IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION VIRGINIA GRANT, et al., Plaintiffs, No. 2017-CH-12080 v. Calendar 16 JUDGE DAVID B, JAMES TT. DIMAS, et al., Judge David B. Atkins lean Defendants. MAR 13 2010 Circuit Court-1879 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THIS CASE COMING TO BE HEARD on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum- mary Judgment and Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider, the Court having con- sidered the briefs submitted, and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED and Defendants’ Motion is DENIED. Background ‘This is an action for mandamus by the Plaintiff's, personal assistants employed by the Ilinois Department of Human Services (‘DHP”) via its Home Services Program (“HSP"), and their collective bargaining representative, the Service Employees International Union, Healthcare Ilinois and Indiana (“SEIU”). Plaintiffs seek to compel the state Defendants to implement Illinois Public Act 100-0028 (the “Wage Act”), which required that the wages of Plain- tiffs (and other HSP personal assistants) be increased by $0.48/hour, effective August 5, 2017. The Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and the De- fendants now move for reconsideration of that order. Plaintiffs also move for summary judgment and class certification. Legal Standard ‘The purpose of a motion to reconsider an order previously entered by the court is (1) to bring to the court's attention newly discovered evidence unavail- able at the time of the original hearing, (2) changes in existing law, or (3) errors in the court’s previous application of existing law to the facts at hand. River Vill. I, LLC v, Century Ins. Cos., 396 Il. App. 3d 480, 492 (2009); Continental Cas, Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 279 Ill, App. 8d 815, 821 (1996). The movant bears the burden of establishing sufficient grounds to vacate the order. McGann v. Illinois Hosp. Ass'n, 172 Ill. App. 84 560, 566 (1988). In order to be successful, the movant must show some error on the part of the court. Id. ‘The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is within the sound discretion of the trial Page 1 of 3court and it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill, 2d 324, 847 (2002). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but rather to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits illustrate no gen- uine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 6/2-1005; Miller v. William Chevrolet, 326 Ill. App. 3d 642, 648 (2001). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider “all the evidence before it strictly against the movant and liber- ally in favor of the nonmovant.” Id. (citing Largosa v, Ford Motor Co., 303 Ill App. 3d 751, 753 (1999)).. Dis ussion. Turning first to the Motion to Reconsider, the Defendants raise no new facts or law to support their argument that the Court’s January 17, 2018 Order denying their Motion to Dismiss was in ervor. Instead, they simply repeat ar- guments previously raised and assert that the Court’s key findings in the January 17 Order, including that the Wage Act leaves no room for discretion and therefore cannot be ignored pending further collective bargaining, were erroneous ‘The Court finds no reason to reconsider its conclusions. As noted in the January 17 Order, the Wage Act is strikingly, clearly mandatory in its lan- guage and intent: it requires that the Defendants “shall increase” the wages of Plaintiffs (and similarly situated workers) by a specific amount ($0.48/hour) on a specific date (August 5, 2017). Their argument that they nevertheless may (or must) bargain indefinitely over current employee wages would render the Wage Act entirely meaningless, especially the provision setting an explicit. August 5 deadline. Defendants’ reliance on Cebertowicz v. Madigan (also raised on the un- derlying Motion) is misplaced. 2016 IL App (4th) 140917 (2016). While the court there instructed that “shall” does not always identify mandatory statutes and that statutes are generally merely directory if no consequence flows from noncompliance, that case involved a clearly distinguishable law requiring that Attorney General “shall investigate all violations” of civil rights laws. Id. The Attorney General's duty to investigate crimes is indeed “directory” because it inherently leaves room for discretion on how to proceed with any given inves- tigation (or even whether an investigation is warranted), and is thus not the sort of ministerial duty appropriate for mandamus. In contrast, the Defend- ants’ duty here under the Wage Act is absolute and precise: Defendants must increase the wages of certain workers by a certain amount on a certain date. Page 2 of 3See also PACE v. RTA, 346 Ill. App. 3d 125, 140 (2008)(“A court will not give shall’ a permissive meaning, however, where it is used with reference to any right of benefit to anyone and the right or benefit depends on giving a manda- tory meaning to the term.”) Similarly, Defendants raise no new arguments to contest the Court’s finding that the Wage Act and the Labor Act do not conflict because the latter explicitly exempts matters “specifically provided for in any other law or [] spe- cifically in violation of the provisions of any law” from the duty to collectively bargain. 5 ILCS 315/7. The Court accordingly finds no reason to reconsider that finding. Finally, because the Court declines to reconsider its January 17 Order, it finds further that summary judgment is appropriate!. The parties agree on all operative facts, especially that the Plaintiffs’ wages have not been increased despite the passage of the Wage Act, and the matter involves only questions of law, namely those discussed above. Because the Court finds Defendants have a mandatory duty to increase Plaintiffs’ wages in accordance with the Wage Act and have not done so, Plaintiffs aro entitled to judgment as a matter of law WHEREFORE, Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider is DENIED and Plaintiff’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants. On or before March 21, 2018, Defendants are hereby ordered to implement the $0.48/hour wage increase provided for in P.A. 100-0023 for all personal assis- tants and individual maintenance home health workers for all hours worked beginning August 5, 2017. This is a final and appealable order. ENTUBEDDAVID B. ATKINS MAR 13 2018 Circuit Court-1879 Judge David B, Atkins The Court "Indeed, Defendants provide no arguments in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment other than their arguments for reconsideration, » Additionally, while the Plaintiffs also request class certification in their motion, the parties agreed at oral argument that auch certification is not necessary for full relief as to all relevant workers via the requested writ of mandamus. The Court accordingly declinos to certify a class in this matter. Page 3 of 3