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FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380


Petitioner,

Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 5, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her

to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a

quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.


On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.

Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American

citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him

currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:


WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the

OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her
to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage


between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as

petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also

ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code

apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background


On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated


and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented
by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse

is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the

marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and

literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming

within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was

still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are

both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino

spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible,
considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On

the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that

his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law must

also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.

Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter


into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family

Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to

remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The


assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

RODOLFO V. ROSALES, G.R. No. 157044


(represented by his heirs,
Rodolfo, Jr., Romeo Allan, Present:
Lillian Rhodora, Roy Victor,
Roger Lyle and Alexander PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
Nicolai, all surnamed Rosales) SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
and LILY ROSQUETA- CORONA,
ROSALES, CARPIO MORALES, and
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

MIGUEL CASTELLTORT,
JUDITH CASTELLTORT, and
LINA LOPEZ-VILLEGAS,
assisted by her Attorney-in-Fact, Promulgated:
Rene Villegas,
Respondents. October 5, 2005

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DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:


The present petition for review on certiorari assails the October 2, 2002
Decision[1] and February 6, 2003 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R.
CV No. 64046 and seeks to reinstate the April 21, 1999 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 2229-95-C.
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are
the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] and designated as Lot 17,
Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna.

On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on
their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort
(Castelltort).[5]

It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot
16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her
son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic
engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.

Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas offering a larger
lot near petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a replacement thereof.[6] In the alternative,
Villegas proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners lot with legal interest. [7] Both
proposals were, however, rejected by petitioners[8] whose counsel, by letter[9] of August 24,
1995, directed Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish his house and any other
structure he may have built thereon, and desist from entering the lot.
Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a complaint [10] for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary
injunction against spouses-respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-95-C.

To the complaint, the Castelltorts claimed in their Answer with Counterclaim[11] that
they were builders in good faith.

Lina, represented by her son-attorney-in-fact Villegas, soon filed a Motion for


Intervention[12] before the RTC which was granted by Order[13] of December 19, 1995.

In her Answer to the complaint,[14] Lina alleged that the Castelltorts acted in good
faith in constructing the house on petitioners lot as they in fact consulted her before
commencing any construction thereon, they having relied on the technical description of
the lot sold to them, Lot 16, which was verified by her officially designated geodetic
engineer.

Nevertheless, Lina proposed to give petitioners a lot containing an area of 536 square
meters together with the house and duplex structure built thereon or, if petitioners choose,
to encumber the 536 square meter lot as collateral to get immediate cash through a
financing scheme in order to compensate them for the lot in question.[15]

Ruling out good faith, the RTC, by Decision of April 21, 1999, found for petitioners
in this wise:

In the instant case, there is no well-founded belief of ownership by the


defendants of the land upon which they built their house. The title or mode of
acquisition upon which they based their belief of such ownership stemmed from
a Contract to Sell (Exhibit P) of which they were not even parties, the designated
buyer being Elizabeth Yson Cruz and the sale even subjected to the judicial
reconstitution of the title. And by their own actions, particularly defendant
Miguel Castelltort, defendants betrayed this very belief in their ownership when
realizing the inutility of anchoring their ownership on the basis of the Contract
of Sale, defendant Miguel Castelltort in his testimony declared Elizabeth Yson
Cruz as his wife (tsn, pp. 7-8, March 24, 1998) despite an admission in their
answer that they are the spouses named as defendants (tsn, p. 8, January 12,
1998) and which declaration is an utter falsehood as the Contract to Sell itself
indicates the civil status of said Elizabeth Yson Cruz to be single.

Even if we are to concede that defendants built their house in good faith
on account of the representation of attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas, their failure
to comply with the requirements of the National Building Code, particularly the
procurement of a building permit, stained such good faith and belief.

xxx
From any and all indications, this deliberate breach is an unmitigated
manifestation of bad faith. And from the evidence thus adduced, we hold that
defendants and the intervenor were equally guilty of negligence which led to the
construction of the defendants house on plaintiffs property and therefore jointly
and severally liable for all the damages suffered by the
plaintiffs.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads, quoted verbatim:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby


rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to
surrender the possession of the property covered by TCT No. 36856 of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna including any and all improvements built thereon to
the plaintiffs.

Defendants and intervenors are likewise jointly and severally directed to


pay to plaintiffs the following damages:

a) TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS per month from


February 1995 by way of reasonable compensation for the use of
plaintiffs property until the surrender of the same;
b) FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS by way of moral
damages;
c) THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as exemplary
damages;
d) TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees
and cost of suit.

The counterclaim interposed by the defendants in their responsive pleading


is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Respondents thereupon filed their respective appeals with the CA.

Petitioner Rodolfo Rosales, in the meantime, died on December 7, 2001. His heirs
Rodolfo, Jr., Romeo Allan, Lillian Rhodora, Roy Victor, Roger Lyle and Alexander
Nicolai, all surnamed Rosales, filed their Appearance[18] as his substitute.

By Decision of October 2, 2002, the CA granted the appeal and set aside the April
21, 1999 RTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is


hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the court a quo REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. In accordance with the cases of Technogas Philippines
Manufacturing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals and Depra vs. Dumlao, applying
Article 448 of the Civil Code, this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34, for further proceedings, as follows:

1. to determine the present fair price of appellees 315 square meter area
of land and the amount of the expenses actually spent by the appellants for
building the house as of 21 August 1995, which is the time they were notified of
appellees rightful claim over Lot 17.

2. to order the appellees to exercise their option under the law (Article
448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying to the
appellants the amount of the expenses spent for the house as determined by the
court a quo in accordance with the limitations as aforestated or to oblige the
appellants to pay the price of the land.

In case the appellees exercise the option to oblige the appellants to pay the
price of the land but the latter reject such purchase because, as found by the court,
the value of the land is considerably more than that of the house, the court shall
order the parties to agree upon the terms of a forced lease, and give the court a
quo a formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement
is reached by the parties, the court a quo shall then fix the terms of the forced
lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less
that Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, payable within the first five
(5) days of each calendar month and the period thereof shall not be more than
two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment.

Upon the expiration of the forced lease, or upon default by the appellants
in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, the appellees shall be
entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover their land, and to have the
improvement removed by the appellants at the latters expense. The rentals herein
provided shall be tendered by the appellants to the court for payment to the
appellees, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance
was made within the period fixed by the court.

In any event, the appellants shall pay the appellees the amount of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as reasonable compensation for their occupancy of
the encroached property from the time said appellants good faith cease (sic) to
exist until such time the possession of the property is delivered to the appellees
subject to the reimbursement of the aforesaid expenses in favor of the appellants
or until such time the payment of the purchase price of the said lot be made by
the appellants in favor of the appellees in case the latter opt for the compulsory
sale of the same.

SO ORDERED.[19] (Emphasis in the original)

In reversing the trial court, the CA held:


xxx

x x x A perusal of the records readily reveals that said court instead relied
on flimsy, if not immaterial, allegations of the appellees, which have no direct
bearing in the determination of whether the appellants are builders in bad faith.
For one, the pivotal issue to be resolved in this case, i.e. whether appellant
Miguel is a builder in good faith, was ignored by the court a quo. The instant
case does not in any way concern the personal and property relations of spouses-
appellants and Elizabeth Yson Cruz which is an altogether different matter that
can be ventilated by the concerned parties through the institution of a proper
action. xxx The court a quo should have focused on the issue of whether
appellant Miguel built, in good faith, the subject house without notice of the
adverse claim of the appellees and under the honest belief that the lot which he
used in the construction belongs to him. xxx

xxx As it is, appellant Miguel relied on the title which the intervenor
showed to him which, significantly, has no annotation that would otherwise
show a prior adverse claim. Thus, as far as appellant Miguel is concerned, his
title over the subject lot, as well as the title of the intervenor thereto, is clean and
untainted by an adverse claim or other irregularities.

For another, the appellants failure to secure a building permit from the
Municipal Engineers Office on their construction on Lot 17 does not impinge on
the good faith of the appellants. In fact, it can be told that a building permit was
actually filed by appellant Miguel with respect to Lot 16 and it was only due to
the confusion and misapprehension by the intervenor of the exact parameters of
the property which caused appellants belief that Lot 17 [the questioned lot], is
his. This fact bolsters appellant Miguels good faith in building his house on
appellees lot under the mistaken belief that the same is his property. Otherwise,
he should have secured a building permit on Lot 17 instead or should not have
bothered to take the necessary measures to obtain a building permit on Lot 16 in
the first place.

By and large, the records show that, as testified to by Engr. Rebecca T.


Lanuang, appellant Miguel had already applied for a building permit as early as
February 1994 and was in fact issued a temporary building permit pending the
completion of the requirements for said permit. Although the building permit
was belatedly issued in January 1996, this does not in any way detract from
appellant Miguels good faith.

xxx

In holding the appellants as builders in bad faith, the court a quo defied
law and settled jurisprudence considering that the factual basis of its findings
and the incontrovertible evidence in support thereof prove that the appellant
Miguel, in good faith, built the house on appellees land without knowledge of an
adverse claim or any other irregularities that might cast a doubt as to the veracity
of the assurance given to him by the intervenor. Having been assured by the
intervenor that the stone monuments were purposely placed, albeit wrongfully,
by the land surveyor in said land to specifically identify the lot and its inclusive
boundaries, the appellants cannot be faulted for having relied on the expertise of
the land surveyor who is more equipped and experienced in the field of land
surveying. Although under the Torrens system of land registration, the appellant
is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of the property with
which he is dealing, appellant however, considering that he is a layman not
versed in the technical description of his property, cannot be faulted in his
reliance on the survey plan that was delivered to him by the intervenor and the
stone monuments that were placed in the encroached property.
xxx

Peremptorily, contrary to the flawed pronouncements made by the court a


quo that appellant Miguel is deemed as a builder in bad faith on the basis of a
mere assertion that he built his house without initially satisfying himself that he
owns the said property, this Court finds reason to maintain good faith on the part
of the appellant. Admittedly, the appellants house erroneously encroached on the
property of the appellees due to a mistake in the placement of stone monuments
as indicated in the survey plan, which error is directly attributable to the fault of
the geodetic engineer who conducted the same. This fact alone negates bad faith
on the part of appellant Miguel.

xxx

Moreover, it is quite illogical for appellant Miguel to knowingly build his


house on a property which he knew belongs to another person. x x x

xxx

In view of the good faith of both parties in this case, their rights and
obligations are to be governed by Article 448, which has been applied to
improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land
belonging to the adjoining owner. x x x

x x x[20] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[21] dated October 22, 2002 having been
denied by the CA by Resolution of March 13, 2002, the present petition was filed raising
the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS


COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING A FINDING
THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS


COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT, IN DECIDING THE CASE, RELIED ON FLIMSY, IF
NOT IMMATERIAL, ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITIONERS, WHICH
HAVE NO DIRECT BEARING IN THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER
THE RESPONDENTS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN RENDERING A
DECISION THAT IS UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST BOTH RESPONDENT
JUDITH CASTELLTORT AND THIRD-PARTY ELIZABETH CRUZ[22]

Petitioners initially hammer against respondents proving that Castelltort and a


certain Elizabeth Cruz are the builders of the house on the subject property, they faulting
them with estoppel for alleging in their Answer before the trial court that they (respondents
Castelltort and Judith) caused the construction of their house which they bought from a
certain Lina Lopez-Villegas.

Petitioners rely on the following doctrine established in Elayda v. Court of


Appeals:[23]

an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making


such admission and are conclusive as to him and that all proofs submitted by him contrary
thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not x x x

Petitioners contention is hardly relevant to the case at bar. Whether it was Castelltort
and Judith or Castelltort and Elizabeth Cruz who purchased the property from Lina is not
material to the outcome of the instant controversy. As found by the CA:

The fact remains that appellant [Castelltort] is the builder of the house on Lot 17 xxx
The court a quo should have focused on the issue of whether appellant Miguel built, in good
faith, the subject house without notice of the adverse claim of the appellees and under the
honest belief that the lot which he used in the construction belongs to him. xxx it cannot be
gainsaid that appellant Miguel has a title over the land that was purchased from the
intervenor x x x[24]

At all events, as this Court held in the case of Gardner v. Court of Appeals:[25]

In its Resolution reversing the original Decision, respondent Court discredited the
testimony of Ariosto SANTOS for being at variance with the allegations in his Answer.
The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto SANTOS in his pleadings and in
his declarations in open Court differed will not militate against the findings herein made
nor support the reversal by respondent Court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys
pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it, but this is not an absolute
and inflexible rule. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects
to prove, but it is not evidence. As Ariosto SANTOS himself, in open Court, had repudiated
the defenses he had raised in his Answer and against his own interest, his testimony is
deserving of weight and credence.[26] (Underscoring supplied)

The issue determinative of the controversy in the case at bar hinges on whether
Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building
on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any
defect or flaw in his title.[27]

Article 527 of the Civil Code provides that good faith is always presumed, and upon
him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.[28]
In the case at bar, Lot 16 was sold by Lina, through her attorney-in-fact Villegas, to
Castelltort and a certain Elizabeth Cruz[29] for a consideration of P500,000.00. While prior
to the sale, what Villegas showed Castelltort as evidence of his mother Linas ownership of
the property was only a photocopy of her title TCT No. (T-42171) T-18550[30] he
explaining that the owners duplicate of the title was lost and that judicial reconstitution
thereof was ongoing, Castelltort acted in the manner of a prudent man and went to the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna to procure a certified true copy of the TCT. [31] The certified
true copy bore no annotation indicating any prior adverse claim on Lot 16.

The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on
petitioners lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by
Villegas.

In his cross-examination, Villegas testified:

Q: You said the surveyor placed a mujon along boundary of the property?
A: Yes.

Q: When were the mujons placed in the boundary of the property?


A: These mujons were the basis for my locating the property in pointing to Mr. Castelltort.

xxx

Q: Is it not a fact that before Miguel Castelltort started constructing that house he sought
your advice or permission to construct the same over that particular lot?
A: Yes.

Q: And you gave your consent?


A: Yes, because based on my knowledge also that that was the lot as pointed by Engr.
Rivera.

xxx
Q: Was there any remarkable difference between lot 16 and 17 at the time that this particular
lot was sold to Miguel Castelltort and Elizabeth Cruz?

xxx

A: Both lots 16 and 17 are practically the same. The (sic) have the same frontage. There is
only a difference of 4 square meters, one is 311 square meters and the other 315 square
meters. Both sides were fenced, as drawn they were facing the same road. They are
practically the same.

Q: But at the time or immediately before Mr. Castelltort started the construction of the house,
was there any remarkable distinction between these two properties?
A: None.[32] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was eventually traced to the error
committed by geodetic engineer Augusto Riveras employees in placing stone monuments
on petitioners property, instead of on Lot 16, the lot sold to Castelltort, based on the survey
made by the engineer in 1992.

The engineer so testified:

Q: Now, aside from inspecting personally the site, what else did your men or assistants do?
A: After computing the subdivision lots, they went back to the field to plant those
subdivision corners with concrete monuments.

Q: Which is (sic) also called as mohons?


A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, can you point to this Honorable Court where exactly did your men place these
additional mohons and how many?
A: Later on we discovered that they placed the mohons in the adjoining lot, lot 17.

xxx

Q: x x x when again did you meet Mr. Rene Villegas or after how many months or year?
A: Maybe after a year, sir.

Q: And you met him again because he had a problem regarding the property of one Engr.
Rosales?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when he confided to you this matter, did you go to the site of Lot 16 or 17?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what did you see there?


A: A house being constructed then I rechecked the location of the house and it turned out to
be in Lot 17.

xxx

Q: Considering that you found out that a mistake was actually made by your assistants
Dennis Orencio, Mario Carpio and Sovejano when you allowed them to proceed on
their own to make this computation, did you confront these men of yours afterwards?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: In what manner?
A: I actually reprimanded them verbally and also I dismissed Mario Carpio from my
office.

xxx
Q: And did you investigate how your men committed this mistake of planting these
monuments on another lot when corners 4 & 1 were clearly planted on the ground?
A: I myself rechecked it and found out that they committed an error.

xxx
Q: And now, you are saying that your men committed a mistake by placing thereon
monuments by planting these monuments not on Lot 16 but on Lot 17?
A: When I investigated how did they commit (sic) a mistake it came to be like this. Before
when we surveyed first this in 1992, at that time Dante Villegas contracted my services
there was a fence here then when we went back, the road was already removed so they
committed an error that this point is Lot 19, they thought that it was Lot 19, the back
portion.

xxx

Q: In this particular case, did you find out how your men checked the succeeding lots, how
they determine (sic) the exact location of lot 16?
A: They just relied on one side of the subdivision.

Q: By just counting the number of lots?


A: Yes, sir.

Q: Without making any actual measurement?


A: They made an actual measurement but the reference point is not the one, the correct one
because they also checked it with the other corner of the road going back.

xxx

Q: And how did they commit a mistake when you said they checked the lot at the back of
Lot 16?
A: Because they were quite confident since we had already relocated the property two years
ago so they thought that they get (sic) the right lot without checking the other side of
the subdivision.

xxx

Q: Now, you said that when you went to the place because you heard from Rene Villegas
that there was a mistake you no longer could find the monuments on lines 1 and 4 and
according to you the reason is that a fence was already constructed?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: For clarification, is this line 1 & 4 on Lot 16 a common line 1 &4 on Lot 17?
A: Yes, sir a common line.

Q: In other words, this line 1 &4 devides (sic) Lot 16 & 17?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: So that when these monuments were placed on lines 1 & 4 somebody could mistake it
for Lot 17 also because there were monuments now 1 &4 for lot 16 since these are
common lines for
Lot 17 also with Lot 16, it could also be construed that these are monuments for Lot 17?
A: Yes, sir possible.[33] (Underscoring supplied)

As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good faith at least until
August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code
which reads:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land,
unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder
in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot come to terms over the
conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even
as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. [35] The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.[36]

The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus:

Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just
solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and
the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the
land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.[37]

Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and
from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully.[38] The good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from
the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence
or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.[39]

In the case at bar, Castelltorts good faith ceased on August 21, 1995 when petitioners
personally apprised him of their title over the questioned lot. As held by the CA, should
petitioners then opt to appropriate the house, they should only be made to pay for that part
of
the improvement built by Castelltort on the questioned property at the time good faith still
existed on his part or until August 21, 1995.
The CA, however, failed to qualify that said part of the improvement should be
pegged at its current fair market value consistent with this Courts pronouncement in Pecson
v. Court of Appeals.[40]

And, as correctly found by the CA, the commencement of Castelltorts payment of


reasonable rent should start on August 21, 1995 as well, to be paid until such time that the
possession of the property is delivered to petitioners, subject to the reimbursement of
expenses, that is, if such option is for petitioners to appropriate the house.

This Court quotes the CAs ratiocination with approval:

x x x Generally, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the payment of
reasonable rent should be made only up to the date appellees serve notice of their option
as provided by law upon the appellants and the court a quo; that is, if such option is for
appellees to appropriate the encroaching structure. In such event, appellants would have a
right to retain the land on which they have built in good faith until they are reimbursed the
expenses incurred by them. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while
the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the
land on which it is built, planted or sown.

However, considering that appellants had ceased as builders in good faith at the
time that appellant Miguel was notified of appellees lawful title over the disputed property,
the payment of reasonable rent should accordingly commence at that time since he can no
longer avail of the rights provided under the law for builders in good faith.[41]

If the option chosen by petitioners is compulsory sale, however, the payment of rent
should continue up to the actual transfer of ownership.[42]

Respecting petitioners argument that the appellate court erred in rendering a decision
that is unenforceable against Judith who is not the owner of the house and Elizabeth Cruz
who was found to be a part owner of the house built on their lot but is not a party to the
case, the same does not lie.

While one who is not a party to a proceeding shall not be affected or bound [43] by a
judgment rendered therein,[44] like Elizabeth Cruz, this does not detract from the validity
and enforceability of the judgment on petitioners and respondents Castelltorts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 2, 2002 and
Resolution dated February 6, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the trial court shall include for
determination the increase in value (plus value) which petitioners 315 square meter lot may
have acquired by reason of the existence of that portion of the house built before
respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort were notified of petitioners rightful claim on said
lot, and the current fair market value of said portion. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987


Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil,
90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in
the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.

xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's


in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not
been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems
in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the
informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not
the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their
own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration,
all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even
dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it
is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal
law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons
and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as
to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to
the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the
relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the
ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of
informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect.
Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord
with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law,
though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering
a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed
that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City,
Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart
from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all
the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of
the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area
of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by
its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982,the Velazcos possession prior
to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it
was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this
Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four
months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the
Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which
had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the
requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the
case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court
in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the
land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14]promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same
observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land
should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart
from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,[15]Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage
of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at
the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private
property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively
from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2)
speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented
Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession
period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and
not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period
should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The
President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.[21]

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the
lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public
Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or
open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a
larger class than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12,
1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then
in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section
14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have


been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion
of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly
refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That
is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of
the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right
itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying
with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the


Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may
be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that
both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek
registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time,
not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed
twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that
for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be
in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and
disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June
1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication
was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not
those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent
a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit,
absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona


fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what
would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering
our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial
hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section
14(1) is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,


citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession That statement, in the
context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited
in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was
ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did
not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had
been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945.
The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the
case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the
Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of


Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as
the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the
dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994,
issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification
Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to
show the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which
is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest
the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of
the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for
the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did
not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year
1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945?
The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six
(6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguitto contradistinguish it
from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2),
which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless
refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over
which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]] There is
a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation
of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in
this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands
and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of
real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty
(30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,[34] as well
as just title.[35]

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the
acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to
the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does
encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which
a private person has acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding


that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet
if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to
Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two
distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made
the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act
No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it
applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation
to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year
period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2).
However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated
under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer
to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-
(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942
had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the
present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as
basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-
year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of
the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section
14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is
no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by
Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:


(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging
to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce
of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not,
are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or
any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the
public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted,
under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property?
After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of
the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man
are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona
fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord
with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply
the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy
is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very
well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual


example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA
law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions
of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For
purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to
transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA)[40] which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof
are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the
BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order
to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44] Such
purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of national wealth under
Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon
their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such
in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to
meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section
14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis
of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article
1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of
extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply
as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately
is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as
the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with
the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil
Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription,
and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed
through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person
from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time,
there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good
faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the
Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would
have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the
one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,
and dacion in payment.[46]

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the
argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to
the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is evident
that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the
State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive
prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary


prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion
lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But
after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run
in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the
person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership
of the property by operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property
under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a
mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code.
What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about
by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either
30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable
public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it
arguably did not preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering
that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of
persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was
finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section
14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during
the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person


acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the
Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied
the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a


phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or


alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as
the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in
this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled
and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded
for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is
much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues
are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands
as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new
phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands
which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes
insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not
only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring
welcome closure to the long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793


Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,


Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ CHICO-NAZARIO,
YU-TE, NACHURA, and
Respondent, PERALTA, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF Promulgated:
THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor. February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our
jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that
current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept
was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004
Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January
1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three
months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus,
they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.[4]

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In
April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and
Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning
him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena
at her uncles place.[5]

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was
then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where
Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle
also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. [7] At one point,
Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay
at their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however,
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward
talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with
his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they
telephoned to ask for him.[9]

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that
they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate
lives. They then parted ways.[10]

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage
to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its
behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could
not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits.[14]

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties


psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and


baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college
at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married
to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at
my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased
sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as
generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each
of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He
clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried
his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And
because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God
by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even
during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a
disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and
shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this


became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that
she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had
insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated
because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last
week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she
already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu.Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house
of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was
compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not
find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek
help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner,
all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go
back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and
said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he
arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to
be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by
phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what
to do.Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner
and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would
be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea
of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify
her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the
Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any
Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of
the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent
refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many
ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that
if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to
harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫]ۥ‬
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went
home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort.Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about
it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,]
tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home
of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea
and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home
of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that
he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the
petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent
refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided
to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he
was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they
should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in


the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[]
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved
with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination


Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and


recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure
and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the
search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really
sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with
other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it
boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more
of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached
and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the


aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in
her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage
as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used
force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the
realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out
of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry
himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of
intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law.
In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that
both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware
of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their
relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and
undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she
is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and
Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested
during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made
marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage of
the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG,
timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision [19] in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner
failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did
not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided
by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. [22] The CA
faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the
OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as
the case may be, the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review
on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]

In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not
only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by
the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been
furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment petition
filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the
parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported
incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus,
the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted
the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus,
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:[33]

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of


the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission
of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April
15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law
and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article
36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had


thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a
new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked
by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal
or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of
legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another
name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision


Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as

a special contract of permanent partnership


between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian


traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry
to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in
the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds
not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present
Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party


who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may


be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the


declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall
not prescribe.

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee
on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father
Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring
marriages null and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice
of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz
also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot
of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.[34]

In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped


any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained
that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which
is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being
a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for
the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that


psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or


mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the


interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion


of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;


2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and
special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for


avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in
nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the


marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential


requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions
on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as


severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent
with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number
of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous


situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon
Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the
same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from
the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon
#1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be
valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations
of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time
in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary.
Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from
the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application.[38]

Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to


comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment
of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction
must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume
the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to
Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law
to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract,
the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third
paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because
it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent,
and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which
does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The
consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act,
however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete
summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of
consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of
positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding
psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions,
there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different
from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is
a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always


and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the
higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological
dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving
intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual
activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency
[nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is
altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so
afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of
the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The
question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which
he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this


regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this
incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and
its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with
the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free
act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the
intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there
are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand
perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his
consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way
and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent
may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting
to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen


his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear
conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and
the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are
usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with
positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they
are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had
likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of
consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the


selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress
towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist
in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have
difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially,
with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a
person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of
fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual
to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it
from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that
person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the


contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium.One
immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered
[e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union
with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A
second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable
to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of
the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only
of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such
would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing
the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the
place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of


the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He
concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the
intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the
fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision
but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when
this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the
inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In
[the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the
respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of
this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and
experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage
of in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial


obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses
and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several,
or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal
relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for
interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations.Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was
able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also
the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate
juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality
is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with
the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities
of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial
contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent,
as in the defect of the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the


source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature.Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can
then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated
by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in
ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the
incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that
should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court,
in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate
courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a
judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when
private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly,
the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis
by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow,
been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the


celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically


permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles


68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal


of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are


unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to


harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining
independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership


concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (laterChief Justice) Artemio V.
Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid,
Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.[48]

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied the
aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is
to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world.[50] The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by
little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article
36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between
the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather be alarmed by the
rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the


Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity
of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder,
who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in
that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much
of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And
second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning
or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never
again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of
the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their
marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this


case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.[56]

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a


psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about
the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could
no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological


incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to


the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the


marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to
the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might
lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone


who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already


detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentratingon the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert


testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there
is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer
the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no
experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of
the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their
own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider
as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality
disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health discusses personality disorders as follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a


persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are
not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties
or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or
earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old
age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,


despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to
pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals
with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with
life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints
propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive
from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage;
fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability
to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development
lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor
involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there
is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid
(5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history
of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been
reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely
reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had
at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control
group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric


Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major
clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals


who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality


disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive


personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious
or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise
specified, that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed
conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term


concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive


behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals


who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice
or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important
decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their
own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[65]

and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows


Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain
a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit
some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-
centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public
scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral
insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical


Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder
is one of the four dramatic personality disorders, the others being borderline,
histrionic and narcissistic.[66]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in
this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and,
thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live),
tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and
void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review


on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,


vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts.
They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file
an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain
Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion
between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the
allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and
embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:


1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s]
50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006
Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and
guidance.5

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also
apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified
of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of
the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which
are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In
short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted. Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
1avvphil

remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity,
is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which
are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in
a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,


DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA
BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS,
ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA
P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS,
JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA,Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1

The Facts

The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot
1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No.
1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia
Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-
owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and
Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria,
Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely,
Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto
herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that
the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from
petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the
properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however,
that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.6

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners’ claim and granted
their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its
Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land subject of
this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including intervenor Maria
Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M)
which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia Policarpio, TCT
No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the same to the enumerated
plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint
filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6,
Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in
Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per Resolution9 dated January 17,
2007.

In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned
the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously
owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido
and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11

Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:

A.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF
THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.

B.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS


MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE
LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12

Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the properties came
from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13

Ruling of the Court

This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this
regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one
of which is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being the case in the petition
at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two
issues that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties and two, whether
petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.

Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong
to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title,
whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus.
The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also
called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios
who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.15

The lineal character of the


reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title

Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.

The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the
ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the
subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title;

(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs
to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved
by the reservor.16

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he
is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties
in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character
of the property.17It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title
when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.

Ascendants, descendants and


collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as
the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather,
she is Gregoria’s collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants, and
those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:

Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that
1âwphi1

constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)

Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so
on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with
Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common
ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.

First cousins of the


descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third
degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned
is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom
the property last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree
relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.20

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a
personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and
relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within
the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth
and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.

x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree
mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character,
petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute,
is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because
petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the complaint
filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the
distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate
at this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based
solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception of evidence on
Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed
specifically for that purpose.

A reservista acquires ownership of


the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished

Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s disposition of the case. In upholding
the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners
and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have done, assuming for argument’s sake
that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondent’s
titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of
the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the
latter’s wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.25

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets
the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)

It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact
that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated
January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any
civil action that the heirs of Gregoria

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of the properties in
question.

SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside
the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed
once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a
sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed
as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition
was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose
any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar
of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the
trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-
105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found
by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the
civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum,
the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no
merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx


(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means
"to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are
expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:


SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days
after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour
of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case
the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was
born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is
defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the
distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is
"the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,
"words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the
Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the
term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change
of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it
has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or
on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions
of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571


Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - *ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
August 11, 2010
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him
and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce


and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance


with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly


celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]


Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as
a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the


second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage.Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26
of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance


with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly


celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be


considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;[25]Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[26]

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive


evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a


judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the


judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the


judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence


of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the


acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy
of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose
the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.[33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the


foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording
to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to
what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a


persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law
on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and


naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the
decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with
the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation
of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,


and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

PERLA G. PATRICIO, G.R. No. 170829


Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF Promulgated:
APPEALS, Second Division,
Respondents. November 20, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005[1] in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being
contrary to law and evidence.

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential
house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia
Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven
hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less.[2]

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially
settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was
cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent
and Marcelino Marc.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted
an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,[3] the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in
the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction
wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property
should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.[4]

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court on August 11, 2003,[5] hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied
the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19,
2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that
the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there
is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor
son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G.
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.[6]

Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH
AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03
OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC
AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF
THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON
CO-OWNERSHIP.[7]

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides
in the said home.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even
after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e.,
even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home
considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the
said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family
home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which
was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers
Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of
the death of their father,[8] hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime.[9] It is the dwelling house where husband and wife,
or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated.[10] It
is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family.[11] The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.[12]

The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof
or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or
actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is
presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the
house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated
in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home
is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and
overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.[13]

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for legal support.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period
of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who
constituted the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of
one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the
family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the
family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her
separate property as family home, the property will remain as family home for
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no
more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home will be
dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there
are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten
years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary,
in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the
heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning
the property after the period provided by this article? We believe that although
the heirs will continue in ownership by not partitioning the property, it will
cease to be a family home.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:

The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued
existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family
or both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts.
153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and
within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are
compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless
of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home.[15] (Emphasis
supplied)

The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are
beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years,
unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the
family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.

It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home
may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the
unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented
to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and
a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that
minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and
protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be
capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art.
154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for
legal support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Family Code.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband
and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of
deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home
to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known
as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has
been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The
liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents,
especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother,
but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant
of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on
legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from
that of his parents, being of legal age.

Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law,
comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.[16] Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on
family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be
renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6)
It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.[17]

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from
their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art.
199.[18] We agree with this view.

The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
to the next nearer relatives and so on.

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son;
neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was
willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal support. On the contrary, herein
petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the
family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended
in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.

The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in
inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every
available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from
arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,[19] no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-
ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time. An
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property.[20]

Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have
ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to
each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.

When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may order
it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other
parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case
the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly.[21]

The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied
in Art. 996 of the Civil Code.[22] Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and
legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the
children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the
decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be given
exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will
have the same share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of
the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario,
4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held that an action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of co-
ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties
in the same action.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in


CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is
directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical
partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the
following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the
property and the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in
accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to the commissioners that
the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest
of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the
same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be
sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to
sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly,
and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each
heir. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996]

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT


OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and
ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously


delivered by the owners agent, a builder in good faith? This is the main issue resolved
in this petition for review on certiorari to reverse the Decision of the Court of
[1]

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 11040, promulgated on August 20, 1987.


[2]

By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court resolved
to transfer this case (along with several others) to the Third Division. After due
deliberation and consultation, the Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the
undersigned ponente.

The Facts

The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:


Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9,
Phase II and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In
1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that
time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of
Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his
name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced
on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same
subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent
of petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even
before the completion of all installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee paid
CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, for the
preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to Kees taking actual
possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to
Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife,
Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by
Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store,
an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The
parties tried to reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinicos lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter
remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9,
Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC),
a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to
CTTEI. It further ruled that petitioner and CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a
defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin construction required
under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment and his having built a sari-
sari store without. the prior approval of petitioner required under paragraph 26 of said
contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was merely to regulate the
type of improvements to be constructed on the lot . [3]

However, the MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with
Kee over Lot 8 for the latters failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not
contested the rescission. The rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint
was instituted. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot
subject of the contract between him and petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay
reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim
reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot.
The MTCC thus disposed:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to vacate tithe premises of Lot 9, covered by TCT No.
106367 and to remove all structures and improvements he introduced thereon;

2. Defendant Wilson Kee is ordered to pay to the plaintiff rentals at the rate of P 15.00 a day
computed from the time this suit was filed on March 12, 1981 until he actually vacates the
premises. This amount shall bear interests (sic) at the rate of 12 per cent (sic) per annum.

3. Third-Party Defendant CT. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Subdivision are
ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P3,000.00 as attorneys fees and
P700.00 as cost and litigation expenses.[4]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that
petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no
preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9
to Kee. It found Kee a builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even
[5]

assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty of
unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was
served with notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for rental.
The RTC thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to the order against the
defendant to vacate the premises of Lot No. 9 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
106367 of the land records of Bacolod City; the removal of all structures and improvements
introduced thereon at his expense and the payment to plaintiff (sic) the sum of Fifteen (P
15.00) Pesos a day as reasonable rental to be computed from January 30, 1981, the date of
the demand, and not from the date of the filing of the complaint, until he had vacated (sic)
the premises, with interest thereon at 12% per annum. This Court further renders judgment
against the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as
attorneys fees, plus costs of litigation.
The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Pleasantville Development
Corporation and C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. is dismissed. The order against Third-Party
Defendants to pay attorneys fees to plaintiff and costs of litigation is reversed. [6]

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1986, Kee
appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which referred the matter to the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware
of the mix-up when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. It further
ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such
wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. The appellate
court also ruled that the award of rentals was without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and


judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he introduced
on Lot 9, and is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New
Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development
Corporation are solidarily liable under the following circumstances:

a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter,


remove these structures, the third-party defendants shall answer for all
demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or
rendered useless;

b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer
for the amount representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.

3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development


Corporation are ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorneys
fees, as well as litigation expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.

Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the determination of the
actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings
in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code. [7]

Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI.

The Issues

The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the respondent
Courts Decision, as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or the
the (sic) applicable decisions of the Supreme Court on third-party complaints, by ordering
third-party defendants to pay the demolition expenses and/or price of the land;

2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted course of judicial
proceedings, by granting to private respondent-Kee the rights of a builder in good faith in
excess of what the law provides, thus enriching private respondent Kee at the expense of the
petitioner;

3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which changed the rights of the
parties, it becomes imperative to set aside or at least modify the judgment of the Court of
Appeals to harmonize with justice and the facts;

4. Private respondent-Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of the lower court is
clearly a builder in bad faith, having violated several provisions of the contract to sell on
installments;

5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal, Pleasantville Development
Corporation (liable) for the acts made by the agent in excess of its authority is clearly in
violation of the provision of the law;

6. The award of attorneys fees is clearly without basis and is equivalent to putting a premium
in (sic) court litigation.

From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:

(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?

(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and

(3) Is the award of attorneys fees proper?

The First Issue: Good Faith

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs ruling
that Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. We agree with the following
observation of the Court of Appeals:

The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when
it pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a
purchaser of a lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by
another, deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the
land and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that would
follow.

Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the
identity of his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69561,
while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under
the Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and
bounds of the property with which he is dealing. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find
a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went
to the subdivision developers agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well
as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEIs geodetic engineer. Upon Kees receipt of the
map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEIs employee, Octaviano,
who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full
faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the companys positive
identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. There was no
need for him to have acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during the geodetic
engineers relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for
errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the regular course of
everyday business of CTTEI. Because of CTTEIs blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall
did in fact transpire. Kees efforts all went to naught.[8]

Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed,
[9]

petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. [10]

At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what
he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was
not Lot 8. Thus, Kees good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kees bad faith, petitioner points to Kees violation of paragraphs
22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a
builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements
on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioners cause of action against
Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases to negate the
presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of Sale on
Installment covering Lot 8 between it and Kee was rescinded long before the present
action was instituted. This has no relevance on the liability of petitioner, as such fact
does not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot to Kee. Such
circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action for unlawful
detainer against Kee.
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot claim that another lot was erroneously
pointed out to him because the latter agreed to the following provision in the Contract
of Sale on Installment, to wit:

13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has
personally examined or inspected the property made subject-matter hereof, as to its location,
contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and from the date hereof whatever
consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the expenses of
the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by him/her. [11]

The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location,
contour and condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the vendee,
having examined the property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder
the expenses resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his
right to recover damages resulting from petitioners negligence. Such waiver would be
contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. [12]
The Second Issue: Petitioners Liability

Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which was
dismissed by the RTC after ruling that there was no evidence from which fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner and CTTEI can be inferred. The Court of Appeals
disagreed and found CTTEI negligent for the erroneous delivery of the lot by
Octaviano, its employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it contends that
the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an act which was clearly outside the scope
of its authority, and consequently, CTTEI alone should be liable. It asserts that while
[CTTEI] was authorized to sell the lot belonging to the herein petitioner, it was never
authorized to deliver the wrong lot to Kee. [13]

Petitioners contention is without merit.


The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within
the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On [14]

the other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the
damage. [15]

CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of
petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it
was, however, negligent. It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioners liability,
as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico and Kee
on July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to
Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following provision:

1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled Jardinico vs. Kee which is now pending appeal with the
Court of Appeals, regardless of the outcome of the decision shall be mutually disregarded
and shall not be pursued by the parties herein and shall be considered dismissed and without
effect whatsoever;[16]

Kee asserts though that the terms and conditions in said deed of sale are strictly
for the parties thereto and that (t)here is no waiver made by either of the parties in
said deed of whatever favorable judgment or award the honorable respondent Court
of Appeals may make in their favor against herein petitioner Pleasantville
Development Corporation and/or private respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. [17]

Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. As we
have earlier stated, petitioners liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent. On
the other hand, what the deed of sale regulates are the reciprocal rights of Kee and
Jardinico; it stressed that they had reached an agreement independent of the outcome
of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:

2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and Pleasantville Development


Corporation are solidarily liable under the following circumstances:

a. If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and, thereafter,


remove these structures, the third-party defendants shall answer for all
demolition expenses and the value of the improvements thus destroyed or
rendered useless;

b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party defendants shall answer
for the amount representing the value of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.[18]

Petitioner contends that if the above holding would be carried out, Kee would be
unjustly enriched at its expense. In other words, Kee would be -able to own the lot, as
buyer, without having to pay anything on it, because the aforequoted portion of
respondent Courts Decision would require petitioner and CTTEI jointly and solidarily
to answer or reimburse Kee there for.
We agree with petitioner.
Petitioners liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence,
the petitioner should be held liable for damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of
damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence
is adduced.However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented
in the trial court; hence no damages could now be awarded.
The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and
owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a slight modification in
the application of such law, on the ground of equity. At any rate, as it stands now, Kee
and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and
obligations with regards to Lot 9. Thus, we delete items 2 (a) and (b) of the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals Decision [as reproduced above] holding petitioner and
CTTEI solidarily liable.

The Third Issue: Attorneys Fees

The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorneys fees and costs in the amount of
P3,000.00 and P700.00, respectively, as prayed for in his complaint. The RTC deleted
the award, consistent with its ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The
Court of Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorneys fees after ruling that
petitioner was liable for its agents negligence.
The award of attorneys fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends
upon the circumstances of each case. We shall not interfere with the discretion of
[19]

the Court of Appeals. Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his
interests and for the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of
petitioners agent. [20]

In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition of the Court of
Appeals that Kee is entitled to the rights granted him under Articles 448, 546
and 548 of the New Civil Code is deleted, in view of the deed of sale entered into by
Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Jardinico and Kee as to
each other. There is also no further need, as ruled by the appellate Court, to remand
the case to the court of origin for determination of the actual value of the
improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity
with Article 448 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith;
(2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Tones Enterprises,
Inc. are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence; however, since the
amount and/or extent of such damages was not proven during the trial, the same cannot
now be quantified and awarded;
(3) Petitioner Pleasantville Develpment Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises,
Inc. are ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorneys fees,
as well as litigation expenses; and
(4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.

SO ORDERED.
HIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may


be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of


Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is
hereby declared valid."[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her


Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson
G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved
[sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51
and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest
and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office,
Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action
consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6,
1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig
(Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang
Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E
and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on,
he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary
Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them
sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always
urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head
of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business.Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their
house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left
the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got
mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for


psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other
hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and
Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must
similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan
were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or
any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume
them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor
medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an
expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering
from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]

Hence, this Petition.[5]

Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination


of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely
on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as
follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition.For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage.It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
HIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA


GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant
case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption, thus:

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence
of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the
grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the
child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,


Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may
use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an
adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent;
(2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the
mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption
is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a
proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future,
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily
the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and
Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he
is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both
of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e.,
whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a
previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume
her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living,
in accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to
use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall
either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

xxx

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of


Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be
added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;

xxx

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which
he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the
child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is
that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive
in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody
calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his
mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that
they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed
Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can
be covered in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa
that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like
the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin
tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name.
What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This
was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted
the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic
Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family
Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact,
it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her
mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It
is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from
her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name
will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The interests
and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the


lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip
the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently
be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the
decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93


ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.
LIM, Present:
MONINA P. LIM, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioner. CARPIO,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.
ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE
P. LIM,
Promulgated:
MONINA P. LIM,
Petitioner. May 21, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision[1] dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed
without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael
Jude P. Lim.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June


1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents
were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it
appear that they were the childrens parents. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when
brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11 days
old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. [4]

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty[5] given
under Republic Act No. 8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of
a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25
years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.[7] Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.[8] Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural
parents were unknown.[10] The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.[11]

The Ruling of the Trial Court


On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied
in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that
petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in
this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption
is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child
acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to
be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since,
at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

We deny the petition.


Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children,
at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter
and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt
in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity
or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;
or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate


son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.[12]

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children ofpetitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such
as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his
own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt


cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.[13] The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.[14] Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.[15]

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age[16] emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life.[17] However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means
of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child
is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory
heirs of each other.[18] Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights[19] of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled[20] such as
support[21] and successional rights.[22]

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person
of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[23] But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:[24]

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position
to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter
is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner
and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October
[1]

21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch
[2]

4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term
of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution of [3]

the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor
at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore.
The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen
[4]

sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the
[5]

City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
[6]

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the
civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case
No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED. [7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense
[8]

in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume


that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez
v. Gmur, which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
[9]

domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu, everyone is
[10]

presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes
a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED. [11]

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that
the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
[12]

before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the
first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia
from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
[13]

jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot
[14]

be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.


Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending
that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of
[15]

law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit. However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts
[16]

original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE


RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE


RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE


RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE
OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. [17]

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon
the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not
be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and
lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage
is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies
upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be
[18]

successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may
[19]

re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account
as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners
contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent,
we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
[20]

(1) the offender has been legally married;


(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency
of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment


of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23,
1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect
the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED. [21]

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a
mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
[22] [23]

CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of
the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of
the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The [24]

records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking
this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married
to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
[25]

likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein
that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one


can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union
is characterized by statutes as void.
[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate
was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of
the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his
guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED
ECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon


Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET
L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA
LIYAO, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision
[1]

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring
William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to
pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William
Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita
Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include
[2]

the allegation that petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." [3]

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:


Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo
for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two
(2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses
in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice
president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She
failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land
located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East
Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited
and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and
hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank
account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly
[4]

amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office,
[5]

introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. [6]

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also
[7]

presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao
while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. During the[8]

occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence
of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I
can still make a good looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
[9]

possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child


of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and
paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos
death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition
fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections,
clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where
he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon
G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions
like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples
residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see
William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was
pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week
in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao.
Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital
during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that
William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery
supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older
children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November 22,
1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told
everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this
is my son, very guapo and healthy. He then talked about his plan for the baptism of
[10]

Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the bells of San
Sebastian Church ring. Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao
[11]

passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped
Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and
gray which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph as well as another shirt of lime
[12] [13]

green as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with the following
[14]

inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William. Maurita remembered having invited the
[15]

couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while
exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still
married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon
legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of
William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other
man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew
that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter
being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout
Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to
see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr.
Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that
she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how
to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong
sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a
rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon
financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon
Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the
house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo,
from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was
about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of
the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of
Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying
Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by his
sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao
carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the
possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San
[16]

Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would
institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San
Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or
for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at
home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble
sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a
strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for
failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he
believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack
which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office
sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in
the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment.
He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her
sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while
her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had
personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr.
Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October
1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt
depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office
unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo.
Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local
Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their [17]

marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia
at the company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went
to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda
added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out
documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again. Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the
[18]

office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did
not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been
shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts
and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. Her father suffered
[19]

two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart
attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected
and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication,
taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for
high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. Tita Rose testified that after the
[20]

death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment
Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they
recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao.
After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come
across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals
for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated
photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the
deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning.
At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took
over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick.
It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao
was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao
suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard
of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the
office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to
massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital
but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-
Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees
of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo
who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of
Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of
Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he
went to the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years,
Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty.
Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation
together with the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he
does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like
shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of


the minor William Liyao, Jr.;

(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita
Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor
William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to
all succesional rights as such; and

(d) Costs of suit.[21]

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr.
since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the
deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt
acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging
petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to
his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that
the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital
intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in
Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The appellate court gave weight
to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and
Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation,
were seen in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited
with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth
certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by
petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any
evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of
Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation.
With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the
appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was
opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos
signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately,
both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner
impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only
[22]

flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption
is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. [23]

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and


consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of
the New Civil Code provides:
[24]

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for
ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the
late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations
with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of Separation, executed and
[25]

signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. [26]

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one
of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil
Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of
[27]
the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs
for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
[28]

such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory. [29]

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as


guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
[30]

present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then
the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption. [31]

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon
Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of
the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth
of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case
at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not
through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can
be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties
and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the
late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his
paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors,


represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE
ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN
DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock,
claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters
estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the
former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on
12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations
and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a
complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that
the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court
denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on,
respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions
before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions
should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared
to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions,
respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate
children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once
petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine, that an
action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and
filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint
of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.[1] It decreed that the declaration of heirship
could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review
on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the
decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does
not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is
inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation
in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the
case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,[3] which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in
a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally
addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter
draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[4] The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required.[5] In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. [6] Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs
acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.[8] This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the
fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible;
or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. [9] Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,[10] and in proper cases Article 171,[11] of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would
no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners,
in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or in exceptional instances the latters heirs,[14] can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child
has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case,
the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an
illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document,
signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children
asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for
them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been the
legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the
decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their
legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally,[15] one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose.[16] Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.[17]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
THIRD DIVISION

FELS ENERGY, INC., G.R. No. 168557


Petitioner,

-versus-

THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS and


THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 170628
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR. and
LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
APPEALS OF BATANGAS, LAURO C.
ANDAYA, in his capacity as the Assessor
of the Province of Batangas, and the Promulgated:
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS represented
by its Provincial Assessor, February 16, 2007
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us are two consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 168557 and G.R. No. 170628,
which were filed by petitioners FELS Energy, Inc. (FELS) and National Power Corporation
(NPC), respectively. The first is a petition for review on certiorariassailing the August 25,
2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 and its
Resolution[2] dated June 20, 2005; the second, also a petition for review on certiorari,
challenges the February 9, 2005 Decision[3] and November 23, 2005 Resolution[4] of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. Both petitions were dismissed on the ground of prescription.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30
MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract,
denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement[5] (Agreement), was for a period of five
years. Article 10 reads:

10.1 RESPONSIBILITY. NAPOCOR shall be responsible for the payment of (a) all taxes, import
duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the National Government of the Republic of the
Philippines or any agency or instrumentality thereof to which POLAR may be or become subject
to or in relation to the performance of their obligations under this agreement (other than (i) taxes
imposed or calculated on the basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its
employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and
charges) and (b) all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of the
Power Barges.[6]

Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to
FELS. The NPC initially opposed the assignment of rights, citing paragraph 17.2 of Article
17 of the Agreement.

On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the


power barges from Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of Batangas City. The assessed
tax, which likewise covered those due for 1994, amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum.
FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to
pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in
any conference regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor.
In a letter[7] dated September 7, 1995, NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial
Assessors decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges. However, the
motion was denied on September 22, 1995, and the Provincial Assessor advised NPC to
pay the assessment.[8] This prompted NPC to file a petition with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA) for the setting aside of the assessment and the declaration of
the barges as non-taxable items; it also prayed that should LBAA find the barges to be
taxable, the Provincial Assessor be directed to make the necessary corrections.[9]

In its Answer to the petition, the Provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real
property for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
Before the case was decided by the LBAA, NPC filed a Manifestation, informing the
LBAA that the Department of Finance (DOF) had rendered an opinion[10] dated May 20,
1996, where it is clearly stated that power barges are not real property subject to real
property assessment.
On August 26, 1996, the LBAA rendered a Resolution[11] denying the petition.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. FELS is hereby ordered to pay the real estate tax in
the amount of P56,184,088.40, for the year 1994.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or
personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes
because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency. The LBAA
also pointed out that the owner of the bargesFELS, a private corporationis the one being
taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC responsible for the payment of all real
estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a privilege can
only be granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that
the petition was filed out of time.

Aggrieved, FELS appealed the LBAAs ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
(CBAA).

On August 28, 1996, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas City issued a Notice of Levy and
Warrant by Distraint[13] over the power barges, seeking to collect real property taxes
amounting to P232,602,125.91 as of July 31, 1996. The notice and warrant was officially
served to FELS on November 8, 1996. It then filed a Motion to Lift Levy dated November
14, 1996, praying that the Provincial Assessor be further restrained by the CBAA from
enforcing the disputed assessment during the pendency of the appeal.
On November 15, 1996, the CBAA issued an Order[14] lifting the levy and distraint on the
properties of FELS in order not to preempt and render ineffectual, nugatory and illusory
any resolution or judgment which the Board would issue.

Meantime, the NPC filed a Motion for Intervention[15] dated August 7, 1998 in the
proceedings before the CBAA. This was approved by the CBAA in an
Order[16] dated September 22, 1998.

During the pendency of the case, both FELS and NPC filed several motions to admit bond
to guarantee the payment of real property taxes assessed by the Provincial Assessor (in
the event that the judgment be unfavorable to them). The bonds were duly approved by
the CBAA.

On April 6, 2000, the CBAA rendered a Decision[17] finding the power barges exempt from
real property tax. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of


the Province of Batangas is hereby reversed. Respondent-appellee Provincial Assessor of
the Province of Batangas is hereby ordered to drop subject property under ARP/Tax Declaration
No. 018-00958 from the List of Taxable Properties in the Assessment Roll. The Provincial Treasurer
of Batangas is hereby directed to act accordingly.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Ruling in favor of FELS and NPC, the CBAA reasoned that the power barges belong to NPC;
since they are actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered
by the exemptions under Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160.[19] As to the other jurisdictional
issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription did not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim
for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No. 7160. The Provincial
Assessor filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by FELS and NPC.

In a complete volte face, the CBAA issued a Resolution[20] on July 31, 2001 reversing
its earlier decision. The fallo of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the resolution of this Board that:

(a) The decision of the Board dated 6 April 2000 is hereby reversed.

(b) The petition of FELS, as well as the intervention of NPC, is dismissed.

(c) The resolution of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Batangas is hereby affirmed,

(d) The real property tax assessment on FELS by the Provincial Assessor of Batangas is
likewise hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[21]

FELS and NPC filed separate motions for reconsideration, which were timely
opposed by the Provincial Assessor. The CBAA denied the said motions in a
Resolution[22] dated October 19, 2001.

Dissatisfied, FELS filed a petition for review before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 67490. Meanwhile, NPC filed a separate petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67491.

On January 17, 2002, NPC filed a Manifestation/Motion for Consolidation in CA-


G.R. SP No. 67490 praying for the consolidation of its petition with CA-G.R. SP No. 67491.
In a Resolution[23] dated February 12, 2002, the appellate court directed NPC to re-file its
motion for consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 67491, since it is the ponente of the latter
petition who should resolve the request for reconsideration.

NPC failed to comply with the aforesaid resolution. On August 25, 2004, the Twelfth
Division of the appellate court rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 denying the
petition on the ground of prescription. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
Resolutions dated July 31, 2001 and October 19, 2001 of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[24]

On September 20, 2004, FELS timely filed a motion for reconsideration seeking the
reversal of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490.

Thereafter, NPC filed a petition for review dated October 19, 2004 before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 165113, assailing the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
67490. The petition was, however, denied in this Courts Resolution[25] of November 8,
2004, for NPCs failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in
the challenged decision. NPC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied
with finality in a Resolution[26] dated January 19, 2005.

Meantime, the appellate court dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. It held that
the right to question the assessment of the Provincial Assessor had already prescribed
upon the failure of FELS to appeal the disputed assessment to the LBAA within the period
prescribed by law. Since FELS had lost the right to question the assessment, the right of
the Provincial Government to collect the tax was already absolute.
NPC filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 8, 2005, seeking reconsideration of
the February 5, 2005 ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. The motion was denied in
a Resolution[27] dated November 23, 2005.

The motion for reconsideration filed by FELS in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 had been earlier
denied for lack of merit in a Resolution[28] dated June 20, 2005.

On August 3, 2005, FELS filed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 168557 before this
Court, raising the following issues:

A.
Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore,
not subject to real property tax.

B.
Assuming that the subject power barges are real properties, whether they are exempt from real
estate tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC).

C.
Assuming arguendo that the subject power barges are subject to real estate tax, whether or not
it should be NPC which should be made to pay the same under the law.

D.
Assuming arguendo that the subject power barges are real properties, whether or not the same
is subject to depreciation just like any other personal properties.

E.
Whether the right of the petitioner to question the patently null and void real property tax
assessment on the petitioners personal properties is imprescriptible.[29]

On January 13, 2006, NPC filed its own petition for review before this Court (G.R.
No. 170628), indicating the following errors committed by the CA:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPEAL TO THE LBAA WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE POWER BARGES ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAXES.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ASSESSMENT ON THE
POWER BARGES WAS NOT MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.[30]
Considering that the factual antecedents of both cases are similar, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two cases in a Resolution[31] dated March 8, 2006.

In an earlier Resolution dated February 1, 2006, the Court had required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda within 30 days from notice. Almost a year passed but
the parties had not submitted their respective memoranda. Considering that taxesthe
lifeblood of our economyare involved in the present controversy, the Court was prompted
to dispense with the said pleadings, with the end view of advancing the interests of justice
and avoiding further delay.

In both petitions, FELS and NPC maintain that the appeal before the LBAA was not time-
barred. FELS argues that when NPC moved to have the assessment reconsidered
on September 7, 1995, the running of the period to file an appeal with the LBAA was
tolled. For its part, NPC posits that the 60-day period for appealing to the LBAA should be
reckoned from its receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners contentions are bereft of merit.

Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, provides:

SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Any owner or person having legal
interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal
assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or
city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of
the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.

We note that the notice of assessment which the Provincial Assessor sent to FELS
on August 7, 1995, contained the following statement:

If you are not satisfied with this assessment, you may, within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt hereof, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province by filing a petition
under oath on the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of ARP/Tax Declaration
and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.[32]

Instead of appealing to the Board of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice),
NPC opted to file a motion for reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision, a
remedy not sanctioned by law.
The remedy of appeal to the LBAA is available from an adverse ruling or action of
the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of the property. It follows then
that the determination made by the respondent Provincial Assessor with regard to the
taxability of the subject real properties falls within its power to assess properties for
taxation purposes subject to appeal before the LBAA.[33]

We fully agree with the rationalization of the CA in both CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. The two divisions of the appellate court cited the case of Callanta
v. Office of the Ombudsman,[34] where we ruled that under Section 226 of R.A. No
7160,[35] the last action of the local assessor on a particular assessment shall be the notice
of assessment; it is this last action which gives the owner of the property the right to
appeal to the LBAA. The procedure likewise does not permit the property owner the
remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor. The pertinent
holding of the Court in Callanta is as follows:

x x x [T]he same Code is equally clear that the aggrieved owners should have brought their
appeals before the LBAA. Unfortunately, despite the advice to this effect contained in their
respective notices of assessment, the owners chose to bring their requests for a
review/readjustment before the city assessor, a remedy not sanctioned by the law. To allow this
procedure would indeed invite corruption in the system of appraisal and assessment. It
conveniently courts a graft-prone situation where values of real property may be initially set
unreasonably high, and then subsequently reduced upon the request of a property owner. In the
latter instance, allusions of a possible covert, illicit trade-off cannot be avoided, and in fact can
conveniently take place. Such occasion for mischief must be prevented and excised from our
system.[36]

For its part, the appellate court declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491:

x x x. The Court announces: Henceforth, whenever the local assessor sends a notice to the
owner or lawful possessor of real property of its revised assessed value, the former shall no longer
have any jurisdiction to entertain any request for a review or readjustment. The appropriate forum
where the aggrieved party may bring his appeal is the LBAA as provided by law. It follows
ineluctably that the 60-day period for making the appeal to the LBAA runs without interruption.
This is what We held in SP 67490 and reaffirm today in SP 67491.[37]

To reiterate, if the taxpayer fails to appeal in due course, the right of


the local government to collect the taxes due with respect to the taxpayers property
becomes absolute upon the expiration of the period to appeal. [38] It also bears stressing
that the taxpayers failure to question the assessment in the LBAA renders the assessment
of the local assessor final, executory and demandable, thus, precluding the taxpayer from
questioning the correctness of the assessment, or from invoking any defense that would
reopen the question of its liability on the merits.[39]
In fine, the LBAA acted correctly when it dismissed the petitioners appeal for having
been filed out of time; the CBAA and the appellate court were likewise correct in affirming
the dismissal. Elementary is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period
therefor is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure in this regard renders the
decision final and executory.[40]

In the Comment filed by the Provincial Assessor, it is asserted that the instant
petition is barred by res judicata; that the final and executory judgment in G.R. No.
165113 (where there was a final determination on the issue of prescription), effectively
precludes the claims herein; and that the filing of the instant petition after an adverse
judgment in G.R. No. 165113 constitutes forum shopping.

FELS maintains that the argument of the Provincial Assessor is completely


misplaced since it was not a party to the erroneous petition which the NPC filed in G.R.
No. 165113. It avers that it did not participate in the aforesaid proceeding, and the
Supreme Court never acquired jurisdiction over it. As to the issue of forum shopping,
petitioner claims that no forum shopping could have been committed since the elements
of litis pendentia or res judicata are not present.

We do not agree.

Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded


upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policy
and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship
on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari et eadem
causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.[41] As we ruled
in Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals:[42]

x x x An existing final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits,


without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a
matter within its authority is conclusive on the rights of the parties and their
privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in
issue in the first suit.

xxx

Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same
parties or their privies to litigate anew a question once it has been considered and decided with
finality. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party
should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by
the same parties.

This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements:
(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require absolute identity of
parties but merely substantial identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when
there is community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in
the second case even if the first case did not implead the latter.[43]

To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any
proceeding regarding real property assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its
petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 165113, it did so not only on its behalf but also
on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the earlier petition for review filed
in this Court was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490, in which
FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner
FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially
identical parties as to warrant the application of res judicata. FELSs argument that it is not
bound by the erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.

On the issue of forum shopping, we rule for the Provincial Assessor. Forum
shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks
another and possibly favorable judgment in another forum other than by appeal or special
civil action or certiorari. There is also forum shopping when a party institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition.[44]

Petitioner FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since the elements of res
judicata are not present in the cases at bar; however, as already discussed, res
judicata may be properly applied herein. Petitioners engaged in forum shopping when
they filed G.R. Nos. 168557 and 170628 after the petition for review in G.R. No. 165116.
Indeed, petitioners went from one court to another trying to get a favorable decision from
one of the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases.

It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence of forum


shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of
similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.[45] The rationale against forum
shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon
orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of
the courts.[46]

Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[47]

Having found that the elements of res judicata and forum shopping are present in
the consolidated cases, a discussion of the other issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless,
for the peace and contentment of petitioners, we shall shed light on the merits of the case.

As found by the appellate court, the CBAA and LBAA power barges are real
property and are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable conclusion,
considering that G.R. No. 165113 was dismissed for failure to sufficiently show any
reversible error. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good
faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise.[48] Besides, factual
findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are generally
binding and conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the sensible
exercise of the judgment of men especially trained in appraising property. Where the
judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed. [49] We
find no reason to depart from this rule in this case.

In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v. The City of New York,
et al.,[50] a power company brought an action to review property tax assessment. On the
citys motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New
York held that the barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants designated to
generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges which supplied fuel oil to the power plant
barges, and the accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to real property
taxation.

Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that [d]ocks and structures
which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place
on a river, lake, or coast are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are
categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and
other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry
or work.[51]

Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are exempt from real estate
tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 because they are actually, directly and
exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlled corporation
engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric power.

We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable
properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is the entity being taxed by the local
government. As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:

OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and
all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the
Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage
and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into
electricity.[52]

It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by
invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160, which reads:

SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax:

xxx

(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used
by local water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged
in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of
electric power; x x x

Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively
used by the government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS
still cannot find solace in this provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement
provides:

OPERATION. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, subject
to the supply of the necessary Fuel pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions
hereof, it will operate the Power Barges to convert such Fuel into electricity in
accordance with Part A of Article 7.[53]

It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law between
the parties. Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
the parties to the contract are bound by its terms and conditions.[54]
Time and again, the Supreme Court has stated that taxation is the rule and exemption
is the exception.[55] The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and the entity that
would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted.[56] Thus, applying the rule of strict construction of laws
granting tax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of provincial
corporations, we hold that FELS is considered a taxable entity.

The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1 of the Agreement, that
it shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not
justify the exemption. The privilege granted to petitioner NPC cannot be extended to FELS.
The covenant is between FELS and NPC and does not bind a third person not privy thereto,
in this case, the Province of Batangas.

It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous litigation has seriously
resulted in the local governments deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident
of sovereignty and is unlimited in its magnitude, acknowledging in its very nature no
perimeter so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay for it.[57] The right of
local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe tax
erosion. This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy
of local governments[58] and the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the
attainment of national goals.[59]

In conclusion, we reiterate that the power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise
the needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units
for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.[60]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and
Resolutions AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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