LABSTAND Full Text 03 Book Three Art. 128 161

LABOR1
(Labor Law I & Agrarian Law and Social Legislation)

Atty. Usita | 2I | A.Y. 2017-2018
BOOK THREE
No. Case Title Pages Page
10 R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) 14 2
11 R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) 3 16
12 R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) IRR 10 19
13 R.A. No. 10361 (Domestic Workers Act or Batas Kasambahay) 9 29
14 R.A. No. 10361 (Domestic Workers Act or Batas Kasambahay) IRR 21 38
R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and
15 11 59
Discrimination Act)
16 Discrimination Act) Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of 5 70
Child Abuse Cases
17 Discrimination Act) Rules and Regulations on Children of Indigenous Cultural 3 75
Communities
18 4 78
Discrimination Act) Rules and Regulations on the Trafficking of Children
19 R.A. No. 9231 (Anti-Child Labor Law) 6 82
People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Sec. of DOLE 34 88
20
People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Sec. of DOLE (Resolution) 8 122
21 Guico, Jr. v. Quisumbing 8 130
22 PT&T v. NLRC 13 138
23 Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. NLRC 4 151
24 Zialcita v. PAL 1 155
25 Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. 9 156
March 8, 2004
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING

FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Violence

Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004". ISCcAT
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared that the State

values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments
of which the Philippines is a party.
SECTION 3. De nition of Terms . — As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against
women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
A. "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed
against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman
or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make lms thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover
to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with
the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or her child. BenchStat
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to

cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited
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to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological
abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of nancial support or preventing the victim from
engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects
on valid, serious and moral grounds as de ned in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of nancial resources and the
right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of in icting physical harm upon the woman or
her child resulting to physical and psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scienti cally de ned pattern of
psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking " refers to an intentional act committed by a person who,
knowingly and without lawful justi cation follows the woman or her child or places the
woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship " refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the bene t of marriage or are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance
or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a
dating relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result
in the bearing of a common child.
(g) "Safe Place or Shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any
other agency or voluntary organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this
Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the
victim.
(h) "Children" refer to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are
incapable of taking care of themselves as de ned under Republic Act No. 7610. As
used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim and other children under
her care.
SECTION 4. Construction. — This Act shall be liberally construed to promote
the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child
of custody or access to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
nancial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own
money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;
(f) In icting or threatening to in ict physical harm on oneself for the purpose
of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force,
physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private
places;EHaCID
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the

woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or in icting harm
to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of nancial support or custody of minor
children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
SECTION 6. Penalties. — The crime of violence against women and their
children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or
consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be
punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious
physical injuries shall have the penalty of prision mayor; those constituting less serious
physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight
physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two (2)
degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as speci ed in
the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto
mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by
prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in
the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a ne in the amount of
not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological
counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
SECTION 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and
their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be led in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
SECTION 8. Protection Orders. — A protection order is an order issued under
this Act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her
child speci ed in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order should serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim
from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the
opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The
provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The
protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order
(BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The
protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,
personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the
petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property
rights are violated, and, if respondent must remove personal effects from
the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until respondent
has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated
family or household member at a distance speci ed by the court, and to
stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any
speci ed place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or
household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and
other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing
the appropriate law enforcement of cer to accompany the petitioner to
the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored
to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects,
or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the
petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her
child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's
employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman.
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support
to the woman and/or her child without justi able cause shall render the
respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any rearm
or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for
appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and
disquali cation to apply for any license to use or possess a rearm. If the
offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to
surrender his rearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on the matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence in icted, including,
but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses
and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner
temporary shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need;
and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to
protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated
family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated
family or household member consents to such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the
absence of a decree of legal separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not
preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.
SECTION 9. Who may File Petition for Protection Orders. — A petition for
protection order may be filed by any of the following:
(a) the offended party;
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity;
(d) of cers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local
government units (LGUs); AcHSEa
(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children's desks;
(f)Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;
(h) at least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality
where the violence against women and their children occurred and who
has personal knowledge of the offense committed.
SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. — Applications for BPOs
shall follow the rules on venue under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and its implementing rules and regulations. An application for a TPO or PPO may
be led in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the
petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the place of residence of
the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court.
SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. — The application for a
protection order must be in writing, signed and veri ed under oath by the applicant. It
may be led as an independent action or as an incidental relief in any civil or criminal
case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this
Act. A standard protection order application form, written in English with translation to
the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate applications for
protection orders, and shall contain, among others, the following information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;
(b) description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as speci ed in Section 8
herein;
(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and
(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order
in another court.
If the applicant is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an
af davit of the applicant attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by
the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the ling of the
application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it
shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the
victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction,
and shall provide a mailing address for purposes of service processing.
An application for protection order led with a court shall be considered an
application for both a TPO and PPO.
Barangay of cials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation
of the application. Law enforcement agents shall also extend assistance in the
application for protection orders in cases brought to their attention.
SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. — All TPOs and PPOs
issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines and a violation
thereof shall be punishable with a ne ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.
SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for a Protection Order. — If
the woman or her child requests in the application for a protection order for the
appointment of counsel because of lack of economic means to hire a counsel de parte,
the court shall immediately direct the Public Attorney's Of ce (PAO) to represent the
petitioner in the hearing on the application. If the PAO determines that the applicant can
afford to hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate the legal
representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack of access to family or
conjugal resources by the applicant, such as when the same are controlled by the
perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal representation by the PAO.
However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from
representing the petitioner.
SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
— Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5(a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of ling after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available
Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay
was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders . — Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of ling of the
application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may
grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective
for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to
or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate
personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the
assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of
the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. — Permanent Protection Order
(PPO) refers to protection order issued by the court after notice and hearing.
Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a lawyer, or
the non-availability of his lawyer shall not be a ground for rescheduling or postponing
the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. If the respondents appears without
counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a lawyer for the
respondent and immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the respondent fails to
appear despite proper notice, the court shall allow ex parte presentation of the
evidence by the applicant and render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented.
The court shall allow the introduction of any history of abusive conduct of a respondent
even if the same was not directed against the applicant or the person for whom the
applicant is made.
The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO in one (1) day. Where the court is unable to conduct the hearing
within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire, the court shall continuously
extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until
nal judgment is issued. The extended or renewed TPO may be modi ed by the court
as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs speci ed in Section 8 hereof in
a PPO. A PPO shall be effective until revoked by a court upon application of the person
in whose favor the order was issued. The court shall ensure immediate personal service
of the PPO on respondent.
The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the
lapse of time between the act of violence and the filing of the application.
Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court must
determine whether or not the PPO shall become nal. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall
be granted as long as there is no clear showing that the act from which the order might
arise did not exist.
SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. — The following
statement must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters on the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay or court:
"Violation of this order is punishable by law."
SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For Protection
Orders. — Failure to act on an application for a protection order within the reglementary
period speci ed in the previous sections without justi able cause shall render the
official or judge administratively liable.
SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. — In cases of legal separation, where
violence as speci ed in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply.
The court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as
possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order led by the petitioner
must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
SECTION 20. Priority of Applications for a Protection Order. — Ex parte and
adversarial hearings to determine the basis of applications for a protection order under
this Act shall have priority over all other proceedings. Barangay of cials and the courts
shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a protection order under this
Act above all other business and, if necessary, suspend other proceedings in order to
hear applications for a protection order.
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. — A complaint for a violation of
a BPO issued under this Act must be led directly with any municipal trial court,
metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction
over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by
imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed. aTcESI
A judgment of violation of a BPO may be appealed according to the Rules of

Court. During trial and upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a
protection order as it deems necessary without need of an application.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute
contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to
any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may le for any of the acts
committed.
SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal Cases. — The
foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be applicable in criminal cases and/or
shall be included in the civil actions deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
actions involving violence against women and their children.
SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. — The Court may order any person
against whom a protection order is issued to give a bond to keep the peace, to present
two suf cient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the
violence sought to be prevented.
Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be detained for a
period which shall in no case exceed six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted
for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not exceeding thirty (30) days, if for
acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(i).
The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the PPOs
issued only by the courts.
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. — Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f)
shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(i) shall
prescribe in ten (10) years.
SECTION 25. Public Crime. — Violence against women and their children shall
be considered a public offense which may be prosecuted upon the ling of a complaint
by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the
commission of the crime.
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. — Victim-survivors
who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not
incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from
battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall
be assisted by expert psychiatrists/psychologists.
SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. — Being under the in uence of alcohol, any
illicit drug, or any other mind-altering substance shall not be a defense under this Act.
SECTION 28. Custody of children. — The woman victim of violence shall be
entitled to the custody and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years
old or older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the
mother, with right to support, unless the court nds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be
disquali ed from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor
children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome.
SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. — Prosecutors and
court personnel should observe the following duties when dealing with victims under
this Act:
a) communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or
her child; and
b) inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and
procedure, and privileges for indigent litigants.
SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Of cials and Law Enforcers . — Barangay
officials and law enforcers shall have the following duties:
(a) respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or
protection of the victim by entering the dwelling if necessary whether or
not a protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the
victim/s;
(b) con scate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or
within plain view;
(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a
clinic or hospital;
(d) assist the victim in removing personal belongings from the house;
(e) assist the barangay of cials and other government of cers and
employees who respond to a call for help;
(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the Punong
Barangay or by the courts;
(g) arrest the suspected perpetrator even without a warrant when any of the
acts of violence de ned by this Act is occurring, or when he/she has
personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed, and
there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as de ned in this
Act; and
(h) immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DSWD,
Social Welfare Department of LGUs or accredited non-government
organizations (NGOs).
Any barangay of cial or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be
liable for a ne not exceeding Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever
applicable criminal, civil or administrative liability.
SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse. — Any healthcare
provider, including, but not limited to, an attending physician, nurse, clinician, barangay
health worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or has been informed by the
victim of violence shall:
(a) properly document any of the victim's physical, emotional or
psychological injuries;
(b) properly record any of victim's suspicions, observations and
circumstances of the examination or visit;
(c) automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certi cate
concerning the examination or visit;
(d) safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon
request at actual cost; and
(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and remedies
provided under this Act, and services available to them.
SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs . — Other
government agencies and LGUs shall establish programs such as, but not limited to,
education and information campaign and seminars or symposia on the nature, causes,
incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards educating the public
on its social impacts.
It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGUs to ensure
the sustained education and training of their of cers and personnel on the prevention
of violence against women and their children under the Act.
SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. — A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or
the court hearing an application for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in
any way unduly in uence the applicant for a protection order to compromise or
abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act.
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought
under this Act.
Failure to comply with this Section shall render the of cial or judge
administratively liable.
SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. — In every case of
violence against women and their children as herein de ned, any person, private
individual or police authority or barangay of cial who, acting in accordance with law,
responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater than necessary to
ensure the safety of the victim, shall not be liable for any criminal, civil or administrative
liability resulting therefrom.
SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. — In addition to their rights under existing
laws, victims of violence against women and their children shall have the following
rights:
(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
(b) to avail of legal assistance from the PAO of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) or any public legal assistance office;
(c) to be entitled to support services from the DSWD and LGUs;
(d) to be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the
Family Code; and CTSAaH
(e) to be informed of their rights and the services available to them including
their right to apply for a protection order.
SECTION 36. Damages. — Any victim of violence under this Act shall be
entitled to actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. — The court shall expedite the process
of issuance of a hold departure order in cases prosecuted under this Act.
SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other Expenses. —
If the victim is an indigent or there is an immediate necessity due to imminent danger or
threat of danger to act on an application for a protection order, the court shall accept
the application without payment of the ling fee and other fees and of transcript of
stenographic notes.
SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and Their
Children (IAC-VAWC) . — In pursuance of the abovementioned policy, there is hereby
established an Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and their Children,
hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed of the following agencies:
(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW);
(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);
(d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);
(i) Department of Health (DOH);
(j) Department of Education (DepEd);
(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and
(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate VAW
based on their mandates as well as develop capability programs for their employees to
become more sensitive to the needs of their clients. The Council will also serve as the
monitoring body as regards to VAW initiatives.
The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who
shall have a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent. These
representatives shall attend Council meetings in their behalf, and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget
and accounting rules and regulations.
SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims. — The DSWD,
and LGUs shall provide the victims temporary shelters, provide counseling, psycho-
social services and/or, recovery, rehabilitation programs and livelihood assistance.
The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.
SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders . — The DSWD shall
provide rehabilitative counseling and treatment to perpetrators towards learning
constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts and reforming their
ways. When necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to submit to
psychiatric treatment or confinement.
SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to Violence Against
Women and their Children Cases. — All agencies involved in responding to violence
against women and their children cases shall be required to undergo education and
training to acquaint them with:
a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their
children;
b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against
women and their children;
c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;
d. the legal duties imposed on police of cers to make arrest and to offer
protection and assistance; and
e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their
children that minimize the likelihood of injury to the of cer and promote
the safety of the victim or survivor.
The PNP, in coordination with LGUs, shall establish an education and training
program for police of cers and barangay of cials to enable them to properly handle
cases of violence against women and their children.
SECTION 43. Entitlement to Leave. — Victims under this Act shall be entitled
to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in addition to other paid leaves
under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when the
necessity arises as specified in the protection order.
Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall
be penalized in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any person for
assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for
discrimination.
SECTION 44. Confidentiality. — All records pertaining to cases of violence
against women and their children including those in the barangay shall be con dential
and all public of cers and employees and public or private clinics to hospitals shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published,
in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address,
employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member,
without the latter's consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a ne of not more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
SECTION 45. Funding. — The amount necessary to implement the provisions
of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGUs
shall be used to implement services for victim of violence against women and their
children.
SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within six (6) months
from the approval of this Act, the DOJ, the NCRFW, the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and
the PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to be identi ed by the NCRFW, shall
promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act.
SECTION 47. Suppletory Application. — For purposes of this Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
SECTION 48. Separability Clause. — If any section or provision of this Act is
held unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions shall not be affected.
SECTION 49. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders and rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 50. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fteen (15) days from
the date of its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation. SaITHC
Approved: March 8, 2004

Published in Today and the Manila Times on March 12, 2004.

February 14, 1995
AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT,

EDUCATION OR TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1.Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995."
SECTION 2.Declaration of Policy. — The State shall value the dignity of every individual,
enhance the development of its human resources, guarantee full respect for human rights,
and uphold the dignity of workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or
those undergoing training, instruction or education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual
harassment in the employment, education or training environment are hereby declared
unlawful.
SECTION 3.Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment De ned . — Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor,
or any other person who, having authority, in uence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said act.
(a)In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: acd
(1)The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the

employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the
sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2)The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
(3)The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.
(b)In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:
(1)Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the
offender;
(2)Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is
entrusted to the offender;
(3)When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing
grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a
stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges, or considerations; or
(4)When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as
herein de ned, or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it
would not have been committed, shall also be held liable under this Act. cd i
SECTION 4.Duty of the Employer or Head of Of ce in a Work-related, Education or

Trainings Environment . — It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-
related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the
employer or head of office shall:
(a)Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and
jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through
their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for
the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative
sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the
proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this subsection (a)
shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the
workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b)Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual
harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may
be, with of cers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding
and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be
composed of at least one(1) representative each from the
management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory
rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee
shall be composed of at least one (1) representative from the
administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or
coaches and students or trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of of ce, educational or training institution shall
disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all
concerned.
SECTION 5.Liability of the Employer, Head of Of ce, Educational or Training Institution . —
The employer or head of of ce, educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable
for damages arising from the acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment,
education or training environment if the employer or head of of ce, educational or training
institution is informed of such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken
thereon. cda

SECTION 6.Independent Action for Damages. — Nothing in this Act shall preclude the
victim of work, education or training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate
and independent action for damages and other affirmative relief.
SECTION 7.Penalties. — Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six
(6) months, or a ne of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such ne and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall prescribe in three
(3) years.
SECTION 8.Separability Clause. — If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or
unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions hereof shall not be affected by such
declaration.
SECTION 9.Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other
issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly. cd i
SECTION 10.Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fteen (15) days after its
complete publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: February 14, 1995
Published in the Philippine Times Journal and Malaya on February 18, 1995. Published in
the Official Gazette, Vol. 91 No. 15 page 2144 on April 10, 1995.

February 6, 2002
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS (IRR) OF R.A. NO. 7877 OR THE ANTI-
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT OF 1995, FOR THE PHILIPPINE SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL
SYSTEM (PSHS SYSTEM)
In compliance with Section 4 of R.A. No. 7877 or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995
and Section 58 of the "Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases"
embodied in CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 and CSC MC No. 17, Series of 2001, the PSHS
System Board of Trustees hereby promulgates these rules and regulations to effectively
carry out the provisions of R.A. No. 7877, within the premises and jurisdiction of the PSHS
System campuses.
RULE I
Affirmation of State Policy and Commitment
SECTION 1. The PSHS System:
1.1 values the dignity of every individual
1.2 enhances the development of its human resources
1.3 guarantees full respect for human rights
1.4 upholds the dignity of teachers, staff, employees, applicants for
employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction or
education.
SECTION 2. The PSHS System commits itself to provide a teaching-learning-working
environment that is free from all forms of sexual harassment.
RULE II
Coverage
SECTION 1. These Rules and Regulations cover the following:
1.1 all school officials, teachers, staff, employees of agents of the
school under a contract and students within the jurisdiction of the
PSHS System.
1.2 all applicants for a teaching or administrative position, applicants for
admission as students, after receipt of the application by the campus.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. —
2.1 PSHS System — includes the Office of the Executive Director, the
PSHS Main Campus in Diliman, and the six (6) regional campuses,
namely, PSHS Nueva Vizcaya, PSHS Camarines Sur, PSHS Western
Visayas, PSHS Eastern Visayas, PSHS Northern Mindanao and PSHS
Central Mindanao.
2.2 Student — means any person enrolled in the four-year secondary
course at the PSHS System, including those who are participants in
short-term training courses, seminars, workshops, review programs,
contests or competitions conducted by any of the system campuses,
on or off campus.
2.3 Employee/staff — means any person holding an appointment or
designation in any unit of the PSHS System, including contractual
employees and employees of agents of the school under a Contract
assigned at a particular PSHS campus.
2.4 Faculty/teacher — any teacher of the PSHS System, regardless of
rank, including the guidance counselors, librarians, research
assistants, as well as trainors/coaches, specialists, consultants and
speakers invited during seminars, workshops, training and the like.
RULE III
Sexual Harassment
SECTION 1. Sexual Harassment is committed by:
1.1 school officials, teachers, staff, coach, trainor and employees of
agents of the school under a contract or any other person.
1.2 such official, teacher, staff, etc., has authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in any aspect of academic or administrative
work in any campus, classroom, office or unit of the PSHS System;
1.3 such official, teacher, staff, etc., demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted or not by
the object of such act.
SECTION 2. Other persons liable for sexual harassment:
2.1 Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of
sexual harassment as herein defined;
2.2 Any person who cooperates in the commission thereof by another
without which sexual harassment would not have been committed.
SECTION 3. In a work-related environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
3.1 the sexual favor is made as condition for the hiring/employment/re-
employment of the individual who is the object of sexual harassment;
or
3.2 the sexual favor is made as a condition for granting such a person
favorable compensation or promotion or any other terms, conditions
or privileges; or
3.3 the refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying a faculty/teacher/staff which would discriminate, deprive
him or her or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect such faculty member or staff;
3.4 the above acts would impair the teacher's/staff's rights or privileges
under existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations; or
3.5 the above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the teacher or staff.
SECTION 4. In the school or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:
4.1 against a student, tutee, trainee or one who is under the care,
custody, supervision or advisorship of the offender;
4.2 against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is
entrusted to the offender;
4.3 when the sexual favor is made as a condition to the giving of a
passing or a high grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships, or
the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges or
considerations; or
4.4 when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.
SECTION 5. Sexual Harassment under these rules includes those in peer relationships,
such as:
5.1 Faculty-faculty
5.2 employee-employees, and
5.3 student-student relations
SECTION 6. Sexual Harassment under these rules also include those involving
harassment of teachers or employees by students.
SECTION 7. Forms of Sexual Harassment. —
7.1 Physical
7.1.1 Malicious touching
7.1.2 Overt sexual advances
7.1.3 Gestures and lewd insinuations
7.2 Verbal, such as, but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual
favors and lurid remarks
7.3 Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters, written notes, texts via
cellular phones with sexual underpinnings
7.4 Other forms analogous to the foregoing
SECTION 8. It shall be the duty of the Executive Director/Campus Director to:
8.1 prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment;
8.2 cause the settlement, prosecution or resolution of acts of sexual
harassment in accordance with the procedure in these IRR.
RULE IV
Committee on Decorum and Investigation
SECTION 1. A Committee on Decorum and Investigation is hereby created in each
PSHS System campus under the office of the Campus Director.
SECTION 2. The Committee shall be composed of the following:
2.1 a Division Chief or Academic Chief as representative of the
Administration, who shall act as Chairperson
2.2 a supervisor/area coordinator or unit head
2.3 a union member, if any
2.4 a rank and file faculty
2.5 a rank and file staff
SECTION 3. The Chairperson and members shall serve for a term of two (2) years.
SECTION 4. The Committee shall:
4.1 disseminate these rules, regulations procedures to the different
sectors of the PSHS community to increase understanding and
prevent incidents of sexual harassment.
4.2 receive and act on reports and complaints of sexual harassment.
4.3 provide support measures to victims of sexual harassment
4.4 conduct the preliminary investigation of sexual harassment cases
4.5 conduct the formal investigation of the case, once formal charges
are filed by the Campus Director.
4.6 submit a report of its findings to the Campus Director
RULE V
Procedure
A. Informal
SECTION 1. Informal procedure refers to PSHS System action, through the CDI of each
campus, which does not involve formal investigation nor the filing of formal charges. It
may consist of counseling, providing information, referral to an agency offering
professional help and advice on options available as well as other means of support.
SECTION 2. The aggrieved party or anyone who witnesses or discovers the
commission of any act of sexual harassment shall report the incident/act, in writing, to the
CDI or to any school official, faculty or staff who shall in turn endorse the said report to the
CDI within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of such report.
SECTION 3. The aggrieved party shall be interviewed by the CDI, and where necessary
referred to the Guidance Center or agency offering professional help for counseling and
assistance.
SECTION 4. The CDI, after consultation with the persons concerned, shall recommend
measures to be adopted to prevent the repetition of the incident.
SECTION 5. Incidents of sexual harassment dealt with in this manner shall be
documented by the CDI to determine whether patterns of sexual harassment are present.
If the situation requires resort to formal charges of sexual harassment, the procedure set
out in the succeeding sections shall be complied with.
B. Formal Investigation of Sexual Harassment Case
SECTION 1. Complaint. —
1.1 The Complaint may be filed directly with the Committee on Decorum
and Investigation (CDI) or with the Campus Director who shall
endorse the same within 24 hours from receipt thereof to the CDI.
1.2 The Complaint must be in writing, signed and sworn to by the
complainant. It must contain the following:
(1) full name and address of the complainant
(2) full name, address and position of the respondent
(3) a specification of the charge/charges
(4) a brief statement of the relevant and material facts
(5) evidence, in the form of affidavits of witnesses, in support of
the Complaint, if any
(6) a certification of non-forum shopping
1.3 In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements, the
Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing.
1.4 Where the Complaint is not under oath, the complainant shall be
summoned by the Committee to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the Complaint.
1.5 A withdrawal of the Complaint at any stage of the proceedings shall
not preclude the CDI from proceeding with the investigation of the
case.
1.6 The CDI shall notify the respondent in writing of the sexual
harassment charge.
SECTION 2. Counter-Affidavit/Comment. —
2.1 If the Complaint is sufficient in form and substance, the CDI will
require the respondent to file a Counter-Affidavit/Comment, under
oath, within three (3) working days from receipt of the notice of the
sexual harassment charge.
2.2 The Respondent shall furnish a copy of such counter-

affidavit/comment to the complainant, otherwise the same shall be
considered as not filed.
SECTION 3. Preliminary Investigation. —
3.1 Within five (5) working days from receipt of the counter-affidavit-
comments, the CDI shall conduct a preliminary investigation of the
sexual harassment case by examining all the documents submitted,
ex parte and shall be terminated fifteen (15) working days thereafter.
3.2 Within five (5) working days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation, the CDI shall submit its Investigation Report and the
complete records of the case to the Campus Director.
SECTION 4. Formal Charge. —
4.1 If, after preliminary investigation, a prima facie exists, a formal
charge shall be issued by the Campus Director within (3) working
days from receipt of the Investigation Report, otherwise, the
complaint is dismissed within the same period.
4.2 The Formal charge shall contain:
a. specific charge(s)
b. a brief statement of material or relevant facts, with certified
true copies of the documentary evidence, if any
c. sworn statements covering the testimony of witnesses
d. a directive to answer the charges in writing under oath within
72 hours from receipt thereof
e. an advice to indicate in the Answer that respondent elects/does
not elect a formal investigation of the charges
f. a notice that respondent is entitled to be assisted by counsel
SECTION 5. Answer. —
5.1 The Answer shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the
respondents, copy furnished the complainant, supported by
documentary evidence, including affidavits of witnesses.
5.2 The respondent shall be given not less than 72 hours after receipt of
the complaint to file an Answer, unless a different period is given. No
other pleading shall be entertained during this period.
5.3 The respondent shall indicate in his Answer whether or not he elects
a formal investigation.
5.4 Failure of the respondent to file an Answer or to appear in the
investigation shall be construed as a waiver to present evidence in
his/her behalf.
SECTION 6. Preventive Suspension. —
6.1 The Board of Trustees (BOT), through the Executive Director, upon
the recommendation of the CDI and the Campus Director, may order
the preventive suspension of the respondent during the pendency of
the investigation where the evidence of guilt is strong.
6.2 A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Preventive Suspension
may be filed with the BOT or the said Order may be appealed before
the Civil Service Commission within fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of such Order.
6.3 If the case against the respondent is not finally decided within ninety
days, after the date of suspension, he/she shall be automatically
reinstated in the service.
SECTION 7. Pre-Hearing. —
7.1 The CDI may conduct a prehearing conference where the parties
appear to agree on the following:
a. stipulation of facts
b. simplification of issues
c. identification/marking of evidence
d. waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence
e. number of names of witnesses
f. dates of hearings
g. other matters that may aid the prompt and just resolution of
the case.
7.2 Parties may submit position papers or memoranda.
7.3 The case may be submitted for resolution without need of further
hearing.
SECTION 8. Hearing. —
8.1 If the case is submitted for further hearing, the CDI shall conduct a
hearing not earlier than five (5) working days nor later than ten
working (10) days from the date of receipt of the respondent's
Answer or Complainant's reply, if any.
8.2 The hearing shall be concluded within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the charges.
8.3 The CDI shall submit its report and recommendations to the
Campus Director within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the
hearing.
SECTION 9. Decision. —
9.1 The Campus Director shall render a decision within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the CDI report.
9.2 Such decision shall be final and executory where a penalty of
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or a fine not exceeding
thirty (30) days salary is imposed.
SECTION 10. Motion for Reconsideration. —
10.1 A Motion for Reconsideration (MR) may be filed with the Campus
Director within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.
10.2 Only one MR shall be entertained.
10.3 The MR shall be based on any of the following grounds:
10.3.1 New evidence is discovered
10.3.2 The decision is not supported by the evidence on record.
10.3.3 Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
SECTION 11. Appeal. —
11.1 An appeal may be filed by the respondent with the Board of
Trustees, through the Executive Director, within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the decision of the Campus Director.
11.2 Any appeal of the decision shall be filed in accordance with the CSC
rules on administrative cases.
RULE VI
Administrative Penalties
SECTION 1. Acts of sexual harassment shall be punishable as light, less grave and
grave offenses, as follows:
1.1 Light Offenses
1st Offense — Reprimand
2nd Offense — Fine or Suspension not exceeding thirty (30) days
3rd Offense — Dismissal
1.2 Less Grave Offenses

1st Offense — Fine or Suspension not less than thirty (30) days and not
exceeding six (6) months
2nd Offense — Dismissal
1.3 Grave Offenses — Dismissal

SECTION 2. A respondent found guilty of two or more charges shall be imposed the
highest penalty corresponding to the most serious charge and the other charges shall be
counted as aggravating circumstances.
SECTION 3. The Head of Agency who fails to act within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of any Complaint for Sexual Harassment properly filed against any employee in that office
shall be charged with Neglect of Duty.
RULE VII
Guidelines on Proper Decorum at the PSHS System Campuses
SECTION 1. School officials, members of the faculty and staff shall treat one another
with dignity and respect. They shall:
1.1 avoid telling green jokes in the classroom and in other public places.
1.2 avoid the use of language with sexual overtones
SECTION 2. All employees shall adhere to the agency dress code while in the school
premises. Students must be in proper and complete uniform at all times.
SECTION 3. All employees and students shall observe prudence in all their actions.
They shall:
3.1 avoid talking and being left alone with the opposite sex in
abandoned, secluded and unlighted places.
3.2 avoid body language or acts that would convey or invite sexual
meanings or interpretations
SECTION 4. Dormitory rooms should be strictly off-limits to students of the opposite
sex.
RULE VIII
Special Provisions
SECTION 1. Independent Civil and/or Criminal Actions. —
1.1 After the filing of a formal charge (administrative case), the victim of
sexual harassment is not precluded from instituting a separate and
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief in
any court or tribunal against the respondent.
1.2 Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to the filing of a criminal
action and prosecution in the proper courts for acts of sexual
harassment
SECTION 2. Penalties. —
2.1 Any person who violates the provisions of R.A. 7877, shall upon
conviction by the courts, be penalized by:
2.1.1 imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than
six (6) months, or
2.1.2 a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos (PhP10,000.00)
not more than twenty thousand pesos (PhP20,000.00), or
2.1.3 both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
SECTION 3. Civil Liability of the Campus Director. —
3.1 The Campus Director shall be solidarily liable for damages arising
from acts of sexual harassment in the campus, if formally informed of
such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken
thereon.
SECTION 4. Prescription. —
4.1. Any action arising from the violation of R.A. No. 7877 shall prescribe
in three (3) years.
SECTION 5. Annual Report. —
5.1 The Campus Directors shall submit an annual report to the Executive
Director on the implementation of these rules and regulations
together with an evaluation thereof at the end of each school year
SECTION 6. Adoption of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940. —
6.1 Rules IX, X and XI of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 are hereby
adopted as part of this IRR.
6.2 All other provisions of the aforesaid resolution shall be applied
suppletorily to this IRR.
6.3 In cases where provisions of this IRR overlap with those of the law
and CSC Rules, the latter shall prevail (i.e., the law, CSC rules, PSHS
System disciplinary rules).
SECTION 7. Adoption of the PSHS System Code of Conduct. —
7.1 In the case of student offenders, the PSHS System Code of Conduct
shall be applied suppletorily to this IRR
SECTION 8. Procedure for Offenders who are Employees of Agents of the School
under a Contract. —
8.1 Offenders who are employees of agents of the school under a
Contract shall be proceeded against criminally or civilly.
8.2 The employee complained of shall be placed under preventive
suspension by his employer upon the filing of the complaint.
RULE IX
Effectivity
This implementing Rules and Regulations shall take effect upon its approval and
publication in the respective school organs of the campuses, certified copies of which
shall be filed with the UP law Center.
Quezon City, February 6, 2002.
APPROVED:
(SGD.) ESTRELLA F. ALABASTRO

Secretary, DOST and Chairman
PSHS System Board of Trustees

January 18, 2013
AN ACT INSTITUTING POLICIES FOR THE PROTECTION AND WELFARE OF

DOMESTIC WORKERS
ARTICLE I
General Provisions
SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Workers
Act" or "Batas Kasambahay". cDCaTS
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared that:

(a) The State strongly af rms labor as a primary social force and is
committed to respect, promote, protect and realize the fundamental
principles and rights at work including, but not limited to, abolition of child
labor, elimination of all forms of forced labor, discrimination in
employment and occupation, and traf cking in persons, especially women
and children;
(b) The State adheres to internationally accepted working conditions for
workers in general, and establishes labor standards for domestic workers
in particular, towards decent employment and income, enhanced coverage
of social protection, respect for human rights and strengthened social
dialogue;
(c) The State recognizes the need to protect the rights of domestic workers
against abuse, harassment, violence, economic exploitation and
performance of work that is hazardous to their physical and mental health;
and
(d) The State, in protecting domestic workers and recognizing their special
needs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions, promotes gender-
sensitive measures in the formulation and implementation of policies and
programs affecting the local domestic work.
SECTION 3. Coverage. — This Act applies to all domestic workers employed
and working within the country.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the term:
(a) Debt bondage refers to the rendering of service by the domestic worker
as security or payment for a debt where the length and nature of service is
not clearly de ned or when the value of the service is not reasonably
applied in the payment of the debt.
(b) Deployment expenses refers to expenses that are directly used for the
transfer of the domestic worker from place of origin to the place of work
covering the cost of transportation. Advances or loans by the domestic
worker are not included in the definition of deployment expenses.
(c) Domestic work refers to work performed in or for a household or
households. EDCIcH

(d) Domestic worker or "Kasambahay" refers to any person engaged in
domestic work within an employment relationship such as, but not limited
to, the following: general househelp, nursemaid or "yaya", cook, gardener,
or laundry person, but shall exclude any person who performs domestic
work only occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis.
The term shall not include children who are under foster family arrangement, and
are provided access to education and given an allowance incidental to
education, i.e., "baon", transportation, school projects and school activities.
(e) Employer refers to any person who engages and controls the services of
a domestic worker and is party to the employment contract.
(f) Household refers to the immediate members of the family or the
occupants of the house that are directly provided services by the domestic
worker.
(g) Private Employment Agency (PEA) refers to any individual, legitimate
partnership, corporation or entity licensed to engage in the recruitment
and placement of domestic workers for local employment.
(h) Working children, as used under this Act, refers to domestic workers who
are fifteen (15) years old and above but below eighteen (18) years old.
ARTICLE II
Rights and Privileges
SECTION 5. Standard of Treatment. — The employer or any member of the
household shall not subject a domestic worker or "kasambahay" to any kind of abuse
nor in ict any form of physical violence or harassment or any act tending to degrade
the dignity of a domestic worker.
SECTION 6. Board, Lodging and Medical Attendance. — The employer shall
provide for the basic necessities of the domestic worker to include at least three (3)
adequate meals a day and humane sleeping arrangements that ensure safety.
The employer shall provide appropriate rest and assistance to the domestic
worker in case of illnesses and injuries sustained during service without loss of
benefits. DCAEcS
At no instance shall the employer withdraw or hold in abeyance the provision of

these basic necessities as punishment or disciplinary action to the domestic worker.
SECTION 7. Guarantee of Privacy. — Respect for the privacy of the domestic
worker shall be guaranteed at all times and shall extend to all forms of communication
and personal effects. This guarantee equally recognizes that the domestic worker is
obliged to render satisfactory service at all times.
SECTION 8. Access to Outside Communication. — The employer shall grant
the domestic worker access to outside communication during free time: Provided, That
in case of emergency, access to communication shall be granted even during work
time. Should the domestic worker make use of the employer's telephone or other
communication facilities, the costs shall be borne by the domestic worker, unless such
charges are waived by the employer.
SECTION 9. Right to Education and Training. — The employer shall afford the
domestic worker the opportunity to nish basic education and may allow access to
alternative learning systems and, as far as practicable, higher education or technical
and vocational training. The employer shall adjust the work schedule of the domestic
worker to allow such access to education or training without hampering the services
required by the employer.
SECTION 10. Prohibition Against Privileged Information. — All
communication and information pertaining to the employer or members of the
household shall be treated as privileged and con dential, and shall not be publicly
disclosed by the domestic worker during and after employment. Such privileged
information shall be inadmissible in evidence except when the suit involves the
employer or any member of the household in a crime against persons, property,
personal liberty and security, and chastity. SADECI
ARTICLE III
Pre-Employment
SECTION 11. Employment Contract. — An employment contract shall be
executed by and between the domestic worker and the employer before the
commencement of the service in a language or dialect understood by both the
domestic worker and the employer. The domestic worker shall be provided a copy of
the duly signed employment contract which must include the following:
(a) Duties and responsibilities of the domestic worker;
(b) Period of employment;
(c) Compensation;
(d) Authorized deductions;
(e) Hours of work and proportionate additional payment;
(f) Rest days and allowable leaves;
(g) Board, lodging and medical attention;
(h) Agreements on deployment expenses, if any;
(i) Loan agreement;
(j) Termination of employment; and
(k) Any other lawful condition agreed upon by both parties.
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop a model
employment contract for domestic workers which shall, at all times, be made available
free of charge to domestic workers, employers, representative organizations and the
general public. The DOLE shall widely disseminate information to domestic workers
and employers on the use of such model employment contract. EaCDAT
In cases where the employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through a

private employment agency, the PEA shall keep a copy of all employment contracts of
domestic workers and shall be made available for veri cation and inspection by the
DOLE.
SECTION 12. Pre-Employment Requirement. — Prior to the execution of the
employment contract, the employer may require the following from the domestic
worker:
(a) Medical certificate or a health certificate issued by a local government
health officer;
(b) Barangay and police clearance;
(c) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance; and
(d) Duly authenticated birth certificate or if not available, any other document
showing the age of the domestic worker such as voter's identification
card, baptismal record or passport.
However, Section 12 (a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be standard requirements when the
employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through the PEA.
The cost of the foregoing shall be borne by the prospective employer or agency,
as the case may be.
SECTION 13. Recruitment and Finder's Fees. — Regardless of whether the
domestic worker was hired through a private employment agency or a third party, no
share in the recruitment or nder's fees shall be charged against the domestic worker
by the said private employment agency or third party.
SECTION 14. Deposits for Loss or Damage. — It shall be unlawful for the
employer or any other person to require a domestic worker to make deposits from
which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools,
materials, furniture and equipment in the household.
SECTION 15. Prohibition on Debt Bondage. — It shall be unlawful for the
employer or any person acting on behalf of the employer to place the domestic worker
under debt bondage. TcDAHS
SECTION 16. Employment Age of Domestic Workers. — It shall be unlawful to

employ any person below fteen (15) years of age as a domestic worker. Employment
of working children, as de ned under this Act, shall be subject to the provisions of
Section 10 (A), paragraph 2 of Section 12-A, paragraph 4 of Section 12-D, and Section
13 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as the "Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act".
Working children shall be entitled to minimum wage, and all bene ts provided
under this Act.
Any employer who has been sentenced by a court of law of any offense against a
working child under this Act shall be meted out with a penalty one degree higher and
shall be prohibited from hiring a working child.
SECTION 17. Employer's Reportorial Duties. — The employers shall register
all domestic workers under their employment in the Registry of Domestic Workers in
the barangay where the employer's residence is located. The Department of the Interior
and Local Government (DILG) shall, in coordination with the DOLE, formulate a
registration system for this purpose.
SECTION 18. Skills Training, Assessment and Certi cation. — To ensure
productivity and assure quality services, the DOLE, through the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA), shall facilitate access of domestic workers to
ef cient training, assessment and certi cation based on a duly promulgated training
regulation.
ARTICLE IV
Employment — Terms and Conditions
SECTION 19. Health and Safety. — The employer shall safeguard the health
and safety of the domestic worker in accordance with laws, rules and regulations, with
due consideration of the peculiar nature of domestic work.
SECTION 20. Daily Rest Period. — The domestic worker shall be entitled to an
aggregate daily rest period of eight (8) hours per day.
SECTION 21. Weekly Rest Period. — The domestic worker shall be entitled to
at least twenty-four (24) consecutive hours of rest in a week. The employer and the
domestic worker shall agree in writing on the schedule of the weekly rest day of the
domestic worker: Provided, That the employer shall respect the preference of the
domestic worker as to the weekly rest day when such preference is based on religious
grounds. Nothing in this provision shall deprive the domestic worker and the employer
from agreeing to the following:
(a) Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day; THESAD
(b) Waiving a particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate of pay;
(c) Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or
(d) Other similar arrangements.
SECTION 22. Assignment to Nonhousehold Work. — No domestic worker
shall be assigned to work in a commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise at a
wage rate lower than that provided for agricultural or nonagricultural workers. In such
cases, the domestic worker shall be paid the applicable minimum wage.
SECTION 23. Extent of Duty. — The domestic worker and the employer may
mutually agree for the former to temporarily perform a task that is outside the latter's
household for the bene t of another household. However, any liability that will be
incurred by the domestic worker on account of such arrangement shall be borne by the
original employer. In addition, such work performed outside the household shall entitle
the domestic worker to an additional payment of not less than the existing minimum
wage rate of a domestic worker. It shall be unlawful for the original employer to charge
any amount from the said household where the service of the domestic worker was
temporarily performed.
SECTION 24. Minimum Wage. — The minimum wage of domestic workers
shall not be less than the following:
(a) Two thousand ve hundred pesos (P2,500.00) a month for those
employed in the National Capital Region (NCR);
(b) Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month for those employed in
chartered cities and first class municipalities; and
(c) One thousand ve hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month for those
employed in other municipalities.
After one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the
Regional Tripartite and Productivity Wage Boards (RTPWBs) shall review, and if proper,
determine and adjust the minimum wage rates of domestic workers. IAETSC
SECTION 25. Payment of Wages. — Payment of wages shall be made on time

directly to the domestic worker to whom they are due in cash at least once a month.
The employer, unless allowed by the domestic worker through a written consent, shall
make no deductions from the wages other than that which is mandated by law. No
employer shall pay the wages of a domestic worker by means of promissory notes,
vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than the cash wage as
provided for under this Act.
The domestic worker is entitled to a thirteenth month pay as provided for by law.
SECTION 26. Pay Slip. — The employer shall at all times provide the domestic
worker with a copy of the pay slip containing the amount paid in cash every pay day,
and indicating all deductions made, if any. The copies of the pay slip shall be kept by
the employer for a period of three (3) years.
SECTION 27. Prohibition on Interference in the Disposal of Wages. — It shall
be unlawful for the employer to interfere with the freedom of any domestic worker to
dispose of the latter's wages. The employer shall not force, compel or oblige the
domestic worker to purchase merchandise, commodities or other properties from the
employer or from any other person, or otherwise make use of any store or services of
such employer or any other person.
SECTION 28. Prohibition Against Withholding of Wages. — It shall be unlawful
for an employer, directly or indirectly, to withhold the wages of the domestic worker. If
the domestic worker leaves without any justi able reason, any unpaid salary for a
period not exceeding fteen (15) days shall be forfeited. Likewise, the employer shall
not induce the domestic worker to give up any part of the wages by force, stealth,
intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever.
SECTION 29. Leave Benefits. — A domestic worker who has rendered at least
one (1) year of service shall be entitled to an annual service incentive leave of ve (5)
days with pay: Provided, That any unused portion of said annual leave shall not be
cumulative or carried over to the succeeding years. Unused leaves shall not be
convertible to cash. EASCDH
SECTION 30. Social and Other Bene ts. — A domestic worker who has
rendered at least one (1) month of service shall be covered by the Social Security
System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), and the Home
Development Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG, and shall be entitled to all the bene ts in
accordance with the pertinent provisions provided by law.
Premium payments or contributions shall be shouldered by the employer.
However, if the domestic worker is receiving a wage of Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) and above per month, the domestic worker shall pay the proportionate
share in the premium payments or contributions, as provided by law.
The domestic worker shall be entitled to all other benefits under existing laws.
SECTION 31. Rescue and Rehabilitation of Abused Domestic Workers. — Any
abused or exploited domestic worker shall be immediately rescued by a municipal or
city social welfare of cer or a social welfare of cer from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) in coordination with the concerned barangay
of cials. The DSWD and the DILG shall develop a standard operating procedure for the
rescue and rehabilitation of abused domestic workers, and in coordination with the
DOLE, for possible subsequent job placement.
ARTICLE V
Post Employment
SECTION 32. Termination of Service. — Neither the domestic worker nor the
employer may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term except for
grounds provided for in Sections 33 and 34 of this Act. If the domestic worker is
unjustly dismissed, the domestic worker shall be paid the compensation already earned
plus the equivalent of fteen (15) days work by way of indemnity. If the domestic
worker leaves without justi able reason, any unpaid salary due not exceeding the
equivalent fteen (15) days work shall be forfeited. In addition, the employer may
recover from the domestic worker costs incurred related to the deployment expenses,
if any: Provided, That the service has been terminated within six (6) months from the
domestic worker's employment.
If the duration of the domestic service is not determined either in stipulation or
by the nature of the service, the employer or the domestic worker may give notice to
end the working relationship ve (5) days before the intended termination of the
service. ECaHSI
The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree upon written notice
to pre-terminate the contract of employment to end the employment relationship.
SECTION 33. Termination Initiated by the Domestic Worker. — The domestic
worker may terminate the employment relationship at any time before the expiration of
the contract for any of the following causes:
(a) Verbal or emotional abuse of the domestic worker by the employer or any
member of the household;
(b) Inhuman treatment including physical abuse of the domestic worker by
the employer or any member of the household;
(c) Commission of a crime or offense against the domestic worker by the
employer or any member of the household;
(d) Violation by the employer of the terms and conditions of the employment
contract and other standards set forth under this law;
(e) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the
employer, or member/s of the household; and
(f) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
SECTION 34. Termination Initiated by the Employer. — An employer may
terminate the services of the domestic worker at any time before the expiration of the
contract for any of the following causes:
(a) Misconduct or willful disobedience by the domestic worker of the lawful
order of the employer in connection with the former's work;
(b) Gross or habitual neglect or inef ciency by the domestic worker in the
performance of duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer on the
domestic worker; aHcACT
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the domestic worker against the

person of the employer or any immediate member of the employer's
family;
(e) Violation by the domestic worker of the terms and conditions of the
employment contract and other standards set forth under this law;
(f) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the
employer, or member/s of the household; and
(g) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
SECTION 35. Employment Certi cation. — Upon the severance of the
employment relationship, the employer shall issue the domestic worker within ve (5)
days from request a certi cate of employment indicating the nature, duration of the
service and work performance.
ARTICLE VI
Private Employment Agencies
SECTION 36. Regulation of Private Employment Agencies (PEAs). — The
DOLE shall, through a system of licensing and regulation, ensure the protection of
domestic workers hired through the PEAs.
The PEA shall be jointly and severally liable with the employer for all the wages,
wage-related benefits, and other benefits due a domestic worker.
The provision of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the "Labor Code of the Philippines", on quali cations of the PEAs with regard to
nationality, networth, owners and of cers, of ce space and other requirements, as well
as nontransferability of license and commission of prohibited practices, shall apply.
In addition, PEAs shall have the following responsibilities:
(a) Ensure that domestic workers are not charged or levied any recruitment
or placement fees; IEcaHS
(b) Ensure that the employment agreement between the domestic worker
and the employer stipulates the terms and conditions of employment and
all the benefits prescribed by this Act;
(c) Provide a pre-employment orientation brie ng to the domestic worker
and the employer about their rights and responsibilities in accordance with
this Act;
(d) Keep copies of employment contracts and agreements pertaining to
recruited domestic workers which shall be made available during
inspections or whenever required by the DOLE or local government
officials;
(e) Assist domestic workers with respect to complaints or grievances
against their employers; and
(f) Cooperate with government agencies in rescue operations involving
abused or exploited domestic workers.
ARTICLE VII
Settlement of Disputes
SECTION 37. Mechanism for Settlement of Disputes. — All labor-related
disputes shall be elevated to the DOLE Regional Of ce having jurisdiction over the
workplace without prejudice to the ling of a civil or criminal action in appropriate
cases. The DOLE Regional Of ce shall exhaust all conciliation and mediation efforts
before a decision shall be rendered.
Ordinary crimes or offenses committed under the Revised Penal Code and other
special penal laws by either party shall be filed with the regular courts.
ARTICLE VIII
Special Provisions
SECTION 38. Information Program. — The DOLE shall, in coordination with
the DILG, the SSS, the PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG develop and implement a continuous
information dissemination program on the provisions of this Act, both at the national
and local level, immediately after the enactment of this law. EHScCA
SECTION 39. "Araw ng mga Kasambahay". — The date upon which the
President shall approve this "Domestic Workers Act" shall be designated as the "Araw
ng mga Kasambahay".
ARTICLE IX
Penal and Miscellaneous Provisions
SECTION 40. Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Act declared
unlawful shall be punishable with a ne of not less than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) without prejudice
to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal action by the aggrieved party.
SECTION 41. Transitory Provision; Non-Diminution of Bene ts. — All existing
arrangements between a domestic worker and the employer shall be adjusted to
conform to the minimum standards set by this Act within a period of sixty (60) days
after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That adjustments pertaining to wages shall
take effect immediately after the determination and issuance of the appropriate wage
order by the RTWPBs: Provided, further, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to
cause the diminution or substitution of any bene ts and privileges currently enjoyed by
the domestic worker hired directly or through an agency.
SECTION 42. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within ninety (90) days
from the effectivity of this Act, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of
Social Welfare and Development, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government,
and the Director General of the Philippine National Police, in coordination with other
concerned government agencies and accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
assisting domestic workers, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of this Act.
ARTICLE X
Final Provisions
SECTION 43. Separability Clause. — If any provision or part of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining parts or provisions not affected shall
remain in full force and effect. DcCHTa
SECTION 44. Repealing Clause. — All articles or provisions of Chapter III

(Employment of Househelpers) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended and
renumbered by Republic Act No. 10151 are hereby expressly repealed. All laws,
decrees, executive orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modi ed
accordingly.
SECTION 45. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fteen (15) days
after its complete publication in the Of cial Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: January 18, 2013.

May 9, 2013
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10361,

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "DOMESTIC WORKERS ACT" OR "BATAS KASAMBAHAY"
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 10361 entitled "An Act Instituting Policies for the
Protection and Welfare of Domestic Workers", the following implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) are hereby issued:
RULE I
General Provisions
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared that:
(a) The State strongly af rms labor as a primary social force and is committed
to respect, promote, protect and realize the fundamental principles and
rights at work including, but not limited to, abolition of child labor,
elimination of all forms of forced labor, discrimination in employment
and occupation, and traf cking in persons, especially women and
children; AECcTS
(b) The State adheres to internationally accepted working conditions for

workers in general, and establishes labor standards for the Kasambahay
in particular, towards decent employment and income, enhanced
coverage of social protection, respect for human rights and
strengthened social dialogue;
(c) The State recognizes the need to protect the rights of the Kasambahay
against abuse, harassment, violence, economic exploitation and
performance of work that is hazardous to their physical and mental
health;
(d) The State, in protecting the Kasambahay and recognizing their special
needs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions, promotes
gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and implementation of
policies and programs affecting the local domestic work;
(e) The State recognizes the special relations of mutual trust and respect
between the employer and the Kasambahay. It shall ensure that this
fiduciary relationship is strengthened and protected; and
(f) The State af rms the right of the Kasambahay to form, join, or assist
associations or organizations of their own choosing for their mutual
bene t and protection and for purposes of collective negotiation and
social dialogue.
SECTION 2. Coverage. — This IRR shall apply to all parties to an employment
contract for the services of the following Kasambahay, whether on a live-in or live-out
arrangement, such as but not limited to:
(a) General househelp;
(b) Yaya;
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

(c) Cook;
(d) Gardener;
(e) Laundry person; or
(f) Any person who regularly performs domestic work in one household on an
occupational basis.
The following are not covered:
(a) Service providers;
(b) Family drivers;
(c) Children under foster family arrangement; and
(d) Any other person who performs work occasionally or sporadically and not
on an occupational basis.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used herein, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Children under foster family arrangement" refers to children who are living
with a family or household of relative/s and are provided access to
education and given an allowance incidental to education, i.e., "baon",
transportation, school projects, and school activities; provided, that the
foster family and foster care arrangements are in compliance with the
procedures and requirements as prescribed by Republic Act No. 10165
or Foster Care Act of 2012.
(b) "Debt bondage" refers to the rendering of service by the Kasambahay as
security or payment for a debt where the length and nature of service is
not clearly de ned or when the value of the service is not reasonably
applied in the payment of the debt.
(c) "Deployment expenses" refers to expenses that are directly used for the
transfer of the Kasambahay from place of origin to the place of work
covering the cost of transportation, meals, communication expense, and
other incidental expenses. Advances or loans by the Kasambahay are
not included in the definition of deployment expenses. IDScTE
(d) "Domestic work" refers to work performed in or for a household.

(e) "Domestic worker" or "Kasambahay" refers to any person engaged in
domestic work within an employment relationship, whether on a live-in or
live-out arrangement, such as, but not limited to, general househelp,
"yaya", cook, gardener, or laundry person, but shall exclude service
providers, family drivers, children who are under foster family
arrangement, or any person who performs domestic work only
occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis.
(f) "Employer" refers to any person who engages and controls the services of a
Kasambahay and is party to the employment contract.
(g) "Household" refers to the immediate members of the family or the
occupants of the house who are directly and regularly provided services
by the Kasambahay.

(h) "Live-out arrangement" refers to an arrangement whereby the Kasambahay
works within the employer's household but does not reside therein.
(i) "Private Employment Agency (PEA)" refers to any individual, partnership,
corporation or entity licensed by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to engage in the recruitment and placement of
Kasambahay for local employment.
(j) "Recruitment and nder's fees" refers to charges or any amount collected by
the licensed PEA from the Kasambahay for his/her recruitment and
placement.
(k) "Working children" refers to Kasambahay who are fteen (15) years old and
above but below eighteen (18) years old.
(l) "Service provider" refers to any person or entity that carries an independent
business and undertakes to perform job, work or service on his/her own
for a household, according to his/her own manner and method, and free
from the control and direction of the employer in all matters in
connection with the performance of the work except as to the results
thereof.
RULE II
Hiring of Kasambahay
SECTION 1. Mode of Hiring. — A Kasambahay can be hired by the employer directly
or indirectly through a licensed PEA.
SECTION 2. Cost of Hiring. — The employer shall shoulder the cost of hiring of a
Kasambahay, whether he/she is hired through a licensed PEA.
In no case shall the recruitment or nder's fees be charged against the
Kasambahay.
SECTION 3. Deployment Expenses. — The employer, whether the Kasambahay is
hired directly or through a PEA, shall pay the expenses directly used for his/her transfer
from place of origin to the place of work.
The employer may recover deployment costs from the Kasambahay whenever
he/she leaves without justifiable reason within six (6) months from employment.
SECTION 4. Pre-Employment Requirements. — Prior to employment, the employer
may require the following from the Kasambahay.
(a) Medical certi cate or a health certi cate issued by a local government
health officer;
(b) Barangay and police clearance;
(c) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance; and
(d) Duly authenticated birth certi cate or if not available, any other document
showing the age of the Kasambahay such as voter's identi cation card,
baptismal record or passport.
The foregoing shall be the standard requirements when the employment of the
Kasambahay is facilitated through a PEA.
The cost of the foregoing shall be borne by the prospective employer or the agency,
as the case may be. HCTEDa

SECTION 5. Employment Contract. — Before the commencement of the service, a
written employment contract between the Kasambahay and the employer shall be
accomplished in three (3) copies. The contract shall be in a language or dialect
understood by both the Kasambahay and the employer, and shall include the following:
(a) Duties and responsibilities of the Kasambahay, including the responsibility
to render satisfactory service at all times;
(b) Period of employment;
(c) Compensation;
(d) Authorized deductions;
(e) Hours of work and proportionate additional payment;
(f) Rest days and allowable leaves;
(g) Board, lodging and medical attention;
(h) Agreements on deployment expenses, if any;
(i) Loan agreement, if any;
(j) Termination of employment; and
(k) Any other lawful condition agreed upon by both parties.
If the Kasambahay is below 18 years old, the employment contract shall be signed
by his/her parent or lawful guardian on his/her behalf.
Upon the request of either party, the Punong Barangay or his/her designated of cer
shall read and explain the contents of the contract to both parties and shall serve as its
witness.
SECTION 6. Standard Employment Contract. — The employment contract shall
conform to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Standard Employment
Contract (Kontrata sa Paglilingkod sa Tahanan) or Form BK-1 , which forms part of this
IRR. Form BK-1 is downloadable and its copies shall be made available to the public for
free through the local government units, speci cally through the barangay and the Public
Employment Service Offices (PESOs).
SECTION 7. Distribution of Copies of Employment Contract. — The employer shall
have the obligation to furnish a copy of the employment contract to the Kasambahay and
to the Office of the Punong Barangay in the barangay where the employer resides.
SECTION 8. Renewal of Contract. — Should the parties mutually agree to continue
their employment relationship upon expiration of the contract, they shall execute a new
contract to be registered with the concerned barangay pursuant to Rule IX of this IRR.
However, if the parties fail to execute a new contract, the terms and conditions of
the original contract and other improvements granted during the effectivity of said
contract are deemed renewed.
RULE III
Recruitment and Deployment of Kasambahay
SECTION 1. Regulation of Private Employment Agencies (PEAs). — The DOLE shall
maintain a system of licensing and regulation of private employment agencies to ensure
the protection of the employer and the Kasambahay recruited and hired through the
employment agencies.
The system shall provide the quali cations of the PEAs with regard to nationality,
owners and of cers, of ce space, capitalization and other requirements, as well as non-
transferability of license and prohibited practices.
SECTION 2. Requirement of License, Authority to Recruit and Authority to Establish
Branch. — The PEA shall secure a license, and if necessary, Authority to Recruit and
Authority to Establish Branch from DOLE prior to any recruitment and deployment
activities, as provided in Rules II, III and IV of the Rules and Regulations Governing Private
Recruitment and Placement Agencies for Local Employment.
The PEA shall also register with the barangay where they recruit, by presenting a
copy of its valid license and authority to recruit issued by DOLE Regional Office/s. SIAEHC
SECTION 3. Responsibilities of PEAs. — In facilitating the employment of

Kasambahay, the PEAs shall undertake the following responsibilities:
(a) Ensure that the Kasambahay is qualified as required by the employer;
(b) Secure the best terms and conditions of employment for the Kasambahay;
(c) Ensure that the employment agreement between the Kasambahay and the
employer stipulates the terms and conditions of employment and all the
benefits in accordance with this IRR;
(d) Provide a pre-employment orientation brie ng to the Kasambahay and the
employer about their rights and responsibilities in accordance with this
IRR;
(e) Ensure that the Kasambahay is not charged or required to pay any
recruitment or placement fees;
(f) Keep copies of employment contracts and agreements pertaining to
recruited Kasambahay which shall be made available during inspections
or whenever required by the DOLE or local government officials;
(g) Assist the Kasambahay in ling his/her complaints or grievances against
the employers;
(h) Cooperate with government agencies in rescue operations involving abused
or exploited Kasambahay; and
(i) Assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for payment of wages,
wage-related and other bene ts, including monthly contribution for SSS,
PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG membership.
SECTION 4. Replacement of Kasambahay by PEAs. — Within one (1) month from the
day the Kasambahay reported for work, the employer shall be entitled to a quali ed
replacement at no additional cost if any of the following grounds occurred:
(a) The Kasambahay is found to be suffering from an incurable or contagious
disease, or mental illness as certi ed by a competent or government
physician;
(b) The Kasambahay abandons the job without justi able cause, voluntarily
resigns, commits theft or any other analogous acts prejudicial to the
employer or his/her family; or
(c) The Kasambahay is physically or mentally incapable of discharging the
minimum requirements of the job, as speci ed in the employment
contract.
The employer shall be entitled to a refund of seventy- ve percent (75%) of the fees
paid to the PEA, if the latter failed to provide a quali ed replacement after a lapse of one
(1) month from receipt of the request for replacement.
RULE IV
Rights of the Kasambahay
SECTION 1. Rights and Privileges of Kasambahay. — The rights and privileges of the
Kasambahay are as follows:
(a) Minimum wage;
(b) Other mandatory bene ts, such as the daily and weekly rest periods,
service incentive leave, and 13th month pay;
(c) Freedom from employers' interference in the disposal of wages;
(d) Coverage under the SSS, PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG laws;
(e) Standard of treatment;
(f) Board, lodging and medical attendance; CADacT
(g) Right to privacy;

(h) Access to outside communication;
(i) Access to education and training;
(j) Right to form, join, or assist labor organization;
(k) Right to be provided a copy of the employment contract as required under
Section 7, Rule II of this IRR;
(l) Right to certi cate of employment as required under Section 5, Rule VII of
this IRR;
(m) Right to terminate the employment as provided under Section 2, Rule VII of
this IRR; and
(n) Right to exercise their own religious beliefs and cultural practices.
SECTION 2. Minimum Wage. — The monthly minimum wage of the Kasambahay
shall not be less than the following:
(a) Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (Php2,500.00) for those employed in
the National Capital Region (NCR);
(b) Two Thousand Pesos (Php2,000.00) for those employed in cities and rst-
class municipalities; and
(c) One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (Php1,500.00) for those employed in
other municipalities.
After one (1) year from the effectivity of the Batas Kasambahay and periodically
thereafter, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards (RTWPBs) shall review
and if proper, determine and adjust the monthly minimum wage rates of the Kasambahay
in accordance with their rules and regulations taking into account the peculiarities of the
Kasambahay employment arrangement.
SECTION 3. Mode of Payment of Wages. — The wages of the Kasambahay shall be
paid in cash. No payment by means of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens,
tickets, chits, or any object other than cash shall be allowed.
SECTION 4. Frequency of Payment of Wages. — The wages of the Kasambahay
shall be paid at least once a month.
SECTION 5. Daily Rest Period. — The Kasambahay shall be entitled to an aggregate
daily rest period of eight (8) hours per day.
SECTION 6. Weekly Rest Period. — The Kasambahay shall be entitled to at least
twenty-four (24) consecutive hours of rest in a week. The employer and the Kasambahay
shall agree in writing on the schedule of the weekly rest day but the preference of the
Kasambahay, when based on religious grounds, shall be respected.
Nothing in this provision shall deprive the Kasambahay and the employer from
agreeing to the following:
(a) Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day;
(b) Waiving a particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate of pay;
(c) Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or
(d) Other similar arrangements.
SECTION 7. Service Incentive Leave. — A Kasambahay who has rendered at least
one (1) year of service shall be entitled to an annual service incentive leave of at least ve
(5) days with pay.
Any unused portion of said annual leave shall not be cumulative or carried over to
the succeeding years. Unused leaves shall not be convertible to cash.
SECTION 8. Thirteenth-Month Pay. — The Kasambahay who has rendered at least
one (1) month of service is entitled to a thirteenth-month pay which shall not be less than
one-twelfth (1/12) of his/her total basic salary earned in a calendar year.
The thirteenth-month pay shall be paid not later than December 24 of every year or
upon separation from employment. acHCSD
SECTION 9. Social Security Bene ts. — A Kasambahay who has rendered at least
one (1) month of service shall be covered by the Social Security System (SSS), Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth),
and Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG, and shall be entitled to all the bene ts
in accordance with their respective policies, laws, rules and regulations.
Bene ts under the SSS include sickness, maternity, disability, retirement, death and
funeral. A uni ed bene t package under PhilHealth includes Inpatient Hospital Care and
Outpatient Care.
Mandatory premium payments or contributions shall be shouldered by the
employer. However, if the Kasambahay is receiving a monthly wage rate of Five Thousand
Pesos (Php5,000.00) and above, the Kasambahay shall pay the proportionate share in the
premium payments or contributions, as provided by law.
In the event the Kasambahay avails of certain loan privileges from Pag-IBIG Fund
which require the payment of additional or upgraded contributions, the said additional or
upgraded contributions shall be shouldered solely by the Kasambahay.
The SSS, Pag-IBIG and PhilHealth shall develop a uni ed system of registration and
enrollment within six (6) months from the promulgation of this IRR.
SECTION 10. Loan Assistance. — An employer may agree to extend loan assistance
to the Kasambahay in an amount not exceeding his/her six (6) months' salary.
This Section shall not apply to working children.
SECTION 11. Deduction for Loans. — By written agreement, the employer may
deduct the loans from the wages of the Kasambahay, which amount shall not exceed 20%
of his/her wages every month.
SECTION 12. Standard of Treatment. — The Kasambahay shall be treated with
respect by the employer or any member of the household. He/she shall not be subjected
to any kind of abuse, including repeated verbal or psychological, nor be in icted with any
form of physical violence or harassment or any act tending to degrade his/her dignity, as
de ned under the Revised Penal Code, Violence Against Women and their Children Law
(RA 9262), Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act (RA 7610) as amended by RA 9231, Anti-Traf cking in Persons Act of
2003 (RA 9208), and other applicable laws.
SECTION 13. Board, Lodging and Medical Attendance. — The employer shall provide
for the basic necessities of the Kasambahay, to include the following:
(a) At least three (3) adequate meals a day, taking into consideration the
Kasambahay's religious beliefs and cultural practices;
(b) Humane sleeping condition that respects the person's privacy for live-in
arrangement; and
(c) Appropriate rest and medical assistance in the form of rst-aid medicines,
in case of illnesses and injuries sustained during service without loss of
benefits.
For the Kasambahay under live-out arrangement, he/she shall be provided space for
rest and access to sanitary facility.
At no instance shall the employer withdraw or hold in abeyance the provision of
these basic necessities as punishment to, or disciplinary action against the Kasambahay.
SECTION 14. Guarantee of Privacy. — The employer shall, at all times, respect the
right of the Kasambahay to privacy, which shall extend to all forms of communication and
personal effects.
SECTION 15. Access to Outside Communication. — During free time, the
Kasambahay shall be granted access to outside communication. In case of emergency,
access to communication shall be granted even during work time. Should the
Kasambahay use the employer's telephone or other communication facilities, the costs
shall be borne by the Kasambahay, unless waived by the employer. cTEICD
SECTION 16. Opportunities for Education and Training. — The Kasambahay shall be
afforded the opportunity to nish basic education, which shall consist of elementary and
secondary education. He/she may be allowed access to alternative learning systems and,
as far as practicable, higher education or technical vocational education and training.
The employer shall adjust the work schedule of the Kasambahay to allow his/her
access to education or training without hampering the services required by the employer.
Access to education may include financial assistance at the option of the employer.
The Department of Education (DepEd) shall ensure continued access of the
Kasambahay to alternative learning system education.
SECTION 17. Membership in Labor Organization. — The Kasambahay shall have the
right to join a labor organization of his/her own choosing for purposes of mutual aid and
collective negotiation.
The Kasambahay shall be afforded opportunity to attend organization meetings
during free time.
The Regional Tripartite Industrial Peace Council (RTIPC), chaired by the DOLE
Regional Director, shall create within the council a sub-committee to ensure adequate
representation of the Kasambahay in social dialogue on issues and concerns peculiar to
Kasambahay work and their welfare.
RULE V
Rights and Obligations of the Employer
SECTION 1. Rights and Privileges of Employer. — The employer enjoys the following
rights:
(a) To require submission of pre-employment documents by the Kasambahay
(Section 4, Rule II of this IRR);
(b) To recover deployment expenses (Section 3, Rule II of this IRR);
(c) To demand replacement (Section 4, Rule III of this IRR); and
(d) To terminate employment (Section 3, Rule VII of this IRR).
SECTION 2. Pay Slip. — The employer shall, at all times, provide the Kasambahay
with a copy of the pay slip (Form BK-2) containing the amount paid in cash every pay day,
and indicating all deductions made, if any. The employer shall keep copies of the pay slips
for a period of three (3) years.
SECTION 3. Registration and Enrollment to SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG. — As
employer of the Kasambahay, he/she shall register himself/herself with, and enroll the
latter as his/her employee to the SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG.
SECTION 4. Prohibition Against Withholding of Wages. — (a) It shall be unlawful for
the employer to withhold the wages of the Kasambahay directly or indirectly, except as
provided for under Section 2, Rule VII of this IRR.
(b) It shall also be unlawful for the employer to induce the Kasambahay to give up
any part of the wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat, or by any other unlawful
means.
SECTION 5. Prohibition on Interference in the Disposal of Wages. — It shall be
unlawful for the employer to interfere with the freedom of the Kasambahay in the
disposition of his/her wages, such as:
(a) Forcing, compelling, or obliging the Kasambahay to purchase merchandise,
commodities or other properties from the employer or from any other
person; or
(b) Making use of any store or services of such employer or any other person.
SECTION 6. Deductions for Loss or Damage. — Other than those mandated by law,
the employer shall not deduct any amount from the wages of the Kasambahay without
his/her written consent or authorization; provided that, deduction for loss or damage shall
only be made under the following conditions:
(a) The Kasambahay is clearly shown to be responsible for the loss or damage;
(b) T h e Kasambahay is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why
deduction should not be made; TAcCDI

(c) The total amount of such deductions is fair and reasonable and shall not
exceed the actual loss or damage; and
(d) The deduction from the wages of the Kasambahay does not exceed 20% of
his/her wages in a month.
The DOLE shall extend free assistance in the determination of fair and reasonable
wage deductions under this Section.
SECTION 7. Deposits for Loss or Damage. — It shall be unlawful for the employer or
any other person to require a Kasambahay to make deposits from which deductions shall
be made for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, furniture and
equipment in the household.
SECTION 8. Prohibition Against Privileged Information. — All communication and
information pertaining to the employer or members of the household shall be treated as
privileged and con dential, and shall not be publicly disclosed by the Kasambahay during
and after employment. Such privileged information shall be inadmissible in evidence,
except when the suit involves the employer or any member of the household in a crime
against persons, property, personal liberty and security and chastity.
SECTION 9. Prohibition on Debt Bondage. — It shall be unlawful for the employer or
any person acting on his/her behalf to place the Kasambahay under debt bondage as
defined under Section 3 (b), Rule I of this IRR.
SECTION 10. Assignment to Non-Household Work. — The employer shall not assign
t h e Kasambahay to work, whether in full or part-time, in a commercial, industrial or
agricultural enterprise at a wage rate lower than that provided for agricultural or non-
agricultural workers.
SECTION 11. Extent of Duty Outside the Household. — The Kasambahay and the
employer may mutually agree for the Kasambahay to temporarily perform a task for the
benefit of another household under the following conditions:
(a) There is an agreement between the Kasambahay and the employer for the
purpose, particularly on the task/s to be performed;
(b) The Kasambahay is entitled to additional payment of not less than the
applicable minimum wage rate;
(c) The original employer shall be responsible for any liability incurred by the
Kasambahay on account of such arrangement; and
(d) The original employer is not charging any amount from the other household
for the arrangement.
The temporary performance of work shall not exceed thirty (30) days per
assignment.
The other household where the Kasambahay is temporarily assigned is solidarily
liable with the original employer for any nonpayment of wages during such temporary
assignment.
It shall be unlawful for the original employer to charge any amount from the said
household where the service of the Kasambahay was temporarily performed.
SECTION 12. Health and Safety. — The employer shall safeguard the safety and
health of the Kasambahay in accordance with the standards which the DOLE shall develop
through the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) and the Occupational Safety and Health
Center (OSHC) within six (6) months from the promulgation of this IRR. The said
standards shall take into account the peculiar nature of domestic work.
RULE VI
Standards for Employment of Working Children
SECTION 1. General Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful to employ any person below
fifteen (15) years of age as Kasambahay.
SECTION 2. Employment of Working Children. — Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9231
(An Act Providing for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor and Affording
Stronger Protection for the Working Child, Amending for this Purpose Republic Act No.
7610, as Amended, Otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act"), working children shall not be subjected to
the following:
(a) Work for more than eight (8) hours a day and beyond forty (40) hours a
week; cITAaD
(b) Work between ten o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning of
the following day; and
(c) Work which is hazardous or likely to be harmful to the health, safety or
morals of children, as defined under existing laws and regulations.
SECTION 3. Bene ts of Working Children. — Working children shall be entitled to
minimum wage, and all bene ts provided under the Batas Kasambahay, which include
access to education and training.
SECTION 4. Programs for the Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labor in
Domestic Work. — The DOLE, through the National Anti-Child Labor Committee (NCLC)
and in collaboration with the NCLC member-agencies, shall continue to implement
programs to withdraw, rescue, and rehabilitate working children below fteen (15) years
of age. The NCLC shall ensure that working children and their families are provided with
access to education, access to productive resources, and that measures are in place to
ensure compliance with the standards for employment of children in domestic work as
prescribed in this Rule.
RULE VII
Post Employment
SECTION 1. Pre-Termination of Employment. — (a) In case the duration of
employment is speci ed in the contract, the Kasambahay and the employer may mutually
agree upon notice to terminate the contract of employment before the expiration of its
term.
(b) In case the duration is not determined by stipulation or by nature of service, the
employer or the Kasambahay may give notice to end the employment relationship ve (5)
days before the intended termination of employment.
SECTION 2. Termination of Employment Initiated by the Kasambahay. — The
Kasambahay may terminate the employment relationship at any time before the expiration
of the contract for any of the following causes:
(a) Verbal or emotional abuse of the Kasambahay by the employer or any
member of the household;
(b) Inhuman treatment including physical abuse of the Kasambahay by the
(c) Commission of a crime or offense against the Kasambahay by the
(d) Violation by the employer of the terms and conditions of the employment
contract and other standards set forth under this IRR;
(e) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the Kasambahay, the employer, or
member/s of the household; and
(f) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
If the Kasambahay leaves without cause, any unpaid salary due, not exceeding the
equivalent of fteen (15) days work, shall be forfeited. In addition, the employer may
recover from the Kasambahay deployment expenses, if any, if the services have been
terminated within six (6) months from employment.
SECTION 3. Termination of Employment Initiated by the Employer. — An employer
may terminate the employment of the Kasambahay at any time before the expiration of
the contract for any of the following causes:
(a) Misconduct or willful disobedience by the Kasambahay of the lawful order
of the employer in connection with the former's work;
(b) Gross or habitual neglect or inef ciency by the Kasambahay in the
performance of duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer on the
Kasambahay;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the Kasambahay against the person
of the employer or any immediate member of the employer's family; caHCSD
(e) Violation by the Kasambahay of the terms and conditions of the

employment contract and other standards set forth under this IRR;
(f) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the Kasambahay, the employer, or
member/s of the household; and
(g) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
If the employer dismissed the Kasambahay for reasons other than the above,
he/she shall pay the Kasambahay the earned compensation plus indemnity in the amount
equivalent to fifteen (15) days work.
SECTION 4. Invalid Ground for Termination. — Pregnancy and Marriage of the
Kasambahay are not valid grounds for termination of employment.
SECTION 5. Employment Certi cation. — Upon the termination of employment, the
employer shall issue the Kasambahay, within ve (5) days from request, a certi cate of
employment (Form BK-3) indicating the nature, duration of the service and work
description.
RULE VIII
TESDA Skills Training, Assessment and Certification
SECTION 1. Training for Local-Hired Kasambahay. — To promote the training of the
Kasambahay, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) shall
adjust the existing training regulations for issuance of National Certi cate (NCII) on
household services and customize them for local-hired Kasambahay within six (6) months
from the promulgation of this IRR.
SECTION 2. Skills Training, Assessment and Certi cation. — To ensure productivity
and assure quality services, the DOLE, through the Regional/Provincial or District Of ces
of TESDA, shall facilitate access of Kasambahayto ef cient training, assessment and
certification based on TESDA Training Regulations for Household Services NC II.
The competencies to be achieved for NC II consist of: (a) cleaning living room,
dining room, bedroom, toilet, and kitchen; (b) washing and ironing clothes, linen and fabric;
(c) preparing hot and cold meals/food; and (d) serving food and beverage.
TESDA Training Regulations for other quali cations can be accessed at the
Regional/Provincial or District Offices.
SECTION 3. Requirements for Training. — Kasambahay intending to be trained and
certi ed for Household Services NC II must possess the quali cations speci ed in the
customized local-hired Kasambahay training regulation of TESDA.
SECTION 4. Skills/Competency-Based Pay System. — The National Wages and
Productivity Commission (NWPC)/RTWPBs shall coordinate with TESDA on the
development of a skills/competency-based pay system in line with the thrust to
professionalize the Kasambahay. Wage advisories containing a range of wage increases
on top of the minimum wage shall be issued by the RTWPBs taking into consideration the
competency standards set by TESDA.
RULE IX
Registration System for Kasambahay
SECTION 1. Employer's Reportorial Duties. — Every employer shall register a
Kasambahay under his/her employment in the barangay where his/her residence is
located. The Punong Barangay shall be responsible for the Registry of Kasambahay within
his/her jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Start-up Registration. — The Punong Barangay, together with SSS, Pag-
IBIG and PhilHealth representatives, shall conduct a common registration of all
Kasambahay nationwide. The start-up registration shall be held in a City or Municipal Hall
or Plaza, organized by the City or Municipal Mayor immediately after the promulgation of
this IRR. The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through the National
Barangay Operations Of ce (NBOO), shall issue a circular prescribing the standard
Registration Form and Protocols as guide for registration, which may contain personal,
education, family, and work information.
The DOLE-Regional Of ce shall ensure facilities for one-stop registration for
Kasambahay during job fairs.
SECTION 3. Continuous Registration. — The Punong Barangay shall designate a
Registration/Kasambahay Desk in the Barangay Hall to accommodate continuous
registration by the employers. SCaDAE
SECTION 4. Kasambahay Masterlist. — The Punong Barangay shall maintain and

update the Kasambahay Masterlist. The barangay through the Kasambahay Desks shall
submit reports to the local government units (LGUs), through the PESOs on data
regarding registration of the Kasambahay.
The PESOs shall submit a monthly report to the DILG for monitoring and data
analysis. The report shall be made available to the DOLE and other concerned government
agencies.
SECTION 5. Disclosure of Information. — The processing of personal information
under this Rule shall be allowed, subject to compliance with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012) and other laws allowing disclosure of
information to the public and adherence to the principles of transparency, legitimate
purpose and proportionality.
RULE X
Rescue and Rehabilitation of Abused Kasambahay
SECTION 1. Rescue of Abused Kasambahay. — Any abused Kasambahay shall be
immediately rescued by a municipal or city social welfare of cer in coordination with the
concerned barangay officials and the proper law enforcement personnel.
SECTION 2. De nition and Coverage of Abuse. — Abuse shall refer to any act or a
series of acts committed by an employer or any member of his/her household against any
Kasambahay which results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
(a) Physical violence refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
(b) Sexual violence refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed
against a Kasambahay. It includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating the
Kasambahay as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
Kasambahay's body, forcing him/her to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing him/her to do
indecent acts and/or make films thereof.
(2) Acts causing or attempting to cause the Kasambahay to engage in
any sexual activity including prostitution by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion.
(c) Psychological violence refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering to the Kasambahay such as but not
limited to intimidation, threats, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation and repeated verbal abuse;
(d) Economic abuse refers to the withholding of the Kasambahay's wage or a
part of it or any act which induce the Kasambahay to give up any part of
the wage by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other unlawful
means whatsoever;
(e) Any other act which limits the Kasambahay's exercise of his/her rights as
provided for in the law.
SECTION 3. Parties Who Can Report the Abuse. — The following may report any act
of abuse committed against a Kasambahay:
(a) Offended Kasambahay;
(b) Parents or guardians of the offended Kasambahay;
(c) Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity; HAaECD
(d) Social workers from the LSWDOs or the DSWD Field Office;
(e) Police officers from the Women and Children Protection Desks;
(f) Barangay Officials;
(g) Lawyer, counsellor, therapist, or healthcare provider of the offended
Kasambahay; or
(h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality
where the abuse occurred and who has personal knowledge of the
offense committed.
SECTION 4. Persons to Whom Report be Made. — Any act of abuse committed
against a Kasambahay may be reported to the following:
(a) Any official of the barangay where the abuse occurred;
(b) Any social worker from the LSWDO or the DSWD Field Office;
(c) Any police officer from the Women and Children Protection Desks; or
(d) Any officer of the PESO.
SECTION 5. Conduct of Rescue Operations. — Upon receipt of any report of abuse,
the abused Kasambahay shall be immediately rescued by a municipal or city social
welfare of cer in coordination with the concerned barangay of cials and the proper law
enforcement personnel.
At all times, the rescue team shall ensure the full protection of the rights of the
abused Kasambahay and the accused while under its custody and control.
No action or suit shall be brought, instituted or maintained in any court or tribunal or
before other authority against any: (a) social worker; (b) law enforcement of cer; or (c)
person acting in compliance with a lawful order from any of the above, for lawful acts
done or statements made during an authorized rescue operation, recovery or
rehabilitation/intervention, or an investigation or prosecution of an abused case involving
a Kasambahay: Provided, that such acts shall have been made in good faith.
SECTION 6. Role of Local Social Welfare and Development Of ces (LSWDOs) in the
Rehabilitation of Abused Kasambahay. — The LSWDOs, in coordination with concerned
government units, shall make available the following services for abused Kasambahay:
(a) Temporary shelter;
(b) Counseling;
(c) Free Legal Services;
(d) Medical or Psychological Services;
(e) Livelihood and Skills Training; and
(f) Other relevant services as necessary.
In the event that the above-mentioned services are not available at the local level,
the LSWDOs may seek the assistance from the DSWD to provide such services to the
abused Kasambahay.
At all times, the LSWDOs and DSWD shall adopt a gender responsive, right-based
and culture-sensitive approach to service delivery to facilitate the recovery, rehabilitation
and reintegration of the Kasambahay in mainstream society. The LSWDOs shall also
ensure that the necessary after-care services are made available at least for the next six
(6) months for the reintegrated Kasambahay.
RULE XI
Settlement/Disposition of Labor Related-Disputes
SECTION 1. Mechanism for Settlement of Disputes. — (a) All labor-related disputes
shall be led before the DOLE Field/Provincial/Regional Of ce having jurisdiction over the
workplace and shall go through the thirty-day (30) mandatory conciliation under the DOLE
Single Entry Approach (SEnA) program to exhaust all efforts for the settlement of the
dispute. HDATCc
SECTION 2. Compliance Order. — In case the parties fail to reach a settlement, a

mandatory conference not exceeding thirty (30) days shall be conducted by the DOLE
Field/Provincial/Regional Of ce from referral of the unsettled dispute. The DOLE-Regional
Director shall issue a Compliance Order within ten (10) days from the submission of the
case for resolution.
SECTION 3. Motion for Reconsideration. — Any aggrieved party may le a motion
for reconsideration from the Compliance Order within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
SECTION 4. Appeal. — The Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration of the
DOLE-Regional Director may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Thereafter, the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be nal and
executory.
SECTION 5. Other Cases. — Ordinary crimes or offenses committed by either party
under the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws shall be led with the
appropriate courts.
RULE XII
Unlawful Acts and Penalties
SECTION 1. Unlawful Acts. — The following acts are declared unlawful:
(a) Employment of Children below 15 years of age (Section 16, Batas
Kasambahay);
(b) Withholding of Wages of the Kasambahay (Section 28, Batas Kasambahay);
(c) Interference in the Disposal of the wages of the Kasambahay (Section 27,
Batas Kasambahay);
(d) Requiring deposits for loss or damage (Section 14, Batas Kasambahay);
(e) Placing the Kasambahay under Debt Bondage (Section 15, Batas
Kasambahay); and
(f) Charging another household for temporarily performed tasks (Section 23,
Batas Kasambahay).
SECTION 2. Administrative Penalties. — Commission of any of the foregoing acts
shall be punishable with a ne of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) but
not more than Forty Thousand Pesos (Php40,000.00), to wit:
Php10,000.00 - 1st offense
Php20,000.00 - 2nd offense
Php30,000.00 - 3rd offense
Php40,000.00 - 4th and succeeding offenses and for violation/s committed against
working children.

The penalties herein shall be without prejudice to the ling of the appropriate civil
and/or criminal action by the aggrieved party.
SECTION 3. Penal Sanction for Offenses Against Working Children. — Any employer
who has been sentenced by a court of law of any offense against a working child under
the Batas Kasambahay shall be meted out with a penalty one degree higher and shall be
prohibited from hiring a working child.
RULE XIII
Special Provisions
SECTION 1. Information Dissemination and Training Program. — Immediately after
the enactment of this IRR, the DOLE, in coordination with the DILG, DSWD, SSS, ECC,
PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG and other stakeholders, shall develop and implement a
continuous information dissemination program on the provisions of this IRR, particularly
to build the capacities of local government units and of cers assigned to the
Kasambahay Desks in fulfilling their mandate.
The employers, Kasambahay association or organization, civil society groups and
labor organizations shall be tapped in the dissemination of information on the provisions
of this IRR. AEcTaS
SECTION 2. "Araw ng mga Kasambahay". — Every 18th day of January shall be

designated as "Araw ng mga Kasambahay".
RULE XIV
Miscellaneous Provisions
SECTION 1. Transitory Provision. — All existing arrangements between a Kasambahay and
the employer shall be adjusted to conform to the minimum standards set by this IRR.
SECTION 2. Non-Diminution of Benefits. — Nothing in this IRR shall be construed to cause the
diminution or substitution of any benefits and privileges currently enjoyed by the
Kasambahay hired directly or through an agency.
SECTION 3. Oversight Function of the National Tripartite Industrial Peace Council (NTIPC). —
The NTIPC created under Executive Order No. 49, Series of 1998, as amended, shall serve as
the oversight committee to verify and monitor the implementation and enforcement of the
provisions of this IRR.
RULE XV
Final Provisions
SECTION 1. Separability Clause. — If any part or provisions of this IRR declared n to
be invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions not affected shall remain in full
force and effect.
SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, executive orders, issuances, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this IRR are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 3. Effectivity. — This IRR shall take effect fteen (15) days after its
complete publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Manila, Philippines, May 9, 2013.
(SGD.) ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ

Secretary
Department of Labor and Employment
(SGD.) MAR A. ROXAS
Secretary
Department of Interior and Local Government
(SGD.) CORAZON "DINKY" JULIANO-SOLIMAN

Secretary
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(SGD.) ALAN LM. PURISIMA

Police Director General
Philippine National Police
(SGD.) EMILIO S. DE QUIROS, JR.

President and Chief Executive Officer
Social Security System
(SGD.) ENRIQUE T. ONA

OIC-President and CEO
PhilHealth
(SGD.) DARLENE MARIE B. BERBERABE

President and CEO
Pag-IBIG Fund
ATTACHMENT
Form BK 1
Kontrata sa Paglilingkod sa Tahanan

[image]

[image]
Form BK-2
Pay Slip

[image]
Form BK-3
Certificate of Employment
[image]
Published in The Philippine Star on May 19, 2013.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.

June 17, 1992
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION

AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
ARTICLE I
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. — It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial
their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the
parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable
to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts
against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having
care and custody of the same. Cdpr
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely
threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and
normal development and over which they have no control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the
Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and
enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse
and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as
food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development
or in his permanent incapacity or death.
(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and
normal development of children" include, but are not limited to, the
following;
(1) Being in a community where there is armed con ict or being
affected by armed conflict-related activities;
(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and morals
which unduly interfere with their normal development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural
areas without the care of parents or a guardian or any adult
supervision needed for their welfare;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living
under conditions of extreme poverty or in an area which is
underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to
basic services needed for a good quality of life;cdphil
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or

(6) Circumstances analogous to those abovestated which endanger
the life, safety or normal development of children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination" refers to the coordinated program of services and
facilities to protect children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;
(4) Other acts of abuse; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal
development of children.
ARTICLE II
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
SECTION 4. Formulation of the Program. — There shall be a comprehensive
program to be formulated by the Department of Justice and the Department of Social
Welfare and Development in coordination with other government agencies and private
sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children
against child prostitution and other sexual abuse; child traf cking, obscene
publications and indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances which
endanger child survival and normal development.
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male
or female, who for money, pro t, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
in uence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of
written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of in uence or relationship to procure a child as
prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary bene t
to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive pro t or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or
owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of
the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment
serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to the
activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment.
SECTION 6. Attempt to Commit Child Prostitution. — There is an attempt to
commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who,
not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or
cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar
establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about
to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of
Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or
bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by
two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5
hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of
child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE IV
Child Trafficking
SECTION 7. Child Traf cking . — Any person who shall engage in trading and
dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child
for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.
SECTION 8. Attempt to Commit Child Traf cking . — There is an attempt to
commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this Act:
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason
therefor and without clearance issued by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or written permit or justi cation from the
child's parents or legal guardian;
(b) When a pregnant mother executes an af davit of consent for adoption
for a consideration;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits
women or couples to bear children for the purpose of child
trafficking; prcd
(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic of cial or employee, nurse, midwife,

local civil registrar or any other person simulates birth for the purpose
of child trafficking; orcd
(e) When a person engages in the act of nding children among low-income
families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-
caring institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child
trafficking.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated
felony under Section 7 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to
commit child trafficking under this Act.
ARTICLE V
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
SECTION 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. — Any person who shall
hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions
and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or
pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12)

years of age, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a
child who shall cause and/or allow such child to be employed or to participate in an
obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLE VI

Other Acts of Abuse
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12)
years or under or who is ten (10) years or more his junior in any public
or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension
house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or
similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period and a ne of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000):
Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or af nity or any
bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the
performance of a social, moral or legal duty. cdrep
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one
prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his company a minor as
provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium period and a ne of not less than Forty thousand
pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be
an ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be
imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a ne of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental
authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any
public or private place of accommodation, whether for occupancy,
food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any
person to take along with him to such place or places any minor
herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period and a ne of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000), and the loss of the license to operate such a place or
establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any
other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;
(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. cdt
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional
mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of quali ed seduction, acts of lasciviousness with
the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade,
respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the
care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ARTICLE VII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
SECTION 11. Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises which Promote,
Facilitate, or Conduct Activities Constituting Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse,
Child Traf cking, Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other Acts of Abuse .
— All establishments and enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and
other sexual abuse, child traf cking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and
other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their authority or license to
operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted
under this Act and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with
the words "off limits" shall be conspicuously displayed outside the establishments or
enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and Development for such period
which shall not be less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine. The
unauthorized removal of such sign shall be punishable by prision correccional. cdasia
An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and

other sexual abuse, child traf cking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and
other acts of abuse if the acts constituting the same occur in the premises of said
establishment under this Act or in violation of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. An
enterprise such as a sauna, travel agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes the
aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists; exhibits children in a lewd or
indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex and
said services include any lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children for
activities constituting the aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have committed the
acts penalized herein.
ARTICLE VIII
Working Children
SECTION 12. Employment of Children. — Children below fteen (15) years of age
may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or
legal guardian and where only members of the employer's family are employed:
Provided, however, That his employment neither endangers his life, safety and health
and morals, nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or
legal guardian shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed primary and/or
secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or
information through cinema, theater, radio or television is essential: Provided, The
employment contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the express
agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of
Labor and Employment: Provided, That the following requirements in all instances are
strictly complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of
the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation
or discrimination taking into account the system and level of
remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and
supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for
training and skill acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall
rst secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall ensure observance of the above requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the effective implementation of this Section.
SECTION 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. — The Department of
Education, Culture and Sports shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal
education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and vocational ef ciency
of working children who have not undergone or nished elementary or secondary
education. Such course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most
effective under given circumstances.
SECTION 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain
Advertisements. — No person shall employ child models in all commercials or
advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its
byproducts and violence.
SECTION 15. Duty of Employer. — Every employer shall comply with the duties
provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
SECTION 16. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any provision of this
Article shall suffer the penalty of a ne of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000)
but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the
court: Provided, That, in case of repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the
offender's license to operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLE IX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities
SECTION 17. Survival, Protection and Development. — In addition to the rights
guaranteed to children under this Act and other existing laws, children of indigenous
cultural communities shall be entitled to protection, survival and development
consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective communities.
SECTION 18. System of and Access to Education. — The Department of
Education, Culture and Sports shall develop and institute an alternative system of
education for children of indigenous cultural communities which is culture-speci c and
relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their communities. The Department
of Education, Culture and Sports shall also accredit and support non-formal but
functional indigenous educational programs conducted by non-governmental
organizations in said communities.
SECTION 19. Health and Nutrition. — The delivery of basic social services in
health and nutrition to children of indigenous cultural communities shall be given
priority by all government agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health institution
shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural communities are given equal attention.
In the provision of health and nutrition services to children of indigenous cultural
communities, indigenous health practices shall be respected and recognized.
SECTION 20. Discrimination. — Children of indigenous cultural communities shall

not be subjected to any and all forms of discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous cultural
communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a ne of
not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000).
SECTION 21. Participation. — Indigenous cultural communities, through their
duly-designated or appointed representatives shall be involved in planning, decision-
making implementation, and evaluation of all government programs affecting children
of indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also be recognized and
respected.
ARTICLE X
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
SECTION 22. Children as Zones of Peace. — Children are hereby declared as
Zones of Peace. It shall be the responsibility of the State and all other sectors
concerned to resolve armed con icts in order to promote the goal of children as zones
of peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be observed.
(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special
respect. They shall be protected from any form of threat, assault,
torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or its civilian units or other armed groups, nor be
allowed to take part in the ghting, or used as guides, couriers, or
spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and
emergency relief services shall be kept unhampered;
(d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those
involved in fact- nding missions from both government and non-
government institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be subjected
to undue harassment in the performance of their work; cdtai
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units
shall not be utilized for military purposes such as command posts,
barracks, detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families
temporarily separated due to armed conflict.
SECTION 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Con ict. — Children shall be
given priority during evacuation as a result of armed con ict. Existing community
organizations shall be tapped to look after the safety and well-being of children during
evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that children evacuated are
accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.
SECTION 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter . — Whenever possible, members
of the same family shall be housed in the same premises and given separate
accommodation from other evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal
family life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers and children
shall be given additional food in proportion to their physiological needs. Whenever
feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor
games.
SECTION 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Con ict.
— Any child who has been arrested for reasons related to armed con ict, either as
combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights:
(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are
accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardian of the child;
and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any
responsible member of the community as determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceeding the court should nd that
the aforesaid child committed the acts charged against him, the court shall determine
the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However,
instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further
proceedings and shall commit such child to the custody or care of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the
Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he has had
reached eighteen (18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem
proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible individual under whose
care he has been committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any duly-licensed agency or
such other of cer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may
prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of
the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases.
SECTION 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed
Conflict. — The chairman of the barangay affected by the armed con ict shall submit
the names of children residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare and
development of cer within twenty-four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed
conflict. cdasia
ARTICLE XI
Remedial Procedures
SECTION 27. Who May File a Complaint. — Complaints on cases of unlawful acts
committed against children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;
( d ) Of cer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring
institution;
( e ) Of cer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned, responsible citizens where the violation
occurred.
SECTION 28. Protective Custody of the Child. — The offended party shall be
immediately placed under the protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular
performance of this function, the of cer of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development shall be free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody
proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603.
SECTION 29. Confidentiality. — At the instance of the offended party, his name
may be withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio broadcasting,
producer and director of the lm in case of the movie industry, to cause undue and
sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of this Act which results in the moral
degradation and suffering of the offended party.
SECTION 30. Special Court Proceedings. — Cases involving violations of this Act
shall be heard in the chambers of the judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated
as Juvenile and Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the
exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and cases involving detention prisoners
and persons covered by Republic Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the
hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
SECTION 31. Common Penal Provisions. —
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum
period if the offender has been previously convicted under this Act;
(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the
of cer or employee thereof who is responsible for the violation of this
Act shall suffer the penalty imposed in its maximum period;

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
af nity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no
license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after
service of sentence and forever barred from entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum
period if the offender is a public of cer or employee: Provided,
however, That if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal, then the penalty of perpetual or temporary
absolute disquali cation shall also be imposed: Provided, nally , That
if the penalty imposed is prision correccional o r arresto mayor, the
penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and
(f) A ne to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered
as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any
immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the
offense.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
SECTION 32. Rules and Regulations. — Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the
Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, shall promulgate rules and regulations of the effective implementation of
this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
SECTION 33. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be appropriated in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
SECTION 34. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is declared invalid
or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full
force and effect.
SECTION 35. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Acts are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 36. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect upon completion of
its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. dctai
Approved: June 17, 1992

Published in Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal on June 20, 1992. Published in the
Official Gazette, Vol. 88 No. 30 page 4851 on July 27, 1992.

October 1993
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION OF CHILD

ABUSE CASES
Pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610 ("An Act Providing For Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And
Discrimination, Providing Penalties For Its Violation And For Other Purposes"), the
following Rules and Regulations are hereby promulgated concerning the reporting and
investigation of child abuse cases:
SECTION 1. Objectives. — These Rules and Regulations seek to encourage the
reporting of cases of physical or psychological injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or
negligent treatment of children and to ensure the early and effective investigation of
cases of child abuse towards the prosecution of the offender consistent with the need
to promote the best interest of the child victim. cITAaD
SECTION 2. De nition of Terms . — As used in these Rules, unless the context

requires otherwise —
a) "Child" shall refer to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one
over said age and who, upon evaluation of a quali ed physician,
psychologist or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking care of
himself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition or
of protecting himself from abuse;
b) "Child abuse" refers to the in iction of physical or psychological injury,
cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child;
c) "Cruelty" refers to any act by word or deed which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
Discipline administered by a parent or legal guardian to a child does
not constitute cruelty provided it is reasonable in manner and
moderate in degree and does not constitute physical or psychological
injury as defined herein;ACaDTH
d) "Physical injury" includes but is not limited to lacerations, fractured bones,

burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by
a child;
e) "Psychological injury" means harm to a child's psychological or
intellectual functioning which may be exhibited by severe anxiety,
depression, withdrawal or outward aggressive behavior, or a
combination of said behaviors, which may be demonstrated by a
change in behavior, emotional response or cognition;
f) "Neglect" means failure to provide, for reasons other than poverty,
adequate food, clothing, shelter, basic education or medical care so
as to seriously endanger the physical, mental, social and emotional
growth and development of the child;
g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another
person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
IHCDAS
h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or

through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person;
i) "Exploitation" means the hiring, employment, persuasion, inducement, or
coercion of a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent
shows, whether live or in video or lm, or to pose or act as a model in
obscene publications or pornographic materials, or to sell or
distribute said materials; and
j) "Department" shall refer to a duly authorized of cer or social worker of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or similar agency of a
local government unit.
SECTION 3. Reporting . — A person who learns of facts or circumstances that
give rise to the belief that a child has suffered abuse may report the same, either orally
or in writing, to the Department, to the police or other law enforcement agency or to a
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children.
SECTION 4. Mandatory Reporting . — The head of any public or private hospital,
medical clinic and similar institution, as well as the attending physician and nurse, shall
report, either orally or in writing, to the Department the examination and/or treatment of
a child who appears to have suffered abuse within forty-eight (48) hours from
knowledge of the same. ADSTCa
SECTION 5. Duty of Government Workers to Report. — It shall be the duty of all

teachers and administrators in public schools, probation of cers, government lawyers,
law enforcement officers, barangay officials, corrections officers and other government
of cials and employees whose work involves dealing with children to report all
incidents of possible child abuse to the Department.
SECTION 6. Failure to Report. — Failure of the individuals mentioned in Section 4
above and the administrator or head of the hospital, clinic or similar institution
concerned to report a possible case of child abuse shall be punishable with a ne of
not more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00).
SECTION 7. Immunity for Reporting . — A person who, acting in good faith, shall
report a case of child abuse shall be free from any civil or administrative liability arising
therefrom. There shall be a presumption that any such person acted in good faith.
SECTION 8. Investigation. — Not later than forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of
a report on a possible incident of child abuse, the Department shall immediately
proceed to the home or establishment where the alleged child victim is found and
interview said child to determine whether an abuse was committed, the identity of the
perpetrator and the need of removing the child from his home or the establishment
where he may be found or placing him under protective custody pursuant to Section 9
of these Rules.
Whenever practicable, the Department shall conduct the interview jointly with the
police and/or a barangay official. DHITcS
To minimize the number of interviews of the child victim, his statement shall be
transcribed or recorded on voice or video tape.
SECTION 9. Protective Custody. — If the investigation discloses sexual abuse,
serious physical injury of life-threatening neglect of the child, the duly authorized of cer
or social worker of the Department shall immediately remove the child from his home
or the establishment where he was found and place him under protective custody to
ensure his safety.
SECTION 10. Immunity of Of cer Taking the Child Under Protective Custody . —
The duly authorized of cer or social worker of the Department and the assisting police
of cer or barangay of cial, if any, who shall take a child under protective custody shall
be exempt from any civil, criminal and administrative liability therefor.
SECTION 11. Noti cation of Police . — The Department shall inform the police or
other law enforcement agency whenever a child victim is placed under protective
custody.
SECTION 12. Physical Examination; Interview. — The Department shall refer the
child who is placed under protective custody to a government medical or health of cer
for a physical/mental examination and/or medical treatment. Thereafter, the
Department shall determine the rehabilitation or treatment program which the child
may require and to gather data relevant to the ling of criminal charges against the
abuser.
SECTION 13. Involuntary Commitment. — The Department shall le a petition for
the involuntary commitment of the child victim under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, if the investigation con rms the commission of child
abuse. ETIHCa
SECTION 14. Suspension or Deprivation of Parental Authority. — The Department

shall ask the Court to suspend the parental authority of the parent or lawful guardian
who abused the child victim, Provided, that in cases of sexual abuse, the Department
shall ask for the permanent deprivation of parental authority of the offending parent or
lawful guardian.
SECTION 15. Transfer of Parental Authority . — The Department shall, in case of
suspension or deprivation of parental authority and if the child victim cannot be placed
under the care of a next of kin, ask the proper Court to transfer said authority over the
child victim to the Department or to the head of a duly accredited children's home,
orphanage or similar institution.
SECTION 16. Who May File a Complaint. — A complaint against a person who
abused a child may be filed by the —
a. offended party;
b. parent or legal guardian;
c. ascendant or collateral relative of the child within the third degree of
consanguinity; aHECST
d. duly authorized officer or social worker of the Department;

e. of cer, social worker or representative of a licensed child caring
institution;
f. Barangay Chairman; or
g. at least three (3) concerned responsible citizens of the community where
the abuse took place who have personal knowledge of the offense
committed.
SECTION 17. Filing of Criminal Case. — The investigation report of the
Department and/or of the police or other law enforcement agency on the abuse of a
child, together with the results of the physical/mental examination and/or medical
treatment and other relevant evidence, shall be immediately forwarded to the provincial
or city prosecutor concerned for the preparation and ling of the appropriate criminal
charge against the person who allegedly committed the abuse.
SECTION 18. Closure of Establishments. — The Department shall immediately
close the establishment or enterprise found to have promoted, facilitated or conducted
activities constituting child abuse. The closure shall be for a period of not less than one
(1) year. Upon said closure, the Department shall post signs with the words "off limits"
in conspicuous places outside the premises of the closed establishment or enterprise.
The unauthorized removal of said sign shall be punishable by prision correccional.
The Department shall seek the assistance of the local government unit
concerned or the police or other law enforcement agency in the closure of an offending
establishment or enterprise. aSECAD
The Department shall also le the appropriate criminal complaint against the
owner or manager of the closed establishment or enterprise under the provisions of
R.A. 7610, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
An establishment or enterprise shall be presumed to promote or facilitate child
abuse if the acts constituting the same occur within its premises. An establishment
such as a sauna parlor, travel agency, or recruitment agency which promotes acts of
child sexual abuse as part of a tour program; exhibits children in a lewd or indecent
show; provides child masseurs or masseuses for adults of the same or opposite sex
and includes any lascivious conduct as part of the services that are rendered; or solicits
children for activities constituting sexual abuse shall be deemed to have promoted or
facilitated child abuse.
SECTION 19. Guardian Ad Litem. — Upon the ling of the criminal complaint for
child abuse, the Department shall ask the appropriate court to appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent the best interests of the child.
The guardian ad litem shall —
a) explain to the child the legal proceedings in which the child will be
involved;
b) advise the judge, when appropriate, and as a friend of the court, regarding
the child's ability to understand the proceedings and questions
propounded therein;
c) advise the prosecutor concerning the ability of the child to cooperate as a
witness for the prosecution; ITaCEc
d) attend all investigations, hearings and trial proceedings in which the child
is a participant; and
e) monitor and coordinate concurrent administrative and court actions.
SECTION 20. Con dentiality of Identity of Victim . — At the request of the victim
or his representative, the name of the child shall be withheld by the Department until the
court has acquired jurisdiction over his case.
SECTION 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases . — The trial of child abuse cases
shall take precedence over all other cases before the courts, except election and
habeas corpus cases. The trial in said cases shall commence within three (3) days from
the date the accused is arraigned and no postponement of the initial hearing shall be
granted except on account of the illness of the accused or other grounds beyond his
control. TaCDIc
SECTION 22. Protection of Victim from Undue Publicity. — The prosecutor in a

child abuse case shall, taking into consideration the age, psychological maturity and
understanding of the child victim, the nature of the unlawful acts committed, the desire
of the victim and the interests of the child's family, take the necessary steps to exclude
the public during the giving of testimony of the child victim; to limit the publication of
information, photographs or artistic renderings that may identify the victim; and to
prevent the undue and sensationalized publicity of the case.
SECTION 23. Con dentiality of Records . — All records pertaining to cases of
sexual abuse shall be strictly con dential and no information relating thereto shall be
disclosed except in connection with any court or official proceeding based thereon.
The unauthorized disclosure of the aforementioned records shall be punishable
by a ne of not more than two thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) or by
imprisonment of not more than one (1) year or such fine and imprisonment.
SECTION 24. Effectivity. — These Rules shall take effect upon the approval of the
Secretary of Justice and fteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation. AIHaCc
DONE in the City of Manila, this day of October 1993.
(SGD.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON

Secretary of Justice
CONFORME:
(SGD.) CORAZON ALMA DE LEON

Secretary of Social Welfare and Development

November 24, 1993
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON CHILDREN OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL

COMMUNITIES
Pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610 ("An Act Providing For Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination,
Providing Penalties For Its Violation And For Other Purposes"), the following Rules and
Regulations are hereby promulgated concerning children of indigenous cultural
communities:
SECTION 1. Objectives. — These Rules and Regulations seek to provide children of
indigenous cultural communities with basic health, nutrition and other basic social services
to ensure their protection, survival and development consistent with the customs and
traditions of their respective communities. CAcIES
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in these Rules, unless the context requires
otherwise —
a) "indigenous cultural community" refers to a native community whose
members are bound by a common ethnic origin, language, culture, or
religion or beliefs and whose existence as a distinct community with
its own particular characteristics should be preserved;
b) "child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age who is a
member of an indigenous cultural community;
c) "DECS" refers to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
d) "DOH" refers to the Department of Health; DEIHAa
e) "DSWD" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development or

similar agency of a local government unit; and
f) "NGOs" refers to non-government organizations.
SECTION 3. Access to Education. — The DECS shall ensure that a child is provided with the
opportunity to obtain an education and to develop his skills.
SECTION 4. Basic Education. — The DECS, in coordination with the Office for Northern
Cultural Communities, Office for Southern Cultural Communities, Office on Muslim Affairs
and concerned NGO's shall develop and/or strengthen programs that will enable a child to
attend a school offering elementary and secondary education programs.
SECTION 5. Alternative Education. — Consistent with the expressed desire or need of an
indigenous cultural community to preserve its ethno-cultural characteristics, the DECS, in
coordination with the government agencies named in Section 4 above and concerned
NGOs, shall develop, establish and maintain an alternative system of education for the
children of said community. Whenever practicable, the dialect of the community shall be
used as the medium of instruction.
SECTION 6. Non-formal Education. — The DECS shall accredit and support non-formal
programs of NGOs that provide a child with practical skills and crafts that will propagate
and develop the traditional arts, culture and vocational skills of the indigenous cultural
community to which the child belongs.
SECTION 7. Health Services. — The DOH, in coordination with the local government unit
concerned and NGOs, shall make essential nutrition and health services available to a child.
It shall provide a child with basic immunization services, protect him from endemic
diseases, and establish programs as will ensure that the child will be given medical
attention in regional and provincial hospitals, rural and municipal health centers and other
field units of the DOH. ECcDAH
The health and nutrition programs that may be established by the DOH shall take into
account the beliefs, customs and practices of the indigenous cultural community to which
the child belongs. The DOH shall train workers in the health practices of the indigenous
cultural community to be served and shall encourage the use of scientifically acceptable
traditional medicine.
SECTION 8. Coordinating Committee for Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities. — A
city/municipal government shall establish a Coordinating Committee for Children of
Indigenous Cultural Communities, hereinafter referred to as the Committee, composed of
representatives of the local government unit, concerned NGOs and of the indigenous
cultural communities in the locality.
The Committee shall elect its Chairman and other officers from among its members. The
municipal/city social worker shall act as the convenor of the Committee and shall serve as
its secretary.
SECTION 9. Functions of Committee. — The Committee shall —
a) identify the barangays where the indigenous cultural community resides
and prepare a mapping plan thereof;
b) determine the number of indigenous cultural community households in a
barangay and the number of children in each household; HCSDca
c) identify, coordinate, monitor and evaluate all programs affecting the

children of an indigenous cultural community in the area and submit a
report thereon to the local government unit concerned and if
necessary, recommend the establishment of other programs to meet
the identified needs of the children; and
d) assist the indigenous cultural community and its members in resolving
disagreements, disputes or difficulties relating to discrimination and
the implementation of government and private programs and projects
intended to benefit said community.
SECTION 10. Discrimination. — No person or entity, whether public or private, shall
discriminate against a child by reason of his being a member of an indigenous cultural
community in, among others, the hiring, promotion and in the enjoyment of the terms and
conditions of employment; in the use of public transport; in the enjoyment or use of public
accommodations and services; and in the availment of health, recreational, nutrition and
educational services and facilities. ADCIca
Any other act, practice, process or treatment which results in the deprivation or
curtailment of the rights, freedoms and privileges to which a child is entitled under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child, The Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended) and
similar issuances and laws on the sole basis of said child being a member of an
indigenous cultural community shall be considered discrimination.
SECTION 11. Complaint for Discrimination. — A complaint for discrimination may be filed
by the aggrieved child or by his parent or guardian with the Chairman of the Coordinating
Committee for Indigenous Cultural Communities, the Barangay Chairman, the DSWD, or
directly with Philippine National Police.
SECTION 12. Penalty for Discrimination. — Any person or entity that practices acts of
discrimination against a child shall, if found guilty, suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more
than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
SECTION 13. Effectivity. — These Rules and Regulations shall take effect upon completion
of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. CHEIcS
DONE in the City of Manila, this 24th day of November 1993.

CONFORME:
(SGD.) CORAZON ALMA DE LEON

Secretary of Social Welfare
and Development

January 24, 1994
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN
Pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610 entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES", the following rules and regulations are hereby issued to
implement Article IV of said Act concerning "Child trafficking":
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. — As used in these Rules, unless the context otherwise
requires —
a. "Child" shall refer to a Filipino citizen who is below eighteen (18) years of
age; caSEAH
b. "Trafficking" shall refer to the act of trading or dealing with children,

including but not limited to, the buying and selling children for money,
or for any other consideration, or barter;
c. "Parent" shall refer to the natural parents, legal guardian of a child or one
exercising parental authority over the child;
d. "Department" shall refer to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development; and
e. "Code" shall refer to Presidential Decree No. 603, "The Child and Youth
Welfare Code".
SECTION 2. Child Abandoned in an Institution. — A hospital, clinic or duly licensed child-
caring or placement agency shall report to the Department any child in its care whenever
the parent has left the child in the said hospital, clinic or child-caring or placement agency
for seven (7) days without any valid reason and without providing for his care and support.
SECTION 3. Child Left with a Private Individual. — If a child is left by the parent with a
private individual for the same period mentioned in Section 2 above without providing for
the care and support of the child, the private individual who has custody over the child shall
report such fact to the Department. IAcTaC
SECTION 4. Presumption of Abandonment of Child. — The following shall be presumed as

an intent on the part of a parent to abandon a child:
a. failure to provide for the care and support of a child for at least six (6)
continuous months for no valid reason shall be presumed as an intent
to abandon the child unless said failure is due to reasons beyond the
control of the parent or is due to financial reasons; or
b. failure to report to a law enforcement agency or to the Department that
the child is missing within seventy-two (72) hours after his
disappearance is discovered.
SECTION 5. Action of Department. — Upon receipt of the report of the presence of an
abandoned child in a hospital, clinic or private individual, the Department shall, if found true,
immediately take custody of said child or arrange for the immediate transfer of the child to
a duly accredited child-caring or placement agency. Thereafter, the Department shall file a
petition for the involuntary commitment of the abandoned child in favor of a duly
accredited child placement agency or private individual in accordance with the provisions
of the Code. The Department shall also file the appropriate criminal complaint against the
parent who abandoned the child.
SECTION 6. Prohibited Act. — It shall be unlawful for a hospital, clinic, duly accredited child
placement agency or person to deliver an abandoned child under its custody to a public
institution or private individual without the written consent of the parent or person who
entrusted such child to its or his care, or in the absence of the latter, of the Department. EDISTc
Violation of this provision will subject the guilty party to the penalty of arresto mayor and
payment of a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00). This is without prejudice to
the filing of a separate complaint against the guilty party under Article 210 of the Code.
SECTION 7. Criminal Liability for Abandonment of Child. — A parent who abandons a child
who is under seven (7) years of age for six (6) continuous months shall, if found guilty, be
punished with arresto mayor and payment of a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos
(P500.00).
If the child dies as a result of the abandonment, the culprit shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
If the child is merely exposed to danger by reason of the abandonment, the culprit shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
SECTION 8. Unaccompanied Foreign Travel of a Child. — A child shall not be allowed to
travel alone to a foreign country without a travel clearance therefor issued by the
Department or a written permit issued under oath by both natural or adoptive parents, or
the legal guardian or other person having legal custody of the child. DCcAIS
SECTION 9. Department Travel Clearance. — An application for travel clearance authorizing

the unaccompanied foreign travel of a child shall be filed with the Department. The
application shall be in the form prescribed by the Department and shall be signed under
oath by both natural or adoptive parents of the child, or the guardian or legal custodian of
the child.
SECTION 10. Parental Travel Permit. — The written permission given by the natural or
adoptive parents, guardian or legal custodian for the unaccompanied foreign travel of their
child shall be in the form prescribed by the Department. It shall be under oath and signed
by both natural parents, the adoptive parent/s or the legal guardian or other person having
legal custody of the child.
If the child will travel in the company of one of the natural parents or adoptive parents, the
permit shall be signed by the parent who will stay behind in the Philippines.
SECTION 11. Contents of Application for Department Travel Clearance and Parental Travel
Permit. — An application for a department travel clearance and a parental travel permit
shall, among others, indicate the exact address of the child at the point of destination, the
date of departure, the purpose and duration of the child's travel and the arrangements for
the welfare of the child in the country of destination.CAIaDT
SECTION 12. Supporting Documents of Application for Department Travel Clearance and
Parental Travel Permit. — An application for the issuance of a Department travel clearance
and a parental travel permit shall be accompanied by certified true copies of the following
documents:
a. the passport or other travel document of the child, including the visa or
other appropriate documentation;
b. the child's birth certificate and marriage certificate of the natural parents
or if the same are not available, other proof of the child's age and
filiation, or the adoption decree, guardianship or custody papers of
the adoptive parent, guardian or person having legal custody of the
child; and
c. proof that the child will not become a public charge in the country of
destination. TCASIH
SECTION 13. Department Action on a Parental Travel Permit. — A copy of the parental
travel permit shall be filed with the Department at least seven (7) working days before the
scheduled departure of the child.
If the Department, after investigation, finds that the foreign travel is inimical to the interest,
it shall request the Bureau of Immigration to place the child in its hold-departure list and
shall notify the parent of the child of said action.
SECTION 14. Holding of Departure of Child. — An unaccompanied child shall not be
allowed by the Bureau of Immigration personnel at the port of embarkation to depart for a
foreign destination except upon presentation of the Department travel clearance or
parental travel permit, as the case may be, duly stamped having been received by the
Department.
The authorized representative of the Department at the port of embarkation shall provide
the immigration personnel thereat with such assistance as may be necessary. aHSCcE
SECTION 15. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking . — The following shall be liable for the
offense of attempt to commit child trafficking as defined and penalized under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7610:
a. The parent or other person who is responsible for the travel arrangements
of the unaccompanied child;
b. The pregnant mother who executes an affidavit consenting to the
adoption of her unborn child for a consideration;
c. The head of an agency, establishment, child-caring institution or person
who recruits women to bear children or couples to procreate; cIaHDA
d. The physician, surgeon, public officer or other person who, in violation of

his profession or office, cooperates in the simulation of the birth for
the purpose of trafficking;
e. The person, whether natural or judicial, who locates children among low-
income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day care centers, or other
child-caring institutions for the purpose of offering said children for
placement or adoption.
SECTION 16. Presumption of Child Trafficking . — There shall be presumption of child
trafficking if a person, whether natural or juridical, has under his custody two or more
children without any legal basis or without being licensed to act as a foster parent or a
child placement agency.
SECTION 17. Criminal Liability. — If any of the offenses described herein is committed by a
juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the manager, administrator,
representative, director, agent, or employee who committed the violation or who caused,
directed, cooperated or participated in said violation.
SECTION 18. Effectivity. — These Rules shall take effect upon approval by the Secretary of
Justice and fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation. SCHIcT
DONE in the City of Manila, this 24th day of January 1994.

CONFORME:
(SGD.) CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON

Secretary of Social Welfare
and Development

December 19, 2003
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD

LABOR AND AFFORDING STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING CHILD,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT"
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise

known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. — It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the State to provide special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development including child labor and its
worst forms; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program
for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of
the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of
the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said
parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same. TACEDI
"It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children
gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect
their survival and normal development and over which they have no control.
"The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all
actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies,
consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to
promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and
happy life."
SECTION 2. Section 12 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 12. Employment of Children. — Children below fteen (15)
years of age shall not be employed except:
"1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of
his/her parents or legal guardian and where only members of his/her family are
employed: Provided, however, That his/her employment neither endangers
his/her life, safety, health, and morals, nor impairs his/her normal development:
Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said child
with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or
"2) Where a child's employment or participation in public
entertainment or information through cinema, theater, radio, television or other
forms of media is essential: Provided, That the employment contract is
concluded by the child's parents or legal guardian, with the express agreement
of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment: Provided, further, That the following requirements in all
instances are strictly complied with:
"(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals
and normal development of the child;
"(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's
exploitation or discrimination taking into account the system and level of
remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and
"(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the
approval and supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for
training and skills acquisition of the child.
"In the above-exceptional cases where any such child may be employed,
the employer shall rst secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from
the Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the
above requirements.
"For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall apply to all persons
under eighteen (18) years of age."
SECTION 3. The same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding
new sections to be denominated as Sections 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, and 12-D to read as
follows:
"SEC. 12-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. — Under the
exceptions provided in Section 12 of this Act, as amended:
"(1) A child below fteen (15) years of age may be
allowed to work for not more than twenty (20) hours a week:
Provided, That the work shall not be more than four (4) hours at
any given day;
"(2) A child fteen (15) years of age but below eighteen
(18) shall not be allowed to work for more than eight (8) hours a
day, and in no case beyond forty (40) hours a week;
"(3) No child below fteen (15) years of age shall be
allowed to work between eight o'clock in the evening and six
o'clock in the morning of the following day and no child fteen
(15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall be allowed to work
between ten o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the morning
of the following day."
"SEC. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and Administration of the Working
Child's Income . — The wages, salaries, earnings and other income of the
working child shall belong to him/her in ownership and shall be set aside
primarily for his/her support, education or skills acquisition and secondarily to
the collective needs of the family: Provided, That not more than twenty percent
(20%) of the child's income may be used for the collective needs of the family.
"The income of the working child and/or the property acquired through
the work of the child shall be administered by both parents. In the absence or
incapacity of either of the parents, the other parent shall administer the same. In
case both parents are absent or incapacitated, the order of preference on
parental authority as provided for under the Family Code shall apply.
"SEC. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child's
Income. — The parent or legal guardian of a working child below eighteen (18)
years of age shall set up a trust fund for at least thirty percent (30%) of the
earnings of the child whose wages and salaries from work and other income
amount to at least two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) annually, for
which he/she shall render a semi-annual accounting of the fund to the
Department of Labor and Employment, in compliance with the provisions of this
Act. The child shall have full control over the trust fund upon reaching the age
of majority.
"SEC. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child Labor. — No
child shall be engaged in the worst forms of child labor. The phrase "worst
forms of child labor" shall refer to any of the following:
"(1) All forms of slavery, as de ned under the "Anti-
traf cking in Persons Act of 2003", or practices similar to slavery
such as sale and traf cking of children, debt bondage and
serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict; or
"(2) The use, procuring, offering or exposing of a child
for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for
pornographic performances; or
"(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal
or illicit activities, including the production and traf cking of
dangerous drugs and volatile substances prohibited under existing
laws; or
"(4) Work which, by its nature or the circumstances in
which it is carried out, is hazardous or likely to be harmful to the
health, safety or morals of children, such that it:
"a) Debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being; or
"b) Exposes the child to physical, emotional or sexual
abuse, or is found to be highly stressful psychologically or may
prejudice morals; or
"c) Is performed underground, underwater or at
dangerous heights; or
"d) Involves the use of dangerous machinery,
equipment and tools such as power-driven or explosive power-
actuated tools; or
"e) Exposes the child to physical danger such as, but
not limited to the dangerous feats of balancing, physical strength
or contortion, or which requires the manual transport of heavy
loads; or
"f) Is performed in an unhealthy environment exposing
the child to hazardous working conditions, elements, substances,
co-agents or processes involving ionizing, radiation, re,
ammable substances, noxious components and the like, or to
extreme temperatures, noise levels, or vibrations; or
"g) Is performed under particularly dif cult conditions;
or
"h) Exposes the child to biological agents such as
bacteria, fungi, viruses, protozoans, nematodes and other
parasites; or
"i) Involves the manufacture or handling of explosives
and other pyrotechnic products."
SECTION 4. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 13. Access to Education and Training for Working Children . —
"a) No child shall be deprived of formal or non-formal education. In all cases of
employment allowed in this Act, the employer shall provide a working child with
access to at least primary and secondary education. SCEHaD
"b) To ensure and guarantee the access of the working child to

education and training, the Department of Education (DEPED) shall: (1)
formulate, promulgate, and implement relevant and effective course designs
and educational programs; (2) conduct the necessary training for the
implementation of the appropriate curriculum for the purpose; (3) ensure the
availability of the needed educational facilities and materials; and (4) conduct
continuing research and development program for the necessary and relevant
alternative education of the working child.
"c) The DEPED shall promulgate a course design under its non-
formal education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational ef ciency of working children who have not undergone or nished
elementary or secondary education. Such course design shall integrate the
learning process deemed most effective under given circumstances."

follows:
"SEC. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain
Advertisements. — No child shall be employed as a model in any advertisement
directly or indirectly promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco
and its byproducts, gambling or any form of violence or pornography."
SECTION 6. Section 16 of the same Act, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 16. Penal Provisions. —
"a) Any employer who violates Sections 12, 12-A, and Section 14 of
this Act, as amended, shall be penalized by imprisonment of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years or a ne of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00)
or both at the discretion of the court.
"b) Any person who violates the provision of Section 12-D of this Act
or the employer of the subcontractor who employs, or the one who facilitates
the employment of a child in hazardous work, shall suffer the penalty of a ne
of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, or both such ne and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.
"c) Any person who violates Sections 12-D(1) and 12-D(2) shall be
prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the penalty provided for by R.A.
9208 otherwise known as the "Anti-traf cking in Persons Act of 2003": Provided,
That such penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
"d) Any person who violates Section 12-D(3) shall be prosecuted and
penalized in accordance with R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002": Provided, That such penalty
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
"e) If a corporation commits any of the violations aforecited, the
board of directors/trustees and of cers, which include the president, treasurer
and secretary of the said corporation who participated in or knowingly allowed
the violation, shall be penalized accordingly as provided for under this Section.
"f) Parents, biological or by legal ction, and legal guardians found
to be violating Sections 12, 12-A, 12-B and 12-C of this Act shall pay a ne of
not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or be required to render community service for
not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year, or both such ne
and community service at the discretion of the court: Provided, That the
maximum length of community service shall be imposed on parents or legal
guardians who have violated the provisions of this Act three (3) times: Provided,
further, That in addition to the community service, the penalty of imprisonment
of thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or both at the discretion of the
court, shall be imposed on the parents or legal guardians who have violated the
provisions of this Act more than three (3) times.
"g) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his/her duly
authorized representative may, after due notice and hearing, order the closure of
any business rm or establishment found to have violated any of the provisions
of this Act more than three (3) times. He/she shall likewise order the immediate
closure of such firm or establishment if:
"(1) The violation of any provision of this Act has
resulted in the death, insanity or serious physical injury of a child
employed in such establishment; or
"(2) Such rm or establishment is engaged or
employed in prostitution or in obscene or lewd shows.
"h) In case of such closure, the employer shall be required to pay the
employee(s) the separation pay and other monetary bene ts provided for by
law."
SECTION 7. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding a new
section to be denominated as Section 16-A, to read as follows:
"SEC. 16-A. Trust Fund from Fines and Penalties . — The ne
imposed by the court shall be treated as a Trust Fund, administered by the
Department of Labor and Employment and disbursed exclusively for the needs,
including the costs of rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of
society of the working children who are victims of the violations of this Act, and
for the programs and projects that will prevent acts of child labor."
follows:
"SEC. 27. Who May File a Complaint. — Complaints on cases of
unlawful acts committed against children as enumerated herein may be led by
the following:
"(a) Offended party;
"(b) Parents or guardians;
"(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third
degree of consanguinity;
"(d) Of cer, social worker or representative of a
licensed child-caring institution;
"(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development;
"(f) Barangay chairman of the place where the violation
occurred, where the child is residing or employed; or
"(g) At least three (3) concerned, responsible citizens
where the violation occurred."
SECTION 9. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding new sections
to Section 16 to be denominated as Sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C to read as follows:
"SEC. 16-A. Jurisdiction. — The family courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act:
Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are no family courts yet, the
regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction depending on the penalties prescribed for the offense charged.
"The preliminary investigation of cases led under this Act shall be
terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of filing.
"If the preliminary investigation establishes a prima facie case, then the
corresponding information shall be led in court within forty eight (48) hours
from the termination of the investigation.
"Trial of cases under this Act shall be terminated by the court not later
than ninety (90) days from the date of ling of information. Decision on said
cases shall be rendered within a period of fteen (15) days from the date of
submission of the case.
"SEC. 16-B. Exemptions from Filing Fees. — When the victim of child
labor institutes a separate civil action for the recovery of civil damages, he/she
shall be exempt from payment of filing fees.
"SEC. 16-C. Access to Immediate Legal, Medical and Psycho-Social
Services. — The working child shall have the right to free legal, medical and
psycho-social services to be provided by the State."
SECTION 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The Secretary of Labor
and Employment, in coordination with the Committees on Labor and Employment of
both Houses of Congress, shall issue the necessary Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) to effectively implement the provisions of this Act, in consultation
with concerned public and private sectors, within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
SECTION 11. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, the validity of the remaining provisions hereof shall remain in
full force and effect.
SECTION 12. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 13. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fteen (15) days from
the date of its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation. DHECac
Approved: December 19, 2003

Published in the Manila Times on January 8, 2004. Published in the Of cial
Gazette, Vol. 100 No. 9 Page 1280 on March 1, 2004.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179652. May 8, 2009.]
PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) , petitioner,

vs . THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
JANDELEON JUEZAN , respondents.
DECISION
TINGA , J : p
The present controversy concerns a matter of rst impression, requiring as it

does the determination of the demarcation line between the prerogative of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives, on the one hand, and the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the other, under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code in an instance where
the employer has challenged the jurisdiction of the DOLE at the very rst level on the
ground that no employer-employee relationship ever existed between the parties. TcHCDE
I.
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2006 and 26 June 2007,
respectively, in C.A. G.R. CEB-SP No. 00855. 1
The petition traces its origins to a complaint led by Jandeleon Juezan
(respondent) against People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.)
(petitioner) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of bene ts, delayed
payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Of ce No. VII, Cebu City. 2 On
the basis of the complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection on 23
September 2003. In the Inspection Report Form, 3 the Labor Inspector wrote under the
heading "Findings/Recommendations" "non-diminution of bene ts" and "Note:
Respondent deny employer-employee relationship with the complainant — see Notice
of Inspection results". In the Notice of Inspection Results 4 also bearing the date 23
September 2003, the Labor Inspector made the following notations:
Management representative informed that complainant is a drama talent hired on
a per drama "participation basis" hence no employer-employeeship [sic] existed
between them. As proof of this, management presented photocopies of cash
vouchers, billing statement, employments of speci c undertaking (a contract
between the talent director & the complainant), summary of billing of drama
production etc. They (mgt.) has [sic] not control of the talent if he ventures into
another contract w/ other broadcasting industries. DTEIaC
On the other hand, complainant Juezan's alleged violation of non-diminution of

benefits is computed as follows:

@ P2,000/15 days + 1.5 mos. = P 6,000
(August 1/03 to Sept. 15/03)

Note: Recommend for summary investigation or whatever action deem proper. 5
Petitioner was required to rectify/restitute the violations within ve (5) days from
receipt. No recti cation was effected by petitioner; thus, summary investigations were
conducted, with the parties eventually ordered to submit their respective position
papers. 6
In his Order dated 27 February 2004, 7 DOLE Regional Director Atty. Rodolfo M.
Sabulao (Regional Director) ruled that respondent is an employee of petitioner, and that
the former is entitled to his money claims amounting to P203,726.30. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the Order, claiming that the Regional Director gave credence to the
documents offered by respondent without examining the originals, but at the same
time he missed or failed to consider petitioner's evidence. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. 8 On appeal to the DOLE Secretary, petitioner denied once
more the existence of employer-employee relationship. In its Order dated 27 January
2005, the Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner did
not post a cash or surety bond and instead submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank
Deposit. 9 EAHDac
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, claiming that it was denied
due process when the DOLE Secretary disregarded the evidence it presented and failed
to give it the opportunity to refute the claims of respondent. Petitioner maintained that
there is no employer-employee relationship had ever existed between it and respondent
because it was the drama directors and producers who paid, supervised and
disciplined respondent. It also added that the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the
DOLE and should have been considered by the labor arbiter because respondent's
claim exceeded P5,000.00.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not deprived of due process as the
essence thereof is only an opportunity to be heard, which petitioner had when it led a
motion for reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary. It further ruled that the latter had
the power to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws irrespective of the
amount of individual claims because the limitation imposed by Article 29 of the Labor
Code had been repealed by Republic Act No. 7730. 1 0 Petitioner sought reconsideration
of the decision but its motion was denied. 1 1
Before this Court, petitioner argues that the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), and not the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over respondent's
claim, in view of Articles 217 and 128 of the Labor Code. 1 2 It adds that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed petitioner's appeal
without delving on the issues raised therein, particularly the claim that no employer-
employee relationship had ever existed between petitioner and respondent. Finally,
petitioner avers that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law available to it. TIDaCE
On the other hand, respondent posits that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion. He invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which "removes the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, from the
effects of the restrictive provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding
the con nement of jurisdiction based on the amount of claims". 1 3 Respondent also
claims that petitioner was not denied due process since even when the case was with
the Regional Director, a hearing was conducted and pieces of evidence were presented.
Respondent stands by the propriety of the Court of Appeals' ruling that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. Finally, respondent argues
that the instant petition for certiorari is a wrong mode of appeal considering that
petitioner had earlier led a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with the
Court of Appeals; petitioner, instead, should have filed a Petition for Review. 1 4 TSHIDa
II.
The signi cance of this case may be reduced to one simple question — does the
Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship?
To resolve this pivotal issue, one must look into the extent of the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE found in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7730. It reads:
Article 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this
Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists , the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to
give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation based on the ndings of labor employment and enforcement
of cers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to
the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases
where the employer contests the ndings of the labor employment and
enforcement of cer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which
were not considered in the course of inspection. (emphasis supplied) DHTECc
xxx xxx xxx
The provision is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE comes into play only "in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still
exists". It also underscores the avowed objective underlying the grant of power to the
DOLE which is "to give effect to the labor standard provision of this Code and other
labor legislation". Of course, a person's entitlement to labor standard bene ts under the
labor laws presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the rst
place.
The clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists"
signi es that the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the
emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE's power does not apply in
two instances, namely: (a) where the employer-employee relationship has
ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever existed.
The rst situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the
Disposition of Labor Standards Cases 1 5 issued by the DOLE Secretary. It reads:
Rule II MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM
COMPLAINT/ROUTINE INSPECTION
Sec. 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists.
— Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact
that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary bene ts fall
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. Accordingly, if
on the face of the complaint, it can be ascertained that employer-employee
relationship no longer exists, the case, whether accompanied by an allegation of
illegal dismissal, shall immediately be endorsed by the Regional Director to the
appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In the recent case of Bay Haven, Inc. v. Abuan, 1 6 this Court recognized the rst
situation and accordingly ruled that a complainant's allegation of his illegal dismissal
had deprived the DOLE of jurisdiction as per Article 217 of the Labor Code. 1 7
In the rst situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC because it is the
NLRC which has jurisdiction in view of the termination of the employer-employee
relationship. The same procedure has to be followed in the second situation since it is
the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee
relationship between the evidentiary parties from the start.
Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the
employer-employee relationship has terminated or such relationship has not arisen at
all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship is a matter which is not easily determinable from an
ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the elements of such a relationship are not
veri able from a mere ocular examination. The intricacies and implications of an
employer-employee relationship demand that the level of scrutiny should be far above
the cursory and the mechanical. While documents, particularly documents found in the
employer's office are the primary source materials, what may prove decisive are factors
related to the history of the employer's business operations, its current state as well as
accepted contemporary practices in the industry. More often than not, the question of
employer-employee relationship becomes a battle of evidence, the determination of
which should be comprehensive and intensive and therefore best left to the specialized
quasi-judicial body that is the NLRC. HCTAEc
It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination,
however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power
itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and
collateral to the DOLE's primary function of enforcing labor standards
provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee
relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the
clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" in
Art. 128 (b).
Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two important
questions must be resolved: (1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or
alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of; and (2) Are
there violations of the Labor Code or of any labor law?
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a statutory
prerequisite to and a limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor, one
which the legislative branch is entitled to impose. The rationale underlying this
limitation is to eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions of the Secretary of
Labor and the NLRC, on a matter fraught with questions of fact and law, which is best
resolved by the quasi-judicial body, which is the NLRC, rather than an administrative
of cial of the executive branch of the government. If the Secretary of Labor proceeds
to exercise his visitorial and enforcement powers absent the rst requisite, as the
dissent proposes, his of ce confers jurisdiction on itself which it cannot otherwise
acquire.
The approach suggested by the dissent is frowned upon by common law. To wit:
[I]t is a general rule, that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself
jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of
the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends ; and however its
decision may be nal on all particulars, making up together that subject matter
which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it
may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or
be not within the limits, yet, upon this preliminary question, its decision must
always be open to inquiry in the superior court. 1 8
cHDaEI
A more liberal interpretative mode, "pragmatic or functional analysis", has also

emerged in ascertaining the jurisdictional boundaries of administrative agencies whose
jurisdiction is established by statute. Under this approach, the Court examines the
intended function of the tribunal and decides whether a particular provision falls within
or outside that function, rather than making the provision itself the determining
centerpiece of the analysis. 1 9 Yet even under this more expansive approach, the
dissent fails.
A reading of Art. 128 of the Labor Code reveals that the Secretary of Labor or his
authorized representatives was granted visitorial and enforcement powers for the
purpose of determining violations of, and enforcing, the Labor Code and any labor law,
wage order, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. Necessarily, the actual
existence of an employer-employee relationship affects the complexion of the putative
ndings that the Secretary of Labor may determine, since employees are entitled to a
different set of rights under the Labor Code from the employer as opposed to non-
employees. Among these differentiated rights are those accorded by the "labor
standards" provisions of the Labor Code, which the Secretary of Labor is mandated to
enforce. If there is no employer-employee relationship in the rst place, the duty of the
employer to adhere to those labor standards with respect to the non-employees is
questionable. TDCAIS
This decision should not be considered as placing an undue burden on the

Secretary of Labor in the exercise of visitorial and enforcement powers, nor seen as an
unprecedented diminution of the same, but rather a recognition of the statutory
limitations thereon. A mere assertion of absence of employer-employee relationship
does not deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction over the claim under Article 128 of the Labor
Code. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of relationship, as in this case, is
needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its power. The Secretary of Labor
would not have been precluded from exercising the powers under Article 128 (b) over
petitioner if another person with better-grounded claim of employment than that which
respondent had. Respondent, especially if he were an employee, could have very well
enjoined other employees to complain with the DOLE, and, at the same time, petitioner
could ill-afford to disclaim an employment relationship with all of the people under its
aegis.
Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case had been consistent
in maintaining that respondent is not its employee. Certainly, a preliminary
determination, based on the evidence offered, and noted by the Labor Inspector during
the inspection as well as submitted during the proceedings before the Regional
Director puts in genuine doubt the existence of employer-employee relationship. From
that point on, the prudent recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer
respondent to the NLRC for the proper dispensation of his claims. Furthermore, as
discussed earlier, even the evidence relied on by the Regional Director in his order are
mere self-serving declarations of respondent, and hence cannot be relied upon as proof
of employer-employee relationship. HCacTI
III.
Aside from lack of jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason to set aside the
Regional Director's 27 February 2004 Order. A careful study of the case reveals that the
said Order, which found respondent as an employee of petitioner and directed the
payment of respondent's money claims, is not supported by substantial evidence, and
was even made in disregard of the evidence on record.
It is not enough that the evidence be simply considered. The standard is
substantial evidence as in all other quasi-judicial agencies. The standard employed in
the last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code that the documentary proofs be
"considered in the course of inspection" does not apply. It applies only to issues other
than the fundamental issue of existence of employer-employee relationship. A contrary
rule would lead to controversies on the part of labor of cials in resolving the issue of
employer-employee relationship. The onset of arbitrariness is the advent of denial of
substantive due process.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. This applies with
greater force in cases before quasi-judicial agencies whose ndings of fact are
accorded great respect and even nality. To be sure, the same ndings should be
supported by substantial evidence from which the said tribunals can make its own
independent evaluation of the facts. Likewise, it must not be rendered with grave abuse
of discretion; otherwise, this Court will not uphold the tribunals' conclusion. 2 0 In the
same manner, this Court will not hesitate to set aside the labor tribunal's ndings of
fact when it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record or when there is showing of fraud or error of law. 2 1
At the onset, it is the Court's considered view that the existence of employer-
employee relationship could have been easily resolved, or at least prima facie
determined by the labor inspector, during the inspection by looking at the records of
petitioner which can be found in the work premises. Nevertheless, even if the labor
inspector had noted petitioner's manifestation and documents in the Notice of
Inspection Results, it is clear that he did not give much credence to said evidence, as he
did not nd the need to investigate the matter further. Considering that the documents
shown by petitioner, namely: cash vouchers, checks and statements of account,
summary billings evidencing payment to the alleged real employer of respondent,
letter-contracts denominated as "Employment for a Speci c Undertaking", prima facie
negate the existence of employer-employee relationship, the labor inspector could have
exerted a bit more effort and looked into petitioner's payroll, for example, or its roll of
employees, or interviewed other employees in the premises. After all, the labor
inspector, as a labor regulation of cer is given "access to employer's records and
premises at any time of day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the
right to copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or
matter which may be necessary to determine violations or which may aid in the
enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules and regulations
pursuant thereto." 2 2 Despite these far-reaching powers of labor regulation of cers,
records reveal that no additional efforts were exerted in the course of the inspection.
EHcaDT

The Court further examined the records and discovered to its dismay that even
the Regional Director turned a blind eye to the evidence presented by petitioner and
relied instead on the self-serving claims of respondent.
In his position paper, respondent claimed that he was hired by petitioner in
September 1996 as a radio talent/spinner, working from 8:00 am until 5 p.m., six days a
week, on a gross rate of P60.00 per script, earning an average of P15,0000.00 * per
month, payable on a semi-monthly basis. He added that the payment of wages was
delayed; that he was not given any service incentive leave or its monetary commutation,
or his 13th month pay; and that he was not made a member of the Social Security
System (SSS), Pag-Ibig and PhilHealth. By January 2001, the number of radio programs
of which respondent was a talent/spinner was reduced, resulting in the reduction of his
monthly income from P15,000.00 to only P4,000.00, an amount he could barely live on.
Anent the claim of petitioner that no employer-employee relationship ever existed,
respondent argued that that he was hired by petitioner, his wages were paid under the
payroll of the latter, he was under the control of petitioner and its agents, and it was
petitioner who had the power to dismiss him from his employment. 2 3 In support of his
position paper, respondent attached a photocopy of an identi cation card purportedly
issued by petitioner, bearing respondent's picture and name with the designation
"Spinner"; at the back of the I.D., the following is written: "This certi es that the card
holder is a duly Authorized MEDIA Representative of BOMBO RADYO PHILIPPINES . . .
THE NO. 1 Radio Network in the Country ***BASTA RADYO BOMBO***" 2 4 Respondent
likewise included a Certification which reads: TcEAIH
This is to certify that MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program employee of

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF-Bombo Radyo Cebu) since
1990 up to the present.
Furtherly certi es that Mr. Juezan is receiving a monthly salary of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS.
This certi cation is issued upon the request of the above stated name to
substantiate loan requirement.
Given this 18th day of April 2000, Cebu City, Philippines.
(signed) GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager
On the other hand, petitioner maintained in its position paper that respondent
had never been its employee. Attached as annexes to its position paper are
photocopies of cash vouchers it issued to drama producers, as well as letters of
employment captioned "Employment for a Speci c Undertaking", wherein respondent
was appointed by different drama directors as spinner/narrator for speci c radio
programs. 2 5
In his Order, the Regional Director merely made a passing remark on petitioner's
claim of lack of employer-employee relationship — a token paragraph — and proceeded
to a detailed recitation of respondent's allegations. The documents introduced by
petitioner in its position paper and even those presented during the inspection were not
given an iota of credibility. Instead, full recognition and acceptance was accorded to
the claims of respondent — from the hours of work to his monthly salary, to his alleged
actual duties, as well as to his alleged "evidence". In fact, the ndings are anchored
almost verbatim on the self-serving allegations of respondent.
Furthermore, respondent's pieces of evidence — the identi cation card and the
certi cation issued by petitioner's Greman Solante — are not even determinative of an
employer-employee relationship. The certi cation, issued upon the request of
respondent, speci cally stated that "MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program employee
of PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF-Bombo Radyo Cebu)", it is not
therefore "crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather than a program
employee hence entitled to all the bene ts appurtenant thereto", 2 6 as found by the
DOLE Regional Director. Respondent should be bound by his own evidence. Moreover,
the classi cation as to whether one is a "station employee" and "program employee", as
lifted from Policy Instruction No. 40, 2 7 dividing the workers in the broadcast industry
into only two groups is not binding on this Court, especially when the classi cation has
no basis either in law or in fact. 2 8
Even the identi cation card purportedly issued by petitioner is not proof of
employer-employee relationship since it only identi ed respondent as an "Authorized
Representative of Bombo Radyo . . . ", and not as an employee. The phrase gains
significance when compared vis a vis the following notation in the sample identi cation
cards presented by petitioner in its motion for reconsideration:
1. This is to certify that the person whose picture and signature appear
hereon is an employee of Bombo Radio Philippines.
2. This ID must be worn at all times within Bombo Radyo Philippines
premises for proper identi cation and security. Furthermore, this is the
property of Bombo Radyo Philippines and must be surrendered upon
separation from the company. cCAIES
HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARTMENT

(Signed) JENALIN D. PALER
HRD HEAD
Respondent tried to address the discrepancy between his identi cation card and
the standard identi cation cards issued by petitioner to its employees by arguing that
what he annexed to his position paper was the old identi cation card issued to him by
petitioner. He then presented a photocopy of another "old" identi cation card, this time
purportedly issued to one of the employees who was issued the new identi cation card
presented by petitioner. 2 9 Respondent's argument does not convince. If it were true
that he is an employee of petitioner, he would have been issued a new identi cation
card similar to the ones presented by petitioner, and he should have presented a copy
of such new identi cation card. His failure to show a new identi cation card merely
demonstrates that what he has is only his "Media" ID, which does not constitute proof
of his employment with petitioner. caHIAS
It has long been established that in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings,

substantial evidence is suf cient as a basis for judgment on the existence of employer-
employee relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
labor cases, is "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion". 3 0 No particular form of evidence is required to
prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and
relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. 3 1 Hence, while no
particular form of evidence is required, a nding that such relationship exists must still
rest on some substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence
depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects. 3 2
In the instant case, save for respondent's self-serving allegations and self-
defeating evidence, there is no substantial basis to warrant the Regional Director's
nding that respondent is an employee of petitioner. Interestingly, the Order of the
Secretary of Labor denying petitioner's appeal dated 27 January 2005, as well as the
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, are silent on the
issue of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, which further suggests
that no real and proper determination the existence of such relationship was ever made
by these tribunals. Even the dissent skirted away from the issue of the existence of
employer-employee relationship and conveniently ignored the dearth of evidence
presented by respondent. AaEDcS
Although substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality,

the peculiar environmental circumstances of the instant case demand that something
more should have been proffered. 3 3 Had there been other proofs of employment, such
as respondent's inclusion in petitioner's payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court
would have af rmed the nding of employer-employee relationship. The Regional
Director, therefore, committed grievous error in ordering petitioner to answer for
respondent's claims. Moreover, with the conclusion that no employer-employee
relationship has ever existed between petitioner and respondent, it is crystal-clear that
the DOLE Regional Director had no jurisdiction over respondent's complaint. Thus, the
improvident exercise of power by the Secretary of Labor and the Regional Director
behooves the court to subject their actions for review and to invalidate all the
subsequent orders they issued.
IV.
The records show that petitioner's appeal was denied because it had allegedly
failed to post a cash or surety bond. What it attached instead to its appeal was the
Letter Agreement 3 4 executed by petitioner and its bank, the cash voucher, 3 5 and the
Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposits. 3 6 According to the DOLE, these documents do
not constitute the cash or surety bond contemplated by law; thus, it is as if no cash or
surety bond was posted when it filed its appeal.
The Court does not agree.
The provision on appeals from the DOLE Regional Of ces to the DOLE Secretary
is in the last paragraph of Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, which reads:
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said
order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
order appealed from. (emphasis supplied) SDATEc
While the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business, the law does admit exceptions when warranted by the
circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. 3 7 Thus, in some cases,
the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards had been relaxed, such as
when (i) there was substantial compliance with the Rules; (ii) the surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious ground to reduce the bond; (iii) a liberal
interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective
of resolving controversies on the merits; or (iv) the appellants, at the very least
exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the
reglementary period. 3 8
A review of the documents submitted by petitioner is called for to determine

whether they should have been admitted as or in lieu of the surety or cash bond to
sustain the appeal and serve the ends of substantial justice.
The Deed of Assignment reads:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT OF BANK DEPOSIT
WITH SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, GREMAN B. SOLANTE in my capacity as Station Manager of DYMF Cebu
City, PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC., a corporation duly authorized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, for and in
consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY (P203,726.30) Phil. Currency, as
CASH BOND GUARANTEE for the monetary award in favor to the Plaintiff in the
Labor Case docketed as LSED Case No. R0700-2003-09-CI-09, now pending
appeal. SHECcD
That Respondent-Appellant do hereby undertake to guarantee available and

suf cient funds covered by Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4
of PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. in the amount of PESOS: TWO
HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100
ONLY (P203,726.30) payable to Plaintiff-Appellee/Department of Labor and
Employment Regional Of ce VII at Queen City Development Bank, Cebu Branch,
Sanciangko St. Cebu City.
It is understood that the said bank has the full control of Platinum Savings
Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4 from and after this date and that said sum
cannot be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellee/Department of Labor and
Employment Regional Of ce VII until such time that a Writ of Execution shall be
ordered by the Appellate Office.
FURTHER, this Deed of Assignment is limited to the principal amount of PESOS:
TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS &
30/100 ONLY (P203,726.30) Phil. Currency, therefore, any interest to be earned
from the said Deposit will be for the account holder.
cAaTED
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto af xed my signature this 18th day if *

June, 2004, in the City of Cebu, Philippines.
PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC.
By:
(Signed) GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager
As priorly mentioned, the Deed of Assignment was accompanied by a Letter

Agreement between Queen City Development Bank and petitioner concerning Platinum
Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4, 3 9 and a Cash Voucher issued by petitioner
showing the amount of P203,726.30 deposited at the said bank. ECcDAH
Casting aside the technical imprecision and inaptness of words that mark the
three documents, a liberal reading reveals the documents petitioner did assign, as cash
bond for the monetary award in favor of respondent in LSED Case No. RO700-2003-CI-
09, the amount of P203,726.30 covered by petitioner's PSD Account No. 010-8-00038-
4 with the Queen City Development Bank at Sanciangko St. Cebu City, with the
depositary bank authorized to remit the amount to, and upon withdrawal by respondent
and or the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Of ce VII, on the basis of
the proper writ of execution. The Court nds that the Deed of Assignment constitutes
substantial compliance with the bond requirement.
The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against
any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees
under the judgment if subsequently af rmed. 4 0 The Deed of Assignment in the instant
case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of
Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the
appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount
is under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the
DOLE Regional Of ce, to be withdrawn by the same of ce after it had issued a writ of
execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the
Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court nds that the
execution of the Deed of Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were
made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner's willingness to
pay the judgment amount.
The Deed of Assignment must be distinguished from the type of bank
certi cation submitted by appellants in Cordova v. Keysa's Boutique, 4 1 wherein this
Court found that such bank certi cation did not come close to the cash or surety bond
required by law. The bank certi cation in Cordova merely stated that the employer
maintains a depository account with a balance of P23,008.19, and that the certi cation
was issued upon the depositor's request for whatever legal purposes it may serve.
There was no indication that the said deposit was made speci cally for the pending
appeal, as in the instant case. Thus, the Court ruled that the bank certi cation had not in
any way ensured that the award would be paid should the appeal fail. Neither was the
appellee in the case prevented from making withdrawals from the savings account.
Finally, the amount deposited was measly compared to the total monetary award in the
judgment. 4 2 aEHADT
V.
Another question of technicality was posed against the instant petition in the
hope that it would not be given due course. Respondent asserts that petitioner pursued
the wrong mode of appeal and thus the instant petition must be dismissed. Once more,
the Court is not convinced.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or of cer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
There is "grave abuse of discretion" when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical
manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 4 3
CScTED

Respondent may have a point in asserting that in this case a Rule 65 petition is a
wrong mode of appeal, as indeed the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and
certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is
settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose
recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal
is not adequate or equally bene cial, speedy and suf cient, as where the orders of the
trial court were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or there is need to promptly
relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or
tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized execution of the judgment. 4 4 This Court has even
recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear
deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process, but so also where other
special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. 4 5
In one case, it was held that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is
satisfactorily established that the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically in total
disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy, 4 6 and if it is
shown that the refusal to allow a Rule 65 petition would result in the in iction of an
injustice on a party by a judgment that evidently was rendered whimsically and
capriciously, ignoring and disregarding uncontroverted facts and familiar legal
principles without any valid cause whatsoever. 4 7
It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of
justice in certiorari proceedings. 4 8 The Court has not too infrequently given due course
to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal,
where valid and compelling considerations would warrant such a recourse. 4 9
Moreover, the Court allowed a Rule 65 petition, despite the availability of plain, speedy
or adequate remedy, in view of the importance of the issues raised therein. 5 0 The rules
were also relaxed by the Court after considering the public interest involved in the case;
5 1 when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the
broader interest of justice so requires; when the writs issued are null and void; or when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 5 2
"The peculiar circumstances of this case warrant, as we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504, 524, the 'exercise once more of our exclusive prerogative to
suspend our own rules or to exempt a particular case from its operation as in . .
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., (83 SCRA 453, 478-480 [1978]),
thus: '. . . The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials
and expediting justice. As a corollary, if their applications and operation tend to subvert
and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified." 5 3 aTcIAS
The Regional Director fully relied on the self-serving allegations of respondent

and misinterpreted the documents presented as evidence by respondent. To make
matters worse, DOLE denied petitioner's appeal based solely on petitioner's alleged
failure to le a cash or surety bond, without any discussion on the merits of the case.
Since the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought the reversal of the
two aforesaid orders, the appellate court necessarily had to examine the evidence anew
to determine whether the conclusions of the DOLE were supported by the evidence
presented. It appears, however, that the Court of Appeals did not even review the
assailed orders and focused instead on a general discussion of due process and the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Had the appellate court truly reviewed the records
of the case, it would have seen that there existed valid and suf cient grounds for
nding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOLE Secretary as well the Regional
Director. In ruling and acting as it did, the Court nds that the Court of Appeals may be
properly subjected to its certiorari jurisdiction. After all, this Court has previously ruled
that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is satisfactorily established that the
tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material
to or even decisive of the controversy. 5 4
The most important consideration for the allowance of the instant
petition is the opportunity for the Court not only to set the demarcation
between the NLRC's jurisdiction and the DOLE's prerogative but also the
procedure when the case involves the fundamental challenge on the DOLE's
prerogative based on lack of employer-employee relationship. As
exhaustively discussed here, the DOLE's prerogative hinges on the existence
of employer-employee relationship, the issue is which is at the very heart of
this case. And the evidence clearly indicates private respondent has never
been petitioner's employee. But the DOLE did not address, while the Court of
Appeals glossed over, the issue. The peremptory dismissal of the instant
petition on a technicality would deprive the Court of the opportunity to
resolve the novel controversy. SECHIA
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 26 October 2006 and
the Resolution dated 26 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CEB-SP No.
00855 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the then Acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment dated 27 January 2005 denying petitioner's
appeal, and the Orders of the Director, DOLE Regional Of ce No. VII, dated 24 May
2004 and 27 February 2004, respectively, are ANNULLED. The complaint against
petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., J., concurs.
Carpio Morales * , J., joins the dissent of J. Brion. Please see my Separate Dissenting.
Leonardo-de Castro ** , J., concurs in the result.
Brion, J., dissents.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO MORALES , J., dissenting :
I join the dissent of Justice Arturo Brion in pointing out the obvious: the petition
is wrecked beyond salvage.
The course taken by the ponencia leads labor cases to the iceberg of protracted
proceedings and unsecured execution. Unless the ponencia can justify the
consequential ripples resulting from the decision that could place the whole vessel of
labor rights in distress, I am constrained to drop an anchor to keep it at bay. I could not
thus join the majority in charting such troubled sea.
I Join Justice Brion in his observation that the ponencia bends over beyond the
law's breaking point in order to accommodate the recti cation of a perceived error.
Methinks the ponencia was too willing to give up the stability of settled doctrines like
the proper mode of appeal, due process in administrative proceedings, requirement of
an appeal bond, all for a porridge of "genuine doubt" in one factual nding which in this
case was resolved by all public respondents 1 in favor of labor. There is, therefore, utter
lack of justi cation for this Court to excuse petitioner from hurdling the basic
preliminary requirements of the remedies.
Let me add a few points for the further illumination of the principal issue on the
exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power of the Labor Secretary under Article
128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730 which legislated the
expanded power of the Labor Secretary.
In complaints such as that led by private respondent for illegal deduction, non-
payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, illegal diminution of bene ts, delayed payment of wages, and non-coverage of SSS,
Pag-ibig and Philhealth, it becomes commonly convenient for the employer to
immediately raise the defense of the absence of an employer-employee relationship. ECcTaH
Although the ponencia concedes that the Labor Secretary is empowered to

preliminarily determine the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship,
it is quick to add that such preliminary determination may be clipped by a mere prima
facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee relationship. This position,
however, effectively dilutes the expanded power emanating from the spirit of the
amendatory law, for it limits the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power to
cases where the relationship of employer-employee is not contested. In such scenario,
the employer could, by a quantum of proof lower than substantial evidence, oust the
Labor Secretary of jurisdiction and have the case thrown to the more tedious and
docket-clogged process of arbitration.
Justice Brion correctly opines that the Labor Secretary or his authorized
representative is competent to fully determine whether an employer-employee
relationship exists, which, in turn, must "always be open to inquiry in the superior court",
as proffered this time by the ponente, subject only, of course, to the usual conditions
for the availment of the remedy.
Justice Brion offers an incisive and comparative analysis between the original
version of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code and the amendment introduced by Republic
Act No. 7730. The changes in the phraseology and sequencing of the excepting clause
are de nitely not inconsequential. Of course, the removal of the P5,000 ceiling in the
exercise of the visitorial power is already settled by jurisprudence.
Notatu dignum is that the clause "issues which cannot be resolved without
considering the evidentiary matters that are not veri able in the normal course of
inspection" was already replaced by "issues supported by documentary proofs which
were not considered in the course of inspection", not to mention the change in
antecedent such that the clause previously referred to the enumerated powers but now
only refers to the issuance of the writ of execution. Despite the change in the statute,
current jurisprudence still relies on the rules and regulations implementing the old
Article 128 (b) and still echoes the outmoded cases applying the old Article 128 (b). It
is highly opportune for the Court to modify this antiquated doctrine and principle in
view of the amendment of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the petition.
BRION, J., dissenting :
I dissent and vote for the dismissal of the petition.

This case originated from a Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
inspection conducted pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code. 1 The DOLE Regional
Director (Director), the DOLE Secretary (Secretary), and the Court of Appeals (CA)
consistently ruled that an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner
Bombo Radyo and the respondent, and that the petitioner is liable for the payment of
the respondent's monetary claims. The ponencia, repetitively bending over
backwards, reverses all these rulings and holds that the result should be otherwise. cHCaIE
I. Grounds for Dissent.

I vote to dismiss the petition for the following reasons:
1. The petitioner chose the wrong recourse in seeking the review by this
Court of the CA's decision on the petitioner's Rule 65 petition for certiorari; the
petitioner came to us via another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 when the
appropriate mode is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The ponencia
bends over backwards to accommodate Bombo Radyo's legally erroneous
petition to open the way for its review of the administrative (DOLE) decisions
and the support the CA gave these decisions.
2. The Director originally ordered the payment of the respondent's monetary
claim in his Order of February 27, 2004.
a. The petitioner was given all the opportunity to present evidence to
oppose the Labor Inspector's ndings; hence, it cannot plead lack of
due process for lack of opportunity to be heard.
b. The Director duly considered the evidence on the issue of employer-
employee relationship in both his initial decision 2 and in his resolution
of May 24, 2004. 3 The ponencia, nitpicking the Director's
decision for not stating how each piece of evidence was ruled
upon, charges that the decision disregarded the petitioner's
evidence. This stance ignores the legal reality that the
Constitution only requires the factual and legal bases for the
decision to be stated, 4 and that the decision maker is not
under any obligation to state in its decision every fact and bit
of evidence the parties submitted. 5
c. The nature of the proceedings, level of evidence required, and level of
expertise between Labor Arbiters and the Regional Director are not
different and one tribunal holds no primacy over the other in the
determination of the employment relationship issue. The terms and
structure of Article 128(b), as amended by R.A. 7730, are
clear and need not give rise to the ponencia's fear of
confusion in determining the employment relationship issue.
3. The Secretary has expanded visitorial and enforcement powers under
Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 7730; 6 he or his representative has
full authority under the amended Article 128 to determine whether employer-employee
relationship exists.
4. Article 128 of the Labor Code clearly provides that an appeal is perfected
"only" by the posting of cash or surety bond; the Deed of Assignment the petitioner
submitted to the DOLE is neither a cash nor a surety bond, and the Secretary correctly
dismissed the petitioner's appeal because it was not duly perfected. The ponencia
bends over beyond the law's breaking point to admit the petitioner's appeal
despite its infirmity under the clear terms and intent of the law.
a. The Secretary fully explained the reasons for the non-perfection of
appeal in an original Order dated January 29, 2005 and in her
subsequent Order dated May 23, 2005 on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The ponencia sees not only legal error but
grave abuse of discretion although the Secretary followed the
letter and intent of the law, as plainly stated in the law itself
and as interpreted by this Court in its rulings.
b. Petitioners have only themselves to blame for their lost appeal to the
Labor Secretary for their failure to post the required bond for the
perfection of their appeal.
c. The Director's Order lapsed to nality when the petitioner failed to
perfect its appeal to the DOLE Secretary. The ponencia digs deep
into this Court's review power, effectively bending
established rules and jurisprudence, to reach and nullify the
effects of this first level decision.
5. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. aEHIDT
a. The CA cannot be wrong when it refused to recognize that no grave

abuse of discretion attended the Secretary's dismissal of an appeal
that was never perfected based on the letter and intent of the law;
b. The CA cannot be wrong in its conclusion that no violation of due
process attended the Director's ruling, as stated above;
c. The CA could not have ruled on other issues after it recognized that no
appeal was perfected and no abuse of discretion attended the
assailed decisions; likewise, it could not have recognized any legal
error on the part of the Secretary for not discussing other issues after
recognizing that the petitioner did not perfect its appeal.
6. The petitioner's evidence, at the most, established a doubt on the
employer-employee relationship issue, which doubt should be resolved in favor of the
respondent-worker. 7
II. Background
DOLE Regional Of ce No. VII conducted an inspection of the premises of the
petitioner resulting in an inspection report/recommendation ordering Bombo Radyo to
rectify/restitute, within ve (5) days from notice, the violation discovered during the
inspection. Radyo Bombo failed to undertake any recti cation so that a summary
investigation ensued where the parties were required to submit their respective
position papers. Radyo Bombo reiterated its position, made during inspection, that the
respondent was not an employee; he was a drama talent hired on a per drama
"participation basis". Both parties presented evidence in support of their respective
positions.
DOLE Director Rodolfo M. Sabulao, in an order dated February 27, 2004, required
Bombo Radyo to pay the respondent P203,726.30 in satisfaction of his money claims.
To directly cite the Director's ruling to avoid the ponencia's selectively chosen
presentation, we quote:
A careful perusal of the records of this case showed that complainant Jandeleon
Juezan was hired by the respondent as a radio talent/spinner and work six (6)
days a week from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday thru Saturday. It was the
respondent who paid complainant's salary every quincena and was required by
the former to sign payrolls. Notwithstanding the employment contract stipulating
herein complainant as a program employee, his actual duty pertains to that of a
station employee. Moreover, respondent failed to register said employment
contract with the Broadcast Media Counsel as required. He is required to observe
normal working hours that deductions are made for tardiness. Therefore, it is
crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather than a program
employee hence entitled to all benefits appurtenant thereto.
In doing so, the Director upheld the existence of employer-employee

relationship between the broadcasting station and the respondent. Bombo
Radyo moved for reconsideration, attaching additional evidence to his motion, but the
Director denied the motion.
Bombo Radyo appealed to the DOLE Secretary, mainly contending that the
respondent was not its employee, pursuant to Rule X-A of the Implementing Rules of
the Labor Code 8 in relation with the Rules on Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in
the Regional Of ce. 9 The appeal was dismissed in an order dated January 27,
2005 by the Acting DOLE Secretary due to Bombo Radyo's failure to post a
cash or surety bond as required by Article 128 of the Labor Code. The
petitioner's next recourse was to go to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The petitioner led with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion. The petition cited the following
grounds, which I quote for purposes of certainty —
1. The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied due course to the petition;

lack or excess of jurisdiction when it assumed jurisdiction over the claim of
the private respondent even as under R.A. 6715 jurisdiction lies with the
NLRC, hence, clearly, the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment,
with due respect, committed errors of law;

lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal by the
respondent without delving on the issues raised by the petitioner;
4. There is no appeal or any claim, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law available to the petitioner.
The CA duly considered the points raised, but ultimately dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. Petitioner now comes to the Court, again under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court alleging the following grounds:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rules that the Secretary
of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction over the claim of the private
respondent even as under R.A. 6715 jurisdiction over it lies with the NLRC,
hence, clearly, the Honorable Court Appeals committed errors of law.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it upheld the Order of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment despite the patent lack of due
process.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal
without delving on the issues raised by the petitioner. Its decision dated
October 26, 2006 did not even rule on the issue raised by the petition that
there is no employer-employee relationship between it and respondent
Juezan.
4. There is no appeal or any plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to the petition.
III. Discussion
These discussions address the above grounds for dissent, not necessarily in the
order posed above in light of the inter-relationships of these grounds with one another.
ITESAc
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari

The ponencia justi es the grant of extraordinary treatment to the petitioner's
Rule 65 petition for certiorari: (1) by general statements, supported by cited
jurisprudence, on when a Rule 65 petition for certiorari may be admitted in lieu of the
Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari that is the required mode of review from a ruling
of the Court of Appeals; and (2) by urging a relaxation of the rules in view of the
attendant legal and factual circumstances of the present case. 1 0 It thereafter urges the
suspension of the applicable rule on mode of review, as follows:
The peculiar circumstances of this case warrant, as we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504, 524, the exercise once more of our exclusive
prerogative to suspend our own rules or to exempt a particular case from its
operation as in . . . Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et. al., (83
SCRA 453, 478-480 [1978]), thus: . . . the rules have been drafted with the primary
objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. As corollary, if their
application and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and
enhance it, their suspension is justified.
With these general statements, as premises, the ponencia generally adverts to

the Regional Director's alleged irregular handling of the case and misinterpretation of
the respondent's documents; the DOLE Secretary's failure to discuss the merits of the
case after she found the appeal to have failed for failure to post the required bond; and
the alleged failure of the CA to examine the records and its focus on the discussion of
due process and the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
Under these terms, the ponencia hopes to open the door for the admission of the
petition, thereby giving its imprimatur to the petitioner's claim that it resorted to a Rule
65 petition because it had no appeal, or any plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
I submit that the petitioner's wrong mode of appeal in coming to this Court
cannot be glossed over and simply hidden behind general statements made by this
Court in the context of the unique and appropriate factual settings of the cited cases,
generally applied to the ponencia's distorted view of the circumstances of this case.
The CA decision under review simply and plainly holds that the Secretary
committed no grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed an appeal that was
supported by neither a cash nor a surety bond that the law requires, and that the DOLE
Director did not violate the petitioner's right to due after it was given full and ample
hearing opportunities and its submitted evidence were considered and found wanting.
In fact, on its face, the petition for certiorari before the CA does not deserve any merit
as it simply hid behind the magic formula — grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction — to justify a review of a decision that has lapsed to
nality for the petitioner's failure to perfect its appeal. Fully examined, what the petition
cites are really inconsequential grounds dismissible on their face or perceived errors of
law (as in fact the petition so states in its cited 2nd ground). 1 1
A comparison of the grounds cited in the present petition and the petition before
the CA shows that in coming to this Court, the petitioner simply repeated the same
issues it submitted to the Court of Appeals. The only difference is that it now cites the
CA as the tribunal committing the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In coming to this Court, on the same grounds cited before and
ruled upon by the CA, the petitioner is merely asking this Court to review the CA ruling
on the "grave abuse of discretion" issues the petitioner raised before the CA. Such a
review is an appeal that, under our Rules, should fall under Rule 45 — a petition for
review on certiorari. It is not accurate therefore for the petitioner to say that there is no
remedy available to it in the ordinary course of law. Neither is it correct to characterize
this situation as an extraordinary one that merits the suspension of the Rules. The
appropriate remedy is a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari which is envisioned to
correct errors of law, 1 2 precisely the errors cited by the petitioner as having been
committed by the CA.
Much harder to accept is the ponencia's cavalier attitude towards the petitioner's
statement that there is no appeal, or any plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to the petitioner, when a Rule 45 appeal is readily available to it
and would have been the proper course since it cited errors of law against the CA. By
accepting the present Rule 65 petition in place of a Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari without any suf ciently demonstrated meritorious ground for exceptional
treatment, we are effectively negating our ruling in the recent Cecilia B. Estinozo v.
Court of Appeals, et al. 1 3 that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive.
The legal and factual circumstances the ponencia cites as justi catory reasons
are in fact the issues discussed in this case; for this reason, there need not be
discussed here for purposes of an orderly presentation, and will be fully discussed in
their proper places below — suf ce it to say for now that the proceedings below were
conducted properly as the CA found. If there is anything extraordinary about this
case at this point, it is the lengths the ponencia has gone to bend over
backwards and justify the grant of the petition. It thus glosses over the
wrong mode of appeal to this Court and the petitioner's failure to perfect its
appeal to the DOLE Secretary, and even minutely analyzes the facts before
the Regional Director to show that the Regional Director's ruling is legally
incorrect. Finally, it grossly misinterprets Section 128 (b) of the Labor Code,
even citing an implementing rule that had been overtaken by the amendment
of the cited section of the Code, and, for the purpose, even cited the common
law.
I cite all these to stress that we should examine the ponencia carefully,
particularly its justi cations for the grant of extraordinary treatment to the petitioner,
before joining the ponencia.
The Secretary's Visitorial Powers
A major issue for the ponencia is the Director's determination that employer-
employee relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time of
the inspection. Citing mainly Section 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Standards Cases, 1 4 the ponencia rationalizes: EDCTIa
The clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists"
signi es that the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before
the emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE's power does not
apply in two instances, namely: (a) where the employer-employee
relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever
existed.
The rst situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the
Disposition of Labor Standards Cases issued by the DOLE Secretary. It reads:
Sec. 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually
exists. Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of
the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary
bene ts fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiters. Accordingly, if on the face of the complaint, it can be ascertained
that employer-employee relationship no longer exists, the case, whether
accompanied by an allegation of illegal dismissal, shall immediately be
endorsed by the Regional Director to the appropriate branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
xxx xxx xxx
In the rst situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC because it is the
NLRC which has jurisdiction in view of the termination of the employer-employee
relationship. The same procedure has to be followed in the second situation since
it is the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee
relationship between the evidentiary parties from the start.
Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the
employer-employee relationship has terminated or such relationship has not
arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a matter which is not easily
determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the elements
of such a relationship are not veri able from a mere ocular examination. The
intricacies and implications of an employer-employee relationship demand that
the level of scrutiny should be far above the cursory and the mechanical. While
documents, particularly documents found in the employer's of ce are the primary
source materials, what may prove decisive are factors related to the history of the
employer's business operations, its current state as well as accepted
contemporary practices in the industry. More often than not, the question of
employer-employee relationship becomes a battle of evidence, the determination
of which should be comprehensive and intensive and therefore best left to the
specialized quasi-judicial body that is the NLRC.
It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival
determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and
enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination of the existence
of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the
NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause "in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128 (b).
This approach is a legally incorrect due mainly to the ponencia's lack of

appreciation of the extent of the DOLE Secretary's visitorial and enforcement powers
under the Labor Code, as amended, and a mis-reading of the current law and the
applicable implementing rules. The present law gives the Secretary or his
representative the authority to fully determine whether employer-employee relationship
exists; only upon a showing that it does not, is the DOLE divested of jurisdiction over
the case.
In the rst place, the ponencia is xated on the application of the Rules on the
Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Of ces which cannot now be
cited and used in their totality in light of the amendment of the Article 128 (b) by
Republic Act No. 7730. 1 5 Prior to the amendment, Section 128 (b) stated that —
Art. 128(b). The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exist, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and
hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation based on the ndings of labor relation of cers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution
to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases
where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises
issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are
not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
As amended, Section 128 (b) now states:

Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. —
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the
contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the ndings of labor
employment and enforcement of cers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall
issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their
orders, except in cases where the employer contests the ndings of the labor
employment and enforcement of cer and raises issues supported by
documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.
order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.
This amendment is critical in viewing the Secretary's visitorial and enforcement powers
as they introduced new features that expanded these powers, thereby affecting the
cited Rules as well as the process of referring an inspection case to the NLRC.
A rst distinction between the original and the amended Article 128 (b) is the
reference to Article 217 of the Labor Code in the "notwithstanding" clause. As amended,
Article 129 is also referred to. Read in relation with Article 217, the effect is the removal
of the P5,000.00 ceiling in the Secretary's visitorial powers — a conclusion that the
ponencia fully supports.
Another distinction relates to the present clause "except in cases where the
employer contests the ndings of the labor employment and enforcement of cer and
raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the
course of inspection" (the "excepting clause"). In the original version of Article 128(b),
this clause states — "except in cases where the employer contests the ndings of the
labor regulation of cer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters that are not veri able in the normal course of inspection". Thus,
previously, the law referred to matters that the labor regulation of cer could not have
ruled upon because they are not veri able in the normal course of inspection. Under the
present formulation, reference is only to "documentary proofs which were not
considered in the course of inspection" used in a different context explained below.
Textually, the present formulation refers only to documentary evidence that might or
might not have been available during inspection but were not considered. CASaEc
The difference can be explained by the new and unique formulation of the whole
Article 128 (b). In the original provision, the visitorial and enforcement power of the
Minister of Labor and Employment generally prevailed over the jurisdiction over
arbitration cases granted to Labor Arbiters and the Commission under Article 217.
Excepted from this rule is what the original and unamended excepting clause, quoted
above, provides — i.e., when inspection would not suf ce because of evidentiary
matters that have to be threshed out at an arbitration hearing.
The new and amended Article 128 (b) did not retain the formulation of the
original as it broke up the original version into two sentences. In the first
sentence, it recognized the primacy of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the
Secretary of Labor over the terms of Articles 129 and 217. In other words, the
Secretary or his delegate can inspect without being fettered by the limitations under
these provisions. The second sentence is devoted wholly to the issuance of writs of
execution to enforce the issued orders. It exists as an independent statement from
what the rst sentence states and is limited only by the exception — when the employer
cites a documentary proof that was not considered during the inspection.
Thus, under the amended Article 128 (b), as written, the power of the Secretary of
Labor or his representative to enforce the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code
and other labor legislations has been vastly expanded, being unlimited by Articles 129
and 217 of the Labor Code, provided only that employer-employee relationship still
exists. The existence of the relationship, however, is still a matter for the Secretary or
the appropriate regional of ce to determine, unfettered by Articles 129 and 217 of the
Labor Code. The mere allegation — whether prima facie or not — that employer-
employee relationship exists, does not, by itself, divests the Regional Director of
jurisdiction to rule on the case; 1 6 the Director can at least fully determine whether or
not employer-employee relationship exists.
The present "excepting clause" (which refers only to the issuance of a writ
of execution ) suggests that after the labor employment of cer has issued its
inspection ruling, the Secretary may issue a writ to execute the ruling, unless the
employer "contests the ndings of the labor employment of cer and raises issues
supported by documentary evidence which were not considered in the course of
inspection." Stated otherwise, there is now a window in the law for immediate execution
pending appeal when the employer's objection does not relate to documentary
evidence that has not been raised in the course of inspection.
What happens to the inspection ruling itself is governed by the next paragraph
of Article 128 (b) which expressly provides for an appeal to the Secretary of Labor, with
the requirement for the ling of a cash or surety bond to perfect the appeal. This
requirement, stated without distinctions or quali cations, should apply to all issues,
whether on the employer-employee issue or on the inspection findings.
A necessary question that arises is the status of the current rule implementing
Article 128 (b) as amended, which is an exact copy of the law except for the addition of
a new sentence — ". . . In such cases the Regional Director shall endorse the dispute to
the appropriate regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission for proper
action." This rule antedates the R.A. 7730 amendment but is not necessarily negated by
the Secretary's expanded powers because of the limitation that the Secretary or his
representation has jurisdiction only where an employment relationship exists. Properly
understood, it should now be read as a con rmation of the Secretary's expanded power
that includes the full authority to rule on whether employer-employee relationship
exists. It is only upon a ruling that no such relationship exists that the Secretary and the
Director are divested of jurisdiction to rule on the monetary claim. The Secretary or the
Director must then endorse the monetary claim to the NLRC instead of dismissing it for
lack of jurisdiction. However, whatever action the Director takes is a matter that can be
appealed to the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 128 (b).
In the present case, the petitioner did appeal as allowed by Article 128 (b), but
unfortunately blew its chance to secure a review on appeal before the Secretary of
Labor as it failed to post the cash or surety bond that the present law expressly
requires.
This reading of the law totally invalidates the ponencia's position in the present
case that the Regional Director and the Secretary of Labor have no jurisdiction to issue
an enforcement order and the case should have been turned over to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration after the petitioner claimed or has shown prima facie that no
employer-employee relationship existed.
The ponencia makes a nal desperate effort to circumvent the plain import of
Section 128 (b) and its history by appealing to and urging the use of the common
law in reading the DOLE Secretary's visitorial and enforcement powers under
the cited Section. The ponencia suggests a "functional or pragmatic analysis" to
ascertain the jurisdictional boundaries of administrative agencies. Why the common
law approach is to be used in the Philippines' statutory regime is puzzling. Why there is
a need for such an analysis to understand the terms of Section 128 (b) and the Labor
Code, is more so. The suggested common law approach is simply irrelevant and
deserves no further discussion.
Petitioner Failed to Validly
Appeal to the Secretary
The parties do not dispute that the remedy from the Regional Director's ruling is
an appeal to the Secretary, as the petitioner did indeed appeal to the Of ce of the
Secretary of Labor. The ponencia, however, rules that the DOLE erred in declaring that
the appeal was not perfected; the ponencia holds that the Deed of Assignment of Bank
Deposits that the petitioner submitted in lieu of a cash or surety bond substantially
satis ed the requirements of Section 128 (b) of the Labor Code. This provision states:
cDTaSH
xxx xxx xxx

amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.
The Deed of Assignment 1 7 was accompanied by a Letter Agreement between

Queen City Development Bank and the petitioner covering Platinum Savings Deposit
(PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4, 1 8 and a Cash Voucher 1 9 issued by the petitioner indicating
the amount of P203,726.30 deposited at the bank. The Deed of Assignment reads:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT OF BANK DEPOSIT
WITH SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That, I, GREMAN B. SOLANTE in my capacity as Station Manager of DYMF
Cebu City, PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC., a corporation duly
authorized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, for and
in consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 (Php203,726.30), Phil.
Currency, CASH BOND GUARANTEE for the monetary award in favor to the
Plaintiff in the Labor Case docketed as LSED Case No. RO700-2003-09-CI-
091 , now pending appeal.
That Respondent-Appellant do hereby undertake to guarantee available and
suf cient funds covered by Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-
00038-4 of PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC., in the amount of
PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
PESOS & 30/100 ONLY (Php203,726.30) payable to Plaintiff-
Appellee/Department of Labor and Employment Regional Of ce VII at
Queen City Development Bank, Cebu Branch, Sanciangko St., Cebu City.
It is understood that the bank has the full control of Platinum Savings Deposit
(PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4 from and after this date and that said sum cannot
be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellee/Department of Labor and
Employment Regional Of ce VII until such time that a Writ of Execution
shall be ordered by the Appellate Office.
FURTHER, this Deed of Assignment is limited to the principal amount of
PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
SIX PESOS & 30/100 from the said Deposit will be for the account holder.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto af xed my signature this 18th day of
June, 2004, in the City of Cebu, Philippines.
PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC.
By:
(Sgd.)
GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager
The ponencia's position is legally incorrect as it conveniently fails to consider

both the wording of the law and the spirit that led to this wording. The law expressly
states that an appeal is perfected "only" upon the posting of a cash or surety bond; 2 0
no other document or instrument is allowed. What aggravates the ponencia's disregard
of the express wording of the law is the petitioner's knowledge, on record, that a cash
or surety bond is required. This knowledge is clearly demonstrated by the petitioner's
motion for extension of time to le appeal, led on June 17, 2004, on the ground of
fortuitous event. 2 1 The fortuitous event referred to was the South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co.'s alleged lack of the required legal forms for the bond; to support the
motion, the surety company committed to issue the bond the following day, June 18,
2004. Further, in a submission entitled "Appeal" led with the DOLE Regional Of ce on
June 18, 2004, the petitioner made the following statement:
Accompanying this APPEAL are —
1. APPEAL MEMORANDUM;
2. Cash bond pursuant to the specifications in RESOLUTION;
3. Proof of payment of required filing fee.
No cash bond was however submitted, showing that the petitioner was less than
candid when it made its claim. It was under these circumstances — i.e., the petitioner's
knowledge that a cash or surety bond is required; the absence of a cash bond; and
misrepresentation that a cash bond was attached when there was none — that the
DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal. The CA correctly supported the Secretary's
action and ruled that the Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal.
Separately from these factual incidents are reasons proceeding from established
jurisprudence as the indispensability of a bond to perfect an appeal is not a new issue
for the Court. In Borja Estate, et al. v. Spouses R. Ballad and R. Ballad, 2 2 we ruled that —
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for
the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that
an appeal may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash bond". The word
"only" makes it perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a
cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an
employer's appeal may be considered complete.
xxx xxx xxx
Evidently, the posting of a cash or surety bond is mandatory. And the perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. [emphasis supplied].
Interestingly, the same adverb — "only" — that this Court construed in Borja, is the
very same adverb that Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code contains. Thus, this Article
states in part — an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. All these safeguards would be for naught if the
ponencia's understanding of the requirements for the perfection of an appeal will
prevail. To reiterate, the bond must be in cash or a surety issued by a reputable bonding
company, not by any bonding company. The reputation alone of the bonding company
will not suf ce to satisfy the law; the bonding company must be accredited by the
Secretary. "Cash", on the other hand, whether in lay or its legal signi cation, means a
sum of money; cash bail (the sense in which a cash bond is used) is a sum of money
posted by a criminal defendant to ensure his presence in court, used in place of a surety
bond and real estate. 2 3
How the aforequoted Deed of Assignment can satisfy the above legal
requirements requires an act of bending that goes beyond the intent of the law. What
the Deed extends is a guarantee using a sum of money placed with a bank, not with the
DOLE. The guarantee is made by a certain Greman B. Solante, described in the Deed as
Station Manager signing for and in behalf of the petitioner, a corporation. There is no
indication anywhere, however, that Mr. Solante was authorized by the Board
of the corporation to commit the corporate funds as a guarantee. 2 4 This lack
of clear authority is replete with legal implications that render the Deed of
Assignment less than the cash bond that it purports to be; among others,
these implications impose on the DOLE added burdens that a cash bond is
designed to avoid. Under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney
is required to bind a principal as guarantor or surety. Under Section 23 and 35 of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines, authority over corporate funds is exercised by the
Board of Directors who, in the absence of an appropriate delegation of authority, are
the only ones who can act for and in behalf of the corporation. Under Article 1403 of the
Civil Code, a contract entered into without any legal authority or legal representation is
unenforceable. To state the obvious, all these are stumbling blocks for the DOLE when
enforcement against the Deed of Assignment comes.
It is noteworthy, too, that the guarantee is under the condition that "said sum
cannot be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellee/Department of Labor and Employment
Regional Of ce VII until such time that a Writ of Execution shall be ordered by the
Appellate Of ce". What this limitation means is not at all certain. But on its face, it
means that the bond is in favor of the DOLE Regional Of ce, not to the Of ce to the
DOLE Secretary where the appeal has been led. Thus, the DOLE Secretary herself has
no authority to call on the guarantee. Even Regional Of ce VII cannot, until a writ of
execution is ordered by the Appellate Of ce. What this Appellate Of ce is, is again not
certain and can mean the highest appellate levels all the way up to this Court. Another
uncertainty is the bank's commitment to the guarantee as the Deed only contains a
"CONFORME" signed by the Of cer-in-Charge of the Queen City Development Bank, not
the exact terms of the bank's own commitment to the DOLE in whose favor any bond
should be made. What is certain about the Deed is provided in its penultimate
paragraph" "any interest to be earned from said Deposit will be for the account holder".
The Platinum Savings Deposit mentioned in the Deed is itself very interesting as
it carries the heading "Deposit Insured by PDIC Maximum Amount of Php100,000.00.
Yet, the amount of deposit is stated to be Php203,726.30, with interest rate of 4.25%,
and maturity date of July 19, 2004 (31 days). Thus, if anything happened to the
depositary bank, in the way that banks under the Legacy group of banks currently has
problems, the DOLE Regional Of ce VII would be holding an empty guarantee and
would still have to file a claim with the PDIC for the maximum amount covered. aEHADT
To be sure, these are not the terms the framers of the law intended when they
required that perfection of appeal requires the ling "only" of a cash or surety bond.
Effectively, what the Deed of Assignment and its allied documents have
committed to support the perfection of the petitioner's appeal, with the
intent to pass it off as a cash bond, is an amount whose control is not clearly
with the DOLE and which may require a lot of clari cations and prior actions
before it can be used to pay the monetary claim secured by the bond. This is
what the ponencia wishes to recognize as a substitute for the cash bond requirement
of the law. To say the least, a ruling from this Court of this tenor would severely and
adversely affect the effectiveness and ef ciency of the DOLE's handling of appeals
before it; it would be a precedent that effectively negates the certainties the law wishes
to foster, and would be a welcome development to those who would wish to submit
guarantees other than the cash or surety bonds the law demands.
I submit that the determination of what satis es the bonding requirement in
labor appeals is a matter for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to determine in
the rst instance, and should be free from judicial interference, provided that the
Secretary does not substantially depart from the letter and intent of the law. Once the
Secretary — the entity with primary jurisdiction over labor appeals — has ruled that a
guarantee other than the strict cash and surety bonds that the law requires is not
suf cient, then this Court should be bound by the determination in the absence of any
attendant grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary. Otherwise stated, this
Court cannot and should not second guess or in hindsight control an administrative
tribunal in the exercise of its powers, even "in the interest of justice", where there is no
attendant grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Only in
this manner can this Court accord due respect to the constitutional separation of
powers that it is duty-bound to enforce.
Failure of the CA to review the evidence
In light of the above discussions, the CA could not have been wrong in concluding
that no grave abuse of discretion attended the CA's conclusion that the petitioner
indeed failed to perfect its appeal before the Secretary. Over and above this objection,
however, the ponencia, faults the CA for not examining the evidence to determine
whether the conclusions of the DOLE in the assailed orders were supported by the
evidence presented. It nds that the CA focused instead on a general discussion of due
process and the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
Let it be clari ed that the Secretary did not need to go into a full discussion of
the merits of the appeal because no appeal was ever perfected. The CA understandably
focused on this aspect of the case as it renders moot all other issues. To the CA's
credit it made sure that there was no denial of due process that tainted the DOLE
decisions and it found that there was none. In this light, the CA complied with what the
Constitution requires as a decision maker is only duty-bound to state the facts and the
law on which its decision is based. 2 5
In this respect, it should be considered that the petitioner was given every
opportunity to be heard at the DOLE Regional Of ce. The plant inspection was
conducted at the petitioner's own establishment where its of cials were present. No
complaint exists regarding this aspect of the case. A notice of inspection results was
duly sent to the petitioner, which it contested. Thus, the Regional Director directed the
parties to le their position papers on the inspection results. The parties duly complied,
with parties both focusing on the employer-employee relationship issue. In the Order
dated February 27, 2004, the Director fully considered the parties' positions in light of
the inspection results and ruled that there was employer-employee relationship. The
petitioner reacted by ling a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration, to which additional supporting exhibits were attached. These
submissions were taken into account but still failed to convince the Director.
Unfortunately, the petitioner equated the Regional Director's failure to rule in its favor to be
denial of due process for the alleged failure to consider the evidence it submitted. The CA,
of course, noting the above-described developments in the case saw the fallacy of the
petitioner's submission and dismissed the petition, thus affirming the DOLE level
decisions.
The Director's ruling that the ponencia now sees as objectionable states in its material
portion:
Under the said Policy Instructions, there are two (2) types of employees in the
broadcast industry, namely: 1) "Station employees — are those whose services
are engaged to discharge functions which are usually necessary and desirable to
the operation of the station and whose usefulness is not affected by changes of
programs, ratings or formats and who observe normal working hours. These shall
include employees whose talents, skills or services are engaged as such by the
station without particular reference to any speci c program or undertaking, and
are not allowed by the station to be engaged or hired by other stations or persons
even if such employees do not observe normal working hours. 2) Program
employees — are those whose skills, talents or services are engaged by the
station for a particular or speci c program or undertaking and who are not
required to observe normal working hours such that on some days they work for
less than eight (8) hours and on other days beyond the normal work hours
observed by the station employees and are allowed to enter into employment
contracts with other persons, stations, advertising agencies or sponsoring
companies. The engagement of program employees, including those hired by
advertising agencies or sponsoring companies, shall be under a written contract
specifying, among other things, the nature of the work to be performed, rates to
pay, and the programs in which they will work. The contract shall be duly
registered by the station with the Broadcast Media Council within three (3) days
from its consummation."
A careful perusal of the records of this case showed that complainant Jandeleon
Juezan was hired by the respondent as a radio talent/spinner and work six (6)
days a week from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday thru Saturday. It was the
respondent who paid complainant's salary every quincena and was required by
the former to sign payrolls. Notwithstanding the employment contract stipulating
herein complainant as a program employee, his actual duty pertains to that of a
station employee. Moreover, respondent failed to register said employment
contract with the Broadcast Media Counsel as required. He is required to observe
normal working hours that deductions are made for tardiness. Therefore, it is
crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather than a program
employee hence entitled to all benefits appurtenant thereto.
cACTaI
In the motion for reconsideration that followed, the Director ruled as follows:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration led by the respondent on March
15, 2004 to the Order of this Of ce dated February 27, 2004 on the ground that
due process is not observed.
The motion was set for clari catory hearing on April 2, 2004 wherein the parties
through their respective counsel appeared. Counsel for complaint asked for 15
days from April 2, 2004 to le its comment to the Motion for Reconsideration
after which the case is submitted for resolution.
Respondent in its Motion for Reconsideration alleged to have been denied due
process because it was not given the opportunity to examine the identi cation
card which was not presented for scrutiny and verification.
The contention sought by the respondent is without merit.
The identi cation card presented by complainant that he was an authorized
Media Representative is not material to this case nor fatal to respondent's case.
Presentation of employment records is the burden of employer and not of
complaint worker.
Respondent's passing the buck of employer-employee relationship to its drama
Directors and Producers is of no moment. Granting without admitting that herein
complainant is indeed under the employ of respondents' drama directors. Such
partakes of a sub-contracting relationship which will not absolve herein
respondent from its solidary liability to complainant's claims pursuant to Art. 106
to Art. 109 of the Labor Code.
Correctly understood, these rulings do not indicate in any way that the
petitioner's evidence were not considered. To be sure, the parties' various pieces of
evidence the parties submitted were not all mentioned in these rulings. What it does
mention are its ndings from the parties' con icting factual assertions. Interestingly, it
implies that, at least nominally, the respondent was a program employee. This is the
ruling's concession to the petitioner's evidence. However, it also asserts that despite
this seeming status, the respondent was in fact a station employee for the reasons the
ruling outlined, namely: (1) the respondent initially hired the respondent as a radio
talent/spinner; (2) his work was six [6] days a week from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.,
Monday thru Saturday; (3) he is required to observe normal working hours and
deductions are made for tardiness; (4) the respondent paid the complainant's salary
every quincena; (5) the petitioner required the respondent to sign payrolls; (6)
notwithstanding the employment contract stipulating herein complainant as a program
employee, his actual duty pertains to that of a station employee; and (7) the petitioner
failed to register the respondent's employment contract with the Broadcast Media
Counsel as required.
Thus viewed, the ponencia's conclusion that the Director did not consider the
petitioner's evidence is misplaced. In fact, the factors the Director pointed out
decisively show that an employer-employee relationship existed between the petitioner
and the respondent.
Confusion between the DOLE and
the NLRC in resolving employment
relationship issues.
As last point that is hard to leave alone is the ponencia's interpretation that the
standard laid down in the last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code that the
documentary proofs be "considered in the course of inspection" applies only to issues
other than the fundamental issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship. A
contrary rule according to the ponencia would lead to controversies on the part of labor
officials in resolving the issue of employer-employee relationship.
What the ponencia apparently refers to is that portion of Article 128 (b) that was
amended by R.A. 7730, heretofore discussed. To reiterate what has been stated above,
the "documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection" refers
to the objection that a party may raise in relation with the issuance of a writ of
execution, and does not relate to the extent of the visitorial and enforcement power of
the Secretary de ned in the rst sentence of the Article. Thus, no writ may immediately
issue if such objection exists. Rather, a full hearing shall ensue as in this case where the
Director allowed the petitioner to submit evidence as late as the motion for
reconsideration stage. After the Director shall have ruled on all the submitted issues,
then a writ of execution shall issue if no appeal is taken; otherwise, an appeal may be
taken to the Secretary. Under the Rules, the perfection of an appeal holds in abeyance
the issuance of a writ of execution or suspends one already issued. 2 6 R.A. 7730
effectively changes this rule by giving the authority to issue a writ of execution unless
the "excepting clause" mentioned above applies.
That the employment relationship issue is for the Secretary or his representative
to rule upon is clear from the wording of the 1st paragraph of Article 128 (b) when it
de nes the extent of the Secretary's power. In this de nition of authority, the issue
cannot be anywhere else but with the Secretary who has been granted visitorial and
enforcement power when an employment relationship exists. This grant must be read
with the 2nd paragraph of the same Article that identi es an appeal as the remedy to
take from an inspection decision made under the 1st paragraph.
For the ponencia to imply that the NLRC is more tted to rule on the employment
relationship issue misunderstands the power that Article 128 grants the Secretary. It is
a full fact- nding power that includes whatever is necessary for the enforcement of the
grant, including the authority to determine when the limits of the power apply and to call
the parties and hear and decide their submissions. For this reason, Sections 5 (a) and 6
of Department Order No. 7-A, Series of 1995 states:
Sec 5. Field investigation and hearing. — (a) In case of complaint inspection
where no proof of compliance is submitted by the employer after seven (7)
calendar days from receipt of the inspection results, the Regional Director shall
summon the employer and the employees/complainants to a summary hearing at
the regional office.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings shall be summary and non-
litigious in character. Subject to the requirements of due process, the
technicalities of law and procedure and the rules governing admissibility and
suf ciency of evidence obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply. The
regional director or his designated representative may, however, avail of all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily and
objectively, including the conduct of ocular inspection and examination of well-
informed persons. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision.
Signi cantly, the nature of the proceedings before the Regional Director is not
different from the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Section 2, Rule V of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (2005)
provides that: cDTSHE
Section 2. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process, the
technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law shall
not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including the ocular
inspection and examination of well-informed persons.
Thus, the view that one tribunal has primacy over another because of the nature
of their proceedings, the quantum of evidence required, or their level of expertise, is
misplaced. Properly understood, the structure that Article 128 (b) provides in relation
with monetary claims within and employment relationship, as well as the delineation of
powers between the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the NLRC are not at all
complicated nor confusing, and need not lead to controversies on the part of labor
of cials in resolving the issue of employer-employee relationship, as the ponencia
fears.
Footnotes
* Acting Chairperson.
** Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro is hereby designated
as additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
who is on official leave.
1. People's Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. The Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, the Regional Director, DOLE Region VII and
Jandeleon Juezan, rollo, pp. 38-43 and 56, respectively. Penned by Associate Justice
Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Agustin S. Dizon and Priscilla Baltazar-
Padilla, concurring.
2. Complaint dated 18 September 2003, id. at 95.

3. Id. at 92.
4. Id. at 94.
5. Id.
6. Per Minutes of the 11 November 2003 Summary Proceeding, DOLE records, p. 24.
7. Rollo, pp. 96-99.
8. DOLE Records, pp. 151-152.
9. Id. at 217-219.
10. Rollo, pp. 38-43.
11. Resolution dated 26 June 2007, id. at 56.
12. Petitioner maintains that the instant case is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director because respondent's claim exceeds P5,000. The argument must be struck
down at once, as it is well settled, following the amendment of the Labor Code by R.A.
7730 on 2 June 1994, that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director
can be exercised even if the individual claim exceeds P5,000. See Allied Investigation
Bureaus, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 122006, 24 November 1999, 319 SCRA 175,
Cirineo Bowling Plaza, Inc. v. Sensing, G.R. No. 146572, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA
175. Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 152396, 20
November 2007, 537 SCRA 2007.
13. Rollo, p. 131.
14. Comment, id. at 125-140.
15. Dated 16 September 1987 issued by then DOLE Secretary Franklin M. Drilon. The same
Rules are used up to the present.
16. G.R. No. 160859, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 457.
17. Id. at 469. The Court made the ruling only as regards respondent Abuan who had made
a claim of illegal dismissal but qualified that "the same (the ruling) does not hold for the
rest of respondents, who do not claim to have illegally dismissed. HSDCTA
18. Bunbury v. Fuller 9 Ex. 111, 140 (1853), cited in CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW by S.H. Bailey, B.L. Jones, A.R. Mowbray, p.
423. This view is more popularly called the "preliminary or collateral question".
19. Re Ontario Nurses Association v. Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal and Glengarry Memorial
Hospital, 10 April 1995, Decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals.
20. Ropali Trading Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122409, 25 September 1998.
21. Felix v. Enertech Systems Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 142007, 28 March 2001, 355 SCRA
680.
22. LABOR CODE, Art. 128 (a).

23. Respondent's position paper, DOLE Records, pp. 29-37.
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 44-49.
26. Order dated 27 February 2004, id. at 64.
27. Issued by then Minister of Labor Blas F. Ople on 8 January 1979, it governs the
employer-employee relationship, hours of work and disputes settlement in the broadcast
industry.
28. Sonza v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 138051, 10 June 2004, 431
SCRA 583, 606.
29. The argument was made in respondent's Comments on Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, DOLE Records, pp. 135-138, photocopy of the identification card is on
p. 134.
30. RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5.

31. Opulencia Ice Plant and Storage v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98368, 15 December 1993, 228
SCRA 473.
32. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-Natu, et al. v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., et al., G.R. No. L-25291, 10 March 1977, 76 SCRA 51.
33. Pacific Maritime Services, Inc., et al. v. Nicanor Ranay, et al., G.R. No. 111002, July 21,
1997, 275 SCRA 717.
34. DOLE Records, p. 209.

35. Id. at 208.
36. Id. at 207.
37. Orozco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155207, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 700, 709,
citations omitted.
38. Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corp., G.R. No. 159372, 27 July 2007, 528 SCRA 300, 318.
39. The Letter Agreement contains the interest rate for the deposit, the maturity date, the
stipulated interest rates in case the principal is withdrawn within a certain period, as well
as the 20% withholding tax.
40. Cordova v. Keysa's Boutique, G.R. No. 156379, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 144, 154,
citing Your Bus Lines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93381, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 160. ETIDaH
41. Id.
42. Id. In this case, the bank certification merely stated that the spouses/employer
have/has a depository account containing a certain amount, and that the certification
was issued upon the clients' request for whatever legal purposes it may serve them.
There was no indication that the said deposit was made specifically for the pending
appeal, as in the instant case.
43. Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125671, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA
679.
44. Provident International Resources Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119328, 26 July
1996, 259 SCRA 510.
45. Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134441, 19 May 1999, 307 SCRA 486 citing
Detective & Protective Bureau v. Cloribel, L-23428, 29 November 1968, 26 SCRA 255 and
Matute v. Court of Appeals, L-26085, 31 January 1969, 26 SCRA 768.
46. Zarate v. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, 7 October 1996, 263 SCRA 1.
47. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. IAC, L-74369, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 706, 715.
48. Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131209, 13 August 1999, 312 SCRA 365.
49. Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, G.R. No. 129718, 17 August 1998, 294 SCRA
382.
50. Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, 16 October 1996, 263 SCRA 222.
51. Osmeña III, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116941, 31 May 2001.
52. Chua, et al. v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, 440 SCRA 365, 374-375, citing MMDA v.
JANCON Environmental Corp., G.R. No. 147465, 30 January 2002, 375 SCRA 320.
53. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. IAC, L-74369, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 706, 716,
citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-54886, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA 504 and
Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 459.
54. Supra note 46.
CARPIO MORALES, J., dissenting:
1. The present petition is one for certiorari.

BRION, J., dissenting:
1. The Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the DOLE Secretary.

2. Order dated February 27, 2004, p. 3, last paragraph.
3. DOLE records, p. 152.
4. Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159922, April 28, 2005, 457 SCRA 502.
5. People v. Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 103226-28, October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587.
6. Approved on June 2, 1994; published on June 20, 1994.
7. Prangan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126529, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 142; see Nicario v. NLRC,
Mancao Supermarket, et al., G.R. No. 125340, September 17, 1998.
8. Incorporated in the Implementing Rules under Department Order No. 7-A, Series of 1995.
9. Rule 3, Section 1 (a) and (b).
10. See: ponencia, pp. 6-7.
11. Its 1st ground is a generic allegation of grave abuse of discretion for denial of due
course to the petition; the 2nd ground, using the "grave abuse" magic formula, at the
same time states that the Secretary committed an error of law; the 3rd ground alleges
grave abuse for not "delving on the issues raised by the petitioner"; the 4th in the list is
not a cited ground at all but a statement that there is no adequate remedy in the course
of law other than a petition for certiorari.
12. RULES OF COURT, Section 1, Rule 45.

13. Estino v. CA, G.R. No. 150276, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 422.
14. Dated September 16, 1987, issued by then DOLE Secretary Franklin M. Drilon.
15. Approved on June 2, 1994; published on June 20, 1994.

16. Bay Haven, Inc., et al. v. Abuan, et al., G.R. No. 160859, July 30, 2008.
17. DOLE Records, p. 207.
18. Id., p. 209.

19. Id., p. 208.
20. Art. 128 (b), last par., Labor Code.
21. DOLE Records, pp. 153 and 154.
22. G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 657.

23. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. P. 216.
24. Under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to bind the
principal as a guarantor or surety.
25. Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution.

26. Section 10, Department Order No. 7-A, Series of 1995.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179652. March 6, 2012.]
PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) ,

petitioner, vs . THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
JANDELEON JUEZAN , respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR. , J : p
In a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner People's Broadcasting Service, Inc.
(Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) questioned the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated October 26, 2006 and June 26, 2007, respectively, in C.A. G.R. CEB-SP No.
00855. cSaCDT
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan led a complaint against petitioner with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Of ce No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal
deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of bene ts, delayed payment of wages and
noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. 1 After the conduct of summary
investigations, and after the parties submitted their position papers, the DOLE Regional
Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to
his money claims. 2 Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Director's Order, but failed.
The Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that petitioner
submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit instead of posting a cash or surety
bond. When the matter was brought before the CA, where petitioner claimed that it had
been denied due process, it was held that petitioner was accorded due process as it had
been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over
the matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the
power of the DOLE Secretary under Art. 128 (b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic
Act No. (RA) 7730. 3
In the Decision of this Court, the CA Decision was reversed and set aside, and the
complaint against petitioner was dismissed. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision dated 26 October 2006
and the Resolution dated 26 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CEB-
SP No. 00855 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The Order of the then Acting
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment dated 27 January 2005
denying petitioner's appeal, and the Orders of the Director, DOLE Regional Of ce
No. VII, dated 24 May 2004 and 27 February 2004, respectively, are ANNULLED .
The complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED . 4
The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
private respondent. It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive
with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 7730. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be
the primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause "in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128 (b). 5
From this Decision, the Public Attorney's Of ce (PAO) led a Motion for Clari cation of
Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. 6 In its Comment, 7 the
DOLE sought clari cation as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and enforcement power
under the Labor Code, as amended. SIDTCa
The Court treated the Motion for Clari cation as a second motion for reconsideration,
granting said motion and reinstating the petition. 8 It is apparent that there is a need to
delineate the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary vis-à-vis that of the NLRC.
Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the DOLE and its duly authorized hearing
of cers to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary
claims and bene ts was quali ed by the proviso that the complaint not include a claim for
reinstatement, or that the aggregate money claims not exceed PhP5,000. RA 7730, or an
Act Further Strengthening the Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor,
did away with the PhP5,000 limitation, allowing the DOLE Secretary to exercise its visitorial
and enforcement power for claims beyond PhP5,000. The only quali cation to this
expanded power of the DOLE was only that there still be an existing employer-employee
relationship.
It is conceded that if there is no employer-employee relationship, whether it has been
terminated or it has not existed from the start, the DOLE has no jurisdiction. Under Art. 128
(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the rst sentence reads, "Notwithstanding
the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to
give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based
on the ndings of labor employment and enforcement of cers or industrial safety
engineers made in the course of inspection." It is clear and beyond debate that an
employer-employee relationship must exist for the exercise of the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE. The question now arises, may the DOLE make a
determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and if so, to
what extent?
The first portion of the question must be answered in the affirmative.
The prior decision of this Court in the present case accepts such answer, but places a
limitation upon the power of the DOLE, that is, the determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship cannot be co-extensive with the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE. But even in conceding the power of the DOLE to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court held that the
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship is still primarily
within the power of the NLRC, that any finding by the DOLE is merely preliminary.
This conclusion must be revisited.

No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would
only make a preliminary nding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did
not say that the DOLE would rst seek the NLRC's determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee
relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must
have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and
from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art.
128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. aCASEH
The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready

set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to
determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4)
the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. 9 The use of this test is not solely
limited to the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same
test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same evidence that would have
been presented before the NLRC.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE
must be respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted
by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple
expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship, force the referral of the matter
to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the
absence of an employer-employee relationship be made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction.
But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will
weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.
If the DOLE makes a nding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it
takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no
jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it
appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place.
The Court, in limiting the power of the DOLE, gave the rationale that such limitation would
eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions between the DOLE and the NLRC. The
prospect of competing conclusions could just as well have been eliminated by according
respect to the DOLE ndings, to the exclusion of the NLRC, and this We believe is the more
prudent course of action to take.
This is not to say that the determination by the DOLE is beyond question or review. Suf ce
it to say, there are judicial remedies such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may
be availed of, should a party wish to dispute the findings of the DOLE.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship need not necessarily result in an af rmative nding. The
DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee relationship exists,
thus divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must not be precluded from being able
to reach its own conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by this Court.
Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully
empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial
review, not review by the NLRC.
There is a view that despite Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, there
is still a threshold amount set by Arts. 129 and 217 of the Labor Code when money claims
are involved, i.e., that if it is for PhP5,000 and below, the jurisdiction is with the regional
director of the DOLE, under Art. 129, and if the amount involved exceeds PhP5,000, the
jurisdiction is with the labor arbiter, under Art. 217. The view states that despite the
wording of Art. 128 (b), this would only apply in the course of regular inspections
undertaken by the DOLE, as differentiated from cases under Arts. 129 and 217, which
originate from complaints. There are several cases, however, where the Court has ruled
that Art. 128 (b) has been amended to expand the powers of the DOLE Secretary and his
duly authorized representatives by RA 7730. In these cases, the Court resolved that the
DOLE had the jurisdiction, despite the amount of the money claims involved. Furthermore,
in these cases, the inspection held by the DOLE regional director was prompted
speci cally by a complaint. Therefore, the initiation of a case through a complaint does not
divest the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representative of jurisdiction under Art.
128 (b). CAcEaS
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a nding by
the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE nds that there is no employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is led with
the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly
with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217 (3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor
Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of
pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a
claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is led with the NLRC, and there is still an existing
employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The ndings of
the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the nding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was an employer-
employee relationship has been subjected to review by this Court, with the nding being
that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private
respondent, based on the evidence presented. Private respondent presented self-serving
allegations as well as self-defeating evidence. 1 0 The ndings of the Regional Director
were not based on substantial evidence, and private respondent failed to prove the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the
case, as there was no employer-employee relationship present. Thus, the dismissal of the
complaint against petitioner is proper.
WHEREFORE , the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 179652 is hereby AFFIRMED , with the
MODIFICATION that in the exercise of the DOLE's visitorial and enforcement power, the
Labor Secretary or the latter's authorized representative shall have the power to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, to the exclusion of the NLRC.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., see Concurring Opinion (In the Result).
Del Castillo, J., is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
BRION , J., concurring :
I concur in the result in af rming with modi cation the Court's Decision of May 8, 2009.
This Decision originally dismissed respondent Jandeleon Juezan's money claims against
the petitioner People's Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.). The present
Resolution still af rms the ruling in favor of the petitioner, but more importantly to me, it
recognizes the validity of the Department of Labor and Employment's (DOLE's) plenary
power under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730,
including its power to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship in the
exercise of its Article 128 (b) powers. ACDIcS
Background
The case arose when the DOLE Regional Of ce No. VII conducted an inspection of Bombo
Radyo's premises in response to Juezan's money claims against the broadcasting
company, resulting in an order for Bombo Radyo to rectify/restitute the labor standards
violations discovered during the inspection. Bombo Radyo failed to make any recti cation
or restitution, prompting the DOLE to conduct a summary investigation. Bombo Radyo
reiterated its position, made during the inspection, that Juezan was not its employee. Both
parties submitted evidence to support their respective positions.
DOLE Director Rodolfo M. Sabulao found Juezan to be an employee of Bombo Radyo.
Consequently, Director Sabulao ordered Bombo Radyo to pay Juezan P203,726.30
representing his demanded money claims. Bombo Radyo moved for reconsideration and
submitted additional evidence, but Director Sabulao denied the motion. Bombo Radyo then
appealed to the DOLE Secretary, insisting that Juezan was not its employee as he was a
drama talent hired on a per drama basis. The Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal
for non-perfection due to Bombo Radyo's failure to put a cash or surety bond, as required
by Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code.
Bombo Radyo went to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Bombo
Radyo then sought relief from this Court, likewise through a Rule 65 petition, contending
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition. It justi ed its
recourse to a petition for certiorari instead of a Rule 45 appeal by claiming that there was
no appeal or any plain and adequate remedy available to it in the ordinary course of law.
On May 8, 2009, the Court's Second Division rendered a Decision reversing the CA rulings
and dismissing Juezan's complaint. It reviewed the evidence and found that there was no
employer-employee relationship between Juezan and Bombo Radyo. The Court
overruled the CA's recognition of the DOLE's power to determine the existence
of employer-employee relationship in a labor standards case under Article 128
(b) of the Labor Code . It stressed that the power to determine the existence of
employer-employee relationship is primarily lodged with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) based on the clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists" in Article 128 (b). cSCADE
The Dissent
The May 8, 2009 Court Decision was not unanimous. I wrote a Dissent and was joined by
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales. I took strong exception to the Court's Decision for:
1. taking cognizance of Bombo Radyo's Rule 65 petition for certiorari despite the fact
that a Rule 45 appeal (petition for review on certiorari) was available to the company and
would have been the proper recourse since errors of law against the CA were raised;
2. allowing a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposits as a substitute for a cash or surety
bond in perfecting an appeal to the Labor Secretary, in violation of Article 128 (b) of the
Labor Code which requires only a cash or surety bond;
3. re-examining the evidence and nding that there was no employer-employee
relationship between Juezan and Bombo Radyo, thereby reversing the DOLE Regional
Director's ndings which had already lapsed into nality in view of the non-perfection of
the appeal;
4. holding that while the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary may preliminarily
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship in a labor standards case,
they can be divested of jurisdiction over the issue by a mere prima facie showing of an
absence of an employer-employee relationship.
The Public Attorney's Office (PAO) moved, with leave of court, to clarify the Decision on the
question of when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE can be considered co-
extensive or not co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. The DOLE, in its Comment, also sought to clarify the extent of its
visitorial and enforcement power under the Labor Code.
The Court, treating the Motion for Clari cation as a Second Motion for Reconsideration,
granted the motion and reinstated the petition. 1
The Court's Ruling
In a reversal of position, the present Resolution now recognizes that the
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the
DOLE, in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power under Article 128
(b) of the Labor Code, is entitled to full respect and must be fully supported . It
categorically states: ICDSca
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down
where the DOLE would only make a preliminary nding, that the power was
primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the
NLRC's determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or
that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the
DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to
determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from
there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art.
128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. 2
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the
DOLE must be respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer
could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship,
force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration that
at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee
relationship be made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE
that will be faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if
the same does successfully refute the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. 3
This is not to say that the determination by the DOLE is beyond question or
review. Suf ce it to say, there are judicial remedies such as a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 that may be availed of, should a party wish to dispute the ndings
of the DOLE. 4 (underscoring ours)
In short, the Court now recognizes that the DOLE has the full power to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship in cases brought to it under
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code. This power is parallel and not subordinate to
that of the NLRC .
Our present ruling on the authority of the DOLE with respect to Article 128 (b) of the Labor
Code is, to my mind, a very positive development that cannot but bene t our working
masses, the vast majority of whom "are not organized and, therefore, outside the
protective mantle of collective bargaining." 5
It should be welcome to the DOLE, too, as it will greatly boost its visitorial and
enforcement power, and serve as an invaluable tool in its quest to ensure that workers
enjoy minimum terms and conditions of employment. The DOLE's labor inspection
program can now proceed without being sidetracked by unscrupulous employers who
could, as the Resolution acknowledges, render nugatory the "expanded visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 . . . by the simple expedient of
disputing the employer-employee relationship [and] force the referral of the matter to the
NLRC." 6
But our Resolution does not fully go the DOLE's way. The Court, at the same time, con rms
its previous nding that no employer-employee relationship exists between Juezan and
Bombo Radyo based on the evidence presented, 7 and that a Deed of Assignment of Bank
Deposits can be a substitute for a cash or surety bond in perfecting an appeal to the Labor
Secretary.
I continue to entertain strong reservations against the validity of these rulings, particularly
the ruling on the Court's acceptance of a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposits to perfect
an appeal to the Labor Secretary; this mode directly contravenes the express terms of
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code which requires only a cash or surety bond. I do hope
that the Court will consider this ruling an isolated one applicable only to the
strict facts obtaining in the present case as this is a step backward in the DOLE's
bid for an orderly and efficient delivery of labor justice. cHCaIE
In light of these reservations, I cannot fully concur with the present Resolution and must
only "concur in the result."
Footnotes
1. People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Secretary of the Department of

Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 724, 738.
2. Id. at 739.
3. Id. at 740.
4. Id. at 763.
5. Id. at 744-745.
6. Rollo, p. 329.
7. Id. at 335.
8. Resolution, People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 179652, January 24, 2011.
9. CRC Agricultural Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 177664,
December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 138, 146.
10. People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, supra note 1, at 761.
BRION, J., concurring:
1. Resolution dated January 24, 2011.
2. Draft Resolution, p. 4.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Reply to the Comment on the Dissent.
6. Supra note 4.
7. Id. at 7.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131750. November 16, 1998.]
FRANCISCO GUICO, JR., doing business under the name and style of
COPYLANDIA SERVICES & TRADING , petitioner, vs . THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING, THE OFFICE OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION I,
DEPT. OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, ROSALINA CARRERA, ET. AL. ,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; VISITORIAL AND ENFORCEMENT

POWERS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR; CASE AT BAR. — The Court sustains the
jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly pointed out, this
Court's ruling in Servando — that the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and
enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual
claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
7730 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, viz.: Article 128 (b) — Notwithstanding
the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give
effect to the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation based on
the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety
engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of
the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by
documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. An order
issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order
appealed from. The records of the House of Representatives show that Congressmen
Alberto S. Veloso and Eriberto V. Loreto sponsored the law. In his sponsorship speech,
Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away with the
jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally
settle any lingering doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment." Petitioner's reliance on Servando is thus untenable.
2. ID.; ID.; PERFECTION OF APPEAL; PAYMENT OF APPEAL BOND, REQUIRED. — The
next issue is whether petitioner was able to perfect his appeal to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond
must be "in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from." The
records show that petitioner failed to post the required amount of the appeal bond. His
appeal was therefore not perfected.
DECISION
PUNO , J : p
This is a petition for certiorari seeking a review of two (2) Orders 1 issued by the
respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissing petitioner's appeal. LLpr
The case started when the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), Region I, San Fernando, La Union, received a letter-complaint dated
April 25, 1995, requesting for an investigation of petitioner's establishment, Copylandia
Services & Trading, for violation of labor standards laws. Pursuant to the visitorial and
enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, inspections were
conducted at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2, 1995. The inspections yielded
the following violations involving twenty-one (21) employees who are copier operators: (1)
underpayment of wages; (2) underpayment of 13th month pay; and (3) no service incentive
leave with pay. 2
The first hearing of the case was held on June 14, 1995, where petitioner was represented
by Joseph Botea, Officer-in-Charge of the Dagupan City outlets, while the 21 employees
were represented by Leilani Barrozo, Gemma Gales, Majestina Raymundo and Laureta
Clauna. It was established that a copier operator was receiving a daily salary ranging from
P35.00 to P60.00 plus commission of P20.00 per P500.00 worth of photocopying. There
was also incentive pay of P20.00 per P250.00 worth of photocopying in excess of the first
P500.00. 3
On July 13, 1995, petitioner's representative submitted a Joint Affidavit signed and
executed by the 21 employees expressing their disinterest in prosecuting the case and
their waiver and release of petitioner from his liabilities arising from non-payment and
underpayment of their salaries and other benefits. Individually signed documents dated
December 21, 1994, purporting to be the employees' Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim were
also submitted. 4
In the investigation conducted by Hearing Officer Adonis Peralta on July 21, 1995, the 21
employees claimed that they signed the Joint Affidavit for fear of losing their jobs. They
added that their daily salary was increased to P92.00 effective July 1, 1995, but the
incentive and commission schemes were discontinued. They alleged that they did not
waive the unpaid benefits due to them. 5
On October 30, 1995, Regional Director Guerrero N. Cirilo issued an Order 6 favorable to
the 21 employees. First, he ruled that the purported Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim dated
December 21 and 22, 1994, could not cause the dismissal of the labor standards case
against the petitioner since the same were executed before the filing of the said case.
Moreover, the employees repudiated said waiver and quitclaim. Second, he held that
despite the salary increase granted by the petitioner, the daily salary of the employees was
still below the minimum daily wage rate of P119.00 under Wage Order No. RB-I-03. Thirdly,
he held that the removal of the commission and incentive schemes during the pendency of
the case violated the prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits under Article
100 of the Labor Code, as amended. The dispositive portion of the Order states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the Rules on the Disposition
of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment on 16 September 1987, respondent Copylandia Services
and Trading thru its owner/manager Mr. Francisco Guico, is hereby ORDERED to
pay the employees the amount of ONE MILLION EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY SIX PESOS AND SEVENTY CENTAVOS (P1,081,756.70)
representing their backwages, distributed as follows: cdasia
1. Rosalina Carrera — P68,010.91
2. Joanna Ventura — 28,568.10
3. Mercelita Paredes — 68,010.91
4. Aida Licuanan — 68,010.91
5. Gemma Gales — 68,010.91
6. Clotilda Zarata — 27,808.33
7. Consolacion Miguel — 65,708.28
8. Gemma Macalalay — 68,010.91
9. Wandy Aquino — 19,559.58
10. Laureta Clauna — 68,010.91
11. Josephine Valdez — 27,808.33
12. Leilani Berrozo — 27,808.33
13. Majestina Raymundo — 68,010.91
14. Theresa Rosario — 68,010.91
15. Edelyn Maramba — 68,010.91
16. Yolly Dimabayao — 40,380.60
17. Vilma Calaguin — 68,010.91
18. Maila Balolong — 40,380.60
19. Clarissa Villena — 27,808.33
20. Maryann Galinato — 68,010.91
21. Desiree Cabansag — 27.808.33
——————
Total P1,081,756.70
and to submit proof of payment to this Office within seven (7) days from receipt
hereof. Otherwise, a Writ of Execution will be issued to enforce this Order.
"SO ORDERED." 7
Petitioner received a copy of the Order on November 10, 1995. On November 15, 1995,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The next day, he filed a Memorandum of Appeal
accompanied by a Motion to Reduce Amount of Appeal Bond and a Manifestation of an
Appeal Bond. LexLib
In his appeal memorandum, 9 petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional

Director citing Article 129 of the Labor Code, as amended, 1 0 and Section 1, Rule IX of the
Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6715. 1 1 He argued that the Regional Director has
no jurisdiction over the complaint of the 21 employees since their individual monetary
claims exceed the P5,000.00 limit. He alleged that the Regional Director should have
indorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper adjudication and for a more formal
proceeding where there is ample opportunity for him to present evidence to contest the
claims of the employees. He further alleged that the Regional Director erred in computing
the monetary award since it was done without regard to the actual number of days and
time worked by the employees. He also faulted the Regional Director for not giving
credence to the Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim of the employees.
In the Motion to Reduce Amount of Appeal Bond, 1 2 petitioner claimed he was having
difficulty in raising the monetary award which he denounced as exorbitant. Pending
resolution of the motion, he posted an appeal bond in the amount of P105,000.00 insisting
that the jurisdiction of the Regional Director is limited to claims of P5,000.00 per employee
and there were 21 employees involved in the case.
On November 22, 1995, petitioner also filed a request to hold in abeyance any action
relative to the case for a possible amicable settlement with the employees. 1 3
On January 10, 1996, District Labor Officer Adonis Peralta forwarded a Report showing
that the petitioner and most of the 21 employees had reached a compromise agreement.
The Release, Waiver and Quitclaim was signed by the following employees and show the
following amounts they received, viz:
1. Aida Licuanan — P3,000.00
2. Clarissa Villena — 3,000.00
3. Gemma Gales — 3,000.00
4. Desiree Cabansag — 3,000.00
5. Clotilda Zarata — 3,000.00
6. Consolacion Miguel — 5,000.00
7. Josephine Valdez — 3,000.00
8. Maryann Galinato — 5,000.00
9. Theresa Rosario — 3,000.00
10. Yolly Dimabayao — 3,000.00
11. Vilma Calaguin — 3,000.00
12. Gemma Macalalay — 3,000.00
13. Edelyn Maramba — 5,000.00
14. Charito Gonzales — 3,000.00

15. Joanna Ventura — 3,000.00
Four (4) employees did not sign in the compromise agreement. They insisted that they
be paid what is due to them according to the Order of the Regional Director in the total
amount of P231,841.06. They were Laureta Clauna, Majestina Raymundo, Leilani
Barrozo and Rosalina Carrera. 1 4
In a letter 1 5 dated February 23, 1996, the Regional Director informed petitioner that he
could not give due course to his appeal since the appeal bond of P105,000.00 fell short of
the amount due to the 4 employees who did not participate in the settlement of the case.
In the same letter, he directed petitioner to post, within ten (10) days from receipt of the
letter, the amount of P126,841.06 or the difference between the monetary award due to
the 4 employees and the appeal bond previously posted. LLjur
On March 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to Reduce Amount of
Appeal Bond. 1 6 He manifested that he has closed down his business operations due to
severe financial losses and implored the Regional Director to accept the appeal bond
already filed for reasons of justice and equity.
In an Order dated December 3, 1996, the respondent Secretary denied the foregoing
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the directive from the Regional Director to
post an additional surety bond is contained in a "mere letter" which cannot be the proper
subject of a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal before his office. He added that for
failure of the petitioner to post the correct amount of surety or cash bond, his appeal was
not perfected following Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended. Despite the non-
perfection of the appeal, respondent Secretary looked into the Receipt, Waiver and
Quitclaim signed by the employees and rejected it on the ground that the consideration
was unconscionably inadequate. He ruled, nonetheless, that the amount received by the
said employees should be deducted from the judgment award and the difference should
be paid by the petitioner.
On December 26, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On February 13,
1997, he filed a Motion to Admit Additional Bond and posted the amount of P126,841.06
in compliance with the order of the Regional Director in his letter dated February 13, 1996.
17
On October 24, 1997, the respondent Secretary denied the Motion for Reconsideration. He
ruled that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case citing Article 128 (b) of the
Labor Code, as amended. He pointed out that Republic Act No. 7730 repealed the
jurisdictional limitations imposed by Article 129 on the visitorial and enforcement powers
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives. In
addition, he held that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the computation made
by the Regional Director as a result of the compromise agreement he entered into with the
employees. Lastly, he reiterated his ruling that the Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim signed by
the employees was not valid.
Petitioner is now before this Court raising the following issues:
I
Whether or not Public Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he set aside the Release and
Quitclaim executed by the seventeen (sic) complainants before the Office of the
Regional Director when Public Respondent himself ruled that the Appeal of the
Petitioner was not perfected and, therefore, Public Respondent did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
II
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when in complete disregard of
Article 227 of the Labor Code, Public Respondent set aside and nullified the
Release and Quitclaim executed by the seventeen (sic) complainants. llcd
III

amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he affirmed the Order of the
Regional Director who, in complete disregard of the due process requirements of
law, computed the monetary award given to the private respondents without
notice to petitioner and without benefit of hearing.
IV
Whether or not petitioner is deemed estopped from appealing the decision of the
Regional Director when it (sic) entered into a compromise settlement with
complainants/private respondents.
The threshold issues that need to be settled in this case are: (1) whether or not the
Regional Director has jurisdiction over the instant labor standards case, and (2) whether or
not petitioner perfected his appeal.
With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner alleged that the Regional Director has no
jurisdiction over the instant case since the individual monetary claims of the 21 employees
exceed P5,000.00. He further argued that following Article 129 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6715, the
jurisdiction over this case belongs to the Labor Arbiter, and the Regional Director should
have indorsed it to the appropriate regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). On the other hand, the respondent Secretary held that the
jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 on his visitorial and enforcement power
under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, has been repealed by Republic Act
No. 7730. 1 8 He pointed out that the amendment "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of
Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code to the contrary" erased all doubts as to the
amendatory nature of the new law, and in effect, overturned this Court's ruling in the case
of Servando's Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment. 1 9
We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly
pointed out, this Court's ruling in Servando — that the visitorial power of the Secretary of
Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised
where the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the
enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, viz:
Article 128 (b) — Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this
Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee
still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to
the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation based on
the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly
authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate
authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer
contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises
issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course
of inspection.
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (Emphasis
supplied.) LLjur
The records of the House of Representatives 2 0 show that Congressmen Alberto S.

Veloso and Eriberto V. Loreto sponsored the law. In his sponsorship speech,
Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away with the
jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to
nally settle any lingering doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment." 2 1 Petitioner's reliance on Servando is thus
untenable.
The next issue is whether petitioner was able to perfect his appeal to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal
bond must be "in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed
from." The records show that petitioner failed to post the required amount of the appeal
bond. His appeal was therefore not perfected.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
Martinez, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. In OS-LS-09-023-096 [LS Case No. RO100-9505-CT-010].

2. Regional Director's Order dated October 30, 1995, p. 1; Rollo, p. 36.
3. Id., pp. 1-2; Id., pp. 36-37.

4. Id., p. 2; Id., p. 37.
5. Id.
6. Rollo, pp. 36-40.
7. Rollo, pp. 38-40.
8. Rollo, p. 101.
9. Rollo, pp. 41-46.
10. ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. — Upon
complaint of any interested party, the regional director of the Department of Labor and
Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is
empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any
matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits,
including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or
household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee
relations: Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement:
Provided further, that the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper
does not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). . . .
11. Section 1. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. — . . .
(c) When the evidence shows that the claim amounts to more than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), the Regional Director or Hearing Officer shall advise the
complainant to amend the complaint if the latter so desires and file the same with the
appropriate regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
12. Rollo, pp. 48-49.

13. Rollo, pp. 51 and 102.
14. Rollo, pp. 29-30, 51.
15. Rollo, pp. 51-52.
16. Rollo, pp. 53-55.
17. Rollo, pp. 111-112.
18. Entitled "AN ACT FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE VISITORIAL AND ENFORCEMENT
POWERS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 128 OF P.D. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"; approved by the President on June 2, 1994.
19. 198 SCRA 156 [June 5, 1991].
20. Records of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, May 12, 1993, Vol. VI,
p. 242.
21. Id., pp. 244-245. The same sentiment was expressed by Congressman Erasmo
Damasing of Cagayan de Oro City.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997.]
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY , * petitioner,

vs . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN , respondents.
D. P. Mercado & Associates for petitioner.

AC Estrada & Partner for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; EMPLOYER'S POLICY

OF NOT ACCEPTING FOR WORK ANY WOMAN WORKER WHO CONTRACTS MARRIAGE,
CONTRARY TO LAW, GOOD MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY. — In the case at bar,
petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disquali ed from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of
the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and
public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions that they may deem convenient the same should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it
may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would
encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL; LOSS OF CONFIDENCE, VALID GROUND. — While loss of
con dence is a just cause of termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes
which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEALMENT OF FEMALE EMPLOYEE OF TRUE NATURE OF
STATUS FOR FEAR OF BEING DISQUALIFIED FROM WORK, NOT SUFFICIENT BASIS. —
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment
on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not
quali ed for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty. Private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT &
T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the
way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In
other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO REMIT COMPANY FUNDS, NOT AN ADDITIONAL GROUND;
CASE AT BAR. — Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private
respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground
to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly,
private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit
some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was
dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of
that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider
petitioner's submissions on this a mere afterthought, just too bolster its supposed
dishonesty as case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor
cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the
amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether
the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private
respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter
was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID., EMPLOYEE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED A FEW DAYS BEFORE COMPLETION OF
HER PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT AND WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY HIRED RELIEVER FOR
SEVERAL TIMES GAINED REGULAR STATUS. — Private respondent, it must be observed,
had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking
papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150
days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her
dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly
raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning
security of tenure. On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were
undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for xed periods, as she
performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of
PT & T. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or
trade of the employer.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS
AND OTHER PRIVILEGES. — As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and
as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; PERIOD OF SUSPENSION FOR DISHONESTY DEDUCTED FROM
AMOUNT RECOVERABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. — However, as she had undeniably
committed an act of dishonesty, in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of
an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent
NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any
sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally, justi ed. Thus, her entitlement to
back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to
the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by, deducting therefrom the amount
corresponding to her three months suspension.
8. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACT OF LABOR; IMPRESSED WITH
PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT CONTAIN OPPRESSIVE PROVISIONS NOR IMPAIR THE
INTEREST OR CONVENIENCE OF THE PUBLIC; POLICY AGAINST MARRIAGE, A
PROHIBITED PROVISION. — Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of
labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not
merely, contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same
should yield to the common good. It goes on to intone dust neither capital nor labor
should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of
the public. In the nal reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed
by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviolable social institution and. ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.
That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled
forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but
imperatively required.
DECISION
REGALADO , J : p
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status
and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what
really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage
during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus
claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by
an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, speci cally as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a xed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20,
1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1 Under the Reliever Agreement
which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1,
1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent' s services as reliever
were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who
went on leave during both periods. 2 After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever
Agreement, her services were terminated. LibLex
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the
job application form that was furnished her to be lled up for the purpose, she indicated in
the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. 3
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When
petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City,
Delia M. O cial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the
company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. 4
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not
aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had
not deliberately hidden her true civil status. 5 Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced
by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992, 6 which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in
Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent
volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between
the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She
then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. 7 All of these took
place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter
being of the rmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing
private respondent was clearly insuf cient, and that it was apparent that she had been
discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent
upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private
respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her
employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modi ed with the
quali cation that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of
the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the
NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of
private respondent in her employment with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration led by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent
NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the
aforestated decisions. of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial
resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with
love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with
indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has
that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the eld of labor, especially on
the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting,
women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types
of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation
against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, bene ts, promotion and
retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few
of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II 8 on the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the
State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII 9 (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the
1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor
and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section
14 of Article XIII 1 0 mandates that the State shall protect working women through
provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential
Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). 11
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 1 2 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunities, Republic Act No. 6955 1 3 which bans the "mail-
order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192, 1 4 also
known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women
equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment,
admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322
1 5 increasing the maternity bene ts granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act
No. 7877 1 6 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the
education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 1 7 or the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their
rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, 1 8
women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles
130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work
while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards
which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes
of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage
clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article
138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman' s right against discrimination
with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and
this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee
of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition
sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ,
to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just
cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one' s labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within
the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of
hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as
well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline,
dismissal, and recall of employees. 1 9 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from
hiring to ring," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided
by law. 2 0
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disquali ed from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than
the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent
from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties
with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married
women are not quali ed for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by
Delia M. O cial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of
the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married women
employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 2 1 Again, in the termination notice sent
to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married
status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company' s policy against
marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or
accepted in our company.") 2 2 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it
was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case
only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking of cers who would otherwise be
solidarily liable with the corporation. 2 3
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the
way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In
other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disquali ed from work. While loss of
con dence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes
which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
LLphil
In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private

respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does
have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the
consequent loss of con dence in her which justi ed her dismissal. Petitioner would
asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes
umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial
distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that
the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent de ed its policy
against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of
insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment
of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it
supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female
employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other bene ts it would
consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that
employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee
conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This
line of reasoning does not impress us as re ecting its true management policy or that we
are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the
aspects of quali cation and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her
supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of
private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the
familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from
employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent
admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections,
but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because
of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed
defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's
submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case
for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was
no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether
her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence
was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent
execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed
settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about
to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary
employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her
probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was
done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. 2 7 On the other hand, her
earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee,
even if the same were for xed periods, as she performed activities which were essential
or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T. 2 8 The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity
performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. 2 9
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other bene ts or their
monetary equivalent. 3 0 However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in
concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner,
the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the
impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the
employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act
which was not totally justi ed. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be
computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual
reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her
three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted
by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
"ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely
by reason of marriage."
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 148, 3 1 better known as the "Women and Child Labor Law," which amended
paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 3 2 entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for
Other Purposes." The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No.
3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of
women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile
establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to re ect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al.
vs. Philippine Air Lines, 3 3 a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There,
a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective ight attendants must be single
and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was
declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with
regard to discrimination against married women. Thus:
"Of rst impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation
with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that
Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary
occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in
extraordinary occupations, like ight attendants, is fair and reasonable,
considering the peculiarities of their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it

knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13,
1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and
Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their
labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain
a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended
paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the
same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was
promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1,
1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new
Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore
abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards
that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate
cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum
standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of ight
attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of
respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the rst
paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting ight
attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which
are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently
illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work . . ."
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from

employment of ight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable
standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis
has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much
against the continued employment of the ight attendant merely by reason of
marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of
marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the
supposed ill effects of pregnancy on ight attendants in the course of their
employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been
adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976. cdll
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as

invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the
preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a
basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In
both instances, respondent predicates absence of a ight attendant from her
home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is
pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern
world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to
another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married ight attendants
can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary
occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping
intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is re ected in the
whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the
employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation 3 4 considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the rm to
consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment
they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed
that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services
would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an
example of "discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment
opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down
said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential
Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or
conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus"
discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same
should be evenly applied and must not in ict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group
which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or
restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been
held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal
statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of,
among other things, sex. 3 5
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against
married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not
against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. 3 6 Upon the
other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be
justi ed as a "bona de occupational quali cation," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general
principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that
nature would be valid provided it re ects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male
and female ight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not
related to the job performance of the flight attendants. 3 7
5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,
tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that
by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may
even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage
illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations
between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as
they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. 40 It
goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the
other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the nal reckoning, the
danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes
at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and,
ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. 4 2 That it must be effectively
interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner. llcd
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes

* The phrase "herein represented by DELIA M. OFICIAL", added hereto in the title of this case as
stated in the petition, has been deleted for being unnecessary and violative of the rules
on pleadings, and is commented upon in the text of this opinion.
1. Rollo, 42; Annex D.
2. Ibid., 44-45; Annexes F and G.
3. Ibid., 46-48; Annexes H and I.

4. Ibid., 49; Annex J.
5. Id., 50; Annex K.
6. Id., 51; Annex L.
7. Id., 53, Annex N.

8. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men (Sec. 14, Art. II).
9. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized or unorganized
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes of settling disputes, including conciliation,
and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investment, and to expansion and growth (Sec. 3. Art. XIII).
10. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions,
taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation (Sec. 14, Art. XIII).
11. Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, it is regarded as the most comprehensive
international treaty governing the rights of women. The Philippines became a signatory
thereto a year after its adoption by the UN and in 1981, the country ratified it.
The Philippines had likewise been an active participant in all the four U.N. World Conferences
on Women, namely those held in Mexico in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985,
and Beijing in 1995.
Other relevant international laws to which the Philippines adheres as a member of the
international community include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
12. Approved, June 9, 1989.

14. Approved, February 12, 1992.
15. Approved, March 30, 1992.

16. Approved, February 14, 1995.
18. Effective August 3, 1988.

19. Caltex Re nery Employees Association (CREA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 102993, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 271; Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative,
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 111905, July 31, 1995, 246
SCRA 794; Nuez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 107574,
December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 518; San Miguel Corporation vs. Ubaldo, et al., G.R. No.
92859, February 1, 1993, 218 SCRA 293.
20. NAFLU vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 90739, October 3, 1991,
202 SCRA 346.
21. Quoted in the Decision of the Third Division, NLRC, in NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-02-0042-92,
Annex B of petition; Rollo, 35. See also Annex J, supra, Fn. 4.
22. Annex L, id.; Rollo, 51.
23. Art. 289, Labor Code; see AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 69494, June 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 269; Chua vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 81450, February 15, 1990, 182 SCRA 353.
24. Mapalo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 107940, June 17, 1994,
233 SCRA 266; PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 79182, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 487.
25. San Antonio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100829, November
21, 1995, 250 SCRA 359; Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183.
26. Hospicio de San Jose de Basili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No.
75997, August 18, 1988, 164 SCRA 516.
27. Cielo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 78693, January 28, 1991,
193 SCRA 410; Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, et al., G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990,
181 SCRA 702.
28. Art. 280, Labor Code; see PLDT vs. Montemayor, et al ., G.R. No. 88626 October 12, 1990,
190 SCRA 427.
29. De Leon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 70705, August 21, 1989,
176 SCRA 615.
30. Molave Tours Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al ., G.R. No. 112909,
November 24, 1995, 250 SCRA 325; see Art. 279, Labor Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6715.
31. Promulgated on March 13, 1973.
32. Approved on April 15, 1952. It was later amended by Republic Act No. 1131, which in turn
was approved on June 16, 1954.
33. Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977.
34. CA-G.R. No. 52753-R, June 28, 1978.

35. 45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, Sec. 506, p. 486.
36. Ibid., id., id.
37. Ibid., id., Sec. 507.

38. Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1979 ed., 235; see Art. 874, Civil Code.
39. Art. 1306, Civil Code.

40. Art. 1700, Civil Code; see Macleod & Co. of the Philippines vs. Progressive Federation of
Labor, 97 Phil. 205 (1955).
41. Art. 1701. Civil Code.
42. The 1987 Constitution provides:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. . . . (Sec. 15, Art. II).
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development (Sec. 1, Art. XV).
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State (Sec. 2, Art. XV).

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94951. April 22, 1991.]
APEX MINING COMPANY, INC. , petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO , respondents.
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.

Angel Fernandez for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; HOUSEHELPER; DEFINED. — The

term 'househelper' as used herein is synonymous to the term `domestic servant' and shall
refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the
employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer's family.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS COVERED. — The foregoing definition clearly contemplates
such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer's home to
minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners,
houseboys and other similar househelps.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS WORKING IN STAFFHOUSES OF A COMPANY, BEYOND THE
SCOPE. — The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywoman
working in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the
company's guests and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it
cannot be considered to extend to the driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in
the company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the
meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRITERIA. — The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of
the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company
staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the
former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED A REGULAR EMPLOYEE WHEN WORKING WITHIN THE
PREMISES OF THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND IN RELATION TO OR IN
CONNECTION WITH ITS BUSINESS. — The mere fact that the househelper or domestic
servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or
in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guests or even for its officers
and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and
should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY WHEN ILLEGALLY DISMISSED;
CASE AT BAR. — Because of an accident which took place while private respondent was
performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated
from the service. She is, therefore entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of
petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her
work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.
DECISION
GANCAYCO , J : p
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a

regular employee of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company,
Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara,
Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on
January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was
ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging
her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident
to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D.
Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was
permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P2,000.00
which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she
refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to
work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department
of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by
the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to
pay the complainant, to wit:
1. Salary Differential — P16,289.20
2. Emergency Living Allowance — 12,430.00
3. 13th Month Pay Differential — 1,322.32.
4. Separation Pay
(One-month for every year of service [1973-1988]) — 25,119.30 or in the
total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND
42/100 (P55,161.42).
SO ORDERED." 1
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth
Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the
appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the
NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appropriately should be a special
civil action for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such. 2
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent should be treated as a mere
househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner. LLphil
The petition is devoid of merit.

Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
"The term 'househelper' as used herein is synonymous to the term 'domestic
servant' and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family." 3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who
is employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundry women working in
staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be
considered to extend to the driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the
meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper,
domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar
in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are
actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit,
service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the
employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to
certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic
servant may be considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in making any
such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within
the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its
business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees,
warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or
domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as
amended. cdphil
Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that
respondent abandoned her work. This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence
to show that because of an accident which took place while private respondent was
performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated
from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of
petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her
work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public
respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Page 57, Rollo.
2. Dentech Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 588 (1989). .

3. Page 106, Rollo.

Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, Case No. RO4-3-3398-76, February 20, 1977 (Office of the President
Decision)*
Facts: Complainant Zialcita, an international flight stewardess of PAL, was discharged from the service on
September 9, 1975 on account of her marriage. Is the termination legal? Justifying the dismissal, Philippine Air
Lines invoked its policy as follows:
“D. Flight Attendants. — Flight attendant applicants must be single. Flight attendants will be
automatically separated from employment in the event they subsequently get married.”
which is allegedly in conformity with the following provision of law:
“Article 132. Facilities for women. — The Secretary of Labor shall establish standards that will insure the
safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall by regulations require any employer to
x x x:
“(d) determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special
occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.” [Article 132 is renumbered as 130]
On the other hand, complainant questioned her termination on account of her marriage based on the policy
above quoted, invoking Article 136 [now 134] of the Labor Code.
Ruling: Of first impression is the incompatibility of the PAL’s policy or regulation with the codal provision
of law. PAL is resolute in its contention that Article 136 [134] of the Labor Code applies only to women
employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary
occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the peculiarities of their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent PAL.
True, Article 132 [130] enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and
health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine
appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that
is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent [employer]. The standards have not yet been
established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight
attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established,
the policy of respondent PAL against marriage is patently illegal.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles
52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances,
respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an
unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern
world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, [employer]
overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and
events.
Article 136 [134] is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have
categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is
reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 [133] that speaks of nondiscrimination on the
employment of women.
*
NOTE: Case digest was taken from Azucena. (2016). Labor Standards and Welfare.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004.]
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A.

TECSON , petitioners, vs . GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC. ,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA , J : p
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional overtones,
involving the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees
from marrying employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated May 19, 2003 and
the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434. 2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone
training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that
he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected
to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives
a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s
employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. SHADcT
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of

Astra Pharmaceuticals 3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch
Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of
her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to
a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide
which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to
retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s
employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was
planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsy’s
separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the
same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September
1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did
not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His
application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del
Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to
Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave
Tecson until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer
order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not
issued samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by
Astra. He was also not included in product conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they
submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of
one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined
the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right
to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB
Decision. EHSTcC
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for
Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate
court held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships
with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives. 4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, but the motion
was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004. 5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the NCMB’s finding that the Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from
marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the Court of Appeals also
erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was transferred to
a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to attend products seminars and
training sessions. 6
Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of
competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that
the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry. 7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he
was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions for medical representatives,
and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondent’s products which were competing
with Astra’s products. 8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its
employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate the equal
protection clause; and that Tecson’s reassignment from the Camarines Norte-Camarines
Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does not
amount to constructive dismissal. 9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical
products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity,
relationship or interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it
expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor
company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo
of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from
gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies. 1 0
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes
existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore
not violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its
business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds. 1 1
According to Glaxo, Tecson’s marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and
potential conflict of interest. Astra’s products were in direct competition with 67% of the
products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxo’s enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecson’s
case was a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. 1 2 In any case, Tecson was
given several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but
to ask his wife to resign from Astra instead. 1 3
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy
because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was
stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from respondent if the
management finds that his relationship with an employee of a competitor company would
be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo. 1 4
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecson’s reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion
from seminars regarding respondent’s new products did not amount to constructive
dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecson’s refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales
area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also considered the welfare of
Tecson’s family. Since Tecson’s hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her
roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol region to the Butuan
City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would be relocating to a
familiar territory and minimizing his travel expenses. 1 5
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecson’s exclusion from the seminar concerning the new anti-
asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug
which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a potential conflict of interest
for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecson’s receipt of his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-
up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his paraphernalia was
delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he
already transferred to Butuan). 1 6
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecson’s contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned by
petitioners provides: ScaEIT
xxx xxx xxx
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship

you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
of competing drug companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of interest in
management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a
matter of Company policy.
xxx xxx xxx 1 7
The same contract also stipulates that Tecson agrees to abide by the existing company
rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such policies. 1 8 In this regard,
the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees of its rules regarding
conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may
run counter to the responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:

a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in
any competitor supplier or other businesses which may consciously
or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and thus
deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge

of Company plans to advance their outside personal interests, that
of their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which
would impair their effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that
may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity

with co-employees of competing drug companies are expected to disclose such
relationship to the Management. If management perceives a conflict or potential
conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by management and the
employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to
another department in a non-counter checking position, or by career preparation
toward outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must be prepared
for possible resignation within six (6) months, if no other solution is feasible. 1 9
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s
policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies
and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it
and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a
policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth. 2 0 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social
justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be
decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. 2 1
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case, 2 2 it is a legitimate business practice to guard business
confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs
male and female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor. Consequently,
the court ruled than an employer that discharged an employee who was married to an
employee of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 3
The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted
that the employer’s business was highly competitive and that gaining inside information
would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the
commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting
under color of its authority. 2 4 Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. 2 5 The only exception occurs when the state
26 in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or
involved in the wrongful private conduct. 2 7 Obviously, however, the exception is not
present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated
requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy
was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the
employee. ITDHSE
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee
handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees
are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate
court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the
company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not
aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual.
However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract the employer from
exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business
success . . . 2 8
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms
part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees,
such as that signed by Tecson, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson,
therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when
he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered
into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law
between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith.” 2 9 He is therefore
estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area
to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from
attending the company’s seminar on new products which were directly competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. 3 0 None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not
show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.
As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in
reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioner’s transfer to another place of assignment was merely in
keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and
thus valid . . . Note that [Tecson’s] wife holds a sensitive supervisory position as
Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which requires her to work in close
coordination with District Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties
include monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing
and furthering relationship with customers, collection, monitoring and managing
Astra’s inventory . . . she therefore takes an active participation in the market war
characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies.
Moreover, and this is significant, petitioner’s sales territory covers Camarines Sur
and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in
Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region,
renders the conflict of interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one
spouse of the other’s market strategies in the region would be inevitable.
[Management’s] appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely
illusory and wanting in factual basis . . . 3 1
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 3 2 which

involved a complaint filed by a medical representative against his employer drug company
for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when he refused to accept
his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the drug company to transfer
or reassign its employee in accordance with its operational demands and requirements.
The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, also finds application in the instant case:
STaCcA
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative

is expected to travel. He should anticipate reassignment according to the
demands of their business. It would be a poor drug corporation which cannot
even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for opening
or expansion or to areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so
if such reassignments are part of the employment contract. 3 3
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and
disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo
gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his
relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecson’s
supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with
the company and on the company’s interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him
time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his wife to
resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because
of his satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her
company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to
resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years
of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that
handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from
employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan del
Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of
Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on
the part of Glaxo. 3 4
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., concurs in the result.
Chico-Nazario, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole. Rollo, pp. 22-32.
2. Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A. Tecson, petitioners, v. Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent.
3. Now Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
4. Rollo, pp. 28-32.
5. Id. at 55.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 9-11.
8. Id. at 14-17.
9. Id. at 96-112.
10. Id. at 99-100.
11. Id. at 101-102.
12. Id. at 102-103.
13. Id. at 102-104.
14. Id. at 104-105.
15. Id. at 64.
16. Id. at 106-110.
17. See Decision of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
18. Item No. 6 of Tecson’s employment contract cited by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision, Id.
19. Excerpt of Glaxo’s Employee Handbook, Annex “A” of respondent’s Comment, Id. at
114.
20. Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the
right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
21. Sta. Catalina College v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 144483,
November 19, 2003.
22. Emory v. Georgia Hospital Service Association (1971), DC Ga., 4 CCH EPD ¶ 7785, 4
BNA FEP Cas 891, affd (CA5) 446 F2d 897, 4 CCH EPD ¶ 7786; Cited 45 Am Jr 2d Sec.
469.
23. 42 USCS §§2000e–2002e–17. Title VII prohibits certain employers, employment

agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management training committees from
discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of race or color, religion,
sex, national origin, or opposition to discriminatory practices.
There is no similar legislation in the Philippines.
24. Avery v. Midland County, 390 US 474, 20 L. Ed 2d 45, 88 S Ct 1114, on remand (Tex)
430 SW2d 487; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1, 3 L Ed 2d 5, 78 S Ct 1401.
25. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 US 418, 34 L.Ed.2d 613, 93 S. Ct. 602, 35 L.Ed.2d
694, 93 S. Ct. 1411; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US 163, 32 L.Ed.2d 627, 92 S. Ct.
1965; United States v. Price, 383 US 787, 16 L.Ed. 2d 267, 86 S. Ct. 1152; Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715, 6 L.Ed.2d 45, 81 S. Ct. 856; Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 US 1, 92 L.Ed.1161, 68 S. Ct. 836, 3 ALR2d 441; United States v. Classic,
313 US 299, 85 L.Ed 1368, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 86 L.Ed 565, 62 S. Ct. 51; Nixon v. Condon, 286
US 73, 76 L.Ed. 984, 52 S. Ct. 484, 88 ALR 458; Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennet,
284 US 239, 76 L.Ed 265, 52 S. Ct. 133; Corrigan v. Buckley , 271 US 323, 70 L.Ed. 969, 46
S. Ct. 521; U.S. — Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., N.Y., 90 S. Ct. 1598, 398 U.S. 144, 26 L. Ed.
2d 142.
26. The equal protection clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution is a restriction on the state governments and operates exclusively upon
them. It does not extend to authority exercised by the Government of the United States.
16 A Am Jur 2d §742.
27. Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 US 556, 41 L Ed 2d 304, 94 S Ct 2416; Evans v. Newton,
382 US 296, 15 L Ed 2d 373, 86 S Ct 486; Anderson v. Martin, 375 US 399, 11 L Ed 2d
430, 84 S Ct 454; Peterson v. Greenville, 373 US 244, 10 L Ed 2d 323, 83 S Ct 1119;
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra note 25.
28. Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 28.
29. Article 1159, Civil Code. See National Sugar Trading and/or the Sugar Regulatory
Administration v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 151218, January 18, 2003, 396
SCRA 528; Pilipinas Hino, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126570, August 18, 2000, 338
SCRA 355.
30. Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 125303, and
126937, June 16, 2000, 333 SCRA 589.
31. Rollo, pp. 30-31.
32. G.R. No. L-76959, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 713.
33. Id. at 719.

34. Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 24-27.

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CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Published in The Philippine Star on May 19, 2013.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION

(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or

(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic of cial or employee, nurse, midwife,

If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12)