LLorenvsComelec GR No. 196355 Sept.
18, 2012 underscores the legislative intent to do away with the award of damages
Issue: Can election protests be summarily dismissed?
Ruling: Yes. As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not indicate the
total number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The
omission rendered the election protest insufficient in form and content, and
warranted its summary dismissal, in accordance with Section 12, Rule 2 of
the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, to wit:
Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. — The court shall
summarily dismiss, motuproprio, an election protest, counter-protest or
petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section
10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
(d) The filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election protest
or petition for quo warranto; and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid
within five (5) days from the filing of the protest.
The summary dismissal of the election protest upon any of the grounds
mentioned in Section 12 is mandatory.
Bungcarasvscomelec GR Nos. 209415-17, Nov. 15,2016
Issue: can moral damages and atty fees be awarded in election protests?
Ruling: We find that the trial court gravely erred in awarding moral damages
of P450,000.00 in favor of each of the private respondents. The award is
improper as the same is not sanctioned under our current election law.
What is patently clear from Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code is
that only actual or compensatory damages may be awarded in election
contests.
Concerning the trial court's award of attorney's fees of P150,000.00 in favor
of each of the private respondents, the same is likewise unwarranted.
Attorney's fees in the concept of damages are not recoverable against a
party just because of an unfavorable judgment. Repeatedly, it has been said
that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Additional: in Atienza case, the omission of the provisions allowing for moral
and exemplary damages in the current Omnibus Election Code clearly
other than those specified in Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code, i.e.,
actual or compensatory damages.
Issue: how are appeals in election cases involving elective municipal and
barangay officials, perfected?
Ruling: In the recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec,
The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court's decision in election contests
involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court
that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The
nonpayment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of
P3,200.00 to the COMELECCash Division, in accordance with Rule 40,
Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect
the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso
facto dismissal of the appeal.
Regio v. Comelec G.R. No. 2014828, Dec. 3, 2013
Issue: Did the Comelec correctly apply the Rosal doctrine?
Ruling:No. The Rosal ruling does not involve issues merely related to the
appreciation or calibration of evidence; its critical ruling is on the propriety
of relying on the revision of ballot results instead of the election returns in
the proclamation of a winning candidate. The Rosal doctrine ensures that in
election protest cases, the supreme mandate of the people is ultimately
determined. In laying down the rules in appreciating the conflicting results
of the canvassing and the results of a revision later made, the Court has no
other intention but to determine the will of the electorate. The Rosal
doctrine is also supplemented by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC establishing the
following disputable presumptions.
Private respondent Co has not proved that the integrity of the ballots has
been preserved applying Rosal, viewed in conjunction with A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC, the Court ruled that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that private respondent had successfully discharged the
burden of proving that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings
are the same ballots cast and counted during the day of the elections.
Additional Info: What the protestant should endeavor to prove, however, in
presenting evidence of preservation, is not that the ballots themselves are
genuine or official, but that they are the very same ones cast by the
electorate. The Report, therefore, cannot be considered as evidence of the
preservation, as required by Rosal.
ER Ejercito v. Comelec& San Luis, GR. 212398, Nov. 25, 2014
Issue: Can the advertising contracts be admitted in evidence even I f not
formally offered?
Ruling:Yes. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, it is well recognized that the Court is empowered to
suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case from the application of a
general rule, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather
than promote the ends of justice. The fact is, even Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure fittingly declare that "the rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission" and that "in the interest of justice and in
order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the
Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission."
Additional Info: Further, the COMELEC may properly take and act on the
advertising contracts without further proof from the parties herein. Aside
from being considered as an admission and presumed to be proper
submissions from them, the COMELEC already has knowledge of the
contracts for being ascertainable from its very own records. Said contracts
are ought to be known by the COMELEC because of its statutory function as
the legal custodian of all advertising contracts promoting or opposing any
candidate during the campaign period. As what transpired in this case, the
COMELEC has the authority and discretion to compare the submitted
advertising contracts with the certified true copies of the broadcast logs,
certificates of performance or other analogous records which a broadcast
station or entity is required to submit for the review and verification of the
frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements aired.
Federico v. Comelec, GR 166912, Jan. 22,2013
Issue: was the election protest against Federico timely filed?
Ruling:Yes. Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second COCVP in
favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. From that day, he had ten (10) days
to question the dubious proceeding in the MBOC under Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8804. Considering that Maligaya filed his petition to annul
Federico’s May 10, 2010 proclamation on June 1, 2010, it was indeed filed
on time.
Garcia v. COMELEC &Payumo, GR No. 216691, July 21, 2015
ISSUE: Was Payumo’s Election protest timely Filed?
RULING:No. Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning
mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013, it is then plain to see that Payumo’s
election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright.
The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC that the
proclamation of protestee (Garcia) was done on May 14, 2013, coupled with
the issuance of the manual certificate of canvass and proclamation on the
same date, is sufficient proof that protestee’s proclamation was in fact done
on May 14, 2013 and not on May 15, 2013. The printed certificate of
canvass and proclamation already on May 15, 2013 was not meant to
supersede the proclamation already been done on May 14, 2013, but only
to comply with the "official format" of the COMELEC, according to Municipal
Election Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what had
already been accomplished with the manually written document.
ISSUE: Is Federico vs. Comelec a precedent in this case?
RULING: NO. The ruling Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the
instant case. Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-
day period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not
from the date of notice. As the elementary rule in statutory construction
goes, when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal,
their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. Federico appears to
have deviated from the wording of Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code
but that is only due to the peculiarities of the said case. It must be stressed
that the SC’s ruling in Federico was based on considerations not in all fours
with the case at bar.
The circumstances in Federico that (1) there were actually two different
proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation
was surreptitiously made were essential in the SC’s ruling therein. This is in
stark contrast with the case at bench where there was only one
proclamation, which was, by no means, clandestinely made. Here, there is
no dispute that there was only one mayoralty candidate proclaimed winner.
Thus, the only issues pertain to when such proclamation was done, and
which document accurately reported the same. In addition, there was no
allegation whatsoever of a surreptitious proclamation for Garcia’s
proclamation was, in fact, publicly announced. As culled from the records,
the members of the MBOC testified that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14,
2013 in a well-attended ceremony
ADDITIONAL INFO:
Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court
indeed nullified the proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico
(Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas even though private
respondent OsmundoMaligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more
than ten (10) days after such fact. There, the Court reckoned the 10-ady
prescriptive period not from the date of proclamation but from the date of
proclamation but from the date Maligaya received notice of the event,
rendering the actual date of proclamation immaterial. It is this holding in
Federico that Payumo adamantly urges that We apply
Legazpi vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 216572, Sept. 1, 2015
Issue: How should the phrase “originally commenced in the commission”
in Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules be construed?
Ruling: The phrase "originally commenced in the commission" in Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is worded in plain language and, therefore,
must be construed in its ordinary and natural sense. It simply means what it
says. The phrase is meant to cover any action or proceeding that is filed, at
the first instance, before the COMELEC—whether sitting in division or en
banc—as contradistinguished from cases that are merely appealed to it.
In this case, the fact that SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an action originally
commenced in the COMELEC cannot at all be doubted. The records are
crystal clear that the petition was first filed with the COMELEC and was
raffled to the First Division for decision. It is a fresh petition—as it passed
upon no other tribunal, body or entity prior to its filing with the COMELEC.
Hence, for all intents and purposes, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) must be
considered as an action "originally commenced in the commission" under
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
Issue: Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules, what are the effects
of the Comelec en banc’s failure to decide?
Ruling: Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules, the COMELEC en
banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot decide or
resolve by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot be had after
the rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide on the part of the
COMELEC en banc. The provision then specifies the effects of the COMELEC
en banc’s failure to decide:
1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such
action or proceeding shall be dismissed;
2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; or
3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
As can be gleaned above, the effects of the COMELEC en banc’s failure to
decide vary depending on the type of case or matter that is before the
commission. Thus, under the provision, the first effect (i.e., the dismissal of
the action or proceeding) only applies when the type of case before the
COMELEC is an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the
commission"; the second effect (i.e., the affirmance of a judgment or order)
only applies when the type of case before the COMELEC is an "appealed
case"; and the third effect (i.e., the denial of the petition or motion) only
applies when the case or matter before the COMELEC is an "incidental
matter."
Issue: Was the Comelec en banc correct in dismissing the electoral protest
after it failed to obtain the required majority during the “re-hearing” of
the MR?
Ruling: Yes. When an election case originally filed with the COMELEC is first
decided by a division, the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration
from that decision before the en banc does not signify the initiation of a
new action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an existing process.
The motion for reconsideration—not being an appeal from the decision of
the division to the en banc—only thus serves as a means of having the
election case decided by the COMELEC en banc. Under this view, therefore,
the nature of the election case as it was before the division remains the
same even after it is forwarded to the en banc through a motion for
reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) when it was unable to reach a
majority vote after the rehearing. Contrary to what petitioner asserts, SPA
No. 13-323 (DC) is most definitely an action that was filed originally before
the COMELEC within the contemplation of the said provision. While SPA No.
13-323 (DC) reached the COMELEC en banc only through a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Special First Division, its character as
an original case filed before the commission remains the same. Hence, the
failure of COMELEC en banc to decide in this case properly results in the
application of the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
which states that “If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the
COMELEC, such action or proceeding shall be dismissed”.facto dismissal of
the appeal.
Legaspivscomelec GR 216572 April 19,2016 MR
Issue: did the interpretation of sec 6 rule 18 of the comlec rules of
procedure in Mendoza and in the sep 1, 2015 decision render the rule
unconstitutional?
Ruling: Yes. The Mendoza doctrine, as reiterated in the September 1, 2015
Decision, deviated from the 1987 Constitution. Not only does it circumvent
the four-vote requirement under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, it
likewise diminishes the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC Divisions
under Sec. 3, Article IX-C.
Additional: Under Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, 15 the
COMELEC Divisions are granted adjudicatory powers to decide election
cases, provided that the COMELEC en bane shall resolve motions for
reconsideration of the division rulings. Further, under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of
the Constitution, 16 four (4) votes are necessary for the COMELEC en bane
to decide a case. Naturally, the party moving for reconsideration, as the
party seeking affirmative relief, carries the burden of proving that the
division committed reversible error. The movant then shoulders the
obligation of convincing four ( 4) Commissioners to grant his or her plea.
This voting threshold, however, is easily rendered illusory by the application
of the Mendoza ruling, which virtually allows the grant of a motion for
reconsideration even though the movant fails to secure four votes in his or
her favor, in blatant violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution. In this
case, in spite of securing only two (2) votes to grant their motion for
reconsideration, private respondents were nevertheless declared the victors
in the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en bane Resolution.
Issue: Is the motion for recon before the COmelec en banc an “incidental
matter”?
Ruling: Yes. Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio)
explained that a motion for reconsideration is an incidental matter, and that
application of Sec. 7, Rule 56 thereto has been clarified in A.M. No. 99- 1-09-
SC28 wherein the Court resolved as follows:
A motion for the consideration of a decision or resolution of the court en
banc or of a division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the
members of the en banc or of a division, as the case may be, who actually
took part in the deliberation of the motion if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
The plain meaning of the clarificatory resolution is that the motion for
reconsideration, being an incidental matter, is deemed denied if no majority
vote is reached. Consequently, the Court's prior majority action in such
cases stands affirmed.
Issue: Is there sufficient basis to re-visit and modify the Mendoza
doctrine?
Not sure about this. Will re-check. Lisod man.
Ruling: Yes. Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC
divisions the authority to decide election cases. Their decisions are capable
of attaining finality, without need of any affirmative or confirmatory action
on the part of the COMELEC en bane. And while the Constitution requires
that the motions for reconsideration be resolved by the COMELEC en bane,
it likewise requires that four votes must be reached for it to render a valid
ruling and, consequently, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of
private respondents. Hence, when the private respondents failed to get the
four-vote requirement on their motion for reconsideration, their motion is
defeated and lost as there was NO valid ruling to sustain the plea for
reconsideration. The prior valid action - the COMELEC Special First Division's
October 3, 2013 Resolution in this case - therefore subsists and is affirmed
by the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
ER Ejercito vs. Comelec GR 212398 Nov. 25 2014
Issue: Did Ejercito commit the election offense of election overspending?
Ruling: Yes. Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess that is allowed by the OEC. Notably, R.A. No.
9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the
candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the
candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be
submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts
shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-
authorized representative of the political party. Conformably with the
mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election
propaganda materials donated to a candidate shall not be broadcasted
unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which
shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and
must specify the description of the items donated, their quantity and value,
and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or
booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly
authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be
accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their
authorized representatives. Assuming arguendo, that the actual cost of both
contracts only amounted to PhP 12,818,470.56 as substantiated by the two
(2) Official Receipts issued by the ABS-CBN on [April 26] and [May 7, 2013],
or even if the court were only to consider the Php 6,409,235.28 payment to
ABS-CBN on [April 26, 2013], it nevertheless supports the finding that
Ejercito exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00
which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68 (c) and concurrently
an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Causing v. Biron, GR 199139, Sept. 9, 2014
Issue: Whether or not the relocation of the petitioner by respondent
Municipal Mayor during the election period from her office as the Local
Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor just a few steps away constituted
a prohibited act under the Omnibus election Code and the relevant
Resolution of the Commission on Elections?
Ruling:No. The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the
Resolution as "any personnel movement from one government agency to
another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision
of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an
appointment;" while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987is
the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical and legal meanings,
transfer and detail must be construed as such. Obviously, the movement
involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred
her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor "some little
steps" away. The Court cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore,
that the phrase "any transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and
all kinds and manner of personnel movement including the mere change in
office location.
Additional Info: Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of Causing
was rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials and
employees serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the
faithful discharge of their duties and functions. His explanation that he
transferred Causing’s work station from her original office to his office in
order to closely supervise her after his office received complaints against
her could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform
her tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil
Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
SWS AND PULSE ASIA VS COMELEC, G.R. NO. 208062, APRIL 07, 2015
ISSUE: For Failure to submit the names of subscribers, including those who
did not commission or pay for a specific survey or caused its publication,
did SWS and Pulse Asia commit an election offence?

RULING:NO, SWS and Pulse Asia Did not commit an election offence. Not
having been served with copies of Resolution No. 9674 itself, petitioners are
right in construing the three-day period for compliance as not having begun
to run. From this, it follows that no violation of the requirement "to submit
within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution the names of all
commissioners and payors of surveys published from February 12, 2013 to
the date of the promulgation of this Resolution could have been committed.
Thus, there was no basis for considering petitioners to have committed an
election offense arising from this alleged violation.
COMELEC's error is compounded by its failure to provide petitioners with
copies of the criminal complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222. COMELEC
has neither alleged nor proven that it has done so. Per its own allegations,
all it did was serve petitioners with the May 8, 2013 Notice and the July 1,
2013 Subpoena. It was not only grave error, but grave abuse of discretion,
for COMELEC to pursue unfounded criminal charges against petitioners. In
so doing, COMELEC violated petitioners' right to due process.
ADDITIONAL:COMELEC admits that petitioners were never actually served
copies of Resolution No. 9674 after it was promulgated on April 23, 2013. It
insists, however, that this flaw has been remedied by service to petitioners
of the May 8, 2013 Notice which reproduced Resolution No. 9674's
dispositive portion.
simultaneously violated the Gun Ban. This court also held that the
unlicensed firearm need not be actually used in the course of committing
the other crime for the application of Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294.Similarly, Madrigal v. People applied the ruling in Agote and held that
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 is express in its terms that a person may
not be convicted for illegal possession of firearms if another crime was
committed. In this case, the accused is already convicted for violation of the
Gun Ban and thus, the dismissal of the charge for illegal possession of
firearm is proper.
Issue: Does the Indeterminate Sentence Law apply to election offenses?
Ruling Yes. Under Section 264 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881, persons found
guilty of an election offense "shall be punished with imprisonment of not
less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to
probation." The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished
by both the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The
trial court should have provided minimum and maximum terms for
petitioner’s penalty of imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the trial court should be
modified. Based on the facts, it is reasonable that petitioner be penalized
with imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2) years as
maximum.

De la Cruz vs. PeopleG.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

Issue: Was the court correct in dismissing the charge for illegal possession
of firearm and convicting the accused for violation of the Gun ban?

Ruling: Yes. The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No.
CBU-80084 for violation of Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise known as
illegal possession of firearms and convicting the accused for violation of the
Gun Ban.
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo already settled the question of whether there can be
a "separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there
is another crime committed." In that case, the petitioner was charged with
both illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Gun Ban under
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 2826. This court acquitted
petitioner in the case for illegal possession of firearms since he