle lying sideways with her knees up to her
chin   (nakabaluktot).   Lucelle   was   trembling   with   fear.   When
Lourdes   asked   Lucelle   what   happened,   she   did   not   respond.
Lourdes left the room and went back to the sala. She wanted to
talk to the  appellant but  decided against it when she saw him
seated in the sala, playing with his balisong.
Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997,
she and her husband were having dinner when she noticed that
Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked for her daughter in
the house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if
she had seen Lucelle. Nita replied in the negative. When Lourdes
asked  Nita  if  Lucelle  was  inside  the bathroom,   Nita  responded
that the appellant was using it. Momentarily, Lourdes saw the
appellant emerge from the bathroom. He was in his short pants
and his shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring profusely.
Lourdes was flabbergasted when she saw Lucelle come out of the
bathroom after the appellant. Lucelle was crying and looked pale.
When  Lourdes  asked  Lucelle  why   she  was crying,  she  told  her
mother that she had just urinated. The appellant later told her
sister Lourdes that he did not do anything to Lucelle.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter,
Celso   and   Lourdes   brought   Lucelle   on   March   5,   1997,   to
Barangay   Chairman   Romeo   Medina.   On   their   way,   Lucelle
adamantly refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to
her.   However,   when   they   reached   the   barangay   headquarters,
Lucelle told the barangay chairman that the appellant sexually
abused   her.   Thereafter,   Lourdes   filed   a   complaint   with   the
barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting
Lucelle.
Barangay  Tanod Fernando  David testified that on March 6,
1997, the barangay chairman ordered him and Barangay Tanod
Antonio   Echavez   to   invite   and   bring   the   appellant   to   the
barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he
raped Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang
Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in
which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in February
1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he
threatened to kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents
to her par­
386
386  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice,
People vs. Ulit
ents.  The appellant signed his statement in the presence of the
13
barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought
to the Makati City Police Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and
Lucelle   filed   a   complaint   against   him   for   rape   and   acts   of
laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Women’s Desk Unit took
the sworn statements of Lourdes and Lucelle. 14 She conducted a
custodial investigation of the appellant who was without counsel
during which the latter admitted having raped the victim. SPO4
Hogar also prepared a report on her investigation of the victim’s
complaint.15
On   July   28,   1997,   Dr.   Armie   M.   Soreta­Umil,   NBI   Medico­
Legal   Officer,   testified   that   on   March   12,   1997,   she   conducted
genital   and   vaginal   examinations   on   Lucelle   and   submitted
Living Case Report No. MG­97­355 which contained the following
findings:
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
     Height: 141 cm.     Weight: 78 lbs.
     Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent,
cooperative, ambulatory subject.
     Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light­brown, 2.6
cms.   in   diameter.   Nipples,   light­brown,   protruding,   0.8   cm.   in
diameter.
     No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
     Pubic   hair,   fully   grown,   moderate.   Labia   majora,   gaping.
Labia   minora,   coaptated.   Fourchette,   lax.   Vestibular   mucosa,
admits a tube 2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities,
shallow.
CONCLUSIONS
 1. 1.)No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted
on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
2. 2.)Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5
cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average­sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury.16
_______________
13
 Exhibit “F,” Records, p. 77.
14
 Exhibits “B” and “E.”
15
 Exhibit “G,” Records p. 78.
16
 Exhibit “C,” Id., at p. 74.
387
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  387
People vs. Ulit
When   the   prosecution   offered   in   evidence   the
appellant’s Sinumpaany   Salaysay before   the   barangay
chairman17 as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando
David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that
the appellant was not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced
and coerced into signing the same. Nevertheless, the trial court
admitted   the   statement   as   part   of   David’s   testimony.   The
appellant’s   counsel,   likewise,   objected   to   the   admissibility   of
Lucelle’s   sworn   statement   on   the   ground   that   she   was
incompetent to give the same because of her mental illness. The
trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in evidence as
part of her testimony.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset
the hearing to November 5, 1997 for the appellant to adduce his
evidence.   When   the   case   was   called   for   trial   on   that   date,   his
counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing
his   plea   in   Criminal   Cases   Nos.   97­385   and   97­387   from   “not
guilty”  to  “guilty.” He  also  manifested  that  he  would  no  longer
adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases Nos. 97­386
and   97­388   because   the   prosecution   failed   to   prove   his   guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein. The trial
court suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty­five
minutes   to   confer   with   his   counsel.   When   trial   resumed,   the
appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the
court that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the
appellant  stood  pat  on  his  decision  to  plead  guilty   in  Criminal
Cases   Nos.   97­385   and   97­387,   and   to   no   longer   present   any
evidence in his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was
re­arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­387 with the
assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to
the charges.
On   December   15,   1997,   the   trial   court   rendered   judgment
convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   judgment   is   hereby
rendered as follows:
1. “1.In Criminal Case Nos. 97­385 and 97­386, for rape, the
prosecution   has   proven   beyond   reasonable   doubt   the
guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as
principal in the two counts of statutory rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
_______________
 Exhibit “F,” Id., at p. 77.
17
388
388  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 People vs. Ulit
as amended. He is hereby declare[d] CONVICTED in each of
the   cases.   Accordingly   he   is   sentenced   to   suffer   the   supreme
penalty [of] DEATH in each of the two cases; and indemnify the
victim LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as moral
damages for each of the cases;
1. “2.In Criminal Case Nos. 97­387 and 97­388, for acts of
lasciviousness,   the   prosecution   has   proven   beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO
ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two counts of acts of
lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal   Code   and   penalized   under   Section   5(b)   of   R.A.
7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of the
two cases; and, accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer in
each   of   the   cases   an   indeterminate   prison   term   from
eight   (8)   years,   eight   (8)   months   and   one   (1)   day
of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum;
and, indemnify the victim, LUCELLE SERRANO, in the
amount   of   P20,000   as   moral   damages   for   each   of   the
cases.
“SO ORDERED.”18
The   trial   court   declared   that   even   prescinding   from   the
appellant’s   plea   of   guilty,   the   prosecutor   adduced   proof   beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified rape in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­386. The trial court ruled that
although   Lucelle   did   not   testify   on   the   contents   of   her   sworn
statement19 the   same   were   admissible   in   evidence   as   part   of
the res gestae.
The  appellant  did  not  appeal   from  the  decision  in  Criminal
Cases   Nos.   97­387   and   97­388.   In   view   of   the   trial   court’s
imposition   of   the   death   penalty   on   the   appellant   in   Criminal
Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­386, the said cases were brought to this
Court on automatic appeal.
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the
lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED
FELICIANO   ULIT   WITH   A  DEATH   PENALTY   DESPITE  HIS
ADMISSION OF GUILT.20
_______________
18
 Records, pp. 226­227.
19
 Annex “A”, Id., at p. 13.
20
 Rollo, p. 65.
389
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  389 
People vs. Ulit
The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal
Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­386, and the validity of the proceedings
in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however, that he be
spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful
for   the   crimes   he   committed   and   that   he   pleaded   guilty   in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­387; he no longer presented
any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97­388 so that the proceedings
before the court would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless,
the appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is
not   limited   to   the   assigned   errors.21 An   appeal   thus   opens   the
whole case  for  review, and  the appellate tribunal may consider
and   correct   errors   though   unassigned   and   even   reverse   the
decision  of  the  trial  court  on  the  grounds other  than  those  the
parties raised as errors.22
Appellant’s   Plea   of   Guilty   in   Criminal   Case   No.   97­385   was
Imprudently Made.
In   Criminal   Case   No.   97­385,   the   appellant   was   charged   with
qualified   rape, i.e.,   the   rape   of   his   niece,   who   was   a   minor,
punishable by death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as   amended   by   Republic   Act   No.   7659.   Undoubtedly,   the
appellant was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant
informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of “not
guilty”   to   “guilty,”   it   behooved   the   trial   court   to   conduct   a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule
116   of   the   Revised   Rules   of   Criminal   Procedure.   In People   vs.
Camay,23 this Court enumerated the following duties of the trial
court under the rule:
1. 1.The   court   must   conduct   a   searching   inquiry   into   the
voluntariness and full comprehension [by the accused] of
the consequences of his plea;
2. 2.The   court   must   require   the   prosecution   to   present
evidence   to   prove   the   guilt  of  the  accused   and   precise
degree of his culpability; and
_______________
21
 People   v.   Espejon, 377   SCRA   412 (2002); People   v.
Feliciano, 365 SCRA 613 (2001).
22
 People v. Lucero, 355 SCRA 93 (2001).
23
 152 SCRA 401 (1987).
390
390  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
1. 3.The   court   must   require   the   prosecution   to   present
evidence   in   his   behalf   and   allow   him   to   do   so   if   he
desires.24
The raison d’etre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with
extreme care where the imposable penalty is death, considering
that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience has
shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the
accused must be averted since by admitting his guilt before the
trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without
having   fully   understood  the  meaning,   significance  and   the  dire
consequences of his plea.25
There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may
conduct a searching inquiry. It has been held, however, that the
focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and
the full or complete comprehension by the accused of his plea of
guilty so that it can truly be said that it is based on a free and
informed judgment. In People vs. Aranzado,26 we formulated the
following   guideline   as   to   how   the   trial   court   may   conduct   its
searching inquiry:
1. (1)Ascertain   from   the   accused   himself   (a)   how   he   was
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had
the   assistance   of   a   competent   counsel   during   the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what   conditions   he   was   detained   and   interrogated
during   the   investigations.   These   the   court   shall   do   in
order   to   rule   out   the   possibility   that   the   accused   has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
 actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
or avenging quarters.
2. (2)Ask   the   defense   counsel   a   series   of   questions   as   to
whether   he   had   conferred   with,   and   completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences
of a plea of guilty.
3. (3)Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused,   such   as   his   age,   socio­economic   status,   and
educational   background,   which   may   serve   as   a
trustworthy   index   of   his   capacity   to   give   a   free   and
informed plea of guilty.
4. (4)Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature  of the  penalty under  the law and  the certainty
that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed
an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a
_______________
24
 Ibid.
25
 People v. Alborida, 359 SCRA 495 (2001).
26
 365 SCRA 649 (2001).
391
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  391
People vs. Ulit
1. lenient   treatment   or   upon   bad   advice   or   because   of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty
should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty
of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
2. (5)Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that
spawned the charges against him or make him reenact
the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause
him to supply missing details or significance.27
In People vs. Ostia,28 we held that the trial court is also required
to probe thoroughly into the reasons or motivations, as well as the
facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused and
his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the
crime for which he is charged as well as the nature and effect of
any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as
well as the qualifying and special qualifying circumstances, and
inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for
the crime for which he would plead guilty to.29
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry
into the appellant’s voluntariness and full comprehension of his
plea of guilty. This is evident by the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on November s 1998:
ATTY. MANALO
     Your   Honor,   at   today’s   reception   of   defense’   evidence,
accused   informed   this   representation   that   he   will   no   longer
present evidence and instead willing to change his plea from not
guilty to that of guilty. This accused’s representation is therefore
praying that he be allowed to change his plea from that of not
guilty to guilty.
COURT
     You better confer with your client and explain to him the
consequences   of  his   intended  change  of  plea   from  not  guilty   to
that of guilty.
ATTY. MANALO      Do  you  know   that  you  are  accused   here  for   the  crime  of
     Yes, Your Honor. rape, a capital offense which carries with it a capital punishment?
ACCUSED
_______________      Yes, Your Honor.
COURT (to accused)
27
 Id., at pp. 661­662.      Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital
28
 G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003, 398 SCRA 132. offense which carries with it a capital penalty you still insists that
29
 Id., at pp. 14­15. you are pleading guilty?
392 ACCUSED
392  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED       Yes, Your Honor.
COURT (to accused)
People vs. Ulit
     Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not
COURT (to the accused)
guilty to that of guilty?
     Is your counsel’s manifestation true, that you would like to
ACCUSED
change your plea from not guilty to that of guilty and that you are
     None, Your Honor.
no longer presenting evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 97­386 and
COURT
97­388?
     (to accused)
ACCUSED
     Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced
     Yes, Your Honor.
in accordance with [what] the law provides?
COURT
393
     (to the accused)
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  393 
     You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking
the court to change your plea of not guilty to that of guilty. The People vs. Ulit
Court will call your case again. . . . ACCUSED
COURT      Yes, Your Honor.
     (to the accused) COURT
     Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you      (to accused)
would like to change your plea from not guilty to that of guilty, in      Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death
Criminal  Case  No.  97­385,  for rape  and  Criminal  Case No.  97­ penalty because the Information states that the victim is eleven
387, for Acts of Lasciviousness, do you affirm the manifestation of years old and your niece and that you used a deadly weapon in
your counsel? the commission of the rape?
ACCUSED ACCUSED
     Yes, Your Honor.      Yes, Your Honor. I am willing to plead guilty.
COURT (to accused) COURT
      Alright, arraign the accused.30
First. The   trial   court   did   not   ask   the   appellant  his  reasons   for
changing his plea, from not guilty to that of guilty, and the cogent
circumstances that led him to decide to do so.
Second. It   appears   in   the   Informations   filed   by   the   Public
Prosecutor   that   the   appellant   opted   not   to   avail   himself   of   his
right   to   a   regular   preliminary   investigation   and   refused   to
execute  a  waiver  under  Article  125  of  the  Revised  Penal  Code.
The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall where he confessed
to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997.
However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was
assisted   by   counsel   when   he   was   brought   to   the   Office   of   the
Public   Prosecutor   for   inquest   investigation.   Neither   did   the
court a quo inquire about the circumstances and the appellant’s
reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
The   records   show   that   when   the   prosecution   offered   the
appellant’s Sinumpaang   Salaysay in   evidence   to   prove   that   he
confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March
2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was
not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the
same.
Third.   The   trial   court   also   failed   to   ascertain   from   the
appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he executed
his Sinumpaang   Salaysay while   detained   at   the   barangay   hall;
and, if he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived
his   right   thereto,   before   and   when   he   signed   his Sinumpaang
Salaysay.  Eighth. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from
_______________
30
 TSN, 5 November 1997, pp. 2­4.
394
394  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
Fourth. The trial  court failed  to ask the appellant why  he was
pleading guilty to a rape committed in November 1996, when in
his Sinumpaang   Salaysay,31 he   confessed   to   having   raped   the
victim only in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant
did not admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged in
the Information in Criminal Case No. 97­385. The trial court did
not   even   inquire   from   the   appellant   who   prepared   and   typed
his Sinum­paang   Salaysay and   if   the   contents   of   his   statement
were explained to him before he signed the same.
Fifth.   The   trial   court   did   not   explain   the   following   to   the
appellant, in plain and simple terms so as to be understood by
him:   (a)   the   elements   of   the   crime   of   qualified   rape;   (b)   the
circumstances of relationship and the minority of the victim; and
(c) that his plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the
penalty for the crime in light of Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of
qualified   rape,   he   would   be   civilly   liable   to   the   victim   in   the
amount   of   P50,000   as   moral   damages   and   P75,000   as   civil
indemnity ex delicto.
Seventh.   Neither   did   the   trial   court   inquire   from   the
appellant’s counsel whether the meaning and the consequences of
a   guilty   plea   were  explained  to  the  appellant  in  a   language  or
dialect known to and understood by him.
the appellant his age, educational attainment and socio­economic
status.
 Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate In   determining   the   guilt   of   the   accused   in   rape   cases,   the
the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident of qualified Court   is   guided   by   the   following   considerations:   (a)   that   an
rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 97­385. accusation   of   rape   can   be   made   with   facility;   it   is   difficult   to
Tenth. The appellant was not  asked  if he desired  to adduce prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent,
evidence in Criminal Case No. 97­385 in spite of his plea of guilty. to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas which   usually   involves   two   persons,   the   testimony   of   the
of guilty in capital offenses because of the improvidence thereof, complainant   must   be  scrutinized   with   extreme   caution;   and   (c)
and   when   such   plea   is   the   sole   basis   of   the   condemnatory that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
judgment.32 However,   where   the   trial   court   receives, merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether of the evidence of the defense.34 It, likewise, bears stressing that
the accused committed  in all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the
defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains
_______________ at  all   times   upon   the  prosecution  to  establish   his   guilt  beyond
reasonable doubt.35
 Exhibit “F.”
31
The   Prosecution   Adduced   Proof 
 People v. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633 (1997).
32
of   the   Appellant’s   Guilt   Beyond 
395 Reasonable   Doubt   of   the   Crime 
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  395 of   Rape   in   Criminal   Case 
People vs. Ulit No. 97­385
the   crimes   charged   and   the   precise   degree   of   his   criminal We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced
culpability  therefor,   he  may   still   be  convicted  if there  is ample that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that
proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to the   appellant   raped   the   victim   in   November   1996.   The   victim
predicate conviction.33 declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her
In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when tes­
the appellant decided to change his plea. In fact, the trial court
granted   the   prosecution’s   motion   that   the   evidence   it   had _______________
presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the
appellant.   It   is,   thus,   incumbent   upon   this   Court   to   determine  People v. Rodriguez, 375 SCRA 224 (2002).
33

whether   the   evidence   adduced   by   the   prosecution   in   Criminal  People v. Mariano, 345 SCRA 1 (2000); People v. Tacipit, 242

34

Case No. 97­385 is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt SCRA 241 (1995).
the appellant’s guilt for qualified rape. 35
 Ibid.
396
396  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  . . . 
People vs. Ulit COURT 
timony   on   clarificatory   questions   made   by   the   trial   court,   that Q  Noong Nobyembre 1996, ayon sa iyo ay ginahasa ka ng iyong Tito. Saan ka 
indeed,   the   appellant   raped   her   in   November   1996.   Quoted ginahasa ng Tito mo? 
hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on direct and on re­direct A  Sa 7104 San Maximo St., po. 
examination: 
Fiscal  _______________
Q  So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo? 
A  Ginahasa niya ako.   TSN, 20 October 1997, pp. 3­4.
36

Q  Ilang ulit kang ginahasa?   Id., at p. 14.
37

A  Marami po.  397
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  397 
Q  Kailan ka ginahasa ng tiyuhin mo? 
A  November po.  People vs. Ulit
Q  19?  Q  Doon din sa bahay na iyong tinitirhan? 
A  1996, po.  A  Opo.38
In   her   Sworn   Statement,  Lucelle   narrated   in   detail   how   the
39
Q  Saan ka ginahasa? 
appellant ravished her:
A  7104 San Maximo St., Makati City, po.36
06. T: Kailan ka unang senalbahe ng iyong TITO ELY?
. . . 
S: Noon  pong   Nobyembre  1996   hindi   ko  na   po  matandaan   ang
Fiscal 
petsa, mga bandang 6:00 ng gabi po nang ako ay natutulog sa
Q  Humigit­kumulang, anong oras ng gabi nang gahasain ka ng Tito Ely mo 
noong Nobyembre 1996?  loob   po   ng   kuwarto   ay   nagising   na   lang   po   ako   nang
A  Alas onse po ng gabi.  maramdaman ko na may humahalik sa aking pisngi, at nang
Q  Samakatuwid, hindi na siya nagtratrabaho, wala na siya sa trabaho?  ako   po   ay   magising   ay   nakita   ko   po   si   TITO   ELY   na   may
A  Wala na po. hawak na  balisong  na  humigit  kumulang po sa 10  pulgada
Q  Saang lugar ka ginahasa?  ang   haba   na   nakatutok   sa   aking   kaliwang   leeg   habang
A  Sa 7104 San Maximo St.  humahalik po sa aking pisngi at ang sabi ay kung ako daw po
Q  Sa loob ba ng bahay?  ay magsusumbong sa aking magulang ay papatayin po niya
A  Opo.  (TITO ELY) ako. Pagkatapos po ay hinubaran po ako ng panty
Q  Saang parte ng bahay ka ginahasa ng Tito mo?  at naghubad na rin po si TITO ELY ng kanyang short pants at
A  Sa kuwarto po.37 pumatong   na   po   sa   akin.   Ipinasok   po   ni   TITO   ELY   and
 kanyang   (TITO   ELY)   ari   sa   aking   “PEPE”   at   ako   po   ay enjoy   the   right   to   confront   and   cross­examine   the   witness
nasaktan at umiyak na lang po ako at nang makaraos po si testifying against him.43 Generally, the affidavits of persons who
are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof
TITO ELY ay umalis na lang . . . .40
are hearsay evidence.44 Such affidavit must be formally offered in
We   do   not   agree   with   the   ruling   of   the   trial   court   that   the
evidence   and   accepted   by   the   court;   otherwise,   it   shall   not   be
contents of the sworn statement of Lucelle  are hearsay,  simply
considered by the court for the simple reason that the court shall
because   she   did   not   testify   thereon   and   merely   identified   her
consider such evidence formally offered and accepted.45
signatures   therein.   By   hearsay   evidence   is   meant   that   kind   of
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the
evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence
contents of her sworn statement which she herself had given. As
to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on
gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the
the   veracity   and   competence   of   some   persons   from   whom   the
appellant   raped   and   subjected   her   to   lascivious   acts.   She   was
witness   has   received   the   information. 41 It   signifies   all   evidence
cross­examined by the appellant’s counsel and answered the trial
which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness
court’s clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn
from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject
statement as  part of her  testimony and  the court admitted the
to crossexamination.42 The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in
same  for   the said  purpose   without  objection  on  the part   of  the
the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which can
appellant.
ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony,
since   the   declarant   is   not   present   and   available   for   cross­ The   Prosecution   Proved   Beyond   Reasonable   Doubt   that   the
examination. In  Appellant Raped the Victim in February 1997
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case
_______________ No.   97­386   on   the   basis   of   Lucelle’s   sworn   statement, 46the
testimony   of   her   mother,   Lourdes   Serrano,   the   appellant’s
38
 Id., at p. 16. statement47 executed in the Barangay Chairman’s Office, and the
39
 Exhibit “H.” testimony   of   Dr.   Armie   Soreta­Umil.   We   agree   with   the   trial
40
 Ibid. court’s findings and conclusion.
41
 Rules on Evidence, Herrera Remedial Law, Volume V, 1999 First.   In   Lucelle’s   sworn   statement,48 she   declared   that   the
ed., pp. 563­564. appellant subjected her to sexual abuse.
42
 Id., at p. 564. Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marina’s room,
398 covered with a blanket beside the appellant who was wearing a 
398  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
_______________
People vs. Ulit
criminal   cases,   the   admission   of   hearsay   evidence   would   be   a
violation of the constitutional  provision  while the accused shall
 43
 Fernando, The   Revised   Rules   of   Court   of   the   Philippines,
Part I, Vol. VIII, 1997 ed., pp. 515­518.
44
 Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587 (1988); People v.
Santos, 139 SCRA 583 (1985).
45
 Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
46
 Supra.
47
 Supra.
48
 Supra.
399
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  399
People vs. Ulit
pair of short pants and undershirt. He slid down from the papag,
went under the bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes removed
the blanket, she saw Lucelle trembling with fear, lying sidewise,
her knees near her chin (nakabaluktot).
Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on
March 5, 1997, that he raped Lucelle in February 1997:
Na, noong isang araw ng PEBRERO 1997, sa loob ng kuwarto ng
aking kapatid na babae, pumasok ako na nadatnang nakahiga si
LUCILLE ULIT sa isang papag na anyong natutulog. Lumapit
ako sa kanya at pinaghihipuan sa maseselang parte ng kanyang
katawan   at   nang   siya’y   magising   tinakot   ko   siyang   huwag
sisigaw,   habang   siya   ay   aking   hinuhubaran   ng   “Short”   na
kasama pati ang kanyang “panty.” Nagpupumiglas siya habang
ako ay nakadagan sa kanya na noon din ay hinuhubad ko ang
aking   “brief.”   Pinaghahalikan   ko   po   siya   habang   siya   ay
nagpupumiglas   at   umiiyak   at   noon   din   ay   aking   pinasok   ang
aking ari sa kanyang ari. Umiiyak siya habang ang aking ari ay
labas masok sa kanyang ari. Nang ako ay makaraos ay tinakot ko
siyang huwag magsusumbog sa kanyang mga magulang.49
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he
gave his statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed
the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he
was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he
gave his statement.50
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant   is   thrust   into   an   unfamiliar   atmosphere   and   runs
through   menacing   police   interrogation   procedures   where   the
potentiality   for   compulsion,   physical   and   psychological,   is
forcefully   apparent.   As   intended   by   the   1971   Constitutional
Convention,   this   covers   “investigation   conducted   by   police
authorities   which   will   include   investigations   conducted   by   the
municipal   police,   the   PC   and   the   NBI   and   such   other   police
agencies   in   our   government.”51 The   barangay   chairman52 is   not
deemed a law enforcement officer 
_______________
49
 Supra.
50
 People vs. Diano, 339 SCRA 515 (2000).
51
 People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997).
52
 R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
SECTION   389.  Chief   Executive:   Powers,   Duties   and
Functions.–
400
400  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.   Under   these   circumstances,   it   cannot   be
successfully
_______________
(a)   The punong   barangay,   as   the   chief   executive   of
the barangay government,   shall   exercise   such   powers   and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and
other laws.
(b)   For   efficient,   effective   and   economical   governance,   the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and its
inhabitants   pursuant   to   Section   16   of   this   Code,   the punong
barangay shall:
1. (1)Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay;
2. (2)Negotiate,   enter   into,   and   sign   contracts   for   and   in
behalf   of   the   barangay,   upon   authorization   of
the sangguniang barangay;
3. (3)Maintain   public   order   in   the barangay and,   in
pursuance   thereof,   assist   the   city   or   municipal   mayor
and   the sangguniang members   in   the   performance   of
their duties and functions;
4. (4)Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang
barangay and   the barangay assembly,   and   vote   only   to
break a tie;
5. (5)Upon   approval   by   a   majority   of   all   the   members   of
the sangguniang   barangay,   appoint   or   replace
the barangay treasurer,   the barangaysecretary,   and
other appointed barangay officials;
6. (6)Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the
same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and
order  or   on  occasions  of  emergency   or  calamity  within
the barangay,
7. (7)In   coordination   with   the barangay development
council, prepare the annual executive and supplemental
budgets of the barangay;
8. (8)Approve   vouchers   relating   to   the   disbursement
of barangay funds;
9. (9)Enforce   laws   and   regulations   relating   to   pollution
control and protection of the environment;
10. (10)Administer   the   operation   of   the katarungang
pambarangay in accordance with then provisions of this
Code;
11. (11)Exercise   general   supervision   over   the   activities   of
the sangguniang kabataan;
401
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  401 
People vs. Ulit
claimed   that   the   appellant’s   statement   before
the barangaychairman is inadmissible.
The   Sufficiency   of   Evidence   on   Lucelle’s   Relationship   with   the
Appellant, her Minority, and the Propriety of the Imposition of the
Death Penalty
The appellant’s conviction for two counts of rape having been duly
established by the prosecution, we now come to the question of
the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659, which was the law in effect at the
time of the commission of the subject rapes, provides in part:
ART. 335. \When and how rape is committed.–Rape is committed
by   having   carnal   knowledge   of   a   woman   under   any   of   the
following circumstances.
1. 1.By using force or intimidation;
2. 2.When   the   woman   is   deprived   of   reason   or   otherwise
unconscious; and
3. 3.When   the   woman   is   under   twelve   years   of   age   or   is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
_______________
1. (12)Ensure   the   delivery   of   basic   services   as   mandated
under Section 17 of this Code;
2. (13)Conduct   an   annual palarong   barangay which   shall
feature   traditional   sports   and   discipline   included   in
national and international games, in coordination with
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
3. (14)Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and
4. (15)Exercise   such   other   powers   and   perform   such   other
duties   and   functions   as   may   be   prescribed   by   law   or
ordinance.
(c)   In   the   performance   of   his   peace   and   order   functions,
the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the
necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to
appropriate rules and regulations.
402
402  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ulit
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
. . .
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. 1.When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the   offender   is   a   parent,   ascendant,   step­parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third   civil   degree,   or   the   common­law   spouse   of   the
parent of the victim.
. . .
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must
concur. More importantly, they must be both alleged and proved,
in order to qualify the crime of rape and warrant the imposition of
the   death   penalty.53 In   addition   to   the   requirement   that   the
qualifying   and   aggravating   circumstance   must   be   specifically
alleged in the information, it must be established with certainty
that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age or that she
was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must
be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its
irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision­
making   process   in   capital   offenses   aptly   subject   to   the   most
exacting rules of procedure and evidence.54
The   relationship   between   the   appellant   and   the   victim   has
been adequately established. The allegations in both Informations
that   the   appellant   is   the   victim’s   “uncle,”   “a   relative   by
consanguinity within the third civil degree” is specific enough to
satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship.
In People v. Ferolino,55 we said–
In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO’s niece is
not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstances
of relationship. If the offender is merely a relation–not a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common law spouse of the
mother of the victim–it must be alleged in the information that he
is   “a   relative   by   consanguinity   or   affinity [as   the   case   may
be] within the third civil degree.” That rela­
_______________
53
 People v. Emperador, 390 SCRA 1 (2002).
54
 People   v.   Ilagan, G.R.   No.   144595,   August   6,   2003, 408
SCRA 442.
55
 329 SCRA 719 (2000).
403
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004  403
People vs. Ulit
tionship   by   consanguinity   or   affinity   was   not   alleged   in   the
informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary
to further allege that such relationship was within the third civil
degree.56
The prosecution’s evidence has also shown that the appellant is
the victim’s uncle, being the older brother of the victim’s mother,
a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of
the   victim.   In People   v.   Pruna,57 the   Court,   after   noting   the
divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases, set
out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as qualifying circumstance:
1. 1.The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
2. 2.In   the   absence   of   a   certificate   of   live   birth,   similar
authentic   documents   such  as  baptismal  certificate  and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. 3.If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown   to   have   been   lost   or   destroyed   or   otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s   mother   or   a   member   of   the   family   either   by
affinity   or   consanguinity   who  is  qualified  to  testify   on
matters   respecting   pedigree   such   as   the   exact   age   or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
 1. a.If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought  to be  proved is that she  is less than 7
years old;
2. b.If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
3. c.If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
1. 4.In   the   absence   of   a   certificate   of   live   birth,   authentic
document,   or   the   testimony   of   the   victim’s   mother   or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
2. 5.It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
_______________
56
 Id., at p. 735 (Emphasis ours).
57
 390 SCRA 577 (2002).
404
404  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  In the determination of whether the death penalty should be
People vs. Ulit
1. 6.The trial court should always make a categorical finding
as to the age of the victim.58
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic
document   was   presented   and   offered   in   evidence   to   prove
Lucelle’s   age.   While   the   victim   testified   that   she   was   born   on
February   19,   1986,   therefore   11   years   old   when   the   appellant
twice raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not
expressly and clearly admit the same as required by Pruna. The
corroboration of Lucelle’s mother as to her age is not sufficient
either, as  there is  no evidence that the  said  certificate of  birth
was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the
prosecution. The fact that there was no objection from the defense
regarding the victim’s age cannot be taken against the appellant
since   it   is   the   prosecution   that   has   the   burden   of   proving   the
same. Moreover, the trial court did not make a categorical finding
of   the   victim’s   minority,   another   requirement   mandated
by Pruna.
Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph
of   Article   335   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   as   amended,   which
provides that, “[w]henever rape  is committed with the use of  a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.”
The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle
with the use of a deadly weapon in both rape incidents as alleged
in both informations, and under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code,   as   amended   by   Republic   Act   No.   7659,   the   imposable
penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.
imposed   on   the   appellant,   the   presence   of   an   aggravating
circumstance   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   is   crucial.   In   the
cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece between
the   appellant   and   the   victim   has   been   duly   proven,   the
alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the
Revised   Penal   Code   cannot   be   appreciated   as   an   aggravating
circumstance   against   the   appellant.   While   it   is   true   that   the
alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in
crimes against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a
relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only
taken  into  consideration  under   Article  15   of  the  Revised  Penal
Code   “when   the   offended   party   is   the   spouse,   ascendant,
descendant,   legitimate,   natural   or  adopted  brother  or   sister,   or
relative   by   affinity   in   the   same   degree   of   the   offender.”   The
relationship   of   uncle   and   niece   is   not   covered   by   any   of   the
relationships mentioned.59
Hence,   for   the   prosecution’s   failure   to   prove   the   age   of   the
victim by any means set forth in Pruna, and considering that the
relationship   of   uncle   and   niece   is   not   covered   by   any   of   the
relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
as  amended,   the  appellant  can  only   be  convicted  of   rape  in  its
aggravated   form,   the   imposable   penalty   for   which   is reclusion
perpetua to death.
There   being   no   modifying   circumstances   attendant   to   the
commission of the crimes, the appellant should be sentenced to
suffer reclusion   perpetua for   each   count   of   rape,   conformably   to
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof
other than the fact of the rape itself because it is assumed that
the  victim  has  suffered  moral   injuries   entitling   her  to  such   an
award.60 We   find   the   trial   court’s   award   of   P50,000   as   moral
damages to the victim in each rape to be in order.
However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity
to the victim in each case, the same being mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape.61 Thus, this Court awards the victim
the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape. In
addition to this, appellant is ordered to pay the victim P25,000 as
exemplary damages, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
use of a deadly weapon having attended the commission of the
crime.62
WHEREFORE,   the   Decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of
Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 to 97­388
is   AFFIRMED   with   MODIFICATION.   The   appellant   Feliciano
Ulit y Tampoy is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97­385 and 97­386, and in
each 
case,   is   hereby   sentenced   to   suffer   the   penalty   of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the victim, Lucelle Serrano, P50,000
as  moral   damages;   P50,000   as  civil   indemnity;   and  P25,000   as
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares­
G.R. No. 179448. June 26, 2013.*
CARLOS   L.   TANENGGEE,   petitioner, vs. PEOPLE   OF   THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional   Law;   Custodial   Interrogation;   Words   and
Phrases; Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner.―The   constitutional   proscription   against   the
admissibility   of   admission   or   confession   of   guilt   obtained   in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly
observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial
interrogation.   Custodial   interrogation   means   any   questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant   manner.   Indeed,   a   person   under   custodial
investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement   thereof,   viz.:   (1)   to   remain   silent,   (2)   to   have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,
and   (3)   to   be   informed   of   the   two   other   rights   above.   In   the
present   case,   while   it   is   undisputed   that   petitioner   gave   an
uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered
in   the   branch   he   managed,   the   following   are   clear:   (1)   the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but
merely   by   an   internal   affairs   manager   of   the   bank;   and,   (2)
petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant   manner   during   the   questioning.   Clearly,   petitioner
cannot  be  said  to  be  under   custodial   investigation  and   to  have
been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking
of his written statement.
Same;   Right   to   Counsel;   In   Remolona   v.   Civil   Service
Commission,   414  Phil.   590   (2001),  the  Supreme  Court   declared
that the right to counsel “applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.”―In Remolona   v.   Civil   Service   Commission,   362
SCRA 304 (2001), we declared that the right to counsel “applies
only  to  admissions made  in  a  criminal   investigation  but  not  to
those made in an administra­
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
640
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
40
Tanenggee vs. People
tive   investigation.”   Amplifying   further   on   the   matter,   the
Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service
Commission,   630   SCRA   202   (2010):   However,   it   must   be
remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill
of   Rights   is   meant   to   protect   a   suspect   during   custodial
investigation.   Thus,   the  exclusionary   rule  under   paragraph  (2),
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in
a   criminal   investigation   but   not   to   those   made   in   an
administrative investigation. Here, petitioner’s written statement
was   given   during   an   administrative   inquiry   conducted   by   his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly
committed   in   the   course   of   his   employment.   No   error   can
therefore   be   attributed   to   the   courts   below   in   admitting   in
evidence  and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written
statement   as   there   is   no   constitutional   impediment   to   its
admissibility.
Same; Evidence; Confessions; A confession [or admission] is
presumed   voluntary   until   the   contrary   is   proved   and   the
confessant   bears   the   burden   of   proving   the   contrary.―“[I]t   is
settled   that   a   confession   [or   admission]   is   presumed   voluntary
until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden
of   proving   the   contrary.”   Petitioner   failed   to   overcome   this
presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to
have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details
he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.
Same;  Same;  Extrajudicial Confessions; It is a settled rule
that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence   was   presented,   his   extrajudicial   statement   shall   be
considered   as   having   been   voluntarily   executed.―The   fact   that
petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges,
criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two
policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him
to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation.
It   is   a   settled   rule   that   where   the   defendant   did   not   present
evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative   action   against   his   supposed   intimidators,   where
no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial
statement   shall   be   considered   as   having   been   voluntarily
executed. Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he
641
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013
Tanenggee vs. People
did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon “just to get it over with” prop up the instant
Petition.   To   recall,   petitioner   has   a   masteral   degree   from   a
reputable educational institution and had been a bank manager
for   quite   a   number   of   years.   He   is   thus   expected   to   fully
understand   and   comprehend   the   significance   of   signing   an
instrument.   It  is  just   unfortunate  that  he  did  not  exercise  due
diligence   in   the   conduct   of   his   own   affairs.   He   can   therefore
expect no consideration for it.
Criminal Law; Forgery; Forgery is present when any writing
is  counterfeited  by the  signing  of   another’s   name  with   intent   to
defraud.―“Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited
by the signing of another’s name with intent to defraud.” It can be
established   by   comparing   the   alleged   false   signature   with   the
authentic or genuine  one. A finding of forgery  does not depend
entirely   on   the   testimonies   of   government   handwriting   experts
whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge
is   not   precluded   but   is   even   authorized   by   law   to   conduct   an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; A rule of long
standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great weight and
respect.―In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of
Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashier’s
checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination
conducted   by   the   National   Bureau   of   Investigation   (NBI)
Document Examiner. The trial court also made an independent
examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the
same,   reached   the   conclusion   that   the   signatures   of   Tan
641
appearing in the promissory notes are different from his genuine
signatures   appearing   in   his   Deposit   Account   Information   and
Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no
reason   to   disturb   the   above   findings   of   the   RTC   which   was
affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is
that   findings   of   a   trial   court,   when   affirmed   by   the   CA,   are
accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to deviate
from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed
conclusive and binding to this Court.642
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
42
Tanenggee vs. People
Same;   Evidence;   Witnesses;   The   prosecution   has   the
prerogative   to   choose   the   evidence   or   the   witnesses   it   wishes   to
present.―The   prosecution   has   the   prerogative   to   choose   the
evidence   or   the   witnesses   it   wishes   to   present.   It   has   the
discretion   as   to   how   it   should   present   its   case.   Moreover,   the
presumption   that   suppressed   evidence   is   unfavorable   does   not
apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense
and   the   prosecution.   In   the   present   case,   if   petitioner   believes
that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from
liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed
the subject documents, the most prudent thing to do is to utilize
him   as   his   witness.   Anyway,   petitioner   has   the   right   to   have
compulsory   process  to  secure  Tan’s   attendance   during   the  trial
pursuant   to   Article   III,   Section   14(2)   of   the   Constitution.   The
records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right.
In view of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to
the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Denials; Denials which are unsubstantiated
by   clear   and   convincing   evidence   are   negative   and   self­serving
evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary   value   over   the   testimony   of   credible   witnesses   who
testified on affirmative matters.―The Court is also not persuaded
by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
loans covered by the promissory  notes and  the cashier’s checks
were personally transacted by Tan against his approved letter of
credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature
thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not
supported   by   established   evidence.   “It   is   settled   that   denials
which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative and self­serving evidence. [They merit] no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.” The
chain   of   events   in   this   case,   from   the   preparation   of   the
promissory   notes  to  the  encashment  of  the  cashier’s   checks,   as
narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on petitioner’s
own   admission,   established   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   he
committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Same; Falsification of Commercial Documents; Falsification
of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code refers to falsification by a private
individual   or   a   public   officer   or   employee,   who   did   not   take
advantage of is official position, of public, private or commercial
document.―
643
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 643
Tanenggee vs. People
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to
falsification   by   a   private   individual   or   a   public   officer   or
employee, who did not take advantage of his official position, of
public,   private   or   commercial   document.   The   elements   of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the
RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer   or   employee   who   did   not   take   advantage   of   his   official
position;   (2)   that   he   committed   any   of   the   acts   of   falsification
enumerated   in   Article   171   of   the   RPC;   and,   (3)   that   the
falsification   was   committed   in   a   public,   official   or   commercial
document. All the above­mentioned elements were established in
this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts
of   falsification   consisted   in   petitioner’s   (1)   counterfeiting   or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2)
causing   it   to   appear   that   Tan   has   participated   in   an   act   or
proceeding   when   he   did   not   in   fact   so   participate. Third,   the
falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which
are   commercial   documents.   Commercial   documents   are,   in
general, documents or instruments which are “used by merchants
or   businessmen   to   promote   or   facilitate   trade   or   credit
transactions.”   Promissory   notes   facilitate   credit   transactions
while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of
money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check
necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person
whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check
and withdraw the amount indicated therein.
Same;   Complex   Crimes;   Words   and   Phrases;   A   complex
crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave
or  less grave  felonies  or to an offense as a necessary means for
committing   another.―When   the   offender   commits   on   a   public,
official   or   commercial   document   any   of   the   acts   of   falsification
enumerated   in   Article   171   as   a   necessary   means   to   commit
another crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes
form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two
classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single
act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or
to   an   offense   as   a   necessary   means   for   committing   another.
In Domingo   v.   People,   603   SCRA   488   (2009),   we   held:   The
falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a
means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document
is actually utilized to defraud another, the
644
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
44
Tanenggee vs. People
crime   of   falsification   has   already   been   consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In
other   words,   the   crime   of   falsification   has   already   existed.
Actually   utilizing   that   falsified   public,   official   or   commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused
by   the   commission   of   estafa,   not   by   the   falsification   of   the
document.   Therefore,   the   falsification   of   the   public,   official   or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.
Same;   Estafa;   Estafa   is   generally   committed   when   (a)   the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of
deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage
or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.―“Estafa is generally
committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a
third   party   suffered   damage   or   prejudice   capable   of   pecuniary
estimation.”  “[D]eceit  is  the   false  representation   of   a   matter   of
fact,   whether   by   words   or   conduct,   by   false   or   misleading
allegations,   or   by   concealment   of   that   which   should   have   been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that
he shall act upon it to his legal injury.” The elements of estafa
obtain  in  this case.   By  falsely  representing  that  Tan  requested
him to process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner
counterfeited   or   imitated   the   signature   of   Tan   in   the   cashier’s
checks.   Through   these,   petitioner   succeeded   in   withdrawing
money   from   the   bank.   Once   in   possession   of   the   amount,
petitioner   thereafter   invested   the   same   in   Eurocan   Future
Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take
hold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to his own
personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the damage and
prejudice of the bank in the amount of about P43 million.
Same;   Estafa   Through   Falsification   of   Commercial
Documents; Penalties; The crime of falsification was established to
be a necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case
should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same
to be applied in its maximum period.―Petitioner in this case is
found   liable   for   the  commission  of   the  complex   crime  of   estafa
through   falsification   of   commercial   document.   The   crime   of
falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit
estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the  Court).
645
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013
Tanenggee vs. People
Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in
its maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the
crime of estafa, being the more serious offense than falsification.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Gabionza, De Santos & Partners for petitioner.
   Perez,   Calima,   Maynigo   &   Roque   Law   Offices for   private
complainant Metrobank.
  Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the December 12, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with
modification   the   June   25,   1999   Decision 3 of   the   Regional   Trial
Court   (RTC)   of   Manila,   Branch   30,   in   Criminal   Case   Nos.   98­
163806­10 finding Carlos L. Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of
commercial   documents.   Likewise   questioned   is   the   CA’s
September   6,   2007   Resolution4 denying   petitioner’s   Motion   for
Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 18­103.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 206­230; penned by Associate Justice Monina
Arevalo­Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin (now members of this
3 Records   of   Criminal   Case   No.   98­163806,   pp.   396­405;
645 penned by Judge Senecio O. Ortile.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 277­279.
5 Id., at pp. 231­243.
6 Id., at pp. 247­257.
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
Factual Antecedents
On   March   27,   1998,   five   separate   Informations 7 for   estafa
through falsification of commercial documents were filed against
petitioner.   The   said   Informations   portray   the   same   mode   of
commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98­163806 but
differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory
notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz.:
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila,
Philippines,   the   said   accused,   being   then   a   private
individual,   did   then   and   there   wilfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously   defraud,   thru   falsification   of   commercial
document,   the   METROPOLITAN   BANK   &   TRUST   CO.
(METROBANK),   represented   by   its   Legal   officer,   Atty.
Ferdinand   R.   Aguirre,   in   the   following   manner:   herein
accused,   being   then   the   Manager   of   the   COMMERCIO
BRANCH OF METROBANK located at the New Divisoria
Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of
his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be
prepared   and   filled   up   METROBANK   Promissory   Note
Form   No. 366857 with   letters   and   figures   reading
“BD#083/97”   after   the   letters   reading   “PN”,   with   figures
reading “07.24.97” after the word “DATE”, with the amount
 of P16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other
words   and   figures   now   appearing   thereon,   typing   or
causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name
reading “ROMEO TAN”, feigning and forging or causing to
be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of
Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom
thereof purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged
signing   of   the   said   note   by   Romeo   Tan,   thereafter
preparing and filling up or causing to be
_______________
7 Records of Criminal Case No. 98­163806, pp. 2­3; records of
Criminal Case No. 98­163807, pp. 1­2; records of Criminal Case
No. 98­163808, pp. 1­2; records of Criminal Case No. 98­163809,
pp. 1­2; records of Criminal Case No. 98­163810, pp. 1­2.
647
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 647
Tanenggee vs. People
prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK
NO. CC   0000001531,   a   commercial   document,   with   date
reading   “July   24,   1997”,   with   the   name   reading   “Romeo
Tan”   as   payee,   and   with   the   sum   of P15,362,666.67 in
words and in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of
the   loan   being   obtained,   thereafter   affixing   his   own
signature   thereon,   and  [directing]  the  unsuspecting   bank
cashier   to   also   affix   his   signature   on   the   said   check,   as
authorized   signatories,   and   finally   affixing,   feigning   and
forging   or   causing   to   be   affixed,   feigned   and   forged four
(4) times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo
Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that Romeo
Tan  had   participated   in  the  [preparation],   execution  and
signing of the said  Promissory Note and the  signing and
endorsement   of   the   said   METROBANK   CASHIER’S
CHECK   and   that   he   obtained   a   loan
of P16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and
in fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not the
case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from
METROBANK,   neither   did   he   participate   in   the
preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory
note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK
CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused
to   prepare,   execute   and   affix   his   signature   in   the   said
documents; that once the said documents were forged and
falsified   in  the  manner   above set   forth,   the  said  accused
released,   obtained   and   received   from   the   METROBANK
the   sum   of P15,363,666.67 purportedly   representing   the
proceeds   of   the   said   loan,   which   amount,   once   in   his
possession,   with   intent   to   defraud,   he   misappropriated,
misapplied   and   converted   to   his   own   personal   use   and
benefit,   to   the   damage   and   prejudice   of   the   said
METROBANK   in   the   same   sum   of P15,363,666.67,
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
_______________
8 Records of Criminal Case No. 98­163806, pp. 2­3.
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the
petitioner after he refused to enter a plea. 9 The cases were then
consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the
CA are as follows:
During   the   pre­trial,   except   for   the   identity   of   the
accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that accused was
the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from
July   1997   to   December   1997,   no   other   stipulations   were
 entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits “A” to “L” and
sub­markings.
x x x x
The   prosecution   alleged   that   on   different   occasions,
appellant   caused   to   be   prepared   promissory   notes   and
cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client
of   the   bank   since   he   has   substantial   deposits   in   his
account,  in connection with the purported loans obtained
by the latter from the bank. Appellant approved and signed
the   cashier’s   check   as   branch   manager   of   Metrobank
Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to
be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the
proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that
the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He
handed   the   checks   to   the   Loans   clerk,   Maria   Dolores
Miranda,   for   encashment.   Once   said   documents   were
forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from
Metrobank   the   proceeds   of   the   alleged   loan   and
misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the
discovery   of   the   irregular   loans,   an   internal   audit   was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in
the   Head   Office   of   Metrobank,   during   which   appellant
signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit “N”) in the
form of questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
_______________
9 Id., at p. 73.
649
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013
Tanenggee vs. People
Valentino   Elevado,   a   member   of   the   Internal   Affairs
[D]epartment   of   Metrobank[,]   testified   that  he   conducted
and   interviewed   the   appellant   in   January   1998;   that   in
said  interview,   appellant  admitted   having   committed   the
allegations   in   the   Informations,   specifically   forging   the
promissory   notes;   that   the   proceeds   of   the   loan   were
secured or personally received by the appellant although it
should   be   the   client   of   the   bank   who   should   receive   the
same;   and   that   all   the   answers   of   the   appellant   were
contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit “N”).
Rosemarie   Tan   Apostol,   assistant   branch   manager,
testified that the signatures appearing on the promissory
notes   were   not   the   signatures   of   Romeo   Tan;   that   the
promissory notes did not bear her signature although it is
required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client
and   her   manager   accommodated   valued   clients;   that   she
signed   the   corresponding   checks   upon   instruction   of
appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took
the same [which] remained in his custody.
Eliodoro   M.   Constantino,   NBI   Supervisor   and   a
handwriting expert, testified that the signatures appearing
on  the  promissory   notes   and  specimen  signatures  on  the
signature card of Romeo Tan were not written by one and
the same person.
Maria   Dolores   Miranda,   a   Loans   Clerk   at   Metrobank
Commercio Branch, testified that several cashier’s checks
were   issued   in   favor   of   Romeo   Tan;   that   appellant
instructed   her   to   encash   the   same;   and   that   it   was
appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified
649 that   he   is   a   holder   of   a   Masters   degree   from   the   Asian
Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of
Metrobank   Commercio   Branch   from   1994   until   he   was
charged  in  1998  [with]  the above­named  offense.  He  was
with   Metrobank   for   nine   (9)   years   starting   as   assistant
 manager   of   Metrobank   Dasmariñas   Branch,   Binondo,
Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
operations of the [branch], solicited accounts and processed
loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan
as a client­depositor when he was the branch manager of
Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was
granted   a   credit   line   for   forty   million   pesos
([P]40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to
open   a   fictitious   account   for   his   personal   use   and   was
assisted   personally   by   appellant  in  his  dealings  with  the
bank.   In   the   middle   of   1997,   Tan   allegedly   opened   a
fictitious   account   and   used   the   name   Jose   Tan.   Such
practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the
bank to hide their finances due to rampant kidnappings or
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their
spouses.
According   to   appellant,   Tan   availed   of   his   standing
credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5) times on
the   following   dates:   1)   24   July   1997   for   sixteen   million
pesos ([P]16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million
pesos   ([P]6,000,000.00),   3)   12   November   1997   for   three
million   pesos   ([P]3,000,000.00),   4)   21   November   1997   for
sixteen   million   pesos   ([P]16,000,000,00),   5)   22   December
1997 for two million pesos ([P]2,000,000.00). On all these
occasions   except   the   loan   on   24   July   1997   when   Tan
personally   went   to   the   bank,   Tan   allegedly   gave   his
instructions   regarding   the   loan   through   the   telephone.
Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would order the
Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the
same through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which
was   located   across   the   [street].   The   latter   would   then
return   to   the   bank,   through   his   own   messenger,   the
promissory   notes  already   signed   by  him.   Upon  receipt  of
the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation
of   the   corresponding   cashier’s   check   representing   the
proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the
bank’s messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter would
return   the   same   through   his   own   messenger   already
endorsed   together   with   a   deposit   slip   under   Current
Account   No.   258­250133­7   of   Jose   Tan.   Only   Cashier’s
Check dated 21 November 1997 for six­
651
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 651
Tanenggee vs. People
teen million pesos ([P]16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and
deposited   for,   allegedly,   it   was   used   to   pay   the   loan
obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the
signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and
the   cashier’s   checks   were   the   genuine   signatures   of   Tan
although he never saw the latter affix them thereon.
In   the   middle   of   January   1998,   two   (2)   Metrobank
auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio Branch for
more   than   a   week.   Thereafter   or   on   26   January   1998,
appellant   was   asked   by   Elvira   Ong­Chan,   senior   vice
president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the
following day. When appellant arrived at the said office, he
was   surprised   that   there   were   seven   (7)   other   people
present:   two   (2)   senior   branch   officers,   two   (2)   bank
lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other in
plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs
unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado.
 Appellant   claimed   that   Elevado   asked   him   to   sign   a
paper   (Exhibit   “N”)   in   connection   with   the   audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign
but   was   not   offered   any   explanation;   that   he   was
intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that
he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he
was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised
of the purpose of the meeting; [and] that “just to get it over
with”   he   signed   the   paper   which   turned   out   to   be   a
confession.  After  the  said meeting,  appellant  went to see
Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter. He also
tried to phone him but to no avail.10
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After   the   joint   trial,   the   RTC   rendered   a   consolidated
Decision11 dated   June   25,   1999   finding   petitioner   guilty   of   the
crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:
_______________
10 CA Rollo, pp. 210­215.
11 Records of Criminal Case No. 98­163806, pp. 396­405.
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
WHEREFORE,   the   Court   finds   the   accused,   Carlos   Lo
Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa
thru  falsification  of  commercial   document[s]  charged  in  each  of
the five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer
the following penalties:
1. In   Criminal   Case   No.   98­163806[,]   to   suffer   the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision   mayor as   minimum   to   twenty   (20)   years
of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law.
2.    In   Criminal   Case   No.   98­163807[,]   to   suffer   the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision   mayor as   minimum   to   twenty   (20)   years
of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum   of   P16   Million   with   interest   [at]   18% per
annum counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.
3. In   Criminal   Case   No.   98­163808[,]   to   suffer   the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision   mayor as   minimum   to   twenty   (20)   years
of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum   of   P6   Million   with   interest   [at]   18% per
annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.
4. In   Criminal   Case   No.   98­163809[,]   to   suffer   the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision   mayor as   minimum   to   twenty   (20)   years
of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum   of   P2   Million   with   interest   [at]   18% per
annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.
5. In   Criminal   Case   No.   98­163810[,]   to   suffer   the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision   mayor as   minimum   to   twenty   (20)   years
of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the
sum   of   P3   Million   with   interest   [at]   18% per
annum [counted]   from   12   November   1997   until   fully
paid.653
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 653
 Tanenggee vs. People
Accused   shall   serve   the   said   penalties   imposed
successively.
As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code,
the maximum duration of the sentence imposed shall not
be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to
the   most   severe   of   the   penalties   imposed   upon   him   and
such   maximum   period   shall   in   no   case   exceed   forty   (40)
years.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner   appealed   the   judgment   of   conviction   to   the   CA
where   the   case   was   docketed   as   CA­G.R.   CR   No.   23653.   On
December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision 13affirming
with modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit
and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused­
appellant   Carlos   Lo   [Tanenggee]   on   five   counts
of estafathrough   falsification   of   commercial   documents   is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that  
Criminal   Case   No.   98­163806,   he   is   further   ordered   to
indemnify   Metrobank   the   sum   of   [P]16   Million   with
interest   [at]   18% per   annumcounted   from   24   July   1997
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration,
which the CA denied per its September 6, 2007 Resolution.16
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 404­405.
13 CA Rollo, pp. 206­230.
14 Id., at pp. 229­230.
15 Id., at p. 231.
16 Id., at pp. 277­279.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
Hence,   the   present   Petition   for   Review   on Certiorariunder
Rule   45   of   the   Rules   of   Court   raising   the   basic   issues   of:   (1)
whether   the   CA   erred   in   affirming   the   RTC’s   admission   in
evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based on its finding
that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation
when   the   same   was   taken;   and,   (2)   whether   the   essential
elements of estafa through falsification of commercial documents
were established by the prosecution.17
The Parties’ Arguments
While   he   admits   signing   a   written   statement, 18petitioner
refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was
only   forced   to   sign   the   same   without   reading   its   contents.   He
asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his
rights   under   Section   12,   Article   III   of   the   Constitution,
particularly   of   his   right  to   remain  silent,   right   to  counsel,   and
in
right   to   be   informed   of   the   first   two   rights.   Hence,   the   same
should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
On   the   other   hand,   respondent   People   of   the   Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that
petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the
constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to
inquiries   made   in   the   context   of   private   employment   but   is
applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus
prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
 _______________
17 Rollo, p. 671.
18 Exhibit “N,” records of Criminal Case No. 98­163806, pp.
189­194.
655
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 655
Tanenggee vs. People
Petitioner’s written statement is  20 414 Phil. 590, 599; 362 SCRA 304, 311­312 (2001).
admissible in evidence.
The   constitutional   proscription   against   the   admissibility   of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section
12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial   interrogation   means   any   questioning   initiated   by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner.   Indeed,   a   person   under   custodial   investigation   is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz.:   (1)   to   remain   silent,   (2)   to   have   competent   and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be
informed   of   the   two   other   rights   above. 19 In   the   present   case,
while   it   is   undisputed   that   petitioner   gave   an   uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch
he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated   by   a   law   enforcement   authority   but   merely   by   an
internal   affairs   manager   of   the   bank;   and,   (2)   petitioner   was
neither arrested nor restrained of his  liberty  in  any  significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said
to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of
the   constitutional   prerogative   during   the   taking   of   his   written
statement.  duress   and   intimidation,   an   already   prepared   typewritten
Moreover,   in Remolona   v.   Civil   Service   Commission,20 we
declared   that   the   right   to   counsel   “applies   only   to   admissions
made   in   a   criminal   investigation   but   not   to   those   made   in   an
administrative investigation.” Amplifying further on the mat­
_______________
19 People   v.   Bandula,   G.R.   No.   89223,   May   27,   1994,   232
SCRA 566, 574.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
ter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil
Service Commission:21
However,   it   must   be   remembered   that   the   right   to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary   rule   under   paragraph   (2),   Section   12   of   the
Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not  to those  made  in  an  administrative
investigation.22
Here,   petitioner’s   written   statement   was   given   during   an
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection
with   an   anomaly/irregularity   he   allegedly   committed   in   the
course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to
the   courts   below   in   admitting   in   evidence   and   in   giving   due
consideration   to   petitioner’s   written   statement   as   there   is   no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
Petitioner’s   written   statement   was   given 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner   attempts   to   convince   us   that   he   signed,   under
statement.   However,   his   claim   lacks   sustainable   basis   and   his
supposition   is   just   an   afterthought   for   there   is   nothing   in   the
records that would support his claim of duress and intimidation.
Moreover,   “[i]t   is  settled  that  a   confession   [or   admission]   is
presumed   voluntary   until   the   contrary   is   proved   and   the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.” 23Petitioner
failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written
statement   was   found   to   have   been   executed   freely   and
consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his state­
_______________
21 G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 202.
22 Id., at p. 207.
23 People v. Rapeza, 549 Phil. 378, 404; 520 SCRA 596, 626
(2007).
657
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 657
Tanenggee vs. People
ment were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of
the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its
voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit
N) of appellant is replete with details which could only be
supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity
and coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to
which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers
to   questions   14   and   24   were   even   initialed   by   him   to
indicate   his   conformity   to   the   corrections   made   therein.
The response to every question was fully informative, even
beyond   the   required   answers,   which   only   indicates   the
mind to be free from extraneous restraints.24
In People   v.   Muit,25 it   was   held   that   “[o]ne   of   the indiciaof
voluntariness   in   the   execution   of   [petitioner’s]   extrajudicial
[statement] is that [it] contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have
supplied without the knowledge and information given by [him].” 
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest
and   file   any   charges,   criminal   or   administrative,   against   the
investigator   and   the   two   policemen   present   who   allegedly
intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions
of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did
not   institute   any   criminal   or   administrative   action   against   his
supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented,   his   extrajudicial   statement   shall   be   considered   as
having been voluntarily executed.26
_______________
24 CA Rollo, p. 220.
25 G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 251, 268.
26 People  v.   Del  Rosario,   411   Phil.   676,  690­691;   359  SCRA
166, 178 (2001), citing People v. Santalani, 181 Phil. 481, 490; 93
SCRA
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
Neither   will   petitioner’s   assertion   that   he   did   not   read   the
contents   of   his   statement   before   affixing   his   signature   thereon
“just to get it over with” prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner   has   a   masteral   degree   from   a   reputable   educational
institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of
years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend
the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate
that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own
affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
 “Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the
signing   of   another’s   name   with   intent   to   defraud.” 27 It   can   be
established   by   comparing   the   alleged   false   signature   with   the
authentic or genuine  one. A finding of forgery  does not depend
entirely   on   the   testimonies   of   government   handwriting   experts
whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge
is   not   precluded   but   is   even   authorized   by   law 28 to   conduct   an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo
Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashier’s checks
was   not   anchored   solely   on   the   result   of   the   examination
conducted   by   the   National   Bureau   of   Investigation   (NBI)
Document Examiner. The trial court also made an independent
examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the
same, reached the conclusion that the signa­
_______________
315, 324­325 (1979), People v. Balane, 208 Phil. 537, 556; 123
SCRA   614,   635   (1983)   and People   v.   Villanueva,   213   Phil.   440,
453­454; 128 SCRA 488, 501 (1984).
27 Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164968,
July 3, 2009, 591 SCRA 562, 570.
28 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 22.
659
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013
Tanenggee vs. People
tures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different from
his   genuine   signatures   appearing   in   his   Deposit   Account
Information and Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank.
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC
which was  affirmed by  the CA.  A rule  of long  standing in  this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the
CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to
deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be
deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.
No   suppression   of   evidence   on   the   part 
of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented
Tan in court  to shed light on the matter.  His  non­presentation
created   the   presumption   that   his   testimony   if   given   would   be
adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends
that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.
Such   contention   is   likewise   untenable.   The   prosecution   has
the prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes
to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its
case.29 Moreover,   the   presumption   that   suppressed   evidence   is
unfavorable   does   not   apply   where   the   evidence   was   at   the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. 30 In the present
case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who
could exculpate him from liability by establishing that it was Tan
and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent
thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has
the right to have compul­
_______________
29 People   v.   Daco,   G.R.   No.   168166,   October   10,   2008,   568
SCRA 348, 361.
659 30 People   v.   Mazo,   419   Phil.   750,   768;   367   SCRA   462,   480
(2001),   citing People   v.   Padiernos,   161   Phil.   623,   632­633;   69
SCRA 484, 491 (1976).
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
sory process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant
to   Article   III,   Section   14(2) 31 of   the   Constitution.   The   records
show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view
of   these,   no   suppression   of   evidence   can   be   attributed   to   the
prosecution.
Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.
The   Court   is   also   not   persuaded   by   the   bare   and
uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by
the   promissory   notes   and   the   cashier’s   checks   were   personally
transacted by Tan against his approved letter of credit, although
he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again,
this allegation, as the  RTC aptly observed,  is not supported  by
established   evidence.   “It   is   settled   that   denials   which   are
unsubstantiated   by   clear   and   convincing   evidence   are   negative
and   self­serving   evidence.   [They   merit]   no   weight   in   law   and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible   witnesses   who   testified   on   affirmative   matters.” 32The
chain   of   events   in   this   case,   from   the   preparation   of   the
promissory   notes  to  the  encashment  of  the  cashier’s   checks,   as
narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on petitioner’s
own admission, established beyond
_______________
31 Section 14. (1) x x x
(2)    In   all   criminal   prosecutions,   the   accused   shall   be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and   the   production   of   evidence   in   his   behalf.   However,   after
arraignment,   trial   may   proceed  notwithstanding   the  absence   of
the   accused   provided   that   he   has   been   duly   notified   and   his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
32 People v. Sison, G.R. No. 172752, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA
156, 170.
661
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 661
Tanenggee vs. People
reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in
the Informations.
Elements   of   falsification   of   commercial
documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to
falsification   by   a   private   individual   or   a   public   officer   or
employee, who did not take advantage of his official position, of
public,   private   or   commercial   document.   The   elements   of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the
RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer   or   employee   who   did   not   take   advantage   of   his   official
position;   (2)   that   he   committed   any   of   the   acts   of   falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that
_______________
33 ART.    171. Falsification   by   public   officer,   employee;   or
notary   or   ecclesiastical   minister.—The   penalty   of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon
any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
 6. Making   any   alteration   or   intercalation   in   a   genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7.   Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting
to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists,
or   including   in   such   copy   a   statement   contrary   to,   or   different
from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating   any   instrument   or   note   relative   to   the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.  663
All   the   above­mentioned   elements   were   established   in   this
case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of
falsification   consisted   in   petitioner’s   (1)   counterfeiting   or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2)
causing   it   to   appear   that   Tan   has   participated   in   an   act   or
proceeding   when   he   did   not   in   fact   so   participate. Third,   the
falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which
are   commercial   documents.   Commercial   documents   are,   in
general, documents or instruments which are “used by merchants
or   businessmen   to   promote   or   facilitate   trade   or   credit
transactions.”34 Promissory   notes   facilitate   credit   transactions
while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of
money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s check
necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person
whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check
and withdraw the amount indicated therein.35
Falsification   as   a   necessary   means
to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial
document  any   of  the  acts  of  falsification  enumerated  in Article
171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa,
theft   or   malversation,   the   two   crimes   form   a   complex   crime.
Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex
crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act
_______________
x x x x
34 Monteverde v. People, 435  Phil. 906, 921; 387 SCRA 196,
210 (2002).
35 Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, October 12, 2009, 603
SCRA 488, 505­506.
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 663
Tanenggee vs. People
which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an
offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
The   falsification   of   a   public,   official,   or   commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa, because
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another,   the   crime   of   falsification   has   already   been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being
an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial   document.   In   other   words,   the   crime   of
falsification   has   already   existed.   Actually   utilizing   that
falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another   is   estafa.   But   the   damage   is   caused   by   the
commission   of   estafa,   not   by   the   falsification   of   the
document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official
or   commercial   document   is   only   a   necessary   means   to
commit estafa.
 “Estafa is   generally   committed   when   (a)   the   accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit,
and  (b) the  offended  party or  a  third party  suffered  damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.” 37“[D]eceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct,
by   false   or   misleading   allegations,   or   by   concealment   of   that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.” 38
The   elements   of estafa obtain   in   this   case.   By   falsely
representing that Tan requested him to process purported loans
on the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 506­507.
37 Eugenio v. People, G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008, 549
SCRA 433, 447.
38 Joson v. People, G.R. No. 178836, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA
649, 656 citing People v. Menil, Jr., 394 Phil. 433, 452; 340 SCRA
125, 142 (2000).
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
signature of Tan in the cashier’s checks. Through these, petitioner
succeeded   in   withdrawing   money   from   the   bank.   Once   in
possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same
in   Eurocan   Future   Commodities.   Clearly,   petitioner   employed
deceit in order to take hold of the money, misappropriated and
converted   it   to   his   own   personal   use   and   benefit,   and   these
resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of
about P43 million.
Taken  in   its  entirety,   the  proven   facts   show   that   petitioner
could   not   have   withdrawn   the   money   without   falsifying   the
questioned   documents.   The   falsification   was,   therefore,   a
necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification was already
consummated  even before  the falsified  documents  were  used to
defraud   the   bank.   The   conviction   of   petitioner   for   the   complex
crime of Estafathrough Falsification of Commercial Document by
the lower courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under
Article 172 of the RPC is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
The penalty in  estafa cases,  on the other hand,  as  provided
under   paragraph   1,   Article   315   of   the   RPC   is prision
correccional in   its   maximum   period   to prision   mayor in   its
minimum period39 if the amount defrauded is over P12,000.00 but
does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the
latter   sum,   the   same   paragraph   provides   the  imposition   of   the
penalty in its maximum period with an incremental pen­
_______________
39 Minimum:   4   years,   2   months   and   1   day   to   5   years,   5
months and 10 days
Medium: 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months
and 20 days
Maximum: 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
665
VOL. 699, JUNE 26, 2013 665
Tanenggee vs. People
alty of one year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 but in no case
shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the
complex   crime   of   estafa   through   falsification   of   commercial
document.   The   crime   of   falsification   was   established   to   be   a
necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the
Code,   the   penalty   to   be   imposed   in   such   case   should   be   that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in
its maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the
crime of estafa, being the more serious offense than falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from P2 million to
P16   million.   Said   amounts   being   in   excess   of   P22,000.00,   the
penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6)
years,   eight   (8)   months   and   twenty­one   (21)   days   to   eight   (8)
years   of prision   mayor,   adding   one   (1)   year   for   each   additional
P10,000.00.   Considering   the   amounts   involved,   the   additional
penalty   of   one   (1)   year   for   each   additional   P10,000.00   would
surely   exceed   the   maximum   limitation   provided   under   Article
315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed
the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the
trial   court   as   affirmed   by   the   CA   in   each   case   respecting   the
minimum   term   of   imprisonment.   The   trial   court   imposed   the
indeterminate   penalty   of   imprisonment   from   eight   (8)   years
of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful range.
Under   the   Indeterminate  Sentence   Law,   the   minimum  term   of
the penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower
to   that   prescribed   by   law   for   the   offense.   Since   the   penalty
prescribed   for   the estafa charge   against   petitioner   is prision
correccional maximum   to prision   mayor minimum,   the   penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods which has a duration of six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets
the minimum term
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanenggee vs. People
of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore sentenced in each
case to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2)   months   of prision   correccional as   minimum   to   twenty   (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE,   the   Petition   is DENIED.   The   Decision   and
Resolution   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   in   CA­G.R.   CR   No.   23653
dated   December   12,   2006   and   September   6,   2007,   respectively,
are   hereby AFFIRMED   with   the   MODIFICATION that   the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon
the   petitioner   should   be   four   (4)   years   and   two   (2)   months
of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Petition   denied,   judgment   and   resolution   affirmed   with
modification.
Notes.―Where   the   prosecution   has   sufficiently   established
that the respective extrajudicial confessions of the accused were
obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these
confessions   are   admissible,   and   are   evidence   of   a   high   order.
(People vs. Reyes, 581 SCRA 691 [2009])
The   roadside   questioning   of   a   motorist   does   not   fall   under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest.
(Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421 [2012])
――o0o―― 
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.

 
G.R. No. 190583. December 7, 2015.*
 
MARIA   PAZ   FRONTRERAS y ILAGAN,   petitioner, vs.PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal   Law;   Theft;   Qualified   Theft;   Theft   becomes
qualified   if   it   is   among   others,   committed   with   grave   abuse   of
confidence.—Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the   latter’s   consent.   Intent   to   gain   or animus   lucrandi is   an
internal   act  that  is  presumed   from   the  unlawful   taking   by   the
offender   of   the   thing   subject   of   asportation.   Theft   becomes
qualified   if   it   is   among   others,   committed   with   grave   abuse   of
confidence.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Elements   of   Qualified   Theft.—
Conviction   for   qualified   theft   committed   with   grave   abuse   of
confidence entails
_______________
*  THIRD DIVISION.
153
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 153
Frontreras vs. People
the   presence   of   all   the   following   elements:   1.   Taking   of
personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3.
That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be
done   without   the   owner’s   consent;   5.   That   it   be   accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force   upon   things;   6.   That   it   be   done   with   grave   abuse   of
confidence.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Intent   to   Gain;   Intent   to   gain   can   be
deduced from the petitioner’s possession of the pawn tickets which
were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their
respective   pledgors.—Intent   to   gain   can   be   deduced   from   the
petitioner’s possession of the foregoing pawn tickets which were
surrendered,   together   with   the   redemption   payment   by   their
respective   pledgors.   She   submitted   them   during   the   spot   audit
along   with   a   confession   letter   stating   that   portions   of   the
P1,250,800.00   missing   value   of   jewelry   were   actually   already
redeemed, thus: Yung iba pong item ay mga tubos na at nakatago
lang po ang papel. Nagsimula po ito noong buwan ng Hulyo. Dala
na rin po ng matinding pangangailangan sa pera. Ito lamang po
ang tangi kong mailalahad at iyan din po ang katotohanan. The
tenor  of  the  foregoing  declaration and the circumstances of the
petitioner at the time she wrote and signed it, all militate against
her   bare   allegation   that   she   was   threatened   with   an
administrative case unless she admits her transgression.
Same;   Same;   It   is   obvious   that   losing   one’s   job   in   an
administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty
by   confessing   to   a   crime   one   did   not   really   commit.   It   is   thus
implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing
at the mere prospect of losing his/her job.—The language of the
confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore
no   suspicious   circumstances   tending   to   cast   doubt   upon   its
integrity   and   it   was   replete   with   details   which   could   only   be
known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s
job   in   an   administrative   case   is   less   cumbersome   than   risking
one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It
is   thus   implausible   for   one   to   be   cajoled   into   confessing   to   a
wrongdoing   at   the   mere   prospect   of   losing   his/her   job.   The
petitioner’s   declarations   to   Talampas   show   that   she   fully
understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed
the   letter   even   before   Finolan  came   to   the  Old  Balara   branch,
thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an
administrative sanction.
 
 
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frontreras vs. People
Remedial Law; Evidence; Confessions; A confession, whether
judicial   or   extrajudicial,   if   voluntarily   and   freely   made,
constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that  no sane  person  or one of normal mind
will   deliberately   and   knowingly   confess   himself   to   be   the
perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.—
A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and
freely   made,   constitutes   evidence   of   a   high   order   since   it   is
supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one
of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to
be   the   perpetrator   of   a   crime,   unless   prompted   by   truth   and
conscience.   The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus
hinges   on   its   voluntariness,   a   condition   vividly   present   in   this
case.
Criminal   Law;   Qualified   Theft;   Penalties;   Since   the
petitioner committed qualified theft, the penalty shall be two (2)
degrees higher or reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods, which shall be imposed in its maximum period which has
a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years.—Since the petitioner committed qualified theft,
the penalty shall be two degrees higher or reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods, which shall be imposed in its
maximum period which has a range of seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Same;   Mitigating   Circumstances;   Analogous   to   Voluntary
Surrender;   Anent   the   appreciation   of   mitigating   circumstances,
the   Supreme   Court   (SC)   agrees   with   the   Regional   Trial   Court
(RTC)   that   the   petitioner’s   extrajudicial   confession   through   the
handwritten   letter   coupled   with   her   act   of   surrendering   the
redeemed pawn tickets and thereafter going to the police station
can be taken as an analogous circumstance of voluntary surrender
under Article 13, paragraph 10 in relation to paragraph 7 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Anent the appreciation of mitigating
circumstances,   the   Court   agrees   with   the   RTC   that   the
petitioner’s   extrajudicial   confession   through   the   handwritten
letter coupled with her act of surrendering the redeemed pawn
tickets and thereafter going to the police station can be taken as
an analogous circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article
13, paragraph 10 in relation to paragraph 7 of the RPC.
155
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 155
Frontreras vs. People
Same; Same; No Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong; The
petitioner   misappropriated   the   redemption   payments   under   her
custody   and   control   because   she   was   constrained   by   extreme
necessity for money.—Based on the same extrajudicial confession,
the petitioner is also entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong under paragraph 3 again in
relation to paragraph 10 both of Article 13. Based on her letter,
the  petitioner   misappropriated  the  redemption  payments  under
her custody and control because she was constrained by extreme
necessity for money. This is not to promote monetary crisis as an
excuse to commit a crime or to embolden a person entrusted with
funds or properties to feloniously access the same, but rather to
underscore the utmost consideration in the Court’s exercise of its
discretional power to impose penalties, that is — a guilty person
deserves   the   penalty   given   the   attendant   circumstances   and
commensurate   with   the   gravity   of   the   offense   committed.   From
such   standpoint,   the   Court   finds   it   prudent   that   unless   the
foregoing analogous mitigating circumstances are appreciated in
her favor, the petitioner will be penalized excessively.
Same;   Same;   Penalties;   When   there   are   two   (2)   or   more
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present,   the   court   shall   impose   the   penalty   next   lower   to   that
prescribed   by   law,   in   the   period   that   it   may   deem   applicable,
according   to   the   number   and   nature   of   such   circumstances.—A
reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is thus in order
pursuant to Article 64(5) of the RPC which states that when there
are   two   or   more   mitigating   circumstances   and   no   aggravating
circumstances   are   present,   the   court   shall   impose   the   penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem   applicable,   according   to   the   number   and   nature   of   such
circumstances. As such, the penalty next lower in degree which
is prisión mayor in its medium period should be imposed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Manuel R. Bustamante for petitioner.
 
 
 
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frontreras vs. People
  Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
REYES, J.:
 
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules   of   Court   seeking   to   reverse   and   set   aside   the
Decision2 dated   July   29,   2009   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   (CA)   in
C.A.­G.R.   CR   No.   30909,   which   affirmed   with   modification   the
Decision3 dated May 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon   City,   Branch   104,   in   Criminal   Case   No.   Q­99­84626,
convicting   Maria   Paz   Frontreras4 y Ilagan   (petitioner)   of   the
crime of Qualified Theft and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
 
The Facts
 
The petitioner was the Vault Custodian of the 685 Old Balara,
Tandang   Sora,   Quezon   City   branch   (Old   Balara   branch)   of
Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop (Cebuana). She was tasked to safe
keep all the pawned items and jewelry inside the branch vault.
Likewise   employed   in   the   same   branch   were   Teresita   Salazar
(Salazar) and Jeannelyn Carpon (Carpon) who served as Branch
Manager   and   District   Manager,   respectively.   Salazar   was
responsible for the overall operation of the Old Balara branch and
was also tasked to handle the appraisal of pawned items and the
recording   of   such   transactions.   Carpon,   on   the   other   hand,
supervised   the   overall   operations   of   the   branches   within   her
district   ensuring   that   they   are   operating   within   the   objectives,
procedures, and policies of Cebuana; she also
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 9­31.
2  Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Normandie   B.   Pizarro,   with
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this
Court) and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring; CA Rollo, pp. 136­155.
3  Issued  by   Judge  Thelma   A.   Ponferrada;   Records  (Vol.   II),
pp. 492­511.
4  Fronteras in other documents of the case.
 
 
157
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 157
Frontreras vs. People
monitored the district bank account and handled the appraisal
of pawned items and the recording of cash.5
On October 27, 1998, a surprise audit was conducted at the
Old Balara branch by Cebuana’s internal auditors, Mila Escartin
(Escartin) and Cynthia Talampas (Talampas). The audit revealed
that   156   pieces   of   jewelry,   with   an   aggregate   value   of
P1,250,800.00   were   missing.   A   cash   shortage   of   P848.60   was
likewise discovered. When the petitioner was asked to explain the
discrepancy,   she   told   Escartin   that   she   would   reduce   her
explanation into writing. The next day, an audit report was sent
to Marcelino Finolan (Finolan), Area Manager of Cebuana.6
Upon receipt of the audit report on October 28, 1998, Finolan
immediately  proceeded to the  Old  Balara  branch to  conduct an
investigation. He called Escartin and the petitioner for a meeting
during   which   the   petitioner   handed   over   several   pawn
tickets7 while Escartin gave him a handwritten letter made by the
petitioner,8 which reads:
Oct. 28, 1998
Sa Kinauukulan:
Sir, nagconduct po ng audit kahapon Oct. 27, 1998 dito sa Old
Balara I at nadiskubre po na maraming nawawalang item. Sir
ang lahat pong ito ay mga sanla namin. Ang involve po dito ay
ang appraiser — Tess Salazar, Dist. Manager — Jeannelyn Uy
Carpon, at ako po Vault Custodian — Ma. Paz Frontreras. Yong
iba pong item ay mga tubos na at nakatago lang po ang papel.
Nagsimula   po   ito   noong   buwan   ng   Hulyo.   Dala   na   rin   pong
matinding pangangailangan sa pera. Ito lamang po 
_______________
 5  CA Rollo, pp. 137­138.
6  Id., at p. 138.
7  TSN, December 13, 1999, pp. 10­13.
8  Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit “B.”
 
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frontreras vs. People
ang tangi kong mailalahad at iyan din po ang katotohanan.
Sumasainyo,
[signed]
Ma. Paz Fronteras9
 
On   May   10,   1999,   an   Information10 for   Qualified   Theft   was
filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That   on   or   about   the   period   comprised   from   June   6,
1998 up to October 17, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the   above   named   accused,   conspiring,   confederating   and
mutually helping one another, being then employed as the
Branch Manager, District Manager  and Vault  Custodian,
respectively   of   [CEBUANA]   represented   by   [FINOLAN]
located at Unit 1119 B & C 685 Tandang Sora, Old Balara,
Quezon   City   and   such   have   free   access   to   the   jewelries
pawned   to   [CEBUANA],   with   grave   abuse   of   confidence
reposed on them by their employer, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
did   then   and   there   wilfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously
take,   steal   and  carry   away   the  amount  of  P1,263,737.60,
Philippine   Currency,   representing   the   value   of   the
jewelries   and   redemption   payments,   belonging   to   said
[CEBUANA],   to   the   damage   and   prejudice   of   the   said
offended party in the amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Salazar   and   Carpon   entered   a   “Not   Guilty”   plea   upon
arraignment on July 13, 1999.12 The petitioner likewise pleaded
“Not Guilty” during her arraignment on August 9, 1999.13
_______________
9   Id.
10  Records (Vol. I), pp. 1­2.
11  Id.
12  Id., at p. 172.
13  Id., at p. 178.
 
 
159
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 159
Frontreras vs. People
Trial   thereafter   ensued.   According   to   prosecution   witness
Finolan, aside from receiving the petitioner’s handwritten letter
on October 28, 1998, the petitioner also gave him original pawn
tickets, the back portion of which showed the signatures of their
respective   pledgors.   These   signatures   mean   that   the   pledgors
have   already   redeemed   the   jewelry   covered   by   each   ticket   by
paying   the   amount   for   which   they   stand   as   a   security.   No
payments   were,   however,   recorded   nor   turned   over   to   the
pawnshop. The petitioner also intimated to him that Carpon took
some of such cash payments but failed to return the same.14 These
declarations   were   corroborated   by   the   testimonies   of   the   other
prosecution witnesses, Escartin15 and Talampas.16
 All   of   the   accused   took   the   witness   stand   and   proffered   in
defense   that   the   internal   audit   for   June,   July,   August   and
September of 1998 showed no report of anomaly or shortage; that
had   there   been   any   anomaly   or   shortage,   it   could   have   been
discovered thru the periodic audit being conducted by Cebuana;
they   were   not   holding   cash   and   there   was   no   complaint   from
clients regarding missing pawned items.17
Carpon   denied   liability   for   the   missing   jewelry   and
redemption   payments   and   averred   that   she   had   no   official
capacity   to   hold   cash   for   Cebuana   and   that   the   pawned   items
were   handled   by   the   vault  custodian.   When   Finolan   asked   her
about the missing items, she told him there was none. She was
brought to the police station and then submitted for inquest but
was thereafter released based on insufficiency of evidence.18
_______________
14  TSN, October 5, 1999, pp. 6­14, 16­17; TSN, December 13,
1999, pp. 4­6, 12­13, 16­17.
15  TSN, June 19, 2000, pp. 4­5, 13­14.
16  TSN, November 7, 2001, pp. 6­9, 12­13, 15­19, 23­24.
17  Records (Vol. II), p. 502.
18  Id., at pp. 502­505.
 
 
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frontreras vs. People
Salazar was absent on October 27 and 28, 1998 because she
was sick. She was surprised when she was informed that there
are   missing   pawned   items   at   the   Old   Balara   branch   because
Finolan conducts an audit twice a month.19
The petitioner claimed that Finolan and the auditor prodded
her to admit liability for the missing pawned items otherwise an
administrative   case   will   be   filed   against   her.   The   prospect   of
losing   her   job   frightened   her.   The   police   car   outside   the   Old
Balara branch also intimidated her. She was brought to the police
station and was eventually subjected to inquest proceedings but
was   released   for   lack   of   evidence.   She   denied   that   there   were
missing jewelries from the Old Balara branch. She stressed that
what   was   actually   missing   was   cash,   over   which   she   had   no
custodial duty.20
On   rebuttal,   Finolan   clarified   that   the   purpose   of   the
spot/surprise   audit   was   to   check   for   fake   or   over­appraised
pawned items and not to check for inventory anomalies. 21
 
The Ruling of the RTC 
 
In a Decision22 dated May 8, 2006, the RTC found sufficient
circumstantial   evidence   establishing   that   the   petitioner
perpetrated   the   offense.   The   petitioner   was   entrusted   with  the
position of vault custodian tasked with the responsibility for all
pawned  wares  and  to  make  sure  that  they   were  all   intact  and
safely kept in the vault. During the audit, there were open items
(unredeemed pawned items) which she could not locate.
She  had   in  her   possession  pawn  tickets  pertaining   to  items
which were already redeemed. She surrendered the pawn tickets
to Finolan, but without the corresponding redemption payment.
Her   position   of   vault   custodian   created   a   high   degree   of
confidence   between   her   and   the   pawnshop   which   she   gravely
abused.23 Based   on   the   appraisal   value   of   the   pieces   of   jewelry
covered by the pawn tickets surrendered by the petitioner during
audit but without the corresponding redemption
_______________
19  Id., at pp. 505­506.
20  Id., at pp. 507­508.
 21  Id., at p. 508. _______________
22  Id., at pp. 492­511.
  23  Id., at p. 509.
  24  Id., at pp. 509­511.
161 25  Id., at p. 511.
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 161 26  Id.
Frontreras vs. People 27  Id., at pp. 512­515.
payment,   Cebuana   suffered   injury   in   the   aggregate   sum   of 28  Id., at pp. 525­540.
P414,050.00.24  
The petitioner’s co­accused Salazar and Carpon were acquitted  
on the ground of reasonable doubt.25 Accordingly, the dispositive 162
portion of the RTC decision reads as follows: 162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 
Frontreras vs. People
WHEREFORE,   the   Court   finds   [the   petitioner]   guilty
it had earlier imposed to four (4) years, two (2) months and
beyond   reasonable   doubt   as   principal   of   the   crime   of
QUALIFIED THEFT defined and penalized in Article 310 one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum to ten (10) years
of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing her therefor to an and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum, explaining thus:
indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8)  
months   of reclusion   temporalas   minimum   to   twenty   (20) The Court is however inclined to reduce the penalty by
considering   the   surrender   of   the   pawn   tickets   as   a
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordering her
mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender
to pay to [Cebuana] the amount of P414,050.00.
under Article 13, paragraph 7, and the necessity mentioned
On   ground   of   reasonable   doubt,   judgment   is   hereby
in the handwritten explanation as analogous to incomplete
rendered acquitting accused [Salazar] and [Carpon] of the
justification under Article 11, paragraph 4, x x x in relation
offense charged against them.
to Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.29
SO ORDERED.26
 
Consequently,   the   previous   RTC   ruling   was   modified   as
The   petitioner   moved   for   reconsideration   arguing   for   her
follows:
acquittal   for   failure   of   the   prosecution   to   establish   her   guilt
 
beyond reasonable doubt. She also questioned the correctness of
WHEREFORE, the Court maintains the Decision dated
the penalty imposed by the RTC.27
May   8,   2006   finding   [the   petitioner]   guilty   beyond
In   an   Order28 dated   November   6,   2006,   the   RTC   denied
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of QUALIFIED
reconsideration on its finding of guilt but it reduced the penalty
 THEFT defined and penalized in Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, considering the two analogous mitigating
circumstances,   modifies   the   penalty   by   sentencing   her
therefor to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2)   months   and   one   (1)   day   of prisión   correccional as
minimum   to   ten   (10)   years   and   one   (1)   day   of prisión
mayor as   maximum,   and   ordering   her   to   pay   to
[CEBUANA] the amount of P414,050.00
SO ORDERED.30
Undeterred,  the petitioner  filed a  Motion for Amendment of
Modified Penalty31 arguing that the RTC erred in the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The RTC denied the motion
in an Order32 dated March 8, 2007.
_______________
29  Id., at p. 539.
30  Id., at p. 540.
31  Id., at pp. 541­543.
32  Id., at pp. 547­549.
 
 
163
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015
Frontreras vs. People
The Ruling of the CA  has daily and unsupervised access to the vault. Again,
 
The   petitioner   appealed   to   the   CA   contending   that   the
inferences   made   by   the   RTC   were   based   on   unfounded   facts,
since: (a) based on the audit reports for June, July, August and
September   of   1998,   there   were   no   anomalies   occurring   in
Cebuana; (b) no evidence was presented tending to prove that the
petitioner had the exclusive right to enter the pawnshop’s vault;
(c) no complaint from clients regarding the missing pawned items
was ever filed.33
The   CA   rejected   the   petitioner’s   arguments   and   upheld   the
RTC’s findings and conclusions. The CA observed that the audits
were actually not audit reports per se but rather reports made in
order to determine the profitability of the pawnshop. Even if they
are considered as regular audits, their nature will not preclude
the existence of fraud because they were conducted only for the
purpose   of   ascertaining   fake   items   or   if   there   was   over­
appraisal.34
Anent the petitioner’s insinuation that another person could
have accessed the vault, the CA held:
 
[O]nly   the   Vault   Custodian   and   the   Area   Manager,
Finolan in this case, knows the combination of the vault.
Finolan,   however,   has   no   keys   to   the   main   door   of   the
branch and likewise has no keys to the inner door/gate of
the   branch.   Furthermore,   nobody   is  allowed   to   enter   the
vault without the presence of the Vault Custodian. Thus,
there is simply no way for Finolan or any other person for
that matter, to have been able to remove items from the
vault. Considering the circumstances and the safe­guards
employed, it is absurd to impute the crime to any person
163 other than [the petitioner].
[The petitioner], on the other hand, as Vault Custodian,
_______________
33  CA Rollo, pp. 76­77.
34  Id., at pp. 145­146.
 
 
 164 35  Id., at pp. 146­147.
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 36  Id., at pp. 147­148.
Frontreras vs. People 37  Id., at pp. 152­154.
she  has the  duty  to ensure  the  safekeeping   of  all  the 38  Id., at pp. 136­155.
pawned items and jewelry inside the branch vault. If there
39  Id., at pp. 154­155.
was any loss, she should have immediately reported it to
 
her superiors. The fact that she failed to do so leads to a
 
reasonable   inference   that   she   is   the   author   of   the
165
loss.35 (Citations omitted and underscoring in the original)
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 165
 
The CA further held that the absence of any complaint from Frontreras vs. People
Cebuana’s clients  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  there  was  no The petitioner moved for reconsideration40 but her motion was
loss. In the pawnshop business, it is not uncommon for people to denied in the CA Resolution 41 dated December 18, 2009. Hence,
fail   to   redeem   the   valuables   they   pawned.   The   CA,   thus, the present petition42 arguing that the CA:
concluded that the prosecution was able to establish: (1) the fact  
of loss; (2) that the loss was due to an unlawful taking; and (3) I.
that   the   unlawful   taking   was   committed   with   grave   abuse   of COMMITTED   SERIOUS   ERROR   IN   NOT   FINDING
confidence.36 THAT   THE   TRIAL   COURT   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
The CA, however, disagreed with the RTC that the return by RENDERING JUDGMENT UPON CONJECTURES AND
the petitioner of the pawn tickets can be deemed as the mitigating SURMISES VIS­À­VIS THE   ABSENCE   OF
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The CA explained that the CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
petitioner did not surrender herself to a person in authority and II.
thus modified the penalty imposed on her to reclusion perpetua.37 COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY CONCLUDING
Accordingly,   the   CA   Decision38 dated   July   29,   2009   was THAT   THE   PETITIONER   HAS   TO   SUFFER   THE
disposed in this manner: PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.43
 
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of The Ruling of the Court 
merit   and   the   assailed   decision   is AFFIRMED   with  
MODIFICATION in that the [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer The Court denies the petition.  
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
SO ORDERED.39  (Emphasis in the original) without   violence   against,   or   intimidation   of   persons   nor   force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
_______________
latter’s consent.44 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal
act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of
the thing subject of asportation.45 Theft becomes qualified if it is
among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. 46
_______________
40  Id., at pp. 156­169.
41  Id., at pp. 223­227.
42  Rollo, pp. 9­31.
43  Id., at p. 14.
44  Revised Penal Code, Article 308, paragraph 1.
45  People   v.   Anabe,   644   Phil.   261,   282;   630   SCRA   10,   28
(2010).
46  Id.; Revised Penal Code, Article 310.
 
 
166
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frontreras vs. People
Conviction for qualified theft committed with grave abuse of
confidence entails the presence of all the following elements:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 47
On the other hand, the elements of corpus delicti in theft are:
(1) that the property was lost by the owner; and (2) that it was
lost by felonious taking.48
The evidence on record shows that the foregoing elements are
present   in   this   case.   The   prosecution   has   established   beyond
reasonable   doubt   that   the   petitioner   unlawfully   deprived
Cebuana   of   cash/money   when   she   took   out   pawned   items   and
released them to redeeming pledgors in exchange for redemption
payments which she, however, did not turnover to the pawnshop,
and instead pocketed them for her own gain. She gravely abused
the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault
custodian when she exploited her exclusive and unlimited access
to   the   vault   to   facilitate   the   unlawful   taking.   Her   position
entailed a high degree of confidence reposed by Cebuana as she
had been granted daily unsupervised access to the vault. 49 Also,
the petitioner knew
_______________
47  People   v.   Mirto,   675   Phil.   895,   906;   659   SCRA   796,   807
(2011).
48  Gan v. People, 550 Phil. 133, 161­162; 521 SCRA 550, 580
(2007).
49  CA Rollo, p. 147.
 
 
167
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 167
Frontreras vs. People
the   combinations   of   the   branch’s   vault 50 and   nobody   was
allowed to enter the vault without her presence.51
The   petitioner   gravely   abused   such   relation   of   trust   and
confidence   when   she   accessed   and   released   the   pawned   items
under  her  custody,   received   the  payments  for   their   redemption letter stating that portions of the P1,250,800.00 missing value of
but failed to record such redemption and remit the payments to jewelry were actually already redeemed, thus:
the   cash   collections   of   Cebuana.   Without   the   authority   and  
consent of her employer, she repeatedly took and appropriated for Yung iba pong item ay mga tubos na at nakatago lang
herself the redemption payments paid for the pawned items with po   ang   papel.   Nagsimula   po   ito   noong   buwan   ng   Hulyo.
the aggregate appraised value of P414,050.00,52 viz.: Dala na rin po ng matinding pangangailangan sa pera. Ito
 
lamang po ang tangi kong mailalahad at iyan din po ang
_______________
katotohanan.53
50  TSN, February 7, 2000, pp. 3­4.  
The tenor of the foregoing declaration and the circumstances
51  Id., at p. 10.
of the petitioner at the time she wrote and signed it, all militate
52  Folder of Exhibits, Exhibits "D"­"D­61."
against   her   bare   allegation   that   she   was   threatened   with   an
 
administrative case unless she admits her transgression.
 
The   petitioner   wrote   and   signed   the   confession   letter
168
spontaneously.   When   Escartin   asked   her   if   there   are   any
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
problems in the Old Balara branch, the petitioner answered that
Frontreras vs. People she   will   write   down   her   explanation   and   will   submit   it   to
044867 4,000.00 042712 22,000.00 Escartin.54 The   petitioner   also   told   Talampas   that   if   she   will
044903 3,000.00 042576 13,000.00 escape, she will just be afraid that someone will go after her
044714 2,500.00 043394 10,000.00
_______________
044938 2,300.00 043395 16,000.00
042988 2,500.00 042147 7,500.00
045029 2,300.00 041972 15,000.00 53  Id., at Exhibit “B.”
043858 5,500.00 044060 12,000.00 54  TSN, June 19, 2000, pp. 13­14.
043766 3,500.00 043027 7,000.00  
043641 1,750.00 042987 2,500.00  
045068 2,000.00 043035 5,200.00 169
  VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 169
  Frontreras vs. People
Intent to gain can be deduced from the petitioner’s possession and that she will just face the consequences.55 Talampas then
of the foregoing pawn tickets which were surrendered, together saw   the  petitioner   make   and   sign   the   confession   letter. 56 When
with the redemption payment by  their respective pledgors.  She Finolan went to the Old Balara branch for further investigation,
submitted   them   during   the   spot   audit   along   with   a   confession Escartin handed her the confession letter from the petitioner. 57
 The   language   of   the   confession   letter   was   straightforward, 170
coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending to 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which Frontreras vs. People
could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that 1. On October 27, 1998, Escartin and Talampas conducted a
losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than spot audit at the Old Balara branch of Cebuana.59
risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really 2.   Escartin   counterchecked   the   computer   list   of   all   pawned
commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing
items   not   yet   redeemed vis­à­vis the   actual   stocks   in   the   vault
to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The
and discovered that there were missing items. 60
petitioner’s   declarations   to   Talampas   show   that   she   fully
3. Escartin asked the petitioner if there are any problems in
understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed
the   branch.   The  latter   answered   that   she  will   just  write  down
the   letter   even   before   Finolan  came   to   the  Old  Balara   branch,
everything   that   happened   and   hand   over   her   explanation   to
thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an
Escartin.61
administrative sanction.
4.   After   receiving   the   audit   report   on   October   28,   1998,
A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily
Finolan  proceeded   to   the  Old  Balara   branch   and   conducted   an
and freely made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is
investigation.62
supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one
5. When Talampas reported for work on October 28, 1998, the
of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to
petitioner   told   her   that   she   thought   about   what   happened   and
be   the   perpetrator   of   a   crime,   unless   prompted   by   truth   and
that she is afraid that someone will be going after her if she will
conscience.   The   admissibility   and   validity   of   a   confession,   thus
run away and so she has to face the consequences.63
hinges on its voluntariness,58 a condition vividly present in this
6.   Talampas   thereafter   saw   the   petitioner   write   and   sign   a
case.
confession letter.64
The petitioner’s extrajudicial written confession coupled with
7. The letter was given to Finolan when he went to the Old
the   following   circumstantial   evidence   all   point   to   her   as   the
Balara branch to investigate.65
perpetrator of the unlawful taking:
8.   In   the   letter,   the   petitioner   admitted   that   some   of   the
_______________
missing   pawned   items   were   already   redeemed.   She   also  stated
that she had “extreme need for money.”66
55  TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 17.
_______________
56  Id., at pp. 18­19.
57  TSN, October 5, 1999, pp. 9­10. 59  TSN, June 19, 2000, pp. 5­6.
58  People v. Satorre, 456 Phil. 98, 107; 408 SCRA 642, 647 60  Id., at p. 11.
(2003).
61  Id., at pp. 13­14.
 
62  TSN, October 5, 1999, pp. 8­9.
 
 63  TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 17. latter   amount   the   penalty   shall   be   the   maximum
64  Id., at pp. 18­19. period of the one prescribed in this 
65  TSN, October 5, 1999, p. 10. _______________
66  CA Rollo, p. 224.
  67  TSN, October 5, 1999, p. 17; TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 24.
  68  TSN, December 13, 1999, pp. 12­13.
171 69  Id., at p. 14.
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 171 70  Id., at p. 15.
Frontreras vs. People 71  Art. 310. Qualified   theft.—The   crime   of   theft   shall   be
9. The petitioner then handed over to Finolan original pawn punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
tickets.67 respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed
10.   Finolan   observed   that   the   pawn   tickets   were   already by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
redeemed   or   paid   by   their   respective   pledgors   as   evidenced   by property  stolen  is  motor  vehicle,   mail   matter   or  large  cattle  or
their signatures of validation.68 consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
11. There are no records of redemption transactions under the fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on
said pawn tickets.69 the   occasion   of   fire,   earthquake,   typhoon,   volcanic   eruption,   or
12. The petitioner did not convey any redemption payment to any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Finolan or to the pawnshop.70  
   
Penalty  172
  172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Under   Article   31071 of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   (RPC),   the Frontreras vs. People
penalty   for   qualified   theft   is   two   degrees   higher   than   that paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
specified in Article 309 which states: thousand   pesos,   but   the  total  of   the  penalty  which
  may   be   imposed   shall   not   exceed   twenty   years.   In
Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty of  theft shall such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
be punished by: which   may   be   imposed   and   for   the   purpose   of   the   other
1. The   penalty   of prisión   mayor in   its  minimum provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 x x x x (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the  
 Considering   that   the   value   involved   in   the   present   case
exceeds   P22,000.00,   the   basic   penalty   is prisión   mayor in   its
minimum and medium periods.
Anent   the   graduation   of   penalty   for   qualified   theft   and   the
imposition   of   incremental   penalty   for   the   amount   in   excess   of
P22,000.00,   the   ruling   espoused   in Ringor   v.   People72 is   hereby
adopted.
Since   the   petitioner   committed   qualified   theft,   the   penalty
shall be two degrees higher or reclusion temporal in its medium
and maximum periods,73 which shall be imposed in its maximum
period which has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.74
The   incremental   penalty   shall   then   be   determined   by
deducting P22,000.00 from the amount involved or P414,050.00.
This will yield the amount of P392,050.00 which would then be
divided   by   P10,000.00,   disregarding   any   amount   less   than
P10,000.00.75 The end result is that 39 years should be added to
the   principal   penalty.   The   total   imposable   penalty,   however,
should not exceed 20 years and as such, the maximum imposable
penalty in this case is 20 years of reclusion temporal.76
_______________
72  Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013, 712
SCRA 622.
73  Id., at p. 634.
74  Revised Penal Code, Article 76.
75  See People   v.   Ocden,   665   Phil.   268,   294;   650   SCRA   124,
151 (2011).
76  Ringor v. People, supra at p. 634.
173
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 173
Frontreras vs. People
Anent the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, the Court
agrees with the RTC that the petitioner’s extrajudicial confession
through   the   handwritten   letter   coupled   with   her   act   of
surrendering the redeemed pawn tickets and thereafter going to
the police station can be taken as an analogous circumstance of
voluntary surrender under Article 13, paragraph 10 77 in relation
to paragraph 778 of the RPC.
Based on the same extrajudicial confession, the petitioner is
also   entitled   to   the   mitigating   circumstance   of   no   intention   to
commit so grave a wrong under paragraph 379 again in relation to
paragraph   10   both   of   Article   13.   Based   on   her   letter,   the
petitioner misappropriated  the redemption payments  under her
custody   and   control   because   she   was   constrained   by   extreme
necessity for money.
This is not to promote monetary crisis as an excuse to commit
a   crime   or   to   embolden   a   person   entrusted   with   funds   or
properties   to   feloniously   access   the   same,   but   rather   to
underscore the utmost consideration in the Court’s exercise of its
discretional power to impose penalties, that is — a guilty person
deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances 
_______________
77  Art. 13. Mitigating   circumstances.—The   following   are
mitigating circumstances: x x x x
10. And finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature
and analogous to those above mentioned.
78  Art. 13. Mitigating   circumstances.—The   following   are
mitigating circumstances:
x x x x
 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a
person   in   authority   or   his   agents,   or   that   he   had   voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution.
79  Art. 13. Mitigating   circumstances.—The   following   are
mitigating circumstances:
x x x x
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frontreras vs. People
and   commensurate   with   the   gravity   of   the   offense
committed.80 From   such   standpoint,   the   Court   finds   it   prudent
that unless the foregoing analogous mitigating circumstances are
appreciated   in   her   favor,   the   petitioner   will   be   penalized
excessively.
A reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is thus in
order pursuant to Article 64(5) of the RPC which states that when
there   are   two   or   more   mitigating   circumstances   and   no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it
may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances. As such, the penalty next lower in degree which
is prisión mayor in its medium period should be imposed.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
shall be taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within
the full range of prisión correccional or six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years, while the indeterminate maximum penalty
shall be fixed anywhere within the range of prisión mayor in its
medium period or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
The   penalty   imposed   by   the   CA   should   thus   be   modified   to
conform to the foregoing findings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July
29,   2009   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   in   C.A.­G.R.   CR   No.   30909
is AFFIRMED   with   MODIFICATION as   to   the   imposed
penalty such that the petitioner, Ma. Paz Frontreras y Ilagan, is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
two   (2)   months   and   one   (1)   day   of prisión
correccional as minimum to   ten   (10)   years   of prisión
mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
80  Perez   v.   People,   568   Phil.   491,   524;   544   SCRA   532,   568
(2008).
 
 
175
VOL. 776, DECEMBER 7, 2015 175
Frontreras vs. People
Velasco,   Jr.   (Chairperson),   Peralta,   Del
Castillo** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—A   confession   [or   admission]   is   presumed   voluntary
until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden
of   proving   the   contrary.   (Tanenggee   vs.   People, 699   SCRA 639
[2013])
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft,
“must   be   the   result   of   the   relation   by   reason   of   dependence,
guardianship,   or   vigilance,   between   the   appellant   and   the
offended   party   that   might   create   a   high   degree   of   confidence
between   them   which   the   appellant   abused.”   (People   vs.
Cahilig, 731 SCRA 414 [2014])
 
 
——o0o——
_______________

**  Designated additional member per Raffle dated January 5,
2015 vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved. VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  715 
People vs. Santos
G.R. Nos. 100225­26. May 11, 1993.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­appellee, vs.RAUL
SANTOS   y   NARCISO,   MARIO   MORALES   y   BACANI,   PETER
DOE and RICHARD DOE, accused. RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO,
accused­appellant.
Criminal   Procedure; Right   to   Counsel; There   exists   no   real
necessity to afford services of counsel to a suspect of a crime in the
course   of   a   police   line­up   provided   that   said   suspect   is   not
subjected to any investigation or interrogation in order to extract
admission or confession without the assistance of counsel.—Since
appellant   Santos   then   had   no   lawyer   present   nor   was   one
provided, his counsel argues, Santos’s identification was “tainted”
and   inadmissible.   The   argument   is   creative,   but   has   no   legal
basis.  In Gamboa v. Cruz, the Court said that there  is “no real
need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line­up,” a
declaration   reiterated   in People   v.   Loveria. The   customary
practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated or
interrogated   in   the   course   of   a   police   line­up   and   who   gives   a
statement   to   the   police,   rather   than   the   accused   who   is   not
questioned at all at that stage. The Court is aware of the caveat
in Gamboa. But there is nothing in the record of this case which
shows that in the course of the line­up, the police investigators
sought   to   extract   any   admission   or   confession   from   appellant
Santos.   The   investigators   did   not   in   fact   interrogate   appellant
Santos during  the line­up  and  he remained silent after he had
been identified by Bautista and Bohol.
Evidence; Similar   Acts   as   Evidence; An   affidavit   of   a
prosecution witness in a case, other than the instant one, shall be
admissible   in   evidence   for   the   limited   purpose   of   proving
knowledge, plan or scheme employed by the accused and failure to
seasonably object to its admission is deemed waiver of the hearsay
character  of said  evidence;  Case  at  bar.—Appellant  Santos  now
complains   that   the   affidavit   of   Ronaldo   Guerrero   was   hearsay
evidence,   considering   that   the   prosecution   did   not   present
Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial. We consider that
the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the
Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving knowledge
or   plan   or   scheme,   and   more   specifically,   that   appellant   knew
that the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Malabon
was   a   good   place   to   ambush   a   vehicle   and   its   passengers.
Appellant also had 
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
716
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  crimes   of   murder   with   the   use   of   unlicensed   firearms   and
16 
People vs. Santos
waived   the   hearsay   character   of   this   evidence   by   failure
seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit; it is too late
in   that   day   to   raise   the   hearsay   rule   in   the   appellant’s
memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented their
respective cases and had made their respective offers of evidence.
Same; Defense of Alibi; Defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the   positive   identification   of   the   accused   by   credible   witnesses,
especially where the witness is the victim­complainant himself.—
In respect of the weight properly given to a defense of alibi, the
Court has, times beyond numbering, ruled that such defense is
weak most especially when established exclusively or mainly by
the accused himself and his relatives and not by independent and
credible persons, and that such a defense will not prevail over the
positive   identification   made   by   credible   witnesses,   especially
where the witness is the victim­complainant himself.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of 
Malabon, Br. 72.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Valmonte Law Offices for accused­appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Raul   N.   Santos   appeals   from   a   judgment   of   the   trial   court
convicting him of murder and frustrated murder.
On 26 October 1989, appellant Santos was charged with the
frustrated murder, under the following informations:
“In Crim. Case No. 8517­MN:1
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1989 in Navotas, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above­named   accused,   conspiring,   confederating   together   and
mutually helping with one another, without any justifiable cause,
with   deliberate   intent   to   kill,   treachery   and   evident
premeditation,   did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and
feloniously shoot GLICERIO CUPCUPIN y  of the informations on 4 April 1990 so as to insert the name of one
_______________
1
 Records, p. 73.
717
VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  717
People vs. Santos
REYES with the use of unlicensed firearms of unknown caliber,
thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which
caused his death at the Tondo Medical Center, Manila.
Contrary to Law.”
“In Crim. Case No. 8518­MN:2
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1989 in Navotas, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above­named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
with one another, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation did, then and
there,   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   shoot   ALBERTO
BAUTISTA Y CAYETANO, with the use of firearms of unknown
caliber,   thereby   inflicting   upon   the   latter   serious   physical
injuries,   thus  performing   all  the  acts  of  execution  which  would
have produced the crime of MURDER as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the herein accused, that is due to the timely, able and
efficient medical attendance rendered to the victim at the Tondo
Medical Center, Manila.
Contrary to Law.”
Three (3) other persons were charged in the same informations.
Upon   request   of   the   City   Prosecutor   who   had   conducted   a   re­
investigation of the cases, the trial court ordered the amendment
Mario Morales, in lieu of John Doe, as a co­accused. Morales for
whom a warrant of arrest was issued, is, however, still at large.
The identities of the two (2) other accused remain unknown.
At arraignment, Raul Santos entered a plea of not guilty. A
joint trial of the two (2) criminal cases ensued, culminating in a
judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion of this judgment
reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   judgment   is   hereby
rendered finding accused Raul  Santos  guilty beyond  reasonable
doubt of the offenses charged against him in these cases. He is
accordingly sentenced to two (2) prison terms as follows:
1. 1)In Crim. Case No. 8517­MN for Murder, to life imprison
_______________
2
 Id. at 71.
718
718  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Santos
1. ment, the death penalty which should have been imposed
in   this   case   having   been   abolished   under   the   present
Constitution;
 2. 2)In Crim. Case No. 8518­MN for Frustrated Murder, to a
prison   term   ranging   from   SIX   (6)   YEARS   of prision
correccional,   as   minimum to   TWELVE   (12)   YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused   Santos   is   also   ordered   to   proportionately   pay   the
heirs of Glicerio Cupcupin the sum of P30,000.00 for the loss of
the   latter’s   life   and   to   pay   said   heirs,   proportionately   also,
P100,000.00 by way of indemnification for the expenses incurred
in connection with Cupcupin’s death.
Costs against accused in both cases.
SO ORDERED.”3
The relevant facts as found by the trial court are the following:
“Glicerio   Cupcupin  and   Alberto   Bautista   were   riding   on   a   jeep
driven by the former on May 26, 1989. At around 11:45 o’clock in
the morning of said date, the jeep was at a stop at the corner of
Estrella and Yangco Streets in Navotas, Metro Manila and was
about   to   make   a   right   turn   when   two   (2)   persons   armed   with
short   guns   approached   the   jeep   and   fired   at   Cupcupin   and
Bautista. Cupcupin was hit several times in different parts of his
body and he died as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds he
sustained (Exh.  V).  Bautista sustained gunshot wounds,  one  at
the left thigh, one in the lower abdomen, one at the back of the
right foot and another at the back of the body. Bautista was able
to run away even as he was being fired upon. He took cover in a
store. The one firing the gun at him was a man he later identified
to be accused Raul Santos. The other one which he saw similarly
firing his gun was aiming at Cupcupin. He identified the man to
be  one  Mario  Morales.   He   added   that  he   saw   Cupcupin   hit   by
gunshots at the left side of the body near the waist which made
Cupcupin   fall­off   the   steering   wheel.   After   running   away,
Bautista  could not  remember anymore what else happened. He
could not say if there were other persons who shot at him and
Cupcupin.   After   hearing   a   shout   that   the   ambushers   were   no
longer around, he learned that a woman bystander was hit and
was   boarded   on   a   jeep   to   be   brought   to   the   hospital.   He   was
boarded   on   said   jeep   too   but   later   transferred   to   a   tricycle
somewhere   at   Bayanbayanan.   Bautista   was   brought   to   the
Martinez   General   Hospital   and   to  the  Mary   Johnston   Hospital
where he was treated. Bautista was operated on (Exhs. B, B­1, C,
D   and   E).   Upon   the   apprehension   of   accused   Santos,   Bautista
went to the police headquarters where he 
_______________
3
 Id., p. 191; underscoring in the original.
719
VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  719 
People vs. Santos
picked out from a line­up accused Raul Santos. In another line­
up,   he   also   picked   out   accused   Morales.   Bautista   also   gave   a
sworn statement narrating the shooting incident (Exh. F).
Police Aide Victorino Bohol was on duty and directing traffic
at the corner of Plaza Rizal and Estrella Streets when he heard
gunshots.   When  he  looked  around  he   saw   two  (2)  persons  who
were holding Cal. 45 pistols firing at persons on board a stainless
steel owner jeep. Bohol was not able to approach the men firing
their guns because he was not provided with a gun. What he did
was   to  run   to  headquarters   to  call   for   policemen   and  when  he
returned to the scene of the shooting he learned that one of the
passengers of the jeep was killed. He learned also that the slain
man was Glicerio Cupcupin and that his companion was Alberto
Bautista alias “Tiwa”. Bohol also added that there were two (2)
other persons who were also firing at the passengers of the jeep
although he did not recognize these two (2) other persons. After
the arrest of accused Santos, Bohol was called to the police station
and   through   a   one­way   mirror   he  was   able  to   identify   accused
Santos  as  one of the persons who shot Cupcupin  and Bautista.
Bohol also gave a sworn statement to the police (Exh. A).
On cross­examination, Bohol admitted that at the time of the
shooting he was at the Jim Bread Store talking to someone. When
he heard gunshots he stood up at once and saw four (4) men firing
their   guns   at   the   same   time   at   the   jeep.   He   added   that   the
accused   was   arrested   some   months   later   in   connection   with
another   shooting   incident   wherein   Santos   was   suspected   of
involvement. He confirmed that Bautista was being shot at while
running away from the place.
Cpl. Sabino Patood of the Navotas Police declared that he was
investigating a shooting incident which resulted in the death of
one Abdul Rosas wherein the suspect was accused Santos when
he was tipped by police intelligence operatives that Santos was
involved   in   the   ambush   of   Cupcupin.   This   made   him   conduct
further   investigation  by   calling   for   Bautista   and   Bohol.   Patood
also   interviewed   Santos   who   admitted   his   participation   in   the
ambush   to   him.   He   did   not   take   any   written   statement   from
accused   Santos   because  there   was  no  counsel   available  at  that
time   and   because   Santos   was   not   willing   to   give   any   written
statement.
Dr.   Maximo   Reyes   of   the   NBI   Medico   Legal   Division
performed   an   autopsy   on   the   cadaver   of   victim   Cupcupin   and
found out that the latter sustained nineteen (19) gunshot wounds
in   different   parts   of   his   body.   The   cause   of   death   was   severe
hemorrhage   secondary   to   multiple   gunshot   wounds.   Dr.   Reyes
added  that  the  assailants  were  probably  at  the  left  side  of  the
victim as they were shooting at the latter with the victim possibly
seated at the time he was shot and hit.
The victim’s wife Lucia Cupcupin declared that P100,000.00
was  witnesses,   the   victim   Bautista   and   Police   Aide   Bohol,   testified
720
720  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Santos
spent   in   connection   with   the   death   of   her   husband   who   was
earning   P5,000.00   a   month   as   a   businessman   dealing   in   junk
materials and marble.4
The   trial   court   found   that   the   accused   Raul   Santos   had   been
identified   positively   by   the   surviving   victim   of   the   shooting
incident—Alberto   Bautista,   and   by   the   Traffic   Aide   who   had
witnessed   the   execution   of   the   crime—Victorino   Bohol.   The
defense   of   alibi   offered   by   the   accused   and   supported   by   the
testimonies   of  a  friend  and   a   sister,   was   rejected   as  weak  and
unavailing. As noted, a judgment of conviction followed.
In   his   appeal,   Raul   Santos   assigns   the   following   as   errors
committed by the trial court:
1. “ithe   lower   court   erred   in   holding   that   accused’s
identification   by   prosecution’s   witnesses   was   ‘positive’
and, therefore it erred when it rejected accused’s defense
of alibi.
2. “iithe lower court erred in considering one of the two cases
(not   the   instant   ones)   filed   against   the   accused   in
holding also for his guilt.
3. “iiithe lower court erred in convicting the accused.”5
In respect of the first assigned error, appellant Santos contends
that the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses do not
conform   with   the   “knowledge   and   common   experience   of
mankind.”   Appellant   argues   that   the   two   (2)   prosecution
that they saw the accused for the first time in their lives when the
crime was committed and yet identified him as one of the gunmen
five (5) months later in the Police Headquarters in Navotas. The
ambuscade and the slaying of Glicerio Cupcupin happened on 26
May 1989; appellant Santos was identified at the police station on
25   October   1989.   Appellant  argues   that   this   lapse   of   time  was
unreasonable,   which,   when   coupled   with   the   brief,   limited   and
obstructed   view   which   the   prosecution   witnesses   had   of   the
gunmen at the time of the shooting, casts serious doubt on the
accuracy and reliability of the identification by the witnesses.
Appellant’s argument does not persuade. 
_______________
 Id. at 192­94.
4
5
 Rollo, pp. 63­64; Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6­7.
721
VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  721
People vs. Santos
Police Aide Bohol  was only about twelve (12)  armlengths away
from   the   ambush   vehicle.   The   ambush   slaying   occurred   under
conditions   of   high   visibility:   the   victim   Cupcupin   was   shot   to
death at 11:45 o’clock in the morning, in good weather, when the
sun was almost at its zenith. On cross­examination, Bohol stated
that there were no passing vehicles that blocked his view of the
slaying of the victim as the vehicles stopped some distance away
from   the   jeep   when   the   shooting   began.   In   addition,   Bohol
testified that he saw one of the gunmen take a wrist watch and a
gun   from   Cupcupin’s   lifeless   body.   Clearly,   Bohol   had   the
opportunity   to   observe   the   extraordinary   and   startling   events
which  unfolded  on  the corner  of  two  (2) busy  streets  almost  at
high   noon,   events   which   may   be   expected   to   leave   a   strong
impression   upon   the   minds   of   an   eye­witness   who,   like   Police
Aide   Bohol,   had   a   duty   to   maintain   law   and   order.   Alberto
Bautista who had been riding on a jeep and who escaped death
(but   not   gunshot   wounds)   by   reason   of   his   quick   reflexes,   had
every reason to remember the faces of those whom he saw firing
at the jeep and at himself. This has been recognized a number of
times in our case law. In People v. Jacolo, et al.,6 the Court said:
“[W]hile evidence as to the identity of the accused as the person
who   committed   the   crime   should   be   carefully   analyzed,   x   x
x ‘where the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness
does not appear to be biased against the man on the dock, his or
her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
be accepted. And this is more so where the witness is the victim or
his  near­relative,   as   in  this   case,   because   these  (people)  usually
strive to remember the faces of the assailants.’ ”7 (Italics supplied).
Appellant Santos also contended that Police Aide Bohol could not
have   had   a   clear   view   of   the   ambuscade   and   the   shooting   of
Cupcupin   since   he   (Bohol)   was   situated   on   the   left   side   of   the
gunmen. As observed by the Solicitor General, however, the trial
court had pointed out that “if he [Bohol] was to the front right of 
_______________
6
 G.R. No. 94470, 16 December 1992.
7
 People   v.   Jacolo,   et   al., G.R.   No.   94470,   December   16,
1992; People   v.   Alvarez, 169   SCRA   731 (1989); People   v.
Bernat, 120 SCRA 918 (1983).
722
722  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Santos
the jeep” then he must [have been] a little by the left side of the
persons   firing   at the  jeep  x   x  x.” 8 “Bohol’s  view,   therefore,”  the
Solicitor General continued, “was not limited to the left side of the
assailants, especially since he was able to see them [the gunmen]
move   around   the   site   of   the   ambush   after   they   [had]   stopped
firing, specifically when one of them stripped victim Cupcupin of
his   gun   and   jewelry   and   they   all   walked   away   from   that
place.”9 The trial court obviously concluded that Bohol had ample
opportunity actually to observe the events on which he testified,
and we find no basis for overturning this conclusion of the trial
court.
In   respect   of   the   identification   by   Bautista,   accused   also
suggests that Bautista had no real opportunity to see and impress
upon   his  memory   the  faces   of  the  assailants.   In  his  testimony,
Bautista stated that two (2) men armed with handguns suddenly
approached the jeep in which he and Cupcupin were riding. He
agreed  that   his  attention  had  been  “focused”  (defense   counsel’s
own   language)   on   vehicles   passing   along   Estrella   Street   as
Cupcupin maneuvered the jeep to turn right at the corner and to
head   towards   Navotas.   When   the   assailants   started   shooting,
Bautista jumped from the jeep, was hit on the left thigh and other
parts  of the  body,  but  managed  to run  for cover  from repeated
shots or bursts of gunfire. Bautista testified further that he was
shot by appellant Raul Santos while Morales pumped bullets into
Cupcupin; that the gunmen fired at Cupcupin and Bautista from
close range, Morales being a mere half an arm­length to the left of
Cupcupin while appellant Santos was about two (2) arm­lengths
away   from   the   ambushed   jeep;   and   that   Bautista   saw   his
companion, Cupcupin, slump on the steering wheel as the bullets
crashed into him. Once more, the trial court was led by the above
circumstances   to   conclude   that   Bautista   had   adequate
opportunity to see appellant Santos and to retain his face in his
memory. We find no basis for rejecting this factual conclusion of
the trial court.
Appellant Santos makes two (2) additional arguments. Firstly,
he complains that he was not afforded his right to counsel in the  counsel   claims   that   Bautista   and   Bohol   were   induced   by   the
_______________
8
 TSN, 7 February 1990, p. 27.
9
 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 5­6; TSN, 10 January 1990, pp. 13­15.
723
VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  723 
People vs. Santos
course of  the police line­up,  at the police station where  he was
identified by the prosecution witnesses. This argument, of course,
assumes   that   during   the   police   line­up,   accused   was   under
custodial investigation, a stage which,  per the appellant, began
the   instant   the   police   suspected   him   of   involvement   in   the
ambuscade. Since appellant Santos then had no lawyer present
nor was one provided, his counsel argues, Santos’s identification
was “tainted” and inadmissible. The argument is creative, but has
no legal basis. In Gamboa v. Cruz,10 the Court said that there is
“no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police
line­up,”11 a   declaration   reiterated   in People   v.   Loveria.12 The
customary   practice   is,   of   course,   that   it   is   the   witness   who   is
investigated or interrogated in the course of a police line­up and
who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who
is not questioned at all at that stage. The Court is aware of the
caveat in Gamboa.13 But there is nothing in the record of this case
which   shows   that   in   the   course   of   the   line­up,   the   police
investigators sought to extract any admission or confession from
appellant   Santos.   The   investigators   did   not   in   fact   interrogate
appellant Santos during the line­up and he remained silent after
he had been identified by Bautista and Bohol.
Appellant Santos’s second contention is that there had been
“improper   suggestiveness”   in   the   course   of   the   police   line­up
amounting   to   an   uncounselled   confession.   In   effect,   defense
police   investigators   to   point   to   appellant   Santos   as   one   of   the   No, sir. Somebody approached me and said, iyan po.But before answering,
gunmen. The record does not show that the police investigators I made a very careful look at the person.”14
had   coached   Bautista.   Appellant   Santos’   counsel   directed   the We   are   not   convinced,   however,   that   the   phrase “iyan
attention of this Court to a portion of Bohol’s testimony during
po”constituted   an   “improper   suggestion,”   certainly   not   in   the
cross­examination, to wit: 
context   of   a   situation   where,   as   here,   appellant   Santos   was
_______________ identified   successively   by   Bautista   and   Bohol   from   a   group   of
persons.   We   consider   that   the   phrase “iyan   po” is   too   cryptic.
10
 162 SCRA 643 (1988). What this Court warned against in People v. Acosta,15 i.e., against
11
 162 SCRA at 651. an   identification   process   that   was   “pointedly   suggestive,   or
12
 187 SCRA 47 (1990). generated   confidence   when   there   was   none,   activated   visual
13
 “. . . the moment there is a move or even an urge of said imagination, and all told, subverted [a person’s] reliability as [an]
investigators   to   elicit   admissions   or   confessions   or   even   plain eye­witness [..],” has not been successfully shown in the case at
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, bar.
from   said   suspect,   he   should   there   and   then   be   assisted   by Appellant   Santos   next   seeks   to   assail   the   credibility   of
counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made Bautista   and   Bohol   by   citing   supposed   inconsistencies   between
in writing and in the presence of counsel.” (Gamboa, 162 SCRA statements   made   in   their   affidavits   before   trial   and   their
651). testimony   given   in   the   course   of   the   trial.   Appellant’s   counsel
724 complains16 that   while  witness   Bohol   could   recall   the  gunmen’s
724  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  general appearance, he could not remember the kind of shoes that
appellant Santos was wearing nor the color of their guns; that he
People vs. Santos
had   stated   in   his   sworn   statement   that   he   had   picked   out
“Atty. Valmonte: 
appellant Santos from a line­up consisting of seven (7) persons,
      Alright, that somebody who told you to go to the office of Capt. Puzon you while he testified in open court that he had identified appellant
were informed that on the other side of the office of Capt. Puzon there was  when  the latter  was  together with  only one  (1) detainee in the
already the person whom they would like to identify?  investi­
Victorino Bohol: 
  Yes, sir.  _______________
Atty. Valmonte:  14
 TSN, 14 February 1990, at 27.
  And was there somebody who asked you who among those in the  15
 See People v. Acosta, 187 SCRA 39, 45 (1990).
investigation room the person whom you saw?  16
 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 14­18; Rollo, pp. 71­73.
Victorino Bohol:  725
 VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  725
People vs. Santos
gation room of the police station; that Bohol had initially stated
that Bautista was driving the jeep but on direct examination, he
stated  that  it  was  Cupcupin instead  who  had  been  driving  the
jeep; that in his sworn statement, Bohol had claimed that he was
directing   traffic   when   he   first   heard   gunshots,   but   on   cross­
examination, stated that at that point he was engaged in taking
his merienda.
Close examination of the record will, however, show that the
supposed inconsistencies adduced by appellant Santos are either
non­existent   or   clearly   minor   and   inconsequential   in  character.
The fact that witness Bohol might not have remembered the kind
of shoes appellant Santos was wearing on that violent occasion
nor the color of the gunmen’s weapons, is clearly inconsequential
Close scrutiny of the sworn statement of Bohol (Exhibit “A”) does
not reveal any statement that he (Bohol) had picked out appellant
Santos   from   a   seven   (7)­person   line­up   nor   does   the   transcript
show   that   witness   Bohol   had   identified   appellant  Santos   when
appellant was alone with only one detainee in the investigation
room at the police station,17Appellant’s counsel did not document
his   averments.   Moreover,   as   pointed   out   by   the   Solicitor
General,18whether a police line­up consisted of two (2) or seven (7)
persons   is   actually   immaterial   since   a   police   line­up   is   not
essential to a proper and positive identification. 19 Whether it was
Bautista or Cupcupin who had been driving the jeep and whether
Bohol   was   directing   traffic   or   enjoying   his merienda when   the
first gun shots rang out, cannot be regarded as critical in nature;
such questions do not detract from the basic facts that Bohol was
in a position to see and did see the ambush and the shooting of
Cupcupin and Bautista and saw both assailants and the victims.
The   entrenched   principle   is   that   minor   inconsistencies   in   the
testimony of a witness tend to strengthen rather than to weaken
the   credibility   of   the   witness   as   they   erase   any   suspicion   of
rehearsed testimony.20
_______________
17
 See TSN, 10 January 1990, pp. 26­28.
18
 Appellee’s Brief, p. 10.
19
 People   v.   Salviero,   198   SCRA   357   (1991); People   v.
Espiritu, 191 SCRA 503 (1990).
20
 People   v.   Kalubiran, 196   SCRA   447 (1991); People   v.
Lagota, 194   SCRA   92 (1991); People   v.   Martinada, 194   SCRA
36 (1991); People
726
726  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Santos
In   his   second   assignment   of   error,   appellant   Santos   in   effect
questions the trial court for admitting a sworn statement by one
Ronaldo Guerrero (Exhibit “EE”), a witness in another criminal
case (Criminal Case No. 8117) where appellant Santos was also
charged with the murder of one Daniel Nuguera which had taken
place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were
ambushed, i.e., at the corner of Yangco Street and Estrella Street,
Malabon, Metro Manila. When the prosecution first presented the
sworn statement of Guerrero in order to show criminal propensity
on the part of appellant Santos, the defense objected to admission
of such sworn statement; the trial court sustained the objection
and rejected the evidence for the purpose it was initially offered.
However, the trial court admitted the same as falling within one
or more of the exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
“Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evidence.—Evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time;
but it   may   be   received   to   prove a   specific   intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,   custom   or
usage and the like.” (Italics supplied).
Appellant   Santos   now   complains   that   the   affidavit   of   Ronaldo
Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution
did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial.
We consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in
admitting   the   Guerrero   affidavit   for   the   limited   purpose   for
proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that
appellant  knew   that  the  particular  corner   of   two  (2)  particular
streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its
passengers. Appellant also had waived the hearsay character of
this evidence by failure seasonably to object to the admission of
the affidavit; it is too late in that day to raise the hearsay rule in
the appellant’s memorandum after prosecution and defense had
presented  their respective cases and  had  made  their  respective
offers  of  evidence.21 Finally,  and  in  any  case,   as  pointed  out  by
the 
_______________
v. Calixto, 193 SCRA 303 (1991).
21
 TSN, 25 July 1990, pp. 24­25; TSN, 1 August 1990, pp. 13­
18;   Records,   pp.   575­580.   See People   v.   Nebreja, 203   SCRA
45 (1991);
727
VOL. 221, MAY 11, 1993  727
People vs. Santos
Solicitor General, the exclusion  of the  Guerrero  affidavit would
not result in any change in the result reached by the trial court.
For   that   result   is   essentially   and   adequately   based   upon   the
positive identification of appellant Santos as one of the gunmen
by Bautista and Bohol.
That it took the police authorities five (5) months to locate and
apprehend appellant Santos who, it turned out, resided close by
the very locale of the ambush­slaying, did not in any way weaken
the  evidence  of  the  prosecution  or  detract  from  the  conclusions
reached by the trial court. The length of that period of time shows
only   that   police   procedures   are   not   always   as   efficient   as   they
could be and that witnesses are frequently reluctant to volunteer
information   to   the   police   authorities   in   criminal   cases,   a   point
noted so frequently as to have become a matter of judicial notice. 22
Finally, we come to the defense of alibi which appellant Santos
raised before the trial court and which was recounted by the trial
court in the following manner:
“Accused Raul Santos, after denying the accusations against him,
insisted   that   he   was   on   the   date   and   time   that   Cupcupin   and
Bautista were ambushed somewhere in Ibaan, Batangas to which
place   he   went   on   May   20,   1989,   because   his   sister   Teresita
received   a   subpoena   in  a   case   involving   one  Apolonio  Nuguera
and which subpoena was given to him by another sister named
Isabel.   Accused   Santos   claimed   that   he   was   surprised   and
confused  by  said  subpoena (Exh.  2) and had to  go to Batangas
while his sisters are verifying the complaint against him. Accused
Santos also maintained that from the time he left the place on
June 12, 1989, he remained continuously in said place.
x x x     x x x     x x x
The   testimony   of   accused   Santos   regarding   his   stay   in
Batangas was corroborated by Melinda David in whose house he
stayed and by his sister Isabel Santos.”23
In   respect   of   the   weight   properly   given   to   a   defense   of   alibi,
the Court has, times beyond numbering, ruled that such defense
is weak most especially when established exclusively or mainly by
the accused himself and his relatives and not by independent and
credible persons,24and  that  such  a  defense will not prevail  over
the positive identification made by credible witnesses, 25 especially
where the witness is the victim­complainant himself.
WHEREFORE,   for   all   the   foregoing,   we   hold   that   the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court must be, and it
is hereby, AFFIRMED with the following modifications: the civil
indemnity   payable   to   the   heirs   of   Glicerio   Cupcupin   shall   be
INCREASED to P50,000.00; the penalty of life imprisonment in
Criminal   Case   No.   8517­MN   shall   be   CHANGED   to reclusion
perpetua, which   is   the   proper   imposable   penalty   under   the
Revised Penal Code. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
     Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Hearsay  evidence whether  objected to  or not  has  no
probative value (People vs. Nebreja, 203 SCRA 45).
The   suspects,   under   custodial   investigation,   have   the
constitutional right to counsel (People vs. Cavite, 203 SCRA 383).
——o0o——
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  339
People vs. Nardo
G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES, accused­appellant.
Criminal   Law; Rape; Evidence; Courts   look   with   disfavor
upon   retractions,   because   they   can   easily   be   obtained   from
witnesses   through   intimidation   or   for   monetary
consideration; Retraction   does   not   necessarily   negate   an   earlier
declaration; Recantations made after the conviction of the accused
deserve only scant consideration.—Be that as it may, recantations
are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is
exceedingly   unreliable,   for   there   is   always   the   probability   that
such  recantation may later  on be itself repudiated.  Courts look
with   disfavor   upon   retractions,   because   they   can   easily   be
obtained   from   witnesses   through   intimidation   or   for   monetary
consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of
the accused deserve only scant consideration.
Same; Same; Same; The   pardon   to   justify   the   dismissal   of
the   complaint   should   be   made   prior   to   the   institution   of   the
criminal   action.—Any   recantation   or   affidavit   of   desistance,   by
itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so­called “private
crimes,” is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once
the action has been instituted. The pardon to justify the dismissal
of the complaint should  be made prior to the institution  of the
criminal action. Parenthetically, the crime in the case at bar was
committed in 1996, i.e., prior to the passage of the R.A. 8353, the
Anti­Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a crime against
persons.
Same; Same; Same; An   affidavit   of   recantation,   being
usually   taken   ex   parte,   would   be   considered   inferior   to   the
testimony given in open court.—Even if it were sworn, Lorielyn’s
recantation could hardly suffice to overturn the finding of guilt by
the trial court which was based on her own clear and convincing
testimony,   given   during   a   full­blown   trial.   An   affidavit   of
recantation,   being   usually   taken   ex   parte,   would   be   considered
inferior   to   the   testimony   given   in   open   court.   It   would   be   a
dangerous   rule   to   reject   the   testimony   taken   before   a   court   of
justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed
his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a
solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.
_______________
*
 EN BANC.
340
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they
40 
People vs. Nardo
Same; Same; Same; As   a   rule,   Court   does   not   disturb   the
findings   by   the   trial   court   on   the   credibility   of   witnesses.—As
stated, the trial court arrived at its finding of guilt after a careful
assessment of the evidence presented, foremost of which was the
testimony of the victim in open court, where the trial judge was
able  to   personally   evaluate  her   manner   of   testifying,   and   from
there reach a studied opinion as to her credibility. As a rule, we
do not disturb the findings by the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon
the same.
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that a person accused of rape
can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial
court finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the course of things.—We find
nothing in the records which would indicate that the findings of
fact of the trial court are not supported by the evidence or were
arrived   at   in   manifest   or   palpable  error,   such   as  to  warrant   a
departure from the foregoing rule. The trial court was correct in
lending   credibility   to   the   testimony   of   Lorielyn.   The   sole
testimony   of   Lorielyn   was   sufficient   to   establish   the   guilt   of
accused­appellant. It is settled that a person accused of rape can
be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court
finds   said   testimony   to   be   credible,   natural,   convincing,   and
consistent with human nature and the course of things.
Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies   in   the   testimony   of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters   do   not   affect   either   the   substance   of   their   declaration,
their   veracity,   or   the   weight   of   their   testimony.—Minor
may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies   in   the   testimony   of   prosecution   witnesses   with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of
a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. Besides,
a rape victim can not be expected to recall vividly all the sordid
details of the violation committed against her virtue.
Same; Same; Same; Alibi; In order to overcome the evidence
of   the   prosecution   with   the   defense   of   alibi,   accused­appellant
must   establish   not   only   that   he   was   somewhere   else   when   the
crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for
him   to   have   been   at   the   scene   of   the   crime   at   the   time   it   was
committed.—As against the positive and categorical testimony of
Lorielyn, accused­appellant can only proffer the defense of alibi.
However, in order to overcome the evidence of the prosecution 
341
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  341 
People vs. Nardo
with the defense of alibi, he must establish not only that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time it was committed. In the instant case, the
testimonies   for   the   defense   sought   to   establish   that   accused­
appellant was 400 to 500 meters, or 15 minutes, away from the
scene   of   the   crime.   This   hardly   qualifies   as   proof   that   it   was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when
it   was   committed.   Accused­appellant’s   defense   of   alibi   must,
therefore, necessarily fail.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City, Albay, Br. 3.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This   case   is   before   this   Court   on   automatic   review   from   the
Regional   Trial   Court   of  Legazpi  City,  Albay,   Branch  III,   which
imposed   on   accused­appellant   the   death   penalty   for   rape   in
Criminal Case No. 7170.
The   victim,   Lorielyn   R.   Nardo,   is   the   eldest   daughter   of
accused­appellant. She was born on September 11, 1981 and, at
the time of the incident, was fourteen (14) years old.1
On   February   24,   1996,   around   noon,   Lorielyn   was   in   their
house located in Barangay 3, Camalig, Albay, together with her
father,   accused­appellant   Alfredo   Nardo,   two   younger   brothers,
Leonel and Louie, and maternal grandfather, Vicente Remot. At
1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente left for
work. Alfredo told his sons, Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then
ordered   Lorielyn   to   get   his   cigarettes   in   his   bedroom.   When
Lorielyn   went   inside   the   bedroom,   her   father   followed   her.   He
embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts.
Lorielyn   pleaded, “Papa,   please   stop   it   Have   mercy.” Her   father
ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and pushed her to the bed.
Lorielyn started to  said she had a problem. She slept at her aunt’s house again that
_______________
1
 Certificate of Baptism, Exhibit “D.”
342
342  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Nardo
cry, while Alfredo took off his clothes. Then, he lay on top of her
and had sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the neck
down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took hold of a knife
from   a   nearby   cabinet   and   pointed   it   at   her   right   ear.   He
threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what
he did. When he was finished, Alfredo left the house. During all
this   time,   Lorielyn’s   mother,   Elizabeth   Nardo,   was   washing
clothes about five houses away.2
Elizabeth returned home at about 3:00 o’clock p.m. She saw
Lorielyn crying while washing the dishes. She asked Lorielyn why
she was crying, but her daughter said nothing.3
On March 19, 1996, Lorielyn was washing clothes when her
father approached her and whispered, “We will play tonight near
the   river.” Lorielyn   understood   this   to   mean   that   her   father
wanted to have sexual intercourse with her again. She finished
the laundry and left the house. She took a passenger jeepney to
Barangay Libod, Camalig, Albay and proceeded to the house of
her aunt, Carol Navera. She stayed there until her aunt arrived
at   around   5:00   o’clock   in   the   afternoon.   When   it   became   late,
Carol told Lorielyn to go home, but she decided to spend the night
at her aunt’s house because she was afraid to undergo the ordeal
from her father again.4
The   next   day,   Lorielyn’s   brother,   Leonel,   was   sent   by   her
father   to   fetch   her,   but   she   refused   to   go   with   him.   Her   aunt
asked her again why she did not want to go home. She merely
night. The following day, her mother came to fetch her. Lorielyn Camalig,   Province   of   Albay,   Philippines,   and   within   the
told her mother she did not want to go home. She said, “Mama, jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,
do you want me to become pregnant in that house?” Her mother being   the   father   of   the   herein   victim,   with   lewd   and   unchaste
design, by means of violence, force and intimidation, armed with
asked, “Who   will   impregnate   you   there?” Lorielyn   replied, “Your
a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
husband.”Her mother retorted that Alfredo could not do that to
have carnal knowledge with her (sic) own daughter, LORIELYN
her, then left.5
R. NARDO, a 14 year old girl, against her will and consent, to her
Lorielyn stayed at her aunt’s house until March 22, 1996. On
damage and prejudice.
that date, Carol again asked Lorielyn what her problem was. Fi­
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.9
At the arraignment on August 8, 1996, accused­appellant pleaded
_______________
not guilty.10
2
 TSN, April 2, 1997, pp. 5­9; p. 28. The prosecution presented Dr. Melvyn Orbe, who testified on
the following findings as a result of his examination of the victim,
3
 Ibid., p. 11.
Lorielyn Nardo:
4
 Id., pp. 14­16. Pelvic Examination:
5
 Id., pp. 17­19.
343  whitish to yellowish discharge
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  343
People vs. Nardo  irritation lateral aspect of the posterior vulva at 3 o’clock
nally, she told her aunt that her father raped her. Immediately,
Carol went to report the matter to the police. She later returned _______________
home with two policemen, and together they brought Lorielyn to
the Camalig Police Station. The rape was entered in the police 6
 Exh. “C.”
blotter.6 The   policemen   then   brought   Lorielyn   to   the   Municipal 7
 Exh. “A.”
Health Office of Camalig, Albay, where she was examined by Dr. 8
 Exh. “E.”
Melvyn   P.   Orbe,   the   Municipal   Health   Officer. 7 From   there 9
 Record, p. 2.
Lorielyn was  brought  to the Municipal Trial Court of  Camalig­ 10
 Id., p. 47.
Albay   to   file   a   formal   complaint   for   rape   against   her   father, 344
Alfredo Nardo.8 344  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
On May 29, 1996, an Information for rape was filed against
People vs. Nardo
Alfredo Nardo, charging as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of February 1996, at more or less
1:30   o’clock   in   the   afternoon,   at   Brgy.   No.   3,   Municipality   of
 * healed laceration hymenal in origin posterior aspect of
the fourchet11
Dr. Orbe stated that based on these findings, it is possible that
Lorielyn had sexual intercourse.12
Carolina Navera, testifying for the prosecution, corroborated
Lorielyn’s statement that the latter went to her house on March
20, 1996. Lorielyn cried and told her that she did not want to go
home because she had a problem. Elizabeth, Lorielyn’s mother,
came to fetch her but she refused to go home, saying that she was
raped by her father.  Upon hearing this, Elizabeth left and told
Carolina not to let Lorielyn leave her house. After Elizabeth was
gone, Carolina went to the police station. She returned later with
two   policemen,   who   then   brought   Lorielyn   to   the   police
headquarters.13
Ma.   Francia   Aguilar,   the   social   welfare   officer   of   the
Department   of   Social   Welfare   and   Development,   also   testified
that in the evening of March 22, 1996, she responded to a report
of   a   rape   incident.   She  met  the   victim,   Lorielyn   Nardo,   at   the
house   of   Cely   Bantog,   a   social   worker,   at   Camalig,   Albay.   She
interviewed Lorielyn and her mother, Elizabeth, for the purpose
of   preparing   a   Social   Case   Study   Report. 14 Thereafter,   she
endorsed   Lorielyn   to   the   DSWD   Center   for   Girls   in   Sorsogon,
Sorsogon to undergo therapeutics.15
SPO3   Jose   Nuylan,   a   member   of   the   Camalig   police   force,
testified   that   he   investigated   the   rape   incident   and   took   the
statement of Lorielyn Nardo.16
Elizabeth   Nardo,   the   victim’s   mother,   was   called   to   the
witness stand. She testified that she and Alfredo are not married,
but they have been living together. They have seven children, the
eldest of whom is Lorielyn. She stated that Lorielyn was born on
September   11,   1981   at   Anei,   Claveria,   Misamis   Oriental;   that
Lorielyn’s birth certificate was burned in the Municipal Building
of Misamis Orien­
_______________
11
 Exh. “A.”
12
 TSN, November 5, 1996, p. 8.
13
 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 5­10.
14
 Exh. “B”
15
 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 13­16.
16
 TSN, December 16, 1996, p. 6.
345
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  345 
People vs. Nardo
tal.17 However,   Elizabeth   presented   and   identified   Lorielyn’s
baptismal certificate showing that she was born on September 11,
1981.18
The defense, on the other hand, presented lawyer Santer G.
Gonzales,   the   employer   of   accused­appellant.   He   testified   that
accused­appellant worked as a helper at his farm in Quirangay,
Camalig, Albay. On February 24, 1996, accused­appellant arrived
at his farm before 8:00 o’clock in the morning. He was followed by
his father­in­law, Vicente Remot, who lived with him in the same
house. It started to rain hard, so they decided not to work that
day. Vicente Remot went home at around 8:30 or 9:00 o’clock in
the   morning.   Accused­appellant   stayed   behind.   After   a   while,
Paterno   Ramas,   a   neighbor   of   Atty.   Gonzales,   arrived.   They
started   to   drink.   None   of   them   left   the   farmhouse   since   Atty.
Gonzales kept bottles of gin and cigarettes in stock. They were
joined   later   in  the  afternoon   by   Didjo  Mujar,   another   friend   of
Atty.   Gonzales.   They   drank   about   five   bottles   of   gin   and   sang
while   Atty.   Gonzales   played   the   guitar.   The   rain   subsided   at
around 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon, so they stopped drinking. At
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, accused­appellant left.19 The farm is
located around 400 to 500 meters away from Barangay 3, where
accused­appellant and the victim reside, and can be reached in 15
minutes.20
When asked to comment on the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, Atty.
Gonzales described her as one capable of telling a lie. He narrated
that once, she went to his farm to collect the amount of P50.00 as
daily wage of her grandfather, Vicente Remot, but she gave only
P35.00 to her mother. Elizabeth thus went to Atty. Gonzales’ to
ask   about   the   deficiency.   They   later   learned   from   Lorielyn’s
younger sister that she spent the missing P15.00 on snacks.21
Vicente Remot, accused­appellant’s father­in­law, corroborated
Atty. Gonzales’ testimony that he reported for work at the latter’s
farm in the morning of February 24, 1996, but he was unable to  was   sick.   Mrs.   Nieva   gave   Lorielyn   P200.00.   Later,   when   she
_______________
17
 TSN, February 11, 1997, pp. 3­4.
18
 Exh. “D.”
19
 TSN, June 9, 1997, pp. 3­7, 12; Exh. “5.”
20
 Ibid., p. 8.
21
 Id., p. 7.
346
346  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  who ordered her to do that, and that she gave the whole sum of
People vs. Nardo
work   because   of   the   rain,   so   he   went   home   instead,   leaving
accused­appellant in the farm. At 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
that day, he was at home watching television with Elizabeth and
his grandchildren, including Lorielyn. He refuted Lorielyn’s claim
that   he   left   after   lunch   to   work,   saying   that   he   stayed   in   the
house the whole afternoon since it was raining.22
Elizabeth also testified that on February 24, 1996, she was at
home watching television with her father and children, namely,
Lorielyn, Lewcherd, Lailani, Leonel, Louie Boy and Leo Boy. All
her   children   were   at   home   because   it   was   a   Saturday.   She
claimed   that   Lorielyn   filed   the   complaint   for   rape   against   her
father   because   he   was   very   strict   with   her.   She   learned   from
Lorielyn’s best friend that she had a problem with her boyfriend,
a certain Erwin Loreno. At one time, Lorielyn asked permission to
attend   a   holy   retreat,   but   Elizabeth  found   out   from   the  school
that there was no such retreat. Lorielyn lied on another occasion,
when she told Mrs. Bonifacia “Paz” Nieva that her grandfather
was sick so she can borrow money.23
Mrs.   Bonifacia   Nieva   testified   that   her   daughter   was   a
classmate of Lorielyn. Once, Lorielyn visited her saying that she
was sent by Elizabeth to borrow money because her grandfather
went   to   see   Elizabeth   to   collect   payment,   she   found   out   that
Lorielyn’s grandfather did not get sick. Lorielyn admitted to her
that she lied about it to be able to borrow money.24
The prosecution recalled Lorielyn to the witness stand by way
of rebuttal evidence. She refuted Atty. Gonzales’ statement that
she did not turn over in full the salary of her grandfather in the
amount of P50.00. She denied that she lied to her mother about a
holy retreat held by her school. Anent the amount of P200.00 she
borrowed  from  Mrs.   Nieva,  she  asserted  that  it  was  her  father
P200.00 to him.25
_______________
22
 Id., pp. 14­16.
23
 TSN, July 10, 1997, pp. 4­10.
24
 TSN, August 11, 1997, pp. 3­5.
25
 TSN, October 7, 1997, pp. 3­6.
347
 VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  347 Nardo the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
People vs. Nardo damages.
On   clarificatory   questioning   by   the   presiding   judge,   Lorielyn For humanitarian reasons, however, it is recommended that
maintained   that   her   grandfather,   Vicente   Remot,   indeed   came the DEATH penalty be commuted to RECLUSION PERPETUA. 
home in the morning of February 24, 1996, but he left again to go
_______________
to Atty. Gonzales’ farm after lunch. That afternoon, her mother
was   at   the   public   faucet   located   far   away   from   their   house
washing clothes. The judge wondered aloud why she was doing
26
 Ibid., pp. 9­13.
the   laundry   in   the   afternoon   when   this   is   usually   done   in   the
27
 TSN, November 24, 1997, pp. 3­11.
morning. Lorielyn replied that her mother had started doing the
28
 Ibid., pp. 13­16.
laundry in the morning but that she was not able to finish it, so 348
she returned in the afternoon to continue her chore. She denied 348  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
having any male friends, saying all her friends are girls. When People vs. Nardo
asked once more by the judge, Lorielyn reiterated that her father SO ORDERED.29
had sexual intercourse with her.26 Accused­appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
Carolina   Nieva   and   Elizabeth   Nardo   were   presented   as
surrebuttal witnesses. They testified in sum that Lorielyn had a I
boyfriend.27
Accused­appellant   was   presented   as   the   last   witness.   He THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
denied that he raped his daughter on February 24, 1997, saying TESTIMONY   OF   THE   VICTIM   LORIELYN   AND
that he was at the farm of Atty. Gonzales. He scolded Lorielyn DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
when he learned from her sister and brother that she was always
going around with a boy. He also stated that Lorielyn got mad at II
him because he did not permit her to leave the house whenever
she wanted to.28 THE   TRIAL   COURT   ERRED   IN   REFUSING   TO   RECITE
On   March   3,   1998,   the   trial   court   rendered   judgment   as THE REASONS WHY IT WAS RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE
follows: CLEMENCY FOR THE ACCUSED.30
WHEREFORE,   IN   VIEW   OF   ALL   THE   FOREGOING Accused­appellant   assails   the   trial   court’s   finding   that   Atty.
CONSIDERATIONS,   this   court   finds   the   accused   ALFREDO Gonzales was his employer and therefore was likely to testify in
NARDO Y ROSALES GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT his favor; and that he could not have noticed accused­appellant
of the crime of RAPE and sentences him to suffer the penalty of leave the farm in the afternoon of February 24, 1996 because he
DEATH.   The   said   accused   in   likewise   ordered   to   pay   Lorielyn had   one   drink   too   many.   Accused­appellant   contends   that   the
court should not have been too quick to condemn him when his
witness   was   a   lawyer.   Furthermore,   he   argues   that   Lorielyn’s On   May   4,   2000,   counsel   for   accused­appellant   filed   a
conduct after the alleged rape, specifically from February 25 to Supplemental   Reply   Brief,33 alleging   that   she   received   another
March 19, 1996, during which she stayed in the house with her letter from Lorielyn Nardo which states:
father and continued to do her daily chores, creates a doubt on the 04­17­2000
veracity of the charge. Dear Atty. Teresita de Guzman,
In   the   Reply   Brief   for   accused­appellant, 31 defense   counsel Unang­una   po   sa   lahat   ay   nagpapasalamat   po   ako   sa   pag­
reveals that Lorielyn wrote her the following letter: response mo sa letter. Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak
7­13­99 ni   Mr.   Alfredo   Nardo   na   nakapiit   ngayon   sa   DORM   I­D   ng
Dear Atty. De Guzman: Muntinlupa, ako po yung nagpadala ng liham sa inyo. Attorney,
Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo lagi ko pong ipinagdarasal na nawa’y matapos na ang paghihirap
na   nakabinbin   pa   sa   ngayon   sa   Maximum   Security   Compound at pagdunisa ng aking ama sa loob ng piitan, nawa’y matapos na
NBP   I­D   Mimtinlupa   City.   Sumulat   po   ako   sa   inyo   upang ang   lahat   ng   problema   upang   manumbalik   muli   ang   sigla   ng
humingi ng tulong na gawin po sana ang lahat, wala po talagang aming pamilya. Nagpapasalamat nga rin po pala ako sa ginagawa
kasalanan ang aking ama ako na po  mong pagtulong sa amin, attorney nawa po ay makamit nyo ang
tagumpay.
_______________ Hanggang na lamang po ang aking liham, umaasa po ako sa
inyong pang­unawa at tagumpay.
29
 Record, p. 149. Nagpapasalamat at umaasa, 
30
 Appellant’s Brief; Rollo, p. 53. Lorielyn Nardo34          
31
 Rollo, pp. 117­129. In  compliance  with  the  Court’s   Resolution  dated  November   14,
349 2000,35 the Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment on the 
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  349 
People vs. Nardo _______________
mismong nag­akusa ang nagsasabi na walang katotohanan ang
lahat ng mga sinabi ko na pinagsamantalahan niya ako. Nagawa
32
 Ibid., pp. 118­119.
ko lang po ‘yon dahil masyado po kasi siyang mahigpit sa aming 33
 Id., pp. 134­136.
magkakapatid. Atty. tulungan ninyo sana ako, nalaman ko nga 34
 Id., p. 137.
po pala ang inyong address dahil dumalaw po ang mama ko noon 35
 Id., p. 141.
sa papa ko at hiningi ko naman po para masulatan ko po kayo. 350
Umaasa po akong lubos na ako’y inyong matutulungan.
350  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Lubos na umaasa      
People vs. Nardo
LORIELYN NARDO32
letters of Lorielyn Nardo,36 contending that there is no mention of
her father’s innocence in her letter dated April 17, 2000. Rather,
she merely expressed therein her deep sympathy for her father’s
situation   in   prison.   The   Solicitor   General   argues   that   a
recantation   is   not   sufficient   to   warrant   the   exoneration   of
accused­appellant   after   he   has   been   proven   guilty   beyond
reasonable   doubt   based   on   Lorielyn’s   candid,   categorical   and
straightforward testimony before the trial court.
In the meantime, counsel for accused­appellant, by way of a
Manifestation   and   Motion,37 submitted   two   more   letters   from
Lorielyn Nardo which are hereunder reproduced, viz.:
August 10, 2000
Dear Attorney,
Unang­una   po sa   lahat  ay  ang  taos­puso  kong   pasasalamat,  sa
dahilang pagpapaunlak niyo sa kahilingan kong maipasa sa korte
ang isang liham ng katotohanan, at kahit wala pa po ang isang
desisyon mtila sa korte ay lubos po akong umaasa at nagtitiwala
sa   inyong   kakayahan.   Attorney,   kung   alam   niyo   lang   po   ng
matanggap   at   mabasa   ang   isang   letter   na   nagmula   sa’yo   ay
punung­puno   po   ng   kaligayahan   ang   aking   puso   dahil   kahit
papaano ay nabawasan na ang pag­aalinlangan sa aking isipan.
Sa ngayon po ay patuloy na lang akong umaasa na sana isang
araw   ay   makita   kong   muling   masaya   ang   aking   pamilya.
Attorney,   isang   pabor  po  ang  nais  kong   hilingin,   na   sana   bago
magpasko ay muli ko ng makasama ang aking ama, at gusto ko
pong maging ninyo ‘to sa akin sa darating na pasko.
Hanggang   dito   na   lamang   po   ang   aking   liham,   at   lubos   po
akong nagtitiwala sa inyong kakayahan na mapapawalang sala
ang aking ama.
Truly yours,        Be   that   as   it   may,   recantations   are   frowned   upon   by   the
Lorielyn Nardo38
_______________
36
 Id., pp. 154­158.
37
 Id., pp. 144­148.
38
 Id., p. 151.
351
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  351 
People vs. Nardo
January 17, 2001
Dear Atty. Teresita De Guzman,
Ako   po   muli   si   Lorielyn   Nardo   na   anak   ni   Alfredo   Nardo   na
nakabinbin   sa   NBP   Dorm­I­D   Muntinlupa.   Kahit   hindi   po
natupad   ang   hinihiling   kong   sana’y   makalaya   ang   aking   ama
noong nakaraang Disyembre ay patuloy ko pa rin pong inaasahan
at hinihiling ang inyong tulong na sana po ay makalaya na ang
aking   ama.   Patuloy   pong   nangingibabaw   ang   aking   konsensiya
dahil   sa   aking   ginawa,   umaasa   po   ako   na   sana   ay   lalo   pang
mapadali ang paglabas niya sa loob ng kulungan, maniwala po
kayo wala siyang kasalanan. Attorney, alam ko po na ginagawa
niyo (po) ang lahat kaya’t ngayon pa lang po ay nagpapasalamat
ako   sa   inyo   at   patuloy   na   umaasa   ng   inyong   tulong   at   sana’y
maunawaan niyo ako.
Patuloy na umaasa,
Lorielyn Nardo      
(anak)39          
Accused­appellant relies on these letters to obtain a reversal of
the   trial   court’s   judgment   of   his   conviction.   However,   the   said
letters were not subscribed and sworn to by Lorielyn.
courts. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for
there is always the probability that such recantation may later on
be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because   they   can   easily   be   obtained   from   witnesses   through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not
necessarily   negate   an   earlier   declaration. 40 Especially,
recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only
scant consideration.41
Moreover, any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by itself,
even   when   construed   as   a   pardon   in   the   so­called   “private
crimes,” is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once
the ac­
_______________
39
 Id., p. 149.
40
 People v. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331, 348 (1998).
41
 Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 135098, April 12, 2000, 330
SCRA 695.
352
352  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance,
People vs. Nardo
tion has been instituted.42 The pardon to justify the dismissal of
the   complaint   should   be   made   prior   to   the   institution   of   the
criminal action.43 Parenthetically, the crime in the case at bar was
committed in 1996, i.e., prior to the passage of the R.A. 8353, the
Anti­Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a crime against
persons.
Even   if   it   were   sworn,   Lorielyn’s   recantation   could   hardly
suffice to overturn the finding of guilt by the trial court which was
based on her own clear and convincing testimony, given during a
full­blown   trial.   An   affidavit   of   recantation,   being   usually
taken ex   parte,   would   be   considered   inferior   to   the   testimony
given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony   taken   before   a   court   of   justice   simply   because   the
witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason
or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and
place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.44
As stated, the trial court arrived at its finding of guilt after a
careful assessment of the evidence presented, foremost of which
was   the  testimony   of   the   victim  in   open   court,   where   the   trial
judge was able to personally evaluate her manner of testifying,
and from there reach a studied opinion as to her credibility. As a
rule,   we   do   not   disturb   the   findings   by   the   trial   court   on   the
credibility of witnesses, for the trial court is in a better position to
pass upon the same.45
“The trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying. He had before him the
essential   aids   to   determine   whether   a   witness   was   telling   the
truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she
often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind’s eye of
the   blush   of   conscious   shame,   the   hesitation,   the   sincere   or
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the 
_______________
 Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245, 266 (1998).
42
 Ibid., citing People v. Entes, 103 SCRA 162 (1981).
43
44
 People v. Agbayani, 284 SCRA 315, 342 (1998).
45
 People   v.   Diasanta, G.R.   No.   128108,   July   6,   2000, 335
SCRA 218.
353
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  353 
People vs. Nardo
yawn,   the   sigh,   the   candor   or   lack   of   it,   the   scant   or   full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.” 46
We   find   nothing   in   the   records   which   would   indicate   that   the
findings of fact of the trial court are not supported by the evidence
or   were   arrived   at   in   manifest   or   palpable   error,   such   as   to
warrant a departure from the foregoing rule. The trial court was
correct in lending credibility to the testimony of Lorielyn. The sole
testimony   of   Lorielyn   was   sufficient   to   establish   the   guilt   of
accused­appellant. It is settled that a person accused of rape can
be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court
finds   said   testimony   to   be   credible,   natural,   convincing,   and
consistent with human nature and the course of things.47
Indeed, a daughter, especially one in her minority, would not
accuse her own father of such an unspeakable crime as incestuous
rape   had   she   really   not   been   aggrieved. 48 More   importantly,
Lorielyn   withstood   all   the   rigors   of   the   case,   starting   from   the
initial police interrogation, the medical examination, the formal
charge,   the   public   trial,   to   the   cross­examination.   She   went
through the court hearings, where she came face to face with her
father. If it was true that she merely made up the charge, she
should have been bothered by her conscience at the sight of her
father in prison garb and upon the realization of his sorry state
while in detention. The fact that she maintained her story during
her testimony­in­chief all the way up to her rebuttal testimony
only serves to substantiate the veracity of her claim.
Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit
herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her
sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have  supposedly   lied   in   order   to   obtain   money   or   her   parents’
_______________
46
 People   v.   Mitra, G.R.   No.   130669,   March   27,   2000, 328
SCRA 774; citing People v. Agbayani, 284 SCRA 315 (1998).
47
 People   v.   Bacule, G.R.   No.   127568,   January   28,   2000, 323
SCRA 734, People v. Reyes, 315 SCRA 563, 571­72 (1999).
48
 People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 122473, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA
201; People   v.   Magdato, G.R.   Nos.   134122­27,   February   7,
2000, 324 SCRA 785.
354
354  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Nardo
the culprit apprehended and punished. 49 A young girl’s revelation
that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission
to   medical   examination   and   her   willingness   to   undergo   public
trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an
assault on her dignity by, as in this case, her own father, cannot
be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction. 50 Courts usually give
credence   to   the   testimony   of   a   girl   who   is   a   victim   of   sexual
assault,   particularly   if   it   constitutes   incestuous   rape   because,
normally, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation
of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were it
not   to   condemn   an   injustice.   Needless   to   say,   it   is   settled
jurisprudence   that   testimonies   of   child­victims   are   given   full
weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor,
says   that   she   has   been   raped,   she   says   in   effect   all   that   is
necessary   to   show   that   rape   was   committed.   Youth   and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.51
During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn
as   an   incorrigible   liar.   Occasions   were   cited   wherein   Lorielyn
permission to leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of
the Rules of Court provides that: “Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but
it   may   be   received   to   prove   a   specific   intent   or   knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like.”   While   lying   may   constitute   a   habit,   we   believe   that   the
falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment
to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious
as charging one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all
of its serious repercussions.
Accused­appellant   argues   that   the   trial   court   should   have
given credence to his witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because
he is a  Accused­appellant assigns as error the trial court’s failure to give
_______________
49
 People   v.   Taño, G.R.   No.   133872,   May   5,   2000, 331   SCRA
449; People  v.   Amigable, G.R.   No.   133857,   March   31,   2000, 329
SCRA   527; People   v.   Sampior, G.R.   No.   117691,   March   1,
2000, 327 SCRA 31.
50
 People v. Antipona, 274 SCRA 328, 335 (1997).
51
 People v. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296, 303 (1998).
355
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  355
People vs. Nardo
member   of   the   bar.   Atty.   Gonzales,   however,   took   the   witness
stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in
his capacity as accused­appellant’s employer. As such, no special
privilege should be accorded him by the trial court by reason only
of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that case
as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should
be treated as one.
Likewise,   accused­appellant   insists   that   Lorielyn’s   conduct
after the rape, during which she continued to perform her tasks
and lived with her father in their house, negates the commission
of rape. Accused­appellant’s proposition is derived from Lorielyn’s
perfunctory   yes­or­no   answers   to   the   leading   questions
propounded to her on cross­examination. Rather than sustain this
argument,   we   rely   instead   on   the   observations   of   the   Social
Welfare Officer, whom we find to be an impartial witness, in this
wise:
Per   observation,   Lorielyn   is   a   shy   and   silent   type   person.   She
talked in a very small voice and  during the  interview she  only
talks when being asked. She also appears to be very sad and have
been staring blankly (sic)52.
the reasons for recommending the commutation of his sentence
from   death   to reclusion   perpetua.   As   correctly   observed   by   the
Solicitor General, the trial court was impelled by humanitarian
reason.53 Moreover, the commutation of sentence is a prerogative
of the Chief Executive.
As against the positive and categorical testimony of Lorielyn,
accused­appellant can only proffer the defense of alibi. However,
in   order   to   overcome   the   evidence   of   the   prosecution   with   the
defense   of   alibi,   he   must   establish   not   only   that   he   was
somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime   at   the   time   it   was   committed. 54 In   the   instant   case,   the
testimonies for the 
_______________
52
 Social Case Study Report, p. 2; Exh. “B” (emphasis ours).
53
 Brief for the Appellee, p. 18; Rollo, p. 109.
54
 People v.  Dando, G.R.  No.  120646,  February  14,  2000, 325
SCRA 406; People v. Paraiso, 319 SCRA 422, 433 (1999).
356
356  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
 People vs. Nardo
defense sought to establish that accused­appellant was 400 to 500
meters,   or  15  minutes,  away  from the scene  of the  crime.  This
hardly qualifies as proof that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Accused­
appellant’s defense of alibi must, therefore, necessarily fail.
Carefully sifting through the entire body of evidence presented
in   this   case,   we   find   nothing   which   would   destroy   the   moral
certainty of accused­appellant’s guilt. While there may be some
inconsistencies in the testimony of Lorielyn, these to our mind are
minor inconsistencies which serve to strengthen her credibility as
they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. 55 Minor
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they
may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies   in   the   testimony   of   prosecution   witnesses   with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of
a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. 56Besides,
a rape victim can not be expected to recall vividly all the sordid
details of the violation committed against her virtue.
Article   335   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,   as   amended   by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. 1.when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the   offender   is   a   parent,   ascendant,   stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third   civil   degree,   or   the   common­law­spouse   of   the
parent of the victim, x x x.57
The   concurrence   of   the   two   special   qualifying   circumstances,
namely   the   victim’s   minority   and   the   relationship   between   the
victim  and  the  culprit,   increases  the  penalty   of  rape  to  one  (1)
degree, thus resulting in the imposition of the death penalty. In
order   to   be   appreciated   as   qualifying   circumstances,   however,
these must 
_______________
55
 55 People   v.   Dreu, G.R.   No.   126282,   June   20,   2000, 334
SCRA 62.
56
 People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA
262.
57
 R.A. 7659, Sec. 11, seventh paragraph.
357
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  357 
People vs. Nardo
be   properly   pleaded   in   the   indictment. 58 In   addition,   the
qualifying circumstances should be duly proved during the trial. 59
These   requirements   are   met   in   this   case.   The   Information
sufficiently   alleges   that   accused­appellant   is   the   father   of   the
victim, and that the latter was fourteen (14) years old at the time
of   commission   of   the   rape.   These   elements,   furthermore,   were
categorically   affirmed   by   Elizabeth   Nardo,   the   victim’s   mother
and   the   most   competent   witness.   She   testified   that   accused­
appellant   is   Lorielyn’s   father,   and   that   Lorielyn   was   born   on
September 11, 1981,60 thus placing her age at the time of the rape
at fourteen (14) years. Moreover, the Lorielyn’s birth date and her
relationship to accused­appellant are shown by her Certificate of
Baptism.61 This was presented by her mother, Elizabeth, in lieu of
her Certificate of Live Birth, which was destroyed by fire. 62 The
baptismal   certificate,   coupled   by   her   mother’s   testimony,   is
sufficient to establish Lorielyn’s age.63
 We therefore affirm the trial court’s imposition of the death awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount
penalty. as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of
Four   justices   of   the   Court   have   continued   to   maintain   the the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the
unconstitutionality   of   Republic   Act   No.   7659   insofar   as   it conventional requirement of allegata el probata in civil procedure
prescribes   the   death   penalty;   nevertheless   they   submit   to   the and   for   essentially   civil   cases   should   be   dispensed   with   in
ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional criminal   prosecutions   for   rape   with   the   civil   aspect   included
and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at therein,   since   no   appropriate   pleadings   are   filed   wherein   such
bar. allegations can be made.
We likewise affirm the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma
which   is   consistent   with   prevailing   jurisprudence. 64 No   proof   is of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute
required   to   substantiate   the   award   of   moral   damages   in   rape the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the
cases. In People vs. Prades,65 we held:  recital   thereof   at  the  trial   by   the  victim,   since   the  Court  itself
even   assumes   and   acknowledges   such   agony   on   her   part   as   a
_______________ gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as
being   ineludibly   present   in   the   case   need   not   go   through   the
58
 People v. Mendez, G.R. No. 132546, July 5, 2000, 335 SCRA superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
147. In   addition   to   moral   damages,   the   amount   of   P75,000.00,   is
59
 People   v.   Alvero, G.R.   Nos.   134536­38,   April   5,   2000, 329 awarded to the victim as indemnity.
SCRA   737; People   v.   Llamo, G.R.   No.   132138,   January   28, x x x. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative
2000, 323 SCRA 791. response   has   been   in   the   form   of   higher   penalties.   The   Court
60
 TSN, February 11, 1997, pp. 3­4. believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on
61
 Exh. “D.” the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting
62
 TSN, February 11, 1997, p. 4. with   the   case   at   bar,   if   the   crime   of   rape   is   committed   or
63
 People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 425, 429 (1989). effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
64
 People   v.   Mendiola, G.R.   No.   134846,   August   8,   2000, 337 death   penalty   is   authorized   by   the   present   amended   law,   the
SCRA 418; People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 130205, July 5, 2000, 335 indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not
SCRA 100. less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic
65
 293 SCRA 411 (1998). societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
358 over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court
358  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.66
People vs. Nardo WHEREFORE,   the   judgment   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of
x x x. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as Legaspi   City,   Albay,   Branch   III,   convicting   accused­appellant
that   under   consideration,   moral   damages   may   additionally   be Alfredo Nardo y Rosales of the crime of rape, sentencing him to
death, and ordering him to pay the victim, Lorielyn Nardo moral
damages   in  the  amount  of   P50,000.00,   is  AFFIRMED   with  the
MODIFICA­
_______________
 People v. Victor, 292 SCRA 186, 200­201 (1998).
66
359
VOL. 353, MARCH 1, 2001  359
Belo vs. Philippine National Bank
TION that accused­appellant is, further, ordered to pay the victim
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00.
In   accordance   with   Section   25   of   Republic   Act   No.   7659,
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this   decision,   let   certified   true   copies   thereof,   as   well   as   the
records of this case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the clemency or pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pang
aniban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga­Reyes, Ynares­
Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval­Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  361
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
G.R. No. 146030. December 3, 2002.*
REPUBLIC   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   represented   by   the
Department   of   Environment   and   Natural   Resources,
petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA, SR., represented by
ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA, JR., MARIA DULLA
ALEJAGA,   FELIPE   ALEJAGA   III,   ROQUETA   ALEJAGA,
JENNIFER   ALEJAGA,   EVERETTE   CAPUNDAN,   AND
LYNETTE   ALEJAGA;   THE   PHILIPPINE   NATIONAL   BANK
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
Land Titles; Free Patent; Fraud; The party alleging fraud or
mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.—We begin our
resolution of this issue with the well­settled rule that the party
alleging   fraud   or   mistake   in  a  transaction  bears   the  burden  of
proof.  The  circumstances evidencing  fraud  are  as varied  as  the
people who perpetrate  it in each  case. It may  assume different
shapes   and   forms;   it   may   be   committed   in   as   many   different
ways. Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear and
convincing evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; “Doctrine   on   Independently
Relevant   Statements”   Defined.—The   doctrine   on   independently
relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness   by   a   third   person   may   be   admitted   as   proof   that,
regardless   of   their   truth   or   falsity,   they   were   actually   made.
Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary
but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.
Same; Same; Same; Registration; Torrens Title; The doctrine
that the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not
by   itself   vest   title—it   merely   confirms   the   registrant’s   already
existing   one.—True,   once   a   patent   is   registered   and   the
corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered by them
ceases   to   be   part   of   the   public   domain   and   becomes   private
property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent
becomes   indefeasible   a   year   after   the   issuance   of   the   latter.
However,   this   indefeasibility   of  a   title  does  not  attach  to  titles
secured   by   fraud   and   misrepresentation.   Well­settled   is   the
doctrine   that   the   registration   of   a   patent   under   the   Torrens the State to land­destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.
System   does   not   by   itself   vest   title;   it   merely   confirms   the Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale
registrant’s   already   existing   one.   Verily,   registration  under   the or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years
Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership. after the grant of the patent.”

_______________ PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
362 The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED       The Solicitor General for petitioner.
62       Benjamin Destura for private respondents.
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.      Legal Department for private respondent PNB.
Same; Same; Same; Under   Section   101   of   Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the State—even after the lapse of one year—may still PANGANIBAN, J.:
bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land.—
We   reiterate   the   familiar   doctrine   that   a   free   patent   obtained
Under   Section  101   of   Commonwealth   Act   No.   141,   the  State—
through fraud or misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one­
even after the lapse of one year—may still bring an action for the
year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does not
reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently
bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired
granted   to   private   individuals.   Further,   this   indefeasibility
through such means. 
cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title
has   been   acquired,   if   the   purpose   of   the   investigation   is   to 363
determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in securing VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  363 
the title. Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
Same; Same; Same; Encumbrance; Prohibition; The   State Statement of the Case
prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision 1 of
within five years after the grant of the patent.—As early as Pascua
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­GR CV No. 44568. The decretal
v.   Talens, we   have   explained   the   rationale   for   the   prohibition
portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
against the encumbrance of a homestead—its lease and mortgage “WHEREFORE,   the   appealed   decision   is   hereby   REVERSED,
included—an  encumbrance  which,   by  analogy,   applies  to  a  free SET ASIDE and RECALLED.”2
patent. We ruled as follows: “It is well­known that the homestead
laws   were   designed   to  distribute   disposable  agricultural   lots   of
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA
thus:
“On December 28, 1978,  [Respondent] Felipe  Alejaga, Sr. x x x
filed   with   the   District   Land   Office,   Roxas   City,   Free   Patent
Application No. (VI2) 8442 covering a parcel of land identified as
Lot 1, Mli­06­000020­D, with an area of .3899 hectares, more or
less   located   at   Dumolog,   Roxas   City   (Exh.   “A”;   Exh   “9”).   It
appears   that  on   December   27,   1978,   when  the   application   was
executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a
report   of   his   investigation   and   verification   of   the   land   to   the
District Land Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March
14,   1979,   the  District   Land  Officer  of  Roxas   City   approved  the
application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to the applicant.
On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued and
the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of
Roxas,   for   registration   and   issuance   of   the   corresponding
Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. P­
15   Free   Patent   No.   (VI­2)   3358   was   issued   to   [respondent]   by
defendant Register of Deeds.
“On   April   4,   1979,   the   heirs   of   Ignacio   Arrobang,   through
counsel   in   a   letter­complaint   requested   the   Director   of   Lands,
Manila, for an investigation of the District Land Officer, Roxas
City,   and   the   Regional   Office,   Region   VI,   Iloilo   City,   for
irregularities in the issuance of  the title of a  foreshore land in
favor   of   [respondent].   Isagani   Cartagena,   Supervising   Special
Investigator, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly
Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report dated April 17, 1989. The
Chief,  [respondent]   died.   He   was   substituted   by   his   wife   Roqueta
_______________
1
 Rollo, pp. 28­38. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and
concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes (Division chairman) and
Rebecca de Guia­Salvador (member).
2
 Assailed   CA   Decision,   p.   12;   rollo,   p.   38.   Emphasis   in   the
original.
364
364  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila, recommended
to   the   Director   of   Lands   appropriate   civil   proceeding   for   the
cancellation   of   Free   Patent   Title   No.   (VI­2)   3358   and   the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P­15 in the name of
[respondent].
“In   the   meantime,   [respondent]   obtained   a   NACIDA   loan
under   the   Cottage   Industry   Guarantee   and   Loan   Fund   by   the
defendant   Philippine   National   Bank   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
PNB)   executed   in   Cebu   City   in   the   amount   of   P100,000.00   on
August 18, 1981. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage
in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was
annotated at the back of the title.
“On   April   18,   1990,   the   government   through   the   Solicitor
General   instituted   an   action   for   Annulment/Cancellation   of
Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of
Roxas   City   and   defendant   Register   of   Deeds   of   Roxas   City
covering Free Patent Application (VI­2) 8442 of the parcel of land
with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog,
Roxas City.
“On  November  17,   1990,   while the  case  is  pending   hearing,
Alejaga   and   his   children,   namely:   Everette   Alejaga,   Lynnette
Alejaga,   Felipe   Alejaga,   Jr.,   Maria   Dulla   Alejaga,   Roqueta
Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and Felipe Alejaga III.
x x x      x x x      x x x
 “After   hearing,   the   [trial]   court   in   its   dispositive   portion
decreed as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval
of   Free   Patent   Application   No.   3358   and   issuance   of   Original
Certificate of Title No. P­15 in the name of Felipe Alejaga is by
means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio and the court orders:
1. ‘a)the cancellation of the approval of the application No.
(VI­2) 8442 covering Lot No. 1, Mli­06­000020­D with an
area of .3899 hectares, more or less, located at Dumulog,
Roxas City;
2. ‘b)the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P­15,
Free   Patent   No.   (VI­2)   3358   in   the   name   of   Felipe
Alejaga;
3. ‘c)the land covered thereby as above described is reverted
to the mass of the public domain;
4. ‘d)the   defendants,   Heirs   of   Felipe   Alejaga,   Sr.   or
defendant,   Philippine   National   Bank,   Roxas   City
Branch, to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of above
described   Original   Certificate   of   Title   No.   P­15   to   the
Register   of   Deeds   (now   Registries   of   Land   Titles   and
Deeds), Roxas City;
365
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  365
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
1. ‘e)the defendant, Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel
Original   Certificate   of   Title   No.   P­15   and   the   owner’s
duplicate copy of said title surrendered by above stated
defendants;
2. ‘f)defendant’s,   Philippine   National   Bank,   cross­claim   is
dismissed.
“Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.’ ”3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove
its allegation that respondents had obtained the free patent and
the Certificate of Title through fraud and misrepresentation. 4 The
appellate   court   likewise   held   that,   assuming   there   was
misrepresentation or fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for
reversion should have been brought within one (1) year from the
registration of the patent with the Registry of Deeds.5
Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s
testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted
an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga,
Sr.6 The CA added that petitioner had failed to support its claim
that   the   lot   covered   by   respondent’s   free   patent   and   title   was
foreshore land.7
Hence, this Petition.8
_______________
3
 Id., pp. 1­5.
4
 Id., p. 6; Rollo, p. 32.
5
 Id., p. 12; id., p. 38.
6
 Id., p. 7; id., p. 33.
7
 Id., p. 11; id., p. 37.
8
 The   case   was   deemed   submitted   for   decision   on   April   15,
2002,   upon   the   Court’s   receipt   of   Respondent   Alejagas’
Memorandum signed by Atty. Benjamin B. Distura. Respondent
PNB’s Memorandum, filed on July 20, 2001, was signed by Atty.
Edwin   M.   Alaestante.   Petitioner’s   Manifestation,   adopting   its
Petition   as   its   Memorandum   was   filed   on   July   20,   2001   and
signed by Assistant Solicitor General Fernanda Lampas Peralta
and Solicitor Brigido Artemon M. Luna II.
366
366  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  acquired a vested right over the parcel of land covered by OCT
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
Issues
Petitioner   raises   the   following   issues   for   this   Court’s
consideration:
“I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case
is already final and executory as against respondent PNB.
“II
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner
has proven the allegations to the Complaint.
“III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the
action for reversion is unavailing.”9
Simply   stated,   the   issues   can   be   summed   up   into   two:   (1)   the
efficacy of the grant of the free patent and (2) the indefeasibility
of the Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First   Issue: 
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner   argues   that   it   has   proven   fraud   in   the   issuance   of
Respondent Alejagas’ free patent and Certificate of Title. 10 It also
avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of
Appeal.
On   the   other   hand,   the   Alejagas   contend   that   they   have
No. P­
_______________
 Petition   for   Review,   p.   10;   Rollo,   p.   15.   Original   in   upper
9
case.
10
 Id., p. 13; id., p. 18.
367
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  367 
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
15   by   virtue   of   their   proven   open,   actual,   exclusive   and
undisputed possession of the land for more than 30 years.11
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records
show   receipt   by   Respondent   PNB   of   a   copy   of   the   Decision   on
October   27,   not   on   October   3,   1993   as   alleged   by
petitioner.12 Further,   the   bank   filed   its   Notice   of   Appeal   on
November 9, 1993, within the 15­day reglementary period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised
in this Petition—the presence of fraud—is factual. As a general
rule, this Court does not review factual matters. 13 However, the
instant   case   falls   under   one   of   the   exceptions,   because   the
findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the
evidence on record.14
 We begin our resolution of this issue with the well­settled rule Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears tioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which
the burden of proof.15 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as were20 ignored by the Court of Appeals.21
varied   as   the   people   who   perpetrate   it   in   each   case. 16 It   may First, the   issuance   of   the   free   patent   was   not   made   in
assume  different  shapes  and  forms;   it  may  be  committed in  as
accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act
many   different   ways.17 Thus,   the   law   requires   that   it   be
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. 22 Under Section
established by clear and convincing evidence.18
91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a
of   ascertaining   whether   the   material   facts   set   out   in   the
preponderance   of   evidence   before   the   trial   court,   showing
application are true.23
manifest fraud in procuring the patent. 19 This Court agrees with
Further,   after  the filing  of the application, the law  requires
the   RTC   that   in   obtaining   a   free   patent   over   the   lot   under
sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land
scrutiny, peti­
is 
_______________
_______________
11
 Respondent Alejagas’ Memorandum, p. 29; Rollo, p. 321. 20
 Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112443, January 25,
12
 See records, p. 349.
2002, 374 SCRA 555.
13
 Tando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127984, December 14, 21
 Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., G.R. No. 130876, January
2001, 372 SCRA 321.
31, 2002, 375 SCRA 390.
14
 Lercana   v.   Jalandoni, G.R.   No.   132286,   February   1, 22
 An act to amend and compile the laws relative to land of the
2002, 375 SCRA 604. public domain, effective December 1, 1936.
15
 Mangahas   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 304   SCRA   375,   March   10, 23
 Section 91 of the Public Land Act provides:
1999; citing Cayabyab v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 SCRA “SEC.   91.   The   statements   made   in   the   application   shall   be
1, April 28, 1994. considered   as   essential   conditions   and   parts   of   any   concession,
16
 Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725, November 19, 1999. title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any
17
 Destura   v.   Court   of  Appeals, 325   SCRA   341,   February   10, false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or
modifying   the   consideration   of   the   facts   set   forth   in   such
2000.
statements,   and   any   subsequent   modification,   alteration,   or
18
 Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 645, August 22, 1996.
change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso
19
 Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, supra.
facto produce the cancellation of  the concession, title, or permit
368
granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to
368  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
time   and   whenever   he   may   deem   it   advisable,   to   make   the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether
they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good
faith, and for the purposes of such investigation, the Director of
Lands   is   hereby   empowered   to   issue subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from
the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this
section,   the   existence   of   bad   faith,   fraud,   concealment,   or
fraudulent   and   illegal   modification   of   essential   facts   shall   be
presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or
fail   to  obey   a subpoena or subpoena  duces   tecum lawfully   issued
by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or
shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent
questions,   and   on   the   basis   of   such   presumption,   an   order   of
cancellation may issue without further proceedings.”
369
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  369
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
located,   in   order   to   give   adverse   claimants   the   opportunity   to
present their claims.24 Note that this notice and the verification
and investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an
application   for   free   patent   has   been   filed   with   the   Bureau   of
Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga, Sr.’s Application for Free
Patent25 was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other
hand, the Investigation & Verification Report 26 prepared by Land
Inspector Efren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau
of   Lands   of   Roxas   City   was   dated   December   27,   1978.   In   that
Report,   he   stated   that   he   had   conducted   the   “necessary
investigation and  verification  in  the  presence  of  the  applicant.”
Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of
the   rule   cannot   be   condoned   because,   obviously,   the   required
notice to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and
investigation allegedly  conducted  by Recio  were precipitate  and
beyond the pale of the Public Land Act.27 As correctly pointed out
by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been
done only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would have
been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own investigation
and   verification   on   December   27,   1998,   a   day   before   Felipe
Alejaga, Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent 28 It must also be
noted   that   while   the   Alejagas   insist   that   an   investigation   was
conducted, they 
_______________
24
 Section 46 of the Public Land Act provides:
“SEC.   46.   If,   after   the   filing   of   the   application   and   the
investigation,   the   Director   of   Lands   shall   be   satisfied   with   the
truth   of   the   allegations   contained   in   the   application   and   the
applicant   comes   within   the   provisions   of   this   chapter,   he   shall
cause a patent to issue to the applicant or his legal successor for
the tract so occupied and cultivated, provided its area does not
exceed twenty­four hectares: Provided, That no application shall
be finally acted upon until notice thereof has been published in
the   municipality   and   barrio   in   which   the   land   is   located   and
adverse   claimants   have   had   an   opportunity   to   present   their
claims.”
25
 Exhibit “A”; exhibits folder, p. 1.
26
 Exhibit “B”; id., p. 2.
27
 Espino v. Salubre, 352 SCRA 668, February 26, 2001.
28
 RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 76.
370
370  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  _______________
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
do   not   dispute   the   fact   that   it   preceded   the   filing   of   the
application.29
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation
was   conducted   is   not   sustained   by   the   Verification   &
Investigation   Report   itself,   which   bears   no   signature.30 Their
reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty31 is thus misplaced. Since Recio’s signature does not
appear   on   the   December   27,   1978   Report,   there   can   be   no
presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of
land   was   actually   conducted.   Strangely,   respondents   do   not
proffer   any   explanation   why   the   Verification   &   Investigation
Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will
later   on   be   explained,   this   alleged   presumption   of   regularity—
assuming it ever existed—is overcome by the evidence presented
by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena
has   not   been   successfully   rebutted.   In   that   report,   Recio
supposedly   admitted   that   he   had   not   actually   conducted   an
investigation   and   ocular   inspection   of   the   parcel   of   land.
Cartagena’s   statement   on   Recio’s   alleged   admission   may   be
considered as “independently relevant.” A witness may testify as
to the state of  mind of  another person—the  latter’s knowledge,
belief, or good or bad faith and the former’s statements may then
be   regarded   as   independently   relevant   without   violating   the
hearsay rule.32
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened
himself   to   cross­examination,   the   Investigation   Report 33 he   had
submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part
of  Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioner’s
29
 Robles v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97, March 14, 2000.
30
 See Exhibit “B”; exhibits folder, p. 2.
31
 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m) provides:
“(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.—When the
law imposes certain duties and obligations, it will be presumed
that such duties and obligations have been performed unless it is
expressly   made   to   appear   to   the   contrary.   All   things   are
presumed to have been rightly and duly performed until there is
proof to the contrary.”
32
 Francisco, Basic Evidence, 2nd ed., (1999), pp. 214­215.
33
 Exhibit “G”; exhibits folder, pp. 8­10.
371
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  371 
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his
personal   knowledge,   perceptions   and   conclusions   are   not
hearsay.34 On the other hand, the part referring to the statement
made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant.35
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may
be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were   actually   made.   Evidence   as   to   the   making   of   such
statements   is   not   secondary   but   primary,   for   in   itself   it   (a)
constitutes a fact in issue 36 or (b) is circumstantially relevant to
the existence of such fact.37
Since  Cartagena’s  testimony was based  on the report of  the
investigation  he  had   conducted,   his  testimony   was  not  hearsay
and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.38
contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga, Sr. is 
_______________
34
 Rodriguez   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 273   SCRA   607,   June   17,
1997.
35
 Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and
Community   Multi­Purpose   Cooperative,   Inc., G.R.   No.   136914,
January 25, 2002, 374 SCRA 653.
36
 Francisco, The   Revised   Rules   of   Court   in   the   Philippines
Part I(1997), p. 518; citing 31 C.J.S. 988.
37
 There are five kinds of independently relevant statements
that are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue:
1. Statements of a person showing his state of mind; that is, his
mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other
emotions
2. Statements that may identify the date, place and condition
as illness and the like
3.   Statements   of   a   person   from   which   an   inference   may   be
drawn   as   to   the   state   of   mind   of   another   person;   i.e.,   the
knowledge, belief, good or bad faith noticed of the latter
4. Statements that may identify the date, place and person in
question
5. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness
38
 Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, supra.
372
372  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
void.39 Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the
Certificate   of   Title.40 The   invalidity   of   the   patent   is   sufficient
basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in consequence
thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former. 41 Verily,
we   must   uphold   petitioner’s   claim   that   the   issuance   of   the
Alejagas’ patent and title was tainted with fraud.42
Second   Issue: 
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right to
cause the reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public
domain.43 On the other hand, the Alejagas claim that, pursuant to
Section 32 of PD 152944—otherwise known as the Property Regis­
_______________
39
 Robles v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97, March 14, 2000.
40
 Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, July 14, 1995.
41
 Daez v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 856, February 17, 2000.
42
 Barrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123935, December 14,
2001, 372 SCRA 312.
43
 Petition for Review, p. 18; Rollo, p. 23.
44
 Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
“SEC. 32.  Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised
by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land   of   any   estate   or   interest   therein   by   such   adjudication   or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date  of  the  entry   of  such  decree  of  registration,   but  in  no  case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase ‘innocent
purchaser of value’ or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree,
it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value.
“Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration   and   the   certificate   of   title   issued   shall   become
incontrovertible.   Any   person   aggrieved   by   such   decree   of
registration in any
373
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  373
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
tration   Decree—the   one­year   period   for   reversion   has   already
lapsed.45 Thus,   the   State’s   Complaint   for   reversion   should   be
dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True,   once   a   patent   is   registered   and   the   corresponding
certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be
part of the public domain and becomes private property. Further,
the   Torrens   Title   issued   pursuant   to   the   patent   becomes
indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. 46 However, this
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud
and   misrepresentation.47Well­settled   is   the   doctrine   that   the
registration  of  a  patent  under   the  Torrens  System   does   not  by
itself   vest   title;   it   merely   confirms   the   registrant’s   already
existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not
a mode of acquiring ownership.48
Therefore,   under   Section   101   of   Commonwealth   Act   No.
141,49 the State—even after the lapse of one year—may still bring
an action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has
been fraudulently granted to private individuals. 50 Further, this
indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as
to   how   the   title   has   been   acquired,   if   the   purpose   of   the
investigation   is   to   determine   whether   fraud   has   in   fact   been
committed in securing the title.51
_______________
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.”
45
 Respondent Alejagas’ Memorandum, p. 43; Rollo, p. 336.
46
 Baguio v. Republic, 301 SCRA 450, January 21, 1999.
47
 Ibid.
48
 J.M.   Tuazon   &   Co.,   Inc.   v.   Macalindong, 6   SCRA   938,
December 29, 1962.
49
 This section provides:
“SEC.   101.   All   actions   for   the   reversion   to   the   Government   of
lands   of   the   public   domain   or   improvements   thereon   shall   be
instituted   by   the   Solicitor­General   or   the   officer   acting   in   his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines.”
50
 Republic   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 255   SCRA   335,   March   29,
1996.
51
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 721, April 10, 1989.
374
374  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
In the  case before us,  the indefeasibility  of a certificate  of title
cannot be invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the
title by means of fraud.52 Public policy demands that those who
have   done   so   should   not   be   allowed   to   benefit   from   their
misdeed.53 Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed
by the State to recover its own property acquired through fraud
by private individuals.54 This is settled law.55
Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that   the   Alejagas’   title   was   validly   issued,
there is another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion   of   the   land   to   the   public   domain.   Section   118   of
Commonwealth   Act   No.   14156 proscribes   the   encumbrance   of   a
parcel of  Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
_______________
52
 Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, 244 SCRA 537, May
31, 1995.
53
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 343.
54
 Republic   v.   Heirs   of   Agustin   L.   Angeles, G.R.   No.   141296,
October 7, 2002, 390 SCRA 502.
55
 Baguio   v.   Republic,   supra; Republic   v.   Court   of   Appeals,
supra at   note   51; Republic   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 183   SCRA   620,
March   23,   1990; Republic   v.   Mina, 114   SCRA   945,   June   29,
1982; Director  of  Lands   v.   Abanilla, 124   SCRA   358,   August  31,
1983.
56
 This section provides:
“SEC.   118.   Except   in   favor   of   the   Government   or   any   of   its
branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent
or homestead provisions shall not be  subject  to encumbrance  or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for
a   term  of   five   years   from  and   after   the   date   of   issuance   of   the
patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
“No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after
five years and before twenty­five years after issuance of title shall
be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce,   which   approval   shall   not   be   denied   except   on
constitutional
375
VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  375 
land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years
from   its   grant.57 The   prohibition   against   any   alienation   or
encumbrance   of   the   land   grant   is   a   proviso   attached   to   the
approval of every application.58
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have
any right or title to, or interest in, lands that are granted under
free or homestead patents;  or any  improvements  thereon.  They
are forbidden from enjoying such right, title or interest, if they
have not secured the consent of the grantee and the approval of
the   secretary   of   the   Department   of   Agriculture   and   Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other
than education, charity, or easement of way.59
_______________
and   legal   grounds.”   (As   amended   by   Com.   Act   No.   456,
approved June 8, 1939.)
57
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 639, November 14,
1997.
 Republic v. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, April 29, 1968.
58
59
 The   following   are   the   pertinent   provisions   of   the   Public
Land Act, as amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved on May 5,
1941:
“SEC.   121.   Except   with   the   consent   of   the   grantee   and   the
approval   of   the   Secretary   of   Agriculture   and   Commerce,   and
solely   for  educational,  religious,  or  charitable  purposes  or  for  a
right   of   way,   no   corporation,   association,   or   partnership   may
acquire   or   have   any   right,   title,   interest,   or   property   right
whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead,
or   individual   sale   provisions   of   this   Act   or   to   any   permanent credit investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga and you have 
improvement on such land. personally examined this? 
“SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under A  Yes, your Honor. 
the  provisions   of   this   Act,   nor  any   permanent  improvement  on
COURT  Do you conclude that this Original Certificate of Title is a [free] 
such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except
patent? 
to persons,  corporations,  associations,  or  partnerships who  may
acquire   lands   of   the   public   domain   under   this   Act   or   to A  Yes, your Honor. 
corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by COURT  And this [free] patent was granted on March 19, 1979. 
their charters. A  Yes, your honor. 
“Except   in   cases   of   hereditary   succession,   no   land   or   any COURT  And as such [free] patent it cannot be alienated except [to] the 
portion   thereof   originally   acquired   under   the   free   patent, government or within five years from its issuance? 
homestead,   or   individual   sale   provisions   of   this   Act,   or   any A  Yes, your honor. 
permanent   improvement   on   such   land,   shall   be   transferred   or
COURT  Why did you recommend the loan? 
assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent
A  Because it is just a mortgage.”64
improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
of said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one hundred
and forty­four hectares. Any falls squarely within the term encumbranceproscribed by Section 
376
_______________
376  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr. transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereof shall
In the  case at bar, Free Patent No.  (VI­2) 3358 60 was approved be null and void.”
and issued on March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate 60
 Exhibit “C”; exhibits folder, p. 3.
of Title No. P­1561 was issued on the same date. On August 18, 61
 Exhibit “E”; id., p. 5.
1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe 62
 See Promissory Note; Records, p. 24.
Alejaga,   Sr.   obtained   from   Respondent   PNB   a   loan 62 in   the
amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate
63
 See Credit Agreement; id., p. 25.
itself   that   the   land   granted   under   the   free   patent   shall   be
64
 TSN, July 24, 1991, p. 9.
inalienable   for   five   (5)   years   from   the   grant,   a   real   estate 377
mortgage   was   nonetheless   constituted   on   the   parcel   of   land VOL. 393, DECEMBER 3, 2002  377 
covered by OCT No. P­15.63 In his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas, Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
Jr., then Cashier III of respondent bank, even admitted that the 118   of   the   Public   Land   Act. 65 A   mortgage   constitutes   a   legal
PNB was aware of such restriction.  limitation   on   the   estate,   and   the   foreclosure   of   the   mortgage
“COURT  You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected the title also when you  would necessarily result in the auction of the property.66
 As   early   as Pascua   v.   Talens,67 we   have   explained   the
rationale   for   the   prohibition   against   the   encumbrance   of   a
homestead—its   lease   and   mortgage   included—an   encumbrance
which, by analogy, applies to a free patent.We ruled as follows:
“It   is   well­known   that   the   homestead   laws   were   designed   to
distribute   disposable   agricultural   lots   of   the   State   to   land­
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance
of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of
the patent.”
Further,   an  encumbrance  on a  parcel  of  land  acquired  through
free   patent  constitutes   sufficient   ground   for   the   nullification   of
such grant, as provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
we quote:
“SEC.  124.  Any acquisition,  conveyance,  alienation,  transfer,  or
other   contract   made   or   executed   in   violation   of   any   of   the
provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and
twenty, one hundred and twenty­one, one hundred and twenty­
two,   and   one   hundred   and   twenty­three   of   this   Act shall   be
unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce
the   effect   of  annulling   and   canceling   the  grant,  title,   patent,   or
permit   originally   issued,   recognized   or   confirmed,   actually   or
presumptively,   and   cause   the   reversion   of   the   property   and   its
improvements to the State.”
Mortgage  over   a   parcel   of   land   acquired   through  a   free   patent
grant nullifies the award and constitutes a cause for the reversion
of the property to the state, as we held in Republic v. Court of
Appeals:68
_______________
65
 Siy v. Tan Gun Ga, 119 Phil. 676; 10 SCRA 398, February
29, 1964.
66
 Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390, August 31, 1987.
67
 80 Phil. 792, April 30, 1948, per Bengzon, J. (later C.J.).
68
 281 SCRA 639, November 14, 1997.
378
378  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.
“The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance
of   a   parcel   of   land   acquired   under   a   free   patent   or   homestead
within   five   years   from   the   grant   of   such   patent.   Furthermore,
such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain.”69
To   comply   with   the   condition   for   the   grant   of   the   free   patent,
within five years from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga, Sr. should not
have encumbered the parcel land granted to him. The mortgage
he   made   over   the   land   violated   that   condition.70 Hence,   the
property must necessarily revert to the public domain, pursuant
to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE,   the   Petition   is   GRANTED   and   the   assailed
Decision   SET   ASIDE.   The   Decision   of   the   RTC   of   Roxas   City
(Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Sandoval­Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio­Morales,
JJ., concur.
     Puno (Chairman), J., Abroad on Official Business.
Petition  granted,   judgment  set  aside.   That   of  the  trial  court
reinstanted.
Note.—Where public land is acquired by an applicant through
fraud  and   misrepresentation,   the  State  may   institute  reversion
proceedings   even   after   the   lapse   of   one   year.   (Republic   vs.   De
Guzman, 326 SCRA 574 [2000])

——o0o——

_______________

69
 Republic   v.   Court   of   Appeals,   supra,   p.   648,   per
Panganiban, J.
Republic of the Philippines
70
 Republic of the Philippines v. Garcia, et al., 105 Phil. 826, Supreme Court
May 27, 1959. BaguioCity
379
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights FIRST DIVISION
reserved.
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, G.R. No. 164457
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,
-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, April 11, 2012
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the
States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the
crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused need
notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the
test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to
20, 1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total
sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said
company under the express obligation to account for the
proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said
company, but far from complying with her obligation and
after a reasonable period of time despite repeated
demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said
company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said
company but instead, did, then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company
in the aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
[1]
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the
information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did
not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that
he was the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was
an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became
a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to
take orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like
Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros
Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could
issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she
would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments
for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite
high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded
that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify;
that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts;
that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen
Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the
customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that
balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated
any money of Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a
case against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that
she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work.[2]
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination
and re-crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16,
1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had
requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they
had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected
outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to
the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental,
and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of
around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate
copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon
completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report denominated as
List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/
Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997
marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.[3]
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the
ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a
first column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified
the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted
the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit
minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by
the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
[4]
With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan,
apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby
tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits,
including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and
duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner),
 shall be effective only until the promulgation of this
inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
judgment.
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final
SO ORDERED.[8]
Report) of Discrepancies.[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to
the motion on May 7, 2004.[9]
file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so,
and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their
Issues
respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.[6]

Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her]

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner
Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of
had opted not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence
the accusation against her because, while the charge against her is estafa
remained unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision finding
under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented
petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and offense not alleged or included in the Information under which she was
circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA
arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that said judgment likewise blatantly
PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in
and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in
and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all
the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review
interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the
costs. on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules 1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY
of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER , CHARGED
OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED
UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED
WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING
THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER
IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER
ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS B
TO YY-YY-2, ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE
EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH
WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC.
20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID
EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY
THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION
THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE
THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO
YY-YY-2INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B)
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED DESPITE ACCUSEDS
OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME
CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT
CROSS-EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR
THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO
PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN
INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF
SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENSES OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-
EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN RULING THAT EXHIBIT A, WHICH IS
THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY
SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH
DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND
SELF-SERVING.[10]
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information
for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate
receipts issued by petitioner to her customersviolated
 petitioners right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting
evidence of the falsification of the duplicate
receiptsdespite the information not alleging the
falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were
admissible as evidence of petitioners guilt
for estafaas charged despite their not being duly
authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers
and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation or
conversion wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
when: (a) it held that the information did not have to allege her falsification
of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the
evidence on falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of
a crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect
when the information was filed in the RTC, contained the following
provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the
accusation in the information, to wit:
 Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever
possible, a complaint or information should state the
designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the
statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same,
and if there is no such designation, reference should be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense must
be stated in ordinary and concise language without
repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the informationshould never be taken for granted
by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be
violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation.[11] Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime,
even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in
the information filed against him.
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and
penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayoror reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud
is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if
such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any
of the following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
 xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such
money, goods or other personal property, or denied
his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was
to the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the
offender for the delivery or return of such money,
goods or other personal property.[12]
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner
misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later
falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her
employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually
reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification
in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsificationwas not an offense separate and distinct from the estafacharged
against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification
as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an
essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that
manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her was not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein
completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the substantive
lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege
the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an
element of the estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with
petitioners concern thuswise:
 In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the]
accused that [the] prosecutions evidence utterly fails to
prove the crime charged. According to the defense, the
essence of Karen Guivencans testimony is that the
accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers
served by her by changing or altering the amounts in the
duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is
immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is
misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the
Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever
of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the
[i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and
pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the
testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be
considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not
charged or included in the [i]nformation and would
violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her. The Court is not in accord with such posture
of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that
because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is
merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of
documents, the prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since
the information charges accused only of
misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the
Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no
necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information
as it is not an element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the
crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one
complex crime and when they are considered as two
separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed
when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to
obtain money or goods from another person. In other
words, the falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is
committed to conceal the misappropriation, two
separate offenses of estafa and falsification are
committed. In the instant case, when accused collected
payments from the customers, said collection which
was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified
or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate
copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some
amount of her collection which she did not remit to the
company xxx.[13]
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt
for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. [14] The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense. [15]In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the
weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. [16]Conversely, as
[17]
to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be
acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption
of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up
by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the
commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the
malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the
information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the
Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to
each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of
the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
[18]
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various
duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part,
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually
received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to
Footluckers.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by
petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner.
The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation
or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable
and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made
toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness
can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes
the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the
witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in
court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of
such testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the
veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing
in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged
to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties,
to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she
was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
[19]
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. [20] The testimony
may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21]
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of
the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the
test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered,
not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the
truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in
a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove
that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is
not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
[24]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not
the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded
from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.[25]If hearsay is allowed,

the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. [26]It is then
to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as
evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga partys
right to cross-examine her adversarys witness,the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial
trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section
1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. -
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom
to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept
relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the
1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx ,
the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies
to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability
of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness
of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the
out-of-court statement depends.[27]

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and

extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination,
the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
 Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary
well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely public except last wills and testaments, and
rejected as proof of petitioners misappropriation or conversion. (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to be entered therein.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered All other writings are private.
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
The nature of documents as either public or private determines
how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it
being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
public document and a private document for the purpose of their
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
presentation in evidence, viz:
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by
purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
are either public or private.
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
Public documents are:
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
(a) The written official acts, or records of the instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, context of Section 21,[28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
or of a foreign country;
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; [29](c) when The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
thegenuineness and authenticity of the document petitioner in various receipts, to wit:

ATTY. ABIERA:
have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being offered as Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not
genuine.[31] tally with the original receipts, do you have
copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in
my possession.
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this
were private documents because private individuals executed or generated Honorable Court, can you assure this
them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the (Next Page)
exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution Honorable Court that you will be able to present those
dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 receipts?
A. Yes.
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz: Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the
accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before A. Yes.
any private document offered as authentic is received in Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be accused in this case?
proved either: A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the
receipts also.
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which
or written; or we would present this,or offer the same as
soon as the original receipts can be
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the presented, but for purposes only of your
signature or handwriting of the maker. testimony, Im going to point to you a
certain signature over this receipt number
Any other private document need only be identified FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila
as that which it is claimed to be. Askin, kindly go over the signature and
 tell the Honorable Court whether you are
familiar with the signature? (Next Page)
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER: COURT:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the
collector. number of that receipt?

(Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the
signature rather, of the accused in this ATTY. ABIERA:
case appears? Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts. that: received from Cirila Askin.[32]
ATTY. ABIERA: xxx
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be
presenting the original receipts Your
Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of
will just forego with the testimony of the
witness but we will just present the petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a
same using the testimony of another document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of
witness, for purposes of identifying the
signature of the accused. We will request petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after
that this signature which has been identified the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the
to by the witness in this case be marked,
Your Honor, with the reservation to present original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution
the original copy and present the same to
expressly promised to produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with
offer as our exhibits but for the meantime,
this is only for the purposes of recording, serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was
Your Honor, which we request the same, the
receipt which has just been identified awhile not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to
ago be marked as our Exhibit A You Honor. authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A. witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the
ATTY. ABIERA: effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit
A-1. number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt
was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following
no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary excerpts from her testimony bear out:
Evidence.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number confirmation sheet, will you go over these
Miss witness?
FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by
Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the signature the customer. The other receipt is the one
showing her payment prior to the last
appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had earliersought to payment.
identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
(Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be
this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely marked as Exhibit B-3, receipt number
differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA 20441.
PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, (Next Page)
1997.
COURT:
Mark it.
In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
two receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of
the collector, are your familiar with that
family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw
signature? (shown to witness)
infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently, A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts A. Miss Patula.
either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
 Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA: following excerpts of her testimony show:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Exhibit B-3-a Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records
COURT: showed that this Cecilia Askin has an
Mark it. account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. ZERNA: ATTY. DIEZ:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis,
and the signature as Exhibit B-4-a. office record.
COURT: COURT:
Mark it.[33] Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
xxx A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just
copied that and showed it to the customers
ATTY. ZERNA: for confirmation.
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number
26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
you please identify this receipt if this is the Q. What about the receipts?
receipt of your office? COURT:
A.Yes. Make a follow-up question and what was the result when
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the you copied that amount in the ledger and
collector. Whose signature is this? you had it confirmed by the customers, what
A.Ms. Patula. was the result when you had it confirmed by
Q.How do you know that this is her signature? the customers?
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34] WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still
a balance of P10,971.75.
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the
ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the
balance of this customer is still P10,971.75
amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the
(Next Page)
amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively
relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
[i]n your office?
report on petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.[35]
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the
original and the duplicate, will you please
enlighten the Honorable Court on that
discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully
paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she
has fully paid while in the original
(Next page)
WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven
hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-
five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is
indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was
already forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger
showing that it has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in
the original receipt she has still a balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as
the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that
what you referred to as the receipts, the
original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said
showed that that particular customer still has
a balance of Ten Thousand something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already
entered in the ledger?
A. Yes.[36]
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it
should come as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely
objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and
allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us
several ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina
Cadilig, how much is her account in your
office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to
answer the question, let me interpose our
objection on the ground that this ledger
has not been duly identified to by the
person who made the same. This witness
will be testifying on hearsay matters
because the supposed ledger was not
identified to by the person who made the
same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I
think they were already duly identified by
this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she
who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made
the entries is not this witness, Your Honor.
How do we know that the entries there is
(sic) correct on the receipts submitted to
their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support
that. Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and
she is the auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified
where those entries were taken. So, you
answer the query of counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a
continuing objection to the questions
profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the
ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one
who prepared the entries on those ledgers,
is she still connected with Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of
business. So, exempt from the hearsay
rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions

instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the
genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting
proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by
any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases
supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves
seen the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did
not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with
the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was
the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[38]
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was
hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the
execution of the documents supporting respondents
cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine
Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was
personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation
of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal
knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondents
cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though
she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel
billets received by respondent, she did not have personal
knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped
and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause
of action is founded on breach of insurance contract
covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To
hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets
valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel
billets delivered to and received by the importer, namely
the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned
to handle respondents importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the
volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore
competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify
on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel
billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the
actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared
the summary of the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts prepared by other
persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was
hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected
to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King
failed to properly authenticate respondents documentary
evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of
Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person
who executed it, the person before whom its execution
was acknowledged, any person who was present and
saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the
parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that
King was none of the aforementioned persons. She
merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the
SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually
received had no proven real basis, and Kings
testimony on this point could not be taken at face
value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are
either public or private. Private documents are those that
do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law,
in turn, provides that before any private document is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here,
respondents documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in
Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity
need to be proved before they can be admitted
in evidence.With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported,
respondent presented no supporting evidence
concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo
and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets.
In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to
prove petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because
petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did
not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial
court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony
bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied
thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value.
[39]
Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and
substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the
adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not
set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections
imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers were
prepared in the regular course of business. [40]Seemingly, the RTC applied
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business.
Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
 the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
course of business or duty.
upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the
guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping
obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.
mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to
the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in IV
No reliable evidence on damage
the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The
requisites are as follows:
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or
Court declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to
unable to testify;
indemnify Footluckers in the amount of P131,286.92 with interest of
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer; 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded.
Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries; has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against
her for the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to Footluckers.
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or
in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral, or religious;
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular decision convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged,
course of business or duty.[41]
and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her for

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to

the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the
Stores, Inc.
trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of
guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
 SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO

C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
G.R. No. 198022. April 7, 2014.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­appellee, vs.SONNY
GATARIN y CABALLERO @ “JAY­R”   and   EDUARDO
QUISAYAS, accused,
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, accused­appellant. 
Criminal   Law;   Robbery   with   Homicide;   Elements   of.—To
sustain a  conviction  for robbery  with  homicide,   the prosecution
must   prove   the   following   elements:   (1)   the   taking   of   personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or  by  reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide,  as
used in the generic sense, was committed.
 Same; Corpus Delicti; Words and Phrases; Corpus delicti has
been   defined   as   the   body   or   substance   of   the   crime   and,   in   its
primary sense,  refers  to  the fact that a crime  has actually been
committed.—The   prosecution   did   not   convincingly   establish
the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery. Corpus delicti has been
defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary
sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission
by   someone   of   the   particular   crime   charged.   In   this   case,   the
element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to
have   been   lost   and   stolen   by   appellant,   was   not   adequately
established. We find no sufficient evidence
_______________  
* THIRD DIVISION.
17to   show   either   the   amount   of   money   stolen,   or   if   any
amount   was   in   fact   stolen   from   Januario.   Even   if   we   consider
Januario’s   dying   declaration,   the   same   pertains   only   to   the
stabbing incident and not to the alleged robbery.
Same; Robbery with Homicide; Assuming that robbery was
indeed committed,  the prosecution must establish with certitude
that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being
the   perpetrator’s   main   purpose   and   objective.—Assuming   that
robbery   was   indeed   committed,   the   prosecution   must   establish
with certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery,
the latter being the perpetrator’s main purpose and objective. It is
not   enough   to   suppose   that   the   purpose   of   the   author   of   the
homicide   was   to   rob;   a   mere   presumption   of   such   fact   is   not
sufficient. Stated   in   a   different   manner,   a   conviction   requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the
killing   may   occur   before,   during   or   after   the   robbery.   What   is
crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is
for the prosecution to firmly establish the offender’s intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when
the homicide is actually carried out. In this case, there was no
showing   of   the   appellant’s   intention,   determined   by   their   acts
prior   to,   contemporaneous   with,   and   subsequent   to   the
commission of the crime, to commit robbery. No shred of evidence
is   on   record   that   could   support   the   conclusion   that   appellant’s
primary   motive   was   to   rob   Januario   and   that   he   was   able   to
accomplish   it.   Mere   speculation   and   probabilities   cannot
substitute   for   proof   required   in   establishing   the   guilt   of   an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Hearsay   Evidence   Rule;   Dying
Declaration; Requisites for the Admissibility of Dying Declaration
as   an   Exception   to   the   Hearsay   Evidence   Rule.—A   dying
declaration, although generally inadmissible as  evidence due to
its   hearsay   character,   may   nonetheless   be   admitted   when   the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns
the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the
declarant   is   under   a   consciousness   of   impending   death;   (c)   the
declarant   would   have   been   competent   to   testify   had   he   or   she
survived;   and   (d)   the   dying   declaration   is   offered   in   a   case   in
which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death.
18
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that, in order to make
a   dying   declaration   admissible,   a   fixed   belief   in   inevitable   and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant.—In the case at
bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration
are present. From the records, no questions relative to the second
requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the
declarant   was   under   the   consciousness   of   his   impending   death
when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make
a   dying   declaration   admissible,   a   fixed   belief   in   inevitable   and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief
in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point
of  fact  that renders a  dying  declaration  admissible.   The  test  is
whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and
looked   on   death   as   certainly   impending.   Thus,   the   utterances
made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Res   Gestae;   Words   and   Phrases; Res
gestae refers   to   the   circumstances,   facts,   and   declarations   that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude   the   idea   of   deliberation   and   fabrication.—Even   if
Januario’s   utterances   could   not   be   appreciated   as   a   dying
declaration,   his   statements   may   still   be   appreciated   as   part   of
the res  gestae. Res  gestae refers  to the  circumstances,  facts,   and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the   main   fact   as   to   exclude   the   idea   of   deliberation   and
fabrication.   The   test   of   admissibility   of   evidence   as   a   part   of
the res   gestae is,   therefore,   whether   the   act,   declaration,   or
exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact
or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction   itself,   and   also   whether   it   clearly   negates   any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Criminal   Law;   Aggravating   Circumstances;   Abuse   of
Superior   Strength;   Abuse   of   superior   strength   is   considered
whenever   there   is   a   notorious   inequality   of   forces   between   the
victim   and   the   aggressor,   assessing   a   superiority   of   strength
notoriously   advantageous   for   the   aggressor   which   the   latter
selected   or  took   advantage  of  in  the  commission   of  the  crime.—
From   the   evidence   presented,   we   find   that   as   alleged   in   the
information, abuse of superior strength attended the commission
of the crime, and thus, qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse of
superior   strength   is   considered   whenever   there   is   a   notorious
inequality   of   forces   between   the   victim   and   the   aggressor,
assessing a superiority of strength notori­
19ously   advantageous   for   the   aggressor   which   the   latter
selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime.  
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellant.
 PERALTA, J.:
Assailed   in   this   appeal   is   the   Court   of
Appeals (CA)Decision1 dated February 23, 2011 in C.A.­G.R. CR­
H.C.   No.   03593   affirming   the   Regional   Trial
Court (RTC)2Decision3 dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No.
13838   convicting   appellant   Eduardo   Quisayas   of Robbery   with
Homicide committed   against   the   victim   Januario
Castillo yMasangcay (Januario).
The facts of the case follow:
Appellant   and   accused   Sonny   Gatarin y Caballero   were
charged   in   an   Information4 with Robbery   with
Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00
o’clock (sic) in the evening, at Barangay Poblacion, Municipality
of   Mabini,   Province   of   Batangas,   Philippines   and   within   the
jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,
armed   with   a   bladed   weapon,   conspiring   and   confederating
together,   acting   in   common   accord   and   mutually   helping   each
other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of
the   owner   thereof   and   with   violence   against   or   intimidation   of
person, did then and there will­
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate
Justices   Isaias   P.   Dicdican   and   Rodil   V.   Zalameda,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 2­14.
2 Branch 3, Pallocan West, Batangas City.
3 Penned by Judge Ruben A. Galvez, CA Rollo, pp. 5­11.
4 Records, pp. 2­3.
20fully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   take,   rob,   and   carry   away
cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay
alias “Ka Maning,” to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the   aforementioned   amount   and   that   on   the   occasion   and   by
reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill and
taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the   said   weapon   Januario   Castillo y Masangcay   alias
“Ka Maning,” thereby inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds
to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which
directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Appellant   was   arrested,   while   his   co­accused   remained   at­
large.   When   arraigned,   he   pleaded   “Not   Guilty.”   Trial   on   the
merits thereafter ensued.
The   prosecution   presented   the   testimonies   of   the   following
witnesses: (1) Maria Castillo, the victim’s wife; (2) Howel Umali
(Umali), who allegedly saw how the accused mauled the victim;
(3)   SPO3   Gregorio   G.   Mendoza   (SPO3   Mendoza)   of   the  Mabini
Police   Station,   who   saw   the   victim   lying   on   the   floor   and   the
accused running away from the crime scene, and testified on the
dying   declaration  of  Januario;   (4)   Dr.   Catalino  Ike  A.   Rasa   Jr.
(Dr. Rasa), who attended to the victim when he was brought to
the hospital; and (5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel (PO1 Coronel),
who saw the accused running fast near the crime scene and who,
likewise, testified on Januario’s ante mortem statement.
From   the   testimonies   of   the   above­named   witnesses,   the
prosecution established the following facts:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was
riding  a  bicycle  on  his  way   home  when  he  saw   Januario  being
mauled   by   two   persons   opposite   Dom’s   Studio   in   Poblacion,
Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of
the church until such time that the accused ran
_______________
5 Id.
21away   and   were   chased   by   policemen   who   alighted   from   the
police patrol vehicle.6
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on
board   their   patrol   vehicle   performing   their   routine   patrol   duty
when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were
running at a fast speed. When asked why they were running, the
accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase them.
The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and
when it became evident that they could no longer find them, they
continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario lying on
the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the
policemen   immediately   boarded   Januario   to   the   patrol   vehicle
and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle,
SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that
it was “Jay­R and his uncle” who stabbed him. The uncle turned
out to be the appellant herein, while Jay­R is his co­accused who
remains at­large.7
At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa
who found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by
a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death.8
Maria Castillo,  for her  part, testified on how she learned of
what  happened  to  her  husband,   the  victim  herein,   the  amount
allegedly stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and
loss   incurred   by   reason   of   Januario’s   death.   She,   further,
quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by reason of
such death.9
In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him.
He claimed that he is from the Province of Samar but has been
residing in Cupang, Muntinlupa City since 1987. He
_______________
6 TSN, February 20, 2006, pp. 5­7.
7 Rollo, p. 5.
8 Id.
9 CA Rollo, p. 6.
22denied knowing, much more residing in, Mabini, Batangas, as
he only heard about the province from his employer who happens
to   be   a   resident   therein.   He   claimed   that   he   did   not   know
Januario and that he was, in fact, working in Muntinlupa City on
the date and time the crime was allegedly committed.10
The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon,
however, belied appellant’s claim and insisted that appellant was
renting a house in Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there
until the day the crime was committed.11
On June 20, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision against the
appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the People having proven the guilt of accused
Eduardo Quisayas beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby declared
“GUILTY”   of   the   offense   as   charged.   Accordingly,   he   is   hereby
sentenced to a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, he is hereby ordered to pay herein offended party of
the following:
(a)      civil indemnity in the amount of Php50,000.00;
(b)      actual   damages   in  the  amount  of   Php20,000.00,   plus
Php35,310.00 (funeral and hospital expenses); and
(c)      moral damages in the amount of Php100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.12
 
The   trial   court   gave   credence   to   the   testimony   of   Maria
Castillo not only as to the fact of taking money from Januario but
also the amount taken.13 The fact of death was, likewise, found
by the court to have been adequately proven by the testimony of
Dr. Rasa.14 Though there was no evidence whether the unlawful
taking preceded the killing of Januario,
_______________
10 TSN, November 27, 2007, pp. 1­13.
11 TSN, January 31, 2008, pp. 1­14.
12 Records, pp. 187­188.
13 Id., at pp. 185­186.
14 Id., at p. 186.
23the court held that there was direct and intimate connection
between the two acts.15
As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the
victim’s   response   to   SPO3   Mendoza’s   question   as   to   who
committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae, which
is an exception to the hearsay rule.16 As to appellant’s defense of
alibi,   the   court   gave   more   weight   to   the   prosecution’s   rebuttal
evidence that indeed the former was an actual resident of Mabini,
Batangas.17
On   appeal,   the   CA   affirmed   the   RTC   decision.   Contrary,
however, to the RTC’s conclusion, the appellate court considered
Januario’s   statement   to   SPO3   Mendoza,   that  the   accused   were
the ones who stabbed him and took his wallet, not only as part
of res gestae but also as a dying declaration.18
Hence, the appeal before the Court.
We   find   appellant   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   not   of
robbery with homicide but of murder.
The trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of
the   credibility   of   the   witnesses,   the   probative   weight   of   their
testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings
are   accorded   great   respect   and   even   conclusive   effect.   We,
nevertheless,   fully   scrutinize   the   records,   since   the   penalty
of reclusion perpetua that the CA imposed on appellant demands
no less than this kind of careful and deliberate consideration.19
To   sustain   a   conviction   for   robbery   with   homicide,   the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a
_______________
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 187.
18 Rollo, p. 8.
19 People v. Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, 578
SCRA 601, 613.
24person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.20
First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven as
conclusively   as   any   other   essential   element   of   the   crime.21 In
order for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be
established that a robbery has actually taken place and that, as a
consequence   or   on   the   occasion   of   robbery,   a   homicide   be
committed.22
For   there   to   be   robbery,   there   must   be   taking   of   personal
property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force
upon   on   things.23 Both   the   RTC   and   the   CA   concluded   that
robbery   was   committed   based   on   the   testimonies   of   Maria
Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1 Coronel. A closer look at the
testimonies of these witnesses, however, failed to convince us that
indeed robbery took place.
Maria Castillo’s testimony was offered by the prosecution to
prove   that   her   husband,   the   victim   herein,   was   a   victim   of
robbery with homicide and that he is a businessman, and that she
suffered damages by reason of such death. The pertinent portion
of her direct testimony is quoted below for a closer scrutiny:
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q     The victim in this case Januario Castillo, how are you
related to him?
_______________
20 Id., at p. 621; People v. Latam, G.R. No. 192789, March
23, 2011, 646 SCRA 406, 410; People v. Baron, G.R. No.
185209, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 646, 656.
21 People   v.   Orias,   G.R.   No.   186539,   June   29,   2010,   622
SCRA 417, 430.
22 People v. Abundo, 402 Phil. 616, 635­636; 349 SCRA 577,
594 (2001), citing People v. Pacala, 58 SCRA 370, 377­
 378; (1974); People v. Arondain, 418 Phil. 354, 367; 366 We will object. That will be misleading.
SCRA 98, 104 (2001). COURT:
23 People v. Obedo, 451 Phil. 529, 538; 403 SCRA 431, 438 If she is aware.
(2003). ATTY. EBORA:
25 We submit.
WITNESS: COURT:
A        My husband, sir. You ask her if she is aware who the perpetrators are.
Q        On   November   3,   2004,   do   you   remember   of   any 26
unusual incident that has occurred? ATTY. MASANGYA:
A        Yes, sir. Q  Madam   Witness,   were   you   informed   who   are   the
Q        And what is that event? perpetrators of the crime on your husband?
A      At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening of November 3, WITNESS:
2004   while   I   was   at   home,   policemen   arrived   and A   Not   yet,   sir.   It   was   not   told   to   me   by   the   policemen
informed me that my husband was wounded, sir. because the policemen were in a hurry.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q       Did these police officers inform you the location (sic) of
Q    After the policemen went to your house, was there [any]
where your husband was located?
person who informed you who were the perpetrators of
A       According to the policemen, my husband was at Zigzag
the crime?
Hospital, sir.
A        Yes, sir. My niece.
Q        Did you go to Zigzag Hospital, Madam Witness?
Q        And who is that niece of yours, Madam Witness?
A        Yes, sir.
A        Josephine Borbon, sir.
Q        What  happened,  Madam  Witness,   when you  arrived
Q    Did   Miss   Borbon   tell   you   about   the   identity   of   the
at the hospital?
perpetrators of the crime, Madam Witness?
A       I was informed by the nurse there that my husband
A        Yes, sir.
was already dead.
Q        And who are the persons did Miss Borbon mention?
ATTY. MASANGYA:
A        My   former   helper   Sonny   Gatarin   and   his   uncle
Q     Were   you   informed   of   the   cause   of   the   death   of   your
Eduardo Quisayas, sir.
husband?
Q     You were told that your husband was robbed, how much
WITNESS:
was taken from your husband, Madam Witness?
A     According   to   them   my   husband   was   wounded,   many
A        P20,000.00.
wounds and he was robbed, sir.
Q     And can you tell, Madam Witness, why is your husband
Q     Madam   Witness,   were   you   able   to  know   who   are  the
carrying   that   amount   of   money   at   the   time   of   his
persons responsible for the death of your husband?
death?
ATTY. EBORA:
A        Yes, sir. A       We   felt   deep   sorrow   together   with   my   three   (3)
WITNESS: children, sir. (Witness is crying)
A     Those were the earnings for that day for he delivered x x x x24
merchandise and groceries, sir.
ATTY. MASANGYA: From   the   above   testimony,   it   can   be   inferred   that   Maria
Q   Do   you   know,   Madam   Witness,   if   your   husband   is Castillo obviously was not at the scene of the crime on that fateful
engaged in any business? night as she was only informed that the incident took place and
A        Yes, sir. that  Januario  was  brought to  the  Zigzag  Hospital.   It,   likewise,
Q    And   what   is   your   proof   in   saying   your   husband   is appears that she had no personal knowledge that Januario was
engaged in business? robbed.   While   she   claimed   that   P20,000.00   was   illegally   taken
A   Our   business   was   we   delivered   bottled   goods   and from   him,   no   evidence   was   presented   to   show   that   Januario
groceries, sir. indeed had that amount at that time and that the same was in his
27 possession. As Maria Castillo claimed that the said amount was
Q        The business wherein your husband is engaged has an allegedly received from their clients
existing license with the appropriate local government? _______________
A        Yes, sir. 24 TSN, November 24, 2005, pp. 3­8.
Q     If   a   copy   will   be   shown   to   you,   will   you   be   able   to 28in their grocery business, said fact could have been proven by
identify the same? receipts or testimonies of said clients. The prosecution’s failure to
A        Yes, sir. present   such   evidence   creates   doubt   as   to   the   existence   of   the
Q        I am showing to you [a] certified copy of [the] Mayor’s money.
permit previously marked as Exhibit “H?” The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony
A        This is it, sir. of SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel on the statement of Januario
Q    If   you   know,   Madam   Witness,   how   much   is   your after the commission of the crime. While both policemen testified
husband earning in his sari­sari or grocery business? as  to  the dying  declaration  of Januario pertaining to the cause
WITNESS: and   circumstances   surrounding   his   death,   only   PO1   Coronel
A        Yes, sir. testified   during   his   direct   examination   that   when   asked   who
ATTY. MASANGYA: stabbed him, Januario replied that it was “Jay­Ar and his uncle
Q        How much is he earning at the time? who   stabbed   him   and   took   his   wallet.”25 In   response   to   the
A        He earns P40,000.00. Presiding   Judge’s   clarificatory   question,   however,   PO1   Coronel
Q        In a month or year? admitted   that   when   he   asked   Januario   who   stabbed   him,   he
A        P40,000.00 a month, sir. replied that it was Jay­Ar and his uncle. After which, no further
Q     How   do   you   feel   or   confront   the   situation   that   your question   was   asked.26 On   the   other   hand,   nowhere   in   SPO3
husband is already dead?
Mendoza’s   testimony   did   he   talk   about   the   alleged   taking   of A        None, your Honor.
wallet. The pertinent portions of their testimonies read: x x x x28
Direct Testimony of SPO3 Mendoza:
Direct Examination of PO1 Coronel: x x x x
x x x x Q        And   when   you   saw   Januario   Castillo   lying   on   the
Q    What   did   you   do   next   after   boarding   him   inside   your street, what did you do?
vehicle? A        We lifted him and boarded him in our vehicle then we
A     We brought him at the Zigzag Hospital and we asked brought him to the hospital.
him who stabbed him. Q        While you were travelling, were you able to talk to the
Q        What was his reply Mr. Witness? victim Januario Castillo?
A     He told us that Jay­ar and his uncle stabbed him and A        Yes, sir.
took his wallet. Q        What was your conversation all about?
x x x x27 A        I   asked Ka Maning   Castillo   as   to   who   stabbed   him
_______________ and he answered Jay­R and his uncle.
25 TSN, July 10, 2007, p. 8. x x x x29
26 Id., at p. 20. _______________
27 Id., at p. 8.  
29PO1 Coronel’s Answers  to the questions propounded by 28 Id., at p. 20.
the Presiding Judge: 29 TSN, May 30, 2006, pp. 6­7.
THE COURT: 30
Alright, the Court will ask. It   is,   therefore,   clear   from   the   foregoing   that   the   evidence
Q        When did you talk with the victim? presented to prove the robbery aspect of the special complex crime
A        When we were inside the patrol car, your Honor. of   robbery   with   homicide,   does   not   show   that   robbery   actually
Q        What exactly did you ask from the victim? took   place.   The   prosecution   did   not   convincingly   establish
A        I asked him who stabbed him, your Honor. the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery. Corpus delicti has been
Q        Did you tell the victim his condition? defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary
A        No, your Honor. sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
Q        You just asked the victim who stabbed him? As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission
A        Yes, your Honor. by   someone   of  the  particular   crime   charged.30In   this   case,   the
Q        What was the answer of the victim? element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to
A    That   he   was   stabbed   by   Jay­ar   and   his   uncle,   your have   been   lost   and   stolen   by   appellant,   was   not   adequately
Honor. established.31 We find no sufficient evidence to show either the
Q        And no other question did you ask him? amount of money stolen, or if any amount was in fact stolen from
Januario. Even if we consider Januario’s dying declaration, the
same pertains only to the stabbing incident and not to the alleged
robbery.
 Moreover, assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the
prosecution must establish with certitude that the killing was a
mere incident to the  robbery,  the latter being  the  perpetrator’s
main purpose and objective. It is not enough to suppose that the
purpose   of   the   author   of   the   homicide   was   to   rob;   a   mere
presumption of such fact is not sufficient.32 Stated in a different
manner,   a conviction requires  certitude  that  the  robbery  is the
main purpose, and objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or  after  the  robbery.33  What  is  crucial  for  a  conviction  for  the
crime of   robbery   with  homicide  is  for  the  prosecution  to  firmly
establish   the   offender’s   intent   to   take   personal   property   before
the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out.34 In this case,
_______________
30 People v. Obedo, supra note 23 at pp. 538­539; pp. 438­439.
31 Id., at p. 539; p. 439.
32 People v. Algarme, supra note 19 at p. 625.
33 Id., at p. 621; People v. Latam, supra note 20 at p. 410.
34 People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665, 684; 372 SCRA 401, 417
(2001).
31there was no showing of the appellant’s intention, determined
by their acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to
the  commission  of  the  crime,  to  commit  robbery.35 No  shred  of
evidence   is   on   record   that   could   support   the   conclusion   that
appellant’s primary motive was to rob Januario and that he was
able to accomplish it.36Mere speculation and probabilities cannot
substitute   for   proof   required   in   establishing   the   guilt   of   an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.37
Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery,
the   killing   of   Januario   would   be   classified   either   as   a   simple
homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of
any qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with
homicide.38
To establish the fact that appellant and his co­accused killed
the victim by stabbing him with a bladed weapon, the prosecution
presented Umali as an eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was
this same witness who identified the perpetrators. The trial and
appellate courts also relied on the statement of Januario as to the
circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1 Coronel and SPO3
Mendoza as dying declaration and as part of res gestae.
A   dying   declaration,   although   generally   inadmissible   as
evidence   due   to   its   hearsay   character,   may   nonetheless   be
admitted  when   the  following   requisites   concur,   namely:   (a)   the
declaration   concerns   the   cause   and   the   surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death
appears   to   be   imminent   and   the   declarant   is   under   a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have
been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
_______________
35 See People v. Algarme, supra note 19 at pp. 625­626.
36 People v. Canlas, supra note 34.
37 Id., at pp. 684­685; p. 418.
38 People v. Orias, supra note 21.
32dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of
inquiry involves the declarant’s death.39
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a
dying   declaration   are   present.   From   the   records,   no   questions
relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It
does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of
his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is
that,   in   order   to   make   a   dying   declaration   admissible,   a   fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession   of   death   in   point   of   fact   that   renders   a   dying
declaration   admissible.   The   test   is   whether   the   declarant   has
abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending.40 Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be
considered as a dying declaration.
However,   even   if   Januario’s   utterances   could   not   be
appreciated as  a dying declaration,  his statements may  still be
appreciated   as   part   of   the res   gestae. Res   gestae refers   to   the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous
and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence
as   a   part   of   the res   gestae is,   therefore,   whether   the   act,
declaration, or  exclamation, is so interwoven  or connected with
the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
as   a   part   of   the   transaction   itself,   and   also   whether   it   clearly
negates   any   premeditation   or   purpose   to   manufacture
testimony.41
_______________
39 People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688
SCRA 646, 654; People v. Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30,
2011, 646 SCRA 770, 778.
40 Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012,
685 SCRA 518, 530­531.
41 People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012,
666 SCRA 501, 514.
33
The   requisites   for   admissibility   of   a   declaration   as   part   of
the res gestae concur herein. When Januario gave the identity of
the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling
occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co­accused.
At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that
would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive
his identification of the assailant. His utterance about appellant
and his co­accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question
of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction
to the startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant
because   it   identified   the   accused   as   the   authors   of   the   crime.
Verily,   the   killing   of   Januario,   perpetrated   by   appellant,   is
adequately proven by the prosecution.
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the
information, abuse of superior strength attended the commission
of the crime, and thus, qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse of
superior   strength   is   considered   whenever   there   is   a   notorious
inequality   of   forces   between   the   victim   and   the   aggressor,
assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the
commission of the crime.42
It is clear from the records of the case that Januario was then
fifty­four (54) years old. Appellant, on the other hand, was then
forty (40) years old. Appellant committed the crime with his co­
accused,   his   nephew.   Clearly,   assailants   are   younger   than   the
victim. These two accused were seen by Umali as the persons who
mauled Januario. Moreover, assailants were armed with a bladed
weapon, while Januario was unarmed. This same bladed weapon
was used in repeatedly stabbing Januario, who no longer showed
any act of defense. Dr. Rasa, the medical doctor who attended to
Januario when he was brought to the hospital, also testified as to
the nature and extent of the injury sustained by Januario. He
_______________
 42 People v. Calpito, 462 Phil. 172, 179; 416 SCRA 491, 495
(2003).
34clearly   stated   that   Januario   sustained   three   fatal   injuries
which   caused   his   death.   The   pertinent   portion   of   Dr.   Rasa’s
testimony reads:
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q    How   many   injuries  were  sustained   by   the  victim,   Mr.
Witness?
A       Three.
Q       In what parts of the body was the victim injured?
A     The victim sustained three injuries: one on the left side
of   the   parasternal   border   the   heart   (sic)   and   it
penetrated, and then the second one was on the right
side of the chest near the shoulder and the third one
was under the armpit also to the chest.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q        Which   of   those   injuries   caused   the   death   of   the
victim?
A    All   of   them   are   fatal,   because   the   one   over   the   heart
penetrated   the   heart   and   the   aorta.   The   one   in   the
anterior   chest   near   the   right   shoulder   hit   the   blood
vessels of the armpit and the wound under the armpit
apparently hit the lungs.
x x x x43
This same physician issued the Medical Certificate explaining
the location of the stab wounds as well as the cause of death of
Januario, to wit:
Location of Stab Wounds:
1. Stab   wound   penetrating   2nd inter­costal   space   left   para­
sternal  border,  6”  deep penetrating  the  heart  chambers  and
aorta.
2.       Stab   wound   over   the   right   anterior   deltoid   muscle,
penetrating 3” into the right axilla space; injuring the axilla
blood vessels.
3. Stab wound over the right axilla, penetrating to the right
chest cavity.
_______________
43 TSN, May 24, 2007, pp. 5­6.
35
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate Cause: Hypovolemic Shock
Antecedent   Cause: Multiple   stab   wounds   to   the   anterior
chest,  right  axilla,   and  right  axilla   penetrating   the  chest
cavity.
x x x x44
From the testimony of the eyewitness and corroborated by the
medical certificate of Dr. Rasa, it can be inferred that indeed the
qualifying   circumstance   of   abuse   of   superior   strength   attended
the   commission   of   the   crime.  To   be   sure,   with   two   assailants
younger   than   the   victim,   armed   with   a   bladed   weapon   and
inflicting multiple mortal wounds on the victim, there is definitely
abuse   of   superior   strength   deliberately   taken   advantage   of   by
appellant and his co­accused in order to consummate the offense.
Now   on  the  penalty.  Article  248   of  the  Revised  Penal   Code
provides:
ART. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the
provisions   of   article   246   shall   kill   another,   shall   be   guilty   of
murder  and  shall   be  punished  by reclusion   perpetua to  death  if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With   treachery, taking   advantage   of   superior
strength, with   the   aid   of   armed   men,   or   employing   means   to
weaken  the  defense   or  of  means  or  persons   to insure   or  afford of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
impunity. perpetua.
x x x x45 We,   likewise, ORDER appellant TO   PAY the   heirs   of   the

There   being   neither   mitigating   nor   aggravating victim   Januario   Castillo y Masangcay   the   following:   (1)
P35,300.00   actual   damages;   (2)   P50,000.00   civil   indemnity;   (3)
circumstances, appellant shall be meted the penalty of reclusion
P50,000.00   moral   damages;   (4)   P30,000.00   exemplary   damages;
perpetua. plus (5) six percent (6%) interest on all damages awarded from
Finally, the award of damages.  In murder, the grant of civil the date of the finality of this decision until full payment.
indemnity which has been fixed by jurisprudence at _______________
_______________
46 People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010, 611
44 Records, p. 144.
SCRA 633, 646­647.
45 Emphasis supplied.
47 People v. Camat, G.R. No. 188612, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA
36P50,000.00 requires no proof other than the fact of death as a
result   of   the   crime   and   proof   of   the   accused’s   responsibility 640,   672; People   v.   Concillado,   G.R.   No.   181204,   November   28,
therefor. Moral damages, on the other hand, which in this case is 2011,  661  SCRA 363,  384; People v.  Rebucan,  G.R. No.  182551,
also P50,000.00 are awarded in view of the violent death of the July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 726, 760.
victim.46 Moreover,   exemplary   damages   in   the   amount   of 37SO ORDERED.
P30,000.00 should likewise be given, considering that the offense Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ.,
was attended by an aggravating circumstance whether ordinary, concur.
or qualifying as in this case. As duly proven by Maria Castillo, Judgment modified, Eduardo Quisayas guilty of murder. 
actual damages representing the hospital and funeral expenses,
as evidenced by receipts in the amount of P35,300.00, be awarded.
Finally, in addition and in conformity with current policy, we also
G.R. No. 214453. June 17, 2015.*
impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) from date of finality of this decision
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
until full payment.47
BERNABE P. PALANAS alias “ABE,” accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court
Criminal Law; Murder; Murder is defined and
of   Appeals   Decision   dated   February   23,   2011   in   C.A.­G.R.   CR­
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
H.C.   No.   03593,   affirming   the   Regional   Trial   Court   Decision
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659 .—
dated   June   20,   2008   in   Criminal   Case   No.   13838,   convicting
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of
appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide. We find
the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, as
appellant   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of   the   crime
follows: Art. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances: 1. With
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery;
There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against a person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.—Treachery is a well-
established concept in criminal law. “There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against a
person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might
make.” There are two (2) conditions therefore that must
be met for treachery to be appreciated: ( a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
Same; Same; Same; The essence of treachery is
that the attack comes without warning in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, granting the victim
no chance to resist or escape .—The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without warning in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, granting the
victim no chance to
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
319
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
resist or escape. The attack must be sudden and
unexpected rendering the victim unable and
unprepared to put up a defense. With the foregoing in
mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and
the CA that Palanas killed SPO2 Borre, and that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
same. The records show that SPO2 Borre was outside
carrying his grandson when two (2) assailants shot him.
During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no opportunity to
raise any meaningful defense against his assailants;
and consequently, he suffered multiple gunshot wounds
on his head and trunk, causing his death.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Dying Declaration;
Hearsay Evidence Rule; Conditions for a dying
declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule.—For a dying declaration to constitute an
exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4)
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the credence since no person aware of his impending death
declarant is the victim. On the other hand, a statement
would make a careless and false accusation. Verily,
to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus,
because the declaration was made in extremity, when
constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay the party is at the point of death and when every
evidence, requires the concurrence of the following motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth,
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
as creating an obligation equal to that which is
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in imposed by an oath administered in court.
question and its immediately attending circumstances. Same; Same; Res Gestae; The test of admissibility
Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
the point of death and when every motive of falsehoodintimately interwoven or connected with the principal
is silenced and the mind is induced by the most fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposedmanufacture testimony.—In the same vein, SPO2
by an oath administered in court .—In the case at bar,
Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form
SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a part of the res gestae. “Res gestae refers to the
dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
circumstances of his death and taking into
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
under a fixed belief that his own death was already fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
the highest order and is entitled to utmost declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
320 or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates
0
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
People vs. Palanas
testimony.” In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer
to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by
Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the
authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by
the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Alibi; It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense, and may only be considered if
the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it
would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime .—On the
other hand, the Court does not find credence in
Palanas’ defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense, and may only be considered if
the following circumstances are shown: ( a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and ( b) it
would be physi-
321
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
cally impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the alleged crime. In this case, the RTC
correctly observed that aside from the admission that
travel from Parañaque City to Pasig City only takes
about one (1) hour, the incident occurred on a Sunday
when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas
had access to a motorcycle that allowed him to travel
faster on the date and time of the incident. Under the
circumstances, there is the possibility that Palanas
could have been present at the locus criminis at the
time of the shooting. Accordingly, his defense of alibi
must fall.
Same; Penalties; Section 3 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9346 provides that “[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL), as amended.”—Anent the proper penalty to be
imposed upon Palanas, Section 3 of RA No. 9346
provides that “[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended.” Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by
accused-appellant Bernabe P. Palanas alias “Abe”
(Palanas) assailing the Decision 2 dated January 16,
2014 of the Court of Appeals
_______________
1 See Notice of Appeal dated January 30, 2014;
Rollo, pp. 19-21.
2 Id., at pp. 2-18. Penned by Associate Justice Elihu
A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring.
322
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
People vs. Palanas
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04925, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 20, 2010, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 133352-H finding Palanas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
An Information4 was filed before the RTC charging
Palanas of the murder of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio
(SPO2 Borre), viz.:
On or about March 26, 2006, in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
[Palanas], acting in conspiracy with one male person
who is at-large, whose true identity and whereabout[s]
are still unknown acted as coprincipal in the killing of
one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio, committed as follows:
said male person, armed with a gun, with intent to kill
and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shot one
SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio on his head and different
parts of his body which directly caused his death, and
thereafter, took the firearm of the said victim, boarded
a motorcycle driven by the accused who thereafter,
drove the motorcycle away from the scene of the crime.
Contrary to Law.5
The prosecution presents the following version of the
facts:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2
Borre took his five (5)-month-old grandson outside his
residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio
Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3
Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre’s residence, was
watching television when four
_______________
3 CA Rollo, pp. 27-41. Penned by Pairing Judge
Nicanor A. Manalo, Jr.
4 Id., at pp. 11-12.
5 Id.
323
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
(4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked
through the open door of SPO2 Borre’s house and saw
two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a
meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver
the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify
the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled
on a motorcycle.6
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre’s stepson
Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig
City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2
Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was “Abe,”
“Aspog,” or “Abe Palanas” — referring to his neighbor,
Palanas — who shot him. This statement was repeated
to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who
followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o’clock in the
morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot
wounds on his head and trunk.7
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial
and alibi. He claimed that on March 25, 2006 he was in
Parañaque City attending to the needs of his sick
father. The next day, he went to a baptism in Tondo,
Manila and stayed there from morning until 9 o’clock in
the evening, after which he returned to his father in
Parañaque City. He maintained that he was not aware
of the death of SPO2 Borre until he was informed by a
neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him of killing
her husband. He also denied any knowledge why
Resurreccion would blame him for SPO2 Borre’s death. 8
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision9 dated October 20, 2010, the RTC
convicted Palanas of the crime of Murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO2
Borre the amounts of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 3.
7 Id., at pp. 3-4.
8 CA Rollo, pp. 31-32.
9 Id., at pp. 27-41.
324
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
People vs. Palanas
indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; ( c)
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) P2,464,865.0710
as actual damages.11
The RTC found that the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and his
companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre
through the positive identification of the eyewitnesses
to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre’s statements that
Palanas shot him constituted an ante mortem
statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus,
admissible as evidence against Palanas. It further
opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre’s killing as
he had no inkling that the attack would take place, and
that he was in no position to mount any feasible
defense.12 The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident
premeditation because of the absence of the following
elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused clung to his determination; and ( c) a
sufficient lapse of time between determination and
execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.13
On the other hand, the RTC gave no credence to
Palanas’ defense of alibi. It observed that it was not
physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus
criminis as his own witness even stated that the
distance between Pasig City and Parañaque City could
be traversed in less than one (1) hour.14
_______________
10 Id., at p. 41. The RTC provided a breakdown of
the amount awarded as actual damages:
11 Id.
12 Id., at pp. 36-39.
13 Id., at p. 36.
14 Id., at pp. 38-39.
325
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
Dissatisfied, Palanas appealed his conviction to the
CA.15
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision16 dated January 16, 2014, the CA affirmed
the RTC’s ruling with modification increasing the
amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre to
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The CA found all the elements of the crime of Murder to
be present, giving probative weight to the dying
declaration of SPO2 Borre that it was Palanas who shot
him. It also found the presence of treachery as SPO2
Borre was in no position to defend himself when he was
successively shot.17
Aggrieved, Palanas filed the instant appeal.18
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not
Palanas’ conviction for the crime of Murder should be
upheld.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, 19
as follows:
_______________
15 See Notice of Appeal dated February 18, 2011;
id., at p. 42.
16 Rollo, pp. 2-18.
17 Id., at pp. 11-16.
18 See Notice of Appeal dated January 30, 2014; id.,
at pp. 19-21.
19 Entitled “An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Laws, as Amended, Other Special Penal
Laws, and for Other Purposes” (approved on December
13, 1993).
326
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
People vs. Palanas
Art. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be treachery attended
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
Treachery is a well-established concept in criminal law.
“There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against a person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.”20 There are two (2)
conditions therefore that must be met for treachery to
be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and ( b) the
means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.21
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes
without warning in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, granting the victim no chance to resist or
escape. The attack must be sudden and unexpected
rendering the victim unable and unprepared to put up a
defense.22
With the foregoing in mind, the Court agrees with the
findings of the RTC and the CA that Palanas killed SPO2
Borre, and that the qualifying circumstance of
_______________
20 Item 16, Article 14 of the RPC.
21 See People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9,
2014, 725 SCRA 597, citing People v. Lacaden, 620 Phil.
807, 824; 605 SCRA 784, 800 (2009).
22 See People v. Warriner, G.R. No. 208678, June 16,
2014, 726 SCRA 469.
327
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
the same. The records show that SPO2 Borre was
outside carrying his grandson when two (2) assailants
shot him. During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no
opportunity to raise any meaningful defense against his
assailants; and consequently, he suffered multiple
gunshot wounds on his head and trunk, causing his
death.23
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s
statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
For a dying declaration24 to constitute an exception to
the hearsay evidence rule,25 four (4) conditions must
concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; ( b)
that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious of his impending death; ( c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and ( d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide,
Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. 26
On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form
part of the res gestae,27 and thus, constitute another
exception to the
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 3-5.
24 Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 37. Dying declaration.—The declaration of
a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
25 “Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce.” (See Espineli v. People,
G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 365) See also
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
26 People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February
22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 512.
27 Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 42. Part of res gestae.—Statements made
by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to
328
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
People vs. Palanas
rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; ( b) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.28
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute
a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into
consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it
may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same
under a fixed belief that his own death was already
imminent.29 This declaration is considered evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation. 30 Verily, because
the declaration was made in extremity, when the party
is at the point of death and when every motive of
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the
law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by an oath administered in court.31
In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may
likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the
_______________
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as
part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
28 People v. Villarico, Sr., 662 Phil. 399, 418; 647
SCRA 43, 58-59 (2011).
29 People v. Cerilla, 564 Phil. 230, 240; 539 SCRA
251, 262 (2007).
30 Id., citing People v. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696, 715;
375 SCRA 95, 112 (2002).
31 Id., at p. 241, citing United States v. Gil, 13 Phil.
530, 549 (1909); People v. Saliling, 161 Phil. 559, 572-
573; 69 SCRA 427, 438 (1976).
329
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are
so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
32
testimony.” In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements
refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by
Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the
authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by
the prosecution.33
On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in
Palanas’s defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense,34 and may only be considered
if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and ( b) it
would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.35 In this
case, the RTC correctly observed that aside from the
admission that travel from Parañaque City to Pasig City
only takes about one (1) hour, the incident
_______________
32 See People v. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022, April 7,
2014, 721 SCRA 16, citing People v. Salafranca, G.R. No.
173476, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 514.
33 Id.
34 People v. Amistoso, G.R. No. 201447, January 9,
2013, 688 SCRA 376, 394, citing People v. Abulon, 557
Phil. 428, 447; 530 SCRA 675, 696 (2007).
 35 People v. Agcanas, G.R. No. 174476, October 11,
2011, 658 SCRA 842, 847.
330
33 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
People vs. Palanas
occurred on a Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy.
Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle that
allowed him to travel faster on the date and time of the
incident.36 Under the circumstances, there is the
possibility that Palanas could have been present at the
locus criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly,
his defense of alibi must fall.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Palanas,
Section 3 of RA 934637 provides that “[p]ersons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”
Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.38
Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the
Court increases the amounts of damages awarded to
the heirs of SPO2 Borre, as follows: ( a) P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
39
(c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully
paid.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04925 finding accused-appellant
Bernabe P. Palanas alias “Abe,” GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
punished under Article 248 of the
_______________
36 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
37 Entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines” (approved on June 24,
2006).
38 See People v. Arguta, G.R. No. 213216, April 22,
2015, 756 SCRA 376. See also People v. Gani, G.R. No.
195523, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 530, 540.
39 People v. Serenas, 636 Phil. 495, 512-513; 622
SCRA 485, 502 (2010).
40 See People v. Balute, G.R. No. 212932, January
21, 2015, 748 SCRA 172.
331
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, and ordered to pay the heirs of SPO2 Ramon
Borre y Orio the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
as exemplary damages, and P2,464,865.07 as actual
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment
until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with
modification.
Notes.—The statement of the victim an hour before
his death and right after the hacking incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule. (People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501
[2013])
The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant.
(People vs. Quisayas, 721 SCRA 16 [2014])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997  197
People vs. Bernal
G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997.*
THE   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs. THEODORE   BERNAL,   JOHN   DOE   and   PETER
DOE, accused­appellants.
Criminal   Law; Kidnapping; Evidence; In   kidnapping,   what
is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the
subsequent   disappearance   of   the   victim   will   not   exonerate   an
accused  from  prosecution  therefor.—The Court  notes  that  up   to
this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This,
however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of
the case. In kidnapping, what is important is to determine and
prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the
victim  will not  exonerate  an  accused from prosecution  therefor.
Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the simple
expedient of disposing of their victims’ bodies.
Same; Same; Same; For the charge of kidnapping to prosper,
the   deprivation   of   the   victim’s   liberty,   which   is   the   essential
element of  the  offense,  must  be duly  proved.—For  the  charge  of
kidnapping   to   prosper,   the   deprivation   of   the   victim’s   liberty,
which is the essential 
_______________
*
 SECOND DIVISION.
198
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
98 
People vs. Bernal
element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at
bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other
unknown   individuals   “as   shown   by   their   concerted   acts
evidentiary   of   a   unity   of   thought   and   community   of   purpose.”
Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence
of  a  chain  of  circumstances  only.   The  circumstances  present  in
this case sufficiently indicate the participation of Bernal in the
disappearance of Openda, Jr.
 Same; Same; Same; Motive; Motive   is   generally   irrelevant,
unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator.
—Motive   is   generally   irrelevant,   unless   it   is   utilized   in
establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably
inferred   that   the   accused   was   the   malefactor,   motive   may   be
sufficient   to   support   a   conviction.   Openda,   Jr.’s   revelation   to
Enriquez  regarding   his   illicit  relationship  with  Bernal’s   wife  is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Declaration   Against   Interest; Requisites
before   a   statement   may   be   admissible.—A   statement   may   be
admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:
“(1)   that   the   declarant   is   dead   or   unable   to   testify;   (2)   that   it
relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at
the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that
the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the
declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration
to be true.”
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Findings of fact of a trial court
carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent
any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better
position   to   decide   the   question   of   credibility   of   witnesses.—The
court a   quo committed   no   error   in   finding   the   testimonies   of
Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. The
court said that Sagarino’s forthright answers to the questions of
the   prosecutor   and   defense   counsel   clearly   establish   the
participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping of Openda,
Jr.   Evidence,   to   be   believed,   must   not   only   proceed   from   the
mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. This
Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established rule
that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are
entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason
to   the   contrary,   since   it   is   in   a   better   position   to   decide   the
question of credibility of witnesses.
199
VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997  199 
People vs. Bernal
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao 
City, Br. 10.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Johnny P. Landero for accused Theodore Bernal.
ROMERO, J.:
Accused­appellant   Theodore   Bernal,   together   with   two   other
persons   whose   identities   and   whereabouts   are   still   unknown,
were charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No.
26658­98 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10,
under   an   information1 dated   July   13,   1992,   which   reads   as
follows:
“That   on   or   about   August   5,   1991,   in   the   City   of   Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovementioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring,
confederating and cooperating together and helping one another,
and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully,
unlawfully,   and   feloniously   grabbed   and   kidnapped   one
Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with
his friends at Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed
and carried away using a PU then fled together with Bienvenido
Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of
his liberty against his will.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.”
A  plea   of  not  guilty   having   been  entered  by   Bernal   during   his
arraignment,   trial   ensued.   The   prosecution   presented   four
witnesses.2 On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his
defense.  drug­pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence,
_______________
1
 Rollo, p. 5.
2
 Namely,   Salito   Enriquez,   a   tailor   and   resident   of   Kasilac,
Bucana,   Davao   City;   Roberto   Racasa,   a   mason   and   resident   of
Kasilac,   Bucana,   Davao   City;   Adonis   Sagarino,   a   student   and
resident   of   Boston   Isla;   and   Teresita   Openda,   the   mother   of
Bienvenido Openda, Jr.
200
200  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Bernal
The material facts and events as found by the court a quoare:
It   appears   that   on   August   5,   1991,   around   11:30   in   the
morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in
a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join
them.
After   a   few   minutes,   Bernal   decided   to   leave   both   men,
apparently  because  he was going  to  fetch his child.  Thereafter,
two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if
he was “Payat.”3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled
out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him “not
to   run   because   they   were   policemen”   and   because   he   had   an
“atraso” or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him
away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and
informed the latter’s mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of
a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had
an illicit affair with Bernal’s wife Naty and this was the motive
behind   the  former’s  kidnapping.   Until   now,   Openda,   Jr.   is  still
missing.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a
was never kidnapped.4
On   December   10,   1993,   the   court a   quo rendered
judgment5 finding Bernal “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime   of   kidnapping   for   the   abduction   and   disappearance   of
Bienvenido Openda,  Jr.  under Article 267 of the Revised  Penal
Code   and   hereby   sentences   him   to reclusion   perpetua and   to
indemnify   his   mother   Teresita   Openda   in   the   amount   of
P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral suffering.”6
_______________
3
 TSN, May 10, 1993, p. 9.
4
 Rollo, p. 9.
5
 Penned by Judge Augusto V. Breva.
6
 Rollo, p. 24.
201
VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997  201 
People vs. Bernal
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to
the prosecution witnesses’ allegedly illusory testimonies and for
convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the
lower court.
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his
body has been found. This, however, does not preclude the Court
from   ruling   on   the   merits   of   the   case.   In   kidnapping,   what   is
important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the
subsequent   disappearance   of   the   victim   will   not   exonerate   an
accused   from   prosecution   therefor.   Otherwise,   kidnappers   can
easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of
their victims’ bodies.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
“ART. 267.—Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. 1.If  the kidnapping  or  detention shall  have lasted more
than five days.
2. 2.If   it   shall   have   been   committed   simulating   public
authority.
3. 3.If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. 4.If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was   committed   for   the   purpose   of   extorting   ransom   from   the
victim   or   any   other   person,   even   if   none   of   the   circumstances
abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.”
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the
victim’s   liberty,   which   is   the   essential   element   of   the   offense,
must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted
in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals “as shown
by their concerted acts evidentiary of a  even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel
202
202  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Bernal
unity of thought and community of purpose.”7 Proof of conspiracy
is   perhaps   most   frequently   made   by   evidence   of   a   chain   of
circumstances   only.8 The   circumstances   present   in   this   case
sufficiently   indicate   the   participation   of   Bernal   in   the
disappearance of Openda, Jr.
The prosecution has proffered sufficient evidence to show that,
indeed,   Bernal,   together   with   his   two   companions,   abducted
Openda,   Jr.   on   August   5,   1991.   A   certain   Adonis   Sagarino,   a
childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw
Bernal   at   the   billiard   hall   at   about   11:00   a.m.   with   his   two
companions   and   overheard   him   dispatching   one   of   them   to
“Tarsing’s Store” to check if a certain person was still there. This
person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the
latter’s  presence  was  confirmed,   the three  men left  the  billiard
hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already  handcuffed, passed by
the billiard hall with Bernal’s companions.
Equally   important   is   the   testimony   of   Roberto   Racasa,   a
resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both Bernal and the
victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated
that he and the victim were drinking at “Tarsing’s Store” on that
fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them.
After   a   few   minutes,   Bernal   decided   to   leave,   after   which,   two
men came to the store and asked for “Payat.” When Openda, Jr.
confirmed   that   he   was   indeed   “Payat,”   he   was   handcuffed   and
taken away by the unidentified men. Likewise, a certain Salito
Enriquez,   a   tailor   and   a   friend   of   Openda,   Jr.,   testified   that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he
and   Bernal’s   wife   Naty   were   having   an  affair.   One  time,   Naty
room. He advised Naty “not to do it again because she (was) a
married woman.9
_______________
7
 People v. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 (1993).
8
 People v. Minanday, 242 SCRA 620 (1995).
9
 TSN, May 10, 1993, p. 5.
203
VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997  203
People vs. Bernal
Undoubtedly, his wife’s infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to
contemplate revenge.
Motive   is   generally   irrelevant,   unless   it   is   utilized   in
establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably
inferred   that   the   accused   was   the   malefactor,   motive   may   be
sufficient   to   support   a   conviction.10 Openda,   Jr.’s   revelation   to
Enriquez  regarding   his   illicit  relationship  with  Bernal’s   wife  is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
“Sec. 38. Declaration against interest.—The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was   made   so   far   contrary   to   declarant’s   own   interest,   that   a
reasonable   man   in   his   position   would   not   have   made   the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors­in­interest and against
third persons.”
With   the   deletion   of   the   phrase   “pecuniary   or   moral   inter­est”
from the present provision, it is safe to assume that “declaration
against   interest”   has   been   expanded   to   include   all   kinds   of
interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.11
A   statement   may   be   admissible   when   it   complies   with   the
following   requisites,   to   wit:   “(1)   that   the   declarant   is   dead   or
unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of
the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true.”12
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot
be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a
declaration against his own interest since his affair 
_______________
10
 People v. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611 (1996).
11
 Francisco on Evidence, 1993 edition, p. 275.
12
 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 7th Revised Ed., p.
609.
204
204  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Bernal
with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13because
no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment.14
In   his   brief,   Bernal   highlights   supposed   inconsistencies   in
Sagarino’s  testimony.  He alleges that  the latter  could not  have
seen the actual handcuffing because “Tarsing’s Store” could not be
seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino’s testimony shows that after
Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back
with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed. 
“Q  The three of them together? 
A  Yes, sir.  If one had a direct view of “Tarsing’s Store” from the billiard hall,
Q  And what about you, where did you stay?  Bernal   would   not   have   requested   his   companion   to   check   if
A  I just stayed in the billiard hall.  Openda,   Jr.   were   still   there   drinking   with   Racasa.   Another
discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of
Q  While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see 
Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on crossexamination, stated: 
next? 
“Q  After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his 
A  The two came back. 
child, is that correct? 
Q  Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back? 
A  Yes, sir, because I was still in the store.”17
A  The companions of Bernal. 
On the other hand, Sagarino averred that: 
Q  And what did these two men do? 
“Q  When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see 
A  They apprehended Jun­jun Openda.”15
him again? 
From   this   proceeding,   Bernal   wrongly   inferred   that   Sagarino
A  Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back 
actually   saw   Openda,   Jr.   arrested.   The   lower   court   correctly
rejected this argument by holding that: and proceeded to Tarcing Store and arrested Jun­Jun Openda. When these 
“But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of two men brought out Jun­jun Openda, fifteen minutes later, Bernal came. 
Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the contrary, he Q  Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic) 
says   that   he   had   not   known   who   the   person   was   that   Bernal A  He was coming from outside. 
referred to when he requested one of this two companions to go Q  He has with him his son? 
see if that person was still there at the store, and that he came to A  He was with nobody, sir. 
know that he was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass Q  Are you sure of that? 
by the billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two unidentified
A  Yes, sir. 
companions   of   Bernal   with   him,   on   their   way   out   to   the   main
Q  He was alone? 
road.”16
A  Yes, sir.”18
_______________ The   testimonies   of   Racasa   and   Sagarino   are   not   absolutely
inconsistent with each other as to be irreconcilable. Considering
13
 Rollo, p. 11. the   proximity   of   the   store   from   the   billiard   hall,   there   is   a
14
 People v. Toledo and Holgado, 51 Phil. 825. possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store,
15
 TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 7­8. the   latter   could   have   already   brought   home   his   son   before
16
 TSN, October 13, 1993, pp. 3­5. proceeding   alone   to   the   billiard   hall   where   he   was   seen   by
205 Sagarino.19
VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997  205
_______________
People vs. Bernal
 17
 TSN, May 10, 1993, p. 13. latter’s   allegations   were   true,   then   Sagarino   should   have   been
18
 TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 21­22. arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court.
19
 Rollo, p. 90. No such arrest was, however, made.
206 The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies
206  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  of   Enriquez,   Racasa   and   Sagarino   sufficient   to   convict   Bernal.
People vs. Bernal The court said that Sagarino’s forthright answers to 
Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino’s testimony by
imputing revenge as his motive for testifying. He alleges that on _______________
July   29,   1991,   or   six   days   before   the   alleged   kidnapping,   five
policemen   arrived   at   Kasilak,   Bucana   on   board   a   patrol   car  TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 4.
20

asking   for   Openda,   Jr.,   Sagarino,   Joseph   Mendoza,   Dansoy 207

Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents VOL. 274, JUNE 19, 1997  207 
of the place and staying at the billiard hall and mahjong house. People vs. Bernal
The policemen departed and went to the places he mentioned.  the   questions   of   the   prosecutor   and   defense   counsel   clearly
“Q  Minutes later do you know what happened?  establish   the   participation   of   Bernal   in   the   abduction   or
“A  They came back.  kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only
“Q  What did you do after they came back?  proceed   from   the   mouth   of   a   credible   witness,   but   must   be
credible   in   itself.21 This   Court   once   again   finds   occasion   to
“A  I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were 
reiterate the established rule that the findings of fact of a trial
looking (for)? 
court carry  great  weight  and  are  entitled  to  respect  on appeal,
“Q  What was their answer?  absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in
“A  They answered in the negative.  a   better   position   to   decide   the   question   of   credibility   of
“Q  Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do?  witnesses.22
“A  I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?)  We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the
“Q  What was the answer of the policemen?  victim has yet to resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is
“A  The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because  safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.
Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate
accordingly (sic) they were marijuana pushers.”20
Bernal’s   position   is   that   no   abduction   or   kidnapping   ever   took Sentence   Law,   recommended   to   this   Court   the   penalty   of
place but that an arrest was made by pursuing policemen. This seventeen   (17)   years   of reclusion   temporal,   as   minimum,
contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous. to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. The maximum penalty must
The   trial   court   correctly   appreciated   the   testimony   of be   determined   in   accordance   with   rules   and   provisions   of   the
Sagarino, it being free from any ill­motive against Bernal. If the Revised   Penal   Code.   With   respect   to   the   minimum   penalty,
however, “it is left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without reserved.
reference   to   the   periods   into   which   it   may   be
subdivided.”23 Consistent   with   this   ruling,   this   Court
imposes reclu­sion   temporal,   in   its   maximum   period,   as   the
minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED and the appealed decision dated November 18, 1993,
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused­appellant Theodore Bernal.

_______________

21
 People v. Ulpindo, 256 SCRA 201 (1996).
22
 People   v.   Catoltol,   Sr., G.R.   No.   122359,   November   28,
1996; People   v.   Balisnomo, G.R.   No.   118990,   November   28,
1996; People v. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685 (1995).
23
 People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109.
208
208  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Sahagun
SO ORDERED.
     Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres,   Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed, judgment affirmed in toto.
Note.—For   kidnapping   to   exist,   there   must   be   indubitable
proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended   party   of   her   liberty.   (People   vs.   Godoy, 250   SCRA 582  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
676 [1995]) Tison vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997.*
——o0o——
CORAZON   DEZOLLER   TISON   and   RENE   R.   DEZOLLER,
petitioners, vs. COURT   OF   APPEALS   and   TEODORA
DOMINGO, respondents.
Filiation; Parent   and   Child; Presumptions; There   is   no
presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder   morality   and   more   convincing   reason   than   the
presumption   that   children   born   in   wedlock   are   legitimate.—It
seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court
have   regrettably   overlooked   the   universally   recognized
presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law
more   firmly   established   and   founded   on   sounder   morality   and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Same; Same; Same; Actions; Actions   for   Reconveyance; The
issue of legitimacy cannot be properly controverted in an action for
reconveyance.—The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are
the   legitimate   children   of   Hermogenes   Dezoller   cannot   be
properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This
is   aside,   of   course,   from   the   further   consideration   that   private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein   petitioners.   The   presumption   consequently   continues   to
operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Same; Same; Same; Burden   of   Proof; The   burden   of   proof
rests   on   the   party   who   disputes   the   legitimacy   of   a   particular
party.—Even 
______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
* evidence   and   support   a   finding   or   decision.   Perforce,   a
583
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  583 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
assuming   that   the   issue   is   allowed   to   be   resolved   in   this
case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have
the   benefit   of   the   presumption   in   their   favor,   but   on   private
respondent   who   is   disputing   the   same.   This   fact   alone   should
have   been   sufficient   cause   for   the   trial   court   to   exercise
appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to
evidence.   It   would   have   delimited   the   issues   for   resolution,   as
well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In   order   to   destroy   the
presumption   of   legitimacy,   the   party   against   whom   it   operates
must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.—
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in
whose   favor   the  presumption  exists   does   not  have  to  introduce
evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that
fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of
proof   to   overthrow   the   presumption.   The   presumption   of
legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the
burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in
order   to   destroy   the   presumption,   the   party   against   whom   it
operates   must   adduce   substantial   and   credible   evidence   to   the
contrary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A   presumption   is   prima   facie
proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established
prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it
must   stand   as   proved.—Where   there   is   an   entire   lack   of
competent   evidence   to   the   contrary,   and   unless   or   until   it   is
rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of
presumption   must   be   followed   if   it   is   uncontroverted.   This   is
based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the
fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by
the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as
proved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pleadings   and   Practice; When   a
party opts not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, he
or   she   in   effect   impliedly   admits   the   truth   of   such   fact.—
Indubitably,   when   private   respondent   opted   not   to   present
countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely
filing   a   demurrer   to   evidence   instead,   she   in   effect   impliedly
admitted   the   truth   of   such   fact.   Indeed,   she   overlooked   or
disregarded the evidential rule 
584
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
84 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
that   presumptions   like   judicial   notice   and   admissions,
relieve  the  proponent  from   presenting   evidence  on  the  facts  he
alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearsay   Rule; Declarations
About   Pedigree; Conditions   for   the   admission   of   declarations
about   pedigree.—The   primary   proof   to   be   considered   in
ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony   of   Corazon  Dezoller   Tison   to   the   effect  that   Teodora
Dezoller   Guerrero   in   her   lifetime,   or   sometime   in   1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such a
statement   is   considered   a   declaration   about   pedigree   which   is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1)  that  the  declarant  is  dead  or  unable  to  testify;   (2)  that  the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry;   (3)   that   such   relationship   be   shown   by   evidence   other
than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit   involving   the   subject   matter   of   the  declaration,   but   before
any controversy has arisen thereon.
Same; Evidence; Hearsay   Rule; Declarations   About
Pedigree;Where   the   party   claiming   seeks   recovery   against   a
relative   common   to   both   claimant   and   declarant—not   from   the
declarant himself or the declarant’s estate—the relationship of the
declarant   to   the   common   relative   may   not   be   proved   by   the
declaration itself, but this requirement does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely
to   establish   a   right   through   his   declarations   to   the   property   of
some other member of the family.—The general rule, therefore, is
that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative
common   to   both   claimant   and   declarant,   but   not   from   the
declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the
declarant   to   the   common   relative   may   not   be   proved   by   the
declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this
fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof
than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does
not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant
himself   and   not   merely   to   establish   a   right   through   his
declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a party claims a right to a
part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that
the
585
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  585 
 Tison vs. Court of Appeals
former   is  her  niece  is  admissible  and   constitutes  sufficient
proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was
no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such
declaration   is   rendered   competent   by   virtue   of   the   necessity   of
receiving   such   evidence   to   avoid   a   failure   of   justice.—We   are
sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one
instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may
be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of
the   declarant   herself.   Conformably,   the   declaration   made   by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible  and   constitutes  sufficient proof  of   such  relationship,
notwithstanding   the   fact   that   there   was   no   other   preliminary
evidence   thereof,   the   reason   being   that   such   declaration   is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such
evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in
the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute
that declaration made by the decedent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where   the   subject   of   the
declaration is the declarant’s own relationship to another person,
it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of
the   declaration,   proof   of   the   very   fact   which   the   declaration   is
offered   to   establish.—From   the   foregoing   disquisitions,   it   may
thus   be   safely   concluded,   on   the   sole   basis   of   the   decedent’s
declaration   and   without   need   for   further   proof   thereof,   that
petitioners   are   the   niece   and   nephew   of   Teodora   Dezoller
Guerrero.   As   held   in   one   case,   where   the   subject   of   the
declaration is the declarant’s own relationship to another person,
it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of
the   declaration,   proof   of   the   very   fact   which   the   declaration   is
offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main
evidence unnecessary.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; It is elementary
that   an   objection   shall   be   made   at   the   time   when   an   alleged
inadmissible   document   is   offered   in   evidence,   otherwise,   the
objection shall be treated as waived.—Applying the general rule in
the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For
while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not
strictly   conform   to   the   rules   on   their   admissibility,   we   are
however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted
by reason of private respondent’s failure to interpose any timely
objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when
an alleged inadmissible 
586
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
86 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
document   is   offered   in   evidence,   otherwise,   the   objection
shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a
privilege which the party may waive.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even   if   certain   documents   are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of a party’s failure
to   object   thereto,   the   same   may   be   admitted   and   considered   as
sufficient   to   prove   the   facts   therein   asserted.—The   situation   is
aggravated   by   the   fact   that counsel   for   private   respondent
unreservedly   cross­examined   petitioners,   as   the   lone   witness,   on
the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the
issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis
for   objection   thereto,   ever   raised.   Instead,   private   respondent’s
counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances
and   regularity   of   her   obtention   of   said   documents:   The
observations later made by private respondent in her comment to
petitioners’ offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were
already   apparent   at   the   time   these   documents   were   being
adduced   in   evidence   during   the   testimony   of   Corazon   Dezoller
Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no
longer   serve   to   rectify   the   legal   consequences   which   resulted
therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
herein   private   respondent’s   failure   to   object   thereto,   the   same
may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts
therein asserted.
Succession; Where a decedent is survived by the spouse and
nephews and nieces, the former shall be entitled to one­half of the
inheritance and the nephews and nieces to the other half.—Upon
the death of Teodora  Dezoller Guerrero,  one­half  of the  subject
property   was   automatically   reserved   to   the   surviving   spouse,
Martin   Guerrero,   as   his   share   in   the   conjugal   partnership.
Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall   be   equally   divided   between   the   widower   and   herein
petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right.
Hence,   Martin   Guerrero   could   only   validly   alienate   his   total
undivided   three­fourths   (3/4)   share   in   the   entire   property   to
herein   private   respondent.   Resultantly,   petitioners   and   private
respondent   are   deemed   co­owners   of   the   property   covered   by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one­fourth (1/4) and three­fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
587
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  587
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Demurrer to Evidence; If a
demurrer   to   evidence   is   granted   but   on   appeal   the   order   of
dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived
the   right   to   present   evidence.—All   told,   on   the   basis   of   the
foregoing   considerations,   the   demurrer   to   plaintiffs’   evidence
should   have  been,   as  it  is  hereby,   denied.   Nonetheless,   private
respondent   may   no   longer   be   allowed   to   present   evidence   by
reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court which provides that “if the motion is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Benjamin P. Quitoriano for petitioners.
     Ramoso Law Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The   present   appeal   by   certiorari   seeks   the   reversal   of   the
judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30,
19951 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein
private   respondent’s   Demurrer   to   Plaintiff’s   Evidence   filed   in
Civil Case No. Q­88­1054 pending therein.
The   present   appellate   review   involves   an   action   for
reconveyance   filed   by   herein   petitioners   against   herein   private
respondent   before   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Quezon   City,
Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q­88­1054,
over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located
at   San   Francisco   del   Monte,   Quezon   City   and   which   was
originally   owned   by   the   spouses   Martin   Guerrero   and   Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and
Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew,  presented by both parties for resolution:
______________
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras, with Associate
Justices Quirino Abad Santos, Jr. and Delilah Vidallon Magtolis,
concurring; Annex K, Petition, Rollo, 74.
588
588  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
respectively,   of   the  deceased   Teodora   Dezoller   Guerrero   who  is
the   sister   of   petitioners’   father,   Hermogenes   Dezoller.   Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant
or   descendant,   and   was   survived   only   by   her   husband,   Martin
Guerrero,   and   herein   petitioners.   Petitioners’   father,
Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit
from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation. The
records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero,
her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an
Affidavit  of  Extrajudicial  Settlement2 adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly   as   sole   heir,   the   land   in   dispute   which   is   covered   by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of
Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the
lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s
name.
Martin   Guerrero   died   on   October   25,   1988.   Subsequently,
herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November
2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one­half of the
property in question by right of representation.
At   the   pre­trial   conference,   the   following   issues   were
1. (1)whether   or   not   the   plaintiffs   (herein   petitioners)   are
the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
2. (2)whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by
right   of   representation   from   the   estate   of   the   late
Teodora Dezoller;
3. (3)whether or not defendant (herein private respondent)
must reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs
to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section
4,   Rule   74   of   the   Rules   of   Court   which   was   duly
annotated on the title of the defendant;
4. (4)whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages,
moral and exemplary, plus attorney’s fees for the willful
and
______________
2
 Annex B, id.; ibid., 41.
589
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  589 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
malicious   refusal   of   defendant   to   reconvey   the   participation   of
plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and
knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said
deceased; and
 (5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be 3
 Original Record, 207­208.
considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero 4
 Ibid., 224­229.
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.3 5
 Ibid., 233­234.
During   the   hearing,   petitioner   Corazon   Dezoller   Tison   was 590
presented   as   the   lone   witness,   with   the  following   documentary
590  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
evidence offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
their   aunt,   to   wit:   a   family   picture;   baptismal   certificates   of
Registrar of Himamaylan,  Negros Occidental  is  merely  proof of
Teodora   and   Hermogenes   Dezoller;   certificates   of   destroyed
the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the
records   of   birth   of   Teodora   Dezoller   and   Hermogenes   Dezoller;
joint   affidavit   executed   by   Pablo   Verzosa   and   Meliton   Sitjar
death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
certifying   to   the   date,   place   of   birth   and   parentage   of   herein
Guerrero;   certification   of   destroyed   records   of   live   birth   of
petitioners   is   inadmissible   for   being   hearsay   since   the   affiants
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
were never presented for cross­examination.6
Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and
the   demurrer   to   evidence   and   dismissing   the   complaint   for
Manuela   Cariaga   attesting   to   the   fact   of   marriage   between
reconveyance.7
Martin   Guerrero   and   Teodora   Dezoller;   and   the   marriage
In   upholding   the   dismissal,   respondent   Court   of   Appeals
certificate   of   Martin   and   Teodora   Guerrero. 4 Petitioners
declared   that   the   documentary   evidence   presented   by   herein
thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and
exhibits   to   which   a   Comment5 was   filed   by   herein   private
joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
respondent.
establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
Subsequently,   private   respondent   filed   a   Demurrer   to
We find for petitioners.
Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove
The   bone   of   contention   in   private   respondent’s   demurrer   to
their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in
evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the
accordance   with   Article   172   of   the   Family   Code.   It   is   further
quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to
averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison
establish   legitimacy   and   filiation.   There   are   two   points   for
regarding   her   relationship   with   her   alleged   father   and   aunt   is
self­serving,   uncorroborated   and   incompetent,   and   that   it   falls consideration   before   us: first is   the   issue   on   petitioner’s
short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the legitimacy,   and second is   the   question   regarding   their   filiation
Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
the Office of the Local Civil  I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced
by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other,
______________ are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It
is   important   to   note,   however,   that   the   rulings   of   both   lower
courts   in   the   case   are   basically   premised   on   the   erroneous
assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be
validly   controverted   in   an   action   for   reconveyance,   and,   in   the
second   place,   that   herein   petitioners   have   the onus   probandi to
prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree
on both counts. It seems that both the court a quo and respondent
appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recog­
______________
6
 Ibid., 259­267.
7
 Ibid., 275.
591
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  591
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
nized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the
law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate.8 And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
“The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The   legitimacy   of   the   child   cannot   be   contested   by   way   of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose.   The   necessity   of   an   independent   action   directly
impugning   the   legitimacy   is   more   clearly   expressed   in   the
Mexican  Code   (Article   335)   which   provides:   ‘The   contest   of   the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in
any other way is void.’ This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because
they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the
action   to   impugn   the   legitimacy   of   a   child   can   no   longer   be
brought.   The   status   conferred   by   the   presumption,   therefore,
becomes   fixed,   and   can   no   longer   be   questioned.   The   obvious
intention of the law  is  to prevent  the  status  of  a child born  in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also   aims   to   force   early   action   to   settle   any   doubt   as   to   the
paternity   of   such   child,   so   that   the   evidence   material   to   the
matter,   which   must   necessarily   be   facts   occurring   during   the
period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
x x x
______________
8
 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., 118­119.
592
592  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife.   He   is   the   one   directly   confronted   with   the   scandal   and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases   that   his   heirs   are   allowed   to   contest   such   legitimacy.
Outside   of   these   cases,   none—even   his   heirs—can   impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate
children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted
in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course,
from the further consideration that private respondent is not the
proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption   consequently   continues   to   operate   in   favor   of
petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this
case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have
the   benefit   of   the   presumption   in   their   favor,   but   on   private
respondent   who   is   disputing   the   same.   This   fact   alone   should
have   been   sufficient   cause   for   the   trial   court   to   exercise
appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to
evidence.   It   would   have   delimited   the   issues   for   resolution,   as
well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party
in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce
evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that
fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of
proof   to   overthrow   the   presumption.10 The   presumption   of
legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the
burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in
order to destroy the presumption,  Petitioners’ evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of
______________
 Tolentino,   A.,   Civil   Code  of   the Philippines,   Commentaries
9
and Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 1990 ed., 535­537.
10
 Op. cit., 535.
11
 Jones on Evidence, Vol. 1, 5th ed., 178.
593
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  593
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and
credible evidence to the contrary.12
Where   there   is   an   entire   lack   of   competent   evidence   to   the
contrary,13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that
a   presumption   may   stand   in   lieu   of   evidence   and   support   a
finding or decision.14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if
it   is   uncontroverted.   This   is   based   on   the   theory   that   a
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless
the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of
its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably,   when   private   respondent   opted   not   to   present
countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely
filing   a   demurrer   to   evidence   instead,   she   in   effect   impliedly
admitted   the   truth   of   such   fact.   Indeed,   she   overlooked   or
disregarded   the   evidential   rule   that   presumptions   like   judicial
notice   and   admissions,   relieve   the   proponent   from   presenting
evidence   on   the   facts   he   alleged   and   such   facts   are   thereby
considered as duly proved.
II.   The   weight   and   sufficiency   of   the   evidence   regarding
petitioner’s  relationship  with Teodora  Dezoller Guerrero,  whose
estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more
intensive and extensive examination.
the   testimony   of   Corazon   Dezoller   Tison,   the   baptismal,   death
and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil
registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by
third   persons   all   of   which   she   identified   and   explained   in   the
course and as part of her testimony.
The   primary   proof   to   be   considered   in   ascertaining   the
relationship   between   the   parties   concerned   is   the   testimony   of
Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller 
______________
 12
 95 ALR 883.
13
 31A CJS, Evidence, Sec. 114, 195.
14
 Ibid., Sec. 119, 216.
15
 Brawsell vs. Tindall, 294 SW 2d 685.
594
594  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  declarant’s declaration of his own relationship is of a self­serving
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
Guerrero   in   her   lifetime,   or   sometime   in   1946,   categorically
declared that the former is Teodora’s niece.16 Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that   such   relationship   be   shown   by   evidence   other   than   the
declaration;   and   (4)   that   the   declaration   was   made ante   litem
motam,   that   is,   not   only   before   the   commencement   of   the   suit
involving   the   subject   matter   of   the   declaration,   but   before   any
controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth
elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is,
whether   or   not   the   other   documents   offered   in   evidence
sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero   in   her   lifetime   regarding   the   pedigree   of   petitioner
Corazon   Dezoller   Tison   or,   if   at   all,   it   is   necessary   to   present
evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made
as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the
very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant,
and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is
stated thus:
“One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a
claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the
admissibility   of   a   declaration   regarding   claimant’s   pedigree,   he
may   not  do   so   by   declarant’s   own   statements   as  to  declarant’s
relationship   to   the   particular   family.   The   reason   is   that
nature.   Accordingly   there   must   be   precedent   proof   from   other
sources   that   declarant   is   what   he   claimed   to   be,   namely,   a
member   of   the   particular   family;   otherwise   the   requirement   to
admissibility that declarant’s relationship to the common family
must appear  is  not met. But  when the party  claiming seeks to
establish relationship in order to claim 
______________
 TSN, February 14, 1992, 5­8.
16
595
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  595 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
directly from the declarant or the declarant’s estate, the situation
and the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such
case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy,
that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible
without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of
the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for
its   admission.   Such   declarations   do   not   derive   their   evidential
value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an
artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations
belong. The distinction we have noted is sufficiently apparent; in
the one case the declarations are self­serving, in the other they
are competent from reasons of necessity.”17 (Italics ours.)
The   general   rule,   therefore,   is   that   where   the   party   claiming
seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s
estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative
may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact.18 As an exception, the requirement
that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as
to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the
estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member of
the family.19
We  are sufficiently convinced,  and so hold,  that the present
case   is   one   instance   where   the   general   requirement   on
evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right
to  part  of  the  estate  of  the  declarant  herself.  Conformably,   the
declaration   made   by   Teodora   Dezoller   Guerrero   that   petitioner
Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof
of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other   preliminary   evidence   thereof,   the   reason   being   that   such
declaration is rendered competent by  inadmissible document is offered in evi­
______________
17
 Jones,   Commentaries   on   Evidence,   Vol.   3,   2nd   ed.,   2094­
2095.
18
 Op. cit., 2096.
19
 Op. cit., 2098.
596
596  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
of   justice.20 More   importantly,   there   is   in   the   present   case   an
absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made
by the decedent.
From   the   foregoing   disquisitions,   it   may   thus   be   safely
concluded,   on   the   sole   basis   of   the   decedent’s   declaration   and
without  need   for   further   proof   thereof,   that   petitioners   are   the
niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one
case,21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own
relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a
foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very
fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary
proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying   the   general   rule   in   the   present   case   would
nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary
evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the
rules   on   their   admissibility,   we   are   however   of   the   considered
opinion   that   the   same   may   be   admitted   by   reason   of   private
respondent’s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at
the time they were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary
that   an   objection   shall   be   made   at   the   time   when   an   alleged
______________
20
 In re Clark’s Estate, 110 P. 828.
21
 Hartman’s Estate, 107 P. 105, cited in Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, 1980 ed., 322.
22
 On offer of evidence, the Rules of Court pertinently provide:
“Sec.   35. When   to   make   offer.—x   x   x   Documentary   and   object
evidence   shall   be   offered   after   the   presentation   of   a   party’s
testimonial   evidence.   Such   offer   shall   be   done   orally   unless
allowed by the Court to be done by writing.
“Sec. 36. Objection.—Objection to evidence offered orally must
be   made   immediately   after   the   offer   is   made.   Objection   to   a
question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness   shall   be   made   as   soon   as   the   grounds   therefor   shall
become reasonably apparent.”
597
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  597
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
dence,  otherwise,   the   objection   shall   be   treated   as
23
waived,24 since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
party may waive.25
As   explained   in Abrenica   vs.   Gonda,   et   al.,26 it   has   been
repeatedly   laid   down   as   a   rule   of   evidence   that   a   protest   or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at
the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived.
The   proper   time   is   when   from   the   question   addressed   to   the
witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of
the   proof,   the   inadmissibility   of   the   evidence   is,   or   may   be
inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not
conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the
time   the   question   is   asked.   An   objection   to   the   admission   of
evidence   on   the   ground   of   incompetency,   taken   after   the
testimony has been given, is too late.27Thus, for instance, failure
to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is
in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private
respondent   unreservedly   cross­examined   petitioners,   as   the   lone
witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time
was   the   issue   of   the   supposed   inadmissibility   thereof,   or   the
possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private
respondent’s   counsel   elicited   answers   from   the   witness   on   the
circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents:
The observations later made by 
______________
23
 Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 5, 3rd ed., 611.
24
 People   vs.   De   la   Cruz, G.R.   No.   108180,   February   8,
1994, 229 SCRA 754.
25
 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1980 ed.,
125. 
26
 34 Phil. 745 (1916).
27
 Conlu vs. Araneta, et al., 15 Phil. 387 (1910).
28
 See Talosig   vs.   Vda.   De   Nieba,   et   al., G.R.   No.   L­29557,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 472.
598
598  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
private   respondent   in   her   comment   to   petitioners’   offer   of
exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at
the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during
the   testimony   of   Corazon   Dezoller   Tison   but   which   objections
were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the
legal   consequences   which   resulted   therefrom.   Hence,   even
assuming ex   gratia   argumenti that   these   documents   are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private
respondent’s failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted
and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it
is   indicated   that   the   parents   of   Teodora   Dezoller   are   Isabelo
Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism
of   Teodora   Dezoller30 (Exhibit   H)   and   Hermogenes   Dezoller
(Exhibit   J)   which   both   reflect   the   names   of   their   parents   as
Isabelo   Dezoller   and   Cecilia   Calpo,   to   show   that   Hermogenes
Dezoller   is   the   brother   of   Teodora   Dezoller   Guerrero;   and   the
Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries
wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his
daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners
are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller—these can be deemed to
have   sufficiently   established   the   relationship   between   the
declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the
rule that a prima facieshowing is sufficient and that only slight
proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss
to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact
that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of
the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller.32
______________
29
 Op. cit., 128.
30
 This parochial record is an official document, having been
made prior to the passage of G.O. No. 68 and Act No. 190 (U.S. vs.
Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 [1915], and cases therein cited).
31
 Fulkerson, et al. vs. Holmes, et al., 117 U.S. 389.
32
 Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. 7, 1973 ed., 494.
599
VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997  599
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
III.   The   following   provisions   of   the   Civil   Code   provide   for   the
manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in
this case, to wit:
“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased   survive,   they   shall   inherit   from   the   latter   by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.”
“Art.   995.   In   the   absence   of   legitimate   descendants   and
ascendants,   and   illegitimate   children   and   their   descendants,
whether   legitimate   or   illegitimate,   the   surviving   spouse   shall
inherit   the   entire   estate,   without   prejudice   to   the   rights   of
brothers and  sisters,  nephews and  nieces,  should there be  any,
under Article 1001.”
“Art.   1001.   Should   brothers   and   sisters   or   their   children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one­half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.”
Upon   the   death   of   Teodora   Dezoller   Guerrero,   one­half   of   the
subject   property   was   automatically   reserved   to   the   surviving
spouse,   Martin   Guerrero,   as   his   share   in   the   conjugal
partnership.   Applying   the   aforequoted   statutory   provisions,   the
remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and
herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own
right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total
undivided   three­fourths   (3/4)   share   in   the   entire   property   to
herein   private   respondent.   Resultantly,   petitioners   and   private
respondent   are   deemed   co­owners   of   the   property   covered   by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one­fourth (1/4) and three­fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
All   told,   on   the   basis   of   the   foregoing   considerations,   the
demurrer to plaintiffs’ evidence should have been, as it is hereby,
denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed
to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of
revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that “if the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed
he   shall   be   deemed   to   have   waived   the   right   to   present
evidence.”33WHEREFORE,   the   questioned   judgment   of
respondent   Court   of   Appeals   is   hereby   REVERSED   and   SET
ASIDE,   and   herein   petitioners   and   private   respondent   are
declared co­owners of the subject property with an undivided one­
fourth (1/4) and three­fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
     Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  495
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998.*
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MONINA JISON, respondents.
Courts; Appeals; While it is a general rule that factual issues
are not within the province of the Supreme Court, such rule does
not apply where there are conflicting findings of facts of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.—In issue is whether or not public
respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error, which,
in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a
general   rule,   factual   issues   are  not   within   the  province   of   this
Court, nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls under an
exception to this rule.
Parent and Child; Paternity and Filiation; Family Code; The
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested  rights.—Before addressing  the merits of  the controversy,
we first dispose of preliminary matters relating to the applicable
law   and   the   guiding   principles   in   paternity   suits.   As   to   the
former,   plainly,   the   Family   Code   of   the   Philippines   (Executive
Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As correctly cited
by   the   Court   of   Appeals, Uyguangco served   as   a   judicial
confirmation   of   Article   256   of   the   Family   Code   regarding   its
retroactive effect unless there  apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations
_______________
*
 FIRST DIVISION.
496
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
96 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
be   impairment   of   vested   rights,   which   does   not   hold   true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child
has   passed   away   and   the   former   having   actually   resisted   the
latter’s claim below.
Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; Evidence; For the success
of   an   action   to   establish   illegitimate   filiation   under   the   second
paragraph of Art.  172 of the Family Code,  a “high standard of
proof”   is   required—specifically,   to   prove   open   and   continuous
possession   of   the   status   of   an   illegitimate   child,   there   must   be
evidence   of   the   manifestation   of   the   permanent   intention   of   the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot
be   attributed   to   pure   charity.—For   the   success   of   an   action   to
establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which
MONINA   relies   upon   given   that   she   has   none   of   the   evidence
mentioned in the first  paragraph,  a  “high standard  of  proof”  is
required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father
to   consider   the   child   as   his,   by   continuous   and   clear
manifestations   of   parental   affection   and   care,   which   cannot   be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts  must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
in   society   and   in   life,   not   accidentally,   but   continuously.   By
“continuous” is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not
require any particular length of time.
Same; Same; Evidence; Rationale for the “High Standard of
Proof”   Requirement   in   Filiation   Proceedings.—The   foregoing
standard of proof required to establish one’s filiation is founded
on  the principle  that an order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the
family  or  lives  of  the  parties,   so  that  it  must be  issued  only  if
paternity   or   filiation   is   established   by   clear   and   convincing
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Words   and   Phrases; Quantum   of
Evidence;The   concept   of   “preponderance   of   evidence”   refers   to
evidence   which   is   of   greater   weight,   or   more   convincing,   that
which   is   offered   in   opposition   to   it—at   bottom,   it   means
probability of truth.—The foregoing discussion, however, must be
situated   within   the   general   rules   on   evidence,   in   light   of   the
burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., prepon­
497
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  497
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
derance   of   evidence,   and   the   shifting   of   the   burden   of
evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a
civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course
of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case
in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant
to   controvert   plaintiff’s prima   facie case,   otherwise,   a   verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance
of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.
The   concept   of   “preponderance   of   evidence”   refers   to   evidence
which   is   of   greater   weight,   or   more   convincing,   that   which   is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Same; Same; Same; Unlawful   intercourse   will   not   be
presumed   merely   from   proof   of   an   opportunity   for   such
indulgence; Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the
only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act
themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim’s
or   mother’s   word,   as   against   the   accused’s   or   putative   father’s
protestations.—FRANCISCO’s   arguments   in   support   of   his   first
assigned   error   deserve   scant   consideration.   While   it   has   been
observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely
from proof  of an opportunity for such  indulgence, this  does  not
favor   FRANCISCO.   Akin   to   the   crime   of   rape   where,   in   most
instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in
the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of
whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds
to   the   victim’s   or   mother’s   word,   as   against   the   accused’s   or
putative   father’s   protestations.   In   the   instant   case,   MONINA’s
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she
had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the
complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA
could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her
parentage   may   be   established   by   evidence   other   than   the
testimony   of   her   mother.   The   paramount   question   then   is
whether MONINA’s evidence is coherent, logical and natural.
Same; Same; Same; Birth   Certificates; Baptismal
Certificates; A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative   father   is   not   competent   evidence   as   to   the   issue   of
paternity, when there is no
 498
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA’s testimony
98  to   corroborate   her   claim   that   FRANCISCO   spent   for   her
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
showing   that   the   putative   father   had   a   hand   in   the
preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is
devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child
upon the information of a third person; Lack of participation by
the putative father in the preparation of the baptismal certificates
and school records renders such documents incompetent to prove
paternity,   the   former   being   competent   merely   to   prove   the
administration   of   the   sacrament   of   baptism   on   the   date   so
specified.—MONINA’s reliance on the certification issued by the
Local   Civil   Registrar   concerning   her   birth   (Exhs.   E   and   F)   is
clearly   misplaced.   It   is   settled   that   a   certificate   of   live   birth
purportedly   identifying   the   putative   father   is   not   competent
evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing
that  the putative  father  had  a  hand in  the  preparation  of  said
certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information
of   a   third   person.   Simply   put,   if   the   alleged   father   did   not
intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information
himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar  is  null   and  void;   the  mere  certificate  by  the  registrar
without   the   signature   of   the   father   is   not   proof   of   voluntary
acknowledgment   on   the   latter’s   part.   In   like   manner,
FRANCISCO’s   lack   of   participation   in   the   preparation   of   the
baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z
and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity,
the former being competent merely to prove the administration of
the   sacrament   of   baptism   on   the   date   so   specified.   However,
despite   the   inadmissibility   of   the   school   records per   se to   prove
education.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence
as   proof   of   filiation,   they   cannot   be   admitted   indirectly   as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.—We likewise disagree
with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued
by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be
taken   as   circumstantial   evidence   to   prove   MONINA’s   filiation.
Since   they   are per   se inadmissible   in   evidence   as   proof   of   such
filiation,   they   cannot   be   admitted   indirectly   as   circumstantial
evidence to prove the same.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence   of   Pedigree; Words   and
Phrases;“Family   Possessions,”   Explained; Statutory
Construction; Ejusdem
499
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  499 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
Generis; The enumeration contained in the second portion of
Rule  130, Section 40, in light of  the  rule of  ejusdem generis,  is
limited   to   objects   which   are   commonly   known   as   “family
possessions,” or those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s
joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.—We hold
that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion
of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited
to objects which are commonly known as “family possessions,” or
those articles which represent, in effect, a family’s joint statement
of   its   belief   as   to   the   pedigree   of   a   person.   These   have   been
described   as   objects   “openly   exhibited   and   well   known   to   the
family,” or those “which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded
as   giving   a   family   tradition.”   Other   examples   of   these   objects
which   are   regarded   as   reflective   of   a   family’s   reputation   or
tradition   regarding   pedigree   are   inscriptions   on   tombstones,
monuments or coffin plates.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Common   Reputation,”
Explained; It is the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree.—Plainly
then,   Exhibits   S   to   V,   as   private   documents   not   constituting
“family possessions” as discussed above, may not be admitted on
the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be
admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation,   it   having   been   observed   that:   [T]he   weight   of
authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common
reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence
going to establish pedigree. x x x [Thus] matters of pedigree may
be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in
the   neighborhood   or   vicinity,   except   where   the   pedigree   in
question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation
in the community.
Same; Same; Same; Notarial   Law; Quantum   of
Evidence; The standard to contradict a notarial document is clear
and convincing evidence,  i.e., more than merely preponderant.—
Indeed,   if   MONINA   were   truly   not   FRANCISCO’s   illegitimate
daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation.
For   as   clearly   established   before   the   trial   court   and   properly
appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from
Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the sworn
statement in question, hence 
500
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
00 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
negating FRANCISCO’s theory of the need to quash rumors
circulating   within   Miller   &   Cruz   regarding   the   identity   of
MONINA’s   father.   Hence,   coupled   with   the   assessment   of   the
credibility   of   the   testimonial   evidence   of   the   parties   discussed
above,   it   is   evident   that   the   standard   to   contradict   a   notarial
document, i.e.,   clear   and   convincing   evidence   and   more   than
merely preponderant, has been met by MONINA.
Same; Same; Same; Denials; Perjurers   usually   confine
themselves  to  the incidents immediately related  to  the principal
fact   about   which   they   testify,   and   when   asked   about   collateral
facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not
infrequently   take   the   stereotyped   form   of  such   expressions   as   “I
don’t   know”   or   “I   don’t   remember.”—Two   (2)   glaring   points   in
FRANCISCO’s   defense   beg   to   be   addressed:   First,   that   his
testimony   was   comprised   of   mere   denials,   rife   with   bare,
unsubstantiated responses such as “That is not true,” “I do not
believe that,” or   “None  that I   know.”  In  declining   then  to  lend
credence   to   FRANCISCO’s   testimony,   we   resort   to   a   guiding
principle   in   adjudging   the   credibility   of   a   witness   and   the
truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as 1921: The
experience   of   courts   and   the   general   observation   of   humanity
teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are
such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court
a   false   narrative   containing   numerous   details,   he   is   almost
certain   to   fall   into   fatal   inconsistencies,   to   make   statements
which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the
falsity   of   his   message.   For   this   reason   it   will   be   found   that
perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately
related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when
asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be
tested, their answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form
of such expressions as “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember.”
Laches; Elements; Doctrine   of   Stale   Demands.—The   last
assigned  error concerning laches likewise  fails to  convince.  The
essential elements of laches are:  (1)  conduct  on  the  part  of the
defendant,   or   of   one  under   whom   he  claims,   giving   rise   to   the
situation   of   which   the   complaint   seeks   a   remedy;   (2)   delay   in
asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had
knowledge   or   notice   of   the   defendant’s   conduct   as  having   been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would
assert the right in which he bases his 
501
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  501
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief   is   accorded   to   the   complainant,   or   the   suit   is   not   held
barred. The last element is the origin of the doctrine that stale
demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would
be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Same; Laches is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires,   for   the   peace   of   society,   the   discouragement   of   stale
claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of   permitting   a   right   or   claim   to   be   enforced   or   asserted.—As
FRANCISCO   set   up   laches   as   an   affirmative   defense,   it   was
incumbent   upon   him   to   prove   the   existence   of   its   elements.
However,   he   only   succeeded   in   showing   MONINA’s   delay   in
asserting   her   claim,   but   miserably   failed   to   prove   the   last
element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is based
upon   grounds   of   public   policy   which   requires,   for   the   peace   of
society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a
question   of   the   inequity   or   unfairness   of   permitting   a   right   or
claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according
to   its   particular   circumstances.   The   question   of   laches   is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an
equitable   doctrine,   its   application   is   controlled   by   equitable
considerations.   It   cannot   be   worked   to   defeat   justice   or   to
perpetuate   fraud   and   injustice.   Since   the   instant   case   involves
paternity   and   filiation,   even   if   illegitimate,   MONINA   filed   her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision
of   law.   A   denial   then   of   her   action   on   ground   of   laches   would
clearly be inequitable and unjust.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Salonga, Hernandez & Mendoza for petitioner.
     Apeles L. Padilla for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
the 27 April 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals 
502
502  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
(CA)   in CA­G.R.   CV   No.   328601 which   reversed   the   decision   of
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil
Case   No.   16373.2 The   latter   dismissed   the   complaint  of   private
respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition as
an   illegitimate   child   of   petitioner   Francisco   Jison   (hereafter
FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals
committed reversible error, which, in this instance, necessitates
an inquiry into the facts. While as a general rule, factual issues
are not within the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of
the conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, this case falls under an exception to this rule.3
In   her   complaint4 filed   with   the   RTC   on   13   March   1985,
MONINA   alleged   that   FRANCISCO   had   been   married   to   a
certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the
start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO’s
daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August
1946,   in   Dingle,   Iloilo,   and   since   childhood,   had   enjoyed   the
continuous,   implied   recognition   as   an   illegitimate   child   of
FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further
alleged   that   FRANCISCO   gave   her   support   and   spent   for   her
education,   such  that  she  obtained  a  Master’s  degree,   became  a
certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank
examiner. In view of FRANCISCO’s refusal to expressly recognize
her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate
status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. 
_______________
1
 Rollo,  65­80,  per  Jacinto,  G.A., J.,   with Purisima,   F.P.  and
Montoya, S.A., JJ., concurring.
2
 Rollo, 84­91, per Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr.
3
 See Geagonia   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 241   SCRA   152,   160
[1995]; Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v.
CA, 246   SCRA   193,   198   [1995];   and Suntay   v.   Court   of
Appeals, 251 SCRA 430, 446 [1995].
4
 Original Record (OR), vol. 1, 1­3.
503
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  503 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
In his answer,  FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had
5
sexual   relations   with   Esperanza   Amolar   during   the   period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as
early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then;
further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as
his   illegitimate   child.   As   affirmative   and   special   defenses,
FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of
action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel,
laches  and/or   prescription.   He  thus   prayed   for   dismissal   of  the
complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of
the complaint.
After MONINA filed her reply,6 pre­trial was conducted where
the parties stipulated on the following issues:
1. 1.Did   Francisco   Jison   have   any   sexual   relation[s]   with
Esperanza Am[o]lar about the end of 1945 or the start of
1946?
2. 2.Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Jison by the latter’s own acts and those of his
family?
3. 3.Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting
the   present   action   by   estoppel,   laches   and/or
prescription?
 4. 4.Damages.7
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11)
witnesses,   namely:   herself,   Ruben   Castellanes,   Sr.,   Adela
Casabuena,   Arsenio   Duatin,   Zafiro   Ledesma,   Danthea   Lopez,
Romeo   Bilbao,   Rudy   Tingson,   Alfredo   Baylosis,   Dominador
Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63­year old resident of Iloilo City,
testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6)
years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO’s Iloilo residence. Towards
the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCO’s  City.   Arsenio  met  MONINA  in  1967,   when   Felipe  Lagarto,   the
_______________
5
 Id., 10­13.
6
 Id., 14­16.
7
 OR, vol. 1, 39.
504
504  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
wife   suffered   a   miscarriage   or   abortion,   thereby   depriving
FRANCISCO   of   consortium;   thereafter,   FRANCISCO’s   wife
managed a nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which
operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day,
thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINA’s mother,
Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed Pansay.
Adela   Casabuena,   a   61­year   old   farmer,   testified   that   she
served   as   the yaya (“nanny”)   of   Lourdes   from   July   1946   up   to
February   1947.   Although Pansay had   left  Nelly   Garden   two   (2)
weeks   before   Adela   started   working   for   the
Jisons, Pansay returned   sometime   in   September   1946,   or   about
one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO
for  support.   As  a   result, Pansay and   Lilia  Jison,  FRANCISCO’s
wife,   quarreled   in   the   living   room,   and   in   the   course
thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her
baby. To which, Lilia replied: “I did not tell you to make that baby
so it is your fault.” During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till
11:00   a.m.,   FRANCISCO   was   supposedly   inside   the   house
listening.
Arsenio   Duatin,   a   77­year   old   retired   laborer,   testified   that
from 1947 until 1977, he worked as FRANCISCO’s houseboy at
the   latter’s   house   on   12th   Street,   Capitol   Subdivision,   Bacolod
bookkeeper   at   Nelly   Garden,   informed   Arsenio   that   MONINA,
FRANCISCO’s   daughter,   would   arrive   at   Bacolod   City   with   a
letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially,   Arsenio   identified   seven   (7)   black­and­white
photographs (Exhs. X­5 to X­11) of MONINA, 8 and as he paid for
the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6) telephone cards
(Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MON­
_______________
8
 Exhibit X­5 showed MONINA standing at the main entrance
of FRANCISCO’s house; Exhibit X­9 showed MONINA’s bedroom
in   FRANCISCO’s   house;   and   Exhibit   X­11   showed   MONINA
standing   on   the   lawn   of   FRANCISCO’s   house.   These   exhibits
were   offered   to   prove   that   MONINA   had   free   use   of
FRANCISCO’s house in Bacolod City and phone thereat.
505
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  505 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
INA   arrived   in   Bacolod   City,   she   introduced   herself   to   him   as
FRANCISCO’s daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCO’s house, but
when   the   latter   and   his   wife   would   come   over,   Arsenio   would
“conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like
to   see   her   face.”   Once,   Arsenio   hid   MONINA   in   the   house   of
FRANCISCO’s   sister,   Mrs.   Luisa   Jison   Alano,   in   Silay   City;
another   time,   at   the   residence   of   FRANCISCO’s   cousin,   Mrs.
Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last
time he saw MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having
finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
On   re­direct   and   upon   questions   by   the   court,   Arsenio
disclosed that it was FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA
be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his wife were around; that
although   FRANCISCO   and   MONINA   saw   each   other   at   the
Bacolod   house   only   once,   they   called   each   other   “through   long
distance,” and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as “Daddy”
during   their   lone   meeting   at   the   Bacolod   house   and   were
“affectionate”   to   each   other.   Arsenio   likewise   declared   that
MONINA stayed at FRANCISCO’s Bacolod house twice: first for a
month, then for about a week the second time. On both occasions,
however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally, Arsenio
recalled   that   FRANCISCO   likewise   bade   Arsenio   to   treat
MONINA like his (FRANCISCO’s) other daughters.
The testimony  of Zafiro Ledesma,  a 74­year old  banker  and
former mayor of Iloilo City, initially touched on how he and his
wife   were   related   to   FRANCISCO,   FRANCISCO’s   wife   and
MONINA.   Zafiro   first   identified   Exhibit   R,   a   diagram   of   the
family trees of the Jison and Lopez families, which showed that
former   Vice­President   Fernando   Lopez   was   the   first   cousin   of
FRANCISCO’s wife, then told the court that the family of Vice­
President   Lopez   treated   MONINA   “very   well   because   she   is
considered a relative x x x by reputation, by actual perception.”
Zafiro   likewise   identified   Exhibits   X­13   to   X­18,   photographs
taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando
Lopez, which showed MONINA with  and   MONINA   was   still   studying   at   San   Agustin   University,
506
506  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
the former Vice­President and other members of the Lopez family.
Zafiro  further  testified that  while MONINA  lived  with  Mrs.
Cuaycong, the latter paid for some of MONINA’s school needs and
even   asked   MONINA   to   work   in   a   hospital   owned   by   Mrs.
Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCO’s wife, a
certain  Remedios Lopez  Franco,  likewise helped MONINA  with
her   studies   and   problems,   and   even   attended   MONINA’s
graduation   in   1978   when   she   obtained   a   masteral   degree   in
Business   Administration,   as   evidenced   by   another   photograph
(Exh.   X­12).   Moreover,   upon   Remedios’   recommendation,
MONINA   was   employed   as   a   secretary   at   Merchant   Financing
Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the
wife   of   another   first   cousin   of   FRANCISCO’s   wife,   and   among
whose   directors   were   Zafiro   himself,   his   wife   and   Danthea’s
husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINA’s Social Security
Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as employer and
where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea   Lopez,   a   58­year   old   housekeeper,   declared   that
FRANCISCO   was   the   first   cousin   of   her   husband,   Eusebio   D.
Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the latter part of
1965   when   Remedios   Franco   recommended   MONINA   for
employment at Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea managed
at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea “as being
reputedly   the   daughter   of   Mr.   Frank   Jison;”   and   on   several
occasions   thereafter,   Remedios   made   Danthea   and   the   latter’s
husband understand that MONINA was “reputedly the daughter
of   [FRANCISCO].”   While   MONINA   worked   at   Merchant
Financing,   Danthea   knew   that   MONINA   lived   with   Remedios;
however, in the latter part of 1966, as Remedios left for Manila
Danthea   and  her  husband  invited  MONINA  to  live  with  them.
During MONINAs 6­month stay with them, she was not charged
for board and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere
employee,   all   owing   to   what   Remedios   had   said   regarding
MONINA’s filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned
from  Rudy   knew   the   persons   receiving   money   from   FRANCISCO’s
507
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  507
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
Merchant Financing as she was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first
cousin of Danthea’s husband who lived in Bacolod City.
Romeo   Bilbao,   a   43­year   old   seaman,   testified   that   he   had
worked for FRANCISCO from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in
various   capacities:   as   a   procurement   officer,   hacienda   overseer
and,   later,   as  hacienda   administrator.   Sometime  in  May,   1971,
Romeo   saw   and   heard   MONINA   ask   “her   Daddy”   (meaning
FRANCISCO)   for   the   money   he   promised   to   give   her,   but
FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to give,
then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then
in the middle of September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to
pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the office of
Atty.   Benjamin   Tirol.   At   said   office,   Atty.   Tirol,   Mr.   Cruz   and
MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they
came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA to sign, but she
refused.   Atty.   Tirol   said   that   a   check   would   be   released   to
MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although
Atty. Tirol intended not to give MONINA a copy of the document
she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q),
then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she signed and
ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to
his  motive  for   testifying,   Romeo  stated   that  he  wanted  to  help
MONINA be recognized as FRANCISCO’S daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45­year old antique dealer, testified that in
1963­1964, he was employed by FRANCISCO’s wife at the Baguio
Military Institute in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at
FRANCISCO’s   office   at   Nelly   Garden   recording   hacienda
expenses, typing vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting
as   paymaster   for   the   haciendas.   From   the   nature   of   his   work,
office,  and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job,
Rudy   gave   MONINA   her   allowance   from   FRANCISCO   four   (4)
times,   upon   instructions   of   a   certain   Mr.   Lagarto   to   give
MONINA  P15.00  a  month.  Rudy   likewise  recalled  that  he first
met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden
whenever FRANCISCO’s wife 
508
508  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
was   not   around.   On   some   of   these   occasions,   MONINA   would
speak   with   and   address   FRANCISCO   as   “Daddy,”   without
objection   from   FRANCISCO.   In   fact,   in   1965,   Rudy   saw
FRANCISCO give MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared
that   in   April   1965,   FRANCISCO’s   office   paid   P250.00   to
Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of MONINA’s mother.
Finally, as to Rudy’s motives for testifying, he told the court that
he simply wanted to help bring out the truth “and nothing but the
truth,”   and   that   MONINA’s   filiation   was   common   knowledge
among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On   re­direct,   Rudy   declared   that   the   moneys   given   by
FRANCISCO’s office to MONINA were not reflected in the books
of the office,  but were kept in a separate book, as Mr. Lagarto
explained that FRANCISCO’s wife and children “should not know
[of] this.” Rudy further revealed that as to the garden “meetings”
between   FRANCISCO   and   MONINA,   Rudy   saw   MONINA   kiss
FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before leaving,
and FRANCISCO’s reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say
in   the   Visayan   dialect:   “Kamusta   ka   iha?”   (“How   are   you,
daughter?”); and that MONINA was free to go inside the house as
the   household   staff   knew   of   her   filiation,   and   that,   sometimes,
MONINA would join them for lunch.
Alfredo   Baylosis,   a   62­year   old   retired   accountant,   testified
that he worked for FRANCISCO at Central Santos­Lopez in Iloilo
from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972.
Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then when Mr.
Lagarto  died  in  1967   or  1969,   Alfredo   replaced  Mr.   Lagarto  as
office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly
Garden   to   claim   her   P15.00   monthly   allowance   given   upon
FRANCISCO’s   standing   order.   Alfredo   further   declared   that
MONINA’s filiation was pretty well­known in the office; that he
had seen MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building
to   the   office,   with   FRANCISCO’s   arm   on   MONINA’s   shoulder;
and that the office paid for the burial expenses of Pansay, but this
was not recorded in the books in  In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagarto’s office
509
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  509
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
order to hide it from FRANCISCO’s wife. Alfredo also disclosed
that the disbursements for MONINA’s allowance started in 1961
and   were   recorded   in   a   separate   cash   book.   In   1967,   the
allowances   ceased   when   MONINA   stopped   schooling   and   was
employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served
as FRANCISCO’s accountant­auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to
the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza,
and   arrange   for   the   preparation   of   FRANCISCO’s   income   tax
return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her
how   she   came   to   work   there,   she   answered   that   “her   Daddy,”
FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza.
Alfredo   then   claimed   that   Mr.   Jose   Cruz,   a   partner   at   Miller,
Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55­year old caretaker, testified that he
worked   as   FRANCISCO’s   houseboy   at   Nelly   Garden   from
November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954, MONINA
and   her   mother Pansay went   to   Nelly   Garden   and   spoke   with
FRANCISCO for about an hour, during which time, Dominador
was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters away.
Due   to   the   noise   of   the   vacuum   cleaner,   FRANCISCO   and
MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their
conversation.   As   FRANCISCO   asked Pansay why   they
came, Pansayanswered that they came to ask for the “sustenance”
of   his   child   MONINA.   FRANCISCO   then   touched   MONINA’s
head   and   asked:   “How   are   you   Hija?,”   to   which   MONINA
answered:   “Good   morning,   Daddy.”   After   FRANCISCO
told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his
wallet and said to Pansay: “I am giving this for the child.”
where   Dominador   was   to   get   “the   day’s   expenses,”   while
MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next
month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in
the office that MONINA was there to get her allowance “from her
Daddy.”  In   December   1960,   Dominador   saw   MONINA   at   Nelly
Garden,   in   the   room   of   Don   Vicente   (father   of   FRANCISCO’s
wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift 
510
510  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
“and   she   was   calling   Don   Vicente, Lolo (grandfather).”   At   that
time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around. Then sometime
in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagarto’s office to get the
marketing   expenses,   Dominador   saw   MONINA   once   more
claiming her allowance.
 Dominador further testified  that in February  1966,  after  he
had stopped  working  for  FRANCISCO,  Dominador was at Mrs.
Franco’s residence as she recommended him for employment with
her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who
was   then   about   15   years   old,   together   with   Mrs.   Franco’s
daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked
Dominador if he knew who MONINA was. Dominador answered
that   MONINA   was   FRANCISCO’s   daughter   with Pansay,   and
then Mrs. Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her
(Mrs. Franco) and that she was sending MONINA to school at the
University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50­year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the
younger brother of Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he
worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to November
1945   at   Nelly   Garden.   Thereafter,   FRANCISCO   sent   Lope   to
work   at   Elena   Apartments   in   Manila.   By   November
1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where she
revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then
confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope “don’t get hurt and don’t
cause   any   trouble,   because   I   am   willing   to   support   your Inday
Pansay and   my   child.”   Three   (3)   days   after   this   confrontation,
Lope   asked   for   and   received   permission   from   FRANCISCO   to
resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand.
At that time, she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner.
She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of
the   Local   Civil   Registrar   (Exhs.   E   and   F)   and   baptismal
certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in
Barangay   Tabugon,   Dingle,   Iloilo,   to   Esperanza   Amolar   (who
passed away on 20 April 1965) and 
511
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  511 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
FRANCISCO.9 MONINA   first   studied   at   Sagrado   where   she
stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to
Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and
other   school   expenses.   She   either   received   the   money   from
FRANCISCO   or   from   Mr.   Lagarto,   or   saw   FRANCISCO   give
money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly.
After   Sagrado,   MONINA   studied   in   different   schools, 10 but
FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University
of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required
a week’s hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of
the   hospitalization   expenses,   her   mother   shouldered   most   of
them.   In   1963,   she   enrolled   at   the   University   of   San   Agustin,
where   she   stayed   with   Mrs.   Franco   who   paid   for   MONINA’s
tuition   fees.   However,   expenses   for   books,   school   supplies,
uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the
start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that
she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then
give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2) semesters
at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of
records   (Exh.   Z   showing   that   FRANCISCO   was   listed   as
Parent/Guardian   [Exh.   Z­1]),   she   transferred   to   “De   Paul
College,” just in front of Mrs. Franco’s house, and studied there
for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of
Technology   (WIT),   where   she   obtained   a   bachelor’s   degree   in
Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with
Eusebio   and   Danthea   Lopez   at   Hotel   Kahirup,   owned   by   said
couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an
M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her tran­
_______________
 9
 Spelled “Esperanza Amador” and “Frank Heson” on Exhibits
E and F, and “Franque Jison” on Exhibit D.
10
 Iloilo   Central   Elementary   for   Grade   5;   Rizal   Elementary
School for Grade 6; Negros Occidental Provincial High School up
to her junior year in high school; and Iloilo Provincial High School
for her senior year in high school.
512
512  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
script   (Exh.   AA),   wherein   FRANCISCO   was   likewise   listed   as
“Guardian” (Exhs. AA­1 and AA­2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household
staff   at   Nelly   Garden,   to   wit:   Luz,   the   household   cook;   the
houseboys   Silvestre   and   Doming;   the   housemaid   Natang;
the yaya of the adopted triplets,  Deling; the yayaof Lolo Vicente,
Adelina; and others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members
of   the  office   staff   (Messrs.   Baylosis,   Lagarto,   Tingson,   Diasnes,
Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and others), and identified them
from a photograph marked as Exhibit X­2. She then corroborated
the   prior   testimony   regarding   her   employment   at   Merchant
Financing Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs.
Cuaycong’s   residence   in   Bacolod   City,   while   working   at   the
hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA  further   testified  that  in  March  1968,   she  went  to
Manila and met FRANCISCO at Elena Apartments at the corner
of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that
she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Franco’s
mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return
from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to
work, so the latter arranged for her employment at Miller & Cruz
in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was interviewed
by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she
would   start   working   first   week   of   September, sansexamination.
She   resigned   from   Miller   &   Cruz   in   1971   and   lived   with   Mrs.
Cuaycong at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA went
to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for
money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not
speak   Spanish   and   would   not   be   able   find   a   job.   The   two
quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA
the pantry and cut her hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged
her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to
Bacolod City and promised that he would give her the money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas
Orient Airways plane ticket (Exh. M) which FRANCISCO 
513
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  513 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by Mr.
Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards
(Exhs.   G to L),  with  annotations  at the back  reading:  “charged
and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison” and were signed by
Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G­1 to L­1). PLDT issued a certification as
to   the   veracity   of   the   contents   of   the   toll   cards   (Exh.   BB).
Likewise   introduced   in   evidence   was   a   letter   of   introduction
prepared   by   Mr.   Cruz   addressed   to   Atty.   Tirol,   on   MONINA’s
behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she
would have to go to Iloilo and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr.
Cruz would turn over the money promised by FRANCISCO. She
went to Atty. Tirol’s office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft
of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not
FRANCISCO’s daughter. She explained that all she had agreed
with   FRANCISCO   was   that   he   would   pay   for   her   fare   to   go
abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her
illegitimacy. She started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the
affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he was also a father
and did not want this to happen to his children as they could not
be   blamed   for   being   brought   into   the   world.   She   then   wrote   a
letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to the latter’s Forbes
Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O­
5  to O­7).   MONINA  subsequently   met  FRANCISCO  in Bacolod
City where they discussed the affidavit which she refused to sign.
FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in
case she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would
“keep her peace.”
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty.
Tirol’s   office,   she   was   accompanied   by   one   Atty.   Fernando
Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit (Exh. P) 11 would
“boomerang”   against   FRANCISCO   “as   it   is   contrary   to   law.”
MONINA   returned   to   Bacolod   City,   then   met   with   Atty.   Tirol
once   more   to  reiterate  her   plea,   but   Atty.   Tirol   did   not   relent.
Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971,  Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus,
_______________
 Also marked as Exhibit 2 for FRANCISCO.
11
514
514  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  possible   employment   with   Mrs.   Rosario   Lopez   Cooper,   another
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
she signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money
to support herself and finish her studies. In exchange for signing
the   document,   MONINA   received   a   Bank   of   Asia   check   for
P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which
FRANCISCO  allegedly  promised to  give.   As  Atty.  Tirol   seemed
hesitant   to   give   her   a   copy   of   the   affidavit   after   notarizing   it,
MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose,
she procured letters of introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin,
Mike   Alano   (son   of   FRANCISCO’s   elder   sister   Luisa);   and   an
uncle,  Emilio Jison (FRANCISCO’s elder  brother),  addressed to
another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilio’s daughter), for Beth to assist
MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S­1) expressly
recognizing   that   MONINA   was   FRANCISCO’s   daughter.
Ultimately   though,   MONINA   decided   not   to   go   abroad,   opting
instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA
review,   board   exam   and   graduate   studies.   After   finishing   her
graduate studies, she again planned to travel abroad, for which
reason,   she   obtained   a   letter   of   introduction   from   former   Vice
President   Fernando   Lopez   addressed   to   then   United   States
Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).
As   to   other   acts   tending   to   show   her   filiation,   MONINA
related that on one occasion, as FRANCISCO’s wife was going to
arrive at the latter’s Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called
MONINA  stayed  with  Mrs.   Luisa  Jison  for the  duration  of  the
stay of FRANCISCO’s wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew
Vice   President   Fernando   Lopez   and   his   wife,   Mariquit,   even
before   starting   to   go   to   school.   Thus,   MONINA   asked   for   a
recommendation   letter   (Exh.   U)   from   Mrs.   Mariquit   Lopez   for
second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly
recognized   MONINA   as   FRANCISCO’s   daughter.   As   additional
proof of her close relationship with the family of Vice President
Lopez, MONINA 
515
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  515 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
identified photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April
1985.
 MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children
of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior)
and   Elena,   but   MONINA   had   met   only   Lourdes   and   Junior.
MONINA’s testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior
and the two (2) occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last
time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when she
sought his blessings to get married.
In   his   defense,   FRANCISCO   offered   his   deposition   taken
before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila,   Branch   48.   As   additional   witnesses,   FRANCISCO
presented   Nonito   Jalandoni,   Teodoro   Zulla,   Iñigo   Supertisioso,
Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansay’s employment ceased as of
October,   1944,   and   that   while   employed   by   him, Pansay would
sleep   with   the   other   female   helpers   on   the   first   floor   of   his
residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the
second floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of
three   (3)   female   workers   and   two   (2)   male   workers.
After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with
him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO
staunchly   denied   having   had   sexual   relations   with Pansay and
disavowed   any   knowledge  about   MONINA’s   birth.   In   the  same
vein, he denied having paid for MONINA’s tuition fees, in person
or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto
paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that
Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions
or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied
that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha
Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO   also   disclosed   that   upon   his   return   from   the
United States in 1971, he fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering
that   Alfredo   had   taken   advantage   of   his   position   during   the
former’s absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and
Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor. 
516
516  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
Finally,   FRANCISCO   denied   knowledge   of   MONINA’s   long
distance calls from his Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he
subsequently discovered this, he fired certain people in his office
for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the caretaker
of   his   Bacolod   residence,   FRANCISCO   explained   that   since
MONINA   lived   at   Mrs.   Cuaycong’s   residence,   the   caretaker
thought   that  he   could   allow   people   who  lived   at  the   Cuaycong
residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCO’s) house.
Nonito   Jalandoni,   bookkeeper   and   paymaster   at   Nelly’s
Garden from 1963  up to 1974,  then from  1980  up to 1986,  the
assistant   overseer   of   Hacienda   Lopez,   testified   that   he   did   not
know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when
he was informed by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him;
and that he never saw MONINA at Nelly’s Garden, neither did he
know   of   any   instructions   for   anyone   at   Nelly’s   Garden   to   give
money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCO’s bookkeeper and paymaster from
1951   up   to  1986,   testified   that   FRANCISCO   dismissed   Alfredo
Baylosis   due   to   certain   unspecified   discrepancies;   and   that   he
never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr.
Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro
admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCO’s
haciendas,   and   not  vouchers   pertaining   to   the   latter’s   personal
expenses.
Iñigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at
Nelly’s   Garden   from   1964   up   to   1984   as   a   field   inspector,
paymaster,   cashier   and,   eventually,   officer­in­charge   (OIC).   He
confirmed   Alfredo   Baylosis’   dismissal   due   to   these   unspecified
irregularities,   then  denied   that   FRANCISCO   ever   ordered   that
MONINA   be   given   her   allowance.   Likewise,   Iñigo   never   heard
FRANCISCO   mention   that   MONINA   was   his   (FRANCISCO’s)
daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCO’s daughter, testified that she
saw   (but   did   not   know)   MONINA   at   the   Our   Lady   of   Mercy
Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes’ first son, Mark.
Over lunch one day, Lourdes’ aunt casually introduced Lourdes
and MONINA to each other, but they were  document, sans revisions.   Jose   alleged   that   he   drew   the
517
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  517
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or
1984,   MONINA  allegedly   went  to  Lourdes’  house   in  Sta.  Clara
Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as
MONINA was then job­hunting. However, Lourdes did not comply
with the request.
Jose   Cruz,   a   partner   at   Miller,   Cruz   &   Co.,   testified   that
MONINA   worked   at   Miller   &   Cruz   from   1968   up   to   1971,
however,   he   did   not   personally   interview   her   before   she   was
accepted   for   employment.   Moreover,   MONINA   underwent   the
usual screening procedure before being hired. Jose recalled that
one   of   the   accountants,   a   certain   Mr.   Atienza,   reported   that
MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCO’s daughter. Jose then told
Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza)
could stop her from spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported
that he spoke with MONINA, who told him that she planned to
leave   for   the   United   States   and   needed   P20,000.00   for   that
purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document disclaiming
filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to
request   that   MONINA   meet   with   Jose,   and   at   that   meeting,
MONINA   confirmed   Mr.   Atienza’s   report.   Jose   then   informed
Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCO’s personal lawyer, about the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his
(Atty.   Tirol’s)   office   in   Iloilo.   Jose   then   wrote   out   a   letter   of
introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose relayed
Atty.   Tirol’s   message   to   MONINA   through   Mr.   Atienza,   then
later,   Atty.   Tirol   told   Jose   to   go   to   Iloilo   with   a   check   for
P15,000.00.   Jose   complied,   and   at   Atty.   Tirol’s   office,   Jose   saw
MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some documents.
MONINA   then   expressed   her   willingness   to   sign   the
P15,000.00   from   his   personal   funds,   subject   to   reimbursement
from and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.
Dolores   Argenal,   a   househelper   at   Nelly   Garden   from   May
1944  up   to  May   1946,   testified  that  she  knew  that Pansay was
Lourdes’ nanny; that Lourdes slept in her parents’ room; that she
had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay; that
there was no “unusual relationship” between 
518
518  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
FRANCISCO   and Pansay,   and   if  there  was   any,   Dolores  would
have   easily   detected   it   since   she   slept   in   the   same   room
as Pansay.   Dolores   further   declared   that   whenever
FRANCISCO’s wife was out of town, Pansay would bring Lourdes
downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in the
room   where   FRANCISCO   slept.   Finally,   Dolores   declared
that Pansay stopped   working   for   FRANCISCO   and   his   wife   in
October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties
filed their respective memoranda.
It   need   be   recalled   that   Judge   Catalino   Castañeda,   Jr.
presided over trial up to 21 October 1986, thereby hearing only
the   testimonies   of   MONINA’s   witnesses   and   about   half   of
MONINA’s testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E.
Devera, Jr. heard the rest of MONINA’s testimony and those of
FRANCISCO’s witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 1990 12 the trial court, through
Judge   Devera,   dismissed   the   complaint   with   costs   against
MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof, it observed:
This   is   a   complaint   for   recognition   of   an   illegitimate   child
instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against defendant Francisco
Jison. This complaint was  filed on March 13,  1985  at the time
when   plaintiff,   reckoned   from   her   death   of   birth,   was   already
thirty­nine   years   old.   Noteworthy   also   is   the   fact   that   it   was
instituted   twenty   years   after   the   death   of   plaintiff’s   mother,
Esperanza   Amolar.   For   the   years   between   plaintiff’s   birth   and
Esperanza’s death, no action of any kind was instituted against
defendant either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latter’s
parents.   Neither   had   plaintiff   brought   such   an   action   against
defendant   immediately   upon   her   mother’s   death   on   April   20,
1965, considering that she was then already nineteen years old
or, within a reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more had to
supervene before this complaint was eventually instituted.
The   trial   court   then   proceeded   to   discuss   the   four   issues
stipulated at pre­trial, without, however, summarizing the  conclusion   was   based   “from   the   rumors   going   [around]   that
_______________
 Supra note 2.
12
519
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  519
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
testimonies  of  the  witnesses  nor referring  to  the testimonies  of
the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the
issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding
that it was improbable for witness Lope Amolar to have noticed
that Pansay was   pregnant   upon   seeing   her   at   the   Elena
Apartments in November 1945, since Pansaywas then only in her
first   month   of   pregnancy;   that   there   was   no   positive   assertion
that   “copulation   did   indeed   take   place   between   Francisco   and
Esperanza”; and that MONINA’s attempt to show opportunity on
the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider “that there was also
the opportunity for copulation between Esperanza and one of the
several   domestic   helpers   admittedly   also   residing   at   Nelly’s
Garden   at   that   time.”   The   RTC   also   ruled   that   the   probative
value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in
light  of  jurisprudence,   especially  when the  misspellings  therein
were considered.
The   trial   court   likewise   resolved   the   second   issue   in   the
negative, finding that MONINA’s evidence thereon “may either be
one   of   three   categories,   namely:   hearsay   evidence,   incredulous
evidence, or self­serving evidence.” To the first category belonged
the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose
knowledge of MONINA’s filiation was based, as to the former, on
“utterances   of   defendant’s   wife   Lilia   and   Esperanza   allegedly
during the heat of their quarrel,” while as to the latter, Alfredo’s
plaintiff is defendant’s daughter, from his personal observation of
plaintiff’s   facial   appearance   which   he   compared   with   that   of
defendant’s and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant)
acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then
opportunity   to   closely   observe   them   together.”   To   the   second
category belonged that of Dominador Savariz, as:
At   each   precise   time   that   Esperanza   allegedly   visited   Nelly’s
Garden and allegedly on those occasions when defendant’s wife,
Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard
pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related
to the paternity of the latter’s child. x x x
520
520  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  ADJUDGE   THIS   CASE   AGAINST   APPELLANT   DUE   TO   ITS
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
The RTC then placed MONINA’s testimony regarding the acts of
recognition   accorded   her   by   FRANCISCO’s   relatives   under   the
third category, since the latter were never presented as witnesses,
for   which   reason   the   trial   court   excluded   the   letters   from
FRANCISCO’s relatives (Exhs. S to V).
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was
not barred by prescription for it was of “the perception . . . that
the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children may be
availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner
as the Family Code has so provided;” or by laches, “which is [a]
creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results, and . . .
addressed   to   the   sound   discretion   of   the   court   [and]   the
circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this
case   immediately   upon   the   death   of   her   mother   Esperanza   in
1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, x x x there seems to be
no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of
plaintiff.”
The   RTC   ruled,   however,   that   MONINA   was   barred   by
estoppel by deed because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which
she   signed   “when   she   was   already   twenty­five   years,   a
professional and . . . under the able guidance of counsel.”
Finally,   the   RTC   denied   FRANCISCO’s   claim   for   damages,
finding that MONINA did not file the complaint with malice, she
having been “propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable
cause.”
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA­
G.R.   CV   No.   32860)   and   sought   reversal   of   the   trial   court’s
decision on the grounds that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO
MISPERCEPTION   THAT   APPELLANT’S   DELAY   IN   FILING
HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
521
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  521 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
II
THE   TRIAL   COURT   ERRED   IN   ITS   REJECTION   OF   THE
TESTIMONIES   OF   APPELLANT’S   WITNESSES   AS   TAILOR­
MADE, INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE
ADMISSIBILITY   OF   THE   CERTIFIED   COPIES   OF   PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS   PRESENTED   BY   APPELLANT   AS   PART   OF
HER EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT
A   WITNESS   TO   THE   ACTUAL   ACT   OF   COPULATION
BETWEEN   THE   APPELLEE   AND   APPELLANT’S   MOTHER
SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.
V
 THE   TRIAL   COURT   ERRED   IN   REJECTING   THE
ADMISSIBILITY   OF   THE   DULY   IDENTIFIED   NOTES   AND
LETTER   OF   THE   RELATIVES   OF   THE   APPELLEE   AS
HEARSAY.
VI
THE   TRIAL   COURT   ERRED   IN   CONCLUDING   THAT
APPELLANT’S   AFFIDAVIT   (EXH.   P)   SERVED   AS   A   BAR
AGAINST   HER   CLAIM   FOR   RECOGNITION   INSTEAD   OF
REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.13
Expectedly,   FRANCISCO   refuted   these   alleged   errors   in   his
Appellee’s Brief.14
In its decision of 27 April 1995, 15 the Court of Appeals initially
declared that as no vested or acquired rights were affected, the
instant case was governed by Article 175, in rela­
_______________
13
 OR, vol. 2, Annex “C,” Brief for Plaintiff­Appellant, 1­2.
14
 OR, vol. 2, 192 et seq.
15
 Supra note 1.
522
522  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  At any rate, what is important is
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
tion   to   Articles   172   and   173,   of   the   Family   Code. 16 While   the
Court  of  Appeals  rejected  the  certifications  issued  by  the  Local
Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO
did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other
means   by   which   illegitimate   filiation   could   be   proved, i.e.,   the
open  and  continuous possession  of  the  status  of  an  illegitimate
child or, by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special   laws,   such   as   “the   baptismal   certificate   of   the   child,   a
judicial admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is
entered,   common   reputation   respecting   pedigree,   admission   by
silence, testimonies of witnesses x x x.” 17 To the Court of Appeals,
the “bottom line issue” was whether or not MONINA established
her   filiation   as   FRANCISCO’s   illegitimate   daughter   by
preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to
prove   that   [MONINA]   is   the   illegitimate   daughter   of
[FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status
by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of
Lope   Amolar,   Adela   Casabuena   and   Dominador   Savariz   were
already sufficient to establish MONINA’s filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolar’s
testimony   by   saying   that   Lope   could   not   have   detected
Esperanza’s pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point
in   time   [sic]   she   was   still   in   the   initial   stage   of   pregnancy.
Apparently,   the   trial   court   paid   more   emphasis   on   the   date
mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import of his
testimony. As x x x Lope x x x was asked about an incident that
transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances, it
is unreasonable to expect that Lope could still be dead right on
the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his sister.
 
_______________
 Citing Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684 [1989].
16
 Citing   ALICIA   SEMPIO­DIY, HANDBOOK   ON   THE
17
FAMILY CODE 246(1988 ed.) (hereafter SEMPIO DIY).
523
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  523 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that
his   sister   pointed   to   their   employer   [FRANCISCO]   as   the   one
responsible for her pregnancy,  and that upon being  confronted,
[FRANCISCO]  assured  him  of  support  for  Esperanza   and  their
child. It would appear then that in an attempt to find fault with
Lope’s testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact
that even [FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he
was confronted by Lope about what he had done to Esperanza,
during   which   he   unequivocally   acknowledged   paternity   by
assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appeals further noted that Casabuena and Savariz
“testified   on   something   that   they   personally   observed   or
witnessed,” which matters FRANCISCO “did not deny or refute.”
Finally, said court aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies
x x x let alone such circumstantial evidence as [MONINA’s] Birth
Certificates   x   x   x   and   Baptismal   Certificates   which   invariably
bear   the   name   of   [FRANCISCO]   as   her   father,   We   cannot   go
along with the trial court’s theory that [MONINA’s] illegitimate
filiation has not been satisfactorily established.
x x x
Significantly,   [MONINA’s]   testimony   finds   ample
corroboration   from   [FRANCISCO’s]   former   employees,   Arsenio
Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. x x x
x x x
Carefully evaluating appellant’s evidence on her enjoyment of
the   status   of   an   illegitimate   daughter   of   [FRANCISCO] vis­a­
vis[FRANCISCO’s] controversion thereof, We find more weight in
the   former.   The   positive   testimonies   of   [MONINA]   and   [her]
witnesses x x x all bearing on [FRANCISCO’s] acts and/or conduct
indubitably   showing   that   he   had   continuously   acknowledged
[MONINA]   as   his   illegitimate   daughter   have   not   been
succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his
deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINA’s] exhaustive and
detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by
[MONINA’s]   witnesses,   he   merely   explained   that   he   had   fired
[them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCO’s]
vague   denial   is   grossly   inadequate   to   overcome   the   probative
weight of [MONINA’s] testimonial evidence.
524
524  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
Even the affidavit  (Exh  2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on
the trial court x x x does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA’s]
logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit
which   contained   untruthful   statements.   In   fact,   she   promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that
the  affidavit  was only for  the consumption of  his spouse x x x.
Further, the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that
led to the execution of the affidavit x x x could not have been true,
for as pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit x x x
almost five months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz
& Co. x x x
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter,
it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO]
or his lawyer to have secured [MONINA’s] sworn statement x x x
On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at
the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention
to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. x x x
In fine, We hold that [MONINA’s] filiation as [FRANCISCO’s]
illegitimate   daughter   has   been   conclusively   established   by   the
uncontroverted   testimonies   of   Lope   Amolar,   Adela   Casabuena
and  Dominador  Savariz  to  the  effect   that  appellee  himself  had
admitted his paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies
of  appellant;  Arsenio  Duatin,  Romeo  Bilbao,  Rudy   Tingson and
Alfredo   Baylosis   unerringly   demonstrating   that   by   his   own
conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school, paying for
her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the
Colegio   del   Sagrado   Corazon   de   Jesus,   defraying   appellant’s
hospitalization   expenses,   providing   her   with   [a]   monthly
allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellant’s mother,
acknowledging   appellant’s   paternal   greetings   and   calling
appellant his “Hija”  or  child,  instructing  his office personnel  to
give appellant’s monthly allowance, recommending appellant for
employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use
his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone
calls,   having   appellant  spend  her  vacation  in  his  apartment   in
Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use
his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA­
1   to   AA­5,   W   &   W­5),   appellee   had   continuously   recognized
appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts
of   [FRANCISCO's]   relatives   acknowledging   or   treating
[MONINA]   as   [FRANCISCO’s]   daughter   (Exh   U)   or   as   their
relative   (Exhs   T   &   V).   On   this   point,   witness   Zafiro   Ledesma,
former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez
clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has been
considered by the  testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment. x x
525
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  525
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the
company   of   the   Lopezes   (Exhs   X­16   &   X­17).   Another   witness,
Danthea   H.   Lopez,   whose   husband   Eusebio   Lopez   is   appellee’s
first   cousin,   testified   that   appellant   was   introduced   to   her   by
appellee’s   cousin,   Remedios   Lopez   Franco,   as   the   daughter   of
appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a]
secretary in the Merchant’s Financing Corporation of which she
was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family
free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz
declared that sometime in February, 1966 appellee’s relative, Ms.
Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the daughter of
appellee Francisco Jison.
Finally,   the   Certifications   of   the   Local   Civil   Registrar   of
Dingle   (Exhs   E   and   F)   as   well   as   [MONINA’s]   Baptismal
Certificates   (Exhs   C   &   D)   which   the   trial   court   admitted   in
evidence   as   part   of   [MONINA’s]   testimony,   may   serve   as
circumstantial   evidence   to   further   reinforce   [MONINA’s]   claim
that she is [FRANCISCO’s] illegitimate daughter by Esperanza
Amolar.
True it is that a trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. But the rule admits
of certain exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who
rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had
overlooked,   misunderstood   or   misappreciated   some   facts   or
circumstances   of   weight   and   substance   which,   if   properly
considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted]
In the  present  case,   both  exceptions  obtain.  All   of  [MONINA’s]
witnesses x x x whose testimonies were not given credence did not
x
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   judgment   of   the   trial
court   is   SET   ASIDE   and   another   one   is   hereby   entered   for
appellant   Monina   Jison,   declaring   her   as   the   illegitimate
daughter   of   appellee  Francisco   Jison,   and   entitled   to   all   rights
and privileges granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
526
526  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals   in  its   resolution  of   29   March  1996,18FRANCISCO   filed
the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the
Court   of   Appeals,   alleging   that   said   court   committed   errors   of
law:
I.
. . . IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND   DECLARING   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT   AS   THE
ILLEGITIMATE   CHILD   OF   PETITIONER,   CONSIDERING
[THE]   IMPOSSIBILITY   OF   SEXUAL   CONTACT   BETWEEN
THE   PETITIONER   AND   THE   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT’S
MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS SUPPOSED TO
HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
.   .   .   IN   REVERSING   THE   TRIAL   COURT’S   FINDING
CONSIDERING   THAT   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT’S
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND FILIATION
IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
.   .   .   IN   GIVING   CREDENCE   TO   DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE   PRESENTED   BY   THE   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT
AS   EVIDENCE   OF   FILIATION   CONSIDERING   THAT   THE
SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF­SERVING AND CANNOT BIND
THE   PETITIONER   UNDER   THE   BASIC   RULES   OF
EVIDENCE.
IV.
.   .   .   IN   INTERPRETING   THE   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT’S
SWORN STATEMENT (EXH. “P”/EXH. “2”) IN A MANNER NOT
IN   CONSONANCE   WITH   THE   RULINGS   OF   THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
V.
.   .   .   IN   NOT   CONSIDERING   THE   LONG   AND
UNEXPLAINED   DELAY   IN   THE   FILING   OF   THE  PRESENT
PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.
_______________
 OR, vol. 2, 192 et seq.
18
527
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  527 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into
account  the second  paragraph  of  MONINA’s complaint  wherein
she   claimed   that  he  and Pansay had  sexual   relations  “by  about
the end of 1945 or the start of 1946,” it was physically impossible
for him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in
MONINA’s birth, considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as
claimed by private respondent in her complaint that her mother
was impregnated by FRANCISCO “at the end of 1945 or the start
of 1946,” she would have been born sometime in late September
or early October and not August 6, 1946 x x x. The instant case
finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,19 thus:
x x x
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was
no   longer   employed   by   him   at   the   time   in   question   was
unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during the
time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINA’s
testimonial evidence is “shaky, contradictory and unreliable,” and
proceeds to attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in
the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected Pansay’s
pregnancy   in   November   1945   when   they   met   since   she   would
have   been   only   one   (1)   month   pregnant   then;   (b)   Dominador
Savariz   did   not   in   fact   witness   the   meeting   between
FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA;  (c) Zafiro  Ledesma had an
ulterior motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in
Iloilo   which   was   then   under   Central   Bank   supervision   and
MONINA   was   the   Bank   Examiner   assigned   to   Iloilo;   and   (d)
Danthea   Lopez   was   not   related   to   him   by   blood   and   whatever
favorable treatment MONINA received from Danthea was due to
the former’s employment at Merchants’ Financing Company and
additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides, Danthea
admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of
paternity and  that   the   Court   of   Appeals’   reliance   on   the   certifications   of   the
_______________
19
 209 SCRA 18, 23 [1992].
528
528  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  as the data was based only
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40 20 of
Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court   did   not   come   into   play.
FRANCISCO   likewise   re­echoes   the   view   of   the   trial   court   as
regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINA’s testimony that
he   answered   for   her   schooling   was   self­serving   and
uncorroborated   by   any   receipt   or   other   documentary   evidence;
and   assuming   he   did,   such   should   be   interpreted   as   a
manifestation of kindness shown towards the family of a former
household helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his
daughter,   FRANCISCO   points   to   the   fact   that Pansay was   the
former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the
families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was
in   their   employ   at   Kahirup   Hotel   and   Our   Lady   of   Mercy
Hospital,   respectively;   MONINA   failed   to   present   Mrs.   Franco,
Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and MONINA’s employment
at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to
her educational attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to
prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her employment thereat.
Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot,21 the quantum of evidence to
prove  paternity  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence,  not  merely  a
preponderance thereof, was not met.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues
Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates
(Exhs.  C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced.  First,
their  genuineness  could  not  be  ascertained   as the  persons   who
issued them did not testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,22 the contents of the baptismal certificates were hearsay,
 
_______________
20
 Act or declaration about pedigree and family reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree, respectively.
21
 186 SCRA 506 [1990].
22
 135 SCRA 439 [1985].
529
 VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  529
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
on what was told to the priest who solemnized the baptism, who
likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the name
of the father appearing therein was “Franque Jison,” which was
not  FRANCISCO’s  name.   Third,   in  both  Exhibits  E and  F,   the
names of the child’s  parents were listed  as “Frank Heson”  and
“Esperanza   Amador”   (not   Amolar).   FRANCISCO   further   points
out   that   in   Exhibit   F,   the   status   of   the   child   is   listed   as
“legitimate,”   while   the   father’s   occupation   as   “la­borer.”   Most
importantly,   there   was   no   showing   that   FRANCISCO   signed
Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the child’s
birth to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINA’s
educational   records,   FRANCISCO   invokes Bañas   v.
Bañas23 which   recognized   that   school   records   are   prepared   by
school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to
prove   paternity.   And,   as   to   the   photographs   presented   by
MONINA, FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of Appeals,24 and
further asserts that MONINA did not present any of the persons
with whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon; besides
these persons were, at best, mere second cousins of FRANCISCO.
He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by his
relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the authors.
Finally,   he   stresses   that   MONINA   did   not   testify   as   to   the
telephone   cards   (Exhs.   G   to   L)   nor   did   these   reveal   the
circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of MONINA’s affidavit of 21
September   1971   ran   counter   to Dequito   v.   Llamas,25 and
overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more than
25 years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court
of Appeals’ failure to consider the long and unexplained delay in
the filing of the case. 
_______________
23
 134 SCRA 260 [1985].
24
 135 SCRA 47 [1985].
25
 66 SCRA 504 [1975].
530
530  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
In   her   comment,   MONINA   forcefully   refuted   FRANCISCO’s
arguments, leading FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which
they subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to
support petitioner.
Before   addressing   the   merits   of   the   controversy,   we   first
dispose of preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and
the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly,
the   Family   Code   of   the   Philippines   (Executive   Order   No.   209)
governs the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of
Appeals, Uyguangco26served as a judicial confirmation of Article
256   of   the   Family   Code27 regarding   its   retroactive  effect   unless
there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child
has   passed   away   and   the   former   having   actually   resisted   the
latter’s claim below.
Under   Article  175   of   the  Family   Code,   illegitimate  filiation,
such as MONINA’s, may be established in the same way and on
the   same   evidence   as   that   of   legitimate   children.   Article   172
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and
filiation is established, thus: 267 of the Civil Code.
ART.   172.   The   filiation  of   legitimate   children   is   established   by For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation
any of the following: under the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given
that   she   has   none   of   the   evidence   mentioned   in   the   first
1. (1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a paragraph, a “high standard of proof” 28 is required. Specifically, to
final judgment; or prove   open   and   continuous   possession   of   the   status   of   an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of
2. (2)An   admission   of   legitimate   filiation   in   a   public the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
the parent concerned. affection   and   care,   which   cannot   be   attributed   to  pure   charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
_______________ conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
 Supra note 16.
26 accidentally, but continuously.29
 This article provides:
27 By   “continuous”   is  meant   uninterrupted   and   consistent,   but
This   Code   shall   have   retroactive   effect   insofar   as   it   does   not does not require any particular length of time.30
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with The   foregoing   standard   of   proof   required   to   establish   one’s
the Civil Code or other laws. filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition
531 and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be
an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  531
issued   only   if   paternity   or   filiation   is   established   by   clear   and
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
convincing evidence.31
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by: _______________

1. (1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a 28
 See Baluyut v. Baluyut, supra note 21, at 513.
legitimate child; or 29
 ARTURO   M.   TOLENTINO,   1 CIVIL   CODE   OF   THE
PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE 602­
2. (2)Any   other   means   allowed   by   the   Rules   of   Court   and 605(1985); see Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 675, 683
special laws. [1991].
30
 SEMPIO­DIY, at 245­246.
31
 Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18, 23­24 [1992].
 532
532  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the
general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil
cases, i.e.,   preponderance   of   evidence,   and   the   shifting   of   the
burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the
affirmative  of   the  issue   has  the  burden  of  proof,   and   upon   the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However,
in   the   course   of   trial   in   a   civil   case,   once   plaintiff   makes   out
a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts   to   defendant   to   controvert   plaintiff’s prima   facie case,
otherwise,   a   verdict   must   be   returned   in   favor   of   plaintiff.
Moreover,   in   civil   cases,   the   party   having   the   burden   of   proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon
the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of “preponderance of
evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
means probability of truth.32
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of
the instant controversy.
FRANCISCO’s   arguments   in   support   of   his   first   assigned
error deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed that
unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of
an   opportunity   for   such   indulgence,33 this   does   not   favor
FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances,
the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual
act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether
sexual   intercourse   actually   occurred   inevitably   redounds   to  the
victim’s   or   mother’s   word,   as   against   the   accused’s   or   putative
father’s protestations. In  as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open
_______________
32
 See 7   VICENTE   J.   FRANCISCO, THE   REVISED   RULES
OF   COURT   IN   THE   PHILIPPINES,   EVIDENCE (PART   II,
RULES   131­134),   at   2­4,   542­543   [1973]   (citations   omitted)
(hereafter FRANCISCO).
33
 10 C.J.S., Bastards §81 and 10 AM. JUR. 2D Bastards §105,
citing Walker   v.   State,   74   NE   614   [1905],   86   NE   502   (1908)
and State v. Breeden, 82 NE 1020 [1908].
533
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  533 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
the instant case, MONINA’s mother could no longer testify as to
the fact of intercourse,  as she had,  unfortunately,  passed away
long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But
this   did   not   mean   that   MONINA   could   no   longer   prove   her
filiation.   The   fact   of   her   birth   and   her   parentage   may   be
established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother.
The paramount question then is whether MONINA’s evidence is
coherent, logical and natural.34
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge
of Pansay “by  about  the  end  of  1945.”  We agree with  MONINA
that  this was broad  enough to cover  the fourth quarter of said
year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to
sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINA’s mother. In
any event, since it was established that her mother was still in
the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived
as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between
FRANCISCO and MONINA’s mother was not at all impossible,
especially   in   light   of   the   overwhelming   evidence,   as   hereafter
shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her
and   continuous   possession   of   the   status   as   FRANCISCO’s
illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by
MONINA,  woven by her narration  of circumstances and  events
that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with
FRANCISCO,   coupled   with   the   testimonies   of   her   witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:
1. 1)FRANCISCO   is   MONINA’s   father   and   she   was
conceived   at   the   time   when   her   mother   was   in   the
employ of the former;
2. 2)FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through
his overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals
took pains to enumerate, thus:
_______________
 See Ilano   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 230   SCRA   242,   256­257
34
[1994].
534
534  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
[L]ike   sending   appellant   to   school,   paying   for   her   tuition   fees,
school   uniforms,   books,   board   and   lodging   at   the   Colegio   del
Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant’s hospitalization expenses,
providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
expenses   of   appellant’s   mother,   acknowledging   appellant’s
paternal   greetings   and   calling   appellant   his   “Hija”   or   child,
instructing   his   office   personnel   to   give   appellant’s   monthly
allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller,
Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and
paying   for   her   long   distance   telephone   calls,   having   appellant
spend her  vacation  in  his apartment in Manila and also at his
Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records (Exhs. Z, AA, AA­1 to AA­5, W & W­
5) . . .
1. 3)Such   recognition   has   been   consistently   shown   and
manifested   throughout   the   years
publicly,35spontaneously,   continuously   and   in   an
uninterrupted manner.36
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the
second assigned error must fail.
There   is   some   merit,   however,   in   the   third   assigned   error
against the probative value of some of MONINA’s documentary
evidence.
MONINA’s   reliance   on   the   certification   issued   by   the   Local
Civil   Registrar   concerning   her   birth  (Exhs.   E  and  F)  is  clearly
misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the
issue   of   paternity,   when  there  is  no   showing   that   the   putative
Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity
of   an   illegitimate   child   upon   the   information   of   a   third
person.37 Simply put, if the alleged father did 
_______________
35
 See Baluyot   v.   Baluyot, supra note   21; Alberto   v.   Court   of
Appeals, 232 SCRA 745, 757 [1994].
36
 See Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95386, 29 May 1997,
at 11.
  See Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 130, 136­137
37
[1994], citing Roces v. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958).
535
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  535
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
not   intervene   in   the   birth   certificate, e.g.,   supplying   the
information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or
doctor  or  registrar is null  and void;  the mere certificate by the
registrar   without   the   signature   of   the   father   is   not   proof   of
voluntary acknowledgment on the latter’s part. 38 In like manner,
FRANCISCO’s   lack   of   participation   in   the   preparation   of   the
baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z
and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity,
the former being competent merely to prove the administration of
the   sacrament   of   baptism   on   the   date   so   specified. 39 However,
despite   the   inadmissibility   of   the   school   records per   se to   prove
paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA’s testimony
to   corroborate   her   claim   that   FRANCISCO   spent   for   her
education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the
baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to
prove MONINA’s filiation. Since  they  are per se inadmissible in
evidence   as   proof   of   such   filiation,   they   cannot   be   admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As   to   Exhibits   “S,”   “T,”  “U”   and   “V,”   the   various   notes  and
letters written by FRANCISCO’s relatives, namely Mike Alano,
Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively,
allegedly   attesting   to   MONINA’s   filiation,   while   their   due
execution   and   authenticity   are   not   in   issue,40 as   MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under
Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be
admitted,   there   being   no   showing   that   the   declarants­authors
were   dead   or   unable   to   testify,   neither   was   the   relationship
between the declarants and MONINA 
_______________
38
 See Berciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53, 77­78 [1984] (citations
omitted).
39
 See Fernandez v. CA, supra note 37; and Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 22, at 450.
40
 Rule 132, Section 20(a), Rules of Court.
536
536  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
shown by evidence other than the documents in question.41As to
the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40,
however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section  40. Family  reputation  or tradition  regarding  pedigree.—
The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may   be   received   in   evidence if   the   witness   testifying   thereon be
also   a   member   of   the   family,   either   by   consanguinity   or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portrait and the like, may be received
as evidence of pedigree. (italics supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts:
the portion containing the first underscored clause which pertains
to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question
may   not   be   admitted   as   the   authors   thereof   did   not   take   the
witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to
V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause “and
the like” as qualified by the preceding phrase “[e]ntries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and]
family portraits.”
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the
second  portion  of  this provision,  in light of  the rule  of ejusdem
generis,   is   limited   to   objects   which   are   commonly   known   as
“family possessions,” or those articles which represent, in effect, a
family’s   joint   statement   of   its   belief   as   to   the   pedigree   of   a
person.42 These have been described as objects “openly exhibited
and well known to the family,”43 or those “which, if  Their   inadmissibility   notwithstanding,   Exhibits   “S”   to   “V,”
_______________
41
 See Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 685 for
requisites   of   admissibility   of   an   act   or   declaration   regarding
pedigree.
42
 See FRANCISCO, at 498.
43
 5 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF
COURT 329 [1980] (hereafter MORAN).
537
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  537
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
preserved   in   a   family,   may   be   regarded   as   giving   a   family
tradition.”44 Other examples of these objects which are regarded
as   reflective   of   a   family’s   reputation   or   tradition   regarding
pedigree   are   inscriptions   on   tombstones, 45monuments   or   coffin
plates.46
Plainly   then,   Exhibits   S   to   V,   as   private   documents   not
constituting “family possessions” as discussed above, may not be
admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these
exhibits   be   admitted   on   the   basis   of   Rule   130,   Section   41
regarding common reputation,47 it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that
it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and
not   the   common   reputation   in   community,   that   is   a   material
element   of   evidence   going   to   establish   pedigree.   x   x   x   [Thus]
matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family,
and   not   by   reputation   in   the   neighborhood   or   vicinity,   except
where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved
by common reputation in the community.48
inclusive,   may,   in   like   manner   as   MONINA’s   school   records,
properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her
claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his
daughter. 
_______________
44
 5   RUPERTO   G.   MARTIN, RULES   OF   COURT   IN   THE
PHILIPPINES   WITH   NOTES   AND   COMMENTS   325 (3rd   ed.
1974) (hereafter MARTIN).
45
 Id.
46
 MORAN, supra note 43.
47
 The provision reads:
Section 41. Common reputation.—Common reputation existing
previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general
interest   more   than   thirty   years   old,   or   respecting   marriage   or
moral   character,   may   be   given   in   evidence.   Monuments   and
inscriptions   in   public   places   may   be   received   as   evidence   of
common reputation.
48
 MORAN, supra note 43, at 328 and 336.
538
538  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
We   now   direct   our   attention  to  MONINA’s   21   September   1971
affidavit   (Exh.   P/Exh.   2),   subject   of   the   fourth   assigned   error,
where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA
contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had
no savings and needed the money to support herself and finish
her studies. Moreover,  she signed Exhibit P upon the advice of
Atty.   Divinagracia   that   filiation   could   not   be   waived   and   that
FRANCISCO’s ploy would “boomerang” upon him. On the other
hand, FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded
Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years old at the time of its
execution and was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized
document,   its   genuineness   and   due   execution   could   not   be
questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at
the   accounting   firm   of   Miller   &   Cruz,   who   declared   that   he
intervened   in   the   matter   as   MONINA   was   spreading   rumors
about   her   filiation   within   the   firm,   which   might   have   had
deleterious   effects   upon   the   relationship   between   the   firm   and
FRANCISCO.
On   this   issue,   we   find   for   MONINA   and   agree   with   the
following observations of the Court of Appeals:
Even the affidavit  (Exh  2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on
the trial court x x x does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA’s]
logical   explanation   that   she   at   first   did   not   agree   to   sign   the
affidavit   which   contained   untruthful   statements.   In   fact,   she
promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to
her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse x
x x.
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter,
it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO]
or his lawyer to have secured [MONINA’s] sworn statement x x x
the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention
to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. x x x
Indeed,   if   MONINA   were   truly   not   FRANCISCO’s   illegitimate
daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation.
For as clearly established before the trial 
539
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  539 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
court and properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA
had   resigned   from   Miller   &   Cruz   five   (5)   months   prior   to   the
execution   of   the   sworn   statement   in   question,   hence   negating
FRANCISCO’s   theory   of   the   need   to   quash   rumors   circulating
within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of MONINA’s father.
Hence,   coupled   with   the   assessment   of   the   credibility   of   the
testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident
that the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and
convincing   evidence   and   more   than   merely   preponderant, 49 has
been met by MONINA.
Plainly   then,   the   burden   of   evidence   fully   shifted   to
FRANCISCO.
Two   (2)   glaring   points   in   FRANCISCO’s   defense   beg   to   be
addressed:   First,   that   his   testimony   was   comprised   of   mere
denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as “That
is  not  true,”  “I   do  not  believe that,” or   “None  that I   know.”  In
declining then to lend credence to FRANCISCO’s testimony, we
resort   to   a   guiding   principle   in   adjudging   the   credibility   of   a
witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early
as 1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity
teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are
such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court
a   false   narrative   containing   numerous   details,   he   is   almost
certain   to   fall   into   fatal   inconsistencies,   to   make   statements
which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the
falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine
themselves to the incidents immediately related to the principal
fact   about  which   they   testify,   and   when  asked   about   collateral
facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers
not infre­
_______________
49
 See Yturralde   v.   Azurin, 28   SCRA   407,   417   [1969],
citing Mendezona   v.   Philippine   Sugar   Estates   Development
Co., 41   Phil.   475,   493   [1921],   in   turn,   citing Camacho   v.
Municipality   of   Baliuag, 28   Phil.   466 [1914]   and Centenera   v.
Garcia   Palicio, 29   Phil.   470 [1915];   and Salame   v.   Court   of
Appeals, 239 SCRA 356, 359 [1994].
540
540  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
quently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as “I don’t
know” or “I don’t remember.” x x x50
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and
Savariz   were   unspecified   or   likewise   unsubstantiated,   hence
FRANCISCO’s attempt to prove ill­motive on their part to falsely
testify in MONINA’s favor may not succeed. As may be gleaned,
the   only   detail   which   FRANCISCO   could   furnish   as   to   the
circumstances   surrounding   the   dismissals   of   his   former
employees   was   that   Baylosis   allegedly   “took   advantage   of   his
position” while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside
from   this   bare   claim,   FRANCISCO’s   account   is   barren,   hence
unable   to   provide   the   basis   for   a   finding   of   bias   against
FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As   to   FRANCISCO’s   other   witnesses,   nothing   substantial
could be obtained either. Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only
came   to   know   of   MONINA   in   June   1988; 51 that   during   his
employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not
recall ever having seen MONINA there, neither did he know of
any   instructions   from   FRANCISCO   nor   Mr.   Lagarto
(FRANCISCO’s   office   manager   before   passing   away)   regarding
the   disbursement   of   MONINA’s   allowance. 52 Teodoro   Nulla
corroborated   Jalandoni’s   testimony   regarding   not   having   seen
MONINA   at   Nelly   Garden   and   MONINA’s   allowance;   declared
that   Alfredo   Baylosis   was   dismissed   due   to   discrepancies
discovered   after   an   audit,   without   any   further   elaboration,
however;   but   admitted   that   he   never   prepared   the   vouchers
pertaining   to   FRANCISCO’s   personal   expenses,   merely   those
intended   for   one   of   FRANCISCO’s   haciendas.53 Then,   Iñigo
Superticioso confirmed that according to the report of a certain
Mr. Atienza, Baylosis “was dismissed by Mr. 
_______________
50
 United States v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 428­429 [1921]; People
v. Nemesio V. Ganan, Jr., Harley S. Fabicon, G.R. No. 119722, 2
December 1996, at 25.
51
 TSN, 15 November 1988, 10­11.
52
 TSN, 15 November 1988, 14­17.
53
 TSN, 16 January 1989, 8; 24­25.
541
VOL. 286, FEBRUARY 24, 1998  541 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
Jison   for   irregularities,”   while   Superticioso   was   informed   by
FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence.
Superticioso likewise denied that MONINA received money from
FRANCISCO’s   office,   neither   was   there   a   standing   order   from
FRANCISCO to release funds to her.54
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for
FRANCISCO   are   likewise   insufficient   to   overcome   MONINA’s
evidence.   The   former   merely   consist   of   denials   as   regards   the
latter’s   having   gone   to   Nelly   Garden   or   having   received   her
allowance from FRANCISCO’s office, which, being in the form of
negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive
testimony;55 bare assertions as regards the dismissal of Baylosis;
ignorance   of   FRANCISCO’s   personal   expenses   incapable   of
evincing   that   FRANCISCO   did   not   provide   MONINA   with   an
allowance;   or   hearsay   evidence   as   regards   the   cause   for   the
dismissals   of   Baylosis   and   Tingson.   But   what   then   serves   as
the coup de grâce is that despite Superticioso’s claim that he did
not   know   MONINA,56 when   confronted   with   Exhibit   H,   a
telephone toll ticket indicating that on 18 May 1971, MONINA
called   a   certain   “Eñing”   at   FRANCISCO’s   office,   Superticioso
admitted that his nickname was “Iñing” and that there was no
other person named “Iñing” in FRANCISCO’s office.57
All   told,   MONINA’s   evidence   hurdled   “the   high   standard   of
proof”   required   for   the   success   of   an   action   to   establish   one’s
illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding
“open and continuous possession” or “any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws”; moreover, MONINA proved
her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
The   last   assigned   error   concerning   laches   likewise   fails   to
convince. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on  claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to
_______________
54
 TSN, 17 April 1989, 6, 8, 10­12, 29.
55
 People   v.   Antonio, 233   SCRA   283,   299   [1994]; Batiquin   v.
Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334, 343 [1996].
56
 TSN, 17 April 1989, 13.
57
 TSN, 17 April 1989, 29­31.
542
542  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Jison vs. Court of Appeals
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay   in   asserting   the   complainant’s   rights,   the   complainant
having   had   knowledge   or   notice   of   the   defendant’s   conduct   as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge   or   notice   on   the   part   of   the   defendant   that   the
complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and
(4)   injury   or   prejudice   to   the   defendant   in   the   event   relief   is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 58 The
last element is the origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply
only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable
to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.59
As   FRANCISCO   set   up   laches   as   an   affirmative   defense,   it
was incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements.
However,   he   only   succeeded   in   showing   MONINA’s   delay   in
asserting   her   claim,   but   miserably   failed   to   prove   the   last
element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is based
upon   grounds   of   public   policy   which   requires,   for   the   peace   of
society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a
question   of   the   inequity   or   unfairness   of   permitting   a   right   or
what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according
to   its   particular   circumstances.   The   question   of   laches   is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an
equitable   doctrine,   its   application   is   controlled   by   equitable
considerations.   It   cannot   be   worked   to   defeat   justice   or   to
perpetuate fraud  and injustice. 60 Since the instant  case  involves
paternity   and   filiation,   even   if   illegitimate,   MONINA   filed   her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision
of   law.   A   denial   then   of   her   action   on   ground   of   laches   would
clearly be inequitable and unjust.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is hereby  DENIED  and the challenged decision of  the Court of
Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA­G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing,
JJ.,concur.
Petition denied; Challenged decision affirmed.
Notes.—The phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article
256 is not defined by the Family Code, leaving it to the courts to
determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to
them. (Aruego, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711 [1996])
In the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265 of the Civil Code,
the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed
by   the   Rules   of   Court   or   special   laws.   (Balogbog   vs.   Court   of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 259 [1997])
 
G.R. No. 196735. May 5, 2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff­appellee, vs. DANILO
FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER
SOLIVA,   WARREN   L.   ZINGAPAN,   and   ROBERT   MICHAEL
BELTRAN ALVIR, accused­appellants.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses;
Probable Cause; Due Process; Upon a finding of probable cause,
an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in
compliance with the due process of the law.—It is enshrined in our
Bill   of   Rights   that   “[n]o   person   shall   be   held   to   answer   for   a
criminal   offense  without  due process  of law.” This  includes  the
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
and “to be informed of the nature and accusation against him.”
Upon a finding of
_______________  
* THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 149
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
probable   cause,   an   information   is   filed   by   the   prosecutor
against  the  accused,   in  compliance  with  the  due  process  of  the
law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that: A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given   by   the   statute;   the   acts   or   omissions   complained   of   as
constituting   the   offense;   the   name   of   the   offended   party;   the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Failure to state
an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be   appreciated   as   such.—It should   be   remembered   that   every
aggravating   circumstance   being   alleged   must   be   stated   in   the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if
duly   proven   at   trial,   will   not   be   appreciated   as   such. It was,
therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in
the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
 Same;   Same;   Disguise;   In   criminal   cases,   disguise   is   an
aggravating   circumstance   because,   like   nighttime,   it   allows   the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out
his   crimes.—In   criminal   cases,   disguise   is   an   aggravating
circumstance   because,   like   nighttime,   it   allows   the   accused   to
remain   anonymous   and   unidentifiable   as   he   carries   out   his
crimes.   The   introduction   of   the   prosecution   of   testimonial
evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but
the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise
as   an   aggravating   circumstance. What   is   important   in   alleging
disguise   as   an   aggravating   circumstance   is   that   there   was
a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise
in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise
the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being
charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
Same;  Conspiracy;  Conspiracy presupposes that  “the act  of
one is the act of all.”—The information charges conspiracy among
the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act
of  all.” This  would  mean  all   the  accused   had   been  one  in their
plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on
to prove that some of them might not have done so. In any case,
the accused
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1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
50
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
were   being   charged   with   the   crime   of   murder,   frustrated
murder,   and   attempted   murder.   All   that   is   needed   for   the
information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have
been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time,
place, and persons involved in the offense.
Remedial Law;  Criminal  Procedure;  Appeals;   As a  general
rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are given great weight and credence on review.—
As  a  general   rule,   the  findings of  fact  by  the  trial   court,   when
affirmed   by   the   appellate   court,   are   given   great   weight   and
credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People
v. Daniel Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996), as follows: Settled is the
rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility   of  witnesses,   are  accorded   great  weight   and   respect.
For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses
through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such
as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of
a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or
the   forthright   tone   of   a   ready   reply;   or   the   furtive   glance,   the
blush   of   conscious   shame,   the   hesitation,   the   sincere   or   the
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the
sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. There are, of course,
recognized   exceptions   to   this   rule.   In People v.Leticia
Labarias, 217 SCRA  483  (1993),  this court stated  that: It is the
policy   of   this   Court   to   sustain   the   factual   findings   of   the   trial
court on the reasonable assumption that it is in a better position
to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the
witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on
the stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such
findings   are clearly   arbitrary   or   erroneous as   when   they
are tainted   with   bias   or   hostility or   are so   lacking   in
basis as   to   suggest   that   they   were   reached   without   the
careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize
a judicial decision.
 Same; Evidence; Witnesses; It would be in line with human
experience   that   a   victim   or   an   eyewitness   of   a   crime   would
endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event
that   he   or   she   survives,   the   criminal   could   be   apprehended.—
It would  be  in  line  with  human  experience  that  a  victim  or  an
eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the
assailant so that in the
151
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 151
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
event that   he   or   she   survives,   the   criminal   could   be
apprehended. It has also been previously held that: It is the most
natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see
the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in
which   the   crime   was   committed.   Most   often   the   face   of   the
assailant   and   body   movements   thereof,   creates   a   lasting
impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory.
Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, a witness can testify
only   to   the   facts   he   knows   of   his   personal   knowledge;   that   is,
which are derived from his own perception.—As  a  general rule,
“[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are  derived from his  own perception,
x x x.” All   other   kinds   of   testimony   are   hearsay   and   are
inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of  Court, however, provide
several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when
the   evidence   is   part   of res   gestae, thus:   Section   42. Part   of   res
gestae.—Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence
is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as
part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal
act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; Considering that the statements of
the   bystanders   were   made   immediately   after   the   startling
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res
gestae.—There   is   no   doubt   that   a   sudden   attack   on   a   group
peacefully   eating   lunch   on   a   school   campus   is   a   startling
occurrence.   Considering   that   the   statements   of   the   bystanders
were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are,
in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
Criminal   Law;   Alibi;   It  is   settled   that   the   defense   of   alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim.—It is
settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the victim. In People v. Benjamin Peteluna, 689
SCRA   190   (2013),   this   court   is   stated   that:   x x x   In   this
case, the victims  were able to  positively   identify  their  attackers
while the accused­appellants merely offered alibis and denials as
their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both
the trial court and the
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1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
52
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
appellate court while giving little credence to the accused­
appellants’ alibis.   There   is,   thus,   no   reason   to   disturb   their
findings.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The swiftness
and   the   suddenness   of   the   attack   gave   no   opportunity   for   the
victims   to   retaliate   or   even   to   defend   themselves.   Treachery,
therefore,   was   present   in   this   case.—The   victims,   who   were
unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats.
The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In
a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would
be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The
attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude
any  possibility   of  the  bystanders   being  able  to  help  them  until
after the incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack
gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend
themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of
attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree
of   participation.—It should   be   remembered   that   the   trial   court
found   that   there   was   conspiracy   among   the   accused­
appellants and   the   appellate   court   sustained   this
finding. Conspiracy,   once   proven,   has   the   effect   of   attaching
liability   to   all   ofthe   accused,   regardless   of   their   degree   of
participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co­principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective
active   participation   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   or
crimes   perpetrated   in   furtherance   of   the   conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of
all. The foregoing  rule is anchored on  the  sound principle that
“when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through  the physical  volition of one, or all,  proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong­doing is in law responsible for the whole,
the same as though performed by himself alone.” Although it is
axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, “when
two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of
the agreement or conspiracy.” The imposition of collective liability
upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court   held   that   ...   it   is   impossible   to   graduate   the   separate
liability of each (conspirator) with­
153
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 153
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
out   taking   into   consideration   the   close   and   inseparable
relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission
of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must
therefore   in   view   of   the   solidarity   of   the   act   and   intent   which
existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or   party   created   by   them,   and   they   are   all   equally
responsible. Verily,   the   moment   it   is   established   that   the
malefactors   conspired   and   confederated   in   the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the
accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy,
and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as
to   the   actual   degree   of   participation   of   each   of   the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.
ABAD,  J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial  Law;   Evidence;   Proof  Beyond  Reasonable   Doubt;
View   that   in   every   criminal   action,   the   prosecution   has   to
establish the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, by proof
beyond   reasonable   doubt.—In   every   criminal   action,   the
prosecution has to establish the identity of the offender, like the
crime  itself,   by  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  Indeed,   its  first
duty   is   to   prove   the   identity   of   the   offender   for,   even   if   the
commission of the offense can be established, no conviction can
take place without proof of his identity beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Alibi; View that true, alibi is a weak defense
in the face of positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the
accused   committed   the   crime.—True, alibi is   a   weak   defense   in
the face of positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the
accused   committed   the   crime.   But   such   testimonies   must   be
credible   and   must   come   from   credible   witnesses.   Several
circumstances militate against the mauling victims’ testimonies
that they were able to identify their attackers.
Remedial Law; Evidence; View that the circumstances of the
separate identifications, taking place in split seconds, defy belief.
—Just what are the chances that four out of five witnesses who
were fleeing and, indeed, running for their lives would just look
back, risk stumbling and crashing down, to put in evidence the
identities of some of those whom the RTC and the CA convicted?
Very little. It appears a convenient excuse for providing evidence
where none
154
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
54
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
existed.   The   circumstances   of   the   separate   identifications,
taking place in split seconds, defy belief. What baffles me is the
fact that the trial court acquitted SJ Morano whom SR Fortes and
Gaston identified while looking back on the run but convicted SJ
Zingapan, Soliva, and Medalla who were also targets of look­back
testimonies.
Same;   Same;   Res   Gestae;   View   that   the   statement   of   the
bystanders, made while some of the wounded were bleeding there
and the excitement lingered, may be given in evidence as part of
the   res   gestae.—The   statement   of   the   bystanders,   made   while
some   of   the   wounded   were   bleeding   there   and   the   excitement
lingered,   may   be   given   in   evidence   as   part   of   the res   gestae.
Section   42,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Evidence   provides:
Sec. 42. Part   of   the   res   gestae.—Statements   made   by   a   person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. x x x These
statements are spontaneous reactions inspired by the excitement
of the moment. It may be assumed that, unlike tardy witnesses,
the bystanders who made the statements had no opportunity to
deliberate   or   fabricate.   The   words   they   uttered   are  part  of   the
commotion they described. The res gestae contradicts the attempt
of prosecution witnesses to show that a number of the attackers
wore masks or that identification was possible because the masks
of some fell off.
Constitutional Law; Right to Remain Silent; View that the
right to silence is given to persons under suspicion for committing
some crimes, not to the victims whose duty is to promptly assist
the police investigators in pinpointing criminal responsibilities.—
The   right   to   silence   is   given   to   persons   under   suspicion   for
committing   some   crimes,   not   to   the   victims   whose   duty   is   to
promptly   assist   the   police   investigators   in   pinpointing   criminal
responsibilities. No evidence has been presented to show that the
UP police force was partial to the opposing fraternity. I am thus
unable to blame the accused for believing that the only possible
reason  in  this  case  for  withholding   information from the  police
from day one was that the victims and their counsel had yet to
put their acts together.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; View
that while the attack by masked men is doubly condemnable, not
only   for   the   treachery   involved   but   also   for   the   cowardice   and
deception
155
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 155
 People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
that came with it, the Supreme Court cannot hastily send to
prison   those   charged   with   these   crimes   without   proof   beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed them.—While the attack by
masked men  is  doubly condemnable, not only for the treachery
involved but also for the cowardice and deception that came with
it,   the   Court   cannot   hastily   send   to   prison   those   charged   with
these   crimes   without   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   they
committed   them.   The   Constitution   ordains   this.   In   a   case   like
this,   where   the   identities   and   participations   of   the   several
accused   involved   are   difficult   to   prove,   the   ideal   solution   is   to
convince the least guilty of them, the one who showed the most
reluctance   and   delivered   the   lightest   blows,   to   turn   state
witness. I am unable to say if efforts in this direction were taken
by the NBI or the prosecutors to ensure that they had a good case.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  De Castro  &  Cagampang  Law  Offices for accused­appellant
Christopher Soliva.
  Villareal,   Rosacia,   Dino   &   Patag   Law   Offices for   appellant
Alvir.
  Estelito P. Mendoza for appellant Zingapan.  injuries   that   required   hospitalization.   One   of   them,   Dennis
LEONEN, J.:  Venturina, died from his injuries.
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students,
faculty, and research personnel should feel safest. After all, this is
where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this
world are peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce
hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade
misplaced   concepts   of   perverse   brotherhood   for   these   hopes.
Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity.
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
This has resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now the
subject   matter   of   this   case. It is   rare   that   these   cases   are
prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible
witnesses   who   present   themselves   courageously   before   an   able
and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this
society   for   hooliganism   disguised   as   fraternity   rumbles.   The
perpetrators   must   stand   and   suffer   the   legal   consequences   of
their actions. They must do so for there is an individual who now
lies   dead,   robbed   of   his   dreams   and   the   dreams   of   his   family.
Excruciating grief for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to
1:00   in   the   afternoon,   seven   (7)   members   of   the Sigma
Rho Fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen,
near   the   Main   Library   of   the   University   of   the   Philippines,
Diliman,   when   they   were   attacked   by   several   masked   men
carrying   baseball   bats   and  lead  pipes.   Some  of   them  sustained
An information[1] for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q95­61133,   was   filed   against   several   members   of   the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity,   namely,   Danilo   Feliciano,   Jr.,   Julius
Victor L. Medalla,   Warren L. Zingapan,   Robert   Michael   Beltran
Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette
Fajardo,   George   Morano,   Raymund   E.   Narag,   Gilbert   Merle
Magpantay,   Benedict   Guerrero,   and   Rodolfo   Peñalosa,   Jr.   with
the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Quezon   City,   Branch   219.   The
information reads:
That   on   or   about   the   8th day   of   December   1994,   in   Quezon
City,   Philippines,   the   above­named   accused,   wearing   masks
and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with
other personswhose true
_______________
[1] Original records, Vol. I, p. 3.
157
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
names,   identities   and   whereabouts   have   not   as   yet   been
ascertained,   and   mutually   helping   one   another,   with   intent   to
kill,   qualified   with   treachery,   and   with   evident   premeditation,
taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats,
lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting
him on the head and clubbing him on different parts of his body
thereby   inflicting   upon   him   serious   and   mortal   injuries   which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and   prejudice   of   the   heirs   of   said   DENNIS   F.   VENTURINA.
(Emphasis supplied)
Separate   informations   were   also   filed   against   them   for   the
attempted   murder   of Sigma Rho Fraternity   members   Cesar
Mangrobang,   Jr.,[2] Cristobal   Gaston,   Jr.,[3] and   Leandro
Lachica,[4] and   the   frustrated   murder   of Sigma   Rho Fraternity
members Mervin Natalicio[5] and Arnel Fortes.[6] Only 11 of the
accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero,
remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro   Lachica,   Arnel   Fortes,   Dennis   Venturina,   Mervin
Natalicio,   Cristobal   Gaston,   Jr.,   Felix   Tumaneng,[7]and   Cesar
Mangrobang,   Jr.   are  all   members   of   the Sigma   Rho Fraternity.
On December 8, 1994,  at  around 12:30  to  1:00  p.m.,  they were
having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the
Main Library of the University of the Philippines,
_______________
[2] Docketed as Q95­61134.
157 [3] Docketed as Q95­61135.
[4] Docketed as Q95­61136.
[5] Docketed as Q95­61137.
[6] Docketed as Q95­61138.
[7] Felix   Tumaneng   was   not   presented   as   a   witness   by   the
prosecution.
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Diliman,   Quezon   City.[8] Suddenly, Dennis   Venturina
shouted, “Brods, brods!”[9]
According   to   Leandro   Lachica,   Grand   Archon   of Sigma
Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina shouted, and
he  saw   about  ten  (10)  men  charging  toward  them.[10]The men
were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads
were   covered   with   either   handkerchiefs   or   shirts.[11] Within   a
few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him
with their lead pipes.[12] During the attack, he recognized one of
the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask
fell off.[13]
Lachica   tried   to   parry   the   blows   of   his   attackers,   suffering
scratches and contusions.[14] He was, however, able to run to the
nearby   College   of   Education.[15] Just   before   reaching   it,   he
looked   back   and   saw   Warren   Zingapan   and   Julius
Victor L. Medalla   holding   lead   pipes   and   standing   where   the
commotion was.[16] Both of them did not have their masks on.
[17] He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because
he   often   saw   them   in   the   College   of   Social   Sciences   and
Philosophy  (CSSP)  and Zingapan used  to be  his friend.[18] The
attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty­five (45) seconds.[19]
According   to   Mervin   Natalicio,   the   Vice   Grand   Archon
of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina shouted.[20]
_______________
  [8]   TSN, June 5, 1995, pp. 9­11.
  [9]    TSN, July 3, 1995,    p.   7.
[10] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 25.
[11] Id., at pp. 11­12.
[12] Id., at p. 12.
[13] Id.
[14] Id., at p. 13.
[15] Id., at pp. 13­14.
[16] Id., at pp. 45­46.
[17] Id., at pp. 13­14.
[18] Id.
[19] Id., at p. 33.
[20] TSN, July 3, 1995, p. 7.
159He saw about  fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men,  most of  who
were wearing masks, running toward them.[21] He was stunned,
and   he   started   running.[22] He   stumbled   over   the   protruding
roots of a tree.[23] He got up, but the attackers came after him
and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell
down.[24] While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2)
of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva
since   they   were   not   wearing   any   masks.[25] After   about   thirty
(30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.[26] He was lying on his
back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to
five   (5)   men   coming   toward   him,   led   by   Benedict   Guerrero.
[27]This   group   also   beat   him   up.[28] He   did   not   move   until
another group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to
eight   (8)   seconds.[29] When   the   attacks   ceased,   he   was   found
lying on the ground.[30] Several bystanders brought him to the
U.P.   Infirmary   where   he   stayed   for   more   than   a   week   for   the
treatment of his wounds and fractures.[31]
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho,
he also looked back when Venturina shouted and saw a group of
men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces
of cloth around their heads.[32] He ran when they attacked, but
two   (2)   men,   whose   faces   were   covered   with   pieces   of   cloth,
blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.[33] While running
and parrying the blows, he recognized them as
_______________
[21] Id.
[22] Id., at p. 10.
[23] Id.
[24] Id., at pp. 12­13.
[25] Id., at pp. 14­16.
[26] Id., at p. 16.
[27] Id., at pp. 16­17.
[28] Id., at p. 17.
[29] Id., at p. 19.
[30] Id., at pp. 19­20.
[31] Id.
[32] TSN, September 28, 1995, pp. 14­15.
[33] Id., at p. 16.
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because
their masks fell off.[34] He successfully evaded his attackers and
ran to the Main Library.[35] He then decided that he needed to
help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.
[36] There,   he   saw   Venturina   lying   on   the   ground.[37] Danilo
Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while
Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.[38] When they
saw him, they went toward his direction.[39] They were about to
hit   him   when   somebody   shouted   that   policemen   were   coming.
Feliciano and Narag then ran away.[40]
Cesar   Mangrobang,   Jr.   then   saw   Arnel   Fortes.   Fortes
accompanied him to his car so they could bring Venturina to the
U.P. Infirmary.[41] When they brought the car over, other people,
presumably   bystanders,   were   already   loading   Venturina   into
another   vehicle.[42] They   followed   that   vehicle   to   the   U.P.
Infirmary   where   they   saw   Natalicio.[43]He   stayed   at   the
infirmary until the following morning.[44]
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he
immediately   stood   up   when   he   heard   someone
shout, “Brods!”[45] He saw a group of men charging toward them
carrying   lead   pipes   and   baseball   bats.[46] Most   of   them   had
pieces of cloth covering their faces.[47] He was about to run when
two (2)
_______________
[34] Id., at pp. 17­18.
[35] Id., at pp. 20­21.
[36] Id., at pp. 21­22.
[37] Id., at p. 23.
[38] Id., at pp. 23­26.
[39] Id., at p. 28.
[40] Id., at pp. 28­29.
[41] Id., at p. 33.
[42] Id., at p. 34.
[43] Id., at p. 35.
[44] Id., at p. 36.
[45] TSN, October 11, 1995, p. 15.
[46] Id.
[47] Id., at pp. 16­17.
161
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 161
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
of   the   attackers   approached   him.[48] One   struck   him   with   a
heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument.
[49] He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe,
but   he   sustained   stab   wounds   on   the   chest   and   on   his   left
forearm.[50] He was able to run away.[51]When he sensed that no
one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House Canteen and
saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.
[52] He decided to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity
brothers.[53]When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity
brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.[54] He ended
up   going   to   their   hang­out   instead   to   meet   with   his   other
fraternity   brothers.[55] They   then   proceeded   to   the   College   of
Law where the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the
incident.[56]
According to Arnel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran
when   he   saw   the   group   of   attackers   coming   toward   them.
[57] When   he   looked   back,   he   saw   Danilo  Feliciano,   Jr.   hitting
Venturina.[58] He   was   also   able   to   see   Warren   Zingapan   and
George Morano at the scene.[59]
 Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College U.P.   where   the Sigma   RhoFraternity   members   held   a   meeting.
of Education, boarded a jeepney to the College of Law to wait for [65]
their other fraternity brothers.[60] One of his fraternity brothers, On   the   night   of   December   8,   1994,   the   officers   of Sigma
Peter Corvera, told him that he received informa­ Rho advised   the   victims   to   lodge   their   complaints   with   the
_______________ National Bureau of Investigation.[66] Their counsel, Atty. Frank
[48] Id., at pp. 17­18. Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their
[49] Id., at pp. 19­20. statements   before   the   National   Bureau   of   Investigation,
[50] Id., at p. 24. promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the
[51] Id., at p. 31. meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to
St. Luke’s Hospital on December 8, 1994. He died on December
[52] Id., at pp. 31­32.
10, 1994.[67]
[53] Id., at p. 33. On   December   11,   1994,   an   autopsy   was   conducted   on   the
[54] Id., at pp. 34­35. cadaver of Dennis Venturina.[68] Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico­
[55] Id., at p. 40. legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, found that
[56] Id., at pp. 44­45. Venturina   had   “several   contusions   located   at   the   back   of   the
[57] TSN, October 30, 1995, p. 74. upper   left   arm   and   hematoma   on   the   back   of   both
[58] Id., at pp. 30­31. hands,”[69] “two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the head,[70]
_______________
[59] Id., at pp. 77­78.
[61] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 14.
[60] TSN, June 21, 1995, pp. 5­6.
162 [62] Id.
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED [63] Id., at pp. 14­15.
People vs. Feliciano, Jr. [64] Id., at p. 17.
tion that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of [65] Id., at p. 15.
the Main Library and were regrouping in SM North.[61] Lachica [66] Id., at p. 20.
and   his   group   then   set   off   for   SM   North   to   confront Scintilla [67] TSN, September 16, 1996, pp. 10­14.
Juris and identify their attackers.[62] [68] TSN, July 24, 1995, pp. 6­7.
When   they   arrived   in  SM   North,   pillboxes   and   stones   were [69] Id., at pp. 14­16.
thrown   at   them.[63] Lachica   saw   Robert   Michael   Beltran   Alvir [70] Id., at pp. 16­17.
and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.[64] They had 163
no choice but to get away from the mall and proceed instead to VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 163
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
generalized hematoma on the skull,”[71] “several fractures on the
head,”[72] and   “inter­cranial   hemmorrhage.”[73] The   injuries,
according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard blunt
object.[74] Dr.   Victoria   concluded   that   Venturina   died   of
traumatic head injuries.[75]
On   December   12,   1994,   Lachica,   Natalicio,   Mangrobang,
Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective affidavits[76]before
the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico­legal
examinations[77] with   their   medico­legal   officer,   Dr.   Aurelio
Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio
had “lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear,
and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion
on the left leg and thigh,”[78] all of which could have been caused
by   any   hard,   blunt   object.   These   injuries   required   medical
attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from
the date of infliction.[79]
Dr. Villena found on Arnel Fortes “lacerated wounds on the
head   and   on   the   right   leg   which   could   have   been   caused   by   a
blunt instrument.”[80] These injuries required hospitalization for
a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from date of infliction.
[81] He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a “healed abrasion
on the left forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with
[a] rough hard surface and would require one
_______________
[71] Id., at p. 18.
[72] Id., at pp. 19­20.
[73] Id., at p. 22.
[74] Id., at p. 41.
[75] Id., at p. 23.
[76] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 17; TSN, July 3, 1995, p. 20; TSN,
September 28, 1995, pp. 116­117; TSN, October 20, 1995, p. 34;
TSN, October 11, 1995, p. 48.
[77] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 17.
[78] TSN, July 31, 1995, p. 14.
[79] Id., at p. 46.
[80] Id., at pp. 26­28.
[81] Id., at p. 46.
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
(1) to nine (9) days of medical attention.”[82] He found on Leandro
Lachica  “contusions  on  the  mid  auxiliary   left  side,  left  forearm
and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side.”[83] On
Christopher   Gaston,   Jr.   he   found   “lacerated   wounds   on   the
anterior   chest,   left   side,   left   forearm;   swollen   knuckles   of   both
hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and
lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side.”[84]
On   September   18,   1997,   after   the   prosecution   presented   its
evidence­in­chief, the court granted the demurrer to evidence filed
by Rodolfo Peñalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified
by the prosecution’s witnesses and that he was not mentioned in
any of the documentary evidence of the prosecution.[85]
Upon   the   presentation   of   their   evidence,   the   defense
introduced their own statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,[86] a member of the U.P. Police,
he  was  on  foot  patrol  with  another  member  of  the  U.P.  Police,
Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the
College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard
somebody shouting, “Rumble!” They went to the place where the
alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped
by bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service
vehicle of the Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name
was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked
Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead
told   him   that   his   attackers   were   wearing   masks.   Oscar
Salvador[87]corroborated his testimony.
_______________
[82] Id., at p. 401.
[83] Id., at pp. 31­33.
[84] Id.
[85] RTC Decision, p. 15.
[86] TSN, November 11, 1995.
[87] TSN, November 20, 1995.
165
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 165
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Benjamin   Lato,[88] a   utility   worker   of   the   Beach   House
Canteen,   likewise   testified   that   the   identities   of   the   attackers
were   unrecognizable   because   of   their   masks.   He,   however,
admitted   that   he   did   not   see   the   attack;   he   just   saw   a   man
sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo,[89] a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main
Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor located nearby. From
there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten
(10) men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with
shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He
also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked
men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims
was lifting the other to help him, but the attackers overtook him.
Afterwards,   the   attackers   ran   away.   He   then   saw   students
helping those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying
one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be Arnel
Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha NuSorority,
Eda   Panganiban,[90] testified  that  she   and  her  friends  were  in
line   to   order   lunch   at   the   Beach   House   Canteen   when   a
commotion happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18)
masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any
mask fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz
Perez,[91]corroborated   her   story   that   the   masked   men   were
unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted
that   a   member   of Scintilla   Juris approached   her   to   make   a
statement.
Another   sorority   sister,   Bathalani   Tiamzon,[92] testified   on
substantially   the   same   matters   as   Panganiban   and   Perez.   She
also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who
_______________
[88] TSN, November 27, 1995.
[89] TSN, December 4, 1995.
[90] TSN, December 11, 1995.
[91] Id.
[92] TSN, December 18, 1995.
166
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
was being beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men.
She also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks
while some were wearing white t­shirts as masks. She did not see
any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,[93] accused­appellant Danilo
Feliciano, Jr.’s mother, her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick
grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son
went to Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school
where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According   to   Robert   Michael   Beltran   Alvir,[94] he   had   not
been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that he could
not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was
absent even from work. He also testified that he wore glasses and,
thus,   could   not   have   possibly   been   the   person   identified   by
Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P.
at the time since he was working to support himself.
According   to   Julius   Victor   Medalla,[95] he   and   another
classmate,   Michael   Vibas,   were   working   on   a   school   project   on
December   8,   1994.   He   also   claimed   that   he   could   not   have
participated   in   the   rumble   as   he   had   an   injury   affecting   his
balance.   The  injury  was  caused   by   an  incident  in August   1994
when he was struck in the head by an unknown assailant. His
testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos[96] who stated
that  after   lunch   that  day,  Medalla   played   darts  with  him  and,
afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher   Soliva,[97] on   the   other   hand,   testified   that   he
was   eating   lunch   with   his   girlfriend   and   another   friend   in
Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to
_______________
[93] TSN, November 27, 1995.
[94] TSN, February 2, 2000.
[95] TSN, September 22, 1999.
[96] TSN, August 11, 1999.
[97] TSN, June 16, 1999.
167
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their fraternity hang­
out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the Main
Library. He also met several Sigma Rhoansacting suspiciously as
they passed by the hang­out. They were also told by their head,
Carlo   Taparan,   not   to   react   to   the Sigma   Rhoans and   just   go
home. Anna Cabahug,[98] his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan[99] also testified that he was not in U.P. at
the time of the incident. He claimed to have gone to SM North to
buy a gift for a friend’s wedding but ran into a fraternity brother.
He   also  alleged   that  some Sigma   Rhoans attacked   them   in  SM
North that day.
On   February   28,   2002,   the   trial   court   rendered   its
decision[100] with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
Feliciano,   Jr.,   Christopher   Soliva,   Julius   Victor   Medalla,   and
Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and   attempted   murder   and   were   sentenced   to,   among   other
penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[101] The trial court,
however,   acquitted   Reynaldo   Ablanida,   Carlo   Jolette   Fajardo,
Gilbert   Magpantay,   George   Morano,   and   Raymund   Narag.
[102] The case  against  Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived
by the court until his apprehension.[103]
The   trial   court,   in   evaluating   the   voluminous   evidence   at
hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the
considered view  that of the ten  accused,  some  were sufficiently
identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the
amorphous images during
_______________
  [98]   TSN, November 23, 1998.
  [99]   TSN, May 12, 1999.
167 [100] Penned   by   the   Hon.   Jose   Catral   Mendoza,   now   an
Associate Justice of this Court (CA Rollo, pp. 576­644).
[101] RTC Decision, pp. 81­83.
[102] Id., at pp. 82­83.
[103] Id., at p. 83.
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and
identify some of the attackers etching an indelible impression in
their memory. In this regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were
emphatic that they saw the attackers rush towards them wielding
deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and
bladed ones, and pounce on their hapless victims, run after them,
and   being   present   with   one   another   at   the   scene   of   the   crime
during   the   assault.   Although   each   victim   had   a   very   strong
motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not
one   of   them   testified   against   all   of   them. If the   prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on
convicting Scintilla   Juris members   for   that   matter,   they   could
have easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant
in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure that no one
else   would   escape   conviction.   Instead,   each   eyewitness   named
only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did
not see who delivered the blows against them.[104]
 
Because   one   of   the   penalties   meted   out was   reclusion
perpetua, the case was brought to this court on automatic appeal.
However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,[105] the
case was remanded to the Court of Appeals.[106] In the Court of
Appeals, the case had to be re­raffled several times[107] before it
was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
for the writing of the decision.
_______________
[104] Id., at pp. 48­49.
[105] Per People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678­87, July 7, 2004,
433 SCRA 640, which modified the rules on direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.
[106] Per   resolution   of   this   Court   dated   April   13,   2005,
CA Rollo, p. 297.
[107] Justice   Romeo   F.   Barza   voluntarily   inhibited   due   to
membership  in Sigma  Rho Fraternity.   Justices  Celia   C.   Librea­
Leagogo and Isaias P. Dicdican also voluntarily inhibited, but the
reason was not shown in the records.
169
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 169
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First
Division of Five, affirmed[108] the decision of the Regional Trial
Court,   with   three   (3)   members   concurring[109] and   one
(1)  dissenting.[110]
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this
court for review.
The   issue   before   this   court   is   whether   the   prosecution   was
able   to   prove   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   accused­appellants
attacked   private   complainants  and   caused   the  death   of  Dennis
Venturina.
On   the   basis,   however,   of   the   arguments   presented   to   this
court by both parties, the issue may be further refined, thus:
1.     Whether   accused­appellants’   constitutional
rights   were   violated   when   the   information   against
them   contained   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   the
use   of   masks   despite   the   prosecution   presenting
witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and 
2.     Whether   the   Regional   Trial   Court   and   the
Court   of   Appeals   correctly   ruled,   on   the   basis   of   the
evidence,   that   accused­appellants   were   sufficiently
identified. 
I 
An   information   is   sufficient   when
the   accused   is   fully   apprised   of
the   charge   against   him   to   enable
him to prepare his defense 
 It is   the   argument   of   appellants   that   the   information   filed
against them violates their constitutional right to be informed
_______________
[108] Rollo, pp. 4­72; CA Rollo, pp. 1480­1551.
[109] Justices   Amelita   G.   Tolentino,   Jose   C.   Reyes,   Jr.,   and
Mariflor P. Punzalan­Castillo.
[110] Justice Stephen C. Cruz.
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
of   the   nature   and   cause   of   the   accusation   against   them.   They
argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase
“wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information
since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the
accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that “[n]o person shall be
held   to   answer   for   a   criminal   offense   without   due   process   of
law.”[111] This includes the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty and “to be informed of the nature and
accusation against him.”[112]
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by
the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with the due
process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the   name   of   the   offended   party;   the   approximate   date   of   the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab­eo,[113] this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a
person of common understanding to know the charge against him,
and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to
allow   the   accused   to   fully   prepare   for   his   defense,   precluding
surprises during the trial.[114]
_______________
[111] Const., Art. III, Sec. 14(1).
[112] Const., Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
[113] 424 Phil. 482; 373 SCRA 461 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, Third
Division].
[114] People v. Wilson Lab­eo, 424 Phil. 482, 497; 373 SCRA 461,
473   (2002)   [Per J.   Carpio,   Third   Division], citing Jumawan   v.
Eviota,
171
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 171
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of
the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the
information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance
being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state
an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be appreciated as such.[115] It was, therefore, incumbent on the
prosecution   to   state   the   aggravating   circumstance   of   “wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order
for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by
the trial court.
In   criminal   cases,   disguise   is   an   aggravating   circumstance
because,   like   nighttime,   it   allows   the   accused   to   remain
anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The   introduction   of   the   prosecution   of   testimonial   evidence
that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks
fell   off   does   not   prevent   them   from   including   disguise   as   an
aggravating   circumstance.[116] What   is   important   in   alleging
disguise   as   an   aggravating   circumstance   is   that   there   was
a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise
in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise
the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being
charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The   introduction   of   evidence   which   shows   that   some   of   the
accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of their right
to be informed of their offenses.
_______________
 G.R.   Nos.   85512­13,   July   28,   1994,   234   SCRA   524   [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc].
[115] Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 8.
[116] See People v. Sabangan Cabato, 243 Phil. 262; 160 SCRA
98 (1988) [Per J. Cortes, Third Division] and People v. Veloso, 197
Phil. 846; 112 SCRA 173 (1982) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
The   information   charges   conspiracy   among   the   accused.
Conspiracy   presupposes   that   “the   act   of   one   is   the   act   of
all.”[117] This would mean all the accused had been one in their
plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on
to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of
murder,   frustrated   murder,   and   attempted   murder.   All   that   is
needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of
the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details
as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II 
Findings   of   the   trial   court,   when 
affirmed by the   appellate   court,
are   entitled   to   great   weight   and
credence 
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when
affirmed   by   the   appellate   court,   are   given   great   weight   and
credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People
v. Daniel Quijada,[118] as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially   on   the   credibility   of   witnesses,   are   accorded   great
weight   and   respect.   For,   the   trial   court   has   the   advantage   of
observing   the   witnesses   through   the   different   indicators   of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter   of   a   reluctant  answer   or   the   forthright   tone   of   a   ready
reply;   or   the   furtive   glance,   the   blush   of   conscious   shame,   the
hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone,
_______________
[117] People   v.   Halil   Gambao, G.R.   No. 172707,   October   1,
2013, 706 SCRA 508 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
[118] 328 Phil. 505; 259 SCRA 191 (1996) [Per J. Davide, En
Banc].
173
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 173
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of
it,  the  scant  or full  realization  of  the  solemnity   of an oath,  the
carriage and mien.[119]
There   are,   of   course,   recognized   exceptions   to   this   rule.
In People v. Leticia Labarias, [120] this court stated that:
 It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of
the trial court on the reasonable assumption that it is in a better
position   to   assess   the   evidence   before   it,   particularly   the
testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by
their deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the
rule   is   where   such   findings   are clearly   arbitrary   or
erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or
are so   lacking   in   basis as   to   suggest   that   they   were
reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that
should   characterize   a   judicial   decision.[121] (Emphasis
supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance
since the presumption is always in favor of innocence. It is only
upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is
sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution
and forty­two (42) witnesses for the defense were put on the stand
from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty­three (83)­page
_______________
[119] People   v.   Daniel   Quijada, 328   Phil.   505,   530­531;   259
SCRA 191, 212­213 (1996) [Per J. Davide, En Banc], citing People
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 76742, August 7, 1990, 188 SCRA 407
[Per J. Cruz, First Division]; People v. De Leon, 315 Phil. 584; 248
SCRA   609   (1995)   [Per J.   Davide,   Jr.,   First   Division]; People   v.
Delovino, 317 Phil. 741; 247 SCRA 637 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
First   Division]; Creamer   v.   Bivert, 214   MO   473,   474   (1908);   M.
Frances Mcnamara, 200 Famous Legal Quotations, p. 548 (1967).
[120] G.R. No. 87165, January 25, 1993, 217 SCRA 483 [Per J.
Cruz, First Division].
[121] Id., at p. 484.
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
decision, the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of
the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be
said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was
“so lacking in basis” that it was arrived at without a judicious and
exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch,   however,   as   the   trial   court’s   findings   hold   great
persuasive value, there is also nothing that precludes this court
from   coming   to   its   own   conclusions   based   on   an   independent
review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The   accused   were   sufficiently
identified   by   the   witnesses   for   the
prosecution 
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible.
In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place
his  fraternity   rivals  permanently  behind  bars,   not one  testified
against   all   of   them. If   the   prosecution   eyewitnesses,   who
were   all Sigma   Rhoans,   were   simply   bent   on
convicting Scintilla   Juris members   for   that   matter,   they
could   have   easily   tagged   each   and   every   accused   as   a
participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make
sure   no   one   would   escape   conviction.   Instead,   each
eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid
enough   to   say   that   they   did   not   see   who   delivered   the
blows against them.
Thus,   the   prosecution   witnesses,   Ernest   Paulo   Tan,   Dennis
Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have seen it all but they
could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other
hand,   said   that   he   did   not   have   the   opportunity   to   see   and
identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two­
inch cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not
see   who   did   it.   Natalicio,   one   of   the   other   three   who   were
hospitalized, was
175
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 175
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
severely beaten by three waves of attackers totalling more than
15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he
would   be  able   to  recognize  those  he  saw   if   he   would   see  them
again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he stressed
that   he   did   not   see   Zingapan,   Soliva,   Guerrero,   Del   Rosario,
Daraoay,   Denoista,   and  Peñalosa   during   the  onslaught.   Gaston
could have named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly
hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said
their  faces  were   covered.   Like  Natalicio,   Fortes  was  repeatedly
beaten by several groups but did not name any of the accused as
one  of those who attacked  him. The  persons he identified were
those   leading   the   pack   with   one   of   them   as   the   assailant   of
Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing while he was
running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during
the   attack   but   did   not   know   then   their   names.[122] (Emphasis
supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that “considering the swiftness of
the incident,”[123] there would be slight inconsistencies in their
statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,[124] it was previously
observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying
on   the   occurrence   of   a   crime   to   give   varying   details   as
there may be some details which one witness may notice
while   the   other   may   not   observe   or   remember.   In   fact,
jurisprudence   even   warns   against   a   perfect dovetailing   of
narration   by   different   witnesses   as   it   could   mean   that   their
testimonies   were   prefabricated   and   rehearsed.
[125] (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
[122] RTC Decision, p. 49.
[123] Id., at p. 57.
[124] G.R.   No.   175980,   February   15,   2012,   666   SCRA
174 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
[125] Id.,   at  p.   191, citing People  v.   Lacbayan, 393  Phil.   800,
807;   339   SCRA   396,   401   (2000)   [Per J.   Ynares­Santiago,   First
Division].
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
According   to   their   testimonies,   Lachica   was   able   to  identify
Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;[126] Natalicio was able to identify
Medalla,   Zingapan,   and   Soliva;[127] and   Fortes   was   able   to
identify   Feliciano,   Medalla,   and   Zingapan.[128] Their   positive
identification was due to the fact that they either wore no masks
or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an
eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the
assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal
could be apprehended. It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence
to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe
the  manner in which the  crime was committed. Most often the
face   of   the   assailant   and   body   movements   thereof,   creates   a
lasting   impression   which   cannot   be   easily   erased   from   their
memory.[129]
 In the  commotion,  it was more than likely that  the masked
assailants   could   have   lost   their   masks. It had   been   testified   by
the victims that  some  of  the  assailants were wearing  masks  of
either   a   piece   of   cloth   or   a   handkerchief   and   that   Alvir,
[130] Zingapan,[131] Soliva,[132] and   Feliciano[133] had   masks
on at first but their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco
_______________
[126] TSN, June 5, 1995, pp. 11­13.
[127] TSN, July 3, 1995, pp. 21­22.
[128] TSN, October 30, 1995, pp. 91, 112.
[129] People   v.   Opiniado   Dolar, G.R.   No.   100805,   March   24,
1994,   231   SCRA   414,   423   [Per J.   Puno,   Second
Division], citing People   v.   Sartagoda, G.R.   No.   97525,   April   7,
1993, 221 SCRA 251, 257 [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
[130] TSN, June 21, 1995, p. 33.
[131] TSN, July 5, 1995, p. 24.
[132] Id., at pp. 48­52.
[133] TSN, September 28, 1995, p. 24.
177
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People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Capilo during cross­examination who observed that some of the
attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q       Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A        No, sir.
Q        During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot
of   people   eating   in   the   Beach   House   Canteen,   and   then
running towards different directions, is it not?
A        Yes, sir.
Q        And   some   people   were   wearing   masks   and   some   were    “hazy”[137] by   the   trial   court   only   with   regard   to   his
not?
A        Yes, sir.[134]
 
While   the   attack   was   swift   and   sudden,   the   victims   would
have had the presence of mind to take a look at their assailants if
they   were   identifiable.   Their   positive   identification,   in   the
absence of evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has   been   argued   that   the   trial   court   did   not   give
Mangrobang’s testimony credence while Gaston’s testimony was
found to be “hazy.” This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated
that   the   acquittal   of   the Scintilla   Juris members   identified   by
Mangrobang   “should   not   be.   misinterpreted   to   mean   that   the
testimony of Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication.”[135] The
court went on to state that they “were exonerated merely because
they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification
by   Mangrobang,   under   tumultuous   and   chaotic   circumstances
were   [sic]   not   corroborated   and   their alibis,   not
refuted.”[136] There was, therefore, no basis to say
_______________
[134] TSN, December 4, 1995, p. 47; See also RTC Decision, p.
51.
177
[135] RTC Decision, p. 64.
[136] Id.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence
presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence.
Gaston’s   testimony,   on   the   other   hand,   was   considered
identification of Zingapan’s companion. Gaston testified that he
saw Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano
staying   in   place.   Fortes,   however,   testified   that   both   Zingapan
and Morano were running after him. Lachica also testified that it
was   Medalla,   not  Morano,   who   was   with   Zingapan.   Because   of
this confusion, the trial court found that there was doubt as to
who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an
acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still did not impute
doubt   in   their   testimonies   that   Zingapan   was   present   at   the
scene.
Be   that   as   it   may,   the   acquittals   made   by   the   trial   court
further   prove   that   its   decision   was   brought   about   only   upon   a
thorough examination of the evidence presented. It accepted that
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but
that these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled
that   “[s]uch   inconsistencies,   and   even   probabilities,   are   not
unusual   ‘for   there   is   no   person   with   perfect   faculties   or
senses.’”[138]
Evidence   as   part   of   the res   gestae  A   declaration   or   an   utterance   is   deemed   as   part   of   the res
may   be   admissible   but   have   little
persuasive value in this case  hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
According   to   the   testimony   of   U.P.   Police   Officer   Salvador,
[139] when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders
who all told him that they could not recognize the
_______________
[137] Id., at p. 65.
[138] Id., at p. 58.
[139] TSN, November 20, 1995, p. 20.
179
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be
evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae. 
As a general rule, “[a] witness can testify only to the facts he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, x x x.”[140] All other kinds of testimony are
hearsay   and   are  inadmissible  as  evidence.   The  Rules   of  Court,
however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one
of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part   of   res   gestae.—Statements   made   by   a
person while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior   or   subsequent   thereto   with   respect   to   the   circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and   giving   it   a   legal   significance,   may   be   received   as   part   of
the res gestae.[141]
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,[142] this court has previously
discussed   the   admissibility   of   testimony   taken   as   part   of res
gestae, stating that:
gestae and   thus   admissible   in   evidence   as   an   exception   to   the
principal   act,   the res   gestae, is   a   startling   occurrence;   (b)   the
statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise;   and   (c)   the   statements   must   concern   the   occurrence   in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
x x x x
_______________
[140] Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
[141] Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 130(C)(6), Sec. 42.
179
[142] G.R.   No.   173476,   February   22,   2012,   666   SCRA   501
[Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances
which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and   which   are   admissible   when   illustrative   of   such act.” In   a
general   way, res   gestae refers   to   the   circumstances,   facts,   and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the   main   fact   as   to   exclude   the   idea   of   deliberation   and
fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations
and   statements   made   by   either   the   participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately
after   the   commission   of   the   crime   when   the   circumstances   are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance   inspired   by  the  excitement  of  the  occasion  and  there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate
a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res   gestae is,   therefore,   whether   the   act,   declaration,   or
exclamation   is   so   intimately   interwoven   or   connected   with   the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.[143]
 
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully
eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occur­
_______________
[143] People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February
22,   2012,   666   SCRA   501,   512­514   [Per J.   Bersamin,   First
Division], citingPeople v. Peralta, G.R. No. 94570, September 28,
1994, 237 SCRA 218, 224 [Per J. Cruz, First Division]; People v.
Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 103226­28, October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587,
600 [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; Alhambra Bldg. & Loan Ass’n
v. DeCelle, 118 P. 2d 19, 47 C.A. 2d 409; Reilly Tar & Chemical
Corp.   v.   Lewis, 61   N.E.   2d   297,   326   Ill.   App.   117; Kaiko   v.
Dolinger, 440 A. 2d 198, 184 Conn. 509; Southern Surety Co. v.
Weaver,   Com.   App., 273   S.W.   838; People   v.   Sanchez, G.R.   No.
74740,   August   28,   1992,   213   SCRA   70,   79   [Per J.   Davide,   Jr.,
Third   Division]; Molloy   v.   Chicago   Rapid   Transit   Co., 166   N.E.
530,   335  Ill.   164; Campbell   v.   Gladden, 118   A.   2d  133,   383   Pa.
144, 53 A.L.R. 2d 1222.
181
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 181
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
rence.   Considering   that   the   statements   of   the   bystanders   were
made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact,
admissible as evidence given in res gestae. 
In People v. Albarido,[144] however, this court has stated that
“in accord to ordinary human experience”:
x x x   persons   who  witness  an  event  perceive  the  same  from
their respective points of reference. Therefore, almost always,
they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly,
we   cannot   expect   the   testimony   of   witnesses   to   a   crime   to   be
consistent in all aspects because different persons have different
impressions   and   recollections   of   the   same   incident.
x x x[145] (Emphasis supplied)
 
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible,
have little persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen
the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different
points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the
time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on
at   first,   but   later   on,   some   remained   masked   and   some   were effect   that   when   she   asked   Natalicio   who   attacked   them,
unmasked. Natalicio   answered   that   he   did   not   know   because   they   were
When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those masked.
of   the   victims   who   witnessed   the   entirety   of   the   incident   from It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case
beginning   to   end   at   close   range,   the   former   become   merely belong   to   rival   fraternities.   While   this   court   does   not   condone
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of their   archaic   and   oftentimes   barbaric   traditions,   it   is   conceded
the   incident,   therefore,   must   be   given   considerably   less   weight that   there   are   certain   practices   that   are   unique   to   fraternal
than that of the victims. organizations.
_______________ It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the
[144] 420   Phil.   235;   368   SCRA   194   (2001)   [Per J.   Sandoval­ identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it without
Gutierrez, Third Division]. first   conferring   with   their   other   fraternity   brothers.   This
[145] Id., at p. 245; pp. 202­203, citing People v. Real, 367 Phil. probability   is   bolstered   by   the   actions   of Sigma   Rho after the
524;   308   SCRA   244   (1999)   [Per J.   Pardo,   First   Division].   This incident,   which   showed   that   they   confronted   the   members
statement was used in order to justify that minor inconsistencies of Scintilla   Juris in   SM   North.   Because   of   the   tenuous
do not affect the witnesses’ credibility so long as they concur on relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been prudent
the material aspects of the incident. for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
182 Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P.
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police officer or the
People vs. Feliciano, Jr. doctor’s testimonies more credible than that of the
The   belated   identification   by   the _______________
victims   do   not   detract   from   their [146] TSN, November 13, 1995, pp. 37­38.
[147] TSN, September 16, 1998, p. 20.
positive   identification   of   the   ap­
183
pellants 
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 183
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about
the   incident   to   the   U.P.   Police   or   the   Quezon   City   Police   but People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
instead   executed   affidavits   with   the   National   Bureau   of victims. It should   not   be   forgotten   that the victims   actually
Investigation four (4) days after the incident gives doubt as to the witnessed   the   entire   incident,   while   Officer   Salvador,   Officer
credibility of their testimonies. Cabrera,   and   Dr.   Mislang   were   merely   relaying   secondhand
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera[146] testified that on their information.
way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who all told The   fact   that   they   went   to   the   National   Bureau   of
him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all Investigation four (4) days after the incident also does not affect
wearing   masks.   Meanwhile,   Dr.   Mislang[147] testified   to   the their  credibility since most of them had  been  hospitalized from
their injuries and needed to recover first. Since a fraternity moves
as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait
until all of them were well enough to go to the National Bureau of
Investigation headquarters in order to give their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the
advice   of   their   senior “brods” and   their   legal   counsel   that   they
executed their sworn statements  before the  National  Bureau of
Investigation four (4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of
Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was the call of their
legal   counsel   who   might   have   deemed   the   National   Bureau   of
Investigation   more equipped to   handle   the   investigation.   This
does   not,   however,   affect   the   credibility   of   the   witnesses   since
they were merely following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of
Investigation   is better equipped   than   the   U.P.   Police   to   handle
the   investigation   of   the   case.   As   stated   in   the   U.P.   College   of
Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining
campus security. Their station is located in front of the College
of Architecture.
The  primary   missions   of  the  UPDP   are  to  maintain  peace  and
order, secure and protect lives and property, enforce basic laws,
applicable   Quezon   City   Ordinances,   and   University   Rules   and
Regulations including policies and standards; and to perform such
other functions relative
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
to the general safety and security of the students, employees, and
residents   in   the   U.P.   Diliman   Campus.   x x x.[148] (Emphasis
supplied)
It   can   be   seen   that   the   U.P.   Police   is   employed   by   U.P.
primarily for campus security. They are by no means an actual
police   force   that   is   equipped   to   handle   a   full­blown   murder
investigation.   Fraternity­related   violence   in   U.P.   has   also
increasingly   become   more   frequent,   which   might   possibly   have
desensitized   the  U.P.   Police   in  such   a   way   that   would   prevent
their   objectivity   in   the   conduct   of   their   investigations.   The
victims’   reliance   on   the   National   Bureau   of   Investigation,
therefore, is understandable.
III 
Alibi cannot   prevail   over   the   posi­
tive identification of the victim 
It is  settled that  the  defense  of alibi cannot  prevail  over  the
positive   identification   of   the   victim.[149] In People   v.   Benjamin
Peteluna,[150] this court is stated that:
It is a time­honored principle that the positive identification of
the   appellant   by   a   witness   destroys   the   defense   of alibi and
denial. Thus:
x x x. It is   well­entrenched   that alibiand
denial are inherently weak and have always
been viewed with disfavor by the courts due
to   the   facility   with   which   they   can   be
concocted. They warrant the least credibility
_______________
[148] UP   Diliman   Police, <http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/up­  
diliman­
police/> (visited March 4, 2014).
[149] People v. Benjamin Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January
23, 2013, 689 SCRA 190, 197 [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
 [150] G.R.   No.   187048,   January   23,   2013,   689   SCRA   190 Accused­appellants   were   correctly
[Per J. Perez, Second Division]. charged   with   murder,   and   there
185 was   treachery   in   the   commission
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 185 of the crime 
People vs. Feliciano, Jr. _______________
[151] Id.,   at   p.   197, citing People   v.   Barde, G.R.   No.   183094,
or none at all and cannot prevail over the September   22,   2010,   631   SCRA   187,   211   [Per J.   Perez,   First
positive identification of the appellant by the Division]; People v. Estepano, 367 Phil. 209, 217­218; 307 SCRA
prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it 701, 708­709 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; People v.
is   not   enough   to   prove   that   appellant   was Berdin, 462   Phil.   290,   304;   416   SCRA   582,   593   (2003)   [Per J.
somewhere   else   when   the   crime   was
Sandoval­Gutierrez, En Banc]; People v. Francisco, 397 Phil. 973,
committed; he must also demonstrate that it
was   physically   impossible   for   him   to   have 985;   344   SCRA   110,   120­121   (2000)   [Per CJ.   Davide,   Jr., En
been at the scene of the crime at the time of Banc].
its   commission.   Unless   substantiated   by 186
clear   and   convincing   proof,   such   defense   is 186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
negative,   self­serving,   and   undeserving   of People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
any   weight  in  law.   Denial,   like alibi,   as  an According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
exonerating   justification[,]   is   inherently Code, the accused­appellants were correctly charged with murder.
weak   and   if   uncorroborated   regresses   to Article 248 states:
blatant   impotence.   Like alibi,   it   also ART. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the
constitutes   self­serving   negative   evidence provisions   of   Article   246,   shall   kill   another,   shall   be   guilty   of
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
weight   than   the   declaration   of   credible committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 1.       With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
[151] with   the   aid   of   armed   men,   or   employing   means   to
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or
attackers while the accused­appellants merely offered alibis and afford impunity;
denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld x x x x
by both the trial court and the appellate court while giving little  
credence   to   the   accused­appellants’ alibis.   There   is,   thus,   no It is  undisputed   that   on   December  8,   1994,   a   group   of   men
reason to disturb their findings. armed   with   lead   pipes   and   baseball   bats   attacked   Dennis
Venturina   and   his   companions,   which   resulted   in   Venturina’s
death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court,
the offense committed against Dennis Venturina was committed
by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with
the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly
ruled   out   the   presence   of   treachery   in   the   commission   of   the
offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the   execution,   which   tend   directly   and   specially   to   insure   its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.[152]
_______________
[152]People v. Gary Vergara, G.R.  No.  177763,  July  3,  2013,
700   SCRA   412,   423   [Per J.   De   Castro,   First
Division], citing People v.
187
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,[153] this court stated
that:
There   is   treachery   when   the   offender   commits   any   of   the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the   execution,   which   tend   directly   and   specially   to   insure   its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which   the   offended   party   might   make. The   essence   of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and
in  a swift,   deliberate,  and   unexpected   manner,  affording
the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance
to   resist   or   escape.   For   treachery   to   be   considered,   two
elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that   gives   the   persons   attacked   no   opportunity   to   defend
themselves   or   retaliate;   and   (2)   the means   of   execution   were
deliberately or consciously adopted.[154](Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused­
appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings of the trial court,
there   was  no  treachery  involved.   In particular,   they  ruled   that
although the attack was sudden and unexpected, “[i]t was done in
broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them”[155] and
that “there was a possibility for
_______________
 Laurio, G.R. No. 182523, September 13, 2012, 680 SCRA 560,
571­572 [Per J. Leonardo­De Castro, First Division].
[153] G.R.   No.   188353,   February   16,   2010,   612   SCRA   738
[Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
[154] People v. Leozar Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February
16,   2010,   612   SCRA   738,   747   [Per J. Velasco,   Third
187
Division], citing People v. Amazan, 402 Phil. 247, 270; 349 SCRA
218,   233   (2001)   [Per J.   Mendoza,   Second   Division]; People   v.
Bato, 401 Phil. 415, 431; 348 SCRA 253, 260 (2000) [Per J. Pardo,
First Division]; People v. Albarido, 420 Phil. 235, 252; 368 SCRA
194,   208   (2001)   [Per J.   Sandoval­Gutierrez,   Third
Division], citing People v. Francisco, 389 Phil. 243, 266; 333 SCRA
725, 746 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
[155] CA Decision, p. 59.
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen
could have helped the victims.”[156]
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case
were  eating  lunch on  campus.   They   were  not at  a  place where
they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden
attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows
was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and
outnumbered,   it   would   be   impossible   for   them   to   fight   back
against the  attackers. The attack also happened  in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders
being able to help them until after the incident.
The   swiftness   and   the   suddenness   of   the   attack   gave   no
opportunity   for   the   victims   to   retaliate   or   even   to   defend
themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The   presence   of   conspiracy   makes
all   of   the   accused­appellants   liable
for murder and attempted murder  the   extent   and   character   of   their   respective   active
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused­appellants
were   found   guilty   of   the   murder   of   Dennis   Venturina   and   the
attempted  murder  of  Mervin  Natalicio,   Cesar  Mangrobang,   Jr.,
Leandro   Lachica,   Arnel   Fortes,   and   Cristobal   Gaston,   Jr.   The
appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that
the   accused­appellants   were   guilty   of   attempted   murder   only
against   Natalicio   and   Fortes,   and   not   against   Mangrobang,
Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court’s reasoning that because Lachica and
Mangrobang   “were   no   longer   chased   by   the   attackers,”[157] it
concluded that accused­appellants “voluntary desisted from
_______________
[156] Id.
[157] CA Decision, p. 61.
189
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 189
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
pursuing   them  and   from   inflicting   harm   to  them,   which  shows
that they did not have the intent to do more than to make them
suffer   pain   by   slightly   injuring   them.”[158] It also   pointed   out
that the wound inflicted on Gaston “was too shallow to have been
done   with   an   intent   to   kill.”[159]Thus,   it   concluded   that   the
accused­appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical
injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there
was   conspiracy   among   the   accused­appellants[160]and   the
appellate   court   sustained   this   finding.[161]Conspiracy,   once
proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all ofthe accused,
regardless of their degree of participation, thus:
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators  are  liable  as  co­principals  regardless  of
participation   in   the   commission   of   the   crime   or   crimes
perpetrated   in   furtherance   of   the   conspiracy   because   in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that “when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrong­doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone.” Although it is axiomatic that
no one is liable for acts other than his own, “when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement
or conspiracy.” The
_______________
[158] Id.
[159] Id.
[160] See RTC Decision, pp. 78­79.
[161] See CA Decision, pp. 22­23.
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
imposition   of   collective   liability   upon   the   conspirators   is
clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
...   it   is   impossible   to   graduate   the
separate   liability   of   each   (conspirator)
without   taking   into   consideration   the   close
and inseparable relation of each of them with
the criminal act, for the commission of which
they all acted by common agreement ... The
crime must therefore in view of the solidarity
of the act and intent which existed between
the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible.
Verily,   the   moment   it   is   established   that   the
malefactors   conspired   and   confederated   in   the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the
accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy,
and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as
to   the   actual   degree   of   participation   of   each   of   the
perpetrators   present   at   the   scene   of   the   crime.   x x x.
[162] (Emphasis supplied)
 
The liabilities of the accused­appellants in this case arose from
a single incident wherein the accused­appellants were armed with
baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run
away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands
of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the
moment   of   attack   and   that   intent   was   shared   by   all   of   the
accused­appellants alike when
_______________
[162] People   v.   Peralta,   et   al., 134   Phil.   703;   25   SCRA   759
(1968)  [Per  Curiam, En Banc], citing U.S.  v.   Ramos, 2  Phil.  434
(1903) [Per J. Willard, En Banc]; U.S. v. Maza, 5 Phil. 346 (1905)
[Per J.   Johnson, En   Banc]; U.S. v.   Grant   and   Kennedy, 18   Phil.
122   (1910)   [Per J.   Trent, En   Banc]; U.S. v.   Ipil, 27   Phil.   530
(1914)   [Per J.   Johnson, En   Banc]; U.S. v.   Synder, 3   McCrary,
377; People   v.   Bannaisan, 49   Phil.   423   (1926)   [Per J.   Villa­
Real, En   Banc]; U.S. v.   Bundal, et   al.,   3   Phil.   89   (1903)   [Per J.
Torres, En Banc].
191
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 191
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial
to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by
the   victims   to   determine   the   respective   liabilities   of   their
attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs
as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate  court,  therefore,  erred  in finding the  accused­
appellants   guilty   only   of   slight   physical   injuries. It would   be
illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of
the   attack,   the   attackers   intended   to   kill   only   Venturina,
Natalicio,   and   Fortes,   and   only   intended   to   injure   Lachica,
Mangrobang,   and   Gaston.   Since   the   intent   to   kill   was   evident
from the moment the accused­appellants took their first swing, all
of them were liable for that intent to kill.
For this reason, the accused­appellants should be liable for the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin
Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes,
and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note  SO ORDERED.
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is
also the effect on the five other lives whose once bright futures
are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado.
There is now more honor for them to accept their responsibility
and  serve the  consequences of their actions. There is, however,
nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully
compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This   is   not   the   first   fraternity­related   case   to   come   to   this
court;   neither   will   it   be   the   last.   Perhaps   this   case   and   many
cases   like   it   can   empower   those   who   have   a   better   view   of
masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in
more life­saving pursuits.192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
“Giting at dangal” are words of the anthem of the University
of   the   Philippines. It colors   the   stories   of   many   who   choose   to
expend   their   energy   in   order   that   our   people   will   have   better
lives.   Fraternity   rumbles   are   an   anathema,   an   immature   and
useless   expenditure   of   testosterone. It fosters   a culture   that
retards manhood. It is devoid of“giting at dangal.”
This kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.­
G.R.   CR   No.   01158   dated   November   26,   2010
is AFFIRMED insofar   as   the   accused­appellants   Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren
L.   Zingapan,   and   Robert   Michael   Beltran   Alvir   are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable  doubt  of  Murder in  Criminal
Case   No.   Q95­61133   with   the MODIFICATION that   they   be
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in
Criminal   Case   Nos.   Q95­61136,   Q95­61135,   Q95­61134,   Q95­
61138, and Q95­61137.
 
Sereno** (CJ.) and Del Castillo,*** JJ., concur.
Peralta, J.,**** I join the dissent of J. Abad.
Abad, J., See Dissenting Opinion. 
_______________
** Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno was designated as
acting   member   of   the   Third   Division,   vice   Associate   Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated February 1, 2012.
*** Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo was designated
as   acting   member   of   the   Third   Division,   vice   Associate   Justice
Jose  Catral  Mendoza  who  penned  the  lower  court  decision,   per
Raffle dated April 29, 2014.
**** Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta was designated as
Acting Chairperson of the Third Division, vice Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recused himself due to close relation to
one of the parties.
193
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 193
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I strongly dissent from the majority Decision.
The   incident   in   this   case   was   an   offshoot   of   a   campus   war
between   members   of   two   fraternities   at   the   University   of   the
Philippines   (UP)  where   one   group,   allegedly   masked,   surprised
and beat up the other, resulting in injuries to some and death to
one.
Alleging conspiracy, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed
an   information   for   murder,   two   informations   for   frustrated
murder, and three informations for attempted murder against 12
accused,   belonging   to   the Scintilla   JurisFraternity,   before   the
Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of   Quezon   City   in   Criminal   Cases
Q95­61133   to   38   with   no   bail   recommended.   Only   11   of   the
accused   were   tried,   however,   since   accused   Benedict   Guerrero
remained at large.
The Facts and Case  Zingapan   and   Christopher   Soliva   who   also   wore   no   masks,
The   evidence   for   the   prosecution   shows   that   seven Sigma
Rho Fraternity members were taking lunch at the Beach House
Canteen inside the UP campus in Diliman, Quezon City, between
12:30  and 1:00 p.m. on December 8, 1994  when about  15 men,
carrying baseball bats or lead pipes, with some wearing masks,
swooped   down   upon   them.   SR   Dennis   Venturina   shouted   an
alarm,   “Brods! Brods!”   His brods scampered   away   but   the
attackers got to some of them. (To avoid confusion, SR or SJ is
affixed before the names of those involved to distinguish members
of   the Sigma   Rho Fraternity   from   members   of   the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity.)
SR Leandro Lachica, his fraternity’s Grand Archon, testified
that the attackers all wore improvised masks of cloth or t­shirts.
Five of them went after SR Lachica, hitting him on the back and
forearms as he parried the blows. In the course of
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
that attack, the mask of one of them, SJ Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir, with whom he was familiar, fell off. SR Lachica got away
from   those   who   were   beating   him   but   he   looked   back   while
running and saw SJ Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor Medalla,
two of the attackers, no longer wearing masks. The attack lasted
for about 30 to 45 seconds.[1]
SR Mervin Natalicio, a 4th year law student and Vice­Grand
Archon of his fraternity, testified that while most of the attackers
running   towards   their   group   wore   masks,   one   of   them,   SJ
Medalla,   wore   none.   Natalicio   tried   to   scamper   away   but   he
tripped on a tree root and fell. About 10 attackers, including SJ
bludgeoned him on the back, arms, left shoulder, hips, toes, and
right hand.[2]
After his initial attackers left SR Natalicio, a group of four or
five others led by SJ Benedict Guerrero, took over and beat him
up, too. A third group came and also mauled him on the left side
of his body. When Natalicio was so hurt he could no longer move,
some people brought him to the UP Infirmary where they treated
his injuries.[3]
SR   Natalicio   later   went   to   the   National   Bureau   of
Investigation (NBI), gave his statement, and submitted himself to
medico­legal  examination.  He  said  that Scintilla  Juris members
attacked them as an offshoot of an August 1994 rumble despite a
signed truce.[4]
SR   Cesar   Mangrobang   testified   that   after   SR   Venturina
sounded   the   alarm,   he   saw   a   group   of   men,   some   with   cloth
masks, approach with lead pipes and clubs. As he received a blow
on his back, he tried to run but two masked men blocked his way
and repeatedly beat him up. When their masks fell
_______________
[1] TSN, June 5, 1995, pp. 11­14.
[2] TSN, July 3, 1995, pp. 6­16.
 [3] Id., at pp. 17­19.
[4] Id., at pp. 20­23.
195
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
off,   the   two   turned   out  to   be  SJ   Gilbert  Magpantay   and   Carlo
Fajardo.[]
SR Mangrobang succeeded in running away until he reached
the corner of the Main Library. On glancing back, he saw no one
after   him.   He   then   decided   to   return   to   the   scene   of   the
commotion   where   he   saw   from   three   to   four   meters   away   SJ
Danilo Feliciano, Jr. and Raymund Narag hitting SR Venturina
with   lead   pipes.   SJ   Feliciano’s   cloth   mask   had   fallen   off.   SR
Mangrobang also saw SJ Reynaldo Ablanida wielding a lead pipe
while running.[6]
SJ Narag and Feliciano were about to turn on SR Mangrobang
when   somebody   shouted, “Pulis!   Takbo!   Takbo!” prompting   the
two to run in the direction of the Main Library. SR Mangrobang
and others helped carry SR Venturina into a passenger jeepney to
bring him to the Infirmary.[7]
SR Cristobal Gaston, Jr. testified that, of the men who came,
two attacked him: the first with a lead pipe, hitting him on the
arms and hands as he tried to cover his head, while the second
stabbed him on the left chest and forearm. The two wore masks.
SR   Gaston   got   away   and   ran   towards   Palma   Hall   but,   as   he
looked back, he saw SJ Zingapan, Feliciano and George Morano
at   the   scene.[8] SR   Gaston   went   to   confer   with   his   fraternity
brothers at the College of Law building. Later that evening, they
met with their alumni brothers.[9]
SR Arnel Fortes testified that some of the men who attacked
them wore masks but some did not. He saw SJ Feliciano, whom
he   recognized   despite   a   cloth   mask,   and   SJ   Medalla   who   wore
none. SR Fortes managed to run away but, as he looked back, he
saw SJ Zingapan and Morano, who also wore no masks, running
after him. They hit him on the back,
_______________
195
[5] TSN, September 28, 1995, pp. 14­19.
[6] Id., at pp. 20­30.
[7] Id., at pp. 28­34.
[8] TSN, October 11, 1995, pp. 17­38.
[9] Id., at pp. 44­46.
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
causing   him  to   fall.   He   stood   up   and   tried   to  run   again  but   a
group of 10 men attacked him for five to eight seconds, hitting his
head five to seven times. They also hit him on the legs. He did not
recognize any of his attackers. But, standing up again after the
second   attack,   SR   Fortes   saw   SJ   Feliciano   beating   up   SR
Venturina. SJ Feliciano’s mask fell off in the process.[10]
Dr. Rolando Victoria described the injuries that SR Venturina
suffered.[11] Dr. Aurea Villena, on the other hand, testified on the
results   of   her   medical   examinations   of   SR   Natalicio,   Fortes,
Mangrobang,   Lachica,   and   Gaston   four   days   after   the   mauling
incident.[12]
Emmanuel Batungbakal testified that he saw a group of men
board three cars that had no plate numbers. The cars sped past
the   back   of   the   law   library.   SJ   Feliciano   was   one   of   those   on
board.   Batungbakal   did   not,   however,   witness   the   reported
incident that followed.[13]
Ernesto Paolo Tan testified that he was at the Beach House
Canteen   during   the   incident.   He   saw   three   separate   groups   of
men, some of whom wore masks, attack SR Natalicio. After the
attackers left, he helped Natalicio board a service vehicle.[14]
 Dennis   Gaio  testified   that  he  was   having   lunch   outside  the
canteen   when   three   of   the   attackers   came   from   the   Arts   and
Science Building followed by  10 more from the College of Law.
Some wore masks but the others did not. They attacked the group
that was having lunch, including SR Venturina. He tried to help
the   latter  after   he  had   fallen  but  one   of   the   attackers   stopped
him. Gaio had two women companions but he
_______________
[10] TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 42­63.
[11] TSN, July 24, 1995, pp. 11­24.
[12] TSN, July 31, 1995, pp. 9­10.
[13] TSN, November 6, 1995, pp. 33­39, 61­62.
[14] TSN, September 3, 1996, pp. 16­17, 24­54.
197
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
told them to run towards the sunken garden when he sensed the
arrival of the masked men.[15]
The defense presented 42 witnesses. To prove its claim that
the   identities   of   the   attackers   were   unrecognizable   because   of
their  masks,   the  defense   presented,   among   others,   Benito  Lato
and Frisco Capilo, both utility workers at UP and some student
customers   at   the   canteen.   Lato   recalled   that   he   was   collecting
plates   at   the   canteen   when   the   attackers   came.   But   he   was
unable to recognize them because they wore masks and he could
see only their eyes.[16] Capilo, on the other hand, testified that he
was on his way to the Main Library to work when several men, all
wearing   masks   and   carrying   lead   pipes,   rushed   towards   the
canteen and attacked some who were eating there.[17]
Daniel Mabazza testified that he was on his way out of the
canteen when 15 men arrived from the South wing of the Main
Library   and   attacked   some   customers   who   were   eating   at   the
tables. He testified further that he was about 3 to 5 meters from
where SR Venturina was attacked but he could not identify any of
the attackers because they were all wearing masks and none of
these fell off during the attack.[18]
Alpha   Sigma   Nu Sorority   members,   Eda   Pangilinan,   Luz
Perez, and Bathalani Tiamson testified that they were unable to
identify  the attackers  because  they   all wore  masks.   Pangilinan
and Tiamson insisted that they did not see any of the attackers’
masks fall off.[19]
UP police officer Romeo Cabrera testified that he and fellow
officer,   Oscar   Salvador,   were   at   the   Arts   and   Science   Building
when they responded to reports that a rumble was taking place at
the back of the Main Library. On arrival at
_______________
[15] TSN, April 3, 1997, pp. 10­22.
197 [16] TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 10­12.
[17] TSN, December 4, 1995, p. 13.
[18] TSN, September 17, 1997, pp. 7­16.
[19] RTC Decision, p. 37.
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the  Beach House Canteen, they saw the  wounded SR Natalicio
with   some   companions.   They   put   him   on   board   a   jeepney   and
brought him to the  UP Infirmary with his companions.  On the
way,   Cabrera   asked   SR   Natalicio   who   attacked   his   group.   He
replied that he did not recognize any of them because they wore
masks.  Cabrera asked SR  Natalicio the  same question  after he
had   received   treatment.   SR   Natalicio   gave   the   same   answer.
Cabrera   could   not  interrogate  SR  Venturina   because  the  latter
suffered serious injuries.[20]
UP police officer Salvador testified that when he and Cabrera
responded to reports of commotion, they noticed a mauling victim,
SR Natalicio, surrounded by some people. Salvador asked some of
the   bystanders   who   the   culprits   were.   They   said   they   did   not
recognize them since they were wearing mass.[21]
The   police   officers   brought   SR   Natalicio   and   his   three
companions to the Infirmary using the canteen’s jeepney. On the
way, Cabrera asked SR Natalicio and the others with him who
attacked them. They replied that they could not tell since the men
wore   masks.   Salvador   saw   SR   Venturina   and   Gaston   being
treated at the Infirmary. After SR Natalicio was treated, Cabrera
asked him again if he recognized the men who hit him. Natalicio
replied   that  he  did  not  because  they   wore   masks.   When  asked
how many hit him, Natalicio said that he could not tell because he
had his back on them.[22]
SJ Feliciano testified that he was in Pampanga on December
8, 1994, visiting his grandfather whom he thought had undergone
surgery of the prostate gland.[23]His mother, Feliciana, and an
elementary   school   teacher,   Rogelio   Yumul,   corroborated   his
testimony. Yumul testified that he was on his
_______________
[20] TSN, November 13, 1995, pp. 22­53.
[21] TSN, November 20, 1995, pp. 15­22.
[22] Id., at pp. 22­40.
[23] TSN, February 17, 1999, pp. 8­9.
199
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 199
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
way to the principal’s office at around noon of December 8 when
he saw Feliciano seated at a waiting shed.[24]
SJ   Alvir   testified   that   he   had   been   ill   since   December   5.
Consequently, he neither reported  for work  nor went  to UP on
December 8.[25]
SJ Medalla testified that on the day in question he was with
his   classmate   Michael   Vibas   working   on   a   school   project.   He
claimed that he could not have taken part in the rumble since he
suffered   from   an   August   1994   head   injury   that   affected   his
balance.[26] Jose   Victor   Santos   testified   that   he   and   Medalla
played darts after lunch on December 8 and they later went to
Jollibee   since   Medalla   had   to   treat   him   after   losing   the   game.
[27] Dr.   Gerardo   Legaspi   corroborated   Medalla’s   testimony
regarding his previous head injuries.[28]
SJ   Soliva   testified   that   he   was   having   lunch   with   his
girlfriend   and   her   lady   friend   at   Jollibee   Philcoa   when   the
incident   took   place.   They   returned   to   UP   at   around   1:00   p.m.
Soliva went straight to his “tambayan” where he learned of the
rumble   at   the   main   library.[29] Anna   Cabahug,   Soliva’s
girlfriend, corroborated his testimony.[30]
SJ Zingapan testified that he could not have taken part in the
incident   at   UP   since   he   was   at   that   time   having   lunch   with
Teodoro Canay in Kamuning, Quezon City. From there, he went
to   the   SM   City   mall   at   around   1:00   p.m.   to   buy   an   electric
thermos as a wedding gift for a town mate. He was on his way out
of the mall when he chanced upon two of his “brods.”[31]
_______________
[24] TSN, November 12, 1997, pp. 7­10.
[25] TSN, February 2, 2000, pp. 9­16.
[26] TSN, September 22, 1999, pp. 4­21.
[27] TSN, August 11, 1999, pp. 7­12.
[28] TSN, September 15, 1999, pp. 10­25.
[29] TSN, June 16, 1999, pp. 12­21.
[30] TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 5­27.
[31] TSN, May 12, 1999, pp. 7­18.
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
 The   RTC   absolved   SJ   Rodolfo   Peñalosa   on   a   demurrer   to
evidence since none of the prosecution witnesses testified that he
had taken part in the attack.
On February 28, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment[32]finding
SJ Alvir, Feliciano, Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty beyond
reasonable   doubt   of   one   count   of   murder   and   four   counts   of
attempted murder. The comi gave credence to the testimonies of
the victims who identified their attackers. It thought little of the
failure of some of the victims to name them when asked by the
UP police officers and the physicians at the Infirmary. It did not
agree  that  the   victims’   delayed   identification   of   their   attackers
tainted   their   testimonies.   The   RTC   held   that   the   accused
conspired   in   the   commission   of   the   crimes   charged.   But   it
acquitted SJ Ablanida, Fajardo, Magpantay, Morano, and Narag
for   failure   of   the   prosecution   to   prove   their   guilt   beyond
reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), Special First Division of
Five,[33] with one Justice dissenting, affirmed the RTC Decision
and   found   SJ   Alvir,   Feliciano,   Soliva,   Medalla,   and   Zingapan
guilty of three counts of slight physical injuries in Criminal Cases
Q95­61136, Q95­61135, and Q95­61134; two counts of attempted
murder   in   Criminal   Cases   Q95­61138   and   Q95­61137;   and   one
count of murder in Criminal Case Q95­61133. The CA imposed on
the accused the penalties that corresponded to the offenses and
ordered them to pay various civil indemnities to the victims or, in
the case of SR Venturina, to his heirs.
The CA ruled that the witnesses’ positive identification of SJ
Alvir, Feliciano, Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan prevailed
_______________
[32] Penned by Hon. Jose Catral Mendoza, now a member of
the Court.
[33] The cases were re­raffled many times after several Court
of Appeals justices inhibited themselves, claiming close relation
with a party, a counsel, or a fraternity involved in the case. See:
Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 26­27.
201
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 201
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
over   the   latter’s   defenses   and alibis. It regarded   the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses as trivial and
did not tarnish their credibility. The CA held that the delay in the
identification of the accused had been explained: SR Natalicio and
Fortes needed medical attention; the others with them wanted to
come together when they filed their complaints.
The CA explained that it characterized the crimes charged in
Criminal Cases Q95­61136, Q95­61135, and Q95­61134 as mere
slight physical injuries since the intent to kill was not evident,
given that none of the accused chased them. SR Gaston, said the
CA, suffered only a lacerated wound near his breast, precluding
an attempt on his life.
The Issue Presented 
The central issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred,
like the RTC, in not rejecting the victims’ identification of their
assailants   as   mere   fabrications   to   go   around   the   fact   that   the
latter wore masks and in thus not absolving the accused of the
charges.
In every criminal action, the prosecution has to establish the
identity   of   the   offender,   like   the   crime   itself,   by   proof   beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, its first duty is to prove the identity of
the   offender   for,   even   if   the   commission   of   the   offense   can   be
established,   no   conviction   can   take   place   without   proof   of   his
identity beyond reasonable doubt.[34]
True, alibi is a weak defense in the face of positive testimonies
of prosecution witnesses that the accused committed
_______________
 [34] People v. Pineda, 473 Phil. 517, 548; 429 SCRA 478, 504
(2004); People v. Esmale, 313 Phil. 471, 492; 243 SCRA 578, 592
(1995), citing Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 813, 817; 241
SCRA 695, 697 (1995).
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the crime. But such testimonies must be credible and must come
from credible witnesses.[35]
Several   circumstances   militate   against   the   mauling   victims’
testimonies that they were able to identify their attackers:
1. SR Lachica, one of the victims, himself testified that the
men he saw coming to attack his group, at least 10 in number, all
wore masks. He said:
Q:    When one of your brod you heard shouted “Brods,” what did
you do?
A:    I stood up and I was alarmed. I stood up and looked back and
from my side, I saw at least ten (10) armed men and masked
men.
Q:    You said armed men, you saw armed men when you looked
back. With what were they armed with?
A:     They were armed with lead pipes and baseball bats.
Q:     You   also   mentioned   that   these   men   were   wearing   masks.
What kind of masks?
A:     They were wearing handkerchiefs, piece of clothes, and some
t­shirts.[36]
 
SR Lachica also said that, as five of the attackers beat him up
on   the   back,   he   covered   his   head   with   his   forearms.
[37] Consequently, it was not likely that, as he would claim, he
saw SJ Alvir’s mask fall off his face.
SR   Lachica   also   testified   that   as   he   ran   away   from   his
assailants,   he   looked   back   running   and   was   able   to   place   the
accused SJ Zingapan and Medalla at the scene.[38] But, consid­
_______________
[35] People   v.   Mansueto, 391   Phil.   611,   633;   336   SCRA   715,
724 (2000); People v. Crispin, 383 Phil. 919, 932; 327 SCRA 167,
179 (2000).
[36] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 11.
[37] Id., at p. 29.
[38] Id., at p. 13.
203
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 203
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
ering that SR Lachica was trying to get away from the men who
were   beating   him   up,   it   was   not   likely,   having   succeeded   in
sprinting away, that he would look back and risk slowing down
his escape. He did not even claim that SJ Zingapan and Medalla
were   among   those   who   attacked   him.   He   appears   to   have   just
made  up  the  statement  to  get  on  record   evidence  that  the  two
were part of the attackers.
2. SR   Natalicio   testified   that   the   men   who   attacked   them
mostly wore masks but SJ Medalla who led those men wore no
mask.[201] This is not easy to believe since SR Lachica, the other
prosecution witness, testified that the attackers all wore masks
but when he looked back while getting away, he saw SJ Medalla
already   without   a   mask,   implying   that   the   latter   lost   it,   thus
belying SR Natalicio’s testimony that SJ Medalla wore no mask
from the start.
SR Natalicio testified that while parrying his attackers’ blows,
he   saw   SJ   Zingapan   and   Soliva.[202] These   two   must   be   near
each  other  since   he  saw   them  at  glance.   But,   contradicting   SR
Natalicio, SR Gaston also saw SJ Zingapan, not with Soliva but
with Morano.[203]
3. The   RTC   itself   gave   no   credence   to   SR   Mangrobang’s
testimony   and   for   this   reason   acquitted   SJ   Magpantay   and
Fajardo, two of his attackers whose masks supposedly fell off. The
trial court also acquitted SJ Narag, whom SR Mangrobang said
he saw, when he returned to the scene of the commotion, hitting
SR Venturina with the aid of SJ Feliciano. It is quite unbelievable
that   having   narrowly   escaped   his   attackers,   SR   Mangrobang
would go back while the mauling was still in progress. Finally,
the trial court acquitted SJ Ablanida whom SR Mangrobang said
he saw wielding a lead pipe while running because it simply could
not believe this witness.
_______________
[39] TSN, July 3, 1995, p. 9.
[40] Id., at pp. 14­16.
[41] TSN, October 11, 1995, p. 143.
 
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
4. After SR Lachica and Natalicio, the third witness to use
the look­back proposition was SR Gaston. He testified that one of
two masked men tried to bludgeon him on the head as the other
lunged at him with a knife, wounding his chest and forearm. As
SR Gaston ran and escaped from those two men, he managed to
look back just to place SJ Zingapan and Morano at the scene of
the mauling.
The trial court itself found something terribly wrong with SR
Gaston’s testimonies. It said:
In this regard, Gaston related a hazy story. At one point, he
said that he saw Zingapan and Morano at the same place but not
at the same time explaining that the former was there first and
when he moved, the latter stood in the same place. Later, he said
that both were there at the same time. Granting arguendo that
Morano was moving, his story does not entirely jibe with that of
Fortes.[42]
 
5. SR Fortes was the fourth witness to foist the same look­
back proposition. He ran away after seeing about 15 men, armed
with   lead   pipes   and   clubs,   coming   to   attack   his   group.   But   he
looked  back  while on  the  run  to  see  SJ  Zingapan  and  Morano,
who supposedly had no masks, right behind him. They hit him on
the  back,   causing   him  to  fall.   As  he  stood   up  and  tried  to  run
again, a group of 10 men attacked him for five to eight seconds.
He   recognized   none   of   them.   But,   standing   up   again   after   the
second attack, he supposedly saw SJ Feliciano whose mask fell off
while beating up SR Venturina.
Just what are the chances that four out of five witnesses who
were fleeing and, indeed, running for their lives would just look
back, risk stumbling and crashing down, to put in evidence the
identities of some of those whom the RTC and the CA convicted?
Very little. It appears a convenient excuse
_______________
[42] RTC Decision, p. 65.
205
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 205
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
for providing evidence where none existed. The circumstances of
the   separate   identifications,   taking   place   in   split   seconds,   defy
belief. What baffles me is the fact that the trial court acquitted
SJ Morano whom SR Fortes and Gaston identified while looking
back on the run but convicted SJ Zingapan, Soliva, and Medalla
who were also targets of look­back testimonies.
 The   trial   court   had   reason   to   further   doubt   SR   Fortes’
testimonies. It said:
By the way, the Court has not ignored the testimony of Arnel
Fortes   that  Morano   repeatedly   struck   him  with  a   lead   pipe.   It
was, however, given during the rebuttal stage. When he sat at the
witness stand for the first time, he said nothing of that sort. He
could have been saying the truth and that what he related was
not an afterthought but still the cloud of doubt remains. As there
still that haziness, the barrier remains uncleared.[43]
6. Emmanuel   Batungbakal   of   course   testified   that   he   saw
three plateless cars rush out towards the Main Library[44] with
SJ Feliciano on board one car. But this testimony is inconclusive
since   Batungbakal   admitted   on   cross­examination   that   he   was
not   sure   it   was   SJ   Feliciano   he   saw.   Besides,   as   pointed   out
above, no credible testimony supports the view that SJ Feliciano
in fact took part in the mauling.
The trial court acquitted some of the accused after rejecting
the testimonies of SR Mangrobang who fingered SJ Feliciano as
well. On the other hand, although SR Gaston did not mention SJ
Feliciano  on  direct  testimony,   he  brought  up   his  name  only   on
cross, a catch­up kind of testimony that the trial court rejected in
SJ   Morano’s   case.   SR   Fortes, the final   witness   against   SJ
Feliciano, said an uncanny thing: two groups of attackers had just
bludgeoned him one after the other, yet SR
_______________
[43] Id.
[44] TSN, November 6, 1995, pp. 31, 33.
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Fortes   claimed   that   he   still   managed   to   stand   up   in   time   to
observe SJ Feliciano attacking SR Venturina.
7. Notably,   the   two   sides   gave   conflicting   testimonies
regarding the victims’ opportunity to identify their attackers. The
prosecution witnesses claim that some of the attackers could be
identified because they wore no masks or their masks fell off. The
defense witnesses testified that all the attackers wore masks and
none of these fell off. Since identification of the attackers is the
key issue, the Court has to consider which witnesses and stories
appear to be more credible.
I   am impressed   with   the   testimony   of   UP   police   officer
Salvador, who had served the UP’s police force for 18 years and
had no motive to fabricate or lie. He testified that when he and
fellow   officer   Cabrera   arrived   at   the   scene   of   the   mauling,   he
asked   the   bystanders   the   identities   of   the   assailants.   The
bystanders replied that they were unable to identify the attackers
because they wore masks. Salvador testified:
Q:       Upon being informed by the blue guard that there was a
rumble near the Beach House canteen, tell the Court what
did you and Cabrera do?
A:       We rushed to the place where the incident took place, sir.
Q:   And   upon   reaching   the   area   of   the   Beach   House   Canteen,
what did you notice?
A:       I noticed one victim together with some people, sir, and I
asked   some   of   the  bystanders   if   they   saw   what   happened
and they said they did not recognize the attackers because
they were wearing mask.[45]
 
The   statement   of   the   bystanders,   made   while   some   of   the
wounded were bleeding there and the excitement lingered, may
be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. Section 42, Rule 130
of the Rules of Evidence provides:
_______________
[45] TSN, November 20, 1995, pp. 19­20.
 207
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Sec. 42. Part   of   the   res   gestae.—Statements   made   by   a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior   or   subsequent   thereto   with   respect   to   the   circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. x x x
These statements are spontaneous  reactions  inspired by the
excitement of the moment. It may be assumed that, unlike tardy
witnesses,   the   bystanders   who   made   the   statements   had   no
opportunity to deliberate or fabricate. The words they uttered are
part   of   the   commotion   they   described.[46] The res
gestae contradicts  the attempt of  prosecution  witnesses  to  show
that a number of the attackers wore masks or that identification
was possible because the masks of some fell off.
In   fact,   Luz   Perez,   a 3rd year   Interior   Design   student,   then
lining up to get food at the Beach House Canteen, testified like
many   others   that   she   was   unable   to   identify   the   attackers
because they all wore masks. She said:
Q.       How many masked men did you see Miss Perez?
A.       There were about ten to fifteen masked men.
x x x x
ATTY. W. CHUA
Q.     And can you identify any of the attackers that you saw?
WITNESS
A.       No, I cannot.
Q.       Why can you not identify them?
A.       Because they were wearing masks.[47]
8. In   the   same   way,   while   the   startling   incident   and   the
pains it caused still occupied their minds, SR Natalicio and
_______________
[46] 2 Jones, Sec. 10:1, 6th Edition.
[47] TSN, December 11, 1995, pp. 80, 85.
207 208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
his   three   companions   admitted   to   the   two   UP   police   officers
investigating   the   mauling   incident  that  they   could   not  identify
their attackers because the latter wore masks. UP police officer
Cabrera testified:
Q        On   you   way   to  the   Infirmary,   please   tell   the  court  if
anything had transpired.
A        I asked Marvin Natalicio of his names, sir.
Q        What else did you ask him, if any?
A        I asked him who hit him, sir.
Q        What did he say?
A        He told me he did not recognize any of them because they
were wearing masks, sir.
Q        What   about   his   companions   who   were   with   you   in   this
vehicle, did you not ask them?
A        They answered the same thing, they did not recognize any
of them, sir.
x x x x
Q        Now, upon arriving at the Infirmary, please tell the Court
what transpired?
A        At   the   Infirmary,   there   were   two   (2)   other   persons   who
were also injured, Sir.
Q        Please tell the court what you did at the U.P. Infirmary?
A        I   asked   Marvin   again   if   he   recognized   the   two   (2)   other
persons   who   hit   him   and   he   answered   the   same   thing   as
what I have asked him when we were at the vehicle, Sir.[48]
 
Notably, as SR Fortes testified, it was “SOP” for all fratmen to
familiarize themselves with the faces and names of the members
of other fraternities.[49] This being the case, there was no reason
for SR Natalicio and his companions, all frat­
_______________
[48] TSN, November 13, 1995, pp. 37­40.
[49] TSN, October 30, 1995, p. 12.
209
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 209
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
men, not to promptly name the attackers from the rival fraternity
when first queried by the police officers.
9. Besides, Dr. Carmen Mislang, a physician who had been
serving at the UP Infirmary for 20 years, also testified that when
asked, SR Natalicio and his companions told her that they could
not   identify   their   attackers   because   the   latter   were   masked.
[212] Dr. Mislang in fact included this information in her medical
report. She thus testified:
Q    You said doctor, in this history of present illness, marked as
Exhibit   9­a­2=zingapan,   that   I   quote:  10. SR   Natalicio   of   course   gave   a   different   version   of   his
“x x x he was allegedly hit by a lead pipe during the rumble
by   unknown   assailants.”   What   was   the   basis   of   your
statement here?
A     He told us, the group because they came with friends, they
alleged that he was hit by a group of people masked by a
lead pipe. I asked if they know the assailants and they said
no because they are masked.
Q        You said he, to whom are you referring to?
A        The patient and their friends around because there are also
commotion in the emergency room, sir.
Q        Are   you   referring   to   the   patient   by   the   name   of   Mervin
Natalicio?
A        Yes, sir.[51]
 
SR Natalicio of course denied having said that he could not
identify their assailants when the police officers and the doctor
asked him and his companions about it. But between the latter,
on the one hand, and those officers and the doctor, on the other,
the Court should have been more inclined to believe the latter.
Indeed,   there   is   no   evidence   that   SR   Natalicio,   Lachica,
Fortes, Gaston, Mangrobang, and Tumaneng, who survived
_______________
[50] TSN, September 16, 1998, pp. 20­21.
[51] Id.
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
the mauling, gave statements shortly after the incident either to
the   UP   police   officers   or   the   Quezon   City   police   which   had
primary jurisdiction over the crimes. They took four days mulling
over it before going to the NBI to name their assailants.
interview with the UP police officers. When they asked him who
their   assailants   were,   he   said   that   he   requested   them  to   come
back as he was not feeling well.[52] There is testimony that two of
his Sigma   Rho brothers   conferred   with   him   to   discuss   what
happened and their strategy for getting back at those whom they
believed   were   responsible.   Further   to   this,   SR   Lachica[53] and
Gaston[54] testified that they met with their alumni brothers that
evening. SR Natalicio said that when the police officers came back
to   ask   him   the   identities   of   the   attackers,   a   senior   fraternity
brother­lawyer was present and he told the police officers that the
statements   would   be   given  to  the   NBI   and   they   would   just   be
furnished copies.[55]
This is ludicrous. The right to silence is given to persons under
suspicion for committing some crimes, not to the victims whose
duty is to promptly assist the police investigators in pinpointing
criminal responsibilities. No evidence has been presented to show
that   the   UP   police   force   was   partial   to   the   opposing
fraternity. I am thus   unable   to   blame   the   accused   for   believing
that   the   only   possible   reason   in   this   case   for   withholding
information from the police from day one was that the victims and
their counsel had yet to put their acts together.
11. The   supposed   identification   of   the   accused   came   four
days  later at the  NBI office in Manila. Admittedly, the  victims
and their brods waited for everyone to be ready before they
_______________
[52] TSN, July 12, 1995, p. 3.
[53] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 15.
[54] TSN, October 11, 1995, pp. 46, 148­149.
[55] TSN, February 7, 2001, p. 31.
211
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014 211
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
came as a group to give their statements at the NBI office. The
excuse that SR Natalicio and Fortes needed medical attention and
that  the others  with  them wanted  to  come  together  when  they
filed their complaints at the NBI is not a valid excuse. Since they
claim that they were terribly aggrieved and that one of them lost
his   life,   the   natural   thing   was   for   them   to   demand   immediate
justice and action from the police or the NBI on the afternoon of
December 8, 1994.
12. The prosecution witnesses testified that the masks of five
of the accused just fell off to reveal who they were. These were (a)
SJ Alvir per SR Lachica’s testimony;[56] (b) SJ Zingapan; and (c)
SJ Medalla also per SR Lachica’s testimony that the two were not
wearing masks when he looked back and saw them,[57] implying
that   they   had   masks   at   the   beginning   of   the   attack;   (d)   SJ
Magpantay; and (e) SJ Fajardo per SR Mangrobang’s testimony
that the masks of these two fell off.[58] SR Fortes also testified
that   he   saw   SJ   Feliciano’s   mask   fell   off   as   he   was   hitting   SR
Venturina.[59]
Just  what  are  the  chances  that  the masks  of  five  out  of  12
accused just fell off during the mauling? Quite little or nil since it
was not actually a fraternity rumble where the protagonists hit
each   other   creating   the   possibility   that   any   mask   they   were
wearing could fall off. Here, the victims testified that they bore
the   punishment   and   were   unable   to   fight   back   since   their
attackers   were   numerous   and   carried   lead   pipes   and   clubs.
Indeed, none of the victims testified that his action in protecting
his   head   resulted   in   the   unmasking   of   one   or   some   of   his
attackers.   Evidently,   the   attackers   deliberately   wore   masks   to
hide   their   identities. It made   no   sense   for   them   to  wear   masks
that would just fall off when one sneezes.
_______________
[56] TSN, June 5, 1995, p. 12.
[57] Id., at p. 13.
[58] TSN, September 28, 1995, pp. 17­18.
[59] TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 62­63.
 
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
Those who swing bats to strike at objects before them rarely
hit their own faces. Only in funny movies like The Three Stooges
can that happen. What are the chances that a mask would just
fall off from the face of the person wearing it? Construction and
industrial laborers doing strenuous work wear mask all day long
to   protect   themselves   from   dusts,   chemicals,   or   fumes.   Food
processing   workers   wear   them   at   work   to   prevent   food
contamination.   They   are   not   likely   to   be   heard   experiencing
unpredictable falling off of masks taking place in great number.
Here, if the prosecution were to be believed, five out of just 12
accused lost their masks in only 30 to 45 seconds. The odds of this
happening are unbelievable.
Indeed, prosecution witness Gaio himself who was at the scene
of the commotion testified that he did not see any of the attackers
losing their masks at any point in time. He said:
ATTY. CHUA:
Q:       At any point in time, did you see any mask pulling [sic] off?
WITNESS:
A:       I did not see anything, sir.[60]
Gaio also belied SR Fortes’ testimony that SJ Feliciano’s mask fell
off while he was hitting SR Venturina. Gaio said:
Q:       Mr.   Dennis   Venturina   was   hit   and   fell   down,   was   the
person who hit Dennis wearing mask?
A:       Their faces were covered, sir.
Q:       All of them?
A:       Yes, sir.
Q:       There is no way to recognize them?
A:       None, sir.[61]
_______________
[60] TSN, April 3, 1997, pp. 48­49.
[61] Id., at p. 49.
213
VOL. 724, MAY 5, 2014
People vs. Feliciano, Jr.
While the attack by masked men is doubly condemnable, not
only   for   the   treachery   involved   but   also   for   the   cowardice   and
deception   that   came   with   it,   the   Court   cannot   hastily   send   to
prison   those   charged   with   these   crimes   without   proof   beyond
reasonable   doubt   that   they   committed   them.   The   Constitution
ordains this.
In a case like this, where the identities and participations of
the   several   accused   involved   are   difficult   to   prove,   the   ideal
solution   is   to   convince   the   least   guilty   of   them,   the   one   who
showed the most reluctance and delivered the lightest blows, to
turn state witness. I am unable to say if efforts in this direction
were taken by the NBI or the prosecutors to ensure that they had
a good case.
I condemn   the   senseless   death   of   SR   Venturina   and
commiserates with the sufferings of his family. Fraternity wars,
many   of   them   cruel   and   barbaric,   are   the   scourge   of   many
campuses. New recruits are romanticized with the mystery, pride,
and   drama   of   brotherhood   or   kinship   with   senior   members   of
great reputation. This of course invites envy and annoyance from
other brotherhoods for none is greater or more courageous than
one’s   own.   They   thus   test   each   other’s   unity,   capability,   and
resolve,   destroying   each   other,   and   subordinating   the   real
purpose   of   their   being   in   school.   They   forget   that   true
brotherhood comes from mutual kindness and respect.
ACCORDINGLY, I  vote  to GRANT the  petition, REVERSE
AND   SET   ASIDE the   judgment   of   conviction   of   the   Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Cases Q95­61133 to 38 dated February
28,   2002,   and ACQUIT the   accused­appellants   Robert   Michael
Beltran   Alvir,   Danilo   A.   Feliciano,   Jr.,   Christopher   L.   Saliva,
Julius   Victor L. Medalla,   and   Warren L. Zingapan   on   ground   of
213 reasonable doubt.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
G.R. No. 158362. April 4, 2011.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.GILBERTO   VILLARICO,   SR.   @   “BERTING”,
GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and RICKY
VILLARICO, accused­appellants.
 Criminal   Procedure;   Evidence;   The   first   duty   of   the
prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal,   for,   even   if   the   commission   of   the   crime   can   be
established,   there   can   be   no   conviction   without   proof   of   the
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.—The first duty
of   the   prosecution   is   not   to   prove   the   crime   but   to   prove   the
identity of the criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of the
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard,
an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of
mistake   cannot   be   accorded   any   evidentiary   force.   The
intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in
the identification simply means that the accused’s constitutional
right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is
not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal, even if doubt may
cloud   his   innocence.   Indeed,   the   presumption   of   innocence
constitutionally   guaranteed   to   every   individual   is   forever   of
primary importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on
the strength of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of
the defense.
Evidence; Witnesses; The familiarity of the witness with the
assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred.—
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim
as   well   as   their   familiarity   with   the   accused   who   were   their
neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as Haide’s
assailants. In Marturillas v. People, the Court observed that the
familiarity   of   the   witness   with   the   assailant   erased   any   doubt
that   the   witness   could   have   erred;   and   noted   that   a   witness
related   to   the   victim   had   a   natural   tendency   to   remember   the
faces of the person involved in the attack on the victim, because
relatives,   more   than   anybody   else,   would   be   concerned   with
seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before
the law.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
44
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Same; Res Gestae; In a general way, res gestae includes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact   and   serve   to   illustrate   its   character   and   which   are   so
spontaneous   and   contemporaneous   with   the   main   fact   as   to
exclude   the   idea   of   deliberation   and   fabrication.—The   term res
gestae refers   to   “those   circumstances   which   are   the   undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when   illustrative   of   such   act.”   In   a   general   way, res
gestae includes   the   circumstances,   facts,   and   declarations   that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
which  are  so  spontaneous   and   contemporaneous   with  the  main
fact   as  to  exclude  the  idea   of  deliberation  and   fabrication.   The
rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during,   or immediately after   the   commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
 Same; Same; Test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
res gestae; Requisites of Res Gestae.—The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a
part   of   the   principal   fact   or   event   itself,   and   also   whether   it
clearly   negatives  any   premeditation  or   purpose   to  manufacture
testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of
the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay   rule   when   the   following   requisites   concur:   (a)   the
principal   act,   the res   gestae,   is   a   startling   occurrence;   (b)   the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Criminal   Law;   Evidence;   Conspiracy;   A   conspiracy   exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it; It is axiomatic
that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.
—In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused,
it   did   not   matter   whether   only   one   or   two   of   them
had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a
conspiracy existed among them. In­
45
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
deed, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit   it.   Direct   proof   of   a   previous   agreement   among   the
accused to commit the crime is not necessary, for conspiracy may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of their
commission  of  the  crime  that  evinces a  common  understanding
among them on perpetrating the crime. Thus, the concerted acts
of the four manifested their agreement to kill Haide, resulting in
each of them being guilty of the crime regardless of whether he
actually   fired   at   the   victim   or   not.   It   is   axiomatic   that   once
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all; and that
all the conspirators are then liable as co­principals.
Same;  Same; Positive Identification;  Two  Types  of Positive
Identification   Distinguished.—Relevantly,   the   Court   has
distinguished   two   types   of   positive   identification   in People   v.
Gallarde,   325   SCRA   835   (2000),   namely:   (a)   that   by   direct
evidence,   through  an  eyewitness  to  the  very   commission  of  the
act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the
accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after
the crime.
Same;   Same;   Alibis;   A   positive   identification   that   is
categorical,   consistent,   and   devoid   of   any   showing   of   ill   or   vile
motive on  the  part  of  the  Prosecution  witnesses always  prevails
over alibi and denial that are in the nature of negative and self­
serving   evidence.—Long   judicial   experience   instructs   that   their
denial   and   alibis,   being   too  easy   to  invent,   could   not  overcome
their   positive   identification   by   credible   Prosecution   witnesses
whose motives for the identification were not shown to be ill or
vile. Truly, a positive identification that is categorical, consistent,
and devoid of any showing of ill or vile motive on the part of the
45
Prosecution witnesses always prevails over alibi and denial that
are   in   the   nature   of   negative   and   self­serving   evidence.   To   be
accepted, the denial and alibi must be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence establishing not only that the accused did not
take part in the commission of the imputed criminal act but also
that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at or near
the place of the commission of the act at or about the time of its
commission.   In   addition,   their   proffered   alibis   were   really
unworthy of credit because only the accused themselves and their
relatives and other intimates substantiated them.46
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6 _______________
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Same;   Aggravating   Circumstances;   Treachery;   It   is   the
suddenness of the attack coupled with the inability of the victim to
defend   himself   or   to   retaliate   that   brings   about   treachery;
Treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was facing
the   assailant.—There   is  treachery   when:   (a)   at  the  time  of   the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b)
the accused consciously and deliberately  adopted  the  particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack that leaves the
victim unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission
of the offense. It is the suddenness of the attack coupled with the
inability of the victim to defend himself or to retaliate that brings
about treachery; consequently, treachery may still be appreciated
even if the victim was facing the assailant.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused­appellants.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The identification of the accused as the person responsible for
the   imputed   crime   is   the   primary   duty   of   the   State   in   every
criminal prosecution. Such identification, to be positive, need not
always   be   by   direct   evidence   from   an   eyewitness,   for   reliable
circumstantial evidence can equally confirm it as to overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.
On   appeal   by   the   accused   is   the   decision   of   the   Court   of
Appeals   (CA)   promulgated   on   June   6,   2003,1 finding   Gilberto
Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos, 2 and
1 CA Rollo, pp. 173­184; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid, and concurred by Associate Justice Bennie Adefuin­
Dela Cruz (retired) and Jose I. Sabio, Jr. (retired).
2 At times spelled as Ramientos in the records and in the RTC
decision.
47
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 47
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Ricky Villarico guilty of murder for the killing of Haide Cagatan,
and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of them,
thereby modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 16, in Tangub City that had pronounced them guilty of
homicide aggravated by dwelling.3
With treachery having attended the killing, we affirm the CA
but   correct   the   civil   liability   to   accord   with   pertinent   law   and
jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On October 7, 1999, an information for murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court in Misamis Occidental (RTC) against all the
accused,4 the accusatory portion of which reads:
“That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 o’clock in the
morning   at   Barangay   Bolinsong,   Municipality   of   Bonifacio,
Province   of   Misamis   Occidental,   Philippines,   and   within   the
jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­named   accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent   to   kill,   armed   with   a   short   firearms   (sic),   did   then   and
there   willfully,   unlawfully,   feloniously   suddenly   and
treacherously shoot HAIDE CAGATAN at the back penetrating
through the neck which cause(d) the instant death of said victim
and that he had no chance to avoid or defend himself from the
attack.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
All the accused pleaded not guilty at their December 15, 1999
arraignment.
Version of the Prosecution
At   around   7:50   p.m.   on   August   8,   1999,   Haide   was   busy
preparing   dinner   in   the   kitchen   of   his   family’s   residence   in
Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. The kitchen, lo­
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 45­69; penned by Judge Resurrection T. Inting.
4 Records, pp. 1­2.
48
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
cated at the rear of the residence, had a wall whose upper portion
was made of three­feet high bamboo slats (sa­sa) and whose lower
portion was also made of bamboo slats arranged like a chessboard
with four­inch gaps in between. At that time, Haide’s sister­in­
law   Remedios   Cagatan   was   attending   to   her   child   who   was
answering the call of nature near the toilet. From where she was,
Remedios   saw   all   the   accused   as   they   stood   at  the   rear   of  the
kitchen aiming their firearms at the door—Ricky Villarico was at
the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto,
Sr.   was   at   the   right   side,   with   Ramentos   behind   him.   When
Gilberto,   Jr.   noticed   Remedios,   he   pointed   his   gun   at   her,
prompting Remedios to drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita
Cagatan, her mother­in­law and Haide’s mother: Nay, Nay tawo
Nay (Mother, mother, there are people outside, mother). At that
instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.5
Francisco   Cagatan,   the   father   of   Haide,   also   heard   the
gunshots   just   as   he   was   coming   out   of   the   toilet,   making   him
instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and
recognize   Gilberto,   Sr.,   Gilberto,   Jr.   and   Ricky   who   were   then
standing   by   the   kitchen   door.   They   were   aiming   their   guns
upward, and soon after left together with Ramentos.6
Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala.She
recalled   that   Haide   then   came   towards   her   from   the   kitchen,
asking for help  and saying: Tabang  kay gipusil ko ni  Berting (I
was   shot   by   Berting).7At   that,   she   and   Remedios   brought   the
wounded   Haide   to   Clinica   Ozarraga,   where   he   was   treated   for
gunshot wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder)
and   right   elbow.   He   succumbed   shortly   thereafter   due   to
hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood.8
_______________
5 TSN, March 29, 2000, pp. 5­6.
6 TSN, March 10, 2000, pp. 6­7.
7 TSN, February 24, 2000, pp. 19 and 24.
8 See Exhibits  “A”  and   “B” for  the  Prosecution  (Records,   pp.
53­54).
49
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 49
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Version of the Defense
 The   accused   denied   the   accusations   and   each   proffered   an
alibi.
Gilberto, Sr. claimed that he was sleeping in his home with a
fever when he heard a gunshot. He insisted that he learned that
Haide had been shot only in the next morning. 9 His denial and
alibi were corroborated by his wife Carmelita 10 and his daughter
Jersel.11
Gilberto, Jr. testified that on the day of the incident, he went
to Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental at around 5:00 p.m. to
visit   his   girlfriend   together   with   Charlie   Bacus   and   Randy
Hernan.   They   stayed   there   until   9:00   p.m.   Thereafter,   they
proceeded to Tiaman to attend the wake for one Helen Oligario
Cuizon,   and   were   there   for   an   hour.   They   then   returned   to
Bolinsong and spent the night in the house of Randy. It was only
in the morning that Randy’s father informed them that Haide had
been shot.12
Ricky declared that he stayed throughout the whole evening of
August   8,   1999   in   the   house   of   his   aunt   Flordeliza. 13 Myrna
Hernan, a neighbor of Flordeliza, corroborated his testimony.14
Ramentos   alleged   that   he   was   drinking tuba with   others   at
the store owned by Cinderella Bacus at the time of the shooting;
and that he went home at around 9:00 p.m. after his group was
done   drinking.   He   did   not   recall   hearing   any   gunshots   while
drinking and came to know of the shooting only from a certain
Anecito Duyag on the following morning.
_______________
9  TSN, May 31, 2000, pp. 4­5.
10 TSN, July 21, 2000, pp. 3­17.
11 TSN, April 11, 2000, pp. 43­58.
12 TSN, May 31, 2000, p. 14­15.
13 TSN, June 29, 2000, pp. 4­5.
14 TSN, April 4, 2000, pp. 45­57.
50
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
To discredit the testimony about Haide being able to identify
his   assailants,   the   Defense   presented   Peter   Ponggos,   who
narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal­habal)
when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then
aided   Lolita   and   Remedios   in   bringing   Haide   to   the   hospital.
According to Peter, he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide
replied that there had been only one assailant whom he did not
recognize.15
Ruling of the RTC
After   trial,   the   RTC   convicted   the   four   accused   of   homicide
aggravated by dwelling, disposing:16
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
with one aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each one of them
to a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day, as
its minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, as its maximum, to
suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay jointly
and solidarily, the heirs of the victim P50,000.00, as civil liability
and to pay the costs.
Let   all   the   accused   be   credited   of   the   time   that   they   were
placed   in   jail   under   preventive   imprisonment,   applying   the
provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.”
The   RTC   accorded   faith   to   the  positive   identification   of   the
accused   by   the   Prosecution’s   witnesses,   and   disbelieved   their
denial   and   alibis   due   to   their   failure   to   show   the   physical
improbability for them to be at the crime scene, for the distances
between   the   crime   scene   and   the   places   where   the   accused
allegedly were at the time of the commission of the
_______________
15 TSN, April 4, 2000, pp. 3­17.
16 Records, p. 138.
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People vs. Villarico, Sr.
crime   were   shown   to   range   from   only   100   to   700   meters. 17The
RTC found, however, that the Prosecution was not able to prove
treachery because:
“x x x   The   medical   report   of   “gunshot   wound   left   scapular
region” which the doctor interpreted to be at the back of the left
shoulder is not sufficient to prove treachery, it being susceptible
to   2   different   interpretations:   one:   that   victim   had   his   back
towards his assailants, and two: that he was actually facing them
but he turned around for cover upon seeing the armed “group of
Berting”.   The   Court   is   inclined   to   believe   the   second
interpretation because the victim was able to see and identify his
assailants.   Two   prosecution   witnesses   testified   that   the   victim
identified to them who shot him.”18
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC’s decision,
holding instead that murder was established beyond reasonable
doubt because the killing was attended by treachery, viz.:19
“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Pursuant to Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, We render JUDGMENT without entering it,
as follows:
1. We   find   all   accused   guilty   beyond   reasonable   doubt   of
MURDER.   Each   accused   is   hereby   SENTENCED   TO
SUFFER the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to CERTIFY
and   ELEVATE   the   entire   records   of   this   case   to   the
Supreme Court for review.
51 _______________
17 The distance between the house of Gilberto, Sr. and Haide’s
house was only 100 meters (TSN, May 31, 2000, p. 21). Gilbert,
Jr. testified that his girlfriend’s house was only 500 meters away
from  Bolinsong   (TSN,   May   31,   2000,   pp.   19­21).   Ricky   claimed
that   the   house   of   his   aunt   was   only   700   meters   from   Haide’s
house (TSN, June 29, 2000, p. 9).
18 Records, p. 137.
19 CA Rollo, p. 173­184.
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People vs. Villarico, Sr.
SO ORDERED.”20
Citing People   v.   Valdez,21 the   CA   explained   that   the
attendance   of   treachery   did   not   depend   on   the   position   of   the
victim at the time of the attack, for the essence of treachery was
in   the   element   of   surprise   the   assailants   purposely   adopted   to
ensure   that   the   victim   would   not   be   able   to   defend   himself.
Considering   that   the   accused   had   purposely   positioned
themselves at night outside the door to the kitchen from where
they   could   see   Haide,   who   was   then   busy   preparing   dinner,
through   the   holes   of   the   kitchen   wall,   the   CA   concluded   that
Haide  was  thus  left  unaware  of   the  impending   assault  against
him.
Issues
In this recourse, the accused raise the following errors:
I CONSIDERING   THE   QUALIFYING   CIRCUMSTANCE   OF
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
CONVICTING   ACCUSED­APPELLANTS   OF   MURDER
DESPITE FAILURE OF
_______________
20 Id., at p. 183.
21 G.R. No. 127663, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 611, where the
Court pointed out:
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender
employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without
risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which
the   victim   might   make   (People   vs.   Santos, 270   SCRA   650
[1997]). The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if
the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving
the   victim   no   opportunity   to   repel   it   or   defend   himself
against such attack. What is decisive is that the execution
of   the   attack,   without   slightest   provocation   from   the
victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA
181 [1997]).
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People vs. Villarico, Sr.
THE   PROSECUTION   TO   PROVE   THE   IDENTITY   OF   THE
ASSAILANT   AS   WELL   AS   ACCUSED­APPELLANTS’   GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   GRAVELY   ERRED   IN
TREACHERY,   ON   THE   ASSUMPTION   THAT   INDEED
ACCUSED­APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY.
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses failed to
positively   identify   them   as   the   persons   who   had   actually   shot
Haide;   that  treachery   was   not  attendant  because  there  was  no
proof showing that they had consciously and deliberately adopted
the  mode of attacking the  victim;  and that assuming  that  they
committed the killing, they could only be convicted of homicide.
The decisive queries are, therefore, the following:
(a) Should an identification, to be positive, have to be made
by a witness who actually saw the assailants?
(b) Was   treachery   attendant   in   the   killing   of   Haide   as   to
qualify the crime as murder?
Ruling
We   affirm   the   finding   of   guilt  for   the   crime  of   murder,   but
modify the civil liability.
1.
Positive identification refers to
proof of identity of the assailant
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but
53 to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the commission of
the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without
proof of the identity of the criminal beyond
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54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
reasonable doubt.  In that regard, an identification that does not
22
preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded
any   evidentiary   force.23 The   intervention   of   any   mistake   or   the
appearance of any weakness in the identification simply means
that   the   accused’s   constitutional   right   of   presumption   of
innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby
warranting   an   acquittal,24 even   if   doubt   may   cloud   his
innocence.25 Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally
guaranteed to every individual is forever of primary importance,
and every conviction for crime must rest on the strength of the
evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense.26
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses  did not
actually see who had shot Haide; hence, their identification as the
malefactors was not positively and credibly made.
We cannot uphold the contention of the accused.
The established circumstances unerringly show that the four
accused were the perpetrators of the fatal shooting of
_______________
22 People   v.   Pineda,   G.R.   No.   141644,   May   27,   2004,   429
SCRA 478; People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981­82, April 21, 1995,
243 SCRA 578.
23 People   v.   Fronda,   G.R.   No.   130602.   March   15,   2000,   328
SCRA 185;Natividad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L­40233, June
25,   1980,   98   SCRA   335,   346; People   v.   Beltran,   L­31860,
November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250; People v. Manambit, G.R.
Nos.   72744­45,   April   18,   1997,   271   SCRA   344,   377; People   v.
Maongco,   G.R.  Nos.   108963­65,   March  1,   1994,   230  SCRA   562,
575.
24 People v. Raquel, G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996, 265
SCRA   248,   259; People   v.   Salguero,   G.R.   No.   89117,   June   19,
1991,   198   SCRA   357; Natividad v.   Court   of   Appeals,   G.R.   L­
40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346.
25 Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, 262
SCRA   518,   533; Perez   v. Sandiganbayan,   G.R.   Nos.   76203­04,
December   6,   1989,   180   SCRA   9; People   v.   Sadie,   No.   L­66907,
April   14,   1987,   149   SCRA   240; U.S.   v. Gutierrez,   4   Phil.   493
(1905).
26 People v. Pidia, G.R. No. 112264, November 10, 1995, 249
SCRA 687, 702.
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VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 55
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Haide.   Their   identification   as   his   assailants   by   Remedios   and
Francisco   was  definitely   positive  and   beyond   reasonable  doubt.
Specifically, Remedios saw all the four accused near the door to
the   kitchen   immediately before the   shots   were   fired   and
recognized   who   they   were.   She   even   supplied   the   detail   that
Gilberto,   Jr.   had   trained   his   firearm   towards   her   once   he   had
noticed her presence at the crime scene. On his part, Francisco
attested   to   seeing   the   accused   near   the   door   to   the   kitchen
holding their firearms right after he heard the gunshots, and also
recognized them.
The   collective   recollections   of   both   Remedios   and   Francisco
about   seeing   the   four   accused   standing   near   the   door   to   the
kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside
the   kitchen   were   categorical   enough,   and   warranted   no   other
logical inference than that the four accused were the persons who
had   just   shot   Haide.   Indeed,   neither   Remedios   nor   Francisco
needed   to   have   actually   seen   who   of   the   accused   had   fired   at
Haide, for it was enough that they testified that the four armed
accused:   (a)   had   strategically   positioned   themselves   by   the
kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in
the   same   positions after the   gunshots   were   fired;   and   (c)   had
continuously   aimed   their   firearms   at   the   kitchen   door   even   as
they were leaving the crime scene.
The   close   relationship   of   Remedios   and   Francisco   with   the
victim   as   well   as   their   familiarity   with   the   accused   who   were
their   neighbors   assured   the   certainty   of   their   identification   as
Haide’s assailants. In Marturillas v. People,27 the Court observed
that the familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any
28 Id., at p. 301; see also People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 84332­
doubt that the witness could have erred; and noted that a witness
related   to   the   victim   had   a   natural   tendency   to   remember   the
faces of the person involved in the attack on the victim, because
relatives, more than anybody
_______________
27 G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273.
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People vs. Villarico, Sr.
else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and
bringing the malefactor before the law.28
Moreover,   the   following   portions   of   Lolita’s   testimony   show
that   Haide   himself   recognized   and   identified   his   assailants,   to
wit:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q. And where were you at that time when he was shot?
A. In the sala.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Honorable Court what actually
took place when your son was shot?
A. He came from the kitchen at that time when I heard
gunreports,   he   said   “Nay”   help   me   because   I   was
shot by Berting.29
x x x
Atty. Anonat:
Q. And   that   affidavit   was   executed   by   you   at   the   Bonifacio
Police Station?
A. Yes.
_______________
33,   May   8,   1996,   256   SCRA   611   (holding   that   where   the
identification made by the wife of the victim was held to be
reliable because she had known the accused for a long time
and  was  familiar with  him,   considering   her being   positive
that it was the accused who had shot her husband although
she   saw   only   the   back   part   and   the   body   contour   of   the
assailant. At the time she  saw  him,  the accused was  only
four meters away, and there was sufficient illumination from
a lamp post six meters away from the house of the victim
and his wife); People v. Jacolo, G.R. No. 94470, December 16,
1992, 216 SCRA 631 (holding that where the conditions of
visibility were favorable and the witness did not appear to
be biased against the man on the dock, his or her assertions
as   to   the   identity   of   the   malefactor   should   normally   be
accepted, more so where the witnesses were the victims, or
near­relatives  of  the  victims,  because  these people  usually
strove to remember the faces of the assailants).
29 TSN, February 24, 2000, p. 19; bold emphasis supplied.
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VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 57
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
x x x
Q. And you affirm to the truth of what you have stated in this
affidavit?
A. Yes.
Q. On question No. 7 you were asked in this manner—“Giunsa
man nimo pagkasayod nga sila maoy responsible sa
kamatayon   sa   imong   anak?   How   do   you know   that
they   were   responsible   (for)   the   death   of   your   son?
And   your   answer   is   this   “Tungod   kay   ang   biktima
nakasulti  pa  man   sa   wala   pa   siya  namatay  ug   ang
iyang pulong mao nga TABANG NAY KAY GIPUSIL
KO   NILA   NI   BERTING   ug   nasayod   ako   nga   sila
gumikan   sa   akong   mga   testigos.”   which   translated
into   English—Because   the   victim   was   able   to   talk
before he died and the words which he told me help
me Nay I am shot by the group of Berting and I know
this because of my witnesses.30
x x x
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been
shot by the group of Berting—uttered in the immediate aftermath
of   the   shooting   where   he   was   the   victim—was   a   true   part   of
the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused
as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
“Section 42. Part of the res gestae.—Statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior   or   subsequent   thereto   with   respect   to   the   circumstances
thereof,   may   be   given   in   evidence   as   part   of   the res gestae.   So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.” (36 a)
_______________
30 Id., at p. 24; bold emphasis supplied.
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58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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The term res gestae refers to “those circumstances which are
the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which
are   admissible   when   illustrative   of   such   act.” 31In   a   general
way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations
that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and   which   are   so   spontaneous   and   contemporaneous   with   the
main   fact   as   to   exclude   the   idea   of   deliberation   and
fabrication.32 The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations
and   statements   made   by   either   the   participants, victims,   or
spectators   to   a   crime   immediately before, during,
or immediately after   the   commission   of   the   crime   when   the
circumstances   are   such   that   the   statements   were   made   as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity  for  the  declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.33
The   test   of   admissibility   of   evidence   as   a   part   of   the res
gestae is   whether   the   act,   declaration,   or   exclamation   is   so
intimately   interwoven   or   connected   with   the   principal   fact   or
event   that   it   characterizes   as   to   be   regarded   a   part   of   the
principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives
any   premeditation   or   purpose   to   manufacture   testimony. 34 A
declaration   or   an   utterance   is   thus   deemed   as   part   of   the res
gestae that   is   admissible   in   evidence   as   an   exception   to   the
hearsay   rule   when   the   following   requisites   concur:   (a)   the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b)
_______________
31 Alhambra Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. DeCelle, 118 P. 2d 19, 47
C.A.   2d  409; Reilly  Tar  &  Chemical  Corp. v.  Lewis,   61   N.E.   2d
297, 326 Ill. App. 117.
32 Kaiko v. Dolinger, 440 A. 2d 198, 184 Conn. 509; Southern
Surety Co. v. Weaver, Com. App. 273 S.W. 838.
33 People v.  Sanchez,  G.R. No.  74740,  August 28,  1992,  213
SCRA 70.
34 Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 166 N.E. 530, 335 Ill.
164; Campbell v. Gladden, 118 A. 2d 133, 383 Pa. 144, 53 A.L.R.
2d 1222.
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People vs. Villarico, Sr.
the   statements   were   made   before   the   declarant   had   time   to
contrive   or   devise;   and   (c)   the   statements   must   concern   the
occurrence   in   question   and   its   immediately   attending
circumstances.35
We   find   that   the   requisites   concurred   herein. Firstly,   the
principal   act—the   shooting   of   Haide—was   a   startling
occurrence. Secondly,   his   statement   to   his   mother   about   being
shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide had time to
contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately
after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned
the   startling   occurrence   itself   and   its   attending   circumstance
(that   is,   the   identities   of   the   assailants).   Verily,   the   statement
was   reliable   as   part   of   the res   gestae for   being   uttered in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused,
it   did   not   matter   whether   only   one   or   two   of   them
had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a
conspiracy existed among them. Indeed, a conspiracy exists when
two   or   more   persons   come   to   an   agreement   concerning   the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 36 Direct proof of a
previous agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not
necessary,37 for   conspiracy   may   be   inferred   from   the   conduct   of
the   accused   at   the   time   of   their   commission   of   the   crime   that
evinces a common understanding
_______________
35 People   v.   Guillermo,   G.R.   No.   147786,   January   20,   2004,
420 SCRA 326; People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 152176, October 1,
59 2003,   412   SCRA   503; People   v.   Ignas,   G.R.   Nos.   140514­15,
September 30, 2003, 412 SCRA 311; People v. Lobrigas, G.R. No.
147649,   December   17,   2002,   394   SCRA   170; People   v.   Peralta,
G.R.   No.   94570,   September   28,   1994,   237   SCRA   218; People   v.
Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 103226­28, October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587,
600.
36 Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
37 People   v.   Ronquillo,   G.R.   No.   126136,   April   5,   2002,   380
SCRA 266; People v. Geguira, G.R. No. 130769, March 13, 2000,
328 SCRA 11, 32­33.
60
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
among them on perpetrating the crime.38 Thus, the concerted acts
of the four manifested their agreement to kill Haide, resulting in
each of them being guilty of the crime regardless of whether he
actually   fired   at   the   victim   or   not.   It   is   axiomatic   that   once
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all; 39 and that
all the conspirators are then liable as co­principals. 40
But   did   not   the   fact   that   the   name   Berting without   any
surname being too generic open the identification of the accused
as the assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?
We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached
to the nickname Berting in order to insulate the identification by
Haide from challenge. The victim’s res gestae statement was only
one of the competent and reliable pieces of identification evidence.
As   already   shown,   the   accused   were   competently   incriminated
also by Remedios and Francisco in a manner that warranted the
logical   inference   that   they, and   no   others,   were   the   assailants.
Also, that Berting was the natural nickname for a person whose
given name was Gilberto,  like  herein  accused  Gilberto,  Sr.  and
Gilberto,   Jr.,   was   a   matter   of   common   knowledge   in   the
Philippines.   In   fine,   the   pieces   of   identification   evidence,
including   Haide’s res   gestaestatement,   collaborated   to   render
their identification unassailable.
Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification   in People   v.   Gallarde,41 namely:   (a)   that   by   direct
evidence,   through  an  eyewitness  to  the  very   commission  of  the
act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such
_______________
38 People v. Geguira, supra.
39 People v. Sotes, G.R. No. 101337, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA
353, 365; People v. Pablo, G.R. Nos. 120394­97, January 16, 2001,
349 SCRA 79.
40 People v. Peralta, G.R. No. L­19069, October 29, 1968, 25
SCRA 759, 776­777; People v. Pablo, supra.
41 G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 835.
61
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 61
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
as  where   the  accused   is  last  seen  with  the  victim  immediately
before or after the crime. The Court said:
“x x x Positive   identification   pertains   essentially   to
proof   of   identity   and   not per   se to   that   of   being   an
eyewitness   to   the very   act   of   commission   of   the
crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness
may   identify   a   suspect   or   accused   in   a   criminal   case   as   the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There
may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he   may   still   be   able   to   positively   identify   a   suspect   or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the   victim   immediately   before   and   right   after   the
commission  of  the crime. This is  the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which,
when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken   chain,   leads   to   only   fair   and   reasonable   conclusion,
which   is   that   the   accused   is   the   author   of   the   crime   to   the
exclusion   of   all   others.   If   the   actual   eyewitnesses   are   the   only
ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to
the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless
there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that
there   can   be   no   conviction   until   and   unless   an   accused   is
positively   identified.   Such   a   proposition   is   absolutely   absurd,
because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion   and   finding   of   guilt.   If   resort   to   circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on
the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the
community would be denied proper protection.”42
To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive
and   sufficient   for   conviction,   does   not   always   require   direct
evidence   from   an   eyewitness;   otherwise,   no   conviction   will   be
possible   in   crimes   where   there   are   no   eyewitnesses.   Indeed,
trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally con­
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 849­850; bold emphasis supplied.
62
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
firm   the   identification   and   overcome   the   constitutionally
presumed innocence of the accused.
Faced with their positive identification, the four accused had
to establish convincing defenses. They opted to rely on denial and
their  respective  alibis,   however,   but  both  the  RTC  and  the  CA
rightly rejected such defenses.
The   rejection   was   warranted.   Long   judicial   experience
instructs  that their  denial   and  alibis,   being  too  easy   to  invent,
could   not   overcome   their   positive   identification   by   credible
Prosecution witnesses whose motives for the identification were
not shown to be ill or vile. Truly, a positive identification that is
categorical,   consistent,   and   devoid   of   any   showing   of  ill   or   vile
motive on the part of the Prosecution witnesses always prevails
over alibi and denial that are in the nature of negative and self­
serving evidence.43 To be accepted, the denial and alibi must be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence establishing not
only that the accused did not take part in the commission of the
imputed criminal act but also that it was physically impossible for
the accused to be at or near the place of the commission of the act
at or about the time of its commission. In addition, their proffered
alibis   were   really   unworthy   of   credit   because   only   the   accused
themselves and their relatives and other intimates substantiated
them.44
2.
The essence of treachery is in the mode of attack,
not in the relative position of the victim 
and the assailant
_______________
43 People   v.   Gonzales,   G.R.   No.   140676,   July   31,   2002,   385
SCRA 573, 580; People v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 80262, September 1,
1993,   226   SCRA   1; People   v.   Herico,   G.R.   Nos.   89682­83,
December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 655;People v. Fulinara, G.R. No.
88326,  August 3,  1995,  247  SCRA 28; People v. Cardesan,  G.R.
No. L­29090, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 631.
44 People v. Abendan, G.R. Nos. 132026­27, June 28, 2001, 360
SCRA 106, 121­122.
63
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 63
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
 The   RTC   ruled   out   the   attendance   of   treachery   due   to   its
persuasion that the victim must have been facing his assailants
at the time of the assault and was thus not taken by surprise. The
CA differed from the RTC, however, and stressed that regardless
of   the   position   of   the   victim,   the   essence   of   treachery   was   the
element   of   surprise   that   the   assailants   purposely   adopted   to
ensure that the victim was not able to defend himself.45
We uphold the ruling of the CA.
There   is   treachery   when:   (a)   at   the   time   of   the   attack,   the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused
consciously   and   deliberately   adopted   the   particular   means,
methods,   or   forms   of   attack   employed   by   him. 46 The   essence   of
treachery   lies   in   the   suddenness   of   the   attack   that   leaves   the
victim unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission
of the offense.47 It is the suddenness of the attack coupled with
the inability of the victim to defend himself or to retaliate that
brings   about   treachery;   consequently,   treachery   may   still   be
appreciated even if the victim was facing the assailant. 48
Here, the elements of treachery were present. His assailants
gunned Haide down while he was preoccupied in the kitchen of
his own abode with getting dinner ready for the household. He
was   absolutely   unaware   of   the   imminent   deadly   assault   from
outside   the   kitchen,   and   was   for   that   reason   in   no   position   to
defend himself or to repel his assailants.
_______________
45 CA Rollo, p. 182.
46 People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003, 400
SCRA 603, 632; People v. Ave, G.R. Nos. 137274­75, October 18,
2002, 391 SCRA 225, 246.
47 People   v.   Sanchez,   G.R.   No.   188610,   June   29,   2010,   622
SCRA  548; People v.  Dela  Cruz,  G.R. No.  188353,  February  16,
2010,   612   SCRA  738,   747; People  v.   Escote,   Jr., supra,   pp.  632­
633.
48 People v. Aguilar, 88 Phil 693 (1951).
64
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
The   argument   of   the   accused   that   the   Prosecution   did   not
show   that   they   had   consciously   and   deliberately   adopted   the
manner of killing Haide had no substance, for the testimonies of
Remedios and Francisco disclose the contrary.
Remedios’   testimony   about   seeing   the   four   accused   taking
positions near the door to the kitchen immediately preceding the
shooting of Haide was as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
x x x
Q. Were you present when the late Haide Cagatan was shot?
A. Yes, I was present.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Court in what particular place
you were when the alleged incident took place?
A. I was in the ground floor.
Q. What were you doing there?
A. I   attended   my   child   (to)   answer(ing)   the   call   of   his   ( sic)
nature.
Q. Now,   could   you   possibly   describe   before   this   Honorable
Court, Mrs. Cagatan, the exact event that took place when
the alleged shooting incident took place in your presence?
A. At that time, I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the
call of (his) nature and after doing that when I was
about to stand up to go up I saw the Villarico’s was
(sic) at the back of the kitchen.
Q. At the time you saw them was (sic) any one of them
saw you likewise?
A. There was.
Q. Who was he?
A. Gilberto Villarico, Jr.
Q. At that precise time when you saw them and one of
them saw you, what did Villarico, Jr. do?
A. He aimed his gun to me.65
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 65
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Q. Could you possibly demonstrate that to the Court?
A. (Witness demonstrated by squatting position)
Q. Now at that precise moment when you saw Villarico,
Jr. on a squatting position pointing his gun at you,
what was the exact action that you did?
A. When he aimed his gun to me I immediately dropped
to the ground.
x x x
Q. Since   you   were   personally   present   could   you   still
remember   Mrs. Cagatan   how   many   gun   burst   you
head at that precise moment when you dropped to
the ground because Villarico Jr. was aiming his gun
at you. How many gun burst did you hear?
A. Three gunbursts.
Q. Let us go back to the time when Villarico, Jr. pointed
his gun to you. Do you still remember what were the
other   accused   doing   or   where   were   they   at   that
time?
A. I can remember.
Q. Please tell the Honorable Court.
A. Gilberto   Villarico,   Sr.   was   on   the   right   side;   Ricky
Villarico   was   on   the   left   side   and   behind   Gilberto
Villarico, Sr. was Jerry Ramientos and behind Ricky
Villarico is (sic) Gilberto Villarico Jr.
Q. What were Ricky and Gilberto Villarico, Jr. doing at
the time?
A. They   were   also   dropping   themselves   on   the   ground
and aimed their guns.
Q. To what particular object that they were aiming their
guns?
A. To the door of our kitchen.
Q. How   about   Ramientos,   where   was   he   at   that   time
when   you   saw   the   accused   pointing   their   guns
towards the door of your kitchen?66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
A. Ramientos   was   standing   behind   Gilberto   Villarico
Sr.49
Likewise,   Francisco   saw   the   four   accused   in   the   same
positions   that   Remedios   had   seen   them   moments   prior   to   the
shooting. He claimed that they were aiming their firearms at the
kitchen and continued aiming their firearms even as they were
leaving the crime scene, viz.:
Atty. Fernandez:
x x x
Q. Now you said that you saw all of the accused at the time
when your late son Haide Cagatan was murdered in  the
evening   of   August   8.   Could   you   possibly   explain   to   this
Honorable Court at the very first time what did you see?
A. After I came from the toilet I was proceeding to the kitchen
because Haide was preparing food and he was calling for
 dinner. When Haide Cagatan was calling for dinner and at
the time I was proceeding to the door of the kitchen, when I
was near the door I heard the gun shots.
Q. At the time when you heard gunshots, what did you do?
A. I laid down flat on the ground while my head is (sic)
looking up and there I saw the 3 Villaricos bringing
a   revolver.   They   came   from   aiming   their   guns
towards   upstairs   and   they   are   about   to   withdraw
from that place together with Jerry Ramientos.
x x x
Q. Now,   since   you   said   that   you   saw   the   accused
Villaricos,   could   you   possibly   tell   the   Court,   what
were their responsible position(s) in relation to the
door of the kitchen?
A. They were in shooting position as they aimed upward
and they were bringing revolver aiming upstairs.
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49 TSN, March 29, 2000, pp. 5­6.
67
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Q. In   relation   to   the   door   of   the   kitchen,   could   you
possibly  tell  the Court   what   were  their  responsible
position at that time when you saw them?
A. The four of them were situated in front of the kitchen
door. Villarico Jr. and Villarico Sr. were facing each
other   while   Ricky   Villarico   and   Jerry   Ramientos
were also facing each other.50
The testimonies of Remedios and Francisco on how and where
the   four   accused   had   deliberately   and   strategically   positioned
themselves could not but reveal their deliberate design to thereby
ensure the accomplishment of their design to kill Haide without
any possibility of his escape or of any retaliation from him. Aptly
did the CA observe:
“A   perusal   of   the   information   shows   that   treachery   was
properly alleged to qualify the killing of Heide [sic] Cagatan to
murder.   The   prosecution   was   likewise   able   to   prove   treachery
through the element of surprise rendering the victim unable to
defend himself. In this case, the evidence shows that the victim,
who was in the kitchen preparing dinner, could be seen from the
outside through the holes of the wall. The witnesses consistently
described the kitchen’s wall as three feet high bamboo splits (sa­
sa), accented with bamboo splits woven to look like a chessboard
with 4­inch  holes  in between.   The  accused­appellants,   likewise,
positioned themselves outside the kitchen door at night where the
victim could not see them. When the accused­appellants shot him,
he was caught unaware.”51
3.
Penalty and Damages
There is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four
67
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and punished
them   with reclusion   perpetua pursuant   to   Article   24852 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63,
_______________
50 TSN, March 10, 2000, pp. 5­7.
51 CA Rollo, pp. 182­183.
52 Article 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
68
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, considering the absence
of any generic aggravating circumstance.
However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and
revise   the   grant   by   the   RTC   of   civil   liability   in   the   amount
of only P50,000.00.   Thereby,   the   CA   committed   a   plainly
reversible   error   for   ignoring   existing   laws,   like   Article   2206   of
the Civil Code,53 which prescribes a death indemnity sepa­
_______________
  murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.    With   treachery,   taking   advantage   of   superior   strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3.    By   means   of   inundation,   fire,   poison,   explosion,
shipwreck,   stranding   of   a   vessel,   derailment   or   assault   upon   a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On  occasion  of  any   of   the   calamities   enumerated   in  the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6.   With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person
or   corpse.   (As   amended   by   Section   6,   Republic   Act   No.   7659,
approved on December 13, 1993).
53 Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by
a   crime   or   quasi­delict   shall   be   at   least   three   thousand   pesos,
even though  there  may   have been mitigating  circumstances. In
addition:
(1)   The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and   awarded   by   the   court,   unless   the   deceased   on   account   of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the   provisions   of   article   291,   the   recipient   who   is   not   an   heir
called   to   the   decedent’s   inheritance   by   the   law   of   testate   or
intestate succession,
69
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 69
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
rately   from   moral   damages,   and   Article   2230   of
the Civil Code,54 which   requires   exemplary   damages   in   case   of
death   due   to   crime   when   there   is   at   least   one   aggravating
circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence, specifically, People v.
Gutierrez,55 where   we   held   that   moral   damages   should   be
awarded to the heirs without need of proof or pleading in view of
the violent death of the victim, and People v. Catubig,56
_______________
may   demand  support  from  the  person  causing   the  death,   for   a
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by
the court;
  (3)  The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants   of   the   deceased   may   demand   moral   damages   for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
54 Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part   of   the   civil   liability   may   be   imposed   when   the   crime   was
committed   with   one   or   more   aggravating   circumstances.   Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party.
55 G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 633.
56 G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, where
the Court explained:
The   term   “aggravating   circumstances”   used   by
the   Civil   Code,   the   law   not   having   specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense.   The   commission   of   an   offense   has   a   two­
pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the
social order and the other upon the private victim as
it   causes   personal   sufferings,   each   of   which   is
addressed   by,   respectively,   the   prescription   of
heavier   punishment   for   the   accused   and   by   an
award   of   additional   damages   to   the   victim.   The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores  the  exacerbation  of  the offense  by  the
attendance   of   aggravating   circumstances,   whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the   award   of   damages,   however,   is   likewise,   if   not
primarily,   intended   for   the   offended   party   who
suffers   thereby.   It   would   make   little   sense   for   an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended   party  when   the  aggravating  circumstance
is ordinary but to be with­
70
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
where   we   ruled   that   exemplary   damages   were   warranted
whenever   the   crime   was   attended   by   an   aggravating
circumstance,   whether   qualifying   or   ordinary.   Here,   the
aggravating   circumstance   of   treachery,   albeit   attendant   or
qualifying in its effect, justified the grant of exemplary damages.
Plain oversight might have caused both the RTC and the CA
to  lapse  into  the  serious   omissions.   Nonetheless,   a   rectification
should now be made, for, indeed, gross omissions, intended or not,
should   be   eschewed.   It   is   timely,   therefore,   to   remind   and   to
exhort all the trial and appellate courts to be always mindful of
and to apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the kinds
and amounts of indemnities and damages appropriate in criminal
cases   lest   oversight   and   omission   will   unduly   add   to   the
sufferings of the victims or their heirs. Nor should the absence of
specific   assignment   of   error   thereon   inhibit   the sua
sponte rectification of the omissions, for the grant of all the proper
kinds and amounts of civil liability to the victim or his heirs is a
matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or controlled
by   an   assignment   of   error.   An   appellate   tribunal   has   a   broad
discretionary   power   to   waive   the   lack   of   proper   assignment   of
errors   and   to   consider   errors   not   assigned,57 for   technicality
should   not   be   allowed   to   stand   in   the   way   of   equitably   and
completely   resolving   the   rights   and   obligations   of   the   parties.
Indeed,   the   trend   in   modern   day   procedure   is   to   accord   broad
discretionary  power such that the appellate court may consider
matters bearing on the issues submitted for resolution that the
parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored.58
Consistent   with   prevailing   jurisprudence,   we   grant   to   the
heirs   of   Haide   P75,000.00   as   death   indemnity; 59P75,000.00   as
moral   damages;60 and   P30,000.00   as   exemplary   damages. 61 As
clarified in People v. Arbalate,62damages in such amounts are to
be granted whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a crime
covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder charged and
proved   herein.   Indeed,   the   Court,   observing   in People   v.
Sarcia,63 citing People   v.   Salome64 and People   v.   Quiachon,65 that
the “principal consideration for the award of damages x x x is the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness,   not   the   public   penalty   actually   imposed   on   the
offender,” announced that:
“The litmus test[,] therefore, in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which
would   have   warranted   the   imposition   of   the   death   penalty,
regardless   of   whether   the   penalty   actually   imposed   is   reduced
to reclusion perpetua.”
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on June 6,
2003 in CA­G.R. CR No. 24711, finding GILBERTO VILLARICO,
SR.,   GILBERTO   VILLARICO,   JR.,   JERRY   RAMENTOS,   and
RICKY   VILLARICO   guilty   of   murder   and   sentencing   each   of
them to suffer reclusion perpetua, subject to the modification that
they are held jointly and solidarily liable to pay to the heirs of the
late   Haide   Cagatan   death   indemnity   of   P75,000.00,   moral
damages of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio­Morales   (Chairperson),   Brion,   Villarama,
Jr.and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.—Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions
two acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. (Talidano vs. Falcon Maritime and
Allied Services, Inc., 558 SCRA 279 [2008])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992  461 
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 92740. March 23, 1992.*
PHILIPPINE   AIRLINES,   INC.,   petitioner, vs. JAIME   M.
RAMOS,   NILDA   RAMOS,   ERLINDA   ILANO,   MILAGROS
ILANO,   DANIEL   ILANO   AND   FELIPA   JAVALERA,
respondents.
Evidence; Documentary evidence; Writing or document made
contemporaneously   with   transaction   regarded   as   more   reliable
proof than oral testimony.—In the absence of any controverting
evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the
testimonies   of   PAL’s   witnesses   are prima   facie evidence   of   the
truth   of   their   allegations.   The   plane   tickets   of   the   private
respondents, exhs. “1,” “2,” “3,” “4,” (with emphasis on the printed
condition of the contract of carriage regarding check­in time as
well as on the notation “late 4:02” stamped on the flight coupon by
the   check­in   clerk   immediately   upon   the   check­in   of   private
respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh.
“5,” (which showed the non­accommodation of Capati and Go and
the private respondents) are entries made in the regular course of
business which the private respondents failed to overcome with
substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or  PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
_______________
*
 FIRST DIVISION.
462
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED       Marcos L. Estrada, Jr. for private respondents.
62 
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Ramos
document   made   contemporaneously   with   a   transaction   in
which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as
proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof
and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness
as to such facts based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S
1179,   1029   cited   in   Francisco, Revised   Rules   of   Court   in   the
Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654).
Same; Same; Exception   to   hearsay   rule;   Res   gestae.—The
hearsay   rule  will   not  apply   in  this   case   as   statements,   acts  or
conduct   accompanying   or   so   nearly   connected   with   the   main
transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate,
qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res
gestae (32 C.J.S., S. 411, 30­31).
Common carriers; Contract of carriage; Passengers bound by
conditions of contract.—When the private respondents purchased
their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions
of   the   contract   of   carriage   particularly   the   check­in   time
requirement. The terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to
come on time for check­in should not militate against PAL. Their
non­accommodation   on   that   flight   was   the   result   of   their   own
action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their tickets by
PAL is only proper.
 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ricardo   V.   Puno,   Jr.,   Caesar   R.   Dulay   &   Marceliano   C.
Calica for petitioner.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21,
directing the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL, for short) to pay the
private   respondents   the   amounts   specified   therein   as   actual,
moral   and   temperate   damages   as   well   as   attorney’s   fees   and
expenses of litigation.
The   antecedent   facts   are   briefly   recounted   by   the   appellate
court, as follows: 
463
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992  463 
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Ramos
“Plaintiffs   Jaime  Ramos,   Nilda   Ramos,   Erlinda   Ilano,   Milagros
Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipa Javalera, are officers of the Negros
Telephone Company  who  held confirmed  tickets for PAL Flight
No.   264   from   Naga   City   to   Manila   on   September   24,   1985,
scheduled   to   depart   for   Manila   at   4:25   p.m.   The   tickets   were
bought sometime in August 1985. Among the conditions included
in plaintiff’s tickets is the following:
‘1. CHECK­IN TIME—Please check in at the Airport Passenger
check­in counter at least one hour before PUBLISHED departure
time of your flight. We will consider your accommodation forfeited
in favor of waitlisted passengers if you fail to check­in at least 30
minutes before PUBLISHED departure time. (Exhs. (1­A­A, 2­A­
1, S­A, O­A­1, tsn, Nov. 23, 1987, p. 8).’
“Plaintiffs   claim   in   their   Complaint   that   they   went   to   the
check­in counter of the defendant’s Naga branch at least one (1)
hour before the published departure time but no one was at the
counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon checking­in
and   presentation   of   their   tickets   to   the   employee/clerk   who
showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to
chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek
actual,   moral   and   exemplary   damages,   and   attorney’s   fees   for
breach of contract of carriage.
“Defendant   disclaims   any   liability,   claiming   that   the   non­
accommodation of plaintiffs on said flight was due to their having
check­in   (sic)   late   for   their   flight.   It   is   averred   that   even   if
defendant is found liable to the plaintiffs such liability is confined
to,   and   limited   by,   the   CAB   Economic   Regulations   No.   7   in
conjunction with P.D. 589.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of
breach of contract of carriage in bumping­off the plaintiffs from
its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to
pay:
1. “1)P1,250.20—the total value of the tickets;
2. “2)P22.50—the   total   value   of   airport   security   fees   and
terminal fees;
3. “3)P20,000.00—for   each   of   the   plaintiffs   for   moral   and
temperate damages; and
4. “4)P5,000.00—for   attorney’s   fees   and   expenses   of
litigation.”
(Rollo, pp. 35­36)
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 1990, the
appellate   court   rendered   a   decision,   the   dispositive   portion   of
which, reads:
“WHEREFORE,   the   decision   appealed   from   is   AFFIRMED in
toto,with costs against appellant.
 “SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 42)
Hence, this present petition with the following legal questions:
1. “1.Can   the   Honorable   Court   of   Appeals   validly
promulgate   the   questioned   decision   by   the   simple
expedient of adopting in toto the trial court’s finding that
defendant­appellant   is   liable   for   damages   on   the   sole
issue of credibility of witnesses without considering the
material   admissions   made   by   the   plaintiffs   and   other
evidence   on   record   that   substantiate   the   defense   of
defendant­appellant.
2. “2.Can   the   Honorable   Court   award   legally   moral   and
temperate   damages   plus   attorney’s   fees   of   P5,000.00
contrary to the evidence and established jurisprudence.”
(Rollo, p. 9)
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a
case is required to prove his affirmative allegations. In civil cases,
the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his
claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by
one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the
other   party   (Stronghold   Insurance   Company,   Inc.   vs.   Court   of
Appeals,   et   al., G.R.   No.   83376,   May   29,   1989, 173   SCRA   619,
625).
The case at bar presents a simple question of fact: Whether or
not   the   private   respondents   were   late   in   checking­in   for   their
flight   from   Naga   City   to   Manila   on   September   24,   1985.   It   is
immediately   apparent   from   the   records   of   this   case   that   the
claims of the parties on this question are dramatically opposed.
As a rule, the determination of a question of fact depends largely
on the credibility of witnesses unless some documentary evidence
is   available   which   clearly   substantiates   the   issue   and   whose
genuineness   and   probative   value   is   not   disputed   (Legarda   v.
Miaile, 88 Phil. 637, 642). The exception to the rule now runs true
in this case.
We   reverse.   This   case   once   more   illustrates   Our   power   to
reweigh   the   findings   of   lower   courts   when   the   same   are   not
supported   by   the   record   or   not   based   on   substantial   evidence
(see Cruz   v.   Villarin, G.R.   No.   75679,   January   12,   1990, 181
SCRA 53, 61).
It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the
required   check­in   time   for   passengers.   The   time   requirement
is prominently printed as one of the conditions of carriage on their
tickets,   i.e.,   that  the  airport   passenger   should   check­in at  least
one hour before published departure time of his flight and PAL
shall consider his accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted
passengers if he fails to check­in at least 30 minutes.
We note that while the aforequoted condition has always been
applied strictly and without exception (TSN, December 16, 1987,
p. 11), the station manager, however, may exercise his discretion
to   allow   passengers   who   checked­in   late   to   board   provided   the
flight is not fully booked and seats are available (ibid, pp. 17­18).
On September 24, 1985, flight 264 from Naga to Manila was fully
booked   owing   to   the   Peñafrancia   Festival   (TSN,   January   25,
1988, p. 5). In addition, PAL morning flights 261 and 262 were
cancelled   resulting   in   a   big   number   of   waitlisted   passengers.
(TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 6).
The   private   respondents   claim   that   they   were   on   time   in
checking­in  for   their   flight;   that   no  PAL   personnel   attended   to
them   until   much   later   which   accounted   for   their   late   check­in;
that PAL advanced the check­in time and the departure of their
flight   resulting   in   their   non­accommodation;   and   that   they
suffered physical difficulties, anxieties and business losses.
The   evidence   on   record   does   not   support   the   above
contentions.   We   note   that   there   were   two   other   confirmed
passengers who came ahead of the private respondents but were
refused   accommodation   because   they   were   late.   Edmundo
Araquel,   then   the   check­in­clerk,   testified   on   this   point,   as
follows: 
“Atty. Marcelino C. Calica, counsel for PAL 
Q  Before the plaintiffs arrive (sic) at the check­in counter, do you recall if there
were other passengers who arrived at the counter and they were advised that 
they were late? 
A  Yes, sir. 
Q  Who were those persons? 
A  My former classmates at Ateneo, sir, Rose Capati and Go, Merly. 
Q  Were these two passengers also confirmed passengers on this flight? 
A  Yes, sir. 
Q  I show to you a document which is entitled ‘Passenger Manifest of flight 
264, September 24, 1985,’ which we request to be marked as Exh. ‘5’ you 
said earlier that aside 
     from the plaintiffs here there were two other passengers who A  Yes, sir. 
also checked in but they were also late and you mentioned the Q  I am showing to you Exhs. ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ and ‘D,’ which are the tickets of 
names of these passengers as Capati and Go, please point to Mr. & Mrs. Jaime Ramos for Exh. ‘A,’ Exh. ‘B’ ticket of Mr. & Mrs. 
us that entry which will show the names of Go and Capati??
Daniel Ilano, ‘C’ ticket of Felipa Javalera and ‘D’ ticket of Erlinda Ilano, 
A Here, sir, numbers 13 and 14 of the Manifest.
will you please go over the same and point to us the notations you said you 
“ATTY.   CALICA: We   request   that   passengers   13   and   14   be
467
marked in evidence, Go for 13 and Capati for 14 as Exh. ‘5­A.’
Q You said that these two passengers you mentioned were also VOL. 207, 467 
similarly   denied   accommodations   because   they   checked   in MARCH 23,
late, did they check in before or after the plaintiffs? 1992 
A Before, sir. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Ramos
Q What time did they appear at the counter?   made on these tickets? 
A 4:01 p.m., sir. A  This particular time, sir. (Witness pointing to the notation 
Q What happened when they checked in at 4:01?
‘Late’ and the time ‘4:02’ appearing at the upper righthand of 
A I   told   them   also   that   they   were   late   so   they   cannot   be
the tickets Exhs. ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ and ‘D.’) 
accommodated and they tried to protest, but they decided later
on just to refund the ticket.” (TSN of November 23, 1987, pp. Q  How long did it take after the tickets were tendered to you for 
11­12) checking in and before you made this notation? 
Shortly after, the private respondents followed the aforesaid two A  It was just seconds, sir. 
passengers   at   the   counter.   At   this   juncture,   Araquel   declared, Q  On the tickets being tendered for check­in and noting that they 
thus:  were late, you mean to say you immediately made 
“Q  Now, you said that you met the plaintiffs in this case because they were  annotations? 
passengers of Flight 264 on September 24, 1985 and they were not  A  Yes, sir. That is an S.O.P. of the office. 
accommodated because they checked in late, what time did these plaintiffs  Q  So on what time did you base that 4:02? 
check in?  A  At the check­in counter clock, sir. 
A  Around 4:02 p.m., sir.  Q  At the time you placed the time, what was the time reflected at 
Q  Who was the clerk at the check in counter who attended to them?  the counter clock? 
A  I was the one, sir.  A  4:02, sir.” (ibid, pp. 8­11) 
  x x x  The private respondents submitted no controverting evidence. As
Q  You said when you were presented the tickets of the plaintiffs in this case  clearly   manifested   above,   the   intervening   time   between   Capati
and noting that they were late for checking in, immediately after advising  and Go and the private respondents took only a mere second. If
them that they were late, you said you made annotation on the tickets?  indeed, the private respondents were at the check­in counter at
3:30 p.m., they could have been the first ones to be attended to by many times. Everytime that you check­in, how many personnel are 
Araquel than Capati and Go. They could have also protested if manning the check­in counter? 
they were the earliest passengers at the counter but were ignored A  There are about three (3) or four (4), sir. 
by Araquel in favor of Go and Capati. They did not.
Q  Everytime, there are three (3) or four (4)? 
It is likewise improbable that not a single PAL personnel was
A  Everytime but not that time. 
in   attendance   at   the   counter   when   the   check­in   counter   was
supposed to be opened at 3:25 p.m. It must be remembered that Q  I am referring to your previous trips, I am not referring to this incident. 
the morning flight to Manila was cancelled and hence, it is not On previous occasions when you took the flight with Pili Airport and you 
farfetched   for   Us   to   believe  that  the   PAL   personnel   then   have see three (3) or four (4) personnel everytime, are all these three (3) or four 
their hands full  in dealing  with  the  passengers  of  the  morning (4) personnel at the counter or some are standing at the counter or others 
flight who became waitlisted passengers. Moreover, the emphatic are seated on the table doing something or what? Will you describe to us? 
assertions of private respondent Daniel Javalora Ilano regarding Q  Some are handling the baggages and some are checking­in the tickets. 
the absence of a PAL personnel lost its impact during the cross
Q  So, on most occasions when you check­in and say, there were at least three
examination: 
(3) of four (4) people at the check­in counter, one would attend to the 
“ATTY. CALICA—
tickets, another to the check in baggage, if any. Now, do you notice if 
Q  So, you maintain therefore that for all the time that you waited there for the 
somebody evade when you check­in your ticket. This other person would 
whole twenty (20) minutes the check­in counter and other PAL Offices there
receive the flight coupon which is detached from your ticket and record it 
—the whole counter was completely unmanned? I am referring to the whole
on what we call passenger manifest? 
468
A  That’s true. 
468  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Q  Now, it is clear one would attend to the baggage, another person would 
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Ramos
receive the ticket, detach the coupon and one would record it on the 
  area there where it is enclosed by a counter. 
passenger manifest. What about the fourth, what was he doing, if you 
I will describe to you, for the benefit of the court. 
recall? 
When you approach the counter at Naga Airport, the counter is enclosed, I 
A  I think, putting the identification tags on the baggages (sic).” (TSN, 
mean, you cannot just go inside the PAL office, right? there is some sort of
November 17, 1986, p. 38) 
counter where you deal with the PAL personnel and you approximate this 
Ilano’s declaration becomes even more patently unreliable in the
counter to be five (5) to six (6) meters. Now, this space after the counter,  face of the Daily Station Report of PAL dated September 24, 1985
did you observe what fixtures or enclosures are contained there inside the  which contained the working hours of its personnel from 
enclosed space?  469
A  I am not sure whether there are offices or enclosures there.  VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992  469 
Q  You have been travelling and had opportunity to check­in your tickets so  Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Ramos
0600 to 1700 and their respective assignments, as follows:  personnel at the airport? 
“ATTY. CALICA  A  Yes, sir. 
Q  Normally upon opening of the check­in counter, how many PAL personnel  Q  I show to you a daily station report for 24 September 1985 covering working
are assigned to man the counter?  hours 0600 to 1700, will you please go over the same and thereafter tell us 
“EDMUNDO ARAQUEL  from the personnel listed in this Daily Station Report what were the name 
A  A total of four personnel with the assistance of others.  (sic) of the personnel assigned to man the check­in counter at that time? 
Q  Who are these personnel assigned to the counter and what specific duties  A There (sic) persons assigned were Mr. Oropesa, Mr.  Espiritu,
they performed?  Mr. Medevilla, myself and Mr. Valencia.
A  Mr. Oropesa handled the cargo, Mr. Espiritu handled the ticketing, Mr.  Q You mentioned about Mr. Espiritu, what was his specific task
Valencia and me handled the checking in of passengers.  at that time?
A He was handling the ticketing, sir.
Q  Are you referring to this particular flight 264 on September 24, 1985? 
Q What about Mr. Medevilla?
A  Yes, sir. 
A He was taking care of the ramp handling.
Q  Who was assigned as check­in clerk that particular time?  Q And Mr. Oropesa?
A  I was the one with Mr. Valencia, sir.  A He was handling the incoming cargo.
Q  What was Mr. Valencia doing?  “ATTY.   CALICA: We   request   that  this   Daily   Station  Report   be
A  He assisted me, sir.  marked Exh. ‘6’ and the portion of the Report which shows the
Q  How?  deployment of personnel of PAL Naga Station on September
A  If a group of passengers simultaneously check in, we divided the work  24, 1985 as ‘6­A.’
Q Plaintiffs in this case testified that when they checked in there
between us. (TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 7) 
was   nobody   manning   the   counter   and   they   had   to   wait   for
“x x x 
twenty minutes before someone came in to the counter, what
Q  When the plaintiffs testified in this case particularly plaintiff Daniel Ilano  can you say to that?
and Felipa Javalera at the previous hearings said plaintiffs stated that they  A It is not true because all the time we were there from the start,
arrived at the check­in counter at about 3:25 or 3:30 and there was nobody in an   hour   before   the   flight   we   were   there   because   we   were
the counter, what can you say to that?  assigned there.
A  We cannot leave the counter, sir. That was always manned from 3:25 up to  Q Plaintiff   Daniel   Ilano   testified   that   he   went   to   the   counter
the last minute. We were there assigned to handle the checking in of  twice, first at 3:25 and it was only at 4:00 p.m. that somebody
passengers.  went   to   the   counter   and   attended   to   him   and   while   he
expected his boarding pass he was told instead that plaintiffs
Q  You mentioned earlier that aside from you there were other personnel 
could not be accommodated because they were late, what can
assigned to the check­in counter and you even mentioned about a certain 
you say to that?
Valencia assisting you, do you have any evidence to show said assignment of
A The   truth   is   we   were   always   there   and   we   never   left   the
counter from the start of the check­in time of 3:25 we were all
there, we never left the counter.
Q Until what time did you remain at the check­in counter?
A At around 4:15 p.m., sir.
Q You said that the check­in counter was closed at 3:55, for what
purpose were you still manning the check­in counter?
A To attend to the passengers who are late in checking in because
they also need assistance in explaining to them the situation.
Q So it was for that purpose you were there?
A Yes, sir.” (ibid., pp. 16­18)
It is significant to note that there were no other passengers who
checked­in late after the private respondents (TSN, November 23,
1987,   p.   13).   In   the   absence   of   any   controverting   evidence,   the
documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of
PAL’s   witnesses   are prima   facie evidence   of   the   truth   of   their
allegations.   The   plane  tickets   of   the   private   respondents,   exhs.
“1,” “2,” “3,” “4,” (with emphasis on the printed condition of the
contract   of   carriage   regarding   check­in   time   as   well   as   on   the
notation “late 4:02” stamped on the flight coupon by the check­in
clerk immediately upon the check­in of private respondents) and
the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. “5,” (which showed
the   non­accommodation   of   Capati   and   Go   and   the   private
respondents) are entries made in the regular course of business
which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial
and   convincing   evidence   other   than   their   testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or
document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which
are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof
of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to
such   facts   based   upon   memory   and   recollection   (20   Am   Jur   S
1179,   1029   cited   in   Francisco, Revised   Rules   of   Court   in   the
Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654).
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written
document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and
Salome de Leon v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992).
This dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of
the private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed
that no one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the
published   departure   time   and   that the   employee who   finally
attended to them marked them late, Records, p. 2) and in their
testimonies (where they contended that there were two different
PAL   personnelwho   attended   to   them   at   the   check­in   counter,
TSNs of November 17, 1986, pp. 41­45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5­
6). Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that
they are self­serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will
not   apply   in   this   case   as   statements,   acts   or   conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction
as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or
characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae (32
C.J.S.,   S.   411,   30­31).   Based   on   these   circumstances,   We   are
inclined   to   believe   the   version   of   PAL.   When   the   private
respondents  purchased  their   tickets,   they   were   instantaneously
bound by the conditions of the contract of carriage particularly 
the   check­in   time   requirement.   The   terms   of   the   contract   are
clear.   Their   failure   to   come   on   time   for   check­in   should   not
militate   against   PAL.   Their   non­accommodation   on   that   flight
was the  result  of  their  own action  or  inaction and  the  ensuing
cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.
Furthermore, We do not find anything suspicious in the fact
that  PAL  flight  264  departed  at  4:13   p.m.  instead  of  4:25   p.m.
Apart from their verbal assertions, the private respondents  did
not show any evidence of irregularity. It being clear that all the
passengers have already boarded, there was no sense in keeping
them waiting for the scheduled time of departure before the plane
could take flight.
ACCORDINGLY,  the petition is GRANTED.  The  questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz and Griño­Aquino, JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Petition granted; decision annulled and set aside.
VOL. 409, AUGUST 14, 2003  43
Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 140023. August 14, 2003.*
RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.,
respondent.
Evidence: Documentary   Evidence; Police   Blotter; A   police
blotter   is   admissible   if   the   following   requisites   are   met.—The
police   blotter   was   admitted   under   Rule   130,   Section   44   of   the
Rules   of   Court.   Under   the   said   rule,   the   following   are   the
requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to
do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance
of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially   enjoined   by   law;   (c)   that   the   public   officer   or   other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must   have  been   acquired   by   him   personally   or   through   official
information.
Damages: Exemplary   Damages; Although   exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they also need
not be proved.—Although exemplary damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, they also  which figured in an accident during the effectivity of the policy.
_______________
*
 SECOND DIVISION.
44
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
4 
Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
need not be proved. But a complainant must still show that
he   is   entitled   to   moral,   temperate   or   compensatory   damages
before   the   court   may   consider   the   question   of   whether   or   not
exemplary damages should be awarded.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of 
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     William P. Demaisip for petitioner.
     The   Law   Office   of   Mirano, Mirano   &   Mirano for   private
respondent.
QUISUMBING,  J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’
Decision1 dated February 4, 1999, as well as its Resolution, 2 dated
September   7,   1999,   in CA­G.R.   CV   No.   47227.   The   assailed
decision dismissed petitioner’s appeal and the resolution denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The original action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court
of  Iloilo City,  Branch  25,   as Civil  Case  No.   17045 for  breach  of
contract   and   damages,   as   a   result   of   the   insurance   company’s
refusal of petitioner’s claim on the insurance policy of his truck
 The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate
No. FCG­538. The truck was insured with respondent Standard
Insurance Co., Inc. under Policy No. CV­21074 3for the maximum
amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover
any damages that might be caused to his goods.
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around
8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City,
the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No. FBS­917,
also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead
of the insured truck and was bumped from the rear. The insured  38 yrs., a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142
_______________
1
 Rollo, pp. 56­64.
2
 Id., at pp. 78­79.
3
 Records, pp.6­7.
45
VOL. 409, AUGUST 14, 2003  45
Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while
the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of
the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less.
Petitioner  filed  a  claim  with  the  insurance  company  for  the
proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the
insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to
investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured
truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license at
the   time   of   the   accident.   The   restriction 4 in   Leonardo   Anit’s
driver’s   license   provided   that   he   can   only   drive   four­wheeled
vehicles   weighing   not   more   than   4,500   kgs.   Since   the   insured
truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore
violated the “authorized driver” clause5 of the insurance policy. In
addition, respondent cited the following excerpts from the police
blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit:
C­UN­85   DAMAGE   TO   PROPERTY   W/   PHY   INJURIES—
R/IMPRUDENCE
11:30 PM—Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision
took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by
Pat.   Villahermosa,   assisted   by   Lt.   P.   Baclaron   (OD),   disclosed
that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a
collision took place between a truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S]
917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y COYEL,
and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG­538 owned by Rudy  Lao
and driver (sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, 33 yrs, a res, of
Brgy   Lava,   Balasan,   Iloilo   with   License   Nr   1836482 .   .   .   .
(Emphasis supplied.)6
_______________
 Id., at p. 195; Restriction Code 2.
4
 Id., at p. 121; AUTHORIZED DRIVER:
5
Any of the following:
1. (a)The insured
2. (b)Any person driving on the Insured’s order or with his
permission.
Provided  that the person driving  is  permitted,  in accordance
with the licensing law or other regulations, to drive the Scheduled
vehicle, or has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a
Court of Law or by reason of any enactment or regulation—that
behalf, provided that for Sections I and II only of this Policy an
authorized   driver   shall   include   a   duly   licensed   driver   whose On   appeal   with   the   Court   of   Appeals,   the   RTC   decision   was
license   at   the   time   of   the   accident   had   expired.   (Emphasis affirmed.   The   petition   was   dismissed   and   the   motion   for
supplied.) reconsideration was denied. The CA stated:
6
 Records, p. 193. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
46 hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, the complaint is DISMISSED
46  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  for lack of merit.
Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. SO ORDERED.”9
Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact In   his   petition   for   review   now   before   us,   petitioner   cites   the
another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the following as grounds therefor:
insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a driver’s license authorizing
him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than 1. A.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
4,500   kgs.   As   evidence,   petitioner   presented   the   Motor   Vehicle LOWER  COURT  RELIED  MAINLY ON  SECTION  44,
Accident Report7wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. RULE   130   OF   THE   RULES   OF   COURT   IN
Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured UPHOLDING THE ENTRY IN THE POLICE BLOTTER
truck   and   not   Leonardo   Anit.   The  said   report   was   made   three WHICH   STATED   THAT   THE   DRIVER   OF   THE
days after the accident or on April 27, 1985. However, respondent INSURED VEHICLE
insurance company was firm in its denial of the claim.
Hence,   petitioner   filed   the   civil   case   before   the   RTC.   After _______________
trial, the court disposed of the case as follows:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Court   finds   that 7
 Id., at p. 11.
plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of action against the defendant and 8
 Rollo, p. 30.
hence ordered his case dismissed and further orderes (sic) him to 9
 Id., at p. 63.
pay the defendant the following: 47
VOL. 409, AUGUST 14, 2003  47 
1. 1)P20,000.00   as   attorney’s   fees   plus   P500.00   for Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
appearance fee; and
1. WAS LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, WHO WAS NOT AN
2. 2)P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. AUTHORIZED DRIVER. UNDER THE SAID SECTION
44,   RULE   130   ITSELF   HOWEVER,   THE   POLICE
SO ORDERED.8 BLOTTER   IS   MERELY   A  PRIMA   FACIE   EVIDENCE
OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN WHICH MAY BE
NULLIFIED BY OTHER EVIDENCE;10
2. B.PERCEPTION   OF   THE   HONORABLE   COURT   OF JURISPRUDENCE   ESTABLISHED   BY   THIS
APPEALS’ ON THE “DIMINISHED” CREDIBILITY OF HONORABLE   SUPREME   COURT   AS   WELL   AS
PAT.   FELIPE   VILLAHERMOSA,   THE   TRAFFIC CLEAR   MISAPPREHENSION   OF   THE   FACTS   IN
POLICE   INVESTIGATOR,   IS   MISPLACED   AND THIS CASE.15
UNFOUNDED;11
Three   issues   must   be   resolved:   (1)   The   admissibility   and
3. C.THE   DRIVER   OF   THE   INSURED   TRUCK   WITH probative   value   of   the   police   blotter   as   evidence;   (2)   The
PLATE NR. FCG­538 WAS GIDDIE BOY Y COYEL, AN assessment of the credibility of witnesses; and (3) The propriety
AUTHORIZED   DRIVER  OF   THE   SAID   TRUCK.   THE and basis of the 
DRIVER OF THE OTHER TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE
ACCIDENT   WITH   PLATE   NR.   FBS­917   WAS _______________
LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES;12
10
 Id., at p. 10.
4. D.THE   HONORABLE   COURT   OF   APPEALS
11
 Id., at p. 12.
MISAPPLIED   ARTICLES   2232   AND   2208   OF   THE
12
 Id., at p. 13.
NEW   CIVIL   CODE   IN   GRANTING   EXEMPLARY 13
 Id., at p. 15.
DAMAGES   AND   ATTORNEY’S   FEES   TO 14
 Id., at p. 17.
RESPONDENT.   UNDER   ARTICLES   2229   AND   2234 15
 Id., at p. 19.
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 48
CANNOT   BE   AWARDED   IN   THE   ABSENCE   OF   AN
48  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
AWARD   FOR   MORAL,   TEMPERATE,   LIQUIDATED
OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES;13 Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
awards for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Also pertinent
here   is   the   factual   issue   of   whether   or   not   Leonardo   Anit,   an
5. E.TESTIMONIES   OF   THE   WITNESSES   OF unauthorized driver, was driving the insured truck at the time of
RESPONDENT NAMELY, SGT. BERNAS, THE DESK
the accident.
OFFICER   AND   ROMEO   GUIERGEN,   INSURANCE
Petitioner   assails   the   admissibility   and   evidentiary   weight
ADJUSTER,   WERE   INCONSISTENT   AND
given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding of the
UNRELIABLE;14 and
RTC and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by
the   Motor   Vehicle   Accident   Report   and   testimony   of   the
6. F.THE   HONORABLE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   UPHELD investigating policeman himself, attesting that it was Giddie Boy
THE   DECISION   OF   THE   LOWER   COURT   DESPITE Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving the insured vehicle. 16
GLARING   MISAPPLICATION   OF   THE   LAW   AND
 Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony
were of dubious nature. Both trial and appellate courts noted that
the  report was made three days  after the accident and  did not
form part of the official police records.17
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of
the Rules of Court.18 Under the said rule, the following are the
requisites for its admissibility:
1. (a)that   the   entry   was   made   by   a   public   officer,   or   by
another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;
2. (b)that   it   was   made   by   the   public   officer   in   the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
3. (c)that   the   public   officer   or   other   person   had   sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been   acquired   by   him   personally   or   through   official
information.19
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the
police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official
records.20 Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance   of   the   duty   especially   enjoined   by   law   are prima
facie
_______________
16
 Rollo, pp. 10­11.
17
 Id., at p. 171.
18
 Rule 130, Section 44.  Entries in official records.—Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty   specially   enjoined   by   law,   are prima   facie evidence   of   the
facts therein stated.
19
 Africa   v.   Caltex   (Phil.)   Inc., 123   Phil.   272,   277; 16   SCRA
448 (1966).
20
 People   v.   Dy, G.R.   No.   L­74517,   23   February   1988, 158
SCRA 111, 125.
49
VOL. 409, AUGUST 14, 2003  49 
Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc.
evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may
be   either   substantiated   or   nullified   by   other   competent
evidence.21 Although police blotters are of little probative value,
they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
In   this   case,   the   entries   in   the   police   blotter   reflected   the
information   subject   of   the   controversy.   Stated   therein   was   the
fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate
number FCG­538. This is unlike People v. Mejia,22 where we said
that   “entries   in   the   police   blotters   should   not   be   given   undue
significance or probative value,” since the Court there found that
“the   entries   in   question   are   sadly   wanting   in   material
particulars”.
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and
formally   offered as  evidence.   The  person  who  made  the entries
was   likewise   presented   in   court;   he   identified   and   certified   as
correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was
supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not
protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to
him.   No   explanation   was   likewise   given   by   the   investigating
officer for the alleged interchange of names.
 Petitioner also assails the credence given by the trial court to
the   version   of   the   respondents vis­à­vis the   testimonies   of   the
witnesses. Time and again we have reiterated the settled doctrine
that   great   weight,   and   even   finality,   is   given   to   the   factual
conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial
courts.23 We   find   on   this   score   no   reason   to   overturn   such
conclusions.
On  the  issue of  damages,   we  agree  with  petitioner  that  the
award of exemplary damages was improper. In Tiongco v. Atty.
Deguma24 we   held   that   the   entitlement   to   the   recovery   of
exemplary   damages   must   be   shown.   In   the   case   at   bar,
respondent   have   not   shown   sufficient   evidence   that   petitioner
indeed   schemed   to   procure   the   dubious   documents   and   lied
through his teeth to establish his version of the facts. What was
found was that the document he presented was inadmissible, and
its   contents   were   dubious.   However,   no   proof   was   adduced   to
sufficiently   establish   that   it   came   to   his   hands   through   his
employment   of   underhanded   means.   In Tiongco, we   further
stated:
Although exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, they also need not be proved. But a complainant must still
show   that   he   is   entitled   to   moral,   temperate   or   compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.25
Thus,   it   was   error   for   the   courts   below   to   award   exemplary
damages   in   the   absence   of   any   award   for   moral,   temperate   or
compensatory damages.
The award of attorney’s fees must also be deleted. Such award
was given in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages
to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. 26 But it was
not   sufficiently   shown   that   petitioner   acted   maliciously   in
instituting   the   claim   for   damages.   Perforce,   the   award   of
attorney’s fees was improper.
WHEREFORE,   the   assailed   Decision   and   Resolution   of   the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the   award   of   exemplary   damages   and   attorney’s   fees   is  hereby
DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), Austria­Martinez and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
     Callejo, Sr., J., On leave.
Judgment and resolution affirmed with modification.
Note.—The testimonies of the three police officers carry with
it   the   presumption   of   regularity   in   the   performance   of   official
functions. (People vs. Barita, 325 SCRA 22 [2000])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 193261.  April 24, 2012.*
MEYNARDO   SABILI,   petitioner, vs.   COMMISSION   ON
ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, respondents.
Election   Law;   Election   Protests;   The   additional   rule
requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision
is   not   part   of   the   process   of   promulgation.—In Lindo   v.
Commission on Elections, 194 SCRA 25 (1991), petitioner claimed
that there was no valid promulgation of a Decision in an election
protest   case   when   a   copy   thereof   was   merely   furnished   the
parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the
promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of
the   COMELEC’s   own   Rules   of   Procedure,   as   follows:   “Sec.
20. Promulgation and  Finality  of Decision.—The decision of  the
court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice
must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after
promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Rejecting   petitioner’s   argument,   we   held   therein   that   the
additional   rule   requiring   notice   to   the   parties   prior   to
promulgation   of   a   decision   is   not   part   of   the   process   of
promulgation.   Since   lack   of   such   notice   does   not   prejudice   the
rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a procedural
lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision.
Same;   Domicile;   To   establish   a   new   domicile   of   choice,
personal   presence   in   the   place   must   be   coupled   with   conduct
indicative of the intention to make it one’s fixed and permanent
place of abode.—In the present case, the parties are in agreement
that  the  domicile  of  origin  of   Sabili   was   Brgy.   Sico,   San  Juan,
Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and
established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa
City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor.
On   the   other   hand,   respondent   COMELEC   held   that   no   such
change in domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry
in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that he was a resident of
Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation
that   disqualified   him   from   running   for   Lipa   City   mayor.   To
establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
must be coupled with conduct indicative of the
_______________
* EN BANC.
665
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
intention   to   make   it   one’s   fixed   and   permanent   place   of
abode.   As   in   all   administrative   cases,   the   quantum   of   proof
necessary   in   election   cases   is   substantial   evidence,   or   such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
Same; Same; Residence; It is not required that a candidate
should have his own house in order to establish his residence or
domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality,
even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.—The Dissent
claims that the registration of the property in Palomares’s name
does   not   prove   petitioner’s   residence   as   it   merely   showed
“donative intent” without the necessary formalities or payment of
taxes. However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be,
this   point   is   immaterial   for   the   purpose   of   ascertaining
petitioner’s residence. We have long held that it is not required
that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish
his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should
live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or
relative.   What   is   of   central   concern   then   is   that   petitioner
identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended
to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Section   117   of   the   Omnibus   Election
Code   provides   that   transfer   of   residence   to   any   other   place   by
reason of one’s “occupation; profession; employment in private and
public   service;   educational   activities;   work   in   military   or   naval
reservations;   service   in   the   army,   navy   or   air   force,   the
constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention
in government institutions in accordance with law” is not deemed
665 as loss of residence.—We have held that “absence from residence
to   pursue   studies   or   practice   a   profession   or   registration   as   a
voter   other   than   in   the   place   where   one   is   elected,   does   not
constitute loss of residence.” In fact, Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election   Code   provides   that   transfer   of   residence   to   any   other
place  by reason of  one’s  “occupation; profession;  employment  in
private and public service; educational activities; work in military
or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention
in government institutions in accordance with law” is not deemed
as loss of residence.666
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
66
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Same;   Same;   Same;   There   is   nothing   “wrong   in   an
individual   changing   residences   so   he   could   run   for   an   elective
post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty
that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes
for the period required by law.”—More importantly, we have gone
so  far   as to  rule  that  there   is  nothing  “wrong   in  an  individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as
long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of  residence for election law purposes  for  the
period required by law.”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries in Official Records; Three
(3)   requisites   must   concur   for   entries   in   official   records   to   be
admissible   in   evidence.—In Country   Bankers   Insurance
Corporation   v.   Lianga   Bay   and   Community   Multi­purpose
Cooperative,   Inc.,   374   SCRA   653   (2002),   we   explained   that  the
following  three  (3) requisites must  concur  for  entries in  official
records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties,   or   by   such   other   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined   by   law;   and   (c)   The   public   officer   or   other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which
facts   must   have   been   acquired   by   him   personally   or   through
official information.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; To successfully challenge
a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate   that   the   ineligibility   is   so   patently   antagonistic   to
constitutional   and   legal   principles   that   overriding   such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people,   would   ultimately   create   greater   prejudice   to   the   very
democratic   institutions   and   juristic   traditions   that   our
Constitution   and   laws   so   zealously   protect   and   promote.—We
reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 337
SCRA   574   (2000),   that   “(t)o   successfully   challenge   a   winning
candidate’s   qualifications,   the   petitioner   must   clearly
demonstrate  that  the  ineligibility   is  so  patently   antagonistic  to
constitutional   and   legal   principles   that   overriding   such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people,   would   ultimately   create   greater   prejudice   to   the   very
democratic   institutions   and   juristic   traditions   that   our
Constitution   and   laws   so   zealously   protect   and   promote.”
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 576 SCRA 331
(2009), we concluded that “when the evi­
667
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 667
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
dence   of   the   alleged   lack   of   residence   qualification   of   a
candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it
clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted
by   upholding   the   victor’s   right   to   the   office,   the   will   of   the
electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is
to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.”
VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting:
 Election Law; Domicile; Residence; View that to establish a
new   domicile   of   choice,   personal   presence   in   the   place   must   be
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. Bodily presence
in the new locality is not the only requirement; there must be a
declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent
place of abode.—For the petitioner to overcome the presumption
of the continuity of his domicile of origin, he must show by clear
and   convincing   evidence   of   (1)   an   actual   removal   or   an   actual
change   of   domicile;   (2)   a   bona   fide intention   of   abandoning   the
former   place   of   residence   and   establishing   a   new   one;   and   (3)
definite   acts   which   correspond   with   the   purpose.   Thus,
to establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in
the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that
intention. Bodily   presence   in   the   new   locality   is   not   the
only requirement; there must be a declared and probable
intent   to   make   it   one’s   fixed   and   permanent   place   of
abode. Indeed,   the   most   important   requirements   for   the
establishment   of   a   new   domicile   is   (1)   an   actual   and   physical
presence in the new locality; and (2) a clear and declared intent to
abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi) and remain in
the new place of residence (animus manendi).
Same;   Same;   Same;   View   that   petitioner’s   temerity   in
asserting   that   he   had   been  living   with  Palomares  for   20   years,
while   he   was   legally   married   to   another,   and   so   should   be
considered to have followed his paramour’s residence simply goes
against the norms of decency, if not the law against concubinage
under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; To consider a man to
follow   the   residence   of   the   woman   who   he   cannot   marry   is
dangerous   precedent.—Indeed,   petitioner   heavily   anchors   his
claimed residency in Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City since April 2007
primarily   on   his   allegation   that   he   purchased   a   house   and   lot
thereat in the same month, registered the property in the name of
his   “common­law   spouse,”   Bernadette   Palomares   (Palomares),
and actually resided therein since April 2007 together with
668
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
68
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Palomares and their children. To say the least, this claim is
not   only   questionable   but   appalling.   Petitioner’s   temerity   in
asserting   that   he   had   been   living   with   Palomares   for   20
years, while   he   was   legally   married   to   another,   and   so
should be considered to have followed his paramour’s residence
simply goes against the norms of decency, if not the law against
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
We cannot now recognize his residency in Lipa City on the pretext
that   his   “common­law   spouse”   lives   therein. Commodum   ex
injuria   sua   non   habere   debet. No   person   ought   to  derive
any advantage of his own wrong.Even in Romualdez­Marcos
v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), this Court did not consider
Mrs. Marcos to have followed the residence of former President
Marcos,   her   legal   spouse.   Why   should  this   Court   now   consider
Sabili to have adopted a domicile of choice in Lipa just because
his   “common­law   spouse”   has   a   house   registered   in   her   name
located   in   the   same   city?   To   consider   a   man   to   follow   the
residence   of   the   woman   who   he   cannot   marry   is   dangerous
precedent.
Same; Same; Same; View that all the requisites for a valid
change   of   domicile   or   residence   is   necessary   for   election   law
purposes. In the absence of even just one element, the presumption
is in favor of the maintenance and continuity of the domicile of
origin.—In the clear absence of the most important element in the
establishment of a domicile—animus manendi—it is of no use to
discuss the consequence of testimonies as to his bodily presence in
the  locality. As  stated, all the requisites for a  valid  change of
domicile  or  residence  is  necessary  for  election  law   purposes.   In
the absence of even just one element, the presumption is in favor
of   the   maintenance   and   continuity   of   the   domicile   of   origin.
Hence, in this case, petitioner is presumed to still be a resident of
San Juan, Batangas and disqualified from taking the mayoralty
position in Lipa City, Batangas.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Romulo B.   Macanlintal and Edgardo  Carlo  L.  Vistan  II for
petitioner.
   Manalo,   Jocson   &   Enriquez   Law   Office for   private
respondent.
669
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the Resolutions
in SPA No. 09­047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August
2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied
due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor
of   Lipa   City   for   the   May   2010   elections.   At   the   heart   of   the
controversy   is   whether   petitioner   Sabili   had   complied   with  the
one­year residency requirement for local elective officials.
When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of
the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010
elections,   he   had   been   twice   elected   (in   1995   and   in   1998)   as
Provincial   Board   Member   representing   the   4th   District   of
Batangas.   During   the   2007   elections,   petitioner   ran   for   the
position   of   Representative   of   the   4th   District   of   Batangas,   but
lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. 2 However, it
is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections,  he  and  his  family  were  then  staying  at  his  ancestral
home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed
a   “Petition   to   Deny   Due   Course   and   to   Cancel   Certificate   of
Candidacy   and   to   Disqualify   a   Candidate   for   Possessing   Some
Grounds for Disqualification”3 against him before the COMELEC,
docketed as SPA No. 09­047 (DC). Citing Section
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 79.
2 The   4th   district   of   Batangas   is   composed   of   the
municipalities   of   Ibaan,   Padre   Garcia,   Rosario,   San   Jose,   San
Juan   and   Taysan,   and   the   City   of
669
Lipa. http://www.batangas.gov.ph/index.php?p=15 (last   accessed
on 30 January 2012).
3 Rollo, pp. 70­76.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, 4private
respondent   alleged   that   petitioner   made   material
misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed
to comply with the one­year residency requirement under Section
39 of the Local Government Code.5 Allegedly,
_______________
4 Section 78. Petition   to   deny   due   course   to   or   cancel   a
certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by   any   person exclusively   on   the   ground   that   any
material   representation   contained   therein   as   required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at
any   time   not   later   than   twenty­five   days   from   the   time   of   the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
. . .   . . .   . . .
Section 74. Contents   of   certificate   of   candidacy.—The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it
is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city of district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
civil   status;   his   date   of   birth;   residence;   his   post   office
address   for   all   election   purposes;   his   profession   or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of
the   Philippines   and   will   maintain   true   faith   and   allegiance
thereto;   that   he   will   obey   the   laws,   legal   orders,   and   decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed  by   his  oath  is  assumed  voluntarily,   without
mental   reservation   or   purpose   of   evasion; and   that   the   facts
stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of
his knowledge. (Emphasis supplied.)
5 Section 39. Qualifications.—
(a)  An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines;   a   registered   voter   in   the   barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member
of   the   sangguniang   panlalawigan,   sangguniang
panlungsod,  or sangguniang bayan,  the district  where he
intends to be elected; a resident
671
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 671
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
petitioner   falsely   declared   under   oath   in   his   COC   that   he   had
already   been   a   resident   of   Lipa   City   for   two   years   and   eight
months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the
following:
1. Petitioner’s   COC   for   the   2010   elections   filed   on   1
December 20096
2. 2009   Tax   Declarations   for   a   house   and   lot   (TCT   Nos.
173355, 173356 and buildings thereon) in Pinagtong­ulan,
Lipa   City   registered   under   the   name   of   Bernadette
Palomares, petitioner’s common­law wife7
3. Lipa   City   Assessor   Certification   of   Property   Holdings   of
properties under the name of Bernadette Palomares8
4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea 9
5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres10
6. Voter   Certification   on   petitioner   issued   by   COMELEC
Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.11
7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12
8. National   Statistics   Office   (NSO)   Advisory   on   Marriages
regarding petitioner13
_______________
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or   any   other local language   or   dialect.   (Underscoring
supplied.)
6  Id., at p. 137.
7  Id., at pp. 138, 152­155.
 8  Id., at p. 139. _______________
9  Id., at pp. 140­141. 14 Id., at p. 148.
10 Id., at pp. 142­143. 15 Id., at p. 149.
11 Id., at p. 144. 16 Id., at p. 150.
12 Id., at pp. 145­146. 17 Id., at p. 156.
13 Id., at p. 147. 18 Id., at pp. 157­158.
672 19 Id., at p. 159.
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 20 Id., at p. 160.
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections 21 Id., at p. 161.
 9. Lipa   City   Assessor   Certificate   of   No   Improvement   on 22 Id., at p. 162.
Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name 23 Id., at p. 163.
of petitioner14 673
10. NSO   Certificate   of   No   Marriage   of   Bernadette
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 673
Palomares15
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
11. Lipa   City   Assessor   Certificate   of   No   Improvement   on
Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name 19. Petitioner’s   2007   COC   for   Member   of   House   of
of petitioner16 Representative24
12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that For   ease   of   later   discussion,   private   respondent’s   evidence
petitioner has no business therein17 shall be grouped as follows: (1) Certificates regarding ownership
13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioner’s of   real   property;   (2)   petitioner’s   Voter   Registration   and
daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili18 Certification   (common   exhibits   of   the   parties);   (3)   petitioner’s
14. Department   of   Education   (DepEd)   Lipa   City   Division COCs   in   previous   elections;   (3)   Certifications   regarding
Certification   that   the   names   Bernadette   Palomares,   Mey petitioner’s   family   members;   and   (4)   Affidavits   of   Lipa   City
Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s residents.
son) do not appear on its list of graduates19 On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence
15. Certification   from   the   Office   of   the   Election   Officer   of to establish the fact of his residence in Lipa City:
Lipa   City   that   Bernadette   Palomares,   Mey   Bernadette 1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25
Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list 2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26
of voters20 3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27
16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21 4. Certification   of   Residency   issued   by   Pinagtong­ulan
17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22 Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade28
18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23 5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet29
 6. Certificate   of   Appreciation   issued   to   petitioner   by   the 16. Joint   Affidavit   of   twenty­one   (21)   Pinagtong­ulan
parish of Sto. Nino of Pinagtong­ulan30 residents,   including   past   and   incumbent   Pinagtong­ulan
7. Designation   of   petitioner   in   the   Advisory   Body   (AB)   of officials.40
Pinagtong­ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians For   ease   of   later   discussion,   petitioner’s   evidence   shall   be
Brotherhood, Inc.31 grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and corresponding
8. COMELEC   Voter   Certification   on   petitioner   issued   by Official   Receipts   for   the   years   2007   and   2008;   (2)   Certification
Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.32 from the barangay captain of Pinagtong­ulan; (3) Affidavit of his
_______________ common­law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from
24 Id., at p. 164. a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation
25 Id., at p. 102. from   the barangay parish   and   Memorandum   from   the   local
26 Id., at p. 103. chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
27 Id., at p. 104. _______________
28 Id., at p. 105. 33 Id., at p. 110.
29 Id., at p. 106. 34 Id., at p. 111.
30 Id., at p. 107. 35 Id., at p. 112.
31 Id., at p. 108. 36 Id., at p. 113.
32 Id., at p. 109. 37 Id., at p. 114.
674 38 Id., at p. 187.
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 39 Id., at p. 190.
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections 40 Id., at pp. 211­212.
 9. COMELEC   Application   for   Transfer/Transfer   with 675
Reactivation dated 6 June 2009 signed by Election Officer VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 675
Juan Aguila, Jr.33 Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
10. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 200734 The COMELEC Ruling
11. Official   Receipt  for  petitioner’s   income  tax   payment  for In   its   Resolution   dated   26   January   2010, 41 the   COMELEC
200735 Second   Division   granted   the   Petition   of   private   respondent,
12. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 200836 declared   petitioner   as   disqualified   from   seeking   the   mayoralty
13. Official   Receipt  for  petitioner’s   income  tax   payment  for post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for
200837 his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet
14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38 the statutory one­year residency requirement under the law.
15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the
10   May   2010   local   elections   were   held.   The   next   day,   he   was
proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering
the   highest   number   of   votes   cast   for   the   said   position.   He
accordingly filed a Manifestation42 with the COMELEC en banc to
reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17  August 2010, 43 the COMELEC en
banc denied   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   of   petitioner.
Although  he  was  able  to receive  his  copy   of  the  Resolution,   no
prior   notice   setting   the   date   of   promulgation   of   the   said
Resolution   was   received   by   him.   Meanwhile,   Section   6   of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases
Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated National
and Local Elections) requires the parties to be notified in advance
of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution.
“SEC. 6. Promulgation.—The promulgation of a Decision or
Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a
date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the  parties or  their attorneys personally, or  by registered
mail, telegram, fax, or thru the fastest means of communication.”
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 48­62.
42 Id., at pp. 296­299.
43 Id., at pp. 63­69.
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Hence,   petitioner   filed   with   this   Court   a   Petition   (Petition
for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance
of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of
this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court,   seeking   the   annulment   of   the   26   January   2010   and   17
August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to
his Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of
Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice­Mayor issued
by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers, 44 as well as a copy of
his   Oath   of   Office.45 He   also   attached   to   his   Petition   another
Certification   of   Residency46 issued   by   Pinagtong­
ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before
a notary public.
On   7   September   2010,   this   Court   issued   a   Status Quo
Ante Order47 requiring   the   parties   to   observe   the
status quoprevailing   before   the   issuance   of   the   assailed
COMELEC   Resolutions.   Thereafter,   the   parties   filed   their
responsive pleadings.
Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:
1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August
2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one­
year residency requirement for local elective officials.
_______________
44 Id., at p. 294.
45 Id., at p. 295.
46 Id., at p. 300.
47 Id., at pp. 314­315.
677
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 677
 Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
The Court’s Ruling
1. On   whether   the   COMELEC   acted
with   grave   abuse   of   discretion   when
it   failed   to   promulgate   its   Resolution
dated   17   August   2010   in   accordance
with its own Rules of Procedure
Petitioner   argues   that   the   assailed   17   August   2010
COMELEC   Resolution,   which   denied   petitioner’s   Motion   for
Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was allegedly
not promulgated in accordance with the COMELEC’s own Rules
of Procedure and, hence, violated petitioner’s right to due process
of law.
The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in
this   case   is   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   8696   (Rules   on
Disqualification of  Cases Filed  in  Connection with the May 10,
2010   Automated   National   and   Local   Elections),   which   was
promulgated   on   11   November   2009.   Sections   6   and   7   thereof
provide as follows:
“SEC. 6. Promulgation.—The promulgation of a Decision or
Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a
date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the  parties or  their attorneys personally, or  by registered
mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration.—A motion to reconsider
a Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling of a Division shall be filed
within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion,
if   not   pro­forma,   suspends   the   execution   for   implementation   of
the Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling.
Within   twenty­four   (24)   hours   from   the   filing   thereof,   the
Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner.
The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to
the Commission en banc.
The   Clerk   of   the   Commission  shall   calendar   the   Motion   for
Reconsideration   for   the   resolution   of   the   Commission en
bancwithin three (3) days from the certification thereof.”
678
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 201048suspended
Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that “all
resolutions   be   delivered   to   the   Clerk   of   the   Commission   for
immediate   promulgation”   in   view   of   “the   proximity   of   the
Automated   National   and   Local   Elections   and   lack   of   material
time.” The Order states:
ORDER
“Considering   the   proximity   of   the   Automated   National   and
Local Elections and lack of material time, the Commission hereby
suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated on November
11, 2009, which reads:
Sec. 6. Promulgation.—The   promulgation   of   a
Decision   or   Resolution   of   the   Commission   or   a   Division
shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which
shall   be   served   upon   the   parties   or   their   attorneys
personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the
fastest means of communication.”
Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission
for immediate promulgation.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner   claims   that   he   did   not   receive   notice   of   the   said
suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus,
his right to due process was still violated. On the other hand, the
COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules
of   procedure   and   invokes   Section   6,   Article   IX­A   of   the
Constitution,   which   gives   it   the   power   “to   promulgate   its   own
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of
its offices.”
We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,49 petitioner claimed that
there   was   no   valid   promulgation   of   a   Decision   in   an   election
protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished
_______________
48 Id., at p. 739.
49 271 Phil. 844; 194 SCRA 25 (1991).
679
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
the parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for
the promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule
35 of the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure, as follows:
“Sec. 20. Promulgation   and   Finality   of   Decision.—The
decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of
which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final
five  (5)  days   after  promulgation.   No  motion  for  reconsideration
shall be entertained.”
Rejecting   petitioner’s   argument,   we   held   therein   that   the
additional   rule   requiring   notice   to   the   parties   prior   to
promulgation   of   a   decision   is   not   part   of   the   process   of
promulgation.   Since   lack   of   such   notice   does   not   prejudice   the
rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a procedural
lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:
“This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by
which a decision is published, officially announced, made known
to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled
with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner
of Immigration, L­24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the
delivery   of   a   court   decision   to   the   clerk   of   court   for   filing   and
publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of
the signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide,
G.R. Nos. 86850­51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution).
The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of
notice  in advance  of  promulgation  is  not  part  of  the  process   of
promulgation.   Hence,   We   do   not   agree   with   petitioner’s
contention   that   there   was   no   promulgation   of   the   trial   court’s
decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made
the decision public. From the recital of facts of both parties, copies
of   the   decision   were   sent   to   petitioner’s   counsel   of   record   and
679 petitioner’s   (sic)   himself.   Another   copy   was   sent   to   private
respondent.
What   was   wanting   and   what   the   petitioner   apparently
objected   to   was   not   the   promulgation   of   the   decision   but   the
failure   of   the   trial   court   to   serve   notice   in   advance   of   the
promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules.
The failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation
may be considered a proce­
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dural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice
the  rights  of  the  parties and  did not  vitiate  the  validity   of  the
decision   of   the  trial   court  nor   (sic)   of   the  promulgation   of   said
decision.”
Moreover,   quoting Pimping   v.
COMELEC,  citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,  we further held in the
50 51
same   case   that   failure   to   receive   advance   notice   of   the
promulgation   of   a   decision   is   not   sufficient   to   set   aside   the
COMELEC’s judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded
an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz.:
“The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of
the promulgation of the decision in the election protest cases, in
Our   view,   does   not   constitute   reversible   error   or   a   reason
sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the
judgment   rendered   by   the   Comelec.   Petitioners   anchor   their
argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the
deviation by the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the
essence   of   due   process   is   that,   the   parties   in   the   case   were
afforded an opportunity to be heard.”
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that
the   exigencies   attendant   to   the   holding   of   the   country’s   first
automated   national   elections   had   necessitated   that   the
COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and
that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of
the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no
prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELEC’s Order
did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were
still furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were able to
reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was
able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the  COMELEC  validly  exercised  its constitutionally
granted power to make its own rules of procedure when it
_______________
50 224 Phil. 326, 359; 140 SCRA 192, 223 (1985).
51 128 Phil 165; 21 SCRA 150 (1967).
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Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution   No.   8696.   Consequently,   the   second   assailed
Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of
COMELEC’s failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date
of the promulgation thereof.
2. On   whether   the   COMELEC   com­
mitted   grave   abuse   of   discretion   in
holding   that   Sabili   failed   to   prove
compliance   with   the   one­year   resi­
dency   requirement   for   local   elective
officials
As   a   general   rule,   the  Court   does   not  ordinarily   review   the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation  of evidence.  However,
exceptions   thereto   have   been   established,   including   when   the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so
grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In
these   instances,   the   Court   is   compelled   by   its   bounden
constitutional   duty   to   intervene   and   correct   the   COMELEC’s
error.52
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July
2010),   we   explained   that   the   COMELEC’s   use   of   wrong   or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint
its action with grave abuse of discretion—
“As   a   concept,   “grave   abuse   of   discretion”   defies   exact
definition; generally, it refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;” the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised   in   an   arbitrary   and   despotic   manner   by   reason   of
681 passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must   be   grave.   We   have   held,   too,   that   the   use   of   wrong   or
irrelevant considerations in decid­
_______________
 52 Mitra   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   G.R.   No.   191938,   19
October 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
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682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
ing an issue is sufficient to taint a decision­maker’s action with
grave abuse of discretion.”
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is
the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that
findings   of   fact   of   the   COMELEC,   supported   by   substantial
evidence, shall be final and non­reviewable. Substantial evidence
is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.
“In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we
do   not   ordinarily   review   in   a certiorari case   the   COMELEC’s
appreciation   and   evaluation   of   evidence.   Any   misstep   by   the
COMELEC   in   this   regard   generally   involves   an   error   of
judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC’s action
on   the   appreciation   and   evaluation   of   evidence   oversteps   the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable,
the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
intervene.   When  grave  abuse  of   discretion   is  present,   resulting
errors   arising   from   the   grave   abuse   mutate   from   error   of
judgment to one of jurisdiction.”
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s
use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of
whether   petitioner   made   a   material   misrepresentation   of   his
residency   qualification   in   his   COC   as   to   order   its   cancellation.
Among others, petitioner pointed to the COMELEC’s inordinate
emphasis   on   the   issue   of   property   ownership   of   petitioner’s
declared residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance regarding
Palomares’s relationship to the Pinagtong­ulan property, and its
failure   to   consider   in   the   first   instance   the   certification   of
residence   issued   by   the   barangay   captain   of   Pinagtong­ulan.
Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required “more” evidence
to show the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various
pieces of evidence he presented and the fact that under the law,
the   quantum   of   evidence   required   in   these   cases   is   merely
substantial   evidence   and   not   clear   and   convincing   evidence.
Petitioner   further   ascribes   grave   abuse   of   discretion   in   the
COMELEC’s brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing his
ITR in Lipa City (where
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VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 683
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
he indicates that he is a resident of Pinagtong­ulan) on the mere
expedient that the law allows the filing of the ITR not only in the
place of legal residence but, alternately, in his place of business.
Petitioner   notes   that   private   respondent’s   own   evidence   shows
that   petitioner   has   no   business   in   Lipa   City,   leaving   only   his
residence therein as basis for filing his ITR therein.
Hence,   in   resolving   the   issue   of   whether   the   COMELEC
gravely   abused   its   discretion   in   ruling   that   petitioner   had   not
sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least
one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence
adduced by the parties and the COMELEC’s appreciation thereof.
In   the   present   case,   the   parties   are   in   agreement   that   the
domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
He   claims   that   he   abandoned   his   domicile   of   origin   and
established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa
City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor.
On   the   other   hand,   respondent   COMELEC   held   that   no   such
change in domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry
in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that he was a resident of
Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation
that disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to
make   it   one’s   fixed   and   permanent   place   of   abode. 53 As   in   all
administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election
cases   is   substantial   evidence,   or   such   relevant   evidence   as   a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.54
_______________
53 Domino   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   369   Phil.   798;   310
SCRA 546 (1999).
54 Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 510; 283
SCRA 229 (1997).
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684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
The   ruling   on   private   respondent’s 
evidence
We begin with an evaluation of the COMELEC’s appreciation
of private respondent’s evidence.
a) Petitioner’s Voter Certification, Registration and
COCs   in   previous
elections
Petitioner’s   Voter   Certification   is   a   common   exhibit   of   the
parties. It states, among others, that petitioner is a resident of
Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a resident
of Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he
was so  registered  on 31  October 2009.  The  information  therein
was   “certified   correct”   by   COMELEC   Election   Officer   Juan   B.
Aguila, Jr.
Private   respondent   presented   this   document   as   proof   that
petitioner misrepresented that he is a resident of Lipa City. On
the other hand, the latter presented this document as proof of his
residency.
The   COMELEC   correctly   ruled   that   the   Voter   Certification
issued by the COMELEC Election Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila,
Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident of
Lipa   City   since   April   2007.   It   noted   that   Aguila   is   not   the
competent   public   officer   to   certify   the   veracity   of   this   claim,
particularly   because   petitioner’s   COMELEC   registration   was
approved only in October 2009.
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on
21 June 1997 showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan,
Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and
March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed
by   the   COMELEC—and   rightly   so.   These   pieces   of   evidence
showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas on
the  said  dates are  irrelevant  as,  prior  to  April  2007,  petitioner
was admittedly a resident of Sico, San
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VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 685
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for consideration
is that from April 2007 onwards, after petitioner’s alleged change
of domicile.
b) Certificates   regarding   owner­
ship of real property 
The   various   certificates   and   tax   declarations   adduced   by
private   respondent   showed   that   the   Lipa   property   was   solely
registered   in   the   name   of   petitioner’s   common­law   wife,
Bernadette Palomares. In discussing the import of this document,
the  COMELEC  reasoned  that, being  a “seasoned politician,” he
should   have  registered   the   Lipa   property   (which   he   claimed   to
have purchased with his personal funds) in his own name. Such
action   “would   have   offered   positive   proof   of   intent   to   change
actual   residence”   from   San   Juan,   Batangas   to   Lipa   City,
considering that he had previously declared his ancestral home in
San   Juan,   Batangas   as   his   domicile.   Since   Palomares   and
petitioner are common­law spouses not capacitated to marry each
other, the property relation between them is governed by Article
148   of   the   Family   Code,55 where   only   the   parties’   actual
contributions   are   recognized.   Hence,   petitioner   cannot   prove
ownership of a property and residence
_______________
55 Art.    148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding   Article,   only   the   properties   acquired   by   both   of   the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their   respective   contributions.   In   the   absence   of   proof   to   the
contrary,   their   contributions   and   corresponding   shares   are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co­ownership shall accrue to the absolute community
or   conjugal   partnership   existing   in   such   valid   marriage.   If   the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph   of   the   preceding   Article.   The   foregoing   rules   on
forfeiture   shall   likewise   apply   even   if   both   parties   are   in   bad
faith.
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
in Lipa City through the registered ownership of the common­law
wife of the property in Lipa City.
On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis
that the COMELEC bestowed upon the question of whether the
Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for the reason
that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue
should be residence, not property ownership.
It   is   true   that   property   ownership   is   not   among   the
qualifications required of candidates for local election. 56Rather, it
is a candidate’s residence in a locality through actual residence in
whatever capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it
considered as evidence tending to establish a candidate’s domicile
of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment
by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position
of governor.57 In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,58 we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidate’s
sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill
could   not   be   considered   as   his   residence   for   the   purpose   of
complying   with   the   residency   requirement   of   Section   78   of   the
Omnibus Election Code.59
_______________
56 Fernandez   v.   House   of   Representatives   Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, 21 December 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
57 Perez   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   375   Phil.   1106;   317
SCRA 641 (1999). The other pieces of evidence considered by the
COMELEC   in   the Perez case   were   the   candidate’s   marriage
certificate,   the   birth   certificate   of   his   daughter,   and   various
letters bearing the address, all showing that he was a resident of
the province for at least one (1) year before the elections.
58 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
59 As   further   proof   of   his   change   in   residence,   Mitra   had
adduced   affidavits   from   the   seller   of   the   lot   he   purchased,   the
owner   of   Maligaya   Feedmill,   the   barangay   captain   and
sangguniang barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, as well as an
Aborlan   councilor.   He   also   presented   photographs   of   the
residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of
his experimental pineapple plantation
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Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
The   Dissent   claims   that   the   registration   of   the   property   in
Palomares’s   name   does   not   prove   petitioner’s   residence   as   it
merely   showed   “donative   intent”   without   the   necessary
formalities or payment of taxes.
However,   whatever   the   nature   of   the   transaction   might   be,
this   point   is   immaterial   for   the   purpose   of   ascertaining
petitioner’s residence. We have long held that it is not required
that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish
his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should
live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or
relative.60 What   is   of   central   concern   then   is   that   petitioner
identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended
to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Hence,   while   the   COMELEC   correctly   ruled   that,   of   itself,
Palomares’  ownership  of  the  Lipa   property  does  not  prove that
she or—and in view of their common­law relations, petitioner—
resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot
apparently owned by petitioner’s common­law wife, with whom he
has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioner’s
allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.
c) Certifications   regarding   the  Lipa   City   occurred   in   2007,   when   petitioner’s   children   were
family members of petitioner  already well into college and could very well have chosen to study
Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd,
Lipa   City   Division,   indicating   that   the   names   Bernadette
Palomares,   Mey   Bernadette   Sabili   (petitioner’s   daughter)   and
Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on the list
of   graduates  of   Lipa   City.   Private  respondent   also   presented   a
Certification from the Office of the Election
_______________
and   cock   farm.   He   further   submitted   the   community   tax
687 certificate   he   himself   secured,   and   a   House   of   Representatives
Identification Card, both indicating that he resides in Aborlan.
60 De los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 (1935).
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688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Officer of Lipa City that the names of these family members of
petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.
As   the   issue   at   hand   is   petitioner’s   residence,   and   not   the
educational   or   voting   record   of   his   family,   the   COMELEC
properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at
its Resolution.
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do
not attend educational institutions in Lipa and are not registered
voters   therein,   and   because   petitioner   does   not   maintain   a
business   therein   nor   has   property   in   his   name,   petitioner   is
unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his
stay in Lipa City.
As to the Dissent’s first assertion, it must be stressed that the
children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile. Even in
the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by
both husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that the transfer to
elsewhere than in Lipa City.
Also, it is petitioner’s domicile which is at issue, and not that
of his children. But even assuming that it was petitioner himself
(rather than his children) who attended educational institutions
or who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we
have   held   that   “absence   from   residence   to   pursue   studies   or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place   where   one   is   elected,   does   not   constitute   loss   of
residence.”62 In  fact,   Section   117   of  the   Omnibus  Election  Code
provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of
one’s “occupation; profession;  employment in private and public
service;   educational   activities;   work   in   military   or   naval
reservations;   service   in   the   army,   navy   or   air   force,   the
constabulary or national police force; or con­
_______________
61 Family Code, Article 69.
62 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
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finement or  detention in government institutions  in  accordance
with law” is not deemed as loss of residence.
As   to   the   Dissent’s   second   assertion,   petitioner   apparently
does not maintain a business in Lipa City. However, apart from
the   Pinagtong­ulan   property   which   both   Suarez   (the   previous
property   owner)   and   Palomares   swear   was   purchased   with
petitioner’s   own  funds,   the  records  also  indicate  that  there  are
two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa
City63 which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and
Palomares. In fact, it was private respondent who presented the
Lipa City Assessor’s Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that
this   Court   were   to   disregard   the   two   Lodlod   lots,   it   is   well­
established   that   property   ownership   (and   similarly,   business
interest) in the locality where one intends to run for local elective
post is not requirement of the Constitution.64
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is
nothing “wrong in an individual changing residences so he could
run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for
election law purposes for the period required by law.”65
d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents 
Private   respondent   also   presented   the   affidavits   of   Violeta
Fernandez66 and  Rodrigo Macasaet,67 who  were also residents of
Pinagtong­ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not reside
_______________
63 Rollo, pp. 148 and 150, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa
Certification dated 14 December 2009.
64 Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412; 15 SCRA 7 (1965).
65 Japzon   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   G.R.   No.   180088,   19
January   2009,   576   SCRA   331,   citing Aquino   v.   Commission   on
Elections, 318 Phil. 467; 248 SCRA 400 (1995).
66 Supra note 21.
67 Supra note 22.
690
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
in   Pinagtong­ulan,   as   they   had   “rarely   seen”   him   in   the   area.
Meanwhile,   Pablo   Lorzano,68 in   his   Affidavit,   attested   that
although the Lipa property was sometimes used for gatherings,
he did “not recall having seen” petitioner in their barangay. On
the other hand, private respondent69and Eladio de Torres,70 both
residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned that petitioner was not a
resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there.
The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed
Resolution.   It   was   correct   in   doing   so,   particularly   considering
that these Affidavits were duly controverted by those presented
by petitioner.
 Moreover,  even assuming  the  truth of  the allegation  in  the
Affidavits that petitioner was “rarely seen” in the area, this does
not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,71 we held that the
averments of certain barangayhealth workers—that they failed to
see   a   particular   candidate   whenever   they   made   rounds   of   the
locality   of   which   he   was   supposed   to   be   a   resident—is   of   no
moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to
attend to his own business at the time. The law does not require a
person to be in his home twenty­four (24) hours a day, seven (7)
days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
The ruling on petitioner’s evidence
We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioner’s
evidence:
_______________
68 Supra note 23.
69 Rollo, pp. 82­83.
70 Id., at pp. 84­85.
71 G.R. No. 187478, 21December 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
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VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
a) Petitioner’s   Income   Tax   Re­
turns for 2007 and 2008
The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed
that petitioner had been paying his Income Tax (2007 and 2008)
to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving aside his
Income   Tax   Returns,   the   COMELEC   held   that   these   were   not
indications   of   residence   since   Section   51(B)   of   the   National
Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in
a person’s legal residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in
a person’s principal place of business.
In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue
Code72 provides that the Income Tax Return shall be filed either
in the place where a person resides or where his principal place of
business is located. However, private respondent’s own evidence
—a Certification from the City  Permits and Licensing Office  of
Lipa City—showed that there was no business registered in the
City under petitioner’s name.
Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because
an individual income tax return may only be filed either in the
legal residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed
under   the   law,   the   fact   that   Sabili   was   filing   his   Income   Tax
Returns  in  Lipa   City   notwithstanding   that  he  had  no  business
therein   showed   that   he   had   actively   elected   to   establish   his
residence in that city.
The   Dissent   claims   that   since   the   jurisdiction   of   RDO   Lipa
City includes both San Juan and Lipa City, petitioner’s filing
_______________
72 SEC. 51. Individual Return.—
 (A) Requirements.—...  …  ...
 (B) Where   to   File.—Except   in   cases   where   the
Commissioner otherwise permits, the return shall be filed with an
691
authorized agent bank, Revenue District Officer, Collection Agent
or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or municipality in which
such person has his legal residence or principal place of business
in  the  Philippines,   or if  there be  no  legal  residence  or  place  of
business in the Philippines, with the Office of the Commissioner.
xxx
692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San
Juan, Batangas—petitioner’s domicile of origin.
However,   a   simple   perusal   of   the   Income   Tax   Returns   and
Revenue Official Receipts for 2007 and 2008 shows that petitioner
invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City,
rather than San Juan, Batangas. 73 Hence, while petitioner may be
submitting   his   income   tax   return   in   the   same   RDO,   the
declaration   therein   is   unmistakable.   Petitioner   considers   Lipa
City to be his domicile.
b) Certification   from   the   Barangay  
Captain of Pinagtong­ulan
The   COMELEC   did   not   consider   in   the   first   instance   the
Certification   issued   by   Pinagtong­ulan Barangay Captain
Dominador Honrade74 (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing
in   Brgy   Pinagtong­ulan   since   2007.   When   this   oversight   was
raised as an issue in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the
COMELEC   brushed   it   aside   on   the   ground   that   the   said
Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence,
“cannot be relied on.” Subsequently, petitioner presented another,
substantially   identical,   Certification   from   the   said   Pinagtong­
ulan Barangay Captain,   save   for   the  fact   that   it  had   now   been
sworn to before a notary public.
We   disagree   with   the   COMELEC’s   treatment   of
the Barangay Captain’s   Certification   and   find   the   same   tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s
Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would
also be entitled to due consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
_______________
73 Rollo, pp. 112­114.
74 Rollo, p. 105.
693
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Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
“SEC. 44. Entries   in   official   records.—Entries   in   official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the   Philippines,   or   by   a   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined   by   law,   are prima   facie evidence   of   the   facts
therein stated.”
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and
Community   Multi­purpose  Cooperative,   Inc.,75 we  explained  that
the   following   three   (3)   requisites   must   concur   for   entries   in
official records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The   entry   was   made   by   a   public   officer,   or   by   another
person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The   public   officer   or   other   person   had   sufficient
knowledge   of   the   facts   stated   by   him,   which   facts   must
have been acquired  by  him personally  or  through official
information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by
the   Local   Government   Code   to   “keep   an   updated   record   of   all
inhabitants of the barangay.”76Regarding the second req­
_______________
75 425 Phil. 511; 374 SCRA 653 (2002).
76 SEC. 394. Barangay   Secretary:   Appointment,
Qualifications,   Powers  and  Duties.—(a) The barangay  secretary
shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the concurrence
of  the  majority  of  all  the  sangguniang   barangay  members.   The
appointment   of   the   barangay   secretary   shall   not   be   subject   to
attestation by the Civil Service Commission.
 (b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified
693 voter and an actual resident of the barangay concerned.
 (c)  No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is
a sangguniang barangay member, a government employee, or a
relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
  (d) The barangay secretary shall:
694
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
uisite,  we have explicitly  recognized in Mitra v.  Commission on
Elections,77 that “it is the business of a punong barangay to know
who   the   residents   are   in   his   own   barangay.”   Anent   the   third
requisite,   the BarangayCaptain’s   exercise   of   powers   and
duties78 concomitant  to  his   position  requires  him  to  be  privy   to
these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. 
_______________
 (1) Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay
and the barangay assembly meetings;
 (2) Prepare   and   keep   the   minutes   of   all   meetings   of   the
sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly;
 (3) Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and
have the same posted in conspicuous places within the barangay;
 (4)   Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the
conduct of barangay elections, initiatives, referenda or plebiscites,
in coordination with the Comelec;
 (5) Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of
births, deaths, and marriages;
 (6)    Keep   an   updated   record   of   all   inhabitants   of   the
barangay   containing   the   following   items   of   information:   name,
address,   place   and   date   of   birth,   sex,   civil   status,   citizenship,
occupation,   and   such   other   items   of   information   as   may   be
prescribed by law or ordinances;
 (7) Submit   a   report   on   the   actual   number   of   barangay
residents   as   often   as   may   be   required   by   the   sangguniang
barangay; and
 (8) Exercise   such   other   powers   and   perform   such   other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
77 Supra note 56.
78 SEC. 389. Chief   Executive:   Powers,   Duties,   and
Functions.—(a)   The punong barangay, as the chief executive of
the   barangay   government,   shall   exercise   such   powers   and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and
other laws.
 (b)   For efficient,  effective and economical governance, the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and its
inhabitants   pursuant   to   Section   16   of   this   Code,   the   punong
barangay shall:
(1) Enforce   all   laws   and   ordinances   which   are   applicable
within the barangay;
(2) Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf
of   the   barangay,   upon   authorization   of   the   sangguniang
barangay;
695
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 695
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its
failure to consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that
it was initially not notarized.
Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the
barangay chair of Pinagtong­ulan that petitioner is a resident of
Lipa City does not help petitioner’s case because it was not shown
that the term “resident” as used therein car­
_______________
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance
thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and the sanggunian
members in the performance of their duties and functions;
(4) Call   and   preside   over   the   sessions   of   the   sangguniang
barangay and the barangay assembly, and vote only to break a
tie;
 (5)   Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the In Mitra   v.   Commission   on   Elections,79 the   declaration   of
sangguniang   barangay,   appoint   or   replace   the   barangay Aborlan’s punong   barangay that   petitioner   resides   in
treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay
his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile,
officials;
inasmuch   as   the   said   declaration   was   made   in   the   face   of   the
(6)    Organize   and   lead   an   emergency   group   whenever   the
Court’s recognition that Mitra “might not have stayed in Aborlan
same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order or
nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and
on occasions of emergency or calamity within the barangay;
activities as a Representative were in Manila.”
(7) In coordination with the barangay development council,
Assuming   that   the   barangay   captain’s   certification   only
prepare   the  annual   executive  and   supplemental   budgets   of   the
pertains   to   petitioner’s   bodily   presence   in   Pinagtong­ulan,   still,
barangay;
the   COMELEC   cannot   deny   the   strength   of   this   evidence   in
(8) Approve   vouchers   relating   to   the   disbursement   of
establishing petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong­ulan since
barangay funds;
2007.
(9) Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control
c) Affidavit   of   petitioner’s 
and protection of the environment;
common law wife
(10) Administer   the   operation   of   the   Katarungang
To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also
Pambarangay in accordance with the provisions of this Code;
presented   the   affidavit   of   Palomares,   wherein   the   latter   swore
(11) Exercise   general   supervision   over   the   activities   of   the
that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007, and
sangguniang kabataan;
that   the   funds   used   to   purchase   the   Lipa   property   were
(12) Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under
petitioner’s   personal   funds.   The   COMELEC   ruled   that   the
Section 17 of this Code;
Affidavit was self­serving for having been executed by petitioner’s
(13)    Conduct   an   annual   palarong   barangay   which   shall
common­law wife. Also, despite the presentation by petitioner of
feature traditional sports and disciplines included in national and
other Affidavits stating that he and Palomares had lived in Brgy.
international   games,   in   coordination   with   the   Department   of
Pinagtong­ulan since 2007, the latter’s Affidavit was rejected by
Education, Culture and Sports;
the COMELEC for having no independent collaboration.
(14) Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and
Petitioner faults the COMELEC’s stand, which it claims to be
(15) Exercise   such   other   powers   and   perform   such   other
inconsistent. He argues that since the property regime between
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
696
(based on the parties’ actual contribution) as the
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections 79 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
ries   the   same   meaning   as   domicile,   that   is,   not   merely   bodily 697
presence   but   also, animus   manendi or   intent   to   return. This VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 697
Court has ruled otherwise.
 Sabili vs. Commission on Elections 81 Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, 16 April 2009, 585
COMELEC stressed, then Palomares’s Affidavit expressly stating SCRA 421.
that petitioner’s money alone had been used to purchase the Lipa 82 People v. Catalino, 131 Phil. 194; 22 SCRA 1091 (1968).
property   (notwithstanding   that   it   was   registered   in   her   name) 698
was   not   self­serving,   but   was   in   fact,   a   declaration   against 698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
interest. Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Petitioner’s   argument   that   Palomares’s   affidavit   was   a her   marriage   to   petitioner.   However,   this   was   not   the   reason
“declaration against interest” is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and propounded   by   the   COMELEC   when   it   rejected   Palomares’
irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil affidavit.
Procedure, refers to a “declaration made by a person deceased, or Moreover,   it   is   notable   that   Palomares’   assertion   in   her
unable to  testify   against  the  interest  of  a  declarant,  if the  fact affidavit   that   she   and   petitioner   have   been   living   in   the
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far Pinagtong­ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by other
contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his evidence,   including   the   affidavits   of   Pinagtong­ulan   barangay
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed officials and neighbors.
it to be true.”80 A declaration against interest is an exception to d) Affidavits   from a   previous
the hearsay rule.81 As such, it pertains only to the admissibility
property   owner,   neighbors,   cer­
of, not the weight accorded to, testimonial evidence.82
tificate   from   parish   and   desig­
Nevertheless,   we see   the logic  in  petitioner’s  claim  that  the
nation   from   socio­civic   organi­
COMELEC   had   committed   grave   abuse   of   discretion   in   being
inconsistent   in   its   stand   regarding   Palomares,   particularly zation
regarding   her   assertion   that   the   Lipa   property   had   been The Affidavit issued by  Leonila Suarez 83 (erstwhile  owner of
purchased   solely   with   petitioner’s   money.   If   the   COMELEC the   Lipa   house   and   lot)   states   that   in   April   2007,   after   she
accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed an
accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of agreement   that   petitioner   would   settle   her   bank   obligations   in
petitioner was far from self­serving as it ran counter to her (and connection with the said transaction, he and Palomares actually
her children’s) property interest. started residing at Pinagtong­ulan. The COMELEC brushed this
The   Dissent   states   that   it   was   not   unreasonable   for   the Affidavit  aside   as   one   that   “merely   narrates   the   circumstances
COMELEC   to   believe   that   Palomares   may   have   committed surrounding the sale of the property and mentions in passing that
misrepresentations   in   her   affidavit   considering   that   she   had Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong­ulan since April 2007 up
perjured herself as an informant on the birth certificates of her to the present.”84
children with respect to the supposed date and place of We disagree with the COMELEC’s appreciation of the Suarez
_______________ Affidavit. Since she was its owner, transactions for the purchase
80 Rules of Court, Rule 130C (6), Sec. 38. of   the   Lipa   property   was   within   her   personal   knowledge.
Ordinarily,   this   includes   the   arrangement   regarding   who   shall
pay for the property and when, if ever, it shall be occupied by the
buyers. We thus consider that her statements impact positively
on petitioner’s claim of residence.
_______________
83 Rollo, p. 104.
84 Id., at p. 66.
699
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
The   Dissent   on   the   other   hand   argues   that   the   claim   that
petitioner started living in the Lipa house and lot in April 2007 is
made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough time
to   effect   an   actual   and   physical   change   in   residence   a   month
before   the   May   2007   elections   when   petitioner   ran   for
representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the Deed of
Absolute   Sale   was   notarized,   and   the   subsequent   transfer   of
ownership in the tax declaration was made, only in August 2008.
Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that
these   were   not   the   reasons   adduced   by   the   COMELEC   in   the
assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were the
unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its
conclusions,   such   reasoning   still   exhibits   grave   abuse   of
discretion.
As   to   the   Dissent’s   first   argument,   it   must   be   remembered
that a transfer of domicile/residence need not be completed in one
single   instance.   Thus,   in Mitra   v.   Commission   on
Elections,85 where   the   evidence   showed   that   in   2008,   petitioner
Mitra had leased a small room at Maligaya Feedmills located in
Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where
he   began   constructing   his   house,   we   recognized   that   petitioner
“transferred   by   incremental   process   to   Aborlan   beginning   2008
and concluded his transfer in early 2009” and thus, he transferred
his   residence   from   Puerto   Princesa   City   to   Aborlan   within   the
period   required   by   law.   We   cannot   treat   the   transfer   to   the
Pinagtong­ulan house any less than we did Mitra’s transfer to the
Maligaya Feedmills room.
Moreover,   the   Joint   Affidavit   of   twenty­one   (21)   Pinagtong­
ulan   residents,   including   former   and   incumbent   barangay
officials,   attests   that   petitioner   had   begun   living   in   the
Pinagtong­ulan house and lot before the May 2007 elections such
699
that it was where his coordinators for the May 2007 elections
_______________
85 G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
went   to   meet   him.86 Jacinto   Cornejo   Sr.,   the   contractor   who
renovated   the   Pinagtong­ulan   house   when   it   was   bought   by
petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his family began living
therein   even   while   it   was   being   renovated.87 Another   Affidavit
petitioner adduced was that of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of
Brgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,88 who   stated   that  she   also   sold   a   lot   she
owned in favor of petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her
lot since it was adjacent to the Lipa house and lot they had earlier
acquired.   Macasaet   also   swore   that   the   couple   had   actually
resided in the house located in Pinagtong­ulan since April 2007,
and that she knew this because her own house was very near the
couple’s   own.   Macasaet’s   Affidavit   is   a   positive   assertion   of
petitioner’s   actual   physical   presence   in   Brgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,
Lipa City.
While   private   respondent   had   adduced   affidavits   of   two
Pinagtong­ulan   residents   (that   of   Violeta   Fernandez 89 and
Rodrigo   Macasaet)90 attesting   that   petitioner   could   not   be   a
resident of Pinagtong­ulan as he was “rarely seen” in the area,
these   affidavits   were   controverted   by   the   Joint   affidavit   of
twenty­one (21) Pinagtong­ulan residents who plainly accused the
two of lying. Meanwhile, the affidavits of private respon­
_______________
86 Rollo,   pp.   211­212, Pinagsama­Samang   Salaysay executed
by   21   Barangay   Pingtong­ulan  residents,   namely   Esmeraldo   P.
Macasaet (former barangay captain of Pinagtong­Ulan), Eduardo
R. Lorzano (former barangay captain of Pinagtong­ulan), Patricia
L.   Alvarez   (incumbent   councilor   of   Pinagtong­ulan),   Pedro   Y.
Montalba   (former   councilor   of   Pinagtong­ulan),   Loida   M.
Macasaet,   Mario   P.   Lingao,   Sancho   M.   Garcia,   Jr.,   Atilano   H.
Macasaet, Baby Jean A. Mercado, Ligaya C. Mercado, Rosalinda
M.   Macasaet,   Olga   M.   Reyes,   Jennifer   D.   Garcia,   Sancho   C.
Garcia, Sr., Marissa G. Mercado, Wilma C. Mercado, Aireen M.
Macasaet,   Eden   R.   Suarez,   Noemi   R.   Ubalde,   Arthur   A.   del
Rosario, and Norberto M. Layog.
87 Rollo, p. 190.
88 Id., at p. 106.
89 Rollo, p. 161.
90 Rollo, p. 162.
701
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 701
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
dent91 and   Eladio   de   Torres92 stating   that   petitioner   is   not   a
resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there is
hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of Barangay
Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not contest this,
about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong­ulan.
As   to   the   Dissent’s   second   argument,   the   fact   that   the
notarization of the deed of absolute sale of the property was made
months after April 2007 does not negate petitioner’s claim that he
started   residing   therein   in   April   2007.   It   is   clear   from   the
Affidavit of the property’s seller, Leonila Suarez, that it was not
yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable that a deed
of absolute sale was not executed at the time. Thus:
“That  initially,   the  contract  to  sell   was  entered  into  by   and
between   Mr.   &   Mrs.   Meynardo   Asa   Sabili   and   Bernadette
Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed their
mind, and after the couple settled all my loan obligations to the
bank, they requested me to put the name of Ms. Bernadette P.
Palomares   instead   of   Mr.   &   Mrs.   Meynardo   Asa   Sabili   and
Bernadette Palomares in the absolute deed of sale;
That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former
residence at Barangay Pinagtong­ulan sometime in the month of
April   2007.   At   that   time,   Mr.   Meynardo   Asa   Sabili   was   still
running for Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District of
Batangas;
That after payment of the down payment and signing of an
agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili will be the one to settle
my   bank   obligations,   Mr.   &   Mrs.   Meynardo   A.   Sabili   and
Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at
Barangay Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City;
That they started living and residing in Pinagtong­ulan in the
month of April, 2007 up to this point in time; xxx”93
_______________
91 Rollo, pp. 82­83.
92 Rollo, pp. 84­85.
93 Rollo, p. 188.
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the
COMELEC held that the Memorandum issued by the Guardians
Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely declares the
designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing
that   residence   in   the   locality   was   a   requirement   for   that
designation.   Meanwhile,   the   Certificate   of   Appreciation   was
nothing   more   than   an   acknowledgment   of   petitioner’s   material
and financial support, and not an indication of residence.
We   agree   that   considered   separately,   the   Guardians
Brotherhood   Memorandum   and   the   Pinagtong­ulan   Parish
Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioner’s residence
in Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact
that   petitioner   had   twice   been   elected   as   Provincial   Board
Member   representing   the   Fourth   District   of   Batangas,   which
encompasses Lipa City, petitioner’s involvement in the religious
life   of   the   community,   as   attested   to   by   the   certificate   of
appreciation issued to him by the Pinagtong­ulan parish for his
“material   and   financial   support”   as   President   of   the   Barangay
Fiesta   Committee   in   2009,   as   well   as   his   assumption   of   a
leadership   role   in   the   socio­civic   sphere   of   the   locality   as   a
member   of   the   advisory   body   of   the   Pinagtong­ulan,   San
Jose/Lipa   City   Chapter   of   the   Guardians   Brotherhood   Inc.,
manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the
needs of the said community. Such, after all, is the rationale for
the residency requirement in our elections laws, to wit:
“The   Constitution   and   the   law   requires   residence   as   a
qualification   for   seeking   and   holding   elective   public   office,   in
order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the
needs,   difficulties,   aspirations,   potentials   for   growth   and   all
matters  vital   to  the  welfare  of  their  constituencies;   likewise,   it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications
and fitness for the job they aspire for xxx.”94
_______________
94 Torayno   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   392   Phil.   343;   337
SCRA 574 (2000).
703
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 703
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Considering   all   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   it   is   clear   that
while separately, each evidence presented by petitioner might fail
to convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtong­ulan
since   2007,   collectively,   these   pieces   of   evidence   tend   to
sufficiently establish the said fact.
Petitioner’s   actual   physical   presence   in   Lipa   City   is
established not only by the presence of a place (Pinagtong­ulan
house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of
various   persons   in   Pinagtong­ulan,   and   the   Certification   of   its
barangay   captain.   Petitioner’s   substantial   and   real   interest   in
establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently
shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the
area   and   the   transfer   of   his   voter   registration,   but   also   his
participation in the community’s socio­civic and religious life, as
well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.
We   therefore   rule   that   petitioner   has   been   able   to   adduce
substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the one­year
residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.
In   view   of   this   Court’s   finding   that   petitioner   has   not
misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong­ulan and the duration
thereof,   there   is  no  need   to  further   discuss   whether   there   was
material   and   deliberate   misrepresentation   of   the   residency
qualification in his COC.
As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City
voters   manifested   their   own   judgment   regarding   the
qualifications   of   petitioner   when   they   voted   for   him,
notwithstanding that the issue of his residency qualification had
been   raised   prior   to   the   elections.   Petitioner   has   garnered   the
highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825
votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar Gozos) 95 legally cast for the
position of Mayor of Lipa City and has conse­
 _______________
95 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/results/2010_natl_local/res_reg
1014000.html (last accessed on 3 April 2012).
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
quently   been   proclaimed   duly   elected   municipal   Mayor   of   Lipa
City during the last May 2010 elections96
In   this   regard,   we   reiterate   our   ruling   in Frivaldo   v.
Commission   on   Elections97 that   “(t)o   successfully   challenge   a
winning   candidate’s   qualifications,   the   petitioner   must   clearly
demonstrate  that  the  ineligibility   is  so  patently   antagonistic  to
constitutional   and   legal   principles   that   overriding   such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people,   would   ultimately   create   greater   prejudice   to   the   very
democratic   institutions   and   juristic   traditions   that   our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.”
Similarly,   in Japzon   v.   Commission   on   Elections,98 we
concluded that “when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence
qualification   of   a   candidate   for   an   elective   position   is   weak   or
inconclusive and  it clearly  appears that  the purpose of  the law
would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office,
the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of
election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of
the voters.”
In   sum,   we   grant   the   Petition   not   only   because   petitioner
sufficiently   established   his   compliance   with   the   one­year
residency   requirement  for  local   elective  officials  under  the  law.
We also recognize that “(a)bove and beyond all, the determination
of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their
voice,   not   ours   or   of   anyone   else,   that   must   prevail.   This,   in
essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred.”99
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   Petition   is
GRANTED.   The   assailed   COMELEC   Resolutions   dated   26
January   2010   and   17   August   2010   in Florencio   Librea   v.
Meynardo A. Sabili [SPA No. 09­047(DC)] are ANNULLED.
_______________
96 Rollo, p. 294.
97 G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 574.
98 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
99 Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896; 315 SCRA 266 (1999).
705
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 705
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Private   respondent’s   Petition   to   cancel   the   Certificate   of
Candidacy   of   Meynardo   A.   Sabili   is   DENIED.   The   Status Quo
Ante Order issued by this Court on 7 September 2010 is MADE
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,   Brion,   Peralta,   Bersamin,   Villarama,   Jr.,   Perez,
Reyes and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., I join the dissent of Hon. Justice Velasco, Jr.
Velasco, Jr., J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo­De Castro, J., I join the dissent of Justice Velasco.
Del Castillo, J., No part.
Abad, J., I join the dissent of J. P.J. Velasco, Jr.
Mendoza, J., No part.
DISSENTING  OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing and seeking to
set aside the Resolutions2 dated January 26, 2010 and August 17,
2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09­
047   (DC),   which   denied   due   course   to,   and   canceled,   the
Certificate   of   Candidacy   (COC)   of   petitioner   Meynardo   Sabili
(Sabili) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City in the May 2010
elections   on   the   ground   of   his   misrepresentation   that   he   is   a
resident of Barangay(Brgy.) Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City.
During   the   1995   and   1998   elections,   petitioner   Sabili   was
elected as a member of the Provincial Board representing the
_______________
1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2 Both penned by Judge Jose Emmanuel M. Castillo.
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, he ran for
the office of Congressman of the 4th District of Batangas but lost.
During these times, he admitted that he was a resident of Brgy.
Sico,   San   Juan,   Batangas.   On   December   1,   2009,   however,
petitioner Meynardo Sabili filed a COC for Mayor of Lipa City,
Batangas for the May 2010 elections. In his COC, he wrote that
he had been a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City for two
(2) years and eight (8) months.
On   December   5,   2009,   private   respondent   Florencio   Librea
(Librea) filed a verified Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate   of   Candidacy   and   to   Disqualify   a Candidate   for
Possessing   Some   Grounds   for   Disqualifications with   respondent
COMELEC, which was docketed as SPA No. 09­047 (DC). In his
petition,   private   respondent   Librea   maintained   that   petitioner
made several material misrepresentations in his COC where he
indicated that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan for the
last two years when in fact he was, and is, a resident of Brgy.
Sico,   San   Juan,   Batangas,   and   so   failed   to   meet   the   one­year
residence requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.3
In   resolving   the   controversy,   the   COMELEC   held   in   its
January   26,   2010   Resolution   that   the   evidence   presented   by
petitioner,   as   respondent   in   SPA   No.   09­047   (DC),   failed   to
establish   an   abandonment   of   his   domicile   of   origin   and   the
adoption  of  Lipa   City  as  his  domicile of  choice  or  residence  for
election law purposes. Hence, petitioner was disqualified to
_______________
3 Sec. 39. Qualifications.—
(a) An   elective   local   official   must   be a   citizen   of   the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city,
or   province   or,   in   the   case   of   a   member   of   the   sangguniang
panlalawigan,   sangguniang   panlungsod,   or   sangguniang   bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at   least   one   (1)   year   immediately   preceding   the   day   of   the
election; and able to  read and  write Filipino or  any  other local
language or dialect. (Underscoring supplied.)
707
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 707
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
run in the May 2010 elections for the mayoralty position in that
city. The COMELEC stated:
“In   the   case   before   us,   it   is   not   denied   that   Respondent’s
domicile  of   origin  is  in  San  Juan,   Batangas.   What   Respondent
repeatedly asserts is that since 2007, he transferred his domicile
to  Lipa   City   after  allegedly   acquiring   the Bgy.   Pinagtong   Ulan
property and claiming that he continuously lived there.
In the first place, domicile or origin is not easily lost. If one
wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must
demonstrate by evidence an actual removal or an actual
change   of   domicile,   a bona   fide intention   of   abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one,
and   definite   acts   which   correspond   with   the
purpose. These   elements   must   concur,   and   absent   clear   and
positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the
domicile of origin continues x x x.
x x x x
The   above   pieces   of   documentary   evidence,   all   taken
together   however,   fail   to   convince   us   that   Respondent
Sabili successfully effected a change of domicile. In all, the
evidence adduced by Respondent Sabili plainly lacks the
degree   of   persuasiveness   required   to   convince   this
Commission that an abandonment of domicile or origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. The claim of
an incidental change of residence, lacking evidence determinative
of abandonment of domicile of origin, without more, would not be
sufficient to break the principle, long followed in cases involving
questions of domicile that there was clear intent to abandon and
repudiate   his   domicile   in   San   Juan,   Batangas. To   effect
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
Petitioner’s   former   domicile with intent   to   supplant   the
former domicile with one of his own choosing. Since he is a
new   voter   of   Lipa   City,   the   records   clearly   indicating   that
officially,   his   registration   came   into   effect   only   on   October   31,
2009; the said voter’s document hardly furnishes sufficient proof
of abandonment of domicile of origin and a change of domicile of
choice. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives
rise   to   a   strong   presumption   of   residence,   it   is   not   conclusive
evidence thereof. Sabili, in fact, has never even voted in Lipa
City x x x.708
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It
requires not only such bodily  presence in  that place  but also a
declared   and   probable   intent   to   make   it   one’s   fixed   and
permanent place of abode.
In this case, Sabili’s claim of a common law relationship
with  Bernadette  Palomares does  not  establish   his actual
physical   presence   in   Bgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,   Lipa   City. In
fact,   the   documents   pertaining   to   Palomares’   actual   place   of
residence   are  conflicting,   since she   is  listed   as   a   resident   of
Parañaque City. The Deed of Sale and registration of the house
in   Bgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,   Lipa   City,   merely   proves   Palomares’
ownership   or   that   she   own   property   in   the   city.   And   it   is   not
impossible that, as indicated in documents presented herein, she
is a resident of Parañaque City owning property in Lipa City.”4
On   January   28,   2010,   petitioner   filed   a   Motion   for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC’s January 26, 2010 Resolution,
and a Supplemental Motion the following day.
On   February   2,   2010,   the   case   was   elevated   to   the
COMELEC En   Banc. In   the   meantime,   the   May   10,   2010
elections were conducted and petitioner emerged as the winning
candidate   for   Mayor   of  Lipa   City. 5 He   eventually   took   his   oath
and assumed office.6
In a Manifestation dated June 15, 2010, petitioner informed
the COMELEC En Banc of these developments and again prayed
for the setting aside of the January 26, 2010 Resolution.
In   its   August   17,   2010   Resolution,   however,   the
COMELEC En   Banc denied   petitioner’s   Motion   for
Reconsideration. Discussing each point petitioner raised in that
motion, the COMELEC En Banc held:
_______________
4 Rollo, pp. 59­61. Emphasis supplied.
 5 Annex “P” to the Petition.
6 Rollo, p. 293, Annex “Q” to the Petition.
709
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
“We   find   that   the   Second   Division   fully   appreciated   the
evidence   presented   by   both   parties   and   correctly   found   Sabili
disqualified for failing to comply with the one (1) year residency
requirement.
Anent Sabili’s first ground in his motion for reconsideration,
We find it important to state that Sabili admitted in Paragraph
14 of his Answer that his domicile of origin is in Brgy. Sico, San
Juan,   Batangas.   This   admission   on   the   part   of   Sabili   was
construed in conjunction with related jurisprudence that domicile
of   origin   is   not   easily   lost.   In   order   “[t]o   successfully   effect   a
change   of   domicile,   one   must   demonstrate   an   actual   change   of
domicile; 2) a bona fideintention of abandoning the former place
of   residence   and   establishing   a   new   one;   and   3)   acts   which
correspond   with  the  purpose.”   Undoubtedly,   Librea   must   prove
his allegations in support of his petition for disqualification, but
since   Sabili   did   not   deny   that   his   domicile   of   origin   is
different from the place where he intends to run, he now
has to prove that he has abandoned his domicile of origin
in favor of Lipa City. Unfortunately, he failed to prove the
same to the satisfaction of the Second Division.
Sabili’s   second   and   third   grounds   refer   to   the   Second
Division’s supposed failure to appreciate the evidence adduced in
this case. We do not find basis for these arguments. The evidence
presented,   together   with   the   arguments   of   the   parties,   were
inextricably   interrelated   and   were   thoroughly   discussed   and
resolved   by   the   Second   Division   in   the   assailed   15­page
Resolution. The Second Division was correct in giving little
or no weight to the following pieces of evidence presented
by Sabili: a) Affidavit of Bernadette P. Palomares which is
self­serving   for   being   executed   by   the  common­law   wife,
709 and   has   no   independent   corroboration   that   they   are
residing in Lipa City since 2007 or that the property was
purchased   with   Sabili’s   personal   funds;   b)   Affidavit   of
Lenila G. Suarez, the previous owners of the property in
Lipa   City   supposedly   occupied   by   Sabili   and   his   family,
which merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the
sale   of the property and  mentions in   passing  that   Sabili
and Palomares lived in Pinagtong­ulan since April 2007 up
to the present; c) Certification issued by Hon. Dominador
B.   Honrade,   Barangay   Captain   of   Brgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,
Lipa City, which is unsworn and thus cannot be relied on;
d)   Certificate   of   Appreciation   issued   by   the   Parish   of
Santo Niño,
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Brgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,   Lipa   City   which   is   nothing   more
than an acknowledgment of Sabili’s material and financial
support and not an indication of residence; e) Designation
as   member   of   the   Advisory   Body   of   Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc., San Jose/Lipa City Chapter effective 02
January   2009   which   merely   declares   the   designation   of
Sabili without any showing that residence in the locality is
a requirement for such designation; f) Voter Certification
issued   by   Atty.   Juan   B.   Aguila,   Jr.   Election   Officer   of
COMELEC Lipa City and the Application for Transfer of
Registration   Record   Due   to   Change   of   Residence   filed
with   the   COMELEC   on   06   June   2009   which   are   not
conclusive   proof   of   change   of   domicile;   g)   Income   Tax
Returns of respondent for the years 2007 and 2008 and the
corresponding Official Receipts which are not indications
of   residence   since   Sec.   51(B)   of   the   National   Internal
Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a
person’s legal residence but that it may also be filed in a
person’s  princip[al]   place   of   business,   and   in   most   cases
the return is filed where the individual earns his income.
The   only   other   evidence   for   Sabili   on   record   are   the
affidavits he submitted which, standing alone, cannot be
considered,   no   matter   how   many,   as   sufficient   proof   of
one’s change of domicile. There has to be more.
With regard to Sabili’s fourth ground, We find that the Second
Division made no pronouncement adding a property requirement
as a qualification of an elective official.
As   to   the   fifth   ground,   We   will   sustain   the   position   of   the
Second Division when it ruled:
In this case, Sabili’s claim of a common law relationship
with   Bernadette   Palomares   does   not   establish   his   actual
physical presence in Bgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City x x x
as   indicated   in   documents   presented   herein,   she   is   a
resident of Parañaque City owning property in Lipa City.
Sabili’s   sixth   and   seventh   grounds   deserve   little   merit.
Nothing   in   the   Assailed   Resolution   reveals   that   Sabili’s
relationship   with   Palomares   or   the   property   regime   governing
such   relationship   had   direct   bearing   on   the   Second   Division’s
determination   of   Sabili’s   qualification.   Sabili’s   relationship   was
merely discussed in relation to the allegations that Sabili bought
a house using his personal
711
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
funds  but  decided   to  register   the property   only   in  the  name  of
Palomares which is quite peculiar.
Finally, on the eight ground, We hereby declare that Sabili’s
residence is a matter that will affect his qualification to run for
public office in Lipa City. In view of the evidence presented in this
case, his declaration in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
resident of Lipa City, when in fact he had not yet abandoned his
domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas, may convince the voters
that he has all the qualifications to run for the position of mayor,
which   tends   to   mislead   the   public   from   a   fact   that   would
otherwise   render   him   ineligible,   is   precisely   what   is   being
referred to in the case of Ugdoracion.”7
Aggrieved,   petitioner   filed   with   this   Court   a Petition   for
Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Status   Quo   Order under   Rule   64   in   relation   to   Rule   65   of   the
Rules   of   Court,   seeking   the   nullification   of   the   COMELEC’s
Resolutions   for   supposedly   having   been   issued   without   or   in
excess   of   respondent   COMELEC’s   jurisdiction,   or   with   grave
abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess   of   jurisdiction.
Among   the   documents   attached   to   his   petition   is   a   new
Certification   of   Residency   issued   by   the   Pinagtong­
ulan barangay chairman   Dominador   Honrade   that   had   been
sworn before a notary public.8
On   September   7,   2010,   this   Court   issued   a   Status Quo
Ante Order requiring the parties to observe the status quobefore
the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
As pointed out by Justice Sereno in her opinion, the following
are the issues for Our Resolution:
(1) Whether   the   COMELEC   acted   with   grave   abuse   of
discretion  when  it  failed  to  promulgate  its  Resolution  dated  17
711 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and
_______________
 7 Emphasis supplied.
8 Rollo, p. 300, Annex “S” to the Petition.
712
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
(2) Whether   the   COMELEC   committed   grave   abuse   of
discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with
the one­year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Failure to serve advance notice of the promulgation of the
resolution does not affect the validity of the resolution
On the first issue, petitioner posits that the COMELEC acted
with   grave   abuse   of   discretion   when   it   failed   to   serve   advance
notice   of   the   promulgation   of   the   August   17,   2010   Resolution
under   Sec.   6,   COMELEC   Resolution   No.   8696   (Rules   on
Disqualification of  Cases Filed  in  Connection with the May 10,
2010   Automated   National   and   Local   Elections). 9 Hence,   so
petitioner   claims,   his   right   to   due   process   was   violated.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Sec. 9 of COMELEC
Resolution 8696 had been suspended by COMELEC Order dated
May 4, 2010 in view of the exigencies attendant to the holding of
the country’s first automated national elections.
Justice  Sereno  is  of  the  opinion  that  petitioner  erred  in  his
claim   of   having   been   deprived   of   due   process,   adding   that   the
August   17,   2010   Resolution   was   validly   promulgated.   On   this
issue, I fully agree with my esteemed colleague.
The suspension of Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and
the   consequential   lack   of   advance   notice   regarding   the   date   of
promulgation   of   the   COMELEC En   Banc’s   August   17,   2010
Resolution is in accordance with the COMELEC’s constitutionally
granted power to make its own rules of procedure. The suspension
action, without more, did not violate the petitioner’s right to due
process or vitiate the validity of the
_______________
9 SEC. 6. Promulgation.—The promulgation of a Decision or
Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a
date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the  parties or  their attorneys personally, or  by registered
mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.
713
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 713
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
COMELEC’s   resolution.   After   all,   as   pointed   out   by   Justice
Sereno, the advance notice of the date of promulgation is not part
of   the   process   of   promulgation.   More   than   that,   the
COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution was sufficiently made known to
petitioner   who   was   able   to   timely   file   the   present   petition   to
assail and question the same Resolution. Clearly, the suspension
of Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and the non­service of
an   advance   notice   to   petitioner   are   of   no   consequence   to   the
validity of the Resolution and the findings of the COMELEC, or to
the opportunity granted to petitioner to assail the Resolution.
A certiorari  writ  is not  available to correct  errors in  the
appreciation of evidence by the lower tribunal
On   the   second   issue,   however,   I   respectfully   disagree   with
Justice   Sereno   who   maintains   that   the   COMELEC   committed
errors in the appreciation and evaluation of evidence so that “the
Court   is   compelled   by   it[s]   bounden   constitutional   duty   to
intervene and correct the COMELEC’s errors.”10
Lest it be forgotten, the present recourse was filed under the
aegis of Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Time
and   again,   this   Court   has   emphasized   that   a   Rule   65   petition
for certiorari is   a   limited   remedy   to   correct   only   errors   of
jurisdiction, not of judgment.11 Its only function is to keep a lower
tribunal   within   its   jurisdiction12and   not   to   authorize   the   court
exercising certiorari powers to review, reconsider, reevaluate, and
re­calibrate   the   evidence   previously   presented   before   and
considered by the lower tribunal.
_______________
10 Ponencia, p. 12.
11 Lydia R. Pagaduan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
172278, March 29, 2007, 519 SCRA 512.
12 Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, 483 Phil. 495;
440 SCRA 467 (2004); quoted in PCGG v. Silangan Investors and
Managers, Inc., G.R. Nos. 167055­56 & 170673, March 25, 2010,
616 SCRA 382.
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
In First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals,13 We reiterated this elementary precept:
“It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and
evidence   is   not   the   province   of   the   extraordinary   remedy
of certiorari,   which   is extra   ordinem—beyond   the   ambit   of
appeal. In certiorari proceedings,   judicial   review   does   not
go   as   far   as   to   examine   and   assess   the   evidence   of   the
parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does
not   include   an   inquiry   as   to   the   correctness   of   the
evaluation   of   the   evidence.   Any   error   committed   in   the
evaluation of the evidence is merely an error of judgment
that   cannot   be   remedied   by certiorari. An error
of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of
its   jurisdiction.   An error   of   jurisdiction is   one   where   the   act
complained   of   was   issued   by   the   court   without   or   in   excess   of
jurisdiction,   or   with   grave   abuse   of   discretion,   which   is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible   only   by   the   extraordinary   writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of
the trial  court  in  its  appreciation   of  the  evidence  of  the
parties, or its conclusions anchored on  the said findings
and its conclusions  of law. It is not  for this Court to re­
examine conflicting evidence, re­evaluate the credibility of
the   witnesses   or   substitute   the   findings   of   fact   of   the
court a quo.”
This   rule   holds   greater   force   in   an   application
for certiorari against   the   COMELEC   as   it   is   the   institution
created by the Constitution precisely to handle election matters
and so presumed to be most competent in matters falling within
its   domain.14 Hence,   the   factual   findings   of   the   COMELEC En
Banc are binding on this Court15 absent any showing of a grave
abuse of its discretion.
_______________
13 G.R.   No.   171989,   July   4,   2007,   526   SCRA   564,   578
(emphasis   supplied);   quoted   in Soriano   v.   Marcelo,   G.R.   No.
160772, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 394.
14 Matalam v. Commission on Elections, 338 Phil. 447, 470;
271 SCRA 733, 750 (1997).
15 Japzon   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   G.R.   No.   180088,
January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331; citing Dagloc v. Commision on
Elect­
715
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 715
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Expectedly,   petitioner   Sabili   attributes   grave   abuse   of
discretion  to respondent COMELEC to  justify  a  review  and re­
evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties. However, not
every claim of an existence of a grave abuse of discretion deserves
consideration; otherwise, every erroneous judgment will be void,
appellate courts will be overburdened and the administration of
justice will not survive.16 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
“Grave   abuse   of   discretion”   exists   only   when   there   is   a
“capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack   of   jurisdiction   or,   in   other   words,   where   the   power   is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or  personal   hostility,  and  it must  be  so  patent  and  gross as  to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform   the   duty   enjoined   or   to   act   at   all   in   contemplation   of
law.”17 An   unfavorable   evaluation   of   the   sufficiency   of   the
evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into unless it is
shown that the evaluation was done in an “arbitrary manner by
reason   of   passion,   prejudice,   or   personal   hostility.”18 This,   the
petitioner has failed to prove in his petition for certiorari.
In   fact,   petitioner   has   not   disputed   or   even   mottled   the
presumption that the COMELEC has “regularly performed”19 its
_______________
ions, 463 Phil. 263, 288; 417 SCRA 574, 594 (2003); Mastura
v. Commission on Elections, 349 Phil. 423, 429; 285 SCRA 493,
499 (1998).
16 San   Fernando   Rural   Bank,   Inc.   v.   Pampanga   Omnibus
Development   Corporation,   G.R.   No.   168088,   April   4,   2007,   520
SCRA 564.
17 Id.; citing Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004,
440 SCRA 662, 678­679.
18 Rimbunan   Hijau   Group   of   Companies   v.   Oriental   Wood
Processing   Corporation,   G.R.   No.   152228,   September   23,   2005,
470 SCRA 650, 661.
19 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 2(m).
716
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
duties   “in   the   lawful   exercise   of   its   jurisdiction.” 20 Thus,   this
Court   must   not,   as   it   cannot,   stray   beyond   the   confines   of
a certiorari review and go so far as to re­examine and re­assess
the evidence of the parties and weigh anew its probative value. 21
Nonetheless,   Justice  Sereno   subscribes   to  the  view   that  the
COMELEC’s   appreciation   and   evaluation   of   evidence   are   so
“grossly   unreasonable   as   to   turn   into   errors   of   jurisdiction.” 22 I
beg   to   disagree.   Even   if   We   consider   the   present   case   as   an
exception to the rule on the limitations of a certiorari review, the
evidence   presented   by   petitioner   does   not   persuade   an   actual
change of his domicile.
Petitioner   failed   to   establish   compliance   with
all the requisites for a change of domicile
Petitioner admits that before April 2007 he was a resident of,
and his domicile of origin was, San Juan, Batangas. This Court
has   previously   ruled   that   “domicile”   and   “residence”   are
synonymous   in   election   law.   A   domicile   is   “the   place   where   a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where
he,   no   matter   where   he   may   be   found,   at   any   given   time,
eventually intends to return and remain.” 23 Thus, the question of
domicile is mainly one of intention24 and circumstances.25
_______________
20 Id., id., Sec. 2(n).
21 Macawaig   v.   Balindong,   G.R.   No.   159210,   September   20,
2006, 502 SCRA 454; citing Garcia v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 147427, February 7, 2005, 450 SCRA 535,
547.
22 Ponencia, p. 12.
23 Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 15; emphasis supplied.
 24 Limbona   v.   Commission   on   Elections,   G.R.   No.   186006,
October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 240.
25 Pundaodaya v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179313,
September   17,   2009,   600   SCRA   178,   184­185;   citing Domino  v.
Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798, 818; 310 SCRA 546, 568
(1999).
717
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 717
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
In   the   consideration   of   circumstances,   three   rules   must   be
borne   in   mind:   (1)   a   man   must   have   residence   or   domicile
somewhere; (2) a residence once established remains until a new
one  is  acquired;   and (3)  a  man  can  only  have  one  residence or
domicile at a time.26 Clearly, therefore, there is a presumption
in   favor   of   a  continuance  of  an   existing   domicile.27 When
the evidence presented by the contending parties are in equipoise
that it is impossible for the court to determine with certainty the
real   intent   of   the   person   whose   domicile   is   in   question, the
presumption   requires   the   Court   to   decide   against   a
change   of   domicile   and   the   retention   of   a   domicile   in
question.28 Hence,   the   burden   of   proving   a   change   of
domicile lies on the person who claims that a change has
occurred.29 In this case, the burden lies on the petitioner.
For   the   petitioner   to   overcome   the   presumption   of   the
continuity  of his  domicile of origin, he  must show  by clear  and
convincing evidence of (1) an actual removal or an actual change
of   domicile;   (2)   a bona   fide intention   of   abandoning   the   former
place  of  residence  and   establishing   a  new   one;   and  (3)   definite
acts   which   correspond   with  the  purpose.30 Thus,   to establish   a
new   domicile   of   choice,   personal   presence   in   the   place
must   be   coupled   with   conduct   indicative   of   that
intention. Bodily   presence   in   the   new   locality   is   not   the
only requirement; there must be a declared and probable
 intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent  
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26 Id.
27 In   the   Matter   of   the   Petition   for   Disqualification   of   Tess
Dumpit­Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619­20, November 17, 2005, 475
SCRA 290, 303; Chesire, Private International Law 218­219.
28 Private International Law by Chesire, pp. 218­219.
29 Bevilaqua v. Bernstein, 642 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); cited in Israel v. Carpenter, Not Reported in F.Supp., 1995
WL   640534   (S.D.N.Y.); Rich   Products   Corp.   v.   Diamond,   51
Misc.2d 675, 273 N.Y.S.2d 687, N.Y. Sup. 1966, October 11, 1966.
30  Id.
718
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
place of abode.  Indeed, the most important requirements for
31
the establishment of a new domicile is (1) an actual and physical
presence in the new locality; and (2) a clear and declared intent to
abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi) and remain in
the new place of residence (animus manendi).
Intending   to   establish   that   petitioner   failed   to   meet   the
foregoing   requisites,   respondent   Librea   presented   the   following
documentary exhibits:
1. Petitioner Sabili’s COC filed on December 1, 2009;32
2. Tax   Declaration   issued   in   2009   covering   the   property   in
Brgy.   Pinagtong­ulan,   Lipa   City   and   in   the   name   of
Bernadette Palomares (Palomares);33
 3. Certification of Property Holdings issued on November 24, 9. Certification of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009
2009 covering the properties in Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City over   Block   2,   Lot   3,   Brgy.   Lodlod,   Lipa   City   (TCT   No.
in the name of Palomares;34 164454) in the name of Sabili and Palomares;40
4. Palomares’   Tax   Declaration   issued   on   December   14,   2009 10. Certification of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009
over   the   lot   bought   from   spouses   Manolito   and   Leonila over Block 2,  Lot 5  Brgy.  Lodlod,  Lipa  City  (TCT  No.  T­
Suarez and covered by TCT No. T­173356;35 164455) in the name of Sabili and Palomares;41
5. Palomares’   Tax   Declaration   issued   on   December   14,   2009 11. Affidavit of petitioner Florencio Librea dated December 4,
over   the   lot   bought   from   spouses   Rodolfo   and   Rosalinda 2009;42
Macasaet and covered by TCT No. T­173355;36 12. Sinumpaang Salysay Eladio de Torres dated December 4,
6. Palomares’   Tax   Declaration   issued   on   December   14,   2009 2009;43
over the building on the lot covered by TCT No. TCT No. T­ 13. Affidavit  executed   by   Violeta   Fernandez   dated   December
173356   bought   from   the   spouses   Suarez   and   covered   by 28, 2009;44
TCT No. T­173355;37 14. Affidavit   executed   by   Rodrigo   Macasaet   dated   December
7. Palomares’   Tax   Declaration   issued   on   December   14,   2009 28, 2009;45
over the building on the lot covered by TCT No. TCT No. 15. Affidavit executed by Pablo Lorzano;46
_______________ 16. Voter   Certification   on   petitioner   Sabili   issued   by
31 Domino v. Commission on Elections, supra note 25, at p. 820 COMELEC Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.;47
(1999); emphasis supplied. 17. Voter’s   Registration   Record   No.   07361248   of   petitioner
32 Rollo, p. 431. Sabili approved on June 21, 1997;48
33 Id. 18. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner;
_______________
34 Id., at p. 433.
38 Id., at p. 447.
35 Id., at p. 444.
39 Id., at p. 448.
36 Id., at p. 445.
40 Id., at p. 442.
37 Id., at p. 446.
719 41 Id., at p. 443.
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 719 42 Id., at p. 434.
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections 43 Id., at p. 436.
T­173355 bought from the spouses Suarez and covered by TCT 44 Id., at p. 454.
No. T­173355;38 45 Id., at p. 455.
8. Palomares’   Tax   Declaration   issued   on   December   14,   2009 46 Id., at p. 456.
over   the   building   on   the   lot   no.   5553   bought   from   the 47 Id., at p. 438.
spouses Suarez;39
48 Id., at p. 440. 49 Id., at p. 457.
720 50 Id., at p. 441.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 51 Id., at p. 439.
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections 52 Id., at p. 449.
19. Sabili’s 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative;49 53 Id., at p. 450.
20. Certification   of   No   Marriage   for   Bernadette   Palomares
54 Id., at p. 452.
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO) on December
22, 2009; 55 Id., at p. 453.
21. National   Statistics   Office   (NSO)   Advisory   on   Marriages 721
stating that as of November 28, 2009, Sabili is married to VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 721
Daisy Cervas;50 Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
22. NSO   Certification   issued   on   December   22,   2009   stating  1. Affidavit of Bernadatte Palomares;56
that Palomares does not appear in the National Indices of  2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili;57
Marriages;51 3. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili;58
23. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that 4. Affidavit of Leonila G. Suarez;59
Sabili has no business therein dated December 11, 2009;52 5. Certification   of   Residency   issued   by   Pinagtong­ulan
24. Printout  of   a   Facebook   webpage  of   petitioner’s   daughter, Barangay   Chairman   Dominador   Honrade   dated   October
Mey   Bernadette   Sabili   stating   that   her   hometown   is 30, 2009;60 
“Portofino, Las Piñas, Philippines”;53 6. Notarized   Certification   of   Residency   issued   by   Pinagtong­
25. Department   of   Education   (DepEd)   Lipa   City   Division ulan   Barangay   Chairman   Dominador   Honrade   dated
Certification   that   the   names   Bernadette   Palomares,   Mey August 25, 2010;61
Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s  7. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Honrade Cornejo, Sr.;62
son) do not appear on its list of graduates;54 8. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet;63
26. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa 9. Certificate of Appreciation issued by the parish of Sto. Niño
City dated December 28, 2009 that Bernadette Palomares, of Pinagtong­ulan;64
Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not 10. Designation   of   petitioner   in   the   Advisory   Body   (AB)   of
appear in its list of voters.55 Pinagtong­ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians
On   the   other   hand,   to   support   his   position   that   he   has Brotherhood, Inc.;65
abandoned his domicile of origin and adopted Lipa City, Batangas 11. COMELEC   Voter   Certification   on   petitioner   issued   by
as his domicile of choice, making him qualified to be elected as the Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.;66
City’s   Mayor,   petitioner   Sabili   presented   the   following 12. COMELEC   Application   for   Transfer/Transfer   with
documentary evidence: Reactivation dated June 6, 2009;67
_______________ 13. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 2007;68
_______________
56 Annex “1” to petitioner’s Answer; Id., at p. 102, 394.
57 Annex “2” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 103, 395.
58 Annex “3” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at p. 394.
59 Annex “4” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 104, 397.
60 Annex “5” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 105, 398.
61 Annex “S” to Sabili’s Petition for Certiorari; Id., at p. 300.
62 Annex “6” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at p. 399.
63 Annex “7” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 106, 400.
64 Annex “8” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 107, 401.
65 Annex “9” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 108, 402.
66 Annex “10” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 109, 403.
67 Annex “11” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 110, 404.
68 Annex “12” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 111, 405.
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
14. Official   Receipt   for   petitioner’s   income   tax   payment   for
2007;69
15. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 2008;70
16. Official   Receipt   for   petitioner’s   income   tax   payment   for
2008;71
17. Pinagsama­samang   Sinumpaang   Salaysay dated   January
16, 2010;72
18. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010 executed by
Dominador Macuha;73
19. Certificate   of   Canvass   of   Votes   and   Proclamation   of
Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice­Mayor;74
20. Sabili’s Panunumpa sa Katungkulan dated July 30, 2010.75
Petitioner claims that the foregoing documents are sufficient
to   constitute   substantial   evidence   of   his   change   of   domicile
pursuant   to   this   Court’s   pronouncements   in Mitra   v.
COMELEC.76 A   closer   inquiry,   however,   will   reveal   a   whale   of
difference between the present case and Mitra. Consider: While
there   were  circumstances  in Mitra that  led  the  majority   of  this
Court   to   conclude   that   petitioner   Mitra   made   “incremental
transfer moves” to change his domicile (by, among others, leasing
a dwelling, purchasing a lot for his permanent home, building a
house   thereon,   and   maintaining   substantial   investments   in  the
new locality in the form of an experimental pineapple plantation,
farm,   farmhouse,   and   a   cock  farm),   the  petitioner  in  this  case,
Sabili,   failed   to   adduce   any   evidence   that   would   substantially
prove a change of his domicile
_______________
69 Annex “12­A” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 112, 407.
70 Annex “13” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 113, 406.
71 Annex “13­A” to Sabili’s Answer; Id., at pp. 114, 408.
72 Rollo, p. 212.
73 Id., at p. 213.
74 Annex “P” to Petition for Certiorari.
75 Annex “Q” to Petition for Certiorari.
76 G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
723
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 723
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
from San Juan,  Batangas to Lipa  City whether by  incremental
acts or an immediate deed. There lies the difference.
As shown by the Certification of No Improvement issued by
the Lipa City assessor, petitioner made no efforts to build a house
on the lots located in Brgy. Lodlod that are actually registered in
his own name.77 Neither has he maintained any business in the
locality   despite   his   avowed   profession   as   a   businessman. 78 As
implied   by Mitra,   having   substantial   investments   and
constructing   improvements   on   properties   bought   in   the   new
locality   are   indicative   of animus   manendi.   Hence,   the   non­
existence   of   such   evidence   in   the   present   case   supports
respondents’ claim of continuance of his domicile of origin in San
Juan, Batangas.
Indeed,   petitioner   heavily   anchors   his   claimed   residency   in
Pinagtong­ulan,   Lipa   City   since   April   2007   primarily   on   his
allegation that he purchased a house and lot thereat in the same
month, registered the property in the name of his “common­law
spouse,” Bernadette Palomares (Palomares), and actually resided
therein   since   April   2007   together   with   Palomares   and   their
children.
To   say   the   least,   this   claim   is   not   only   questionable   but
appalling.   Petitioner’s   temerity   in   asserting   that   he   had   been
living   with   Palomares   for   20   years, while   he   was   legally
married   to   another,   and   so   should   be   considered   to   have
followed his paramour’s residence simply goes against the norms
of decency, if not the law against concubinage under Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, We cannot now recognize his residency in Lipa City on
the   pretext   that   his   “common­law   spouse”   lives
therein. Commodum   ex   injuria   sua   non   habere   debet. No
person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong.79
 
_______________
77 Rollo, pp. 442­443.
78 Id., at p. 449.
79 Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies and Niugini Lumber
Merchants   Pty.,   Ltd.   v.   Oriental   Wood   Processing   Corporation,
G.R.
724
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Even in Romualdez­Marcos v. COMELEC,80 this Court did not
consider   Mrs.   Marcos   to   have   followed   the   residence   of   former
President Marcos, her legal spouse. Why should this Court now
consider Sabili to have adopted a domicile of choice in Lipa just
because his “common­law spouse” has a house registered in her
name located in the same city? To consider a man to follow the
residence   of   the   woman   who   he   cannot   marry   is   dangerous
precedent.
If this Court is disposed to establish a rule that a man can
follow the residence of a woman, that woman must be the man’s
lawful wife, not his concubine. This is corollary to the provisions
of   the   Family   Code   explicitly   imposing   on   the   husband   the
obligation  to  establish  his  domicile  with   his   wife  and  live  with
her:
“Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if
the   latter   should   live   abroad   or   there   are   other   valid   and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of
the family.”
Further, even assuming that it was petitioner who negotiated
the   purchase   and   paid   for   the   property   in   Pinagtong­ulan   (no
deed of sale was presented), his act of having it registered in the
name of his “common­law” spouse only indicates a donative intent
without the necessary formalities or the pay­
_______________
No.   152228,   September   23,   2005,   470   SCRA   650; European
Resources   and   Technologies,   Inc.   v.   Ingenieuburo   Birkhahn   +
Nolte, Ingeniurgesellschaft mbh, G.R. No. 159586, July 26, 2004,
435 SCRA 246; Communication Materials Design, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 102223, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 673.
80 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.
725
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 725
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
ment   of  taxes, not the  intent  to  abandon   his   domicile   of   origin
and maintain a new domicile of choice.
In fact, Sabili’s resounding omission to provide the COMELEC
and this Court the deeds of sale over the properties in Pinagtong­
ulan,   Lipa   City   executed   by   the   spouses   Manolito   and   Leonila
Suarez and the spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda Macasaet in favor
of  Palomares,   as  well   as  the  certificates  of  title,   puts   doubt on
Sabili’s allegation that there was a transfer of ownership over the
properties to Palomares in April 2007 that would have allowed
her   and/or   the   petitioner   to   claim   the   right   to   reside   in   the
properties.   This   doubt   is   aggravated   by   the   fact   that   the   tax
declarations over the properties show that the deeds of sale were
drawn up and notarized only in August 2008.81
Indeed,   the  claim  of  an  actual   and   physical   transfer  on  the
same   month   of   the   negotiation,   April   2007,   strains   credulity
considering that it is admitted by Sabili that he ran for a position
in   the   lower   house   of   Congress   in   the   May   2007   elections   (for
which   he   filed   a   COC   indicating   his   domicile   as   San   Juan,
Batangas).   Was   there   enough   time   to   effect   an   actual   and
physical change a month before the elections? If there was time to
relocate, why were the deeds of sale drawn up and notarized only
in August 200882 and the tax declarations transferred in the name
of   Palomares   only   in   the   same   month   if   they   had   already
relocated in April 2007?
All these inconsistencies easily show that when Sabili stated
in his COC that he had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan since April
2007,   he   had   deliberately   committed   a   material
misrepresentation obviously to deceive the voting public.
It   is   also   curious   to   note   that   even   Sabili’s   common­law
spouse, named as the owner of the property in Brgy. Pinagtong­
ulan, is registered as a resident of 215 Elizalde Street, BF Homes,
Parañaque City in the tax declarations covering
_______________
81 Rollo, pp. 444­448; Private respondent’s Annex “B.”
82 Id.
726
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
the Pinagtong­ulan property.83 Clearly, the COMELEC could not
be held “grossly unreasonable” for holding that while Palomares
might be a Lipa City property owner, she was a resident of
Parañaque City. Official documents issued by the Office of the
City Assessor of Lipa City clearly establish such fact. This official
records cannot be defeated by a self­serving affidavit drawn up by
petitioner’s   common­law   wife   that   she   resides   in   Lipa   City   in
order to support petitioner’s claim that he too is a resident of the
city. 
Parenthetically, Palomares’ Affidavit cannot be considered as
a   declaration   against   her   interest   under   the   rules   on   evidence
because the primary requisite of Sec. 38, Rule 130 84 is that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify, and it is not alleged that
Palomares has died or is now unable to testify.
Instead,   Palomares’   Affidavit   should   be   taken   with   the
metaphorical grain of salt. The numerous falsities committed by
Palomares in various official and governmental documents negate
any faith on her word and betray her propensity to lie to favor her
“family”   so   that   it   is   not   grossly   unreasonable   to   hold   that
Palomares have committed a misrepresentation in her affidavit in
order   to   support   Sabili.   This   is   readily   apparent   in   the   very
documents presented by Sabili as his own evidence. For instance,
Palomares   had   previously   perjured   herself   as   the   informant   in
the   birth   certificates   of   her   children   sired   by
petitioner.85 Palomares asserted in the birth certificate of her son
that   she   married   petitioner   on   December   2,   1980   in   Bulacan,
Bulacan. On the other hand, she claimed
_______________
83 Id.
84 Section 38. Declaration against interest.—The declaration
made   by   a   person   deceased,   or   unable   to   testify,   against   the
interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest,  that a  reasonable  man in  his position would  not have
made   the   declaration   unless   he   believed   it   to   be   true,   may   be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest
and against third persons.
85 Rollo, pp. 58­59.
727
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
that she and petitioner were married on March 2, 1983 in Manila
in the birth certificate of her daughter when the fact certified by
the   NSO   is   that   she   and   petitioner   had   never   been
married.86 These misrepresentations are undeniably important as
they   determine   the   legitimacy   or   illegitimacy   of   the   children.
Hence,   the   doctrine   of falsus   in   uno,   falsus   in   omnibus clearly
applies and   the   COMELEC   had   reason   not   to   find   Palomares’
statements worthy of credit.
So are Sabili’s statements. It should not escape this Court that
Sabili has adopted the untruthful statements of Palomares in the
birth   certificates   of   their   children   as   his   own   evidence   in   the
proceedings   before   the   COMELEC   and   this   Court.   He   has,
therefore,   clearly   sanctioned  the  falsities  boldly   stated   thereon.
Worse, the same predilection for the untruth can be observed in
Sabili’s   Voter’s   Certification   that   he   presented   as   his   own
evidence.   While   it   is   not   denied   that   he   is   married   to   Daisy
Cervas Sabili, he did not dispute the entry made on his status as
“single.” In fact, in his Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for 2007 and
2008 he claimed that his spouse’s name was “Sabili Bernadette
Palomares,” when the NSO certified that as of November 2009,
Sabili   was   still   legally   married   to   Daisy   Cervas.   Clearly,
petitioner   shows   a   pattern   of   false   machinations   intended   to
assume a coveted electoral position. Unfortunately for him, deceit
cannot   take   the   place   of   compliance   with   the   statutory
qualifications for office.
It is also notable that petitioners’ children by Palomares have
not   attended   any   of   the   educational   institutions   in   Lipa
City,87 nor   have   Palomares   or   the   children   been   registered   as
voters of Lipa City88 despite the fact that Sabili filed a COC for
the Mayoralty position. Instead, Sabili’s own daughter made an
727 extrajudicial declaration that she considers “Portofino, Las Piñas”
as her hometown, not Batangas.
_______________
86 Id., at p. 439; Respondent’s Annex “F.”
87 Id., at p. 452.
 88 Id., at p. 453.
728
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
In the case of Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,89 this   Court   considered   the   existence   of   “real   and
substantial reason” to indicate animus manendiin the purported
new domicile of choice:
“In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons
for   petitioner   to   establish   Sta.   Rosa   as   his   domicile   of
choice   and   abandon   his   domicile   of   origin   and/or   any
other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his
wife   have   owned   and   operated   businesses   in   Sta.   Rosa
since   2003.   Their   children   have   attended   schools   in   Sta.
Rosa   at   least   since   2005. Although   ownership   of   property
should   never   be   considered   a   requirement   for   any   candidacy,
petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently
reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that
city   even   prior   to   the   May   2007   election,   as   evidenced
by certificates of title issued in the name of petitioner and
his wife. One of these properties is a residence in Bel­Air, Sta.
Rosa   which   petitioner   acquired   even   before   2006   but   which
petitioner had been leasing out. He claims that he rented out this
property because prior to 2006 he had not decided to permanently
reside   in   Sta.   Rosa.   This   could   explain   why   in   early   2006
petitioner had to rent a townhouse in Villa de Toledo—his Bel­Air
residence was occupied by a tenant. The relatively short period of
the   lease   was   also   adequately   explained   by   petitioner—they
rented  a   townhouse   while  they   were   in  the  process  of   building
their own house in Sta. Rosa. True enough, petitioner and his
spouse   subsequently   purchased   a   lot   also   in   Villa   de
Toledo in April 2007,  about a month before election day,
where they have constructed a home for their family’s use
as a residence. In all, petitioner had adequately shown that his
transfer   of   residence   to   Sta.   Rosa   was   bona   fide   and   was   not
merely   for   complying   with   the   residency   requirement   under
election laws.”90
Unlike   in Fernandez where We   sustained   petitioner’s   change
of domicile and qualification for his office, Sabili has no “real and
substantial   reason”   to   establish   his   domicile   in   Lipa   City   and
abandon his domicile of origin in San Juan, Batangas.
_______________
89 G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
90 Emphasis supplied.
729
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 729
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
With   no   children   or   wife   actually   residing   in   Lipa   City,   or
business interests therein, it is not “grossly unreasonable” for the
COMELEC   to   conclude   that   petitioner   had   no   “declared   and
probative intent” to adopt Lipa City as his domicile of choice in
the absence of a real and substantial reason to do so.
Contrary to Justice Sereno’s Opinion, Sabili’s act of filing his
ITR in Revenue District Office No. (RDO) 59 in Lipa City for the
years 2007 and 2008 does not indicate a change of domicile from
San Juan to Lipa City, Batangas. RDO 59’s jurisdiction includes
both San Juan and Lipa City 91 so that the intent to remain cannot
immediately be ascribed to Lipa City. On the contrary, his filing
of the ITR in RDO 59 can also be used to support his intent to
remain  in  San  Juan,   Batangas––his   domicile  of   origin.   In  fact,
petitioner left the space for his residence in his 2007 ITR blank
without indicating where he was actually residing. To reiterate,
any doubt on residency or domicile shall be resolved in favor of
the domicile of origin.
 In   the   clear   absence   of   the   most   important   element   in   the
establishment of a domicile—animus manendi—it is of no use to
discuss the consequence of testimonies as to his bodily presence in
the  locality. As  stated, all the requisites for a valid change of
domicile  or  residence  is  necessary  for  election  law   purposes.   In
the absence of even just one element, the presumption is in favor
of   the   maintenance   and   continuity   of   the   domicile   of   origin.
Hence, in this case, petitioner is presumed to still be a resident of
San Juan, Batangas and disqualified from taking the mayoralty
position in Lipa City, Batangas.
The   notarized   certification   of   the Baranggay   Chairmanof
Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan, Lipa City does not bar Us from holding this
position   contrary   to   Justice   Sereno’s   opinion.   My   esteemed
colleague bases her appreciation of the notarized
_______________
91 <http://www.bir.gov.ph/directory/rdoinner.htm#66>   visited
March 15, 2012.
730
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
certification on Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
“Section 44. Entries   in   official   records.—Entries   in   official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the   Philippines,   or   by   a   person   in   the   performance   of   a   duty
specially   enjoined   by   law,   are prima   facie evidence   of   the   facts
therein stated.”
As   is   readily   apparent,   Section   44,   Rule   130   pertains   to
“entries in official records.” Needless to state, no such “entries” or
“records” were referred to in the certification, much less presented
before   the   COMELEC   or   this   Court.   Instead,   the   certification
plainly   states   in   a   pro­forma   way:   “This   is   to   certify   that
Meynardo   A.   Sabili,   53   years   old   is   a   resident   of   Zone   5   of
Barangay   Pinagtong­ulan   Lipa   City   since   April   2007.”   Neither
does the certification mention any record kept by the Baranggay
Secretary, or even cite any of its entries. Clearly, Section 44, Rule
130   cannot   clothe   the   certification   executed   by   the   Baranggay
Chairman   of   Pinagtong­ulan   with   finality   and   conclusiveness.
Instead, as it is not the duty of the Baranggay Chairman, but the
duty of the Baranggay Secretary, “to keep an updated record of all
inhabitants   of   the   baranggay,”92 the   certification   must   be
dismissed as nothing but containing hearsay statements.
In   fact,   even   if   we   consider arguendo the   Baranggay
Chairman’s certification   stating   that   Sabili   is   a   resident   of   his
baranggay, there is no indication that the term “resident” used
therein carries the same meaning as the “resident” used in the
provision   requiring   residence   as   a   qualification   for   candidacy,
which   is   equivalent   to   domicile   that   requires   not   just   physical
presence but, again, animus manendi. At most, the certification
may   only   attest   to   the   bodily   presence   of   petitioner   in
his baranggay,  but  not  the  element  of  Sabili’s  intent  to  remain
therein which, as indicated by circumstances, is patently absent.
_______________
92 Section 394 (d) (6), Local Government Code.
731
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 731
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
The   certification   is   also   negated   given
the conflictingtestimonies   of   residents   of   the   Brgy.   Pinagtong­
ulan where petitioner claims to be residing.93 Again, the rule is in
the presence of conflicting evidence on the issue of domicile, the
Court is behooved to uphold the presumption of the continuity
of the domicile of origin.94
Both  the  Certificate  of  Appreciation  issued  by  the  Parish of
Santo Niño and Sabili’s Designation as a Member of the Advisory
Body   of   Guardians   Brotherhood   Incorporated   cannot   be
considered to establish Sabili’s domicile in Brgy. Pinagtong­ulan
since,   as   noted   by   the   COMELEC,   the   first   merely   mentions
material and financial support to the fiesta celebration. And there
is   nothing   in   the   second   document   making   residency   in   Brgy.
Pinagtong­ulan as a requisite for the designation in the Advisory
Board.
Furthermore, it notable that Sabili applied for transfer of his
registration   record   only   on   June   9,   2009   and   the   same   was
approved   in   October   31,   2009   as   proven   by   Sabili’s   voter
certification. Technically, therefore, Sabili is a registered voter of
Lipa City only in October 2009, sevenmonths prior to the May
2010 elections.
_______________
93 Respondent Librea presented his Affidavit as well as  the
Affidavits   of   Eladio   de   Torres,   Violeta   Fernandez,   Rodrigo
Macasaet and Pablo Lorzano. Sabili on the other hand, presented
the   Affidavits   of   Leonila   Suarez,   Jacinto   Cornejo   Sr   and
Rosalinda Macasaet. Notably, the witnesses of Sabili all benefited
from a business transaction with Palomares, Sabili’s common­law
wife.   Suarez   and   Macasaet   sold   properties   to   Palomares   while
Cornejo was hired by her to renovate a house. Hence, it is not far­
fetched to conclude that they would be biased in favour of Sabili.
Furthermore,   the Pinagsama­samang   Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated January   16,   2010   and   the Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed   by   Dominador   Macuha   attributed   familial
relations   to   the   witnesses   of   Librea   and   the   wife   of   Sabili’s
opponent for the mayoralty position.
94 Bevilaqua, supra note 29.
732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
Indeed,   it   is   not   only   that   “each   evidence   presented   by
petitioner… fail(s) to convincingly show that fact of his residence
at   Pinagtong­ulan   since   2007,”95 even   collectively   considered,
these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish such failure.
As Sabili’s acts belie his intent to change his domicile and be a
resident   of   Lipa   City,   he   had   deliberately   and   falsely
misrepresented   in   his   COC   that   he   is   resident   of   Lipa   City,
knowing   fully   well   that   he   is   not,   in   order   to   qualify   as   a
candidate  for  the  office   of  the  Mayor.   Sabili’s   statement  in  the
COC   cannot   be   dismissed   as   a   simple   mistake   that   does   not
warrant its cancellation since residence being primarily a matter
of   intent,   any   falsehood   with   regards   thereto,   as   in   this   case,
reveals   an   intentional   and   deliberate   misrepresentation   that
cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Hence, the misrepresentation
committed by Sabili regarding his residence is a clear ground for
the   cancellation   of   his   COC   under   Section   78   of   the   Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) and his disqualification from the office he is
presently occupying.
Sabili’s subsequent election is of no consequence considering
that an invalid COC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, much
less valid votes. More importantly, while the electorate’s will is
indeed primary, the electorate likewise deserves a person who is
unwilling to resort to a Machiavellian circumvention of the laws
and blatant falsehood just to suit his own purposes. He is not only
disqualified from a  public  office  but  more  importantly  does  not
deserve the public’s trust.
I,   therefore,   submit   that   the   COMELEC’s   Resolutions   be
upheld and the instant petition for certiorari be denied. 
 Petition granted, COMELEC Resolutions annulled.
Notes.—The   powers   of   the   Commission   on   Elections   are
essentially executive and administrative in nature, and this is
_______________
95 Ponencia, pp. 23­24.
733
VOL. 670, APRIL 24, 2012 733
Sabili vs. Commission on Elections
the   reason   why   the   question   of   whether   or   not   there   were
terrorism,   vote­buying   and   other   irregularities   in   the   elections
should   be   ventilated   in   regular   election   protests.   (Suhuri   vs. G.R. No. 185374. March 11, 2015.*
Commission on Elections, 602 SCRA 633 [2009])  
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be SIMPLICIA CERCADO­SIGA and LIGAYA CERCADO­
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
BELISON, petitioners, vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR.,MANUELA 
voluntary;   and   the   residence   at   the   place   chosen   for   the   new
C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C.ARALAR and VIOLE
domicile   must   be   actual.   (Asistio   vs.   Aguirre, 619   SCRA   518
[2010]) TA C. BINADAS, respondents.
——o0o——   Remedial   Law;   Evidence;   Documentary   Evidence;   Private
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights Documents; As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, 29 Phil.
reserved. 215   (1915), it   has   been   settled   that   church   registries   of   births,
marriages,  and  deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Order No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer
public   writings,   nor   are   they   kept   by   duly   authorized   public
officials.—In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage
,petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato
Matrimonial. There isno dispute that said marriage contract was 
issued by IglesiaFilipina Independiente church. The Court of App
eals correctly ruledthat it is a private document. As early as in th
e case of U.S.   v.   Evangelista,   29   Phil.   215   (1915),
it has been settled that churchregistries of births, marriages, and 
deaths made subsequent to thepromulgation of General Order No.  uld she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simpliciaadmitted
68 and the passage of Act No.190 are no longer public writings, no
r are they kept by dulyauthorized public officials. They are privat
e writings and theirauthenticity must therefore be proved as are  uncertified   document   purporting   to   be   a   carbon   copy   is   not
all other privatewritings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   Under   Section   20,   Rule   132,
Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence,
it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person
who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution,
saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the
parties   to   the   instruments   had   previously   confessed   execution
thereof.—Under Section 20, Rule132, Rules of Court, before a priv
ate document is admitted inevidence, it must be authenticated eit
her by the person whoexecuted it, the person before whom its exec
ution wasacknowledged, any person who was present and saw it e
xecuted, orwho after
_______________
*  FIRST DIVISION.
515
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or theper
son to whom the parties to the instruments had previouslyconfess
ed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals,petition
ers failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, onlySimpli
cia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract.Unfo
rtunately however, she was not present during its executionnor co
 
that she is illiterate.
Same;   Same;   Same;   Carbon   Copies;   An   unsigned   and
competent   evidence.—We had previously ruled in Vallarta   v.
Court   of   Appeals, 163   SCRA   587
(1988), that “a signed carbon copy orduplicate of a document exec
uted at the same time as the original isknown as a duplicate origi
nal and maybe introduced in evidencewithout accounting for the 
non­production of the original. But, anunsigned and uncertified d
ocument purporting to be a carbon copyis not competent evidence. 
It is because there is no public officeracknowledging the accuracy 
of the copy.”
Same; Same; Same; Ancient Documents; Words and Phrases;
Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1)
is more than thirty (30) years old; 2) is produced from custody in
which   it   would   naturally   be   found   if   genuine;   and   3)   is
unblemished   by   any   alteration   or   by   any   circumstance   of
suspicion.—While petitionersconcede that the marriage contract i
s a private document, they nowargue that it is an ancient docume
nt which need not beauthenticated. Petitioners’ argument still ha
515
s no merit. Section 21,Rule 132 defines an ancient document as on
e that: 1) is more than30
years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it wouldnaturally 
be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by anyalteration or by 
any circumstance of suspicion. The marriagecontract was execute
d on   9 October 1929, hence it is clearly morethan 30
years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence ofalteration
.
The marriage contract however does not meet the secondrequirem urch, by the priest who baptized subjectchild, but it does not prov
ent.  Ancient documents are considered from propercustody if the e the veracity of the declarations andstatements contained in the 
y come from a place from which they might reasonablybe expected  certificate concerning the relationshipof the person baptized.” As 
to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have hada legitima such, Simplicia cannot be considered asan heir, in whose custody 
te origin or if the circumstances of the particular case aresuch as t the marriage contract is expected to befound. It bears reiteration 
o render such an origin probable. If a document is foundwhere it  that Simplicia testified that the marriagecontract was given to he
would not prop­ r by Benita but that Simplicia cannot makeout the contents of sai
516 d document because she cannot read andwrite.
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same;   Same;   Same;   While   the   Supreme   Court   (SC)
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr. acknowledges   the   difficulty   of   obtaining   old   records,   it   simply
erly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place mus cannot   ignore   the   rules   on   evidence,   specifically   the   rule   on
tbe satisfactorily accounted for. authentication   with   respect   to   private   documents   which   is
Same;   Same;   Same;   Same;   In   Bartolome   v.   Intermediate precisely in place to prevent the inclusion of spurious documents
Appellate Court, 183 SCRA 102 (1990), the Supreme Court (SC) in the body of evidence that will determine the resolutions of an
ruled that the requirement of proper custody was met when the issue.—While weacknowledge the difficulty of obtaining old record
ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper s, we simplycannot ignore the rules on evidence, specifically the r
custodian   thereof   who   is   an   heir   of   the   person   who   would ule onauthentication with respect to private documents which is p
naturally   keep   it.—   In Bartolome v.   Intermediate   Appellate reciselyin place to prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in 
Court, 183   SCRA   102   (1990), the bodyof evidence that will determine the resolutions of an issu
the Court ruled that the requirement of proper custodywas met w e.
hen the ancient document in question was presented incourt by th 517
e proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the personwho would  VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 517
naturally keep it. In this case however, we find thatSimplicia also  Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita.She merely pres PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
ented a baptismal certificate which has long beenheld “as evidenc
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
e only to prove the administration of the sacramenton the dates t
  Napoleon Uy Galit and Associates Law Offices for petitioners.
herein specified, but not the veracity of thedeclarations therein st
  Willie G. Purisima for respondents.
ated with respect to her kinsfolk. “The sameis conclusive only of t  
he baptism administered, according to therites of the Catholic Ch
PEREZ, J.: 518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
  Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
Not too long ago, we were called to pass upon the issueof the p Cercado­Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are thelegitimate c
robative value of a marriage contract issued by thechurch to prov hildren of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo(Benita), who were 
e the fact of marriage.1 Once again, itbehooves upon us to determi married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla,Rizal. Petitioners alleged th
ne whether the marriagecontract or Contrato at during the lifetime of theirparents, their father acquired by gra
Matrimonial, as it is denominated inthis case, is sufficient to prov tuitous title a parcel ofland identified as Lot No. 7627 Cad 609­D l
e the fact of marriage. ocated atBarangay Kinagatan, Binangonan, Rizal with an area of
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the 5August 200 6,032 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No.BIP­021­
8 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals and its 14November 2008 Reso 0253. Petitioners claimed that upon the death oftheir father Vicen
lution3 in C.A.­G.R. CV No. 89585reversing the 30 January 2007  te and by virtue of intestate succession,ownership over the subject 
Decision4 of the RegionalTrial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal,  land pertained to them as heirs;that upon the death of Benita, he
Branch 69, whichnullified the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate  r share was acquired bypetitioners by operation of law. Sometime 
of theDeceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and LeonoraDitabla in September1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice tha
n (Leonora). t theestate of Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has beenext
In their Complaint against respondents VicenteCercado, Jr.,  rajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein.Upon verific
Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita Basco, Maria C.Aralar, Violeta C. Bina ation, petitioners were furnished a copy of theExtrajudicial Settle
das and the Registrar of Deeds ofBinangonan, Rizal, petitioners S ment of the Estate (Deed) executed andsigned by respondents. Pe
implicia Cercado­Siga(Simplicia) and Ligaya titioners insist that Vicente andLeonora were not married or if th
_______________ ey were so married, thensaid marriage was null and void by reaso
n of the subsistingmarriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita. 
1  Macua   Vda.   de   Avenido   v.   Avenido, G.R.   No.   173540,   22
Petitionersprayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; 
January 2014, 714 SCRA 447, 457­458.
forthe Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to correct theentry o
2  Rollo,   pp.   76­108;   Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Celia   C.
Librea­Leagogo, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and n the marital status of Vicente; and for the paymentof damages a
Mariflor P. Punzalan­Castillo, concurring. nd attorney’s fees.5
3  Id., at pp. 142­143. To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita,petitioners 
4  Id., at pp. 144­171; Penned by Presiding presented the following documents: 1) Contrato
Judge Narmo P. Noblejas. Matrimonial or the marriage contract;6 2) Certificationdated 19 N
518
ovember 2000 issued by Iglesia FilipinaIndependiente of its accep owing that Vicente wasmarried to Benita is not a certified true co
tance of original marriagecontract;7 3) Certification of non­ py; and that theyare now estopped by laches.12
production of record ofbirth of Simplicia issued by the Office of th On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment infavor of pe
e MunicipalCivil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;8 titioners. The dispositive portion reads:
_______________ WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is herebyrend
ered as follows:
5   Records, pp. 1­5.
1.   Extra­
6   Id., at p. 7.
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased VicenteCercado, Sr. 
7   Id., at p. 20.
and Benita Ditablan is hereby declared null and voidand therefor
8   Id., at p. 34.
e no force and effect;
 
2.
519
The [petitioners] and the [respondents] are entitled to sharepro
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 519
indiviso in the subject property as follows:
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
a.   2,639 square meters – For [petitioner] Simplicia Cercado­
Siga;
4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia;9 5) Certification ofnon­
_______________
production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by theOffice of the 
Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;10and 6) Joint Affidavit o 9   Id., at p. 35.
f two disinterested persons attestingthat Ligaya is the child of Vic 10  Id., at p. 37.
ente and Benita.11 11  Id., at p. 36.
In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are thelegitima 12  Id., at pp. 74­77.
te heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were marriedon 27 June 197 520
7 as evidenced by a marriage certificateregistered with the Local  520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Civil Registrar of Binangonan,Rizal. They averred that petitioner Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
s are not the real   parties­in­ b.   2,639 square meters – For [petitioner]   Ligaya Cercado­
interest to institute the case because they failedto present their bi Belison;
rth certificates to prove their filiation toVicente; that the marriag c.   150.8   square   meters   –   For   [respondent]
e between Vicente and Benita wasnot valid; that the document sh Vicente Cercado, Jr.;
d. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Manuela C. Arabit;
e. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Lolita C. Basco;
 f.   150.8 square meters – For [respondent]
Maria C. Aralar; and
g. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Violeta C. Binadas.
3.
In the event that the property has already been sold by the[respo
ndents], they are hereby ordered to pay the [petitioners] theamou
nt equivalent to their share, at the time the subject propertywas s
old;
4.
[respondents] to pay [petitioners] the amount of P30,000.00attorn
ey’s fees; and
5. To pay the cost of suit.13
The trial court reduced the issues into three: 1) whetherthe Ex
tra­Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the DeceasedVicente Cerc
ado, Sr. and Leonora Ditablan­Cercado isvalid; 2) whether petitio
ners are entitled to recover fromrespondents their share in the pr
operty; and 3) whetherpetitioners are entitled to damages and att
orney’s fees.
In resolving the issues, the trial court relied on thefollowing m
aterial findings:
The [petitioners] are the legitimate children of the late Vicente
Cercado, Sr. and Benita Castillote/Castillo who were married onO
ctober 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato Matrimonial x x x.14
_______________
13  Rollo, pp. 170­171.
14  Id., at p. 167.
521
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 521
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriagebetwee
n Vicente and Benita and considered the subsequentmarriage bet
ween Vicente and Leonora as void andbigamous before it conclude
d that the subject property waspart of the conjugal property of Vic
ente and Benita.Consequently, the trial court held that the Deed i
s null andvoid because it deprived Benita of her share of the prop
ertyas surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimesof 
petitioners.15 Thus, the trial court ruled that petitionersare entitle
d to recover from respondents their share in theproperty subject o
f this action.
Respondents appealed from said judgment and assignedthe fol
lowing errors: 1) the trial court erred in passing uponthe validity 
of the marriage between Vicente and Leonora;2) the trial court fai
led to consider the probative value ofthe certificate of marriage be
tween Vicente and Benita; 3)the trial court failed to consider the 
probative value of thecertificate of live birth to prove filiation; and 
4) the trialcourt erred when it relied on the baptismal certificate t
oprove filiation.16
The appellate court ruled that the trial court “can passupon th
e issue of the validity of marriage of Vicente andLeonora [because
] no judicial action is necessary to declarea marriage an absolute 
nullity and the court may passupon the validity of a marriage eve
n in a suit not directlyinstituted to question the same, as long as i
t is essential tothe determination of the case before it.”17 However, 
theappellate court found that the Contrato
Matrimonial ofVicente and Benita, being a private document, was 
notproperly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence.Mor
eover, the appellate court did not consider thebaptismal certificat
e submitted by petitioners as conclusiveproof of filiation. The Join
t Affidavit executed by a certainMario Casale and Balas Chimlan
gco
_______________
15  Id., at p. 168.
16  Id., at pp. 45­46.
17  Id., at p. 100.
522
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benitawas not g
iven credence by the appellate court for being ahearsay evidence. 
For failure of petitioners to prove theircause of action by preponde
rance of evidence, the appellatecourt reversed and set aside the D
ecision and Resolution ofthe RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but theCourt of  AUTHENTICATION APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE DOCUMENT.
Appeals denied it in its Resolution18 dated 14November 2008.
Hence, the instant petition based on the followinggrounds:
I THE   APPELLATE   COURT   COMMITTED   A   REVERSIBLE
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE   ERROR   WHEN   IT   DID   NOT   CONSIDER   THE
MARRIAGE   CONTRACT   AS   A  PUBLIC  DOCUMENT   —  AND
SO   WITH   ITS   DUPLICATE   ORIGINAL.   THE CONTRATO
MATRIMONIAL BUTTRESSED   A   CERTIFICATION   ISSUED
BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE IS A PUBLIC
DOCUMENT,  [IT] BEING  REQUIRED  BY  LAW  TO  BE KEPT
NOT   ONLY   BY   THE   CHURCH   CONCERNED   BUT   BY   THE
OFFICE   OF   THE   LOCAL   CIVIL   REGISTRAR   —   AND   THE
NATIONAL   STATISTIC   OFFICE.   AND   THE   DUPLICATE
ORIGINAL   COPY   OF   THE   SAME   IS   ALSO   CONSIDERED
ORIGINAL   (SECTION   4,   RULE   130)   (AND   HENCE   ALSO   A
PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER THE RULE) ON EVIDENCE.
 
II
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS,   WITH   ALL   DUE   RESPECT,
COMMITTED   ANOTHER   REVERSIBLE   ERROR,   WHEN   IT
DID NOT CONSIDER THE SAID DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF
THE   SUBJECT   MARRIAGE   CONTRACT   AS   AN   ANCIENT
DOCUMENT, BESIDES, THE SAID DOCUMENT, MORE THAN
30 YEARS IN EXISTENCE IS CONSIDERED AS AN ANCIENT
_______________
18  Id., at pp. 142­143.
523
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 523
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
DOCUMENT, OUTSIDE THE NEEDED REQUIREMENT OF
 
III
ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF A
BAPTISMAL   CERTIFICATE   AND   PETITIONERS’   PARENTS
YEARS   [OF]   COHABITATION.   THE   BAPTISMAL
CERTIFICATE   WHILE   NOT   ADMISSIBLE   AS   DIRECT
EVIDENCE FOR A MARITAL CONTRACT, THE SAME IS OF
STRONG EVIDEN[T]IARY SUPPORT TO THE EXISTENCE OF
MARRIAGE OF  [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS,  EVIDENCED  BY
EXHIBIT “A” AND EXHIBIT “A­1” AND BY THE CERTIFICATE
OF ITS DESTRUCTION DURING WORLD WAR II, ALSO, BY
THE   OPEN   AND   PUBLIC   COHABITATION   OF
[PETITIONERS’] PARENTS, ADDED THE PRESUMPTION IN
FAVOR   OF   SUCH   MARRIAGE,   BOLSTERED   BY   THE   OPEN
AND PUBLIC COHABITATION.
 
IV
THE   APPELLATE   COURT   COMMITTED   ANOTHER
REVERSIBLE   ERROR   WHEN   IT   IGNORED   THE   WEIGHT
AND   PROBATIVE   VALUE   OF   THE   JOINT   AFFIDAVIT   OF
TWO   (2)   DISINTERESTED   PERSONS.   THE   AFFIDAVIT   OF
TWO   (2)   DISINTERESTED   PERSONS   BEING   A
REQUIREMENT BY THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND/OR
THE   NSO   TO   SUPPORT   THE   EXISTENCE   OF
[PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND IN THAT SINCE
BECOMES ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR AT THE VERY
LEAST,   A   CIRCUMSTANTIAL   DOCUMENTARY   PROOF,
WHICH   IF   ADDED   TO   THE   BAPTISMAL   CERTIFICATE
EXHIBIT   “H­1,”   THE CONTRATO   MATRIMONIAL AND   THE
CERTIFICATION   ISSUED   BY   THE   IGLESIA   FILIPINA
INDEPENDIENTE   TAKEN   TOGETHER,   PLUS   THE   OPEN
AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF
524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
THE   [PETITIONERS’]   PARENTS   MARRIAGE,   AND   THE
PRESUMPTION   OF   MARRIAGE   PROVIDED   FOR   BY   LAW,
BANDED TOGETHER, ARE STRONG EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE.
 
V 525
THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   COMMITTED   ANOTHER   YET
SERIOUS   REVERSIBLE   ERROR,   WHEN   IT   DID   NOT
CONSIDER   THE   RESPONDENTS’   PARENTS’  MARRIAGE   AS
BIGAMOUS.   THE   NULLITY   OF   THE   [RESPONDENTS’]
PARENTS’ MARRIAGE, FOR BEING BIGAMOUS, AND BEING
THE   INCIDENT   NECESSARILY   INTERTWINED   IN   THE
ISSUES   PRESENTED,   AND   IT   BEING   A   BIGAMOUS
MARRIAGE,   CAN   BE   COLLATERALLY   ATTACK[ED]   OR
SLAIN AT SIGHT WHEREVER AND WHENEVER ITS HEAD
(THE   [RESPONDENTS’]   PARENTS   MARRIAGE)   IS
EXHIBITED.19
 
Petitioners insist that the Contrato
Matrimonial is apublic document because it is required by law to 
berecorded in the local civil registrar and the NationalStatistics O
ffice (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in theirpossession a duplica
te original of the Contrato
Matrimonialwhich should be regarded as original. Petitionersemp
hasize that the certification issued by the IglesiaFilipina Indepen
diente Church, the joint affidavit of twodisinterested persons, the 
baptismal certificate presentedby petitioners, and the open and p
ublic cohabitation ofpetitioners’ parents are sufficient proof of thei
r marriage.
Granting that the Contrato
Matrimonial is a privatedocument, petitioners maintain that said 
document shouldbe considered an ancient document which should 
beexcluded from the requirement of authentication.
_______________
19  Id., at pp. 61­66.
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 525
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
 Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals should haveconside 20  Id., at pp. 190­196.
red the marriage between Vicente and Leonora asbigamous. 21  Id., at p. 178.
In their Comment,20 respondents submit that theContrato 22  29 Phil. 215 (1915).
Matrimonial is a private document and the factthat marriages ar 23  On December 18, 1899, at the beginning of the American
occupation of the Philippines, Major General Otis, exercising the
e required to be registered in the localcivil registrar does not ipso
legis­
facto make it a publicdocument. Respondents assert that the certi
526
ficate ofbaptism is likewise a private document which tends topro 526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ve only the administration of the sacrament of baptismand not th Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
e veracity of the declarations therein.Respondents moreover refut public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorizedpublic offi
e the certification issued by thelocal civil registry arguing that it  cials. They are private writings and theirauthenticity must theref
does not prove filiationbut only the fact that there is no record of  ore be proved as are all otherprivate writings in accordance with t
Ligaya on filewith said office. he rules of evidence.24
With respect to the joint affidavit attesting to themarriage of  Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,25 before aprivate d
Vicente and Benita, respondents assert that itis inadmissible for  ocument is admitted in evidence, it must beauthenticated either b
being a hearsay evidence because thetwo affiants were never pres y the person who executed it, theperson before whom its executio
ented on the witness stand. n was acknowledged, anyperson who was present and saw it exec
The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of theEstate of Vic uted, or who afterits execution, saw it and recognized the signatu
ente and Leonora hinges on the existence ofthe first marriage of V res, or theperson to whom the parties to the instruments hadprevi
icente and Benita. ously confessed execution thereof.26 As observed bythe Court of Ap
In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage,petitio peals, petitioners failed to present any oneof such witnesses. In fa
ners presented a copy of the Contrato ct, only Simplicia testified that hermother gave her the marriage 
Matrimonial.21There is no dispute that said marriage contract wa contract. Unfortunatelyhowever, she was not present during its e
s issuedby Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. xecution nor couldshe identify Benita’s handwriting because Simp
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a privatedocume liciaadmitted that she is illiterate.
nt. As early as in the case of U.S.   v. Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriagecontract 
Evangelista,22 ithas been settled that church registries of births,  on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence,the
marriages,and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation ofGe _______________
neral Order No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 areno longer
_______________
 lative   power   vested   in   him   as   Commander­in­Chief   of   an
American army in occupied territory, promulgated General Order
No. 68 the purpose of which was to establish rules of law relating
to marriage. It provides that marriages may be solemnized by a
judge of a court inferior to the Supreme Court, by a justice of the
peace,   or   by   a   priest   or   minister   of   the   gospel   of   any
denomination. x x x. <http://kahimyang.
 info/kauswagan/articles/830/today ­in­philippine­history­
december­18­1899­major­general­otis­promulgated­general­order­
 no­ 68known­as­the­marriage­law.> (visited 10 November 2014)
24  U.S. v. Evangelista, supra note 22.
25  Rule 132, Section 20. Proof of private document.—Before
any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By   evidence   of   the   genuineness   of   the   signature   or
handwriting of the maker.
26  Malayan Insurance, Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires
Corp., 430 Phil. 163, 168; 380 SCRA 374, 379 (2002).
527
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
original need not be produced. We do not agree. We hadprevio
usly ruled in Vallarta   v.   Court   of
Appeals27 that “asigned carbon copy or
duplicate of a document executed atthe same time as the
original is known as a duplicateoriginal and maybe introduced in 
evidence withoutaccounting for the nonproduction of the original.  28  Id.
But, anunsigned and uncertified document purporting to be acarb
on copy is not competent evidence. It is because thereis no public  528
officer acknowledging the accuracy of thecopy.”28
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriagecontract is a 
private document, they now argue that it is anancient document 
which need not be authenticated.Petitioners’ argument still has n
o merit. Section 21, Rule132 defines an ancient document as one t
hat: 1) is morethan 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in w
hich itwould naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished
by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. Themarria
ge contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence itis clearly mor
e than 30
years old. On its face, there appearsto be no evidence of alteration
.
The marriage contract however does not meet the secondrequi
rement.
 Ancient documents are considered from proper custodyif they 
come from a place from which they mightreasonably be expected t
o be found. Custody is proper if itis proved to have had a legitimat
e origin or if thecircumstances of the particular case are such as t
o rendersuch an origin probable. If a document is found where itw
527 ould not properly and naturally
_______________
27  246   Phil.   596,   603;   163   SCRA   587,   592­593   (1988),
citing Mahilum v. Court of Appeals, 123 Phil. 1335; 17 SCRA 482,
486   (1966);   and U.S.   v.   Zapanta,   33   Phil.   567
(1916). See Herrera, Remedial   Law,   Vol.   V,   pp.   182­183,   1999
edition.
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
be, its absence from the proper place must besatisfactorily acc
ounted for.29
Gibson   v.
Poor  cited the reason why it is required thatan ancient documen
30
t shall be produced from the properdepository:
x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it no
tfor its antiquity, and the presumption that consequently arises t
hatevidence of its execution cannot be obtained, it would have to b
eproved. It is not that any one particular place of deposit can have
more virtue in it than another, or make that true which is false; b
utthe fact of its coming from the natural and proper place, tends t
oremove presumptions of fraud, and strengthens the belief in itsg
enuineness. It may be false, and so shown, notwithstanding thepr
esumptions in its favor. If found where it would not properly andn
aturally be, its absence from the proper place must besatisfactoril
y accounted for; but that being done and all suspicionsagainst its  hat are reasonable and probable, though differing indegree; some
genuineness removed, we can discover no reason why itmay not b
e read in evidence. The real question which is to affect itsconsider
ation is, whether the instrument offered is genuine, andcontains a  ably accounted for, that it impresses the mindwith the conviction,
true statement of what it purports to. In the Bishop   of   Meath   v.
Marquis   of
Winchester, 2 Bing. 183, Tindal, CJ., speakingof ancient documen
ts, holds this language. “It is not necessary thatthey should be fou
nd in the best and most proper place of deposit. Ifdocuments conti
nued in such custody, there never would be anyquestion as to thei
r authenticity; but it is when documents arefound in other than t
heir proper place of deposit, that theinvestigation commences whe
ther it was reasonable and naturalunder the circumstances in the 
particular case, to expect that
_______________
29  29A   Am.   Jur.   2d   Evidence   §   1204,   citing McGuire   v.
Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 26 S. Ct. 1, 50 L. Ed. 125 (1905); Nicholson
v. Eureka Lumber Co., 156 N.C. 59, 72 S.E. 86 (1911); Gibson v.
Poor, 21 N.H. 440, 1850 WL 2344 (1850). See Herrera, Remedial
Law, Vol. V, pp. 186­187, 1999 edition.
30  Gibson v. Poor, id.
529
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 529
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
 
they should have been in the place where they are actuallyfou
nd; for it is obvious, that while there can be only one place ofdepos
it strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many andvarious t
 
being more so, some less; and in those cases theproposition to be d
etermined is, whether the actual custody is soreasonably and prob
 
that the instrument found in such custody mustbe genuine.” Som
e authorities hold, that the antiquity of thedocument is alone suffi
cient to entitle it to be read, and that theother circumstances only 
go to its effect in evidence.
 
In Bartolome   v.   Intermediate   Appellate
Court,  theCourt ruled that the requirement of proper custody wa
31
smet when the ancient document in question was presentedin cou
rt by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir ofthe person who  t she was born to Vicente andBenita. These two affiants were nev
would naturally keep it. In this casehowever, we find that Simplic
ia also failed to prove herfiliation to Vicente and Benita. She mere
ly presented abaptismal certificate which has long been held “as e
videnceonly to prove the administration of the sacrament on thed
ates therein specified, but not the veracity of thedeclarations ther
ein stated with respect to her kinsfolk.“The same is conclusive onl
y of the baptism administered,according to the rites of the Catholi
c Church, by the priestwho baptized subject child, but it does not  icate ofevery registered birth with the NSO. The advice was nothe
prove theveracity of the declarations and statements contained in
the certificate concerning the relationship of the personbaptized.”3
2
 As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as anheir, in whose cust
ody the marriage contract is expected tobe found. It bears reiterat
ion that Simplicia testified thatthe marriage contract was given t
o her by Benita but thatSimplicia cannot
_______________
31  262 Phil. 113, 122­123; 183 SCRA 102, 109­110 (1990).
32  Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 681,
689; 316 SCRA 338, 344 (1999), citing Macadangdang v. Court of
Appeals, 188 Phil. 192, 201; 100 SCRA 73, 84­85 (1980); Paa v.
Chan, 128 Phil. 815, 822; 21 SCRA 753, 759 (1967).
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
make out the contents of said document because shecannot rea
d and write.
On the other hand, the document presented to proveLigaya’s k
inship is a Joint Affidavit executed by twopersons to the effect tha
er presented in court.Thus, their statement is tantamount to hear
say evidence.
Petitioners also presented certifications from the localcivil regi
strar certifying that the records of birth from 1930to 1946 were de
stroyed by fire and/or war. In saiddocuments, there contains an a
dvice that petitioners maymake a further verification with the NS
O because the localcivil registrar submits a copy of the birth certif
eded. Petitioners failed to present a certification fromNSO whethe
r such records do exist or not.
While we acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining oldrecords, w
e simply cannot ignore the rules on evidence,specifically the rule o
n authentication with respect toprivate documents which is precis
ely in place to preventthe inclusion of spurious documents in the 
body of evidencethat will determine the resolutions of an issue.
Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validityof the 
marriage between Vicente and Benita, it follows thatthey do not h
ave a cause of action in the case for thedeclaration of nullity of th
e Extrajudicial Settlement of theEstate of Vicente and Leonora.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 5 August2008 
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.­G.R. CV No.89585 reversi
ng and setting aside the 30 January 2007Decision and 16 April 20
07 Resolution of the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 69 of Binangona
n, Rizal in Civil Case No. R­98­047 is AFFIRMED.
531
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 531
Cercado­Siga vs. Cercado, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
  Sereno   (CJ.,   Chairperson),   Leonardo­De   Castro,
Bersamin and Perlas­Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Before   private   documents   can   be   received   in
evidence, proof of their due execution and authenticity must be
presented.   (Ledesco   Development   Corporation   vs.   Worldwide
Standard International Realty, Inc., 636 SCRA53 [2010])
Proof  of  due  execution  and  authenticity  required  before any
private   document   offered   as   authentic   is   received   in   evidence.
(Meneses vs. Venturozo, 659 SCRA 577 [2011])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
172  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 127598. February 22, 2000.*
MANILA   ELECTRIC   COMPANY,   petitioner, vs. Hon.
SECRETARY   of   LABOR   LEONARDO   QUISUMBING   and
MERALCO   EMPLOYEES   and   WORKERS   ASSOCIATION
(MEWA), respondents.
Labor   Law; Collective   Bargaining   Agreements; Public
Utilities;An   increase   in   the   prices   of   electric   current   needs   the
approval   of   the   appropriate   regulatory   government   agency   and
does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of
the public utility firm’s employees.—–Petitioner warns that if the
wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary
is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to
the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This
is   a non   sequitur. The   Court  cannot   be   threatened   with  such   a
misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric current
needs   the   approval   of   the   appropriate   regulatory   government
agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in
the   wages   of   petitioner’s   employees.   Besides,   this   argument
presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase.
Same; Same; Evidence; Commercial Lists; A mere newspaper
account   is   not   considered   a   commercial   list—it   is   at   most   an
analysis   or   opinion   which   carries   no   persuasive   weight   in
determining the rate of wage increase.—–Under the afore­quoted
rule,   statement   of   matters   contained   in   a   periodical   may   be
admitted only “if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them therein.” As correctly held in our Decision dated January
27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not
even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion
sufficient   figures   to   support   it   were   presented.   Neither   did
anybody   testify   to   its   accuracy.   It   cannot   be   said   that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their
occupation.   Besides,   no   evidence   was   presented   that   the
publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the
market   and   that   it   is   generally   regarded   as   trustworthy   and
reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are
not admissible. In 
__________________
  SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION.
*
173
VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  173
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
the  same  manner,  newspapers  containing stock quotations
are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is
available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such
reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report
in   this   case   can   be   easily   made   available   considering   that   the
same   is   necessary   for   compliance   with   certain   governmental
requirements.
Same; Same; Arbitral   Awards; Retroactive   Effect;   Collective
Bargaining Agreement arbitral awards granted after six months
from  the expiration  of the last  Collective Bargaining  Agreement
shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the
employees or their union, and in the absence of such an agreement
as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after
the six­month period following the expiration of the last day of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement should there be one, or, in the
absence   of   a   Collective   Bargaining   Agreement,   the   Secretary’s
determination   of   the   date   of   retroactivity   as   part   of   his
discretionary   powers   over   arbitral   awards   shall   control.—–The
Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall
be “effective for a period of 2 years counted from December 28,
1996   up   to   December   27,   1999.”   Parenthetically,   this   actually
covers a three­year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an
arbitral   award   in   a   labor   dispute   where   the   Secretary   had
assumed jurisdiction by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code
shall   retroact.  In  general,  a  CBA  negotiated  within six  months
after   the   expiration   of   the   existing   CBA   retroacts   to   the   day
immediately   following   such   date   and   if   agreed   thereafter,   the
effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other
hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral
award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of
the  parties   but  by  intervention  of  the  government.   Despite  the
silence   of   the   law,   the   Court   rules   herein   that   CBA   arbitral
awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last
CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer
and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to
retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the
six­month period following the expiration of the last day of the
CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s
determination   of   the   date   of   retroactivity   as   part   of   his
discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
Same; Same; Same; An arbitral award can be considered as
an   approximation   of   a   collective   bargaining   agreement   which
would otherwise have been entered into by the parties.—–It is true
that an 
174
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
74 
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement
voluntarily   entered   into   by   the   parties   because   it   requires   the
interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary
of   Labor   when   he   assumes   jurisdiction.   However,   the   arbitral
award   can   be   considered   as   an   approximation   of   a   collective
bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered
into by the parties. The terms or periods set forth in Article 253­A
pertains   explicitly   to   a   CBA.   But   there   is   nothing   that   would
prevent  its   application   by   analogy   to  an   arbitral   award   by   the
Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law.
 Same; Same; Same; Cooperatives; The   award   of   loans   for
housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of life,
but providing seed money for the establishment of an employee’s
cooperative   is   a   matter   in   which   the   employer   has   no   business
interest   or   legal   obligation.—–On   the   allegation   concerning   the
grant  of  loan to  a  cooperative,   there is  no  merit  in  the union’s
claim  that it is no  different from housing loans granted by the
employer. The award of loans for housing is justified because it
pertains   to   a   basic   necessity   of   life.   It   is   part   of   a   privilege
recognized   by   the   employer   and   allowed   by   law.   In   contrast,
providing   seed   money   for   the   establishment   of   the   employee’s
cooperative is  a matter  in which the  employer has no business
interest or legal obligation. Courts should not be utilized as a tool
to compel any person to grant loans to another nor to force parties
to undertake an obligation without justification. On the contrary,
it is the government that has the obligation to render financial
assistance   to   cooperatives   and   the   Cooperative   Code   does   not
make it an obligation of the employer or any private individual.
Same; Same; Management   Prerogatives; Contracting   Out   of
Services; The employer is allowed to contract out services for six
months   or   more.—–The   added   requirement   of   consultation
imposed by the Secretary in cases of contracting out for six (6)
months or more has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say
that   the   employer   is   allowed   to   contract   out   services   for   six
months   or   more.   However,   a   line   must   be   drawn   between
management   prerogatives   regarding   business   operations   per   se
and those which affect the rights of employees, and in treating
the latter, the employer should see to it that its employees are at
least properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order
to   attain   a   harmonious   labor­management   relationship   and
enlighten the workers concerning their rights.
175
VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  175 
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
Same; Same; Same; Same; The   management   cannot   be
denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy
by a study of what units are essential for its operation—it has the
ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by
its personnel or contracted to outside agencies; Contracting out of
services   is   an   exercise   of   business   judgment   or   management
prerogative.—–Hiring   of   workers   is   within   the   employer’s
inherent   freedom   to   regulate   and   is   a   valid   exercise   of   its
management   prerogative   subject   only   to   special   laws   and
agreements on the matter and the fair standards of justice. The
management cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency
and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for
its   operation.   It   has   the   ultimate   determination   of   whether
services   should   be   performed   by   its   personnel   or   contracted   to
outside   agencies.   While   there   should   be   mutual   consultation,
eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides.
Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or
management prerogative. Absent proof that management acted in
a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with
the   exercise   of   judgment   by   an  employer.   As   mentioned   in  the
January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already sufficiently regulates
this   matter.   Jurisprudence   also   provides   adequate   limitations,
such that the employer must be motivated by good faith and the
contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent the law or
must not have been the result of malicious or arbitrary actions.
These   are   matters   that   may   be   categorically   determined   only
when an actual suit on the matter arises.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the 
Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.     resolution
     Rolando R. Arbues, Atilano S. Guevarra, Jr. and Marianito Wages  ­P1,900.00 for 1995­96  P2,200.00 
D.   Miranda   and   Siguion   Reyna,   Montecillo   &   Ongsiako for X’mas bonus  ­modified to one month  2 months 
petitioner. Retirees  ­remanded to the Secretary  granted 
     Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Loan to coops  ­denied  granted 
Fernandez for Meralco Employees and Workers Association. GHSIP, HMP and Housing loans  ­granted up to P60,000.00  granted 
     M.B. Tomacruz Law Office and Jesus S. Silo for First Line Signing bonus  ­denied  granted 
Asso. of Meralco Supervisory Employees.  Union leave  ­40 days (typo error)  30 days 
176 High voltage/  ­not apply to those who are not  members 
176  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  pole  exposed to the risk  of a team 
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing Collectors  ­no need for cash bond, no need   
R E S O L U T I O N   to reduce quota and MAPL   

YNARES­SANTIAGO, J.: _________________

In   the   Decision   promulgated   on   January   27,   1999,   the   Court  Decision   promulgated   January   27,   1999,   G.R.   No.   127598
1

disposed of the case as follows: penned   by   Justice   Antonio   Martinez   (now   retired)   with   Chief

“WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public Justice   Hilario   Davide,   Jr.   and   Justices   Jose   Melo,   Santiago
respondent   Secretary   of   Labor   dated   August   19,   1996   and Kapunan and Bernardo Pardo, concurring.
December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The 177
parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  177 
incorporating   the   terms   and   conditions   contained   in   the Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor’s orders of August
CBU  ­exclude confidential employees  include 
19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth
Union security  ­maintenance of membership  closed shop 
above. The retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of
Labor   for   reception   of   evidence   and   determination   of   the   legal Contracting out  ­no need to consult union  consult 
personality of the Meralco retirement fund.”1 first 
The modifications of the public respondent’s resolutions include All benefits  ­existing terms and conditions  all terms 
the following:  Retroactivity  ­Dec. 28, 1996­Dec. 27, 199(9)  from 
  January 27, 1999 decision Secretary’ Dec. 1, 1995 
s Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private
respondent   union   (Union   for   brevity)   filed   a   motion   for
intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
A   separate   intervention   was   likewise   made   by   the   supervisor’s
union   (FLAMES2)   of   petitioner   corporation   alleging   that   it
has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case. 3 The Court
required   the   “proper   parties”   to   file   a   comment   to   the   three
motions for reconsideration but the Solicitor­General asked that
he be excused from filing the comment because the “petition filed
in   the   instant   case   was   granted”   by   the   Court. 4Consequently,
petitioner   filed   its   own   consolidated   comment.   An   “Appeal
Seeking Immediate Reconsideration” was also filed by the alleged
newly   elected   president   of   the   Union. 5 Other   subsequent
pleadings were filed by the parties and intervenors.
The   issues   raised   in   the   motions   for   reconsideration   had
already been passed upon by the Court in the January 27, 1999
decision. No new arguments were presented for consideration of
the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein,
particularly   those   involving   the   amount   of   wages   and   the
retroactivity   of   the   Collective   Bargaining   Agreement   (CBA)
arbitral awards.
Petitioner  warns   that  if  the  wage  increase  of  P2,200.00   per
month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply  compilation   is   published   for   use   by   persons   engaged   in   that
__________________
2
 First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees.
3
 Motion for Leave to Intervene and to treat this as Movant’s
Intervention filed by FLAMES, p. 4; Rollo, p. 2476.
4
 Solicitor­General’s   Manifestation   and   Motion   dated   August
10, 1999, p. 2; Rollo, p. 2506.
5
 Rollo, p. 2495.
178
178  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an
increase   in   the   rate   of   electricity.   This   is   a non   sequitur. The
Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An
increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the
appropriate   regulatory   government   agency   and   does   not
automatically   result   from   a   mere   increase   in   the   wages   of
petitioner’s employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that
petitioner   is   capable   of   meeting   a   wage   increase.   The   All   Asia
Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding   the   wage   issue   can   not   be   an   accurate   basis   and
conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of
Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
“Commercial   lists   and   the   like.—–Evidence   of   statements   of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained
in   a   list,   register,   periodical,   or   other   published   compilation   is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged
in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein.”   Under   the   afore­quoted   rule,   statement   of   matters
contained   in   a   periodical   may   be   admitted   only   “if   that
occupation   and   is   generally   used   and   relied   upon   by   them
therein.”
As   correctly   held   in   our   Decision   dated   January   27,   1999,   the
cited   report   is   a   mere   newspaper   account   and   not   even   a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which
carries   no   persuasive   weight   for   purposes   of   this   case   as   no
sufficient   figures   to   support   it   were   presented.   Neither   did
anybody   testify   to   its   accuracy.   It   cannot   be   said   that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their
occupation.   Besides,   no   evidence   was   presented   that   the
market   and   that   it   is   generally   regarded   as   trustworthy   and
reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are
not admissible.6 In the same manner, newspapers con­
________________
6
 20 Am. Jur. 819.
179
VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  179
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
taining stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the
source   of   the   reports   is   available.7 With   more   reason,   mere
analyses   or   projections   of   such   reports   cannot   be   admitted.   In
particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made
available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.
Nonetheless,   by   petitioner’s   own   allegations,   its  actual   total
net income for 1996 was P5.1 billion. 8 An estimate by the All Asia
financial analyst stated that petitioner’s net operating income for
the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union
relies on  to  support  its  claim.  Assuming   without  admitting  the
truth   thereof,   the   figure   is   higher   than   the   P4.171   billion
allegedly   suggested   by   petitioner   as  its  projected   net  operating
income.   The   P5.7   billion   which   was   the   Secretary’s   basis   for
granting  the P2,200.00 is higher than the  actual net income  of
P5.1   billion   admitted  by   petitioner.   It  would   be  proper   then   to
increase this Court’s award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the two
years of the CBA award. For 1992, the agreed CBA wage increase
for rank­and­file was P1,400.00 and was reduced to P1,350.00, for
1993;   further   reduced   to   P1,150.00   for   1994.   For   supervisory
employees, the agreed wage increase for the years 1992­1994 are
P1,742.50,   P1,682.50   and   P1,442.50,   respectively.   Based   on  the
foregoing figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two­year period
awarded   to   the   rank­and­file   is   much   higher   than   the   highest
increase granted to supervisory employees.9 As mentioned in the
January 27, 1999 Decision, the Court does “not seek to enumerate
in this decision the factors that should affect wage determination”
because collective bargaining disputes particularly those affecting
the   national   interest   and   public   service   “requires   due
consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties
to the dispute and of those who might
_________________
7
 20 Am. Jur. 819­820.
8
 Petitioner’s   Comment   to   Motions   for   Reconsideration   and
Motion for Intervention, p. 6; Rollo, p. 2514.
9
 See the January 27, 1999 Decision.
180
180  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
be affected by the dispute.”10 The Court takes judicial notice that
the new amounts granted herein are significantly higher than the
weighted average salary currently enjoyed by other rank­and­file
employees   within   the   community.   It   should   be   noted   that   the
relations   between   labor   and   capital   is   impressed   with   public
interest   which   must   yield   to   the   common   good. 11 Neither   party
should act oppressively against the other or impair the interest or
convenience of  the public.12 Besides, matters  of salary  increases
are part of management prerogative.13
On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, it is well to
recall that this petition had its origin in the renegotiation of the
parties’ 1992­1997 CBA insofar as the last two­year period thereof
is concerned. When the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction
and granted the arbitral awards, there was no question that these
arbitral awards were to be given retroactive effect. However, the
parties   dispute   the   reckoning   period   when   retroaction   shall
commence. Petitioner claims that the award should retroact only
from such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award,
invoking   the   1995   decision   in Pier   8case14 where   the   Court,
citing Union of Filipro Employees v. NLRC,15 said:
“The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed
by   the   parties   was   promulgated   on   June   5,   1989,   (and   hence,
outside the 6 month period from June 30, 1987,) the expiry date of
the past CBA. Based on the provision of Section 253­A, its retro­
__________________
10
 Manila   Electric   Company   v.   Quisumbing, 302   SCRA   173,
196 (1999).
11
 Article 1700, New Civil Code (NCC).
12
 Article 1701, NCC.
13
 See National   Federation   of   Labor   Unions   v.   NLRC, 202
SCRA 346 (1991).
14
 Pier   8   Arrastre   and   Stevedoring   Services,   Inc.   v.
RoldanConfesor, (2nd Div.), 311 Phil. 311; 241 SCRA 294 (1995)
penned   by   Justice   Puno   with   Chief   Justice   Narvasa   (ret.)   and
Justices Bidin (ret.), Regalado (ret.) and Mendoza, concurring, p.
329.
15
 192 SCRA 414 (1990).
181
VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  181
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
activity   should   be   agreed   upon   by   the   parties.   But   since   no
agreement   to   that   effect   was   made,   public   respondent   did   not
abuse its discretion in giving the said CBA a prospective effect.
The   action   of   the   public   respondent   is   within   the   ambit   of   its
authority vested by existing laws.”
On   the   other   hand,   the   Union   argues   that   the   award   should
retroact to such time granted by the Secretary, citing the 1993
decision of St. Luke’s.16
“Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must
retroact   to   the   date   of   the   expiration   of   the   previous   CBA,
contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of
the case, Article 253­A cannot be properly applied to herein case.
As correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of
April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
—–
Anent   the   alleged   lack   of   basis   for   the   retroactivity   provisions
awarded, we would stress that the provision of law invoked by the
Hospital, Article 253­A of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements
by and between the parties, and not arbitral awards . . .
“Therefore,   in   the   absence   of   a   specific   provision   of   law
prohibiting   retroactivity   of   the   effectivity   of   arbitral   awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed
vested  with  plenary   and  discretionary   powers  to  determine  the
effectivity thereof.”
In   the   1997   case   of Mindanao   Terminal,17 the   Court   applied
the St. Luke’s doctrine and ruled that: 
_________________
16
 St.   Luke’s   Medical   Center,   Inc.   v.   Torres, (3rd   Div.), 223
SCRA 779(1993), penned by Justice Melo with Justices Feliciano
(ret.),   Bidin   (ret.),   Davide,   Jr.   (now   Chief   Justice)   and   Romero
(ret.), concurring, pp. 792­793.
17
 In Mindanao   Terminal   and   Brokerage   Service,   Inc.   v.
Confesor, (2nd Div.), 338 Phil. 671; 272 SCRA 161 (1997) penned
by Justice Mendoza with Justices Regalado (ret.), Romero, (ret.),
Puno and Torres (ret.), concurring, p. 679.
182
182  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
“In St. Luke’s Medical Center v. Torres, a deadlock also developed
during   the   CBA   negotiations   between   management   and   the
union. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered
the   retroaction   of   the   CBA   to   the   date   of   expiration   of   the
previous CBA. As in this case, it was alleged that the Secretary of
Labor   gravely   abused   its   discretion   in   making   his   award
retroactive. In dismissing this contention this Court held:
“Therefore,   in   the   absence   of   a   specific   provision   of   law
prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued
by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code,   such   as   herein   involved,   public   respondent   is   deemed
vested  with  plenary   and  discretionary   powers  to  determine  the
effectivity thereof.”
The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA
shall be “effective for a period of 2 years counted from December
28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999.” Parenthetically, this actually
covers a three­year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an
arbitral   award   in   a   labor   dispute   where   the   Secretary   had
assumed jurisdiction by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code
shall   retroact.  In  general,  a  CBA  negotiated  within six  months
after   the   expiration   of   the   existing   CBA   retroacts   to   the   day
immediately   following   such   date   and   if   agreed   thereafter,   the
effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. 18On the other
hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral
award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of
the  parties   but  by  intervention  of  the  government.   Despite  the
silence   of   the   law,   the   Court   rules   herein   that   CBA   arbitral
awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last
CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer
and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to
six­month period following the expiration of the last day of the
CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s
determination   of   the   date   of   retroactivity   as   part   of   his
discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control. 
________________
 Article 253­A, Labor Code, as amended.
18
183
VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  183 
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as
an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it
requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru
the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However,
the arbitral award can be considered as  an approximation of a
collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been
entered   into   by   the   parties. 19 The   terms   or   periods   set   forth   in
Article 253­A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing
that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award
by   the   Secretary   considering   the   absence   of   an   applicable   law.
Under   Article   253­A:   “(I)f   any such   agreement is   entered   into
beyond   six   months,   the   parties   shall   agree   on   the   duration   of
retroactivity   thereof.”   In   other   words,   the   law   contemplates
retroactivity   whether   the   agreement   be   entered   into   before   or
after   the   said   six­month   period.   The   agreement   of   the   parties
need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered
in determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection,
the   Court   considers   the   letter   of   petitioner’s   Chairman   of   the
Board   and   its  President  addressed  to  their   stockholders,   which
states that the CBA “for the rank­and­file employees covering the
period December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997 is still with the
Supreme Court,”20 as indicative of petitioner’s recognition that the
CBA   award   covers   the   said   period.   Earlier,   petitioner’s
negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed
CBA covering the same period inclusive. 21 In addition, petitioner
does   not   dispute   the   allegation   that   in   the   past   CBA   arbitral
awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity commencing from the
period   immediately   following   the   last   day   of   the   expired   CBA.
Thus,   by   petitioner’s   own   actions,   the   Court   sees   no   reason   to
retroact the subject CBA awards to a different date. The period is
herein set at two (2) years from December 1, 1995 to November
30, 1997. 
_________________
19
 Mindanao   Terminal   and   Brokerage   Service,   Inc.   v.
Confesor, 338 Phil. 671; 272 SCRA 161 (1997).
20
 Rollo, p. 2347.
21
 Annex “C” of the Petition.
184
184  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  undertake the actual formation of cooperatives and shall create
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative,
there is no merit in the union’s claim that it is no different from
housing loans granted by the employer. The award of loans for
housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of life.
It is part of a privilege recognized by the employer and allowed by
law. In contrast, providing seed money for the establishment of
the employee’s cooperative is a matter in which the employer has
no   business   interest   or   legal   obligation.   Courts   should   not   be
utilized as a tool to compel any person to grant loans to another
nor   to   force   parties   to   undertake   an   obligation   without
justification. On the contrary, it is the government that has the
obligation to render financial assistance to cooperatives and the
Cooperative Code does not make it an obligation of the employer
or any private individual.22
Anent the 40­day union leave, the Court finds that the same is
a typographical error. In order to avoid any confusion, it is herein
declared that the union leave is only thirty (30) days as granted
by   the   Secretary   of   Labor   and   affirmed   in  the   Decision  of   this
Court.
The   added   requirement   of   consultation   imposed   by   the
Secretary in cases of contracting out for six (6) months or more
has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say that the em­
___________________
 See   Section   2,   R.A.   No.   6838   (Cooperative   Code   of   the
22
Philippines)   which   provides:   “It   is   the   declared   policy   of
the State to   foster   the   creation   and   growth   of   cooperative   as   a
practical   vehicle   for   promoting   self­reliance   and   harnessing
people   power   towards   the   attainment   of   economic   development
and social justice. The State shall encourage the private sector to
an atmosphere that is conducive to the organizational growth and
development   of   the   cooperatives.   Towards   this   end,
the Government and   all   its   branches,   subsidiaries,
instrumentalities,   and   agencies   shall   ensure   the   provision   of
technical   guidelines, financial   assistance, and   other   services   to
enable said cooperative to development into viable and responsive
economic   enterprises   and   thereby   bring   about   a   strong
cooperative movement that is free from any conditions that might
infringe   upon   the   autonomy   or   organizational   integrity   of
cooperatives.
185
VOL. 326, FEBRUARY 22, 2000  185
Manila Electric Company vs. Quisumbing
ployer is allowed to contract out services for six months or more.
However,   a   line   must   be   drawn   between   management
prerogatives   regarding   business   operations per   se and   those
which affect the rights of employees, and in treating the latter,
the   employer   should   see   to   it   that   its   employees   are   at   least
properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order to
attain   a   harmonious   labor­management   relationship   and
enlighten the workers concerning their rights. 23 Hiring of workers
is  within  the  employer’s   inherent  freedom   to  regulate  and   is  a
valid   exercise   of   its   management   prerogative   subject   only   to
special laws and agreements on the matter and the fair standards
of   justice.24 The   management   cannot   be   denied   the   faculty   of
promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study  of what
units   are   essential   for   its   operation.   It   has   the   ultimate
determination   of   whether   services   should   be   performed   by   its
personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be
mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what
management decides.25 Contracting out of services is an exercise
of business judgment or management prerogative. 26 Absent proof
that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the
Court   will   not   interfere   with   the   exercise   of   judgment   by   an
employer.27 As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the
law   already   sufficiently   regulates   this   matter. 28 Jurisprudence
also provides adequate limitations, such that the employer must
be motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be
resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of
malicious or arbitrary  actions.29 These are  matters that  may be
categorically determined only when an actual suit on the matter
arises.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED and the assailed Decision is MODIFIED as follows: (1)
the   arbitral   award   shall   retroact   from   December   1,   1995   to
November 30, 1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from
the   original   amount   of   One   Thousand   Nine   Hundred   Pesos
(P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for the years 1995
and  1996.   This   Resolution  is  subject  to  the  monetary  advances
granted  by   petitioner  to  its  rank­and­file  employees  during   the
pendency of this case assuming such advances had actually been
distributed to them. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Petition partially granted, judgment modified.
Notes.—–A   “public   utility”   under   the   Constitution   and   the
Public Service Law is one organized “for hire or compensation” to
serve the public, which is given the right to demand its service.
(Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 [1995])
The signing of the CBA is not determinative of the question
whether “the agreement was entered into within six months from
the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in
such  collective  bargaining  agreement”  within the contemplation
of Art. 253­A of the Labor Code where the parties already had a
meeting of the minds before the end of  the said six­month period.
(Mindanao   Terminal   and   Brokerage   Service,   Inc.   vs.   Roldan­
Confesor, 272 SCRA 161[1997])
A   CBA   which   is   part   of   an   arbitral   award   may   be   made
retroactive   to  the  date   of   expiration   of   the  previous   agreement
since Art. 253­A of the Labor Code refers to CBAs entered into by
the parties as a result of their mutual agreement, not to arbitral
awards.   (Manila   Central   Line   Corporation   vs.   Manila   Central
Line   Free   Workers   Union­National   Federation   of   Labor, 290
SCRA 690 [1998])
180  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
People vs. Ortiz­Miyake
G.R. Nos. 115338­39. September 16, 1997.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­appellee, vs. LANIE
ORTIZ­MIYAKE, accused­appellant.
Labor   Law; Criminal   Law; Illegal   Recruitment; Words   and
Phrases; “Recruitment and Placement,” Defined.—The Labor Code
defines   recruitment   and   placement   as   “x   x   x   any   act   of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or   procuring   workers   and   includes   referrals,   contract   services,
promising   or   advertising   for   employment,   locally   or   abroad,
whether for profit or not x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995); Ex Post Facto Laws; R.A. No.
8042 does not apply to an offense committed before its effectivity.—
During   the   pendency   of   this   case,   Republic   Act   No.   8042,
otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act   of   1995,”   was   passed   increasing   the   penalty   for   illegal
recruitment. This new law, however, does not apply to the instant
case because the offense charged herein was committed in 1992,
before the effectivity of said Republic Act No. 8042. Hence, what
are applicable are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.
Same; Same; Same; In illegal recruitment cases, the number
of   persons   victimized   is   determinative.—It   is   evident   that   in
illegal   recruitment   cases,   the   number   of   persons   victimized   is
determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a
lone   victim,   the   accused   may   be   convicted   of   simple   illegal
recruitment   which   is   punishable   with   a   lower   penalty   under
Article 39(c) of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is
committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal
recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under
Article 39(a) of the same Code.
Same; Same; Same; Right   of   Confrontation; The   right   of
confrontation has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of
cross­examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment   and   appearance   of   the   witness   while   testifying.—
Under   the   aforecited   rules,   the   accused   in   a   criminal   case   is
guaranteed the 
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
181
VOL. 279, SEPTEMBER 16, 1997  181 
People vs. Ortiz­Miyake
right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to
secure the opportunity of cross­examination; and, second, to allow
the   judge   to   observe   the   deportment   and   appearance   of   the
witness while testifying.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearsay   Rule; The   right   of
confrontation   is   not   absolute   as   it   is   recognized   that   it   is
sometimes   impossible   to   recall   or   produce   a   witness   who   has
already   testified   in   a   previous   proceeding,   in   which   event   his
previous   testimony   is   made   admissible   as   a   distinct   piece   of
evidence,   by   way   of   exception   to   the   hearsay   rule.—This   right,
however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified
in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is
made   admissible   as   a   distinct   piece   of   evidence,   by   way   of
exception   to  the  hearsay   rule.   The   previous   testimony   is  made
admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly
and expeditious.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; The   exception
to the right of confrontation contemplated by law covers only the
utilization   of   testimonies   of   absent   witnesses   made   in   previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions
or   judgments.—Under   these   rules,   the   adoption   by   the   Makati
trial   court   of   the   facts   stated   in   the decision of   the   Parañaque
trial   court   does   not   fall   under   the   exception   to   the   right   of
confrontation as the  exception contemplated by law covers only
the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions
or judgments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A   previous   decision
or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an
accused was previously convicted of a crime—it may not be used to
prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
case.—A   previous   decision   or   judgment,   while   admissible   in
evidence,   may   only   prove   that   an   accused   was   previously
convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused
is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said
previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis
for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of
the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
182
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence
82  proving   that   the   offense   was   committed   against   three   or   more
People vs. Ortiz­Miyake
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Every   conviction   must   be
based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its
appreciation   of   the   evidence   before   it—a   conviction   may   not   be
based merely on the findings of fact of another court.—As earlier
stated,   the   Makati   court’s   utilization   of   and   reliance   on   the
previous decision of the Parañaque court must be rejected. Every
conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial
court   according   to   its   appreciation   of   the   evidence   before   it.   A
conviction   may   not   be   based   merely   on   the   findings   of   fact   of
another   court,   especially   where   what   is   presented   is   only   its
decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who
testified therein and upon which the decision is based.
Same; Same; Same; Words   and   Phrases; “Simple   Illegal
Recruitment”   and   “Illegal   Recruitment   in   Large   Scale,”
Distinguished.—The   distinction   between   simple   illegal
recruitment and illegal recruitment in large scale are emphasized
by jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is committed where
a person: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under
Article   13(b)   or   any   prohibited   practice   enumerated   under
Articles  34  and  38  of  the  Labor  Code;   and  (b)  does  not  have  a
license   or   authority   to   lawfully   engage   in   the   recruitment   and
placement of workers. On the other hand, illegal recruitment in
large scale further requires a third element, that is, the offense is
committed   against   three   or   more   persons,   individually   or   as   a
group.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In illegal recruitment in large
scale, while the law does not require that at least three victims
persons.—In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does
not  require  that  at  least  three  victims  testify   at the  trial,  it  is
necessary   that   there   is   sufficient   evidence   proving   that   the
offense was committed against three or more persons. This Court
agrees   with   the   trial   court   that   the   evidence   presented
sufficiently   proves   that   illegal   recruitment   was   committed   by
appellant against Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be
made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as well.
Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Double   Jeopardy; Conviction
under   the   Labor   Code   for   illegal   recruitment   does   not   preclude
punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa.
—The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa
which was 
183
VOL. 279, SEPTEMBER 16, 1997  183
People vs. Ortiz­Miyake
committed against Marasigan. Conviction under the Labor
Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under
the   Revised   Penal   Code   for   the   felony   of   estafa.   This   Court   is
convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable  doubt
that   appellant   violated   Article   315(2)(a)   of   the   Revised   Penal
Code.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo
and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa
by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party
being Elenita Marasigan alone.
The information in the charge of illegal recruitment in large
scale in Criminal Case No. 92­6153 reads as follows:
That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August
1992,   in   the   Municipality   of   Parañaque,   Metro   Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above­named accused, falsely representing herself to have the
capacity   and   power   to   contract,   enlist   and   recruit   workers   for
employment abroad did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad to the following persons, to wit: 1) Rosamar del
Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo, without first
securing the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment in
large scale, in violation of the aforecited law.1
_______________
1
 Original Record, 1.