Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability For Battalion-And-Below Operations

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
This PDF is available at http://nap.edu/24747 SHARE

   
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for

Battalion-and-Below Operations: Abbreviated Version of a
Restricted Report
DETAILS
48 pages | 8.5 x 11 | PAPERBACK

ISBN 978-0-309-45813-9 | DOI 10.17226/24747
CONTRIBUTORS
GET THIS BOOK Committee on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for
Battalion-and-Below Operations; Board on Army Science and Technology; Division
on Engineering and Physical Sciences; National Academies of Sciences,
FIND RELATED TITLES Engineering, and Medicine

Visit the National Academies Press at NAP.edu and login or register to get:
– Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of scientiﬁc reports

– 10% off the price of print titles
– Email or social media notiﬁcations of new titles related to your interests
– Special offers and discounts

Distribution, posting, or copying of this PDF is strictly prohibited without written permission of the National Academies Press.
(Request Permission) Unless otherwise indicated, all materials in this PDF are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for Battalion-and-Below Operations: Abbreviated Version of a Restricted Report
Cou
unter--Unma anned Aircraaft Sysstem ((CUASS)
Capability
y for Battalio
B on-and
d-Beloow Opperatioons
Abb
breviated
d Versio
on of a R
Restricteed Repoort
Com
mmittee on Co nned Aircraft System (CUA
ounter-Unman AS) Capabilitty for Battalioon-and-Below
w
Operations
O
Board on Army Science and Technology
Division on Engineeering and Phy

hysical Sciencces
A Consensuus Study Reeport of
PRE
EPUBLICAT
TION DRAFT—SUBJEC
CT TO FURT
THER EDIT
TORIAL COR
RRECTION
N
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

C o u n t e r - U n m a n n e d A i r c r a f t S y s t e m ( C U
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001
This activity was supported by Contract No. W911NF-13-D-0002-0002 with the U.S. Department of
Defense. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not
necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/24747
Additional copies for this publication are available for sale from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth
Street, NW, Keck 360, Washington, DC 20001; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313; http://www.nap.edu.
Copyright 2018 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2018. Counter-
Unmanned Aircraft System [CUAS) Capability for Battalion-and-Below Operations: Abbreviated Version
of a Restricted Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24747.
PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION
C o p y r i g h t N a t i o n a l A c a d e m
The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 by an Act of Congress, signed by
President Lincoln, as a private, nongovernmental institution to advise the nation on issues
related to science and technology. Members are elected by their peers for outstanding
contributions to research. Dr. Marcia McNutt is president.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964 under the charter of the
National Academy of Sciences to bring the practices of engineering to advising the nation.
Members are elected by their peers for extraordinary contributions to engineering. Dr. C. D.
Mote, Jr., is president.
The National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine) was established in
1970 under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to advise the nation on medical
and health issues. Members are elected by their peers for distinguished contributions to
medicine and health. Dr. Victor J. Dzau is president.
The three Academies work together as the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine to provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation and
conduct other activities to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions. The
National Academies also encourage education and research, recognize outstanding
contributions to knowledge, and increase public understanding in matters of science,
engineering, and medicine.
Learn more about the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine at
www.nationalacademies.org.

Consensus Study Reports published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine document the evidence-based consensus on the study’s statement of task by an
authoring committee of experts. Reports typically include findings, conclusions, and
recommendations based on information gathered by the committee and the committee’s
deliberations. Each report has been subjected to a rigorous and independent peer-review
process and it represents the position of the National Academies on the statement of task.
Proceedings published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and

Medicine chronicle the presentations and discussions at a workshop, symposium, or
other event convened by the National Academies. The statements and opinions contained in
proceedings are those of the participants and are not endorsed by other participants, the
planning committee, or the National Academies.
For information about other products and activities of the National Academies, please
visit www.nationalacademies.org/about/whatwedo.

COMMITTEE ON COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (CUAS) CAPABILITY FOR

BATTALION-AND-BELOW OPERATIONS
ALBERT A. SCIARRETTA, (LTC, U.S. Army, retired), CNS Technologies, Inc., Springfield, Virginia,
Chair
JULIE A. ADAMS, Oregon State University, Corvallis
FREDERICK R. CHANG, NAE,1 Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
JAMES A. FREEBERSYSER, BBN Technology, St. Louis Park, Minnesota
J. SEAN HUMBERT, University of Colorado, Boulder
PAUL KOLODZY, Kolodzy Consulting LLC, Falls Church, Virginia
VIJAY KUMAR, NAE, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia2
TERRY P. LEWIS, Independent Consultant, Lomita, California
TODD MURPHEY, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
GABRIEL REBEIZ, NAE, University of California, San Diego3
MICHAEL A. VANE (LTG, U.S. Army, retired), Independent Consultant, Shaver Lake, California
Staff
BRUCE BRAUN, Director, Board on Army Science and Technology

JAMES C. MYSKA, Study Director
NIA P. JOHNSON, Senior Research Associate
DEANNA SPARGER, Program Administrative Coordinator
1
Member, National Academy of Engineering.
2
Resigned April 15, 2017. Due to circumstances beyond his control, he was unable to participate in the
report drafting and concurrence process.
3
Resigned April 10, 2017. Due to circumstances beyond his control, he was unable to participate in the
report drafting and concurrence process.

v

BOARD ON ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DAVID M. MADDOX, NAE,1 (GEN, U.S. Army, retired), Independent Consultant, Arlington, Virginia,
Chair
SCOTT BADENOCH, Badenoch, LLC, Southfield, Michigan
STEVEN W. BOUTELLE (LTG U.S. Army, retired), Independent Consultant, Arlington, Virginia
CARL A. CASTRO, Center for Innovation and Research and Military Families, University of Southern
California, Los Angeles
DAVID E. CROW, NAE, University of Connecticut, Glastonbury
REGINALD DESROCHES, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
FRANCIS J. DOYLE III, NAM,2 Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
JULIA D. ERDLEY, Pennsylvania State University, State College
LESTER A. FOSTER III, Electronic Warfare Associates, Herndon, Virginia
JAMES A. FREEBERSYSER, BBN Technology, St. Louis Park, Minnesota
PETER N. FULLER (MG, U.S. Army, retired), Cypress International, Springfield, Virginia
R. JOHN HANSMAN, NAE, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
J. SEAN HUMBERT, University of Colorado, Boulder
JOHN W. HUTCHINSON, NAS3/NAE, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
JENNIE HWANG, NAE, H-Technologies Group, Cleveland, Ohio
JOHN JOANNOPOULOS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
ERIC T. MATSON, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
ROGER L. McCARTHY, NAE, McCarthy Engineering, Palo Alto, California
MICHAEL McGRATH, McGrath Analytics, LLC, Reston, Virginia
ALLAN T. MENSE, Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona
WALTER F. MORRISON, Booz, Allen and Hamilton (retired), Alexandria, Virginia
DANIEL PODOLSKY, NAE, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas
KENNETH M. ROSEN, NAE, General Aero-Science Consultants, LLC, Guilford, Connecticut
ALBERT A. SCIARRETTA (LTC, U.S. Army, retired), CNS Technologies, Inc., Springfield, Virginia
NEIL SIEGEL, NAE, North Grumman Information Systems, Carson, California
MICHAEL A. VANE (LTG, U.S. Army, retired), Independent Consultant, Shaver Lake, California
Staff
BRUCE A. BRAUN, Director

CHRIS JONES, Financial Manager
DEANNA P. SPARGER, Program Administrative Coordinator
1
2
Member, National Academy of Medicine.
3
Member, National Academy of Sciences.

vi

Preface
At the request of the Army Research Office, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine appointed an expert committee to assess the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System
(CUAS) capability for battalion-and-below. The Department of the Army has determined that the final
report prepared by the Committee on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for
Battalion-and-Below Operations is restricted in its entirety under exemption 1 of the Freedom of
Information Act (5 USC § 552 (b) (1)) and therefore cannot be made available to the public. This
abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared
it.
Copies of the report will be made available to authorized individuals in the government from the
National Academies’ Board on Army Science and Technology (BAST). Other requests for the report
should be submitted to the Department of the Army.
This study resulted from the recognition by the U.S. Army that a confluence of multiple
developments was contributing to an emerging major threat from small unmanned aircraft systems
(sUASs), particularly to dismounted infantry and lightly armored vehicles. First, the worldwide
availability of relatively inexpensive and significantly advanced sUASs, especially small hobby aircraft,
has created opportunities for potential adversaries to easily acquire sUASs with impressive and rapidly
growing capabilities. Second, these readily available, high-performance sUASs pose a significant
potential threat to U.S. forces as lethal weapon systems (carrying conventional or unconventional
payloads); reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition systems; and electronic warfare systems.
Third, the space, weight, and power (SWaP) needs for most developed or developing counter-sUAS
systems make them more appropriate for use on medium and heavy vehicle platforms or for static
emplacement in the defense of fixed sites. Almost none of the current counter-sUAS systems fit within
the available SWaP of a dismounted infantry unit. Without low SWaP counter-sUAS systems,
dismounted infantry and lightly armored vehicles are vulnerable to threat sUASs and will remain so for
the near term. Adding to the problem is the fact that dedicated air defense units for brigade combat teams
were withdrawn from the Army inventory in the 2000s after a determination was made that no significant
air threat existed to maneuver battalions and lower-echelon units due to the demise of the Soviet Union.
I would like to thank the committee for its expertise, dedication, and tenacity; especially in
interacting with numerous experts (including 12 U.S. Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel),
assessing the pertinent issues, and addressing the many demands of its statement of task from the Army
sponsor (see the Summary). The committee, in turn, is grateful to the many U.S. Army, U.S. Marine
Corps, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security personnel, both military and
civilian, who provided much of the information on which this report is based. We also thank Adam
Lisberg, DJI corporate communications director, DJI North America, and engineers from the DJI
Corporation for their assessment of future commercial sUAS capabilities; and David Rambling, author
of Swarm Troopers: How Small Drones Will Conquer the World, for his thoughts on the emergence
and potential military uses of swarms of sUASs. We especially want to thank the 12 U.S. Marine Corps
officers and enlisted members of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, who discussed their experiences and
lessons learned from counter-sUAS experiments held at the training areas at 29 Palms Marine Corps
Base and surrounding areas. These Marines provided insightful information, providing the committee
with a very thought-provoking user perspective.
The committee and I very much appreciate the expertise and outstanding assistance of Vijay

vii

Kumar, member of the National Academy of Engineering and dean at the School of Engineering at the
University of Pennsylvania, for his technical contributions in areas of bio-inspired algorithms for
collective behaviors, robot swarms, and especially in collaborative and swarming robotic operations.
The committee and I also appreciate the assistance of Gabriel Rebeiz, also a member of the National
Academy of Engineering and Distinguished Professor at the University of California, San Diego, for his
technical contributions in areas of sensing and communications systems. Both Dr. Kumar and Dr.
Rebeiz were part of the original committee membership but, due to circumstances beyond their control,
were unable to participate in the report drafting and concurrence process.
Undeniably, the committee and I greatly appreciate the support and assistance of the staff of the
National Academies, which ably assisted the committee in its fact-finding activities and in the
production of this report. In particular, I thank the staff that supports the National Academies’ BAST,
especially James Myska for his programmatic support and sage advice as study director. Deanna
Sparger for outstanding support in coordinating meeting logistics for committee members and guests at
major meetings in multiple locations, and Nia Johnson for running down information, organizing the
study fact-finding library, and assisting in the development of this report. The staff of both the BAST
and the National Academies Office of Program Security is to be commended for providing an
environment conducive for committee members to accumulate relevant information, generate and
collaborate on report content, share expertise, and develop a consensus for the report we present here.
This study was conducted under the auspices of the BAST, a unit of the National Academies’
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, established in 1982 at the request of the Army. The
BAST brings broad military, industrial, and academic scientific, technological, engineering, and
management expertise to bear on technical challenges of importance to senior Army leaders. The BAST
does not conduct studies; rather, it deliberates on study concepts and statements of task for the expert
committees, such as ours, that are formed under rigorous National Academies procedures to conduct a
particular study. The BAST discusses potential study topics and tasks, ensures study project planning
and execution in conformance with National Academies procedures, and suggests candidate experts to
serve as committee members or report reviewers.
Although the BAST members are listed in the front matter of the report, with the exception of
four members who were nominated and appointed to the study committee, they were not asked to
endorse the committee’s findings or recommendations or to review final drafts of the report before its
release. The findings and recommendations are those reached by unanimous consensus of the
committee.
Albert A. Sciarretta, Chair

Committee on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System
(CUAS) Capability for Battalion- and-Below
Operations

viii

Acknowledgment of Reviewers
This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and
critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in
making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards
for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and
draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Jonathan Alt, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, Naval Postgraduate
School,
James Bonomo, RAND Corporation,
Ruth David, NAE,1 ANSER (retired),
Antonio Elias, NAE, Orbital ATK, Inc.,
COL Ricardo Morales, U.S. Army, United States Military Academy at West Point,
CAPT Brian Morgan, U.S. Navy, Naval Postgraduate School, and
Michael Perschbacher, RonovoTech.
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions,
they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this report nor did they see the
final draft before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Dr. Stephen Robinson,
University of Wisconsin, Madison. He was responsible for making certain that an independent
examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies
and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests
entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.
1

ix


Contents
SUMMARY 1
DISCUSSION OF SELECTED TOPICS FROM THE RESTRICTED REPORT 3

Study Origins, 3
Concern about Commercial sUASs, 3
The Potential Threat, 5
Concern about the Emergence of Swarms and Collaborative Groups, 6
Battalion-and-Below Operations, 7
Battalion-and-Below Formations and Assets Considered as Potential Targets for
This Study, 7
Study Applicability Beyond the Army, 7
Timeframe Taxonomy, 8
The Challenges for Countering sUASs, 9
Decomposition of sUAS Technologies and Capabilities, 9
Definitions, 9
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 10
Modes of sUAS Utilization, 11
U.S. Army versus Committee Definitions for Groups of sUASs, 14
Levels of Customization, 14
Counter-sUAS, 15
Study Approach, 16
Organization and Scope of Restricted Report, 16
References, 17
APPENDIXES
A Committee Activities 23
B Biographical Sketches of Committee Members 27
C Additional Definitions 31
D Decomposition of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems 33

xi


Summary
The development of inexpensive small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technologies and
the growing desire of hobbyists to have more and more capability have created a sustained sUAS
industry. The Committee on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for Battalion-
and-Below Operations has found that these capabilities are directly enabling the ability of adversaries
to threaten U.S. interests. In response to these threats, the U.S. Army and other Department of
Defense (DoD) organizations have invested significantly in counter-sUAS technologies, often
focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions by sUASs and/or their operators, and jamming
the radio frequency command and control links and Global Positioning System signals of individual
sUASs. However, today’s consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio
frequency command and control links by using automated target recognition and tracking, obstacle
avoidance, and other software-enabled capabilities. Moreover, the committee believes that current and
near-term (by 2025) capabilities will enable the employment of multiple sUASs in coordinated
groups, swarms, and collaborative groups. Collaborative swarms will evolve beyond 2025. These
groupings, defined in the “Definitions” section below, will include tens to hundreds of sUASs.
The U.S. Army tasked the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to
conduct a study to address the above concerns. In particular, the committee was asked to assess the
sUAS threat, particularly when massed and collaborating; assess current capabilities of battalion-and-
below infantry units to counter sUASs; identify counter-sUAS technologies appropriate for near-
term, mid-term, and far-term science and technology investment; consider human factors and
logistics; and determine if the Department of Homeland Security could benefit from DoD efforts. The
complete statement of task from the sponsor is in Box 1.
The committee recognizes that the Army and other DoD organizations are engaged in a
significant number of very relevant and often highly successful materiel and non-materiel (e.g., tactics
and training) efforts to address the single-sUAS threat. The committee thus did not see a need to discuss
these efforts in detail in a report that is focused on science and technology efforts. This report is mostly
focused on the future threat of coordinated groups, swarms, collaborative groups, and collaborative
swarms because (1) the committee anticipates these threats will appear much earlier than does the Army
and, (2) the sponsor, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology),
asked that the committee focus on collaborative groups, as explained in “Study Origins,” below.
In addressing this task, the committee quickly determined that the U.S. Army’s timeframes of
near-term (today-2025, the Current Force), mid-term (2026-2035, the Interim Force), and far-term
(2036-2050, the Future Force) are inadequate to address the sUAS threat. The U.S. Army’s force
capability timeframe is too drawn out to address the rapid advancements in sUAS performance
capabilities and anticipated threat uses. This is because potential adversaries are improving their sUAS
capabilities on commercial and consumer developmental timelines. Thus, the committee proposes that
the timeframe for sUAS and counter-sUAS activities should be more like immediate (today-2019, 1-2
years), imminent (2020-2022, 3-5 years), and emerging (2023-2025, 6-8 years). The committee used this

1

shorter timeframe to address the statement of task. It is important to note that the committee believes that
it is practically impossible to make reliable predictions of sUAS capabilities more than 8 years into the
future—so rapid are the changes.
The committee found that the statement of task was very relevant to U.S. military forces and of
extremely high importance.
BOX 1 Statement of Task
Assess how much of a threat, both kinetic and non-kinetic, model aircraft and other small unmanned aircraft
systems (sUASs), particularly when massed and collaborating, pose to U.S. Army battalion-and-below operations,
and especially to lightly armored vehicles and dismounted infantry. Building on recent Department of Defense
(DoD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts (e.g., efforts by the U.S. Army Science and Technology
(S&T) Systems Adaptive Red Team (ART) and Technical Support and Analysis (TSOA) groups), the committee
will consider the availability and capabilities of these sUASs (and particularly when massed and operating
collaboratively) and their potential for use in both weaponized and surveillance modes. In particular, the committee
will assess future improvements in areas such as power, control mechanisms, autonomous flight, communications
links, collaboration, flight performance, and payloads and their impacts on future threat capabilities, and will depict
these sUAS capabilities in a high-level (macro-scale) roadmap.
Assess the current capability of U.S. Army battalion-and-below units and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) infantry
units to counter sUASs with existing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); equipment; and unit organization.
Identify technological, tactical, and organizational approaches for optimizing battalion-and-below units, especially
lightly armored vehicles and dismounted infantry, to counter sUASs on the battlefield, including when operating as
a multiple, collaborative sUAS system. For countermeasure systems, consider detection and tracking capabilities as
well as kinetic, directed energy, and non-kinetic (e.g., electronic warfare (EW) and cyber) approaches. Consider the
fact that very little time will be available for warfighters to react to threat sUAS actions. Expand on TTP and
organizational needs.
Building on current U.S. Army S&T efforts, identify near-term, mid-term, and far-term technologies
appropriate for new or enhanced S&T investments to facilitate the development of technological approaches for
countering threat sUASs, particularly massed and operating collaboratively, used in both weaponized and
surveillance modes. The committee will examine potential creative solutions, including neutralizing command and
control nodes, and will describe the characteristics needed in a counter-sUAS system. The committee will depict
these near-term, mid-term, and far-term technologies and capability characteristics in a high-level (macro-scale)
roadmap. While doing this, the committee will continually monitor and remain cognizant of on-going DoD/DHS
counter-sUAS experiments (e.g., Maneuver Fires Integration Experiment (MFIX) and ART/TSOA efforts) and their
findings.
Building on ART logistics and usability assessments, consider human burdens (e.g., perceptual, physical, and
cognitive) and logistics burdens (e.g., transport, resupply, and power) from two perspectives. First, determine the
human and logistics burdens of potential counter-sUAS systems on U.S. personnel and make recommendations (e.g.,
tactical, organizational, and materiel) for mitigating these burdens. Second, identify the potential for exploiting
human and logistics burdens as a threat vulnerability.
Determine if there are DHS-unique requirements for counter-sUAS systems and how the DoD may be able to
assist in addressing those requirements.

2

Discussion of Selected Topics from the Restricted Report
The Committee on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for Battalion-and-

Below Operations recognizes that the U.S. Army and other Department of Defense (DoD) organizations
are engaged in a significant number of very relevant and often highly successful materiel and non-
materiel (e.g., tactics and training) efforts to address the single-small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)
threat. The committee thus did not see a need to discuss these efforts in detail in a report that is focused
on science and technology efforts. Some specific areas of concern (e.g., the inability of a dismounted
infantry unit to detect and engage a surveillance UAS at a distance of a kilometer or more) relate to
single sUASs but are also of concern for large groups of sUASs. However, this report is mostly focused
on the future threat of coordinated groups, swarms, collaborative groups, and collaborative swarms,
defined later in this report, because (1) the committee anticipates these threats will appear much earlier
than does the Army, (2) few development efforts appear to be focused on countering these threats, and
(3) the sponsor, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), asked
that the committee focus on collaborative groups, as discussed below in “Study Origins.”
STUDY ORIGINS
Concern about Commercial sUASs
The development of the statement of task began in January 2016. At that time, concerns about
the adversarial use of commercial sUASs was emerging. Since then, a significant number of media
reports have discussed both state and non-state actor development and use of sUASs for military
operations. These activities figured prominently in committee deliberations, and some are discussed in
subsequent chapters.
This study’s origins were based on concerns due to the confluence of multiple developments.
First, the worldwide availability of relatively inexpensive and significantly advanced sUASs, especially
small hobby aircraft, created opportunities for potential adversaries to easily acquire sUASs with
impressive and rapidly growing capabilities. Second, these readily available, high-performance sUASs
pose a significant potential threat to U.S. forces as lethal weapon systems; reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RSTA) systems; and electronic warfare systems (especially as low-power
jammers). Lethal sUASs can carry either conventional (kinetic or non-kinetic payloads) or
unconventional (chemical, biological, and radiological) payloads. Third, the size, weight, and power
(SWaP) needs for most developed or developing counter-sUAS systems make them more appropriate
for use on medium and heavy vehicle platforms or for static emplacement in the defense of fixed sites.
Nearly all of the current counter-sUAS systems do not fit within the available SWaP of an infantry unit.
After discussing these concerns with senior leaders within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command Headquarters, and three of its subordinate organizations, the Fires Center of Excellence

3

(COE), Maneuver COE, and Cyber COE, it was agreed that a study should go forward and that it
should focus not just on dismounted infantry, but also lightly armored vehicles in battalion-and-below
operations. These latter two points are particularly important because dedicated air defense units within
brigade combat teams were withdrawn from Army inventory in the early 2000s after a determination
was made that no significant air threat existed to maneuver battalions and lower-echelon units due to
the demise of the Soviet Union.
The commercial market for small hobby aircraft has increased dramatically over the past 3
years. Venture capital firm Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers has estimated that global sUAS
shipments reached about 4.3 million units in 2015, up from 1.6 million units in 2014. About 35 percent
of those sales were in the United States (Bedard, 2015). Within the United States, the number of sUASs
sold from April 2015 to April 2016 grew 224 percent. More disturbing is that Chinese manufacturer
DJI accounts for 50 percent of the sUAS sales in North America, while 3D Robotics (American) and
Yuneec (also Chinese) trail with 7 percent and 4 percent of the market share, respectively (French,
2016). This surge in sales motivates manufacturers of hobby sUASs to make substantial investments
into improvements in sUAS capabilities such as increased payload capacity, advanced aerodynamic
performance, autonomous navigation, advanced avionics, and the use of smartphone and/or tablet
systems as operator control stations. Many of these advances are developed by non-U.S. companies and
personnel. As an example, the DJI Phantom 4 has enhanced flight modes that use Global Positioning
System (GPS) Waypoints (i.e., it flies along operator-selected GPS points), Home Lock (i.e., the user
identifies a GPS-set position as “home” to which the Phantom 4 returns when it has problems), and
Point of Interest (i.e., the sUAS flies in circles around an object or location).1 The flight modes include
the following capabilities:
 Obstacle avoidance. Avoid obstacles, using an array of ultrasonic rangefinders (aiming left,
right, forward, backward, and down), vision sensing (visual cameras integrated with
computer vision algorithms), and onboard processors. This mode does not require GPS.
 Tapfly. Tap on a point in the video image (from the Phantom 4’ s camera) on the control
screen (e.g., a smartphone) and the Phantom 4 will fly there.
 Follow me. The Phantom 4 is linked to a mobile device. Both must have strong GPS signals.
The Phantom 4 will follow a person, similar to the skier in Figure 1.
 Active track. Track subjects automatically (without using a GPS reference) by using
advanced image recognition algorithms. The user can also use it to effortlessly orbit around
subjects.
 Sport mode. The Phantom 4 can increase speed to 20 m/s and ascend or descend at
speeds of 9 m/s and 4 m/s, respectively.
In addition, flight time is also improving. Previous batteries lasted for approximately 15 min in
regular flight mode, but with its 5,230 mAh battery, the Phantom 4 can operate a little under a half hour
in regular flying mode. Additionally, prices have fallen just as dramatically as sales have risen.
The bottom line is that consumer sUASs are easy to buy, their performance is improving
dramatically, their cost has dropped significantly, and there are millions of them around the world.
Thus, they pose a significant and growing threat to U.S. warfighting forces when used for nefarious
means rather than as intended.
1
A description of Phantom 4 capabilities, https://www.dji.com/phantom-4/info.

4

FIGURE 1 Ex
xample of the “follow me” capability onn the DJI Phan
antom 4.
otential Threeat
The Po
With
W creative thinking
t and engineering,
e at which currrent and potenntial adversarries have provven
adept, hob bby sUASs caan be used to pose a signifficant threat too U.S. warfighters, especiaally lightly
armored vehicles
v and dismounted
d in
nfantry in the U.S. Army, U U.S. Marine C Corps (USMC C), and Special
Operation ns Forces. Tod day, U.S. miliitary personnel have to be concerned abbout the use oof sUASs by
state (e.g., peer nationss) and non-staate (e.g., Islam
mic State in Irraq and Syriaa [ISIS]) actorrs (Watson,
2017). Ass documented d in various neew stories, theey may also ppose a threat tto U.S. Navy ships and
submarinees while in po ort and U.S. Air
A Force plan nes on airfieldds and duringg take-off and landing.
sUUASs can be used to suppo ort convention nal and unconnventional atttacks. sUASss can be fittedd
with an ex xternal or emb bedded explo osive designed d to explode oon impact or w when handledd. As an
example of o this latter case,
c on Octob ber 2, 2016, tw wo Kurdish ssoldiers were killed and tw wo French
soldiers were
w wounded d near Mosul, Iraq, when an ISIS boobyy-trapped fixeed-wing sUAS S exploded
(Atherton n, 2016). Conttrary to the paast, when U.S S. warfighters may have fouund improvissed explosive
devices, now
n the impro ovised explossive devices will
w find our w warfighters. T
There have alsso been reportts
of sUASs with attached d small arms (e.g., pistols)) and even flaamethrowers. Because of w weight and
velocity, a sUAS itselff can generatee enough kinetic energy to cause significcant damage when it crashhes
into a warrfighter or sofft target. sUA
ASs can also be b equipped w with external ppayloads that can be used tto
2
drop explosives, as thee ISIS has don ne in Syria annd Iraq or, in an unconvenntional attack mode, for
disseminaating biological or chemicaal agents from m an altitude tthat minimizees detection annd direct
engagemeent while max ximizing conttamination an nd kill ratios.
In
n addition to the
t above kin netic kill appliications, sUAASs can be useed by the enem my for RSTA A
operationss, for jammin ng radio frequuency signals, and for suppporting inform mation operatiions. As an
example of o the RSTA use u of sUASss, the Russian ns have emplooyed as manyy as 16 differeent types of
UASs in Ukraine
U (Tuck ker, 2015). Th hey flew sUA ASs in pairs anand used them m with great efffect to targett
Ukrainian n units. The sU UASs first fouund Ukrainian units, then operators passsed the inform mation to
multiple indirect fire sy ystems (howitzers, missiles, and rocketss), which deliivered massedd fires for 3 m min.
From beginning to end d, the process took about 15 5 min (Freedbberg, 2015). T This approachh has resultedd in
Ukrainian n casualty ratees as high as 85
8 percent (K Karber, 2015).. Discussions of the threat of sUASs,
especiallyy hobbyist sUASs, have beeen reported in n an online WWired article ((Barrett, 20166) and in a repport
(Remote Control
C Projeect, 2016) by Open
O Briefingg, a nonprofitt think tank inn the United K
Kingdom.
sUASs caan be fitted wiith low-powerr jammers to support locallized jammingg missions. A An example off
sUASs in an informatio on operationss mission is thhe employmennt of a swarm m of sUASs too form the flag
2
ISIS weaponized drone
d usage, htttps://www.you
utube.com/watcch?v=7X20RS
SIPJ10.
PRE
EPUBLICAT
TION DRAFT—SUBJEC
CT TO FURT
THER EDIT
TORIAL COR
RRECTION
N
5

of a terrorist organization above a village or town.

Recently marketed sUASs have technological enhancements (e.g., obstacle avoidance and
target-following technologies) that support autonomous flying with no need for a control link or access
to GPS. These autonomously guided sUASs can overcome counter-sUAS systems based on jamming
radio frequency and GPS signals. The threat these capabilities pose are not looming in the future; they
are here today. Commercially available, small, autonomously guided aircraft components and systems
are already on the market, and more capable components and systems continue to be advertised to
consumers. For example, DJI, Intel, Parrot, Neurala, and LeddarTech have developed novel “obstacle
avoidance,” as opposed to just “airborne collision avoidance,” navigation technologies using
barometers, ultrasonic altimeters, optical flow sensors, camera-based perception, and simultaneous
localization and mapping to sense and avoid obstacles. With these technologies, sUASs can accomplish
a mission with minimal use of data links or access to GPS signals. Current sUASs sense and avoid
technologies are not perfect, but they do offer many amazing capabilities both outdoors and indoors.
Most likely, new approaches will be announced even while this report is in development.3
Concern about the Emergence of Swarms and Collaborative Groups4
As the statement of task for this study was being developed, and sUAS capabilities continued to
improve at a lightning pace, a new concern began to emerge: the threat of swarms and collaborative
groups of sUASs and how they may be countered. The statement of task was modified to address this
concern before the study was approved. As the study progressed, it became apparent that this concern
was based on current, real threats, as evidenced by various news reports and as discussed by invited
speakers during unclassified and classified presentations.
For years, the United States appeared to have a clear lead when it came to swarming sUASs.
Last year the Advanced Robotic Systems Engineering Laboratory claimed a new world record by
launching a swarm of 50 sUASs, all controlled by the same operator.5 More recently, the DoD Strategic
Capabilities Office, partnering with Naval Air Systems Command, successfully demonstrated a large
(>100) sUAS swarm at China Lake, California. The demonstration, conducted in October 2016 and
documented on the CBS News program 60 Minutes on January 8, 2017, consisted of 103 Perdix6
sUASs launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornets.7 The sUASs demonstrated basic swarm behaviors
such as adaptive formation flying. Current goals include demonstrating advanced swarm behaviors,
such as collective decision-making and self-healing, as well as flying Perdix sUASs in batches of up to
1,000 (60 Minutes, 2017).
However, peer nations are also making progress. At the 11th China International Aviation and
Aerospace Exhibition, state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation claimed to have
flown a swarm of 67 sUASs (Rambling, 2016). A continued U.S. technological lead cannot be
assumed.
The threat of swarms and large collaborative groups pose a significant challenge for counter-
sUAS efforts. Not only is it difficult to detect, identify, and track numerous sUASs flying from many
3
Sense and Avoid for Drones is No Easy Feat, http://droneanalyst.com/2016/09/22/sense-and- avoid-for-
drones-is-no-easy-feat/.
4
Swarms and Collaborative Groups are defined in detail in this chapter in the section entitled “Modes of
sUAS Utilization.”
5
Raymond Buettner, associate professor, Naval Postgraduate School, “State of the Art and Vision for Class 1
VAS Swarming and Collaborative Capabilities,” presentation to the committee on November 7, 2016.
6
This is not an acronym; it is the name of a small bird, a partridge. In Greek mythology, Athena turned
Perdix into a partridge to save him while he was falling from a high tower,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdix_(mythology).
7
The Perdix UAS was developed by MIT Lincoln Labs.

6

distributed directions, counter-sUAS systems will need very deep magazines and sufficient stowed
kills to neutralize large numbers of threat sUASs (“deep magazine” and “stowed kill” are defined in
Appendix C).
Battalion-and-Below Operations
Both the Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters and the Fires COE requested that this
study focus on battalion-and-below operations to address both the lack of dedicated air defense
capabilities within battalions as well as the vulnerability of dismounted infantry and lightly armored
vehicles to sUASs. In fact, at the time this report was being written, there were no air defense units in
brigade combat teams. Current air defense units are located at echelons above corps and are not
resourced to support brigade-and-below maneuver forces on a regular basis. As a result, the statement of
task was modified to accommodate the request to focus on battalion-and-below operations.
Battalion-and-Below Formations and Assets Considered as Potential Targets for This Study
For this study, the committee assumed an adversary will use sUASs against unit personnel,
equipment, and activities within a dismounted infantry battalion in either open and natural or urban
terrain. A dismounted infantry battalion was selected because dismounted infantrymen have minimal
body armor and have very limited SWaP capacity available to support organic counter-sUAS systems. In
addition, the sponsors for this study were most interested in the ability of dismounted infantrymen and
lightly armored vehicles to protect themselves from threat sUASs. An extremely large number of
potential targets for sUAS attacks are possible when considering the Modification Table of Organization
and Equipment for battalions within an infantry brigade combat team along with numerous offensive,
defensive, and security scenarios. To make its task manageable, the committee considered a smaller set of
unit personnel, equipment, and activities in its deliberations, including the following:
 Command and control elements of the battalion and company;

 Dismounted infantry unit (company/platoon/squad)
— Moving in tactical formations (e.g., column, vee, or wedge),
— Assaulting an objective, or
— Defending a piece of terrain;
 Lightly armored vehicles
— Moving in a column,
— Composing a temporary, static command and control node, or
— Resupply battalion assets in a temporary, static location;
 Battalion or company mortars, such as
— U.S. Army battalion mortars setting up or already set up at a firing position or
— USMC battalion and company mortars setting up or already set up at a firing position;
and
 A forward operating base (in both open terrain and an urban environment).
STUDY APPLICABILITY BEYOND THE ARMY
Besides the U.S. Army, the USMC has a significant number of dismounted infantrymen just as
vulnerable to threat sUASs. To address this problem, the USMC is sponsoring multiple ongoing
technology development efforts, as well as experiments to assess possible materiel and non-material
approaches to countering sUASs. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is one of the focus points for

7

these efforts. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory personnel were approached about the study, and they
agreed that the USMC could benefit from the study’s findings and recommendations.
Although not officially approached about the study, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the
U.S. Special Operations Command may also benefit from this study, based on recent reports of counter-
sUAS activities in these organizations. For example, the Naval Research Laboratory discussed a recent
Joint Emerging Operational Need document for countering sUASs. One of the motivators for this Joint
Emerging Operational Need document was a sUAS incident at the U.S. Navy’s submarine base in
Bangor, Washington.8 The U.S. Air Force is also worried about drone threats to nuclear sites (Copp,
2016).
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can benefit from this study. Besides its
current challenges with sUASs for customs (e.g., transporting contraband across borders), prisons (e.g.,
flying contraband over prison walls), forest fires (e.g., interfering with aerial firefighting), airports (e.g.,
threatening take-offs and landings), and sensitive areas (e.g., entering White House area or getting too
close to sensitive infrastructure), DHS may see sUASs being used against emergency responders. If true,
the emergency responders may benefit from counter-sUAS approaches recommended for dismounted
infantry and lightly armored vehicles. Thus, a consideration of what counter-sUAS approaches might be
useful to DHS was included in the statement of task.
TIMEFRAME TAXONOMY
The Army uses the following timeframes for its efforts to develop force capabilities and for
planning research and development efforts: near-term (today-2025, the Current Force), mid-term
(2026-2035, the Interim Force), and far-term (2036-2050, the Future Force).9 Additionally, the
committee found conflicting Army definitions for the near-, mid-, and far terms across various
organizations and documents. For example, the mid-term in the U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous
Systems Strategy is 2021-2030, not the 2026-2035 timeframe mentioned above (MASD ARCIC,
2017).
Based on an open source review of current and anticipated threat uses of sUASs, discussions
with the Army about its timeframe and planned development and deployment of counter-sUAS
systems, and the tremendous improvement in sUAS performance capabilities in short periods of time,
the committee believes that the Army timeframes are significantly out of sync with the rapidly
advancing performance capabilities of individual sUASs and teams of sUASs. Additionally, significant
sUAS performance enhancements are occurring so quickly that it is impossible to predict performance
capabilities beyond 8 years (the length of the Army’s “near term”). Unless potential threat sUAS
capabilities and counter-sUAS efforts are addressed more rapidly, the vulnerabilities of dismounted
infantry and lightly armored vehicles to sUAS threats will grow extremely quickly, potentially to the
point where force protection standards cannot be met for soldiers in the field.
To reflect the speed of sUASs developments that it expects, the committee has generated its
own timeframe taxonomy, as follows:
 Immediate (today-2019, 1 to 2 years);

 Imminent (2020-2022, 3 to 5 years); and
 Emerging (2023-2025, 6 to 8 years).
8
John Lee, senior scientist (ST), Applied Optics Branch, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, “Current and Future
U.S. Navy CUAS-related Science and Technology Efforts,” presentation to the committee on December 19, 2016.
9
COL Frank Brewster, (MBL) TCM SBCT, Maneuver Center of Excellence, “MCoE “Counter- Small
UAS” Efforts Related to Dismounted Infantry and Lightly Armored Vehicles,” presentation to the committee
on March 14, 2017.

8

The committee uses this taxonomy to discuss both predictions of sUAS performance
capabilities and in recommending S&T investments in counter-sUAS systems.
As will be seen in this report, this difference in timeframes creates mismatches between
committee predictions and Army predictions about the performance capabilities of sUASs—for
example, in the anticipated timeframes for the development of swarm and collaborative group
capabilities for sUASs.
THE CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERING sUASs
Developing effective countermeasures to highly modified and customized sUASs is a difficult

challenge. Additionally, a counter-sUAS system often costs significantly more, in terms of per-system
and/or per-engagement cost, than the cost of the individual sUASs being countered.
Countering sUASs requires the detection, identification, and neutralization of threat sUASs.
Detection and identification are very difficult because these sUASs are small, can fly at low altitude, and
can have highly irregular flight paths that can range in speed from zero (hover) to close to 18 m/s.10
Additionally sUASs can take advantage of the significant amount of background clutter close to the
ground (e.g., birds and trees).
Once detected and identified, neutralizing a sUAS is a separate and even greater challenge. For
neutralization, the DoD has been developing various defenses against sUASs, but mostly for use against
individual sUASs and especially those larger than hobby aircraft. Kinetic counters, such as shooting down
a single, highly dynamic, fast-moving, low-flying hobby aircraft with small arms (rifles, shotguns, and
light machine guns), are extremely difficult due to the agility and small size of sUASs. Additionally,
swarming sUASs can be employed to overwhelm most existing kinetic countermeasures. Finally, any
counter-sUAS system developed for dismounted infantry, who are already overburdened with equipment,
must minimize the additional SWaP and cognitive demands on the infantryman.
DECOMPOSITION OF sUAS TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES
To assist in identifying sUAS technologies and how they can contribute to future sUAS
capabilities, the committee decomposed sUAS functions and capabilities. The decomposition includes the
following four areas:
1. Autonomous behavior,
2. Supporting functions,
3. Mission packages, and
4. Development and testing needs for sUASs.
Each area is further decomposed into more detailed subareas. This is discussed in Appendix D.
DEFINITIONS
One challenge the committee encountered was the variability of definitions across organizations.
In this section, the committee presents the definitions it used in conducting its work and authoring this
report.
10
Specifically for multi-rotor aircraft. Fixed-wing sUAS and hybrid sUAS (able to hover as multi-rotor
sUASs and rotate the whole aircraft to transition into a fixed-wing mode) can achieve much higher speeds.

9

TABLE 1 The Five Department of Defense Groups of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)
UAS Maximum Nominal Operating
Group Weight (lb.)a Altitude (ft.) Speed (mph) Representative UAS
b
Group 1 0-20 <1,200 <115 Most commercial hobby drones (e.g., DJI
Phantom series), RQ-11 Raven, Wasp
Group 2 21-55 <3,500b <290 ScanEagle, Silver Fox, BUSTER
c
Group 3 <1,320 <18,000 <290 RQ-7 Shadow, RQ-21 Blackjack, RQ-23
Tiger Shark
Group 4 >1,320 <18,000c Any airspeed MQ-8 Fire Scout, Predator, MQ-1C Gray
Eagle
Group 5 >1,320 >18,000c Any airspeedMQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-4C
Triton
NOTE: The units of pounds (lb), feet (ft), and miles per hour (mph) are retained in this table to match Department of
Defense definitions.
a
Maximum takeoff weight.
b
Above ground level.
c
Above sea level.
SOURCE: Adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._military_UAS_groups.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). This is an aircraft without a human pilot aboard. UASs
were previously referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e., UAVs) within DoD and are often
identified as drones in DoD and, more commonly, in the media.
Class (a.k.a. group) 1 and 2 UASs. Within DoD, UASs are identified in five groups, shown in
Table 1. This report mostly focuses on sUASs that are assigned to Group 1, especially small hobby
aircraft, which are described in more detail immediately below Table 1 (DoD, 2011). This report uses
the term “class” instead of “group” to avoid confusion with discussions later in the report that use
“group” in reference to multiple sUASs.
As shown in Table 1, sUASs weigh up to 55 , lb. (25 kg). Included in the sUAS category are
most commercial hobby aircraft (e.g., quadcopters), which weigh less than 5 lb. (2.3 kg) and have a
diameter less than 2 ft. (60 cm). A hobby rotary-wing aircraft of this size can have an average speed of
18 m/s, fly at altitudes ranging from 50 cm above the ground to 6,000 m above sea level,11 hover
vertically with a precision of ±8 cm, fly more than 20 minutes with a standard battery, and easily carry
payloads weighing 1 kg. Designs vary significantly, as discussed below, and there are many variations
of these capabilities—for example, higher speeds, longer flying times, and heavier payloads for fixed-
wing aircraft.
Types of sUASs. The types of sUASs are fixed wing, rotary wing, and hybrid. Examples of each
are shown in Figure 2.
 A fixed wing sUAS generates lift using the vehicle’s forward airspeed and the upward force
caused by the shape of its wings. Normally, one or more propellers provide thrust for forward
motion. Motion is in the direction of the nose of the sUAS and is needed to maintain lift;
thus, fixed-wing sUASs cannot hover.
11
This is the theoretical maximum height where the air becomes too thin for a rotary-wing sUAS to continue
flying. Practically, limitations on battery power and high-altitude winds would prevent a hobby sUAS from
reaching this height.

10

B c.
FIGURE 2 Types of Unmanned
U Aircraft System
ms (UASs): (A
A) fixed wing (Parrot DISC CO), (B) rotarry
wing, and
d (C) hybrid (x
xCraft X PlussOne). SOURRCE: (A) Sgt. Brian Calhouun [public doomain] via
Wikimediia Commons; (B) Murphy (2016), U.S. Army photo by Jason Johnnston; (C) courtesy of
xCRAFT..
 A rotary wing
w sUAS is a multi-rotor helicopter thhat is lifted annd propelled bby its rotors
(vertically oriented proppellers). Its lift is generatedd by a set of rrotors. Horizoontal motion iis
caused by tilting the rottors, and it can be in any diirection. Rotaary-wing sUA ASs normally have
four to eig
ght rotors. Lik
ke a helicopterr, a rotary-winng sUAS cann hover.
 A hybrid sUAS
s may bee a vertical takke-off and lannding sUAS. F For example, it may take ooff
like a rotarry-wing sUAS S and then turrn its entire aairframe to flyy like a fixed--wing sUAS. It
may also beb a combinattion of more diverse
d mobillity functions like one that transitions
back and forth
f between a sUAS and a small unmaanned underw water (or surfaace) vehicle, oor
between a sUAS and a small, unman nned ground vvehicle.
Modes off sUAS Utilizzation
The
T operating modes for sU UASs vary widely, dependiing on the maaturity of autoonomous
behavior of
o a given sU
UAS and the needs
n and abillities of the huuman operatoor(s). The moddes, discussedd
below, ran
nge from sing
gle, line-of-sig
ght (LOS), reemote-controllled sUASs too collaborative groups and
swarms of fully autono
omous sUASss.
Single sU
UAS with Varrying Levels of Autonomy
y
Single sUAS with

w varying levels
l of auton
nomy includee the followinng:
 Wired or wireless,
w LOS S, remote conttrol.12An operrator controlss all operationns of the sUAS.
The same operator or an n observer neear the operatoor must have a clear LOS w with the sUAAS to
understandd its three-dim
mensional location and orieentation, espeecially with reespect to its
immediatee surroundings, while contrrolling the moovements of tthe sUAS.
 Wireless, non-LOS,
n rem
mote control. An
A operator ccontrols all opperations of thhe sUAS.
However, a direct LOS is not necessary to undersstand its threee-dimensionall location andd
orientation
n, especially with
w respect to o its immediaate surroundinngs, while conntrolling its
12
Remmote control reefers to a devicce that is fully operated and controlled by a human usingg a tethered,
quency/electro optical link.
untethered, or radio freq
PRE
EPUBLICAT
TION DRAFT—SUBJEC
CT TO FURT
THER EDIT
TORIAL COR
RRECTION
N
11

movements. Onboard sensors generate digital information (e.g., video, text, and graphical
information) to enable the operator to understand the location of the sUAS with respect to its
surroundings and the operator while the operator controls the movement of the sUAS.
 Semi-autonomous. The sUAS can perform very limited control activities to enhance the
ability of the operator to perform other tasks. For example, it may automatically go into a
hover when the operator stops inputting commands to observe video from the sUAS, or the
sUAS may automatically avoid obstacles while being flown by the operator. However, the
sUAS can perform very few tasks on its own without accompanying operator input. A
communications link is often used by the operator.
 Nearly full autonomy. The sUAS can perform many automated tasks, such as automatic flight
control (including obstacle avoidance), engine control (for complex flight dynamics and
hovering), target recognition, and target tracking (e.g., DJI’s Active Track function).
However, the automated tasks are still activated or deactivated by the operator, and, if
activated, will function without the specific knowledge of or control by the operator. An
operator may direct the actions of individual or multiple sUASs in a supervisory role,
especially in the execution of missions.
 Fully autonomous. Individual or large numbers of sUASs that require no human intervention
to perform tasks, especially complex tasks such as planning and executing missions,
navigating without GPS, avoiding obstacles, etc. The operator will assign missions,
occasionally supervise the execution of missions, and be part of a manned-unmanned team.
Operator-Enabled, Coordinated sUASs
The concept of operations (CONOPS) for operator-enabled, coordinated sUASs, is that two or
more operators of single sUASs coordinate their efforts before and/or during a mission to accomplish
mission tasks. This CONOPS will most likely use remote-controlled or semi-autonomous sUASs.
Software-Enabled, Coordinated sUASs
The software-enabled, coordinated sUAS CONOPS is for one operator to control two or more
semi- and/or nearly fully autonomous sUASs to accomplish a mission. However, these sUASs will
operate independently of each other, and the operator will control each of them individually either by pre-
programming or by controlling them during flight. Pre-programming (e.g., when launched, each flies to
its own specified, pre-programmed location) may enable a single operator to coordinate the flight paths of
numerous (more than 40) sUASs. If a change in mission requires dynamic reprogramming or coordination
during flight, this will significantly task the cognitive abilities of the operator, thus reducing the number
of sUASs being controlled for a particular mission from more than 40 to perhaps as few as 5, depending
on the skills of the operator. This CONOPS will most likely use wireless, non-LOS, remote controlled,
semi-autonomous, or nearly fully autonomous sUASs.
Swarm of sUASs
A swarm is a larger number (40, but maybe hundreds) of sUASs all following the same simple
rules to achieve a goal (Aoki, 1982; Huth and Wissel, 1992; Reynolds, 1987). As the number of
individual sUASs increases in a single swarm, humans lose the ability to track individual sUASs and
begin to perceive multiple sUASs as a single entity (Seiffert et al., 2015). While it is not entirely clear at
what number of entities this perceptual transition occurs, it is believed that the tipping point is about 40
sUASs. In current experimental swarms, an operator can control 40 to 100 sUASs. In the future, an

12

C o u n t e r - U n m a n n e d A i r c r a f t S y s t e m ( C U
operator may be able to control hundreds or even thousands of sUASs (Brown et al., 2016; Goodrich et
al., 2012; Kolling et al., 2013, 2016; Walker et al., 2014).
The key to a swarm is that the entire group appears to act as a single unit, but the individual
sUASs actually act as distributed, local controllers (Aoki, 1982; Reynolds, 1987; Barca and Sekercioglu,
2013). The individual sUASs behave like a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for
decision-making and adapting to each other, like swarms in nature (e.g., flocks of birds and schools of
fish). Each sUAS uses its software-based intelligence to coordinate its location among other sUASs and
execute its localized behavior. The sUASs need not all be of the same type.
Not all members of the swarm will know the assigned mission. There may be leaders in a swarm
with knowledge of the mission. The remainder of the swarm executes their standard localized behaviors
without knowing the mission objectives, but as an entity the swarm executes the mission. For example, an
operator may direct swarm leaders (Tiwari et al., 2017; Kolpas et al., 2013) to “search this area,” and the
swarm automatically coordinates its individual members to accomplish the mission.
Communications among swarm members can be explicit (e.g., the exchange of trivial messages,
like “I found the target”), but they will mostly be implicit (e.g., using onboard sensors to determine
position relative to other nearby sUASs) (Haque et al., 2016). The models of communications from the
biological swarm literature, mostly passive-based sensing, are metric (communicate with any sUAS
within a specified distance) (Aoki, 1982), topological (based on number of aircraft, not on distance)
(Ballerini et al., 2008), or visual/perceptual (react to all sUAS within LOS) (Standburg-Peshkin et al.,
2013).
While swarming, each sUAS will position itself relative to other sUASs, establishing minimum
relative distances between sUASs. These distances may be created by a combination of repulsion (moving
away from nearby sUASs), orientation (determining one’s location relative to other sUASs), or attraction
(moving toward nearby sUASs) (Aoki, 1982; Huth and Wissel, 1992; Reynolds, 1987). These sUASs will
also change their location to improve their passive sensing outcomes. This swarm CONOPS would use
nearly fully autonomous sUASs.
Collaborative Groups (<40) and Collaborative Swarms (≥40) of sUASs
In the CONOPS for collaborative groups (<40) and collaborative swarms (≥40) of sUASs,
multiple sUASs (either all the same or different types) can perform sophisticated tasks as part of a team
through data sharing, communications, and synchronization of actions, and even dynamically reassigning
missions (e.g., sUAS-target pairings) to take advantage of the capabilities and physical location of team
members and abide by established rules of engagement. Collaboration is accomplished through
distributed, platform-based interactions—that is, individual platforms can contribute to the overall
decision.
As an example, a group or swarm of collaborative sUASs approach a target area, and that
approach may be from different directions and at different altitudes. Based on the priority of identified
targets and the lethal capability of each sUAS, the group or swarm members will determine which sUASs
attack particular targets (e.g., attacking high-priority targets with more than one sUAS).
A collaborative group or swarm will have a human commander who assigns its mission and, for
parts of the mission, may release the sUASs to their fully autonomous mode in which they function with
no human intervention. More advanced collaborative groups or swarms of sUASs may solicit nearby
friendly ground and air platforms to join the group to accomplish an assigned mission or to adapt to
dynamic situations, such as unanticipated threats. Additionally, as these advanced collaborative groups or
swarms are reduced by attrition, they may consolidate forces to create new collaborative groups or
swarms. This CONOPS will use fully autonomous sUASs.

13
C o p y r i g h t N a t i o n a l A c a d e m
U.S. Army versus Committee Definitions for Groups of sUASs
The Army’s definitions for coordinated, swarm, and collaborative groups or swarms are
significantly different from, and much less detailed than, the committee’s definitions. For CONOPS
involving multiple sUASs, the Army uses two terms: saturation and swarm. For the Army, saturation
is the use of a small group of operator-enabled or software-enabled coordinated sUASs to attack a
target. The thought is that multiple sUASs will “saturate” the target and, hopefully, overcome counter-
sUAS systems.
The Army defines a swarm as follows:
Swarming is a method of operations where large numbers of autonomous systems

actively coordinate their actions to achieve operational outcomes. Swarming overwhelms
targets by using mass and attrition in combination with decentralized maneuvers or
combined fires from multiple directions (MASD ARCIC, 2017).
The committee does not view swarming as a method but rather as a cooperative behavior
capability for a large number of semi-autonomous sUASs. When cooperative behavior is enhanced,
utilizing fully autonomous sUASs, collaborative groups and swarms become possible. If the Army
focuses its counter-sUAS efforts on its definitions of saturation and swarm, it may miss technical
opportunities to develop overmatching counter-swarm capabilities.
Levels of Customization
sUASs generally fall into three categories of customization: consumer (i.e., non-customized,
ready to fly), modified consumer (i.e., some level of customization), and customized (i.e., built from
scratch).
A consumer sUAS (i.e., non-customized, ready to fly) is one that can be purchased in a store or
online already assembled. The user has little to no understanding of the software and hardware operation
and integration or how the components (parts of the sUAS) interact. Operations are limited to the
advertised capabilities of the commercial sUAS and are limited by published controls (e.g., geo-fencing to
prevent flying near sensitive areas such as an airport). These are generally of low to moderate cost
($1,000). An example is ISIS buying a DJI Phantom sUAS and using its integral camera for conducting
surveillance missions.
A modified consumer sUAS (i.e., some level of customization) is assembled using sUAS
components available in a store or online. The user integrates the components together, similar to building
a model. This type of customization is limited by the commercial availability of sUAS components. The
user has some understanding of component interactions and the science and engineering behind
component functions. Modified consumer sUASs may exceed the limitations of commercial capabilities
and published controls. These are generally of moderate to moderately high cost ($10,000). An example is
ISIS’s “drone factories” where mostly fixed-wing sUASs were assembled using commercially available
components.
A customized sUAS has some or all of its components designed, built, and tested by or for a user.
This approach is not limited to the commercial availability of sUAS components for a modified consumer
sUAS. This sUAS category requires an in-depth understanding of multiple technical fields. Customized
sUASs can conduct highly sophisticated operations. These sUASs are generally of moderate to very high
cost ($100,000). Threat examples are limited but include a report of wing modifications to enhance flight
performance and many reports of customizing payloads for dropping grenades and small bombs. The
committee is aware of very successful customization efforts by university students (IMechE, 2017; UAV
Challenge, 2017; AUVSI SUAS, 2017). This level of customization is still short of the capabilities of
nation states.

14

Counter-sUAS
Countering sUAS(s) is the use of counter-sUAS materiel systems; tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs); and other approaches to prevent a sUAS from accomplishing its mission.
 A counter-sUAS materiel system is a dedicated, physical counter-sUAS system(s) used to

implement the following kill chain;
— Detect, locate, and track potential targets;
— Identify, classify, and evaluate targets as sUASs;
— Engage and defeat (neutralize) sUASs;
— Verify the response through battle damage assessment; and
— Clean up and recovery.13
 Active TTPs involve the reemphasis of existing mission tasks (e.g., scanning the horizon),
improving firing techniques with organic weapons (e.g., rifles) or modified organic weapons
(e.g., a multi-purpose 40 mm round), or other actions to defeat sUASs.
 Passive TTPs involve the use of camouflage, stealth, decoys, or other actions to prevent the
sUAS from locating the friendly force.
 Other counter-sUAS approaches that consider doctrine, organization, training, leadership,
personnel, facilities, and policy (i.e. DOT_LPF-P),14 for example,
— Doctrine (e.g., use of distributed operations),
— Organization (e.g., integration of air defense units in rifle companies),
— Training (e.g., including the equivalent of skeet training as part of basic training),
— Leadership (e.g., training in the integration of counter-sUAS considerations into
operations),
— Personnel skills (e.g., establishing career fields in counter-sUAS),
— Facilities (e.g., hardening forward operating bases against sUAs), and
— Policy (e.g., balancing realism in training with safety).
The performance of a materiel counter-sUAS system will depend on a large number of factors.
These include the following:
 Target acquisition capability and range;

 Engagement range;
 Effect on target(s);
 Performance characteristics of threat sUASs (including autonomy);
 Level of sUAS customization;
 Vulnerability of the components of sUASs (as identified in the taxonomy in Appendix D);
 Governing weapons control order;
 Threat TTPs (including the use of swarms and collaborative groups);
 The operational environment (e.g., open versus urban terrain);
 Weather;
 Lighting conditions; and
 If the counter-sUAS system is not automated,
— Operator skills,
13
This bullet was added by the committee as an additional kill chain activity in order to include functions
the committee believes are important to the counter-sUAS fight.
14
Materiel is omitted from what is the usual Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,
Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (i.e., DOTMLPF-P) formulation because it is addressed in the first bullet as
“counter-sUAS materiel system.”

15

— Training, and
— Physical and mental performance.
Additional terms are defined in Appendix C. These terms include the following:
 Deep magazine versus stowed kills,

 Target acquisition levels,
 Track,
 Multi-track,
 Neutralization, and
 Weapons control order.
STUDY APPROACH
The committee conducted data gathering at all five of its meetings, with the fourth meeting
focused on gathering restricted information. Committee activities and the organizations they heard from
are listed in Appendix A. In addition to approaching various Army organizations to learn about their view
of the sUAS threat and current and planned counter-sUAS efforts, the committee also reached out to the
U.S. Navy, the USMC, the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, and to DHS. Of particular note
was an opportunity for the committee to meet with 12 officers and enlisted members of the 3rd Battalion,
5th Marines, to discuss their experiences and lessons learned from their counter-sUAS experiments held
in the training areas at 29 Palms Marine Corps Base. These Marines provided insightful information,
providing the committee a very thought-provoking user perspective.
Data gathering for this report ended with the fifth meeting and was cut off around April 28, 2017.
After that point in time, the development of sUASs and counter-sUAS systems continued to advance at a
very rapid pace. There has been a significant amount of discussion and activity related to the adversarial
use of sUASs and the development of counter-sUAS systems since April. Due to the necessity to stop
data gathering so the report could be finalized and reviewed, most information since April is not included
in this report. Small amounts of data were collected to clarify the discussion, findings, and
recommendations developed in April.
ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE OF RESTRICTED REPORT
The restricted report is organized into six chapters and five supporting appendixes. The chapters
and appendixes provide the following information:
 Chapter 1 includes the statement of task, origins of the study, timeframe taxonomy, modes of
sUAS utilization (including descriptions of coordinated groups, swarms, and collaborative
swarms or groups), levels of customization,’ definitions, and a functional decomposition of
sUASs, with additional definitions and discussions in Appendixes C and D.
 Chapter 2 includes a discussion of performance capabilities of sUASs, including a committee
assessment of likely improvements in the immediate, imminent, and emerging timeframes. It
also includes a high-level roadmap of those capabilities.
 Chapter 3 discusses human performance considerations, as well as logistics and operational
usability/utility considerations.
 Chapter 4 discusses current counter-sUAS efforts and assesses counter- sUAS approaches to
identify counter-sUAS capability needs. This chapter also includes a quality function
deployment (QFD) analysis, with accompanying QFD details in Appendix E.

16

 Chapter 5 focuses primarily on recommending science and technology development efforts,

but also discusses non-materiel approaches in areas of doctrine, organization, training,
leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy.
 Chapter 6 discusses the DHS concern about sUAS activities in the homeland and potential
areas of interest from Chapter 5.
 Appendix A discusses committee activities.
 Appendix B presents the committee member biographies.
 Appendix C presents some definitions used by the committee that were omitted from Chapter
1 for the sake of brevity.
 Appendix D presents a decomposition of sUAS capabilities.
 Appendix E presents a detailed discussion of the rating factors supporting the QFD tables in
Chapter 4. ·
Many findings and recommendations are identified and detailed in the restricted report, including
seven high-impact recommendations.
REFERENCES
60 Minutes. 2017. Capturing the swarm. CBS News. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-

capturing-the-perdix-drone-swarm/.
Aoki, I. 1982. A simulation study on the schooling mechanism in fish. Nihon-suisan-gakkai-shi
48(8):1081-1088.
Atherton, K.D. 2016. IED drone kills Kurdish soldiers, French commandos. Popular Science.
https://www.popsci.com/booby-trapped-isis-drone-kills-kurdish-soldiers-french-commandos.
AUVSI SUAS (Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International Student Unmanned Aerial
Systems). 2017. Student Unmanned Aerial Systems Challenge. http://www.auvsi-
suas.org/competitions/2017/.
Ballerini, M., N. Cabibbo, R. Candelier, A. Cavagna, E. Cisbani, I. Giardina, V. Lecomte, A. Orlandi, G.
Parisi, A. Procaccini, M. Viale, and V. Zdravkovic. 2008. Interaction ruling animal collective
behavior depends on topological rather than metric distance: Evidence from a field study.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences US.A. 105(4):1232-1237.
Barca, J.C., and Y.A. Sekercioglu. 2013. Swarm robotics reviewed. Robotica 31(3):345-359.
Barrett, B. 2016. When Good Drones Go Bad. Wired.com. January 18.
https://www.wired.com/2016/01/when-good-drones-go-bad/.
Bedard, P. 2015. Drone sales surge 167% to 4.3 million, U.S. leads but China catching up. Washington
Examiner. May 29. http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/drone-sales-surge-167-to-43-million-us-
leads-but-china-catching-up/article/2565240.
Brown, D.S., M.A. Goodrich, S.-Y. Jung, and S. Kerman. 2016. Two invariants of human-swarm
interaction. Journal of Human-Robot Interaction 5(1):1-31.
Copp, T. 2016. Pentagon worried about drone threat to nuclear sites. Stars and Stripes. September 27.
https://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-worried-about-drone-threat-to-nuclear-sites-1.431196.
DoD (Department of Defense). 2011. Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration Plan, version 2.0.
Arlington County, Va.: UAS Task Force, Airspace Integration Integrated Product Team.
Freedberg, Jr., S.J. 2015. Russian drone threat: Army seeks Ukraine lessons. Breaking Defense. October
14. https://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/russian-drone-threat-army-seeks-ukraine-lessons/.
French, S. 2016. Drone sales in the U.S. more than doubled in the past year. MarketWatch. May 28.
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/drone-sales-in-the-us-more-than-doubled-in-the-past-year-2016-
05-27.
Gillis, J. 2017. In over their heads: U.S. ground forces are dangerously unprepared for enemy drones. War

17

on the Rocks. May 30. https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/in-over-their-heads-u-s-ground-forces-are-

dangerously-unprepared-for-enemy-drones/.
Goodrich, M.A., B. Pendleton, S. Kerman, and P. Sujit. 2012. What Types of Interactions Do Bio-
Inspired Robot Swarms and Flocks Afford a Human? Pp. 105-112 in Proceedings of Robotics,
Science and Systems. Sydney, Australia: Robotics: Science, and Systems.
Hambling, D. 2016. If drone swarms are the future, China may be winning. Popular Mechanics.
December 23. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a24494/chinese-drones-swarms/.
Haque, M., C. Ren, E. Baker, D. Kirkpatrick, and J.A. Adams. 2016. Analysis of Swarm Communication
Models. Pp. 29-37 in Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Combo of Intelligent
Methods and Applications.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zhidong_Deng/publication/308946227_Generic_Convolutional_
Neural_Network_with_Random_Pooling_Area/links/57f919eb08ae91deaa6166d5.pdf#page=39.
Huth, A., and C. Wissel. 1992. The simulation of the movement of fish schools. Journal of Theoretical
Biology 156(3):365-385.
IMechE (Institution of Mechanical Engineers). 2016. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Challenge.
https://www.imeche.org/get-involved/young-members-network/auasc.
Karber, P. 2015. “Lessons Learned” from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal Observations. July 8. Draft.
The Potomac Foundation. https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf.
Kolling, A., K. Sycara, S. Nunnally, and M. Lewis. 2013. Human swarm interaction: An experimental
study of two types of interaction with foraging swarms. Journal of Human-Robot Interaction
2(2):103-128.
Kolling, A., P. Walker, N. Chakraborty, K. Sycara, and M. Lewis. 2016. Human interaction with robot
swarms: A survey. IEEE Transactions on Human-Machine Systems 46(1):9-26.
Kolpas, A., M. Busch, H. Li, I.D. Couzin, L. Petzold, and J. Moehlis. 2013. How the spatial position of
individuals affects their influence on swarms: A numerical comparison of two popular swarm
dynamics models. PLoS ONE 8(3):e58525.
MASD ARCIC (Maneuver, Aviation, and Soldier Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center). 2017.
The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy.
http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/RAS_Strategy.pdf.
Murphy, M. 2016. UK is crowdsourcing its swarming drone attacks. Defense One. October 4.
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/10/uk-crowdsourcing-its-swarming-drone-
attacks/132082/.
Remote Control Project. 2016. Hostile Drones: The Hostile Use of Drones by Non-State Actors Against
British Targets. U.K., London: Oxford Research Group. January. http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Hostile-use-of-drones-report_open-briefing.pdf.
Reynolds, C.W. 1987. Flocks, herds, and schools: A distributed behavioral model. Computer Graphics
21(4):25-34.
Seiffert, A.E., S.T. Hayes, C.E. Harriott, and J.A. Adams. Motion Perception of Biological Swarms. Pp.
2128-2133 in Proceedings of the Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting. Pasadena, Calif.:
Cognitive Science Society.
Strandburg-Peshkin, A., C.R. Twomey, N.W.F. Bode, AB. Kao, Y. Katz, C.C. Ioannou, S.B. Rosenthal,
C.J. Tomey, H.S. Wu, and S.A. Levin. 2013. Visual sensory networks and effective information
transfer in animal groups. Current Biology 23(17):R709-R711.
Tiwari, R., P. Jain, S. Butail, P.B. Sujit, and M.A. Goodrich. 2017. Effect of Leader Placement on
Robotic Swarm Control. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems. Sao Paulo, Brazil: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems.
Tucker, P. 2015. Did NATO forces just down a Russian drone over Turkey? Defense One.
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/10/did-nato-forces-just-down-russian-drone-over-
turkey/122882/.
UAV Challenge. 2017. Announcing the 2017 UAV Challenge Airborne Delivery Challenge.

18

https://uavchallenge.org/2017/03/19/announcing-the-2017-uav-challenge-airborne-delivery-
challenge/.
Walker, P., S.A. Amraii, N. Chakraborty, M. Lewis, and K. Sycara. 2014. Human Control of Robot
Swarms with Dynamic Leaders. Pp. 1108-1113 in Proceedings of 2014 IEEE/RSJ International
Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS). Piscataway, N.J.: IEEE.
Watson, B. 2017. The drones of ISIS. Defense One.
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/01/drones-isis/134542/.

19


Appendixes


Committee Activities
FIRST COMMITTEE MEETING

NOVEMBER 7-9, 2016
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Objectives: Conduct administrative actions, introductory discussions, bias discussion, and briefings;
discuss statement of task and background with sponsor; receive briefings and engage in dialogue with
briefers; review report-writing process and project plan; review and flesh out initial report outline; make
committee writing assignments; and set future meeting dates and determine next steps.
Army S&T Systems Adaptive Red Team UAS as a Threat Project, Dr. Patrick J. Driscoll, Army Systems
Adaptive Red Team, and Professor, Department of Systems Engineering, United States Military Academy
USMC Counter Class 1 UAS Development and Experiment Efforts for Dismounted Infantry, Col James
Jenkins, S&T Director, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
The Use of Commercial Drones in Lethal and JSR Modes, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research
Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College and Adjunct Faculty, Claremont Graduate
University (via web meeting)
State-of-the-Art and Vision for Class 1 UAS Swarming and Collaborative Capabilities, Dr. Raymond R.
Buettner, Jr., Associate Professor of Information Science, Naval Postgraduate School (via web meeting)
Black Dart—View of Emerging and Future Class 1 UAS Threats and Capabilities to Counter Class 1
UAS, MAJ Adam Bock, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization
A Proposed Taxonomy and Structure for Discussing Drone Threats and Countermeasures, Mr. Michael
Hopmeier, President, Unconventional Concepts, Inc.
Commercial Drones: How They Change the Character of Conflict Between State and Non-State Actors
Today and in the Future , Dr. T.X. Hammes, Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Strategic
Research, National Defense University
DHS Concerns and Ongoing Efforts for Countering Class 1 UAS, Ms. Anh N. Duong, Program Executive
Officer, Unmanned Aerial Systems, DHS Science & Technology

23

Small UAS and Counter Small UAS DARPA Programs, Mr. Jean-Charles Lede, Program Manager,
Tactical Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
TELECONFERENCE WITH DJI,

NOVEMBER 22, 2016
Objective: Conduct data gathering with engineers at DJI about the state of the art in small unmanned
aircraft system capabilities and obtain an industry perspective on how those capabilities will develop
within the next 8 years.
SECOND COMMITTEE MEETING

DECEMBER 19-21, 2016
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Objectives: Receive briefings and engage in dialogue with briefers; arrive at a report concept draft; make
committee writing assignments; discuss fact finding; and set future meeting dates and determine next
steps.
Cooperative Teams of UAS: Uses and Vulnerabilities, Dr. David Grymin, Research Engineer, Control
Science Center of Excellence, Aerospace Systems Directorate Air Force Research Laboratory
CUAS Efforts at the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, Dr. Andrew Roettgen, Joint
Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization
Current and Future U. S. Army CUAS Science and Technology Efforts, Dr. Matthew B. Higgins, Chief
(A), RF EW Branch, U.S. Army Research Laboratory
Current and Future U. S. Navy CUAS Science and Technology Efforts, Dr. John N. Lee, Senior Scientist
(ST), Applied Optics Branch, Naval Research Laboratory
Swarming and Collaborative Groups of Drones: Uses and Counters, Dr. Timothy H. Chung, Tactical
Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ·
Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology, Mr. Don Rassler,
Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy (via web meeting)
Current and Future US. Air Force CUAS Efforts, Mr. Bede “BJ” Lopez, Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Branch Chief, Command and Control, Integrated Air & Missile Defense, and Information
Operations Division, Headquarters USAF
Mental and Physical CUAS System Burdens on Dismounted Soldiers, Mr. Rodger Pettitt, Human
Research and Engineering Directorate, Army Research Laboratory (via web meeting)
Congressional Perspectives on CUAS for Dismounted Infantry and Light Armored Vehicles, Mr. Kevin
Gates, Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee
Aerial Dragnet, Dr. Jeffrey Krolik, Strategic Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency

24

TELECONFERENCE WITH DAVID RAMBLING

JANUARY 4, 2017
Objective: Conduct data gathering with David Rambling about his small unmanned aircraft
system swarms and how they might be used.
THIRD COMMITTEE MEETING

JANUARY 30-FEBRUARY 1, 2017
IRVINE, CALIFORNIA
Objectives: Receive briefings and engage in dialogue with briefers; engage in report drafting; make
committee writing assignments; discuss fact finding; and set future meeting dates and determine next
steps.
Physical and Cognitive Burdens of Operating a CUAS System, Ms. Meghan O’Donovan, Biomechanics,
and Dr. Joseph Moran, Cognitive Sciences, Natick Soldier Research, Development & Engineering Center
(via VTC)
Panel Discussion: Practical CUAS Field Experience, LtCol Jackson T. Doan, Commanding Officer; Capt
Tyler J. Anthony; Capt Charles E. Broun; Capt Josef E. Patterson; Capt Nathan Jeffcoat; Capt Bobby
Wolff; 2ndLT Kyle Connell; SSgt Dustin Decou; Sgt Justin McGee; Sgt Daniel Meadows; and Cpl
Marquis Blocker, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines “DARKHORSE,” U.S. Marine Corps
Fires Center of Excellence CUAS Update, LTC Rhonda Williams, Fires Center of Excellence, U.S. Army
(via VTC)
Russian Efforts to Counter UAS Swarms, Mr. Samuel Bendett, Researcher, Center for Naval Analyses
(via web meeting)
EO/JR Detection of Small UAS, Mr. Mark Anderson, Director, Information Sciences, Teledyne Scientific
Company (via web meeting)
UAS Detection, Classification, and Neutralization: Market Survey 2015, Dr. Gabriel Birch, Senior
Member of the Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratories (via web meeting)
FOURTH COMMITTEE MEETING

MARCH 13-16, 2017
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Objectives: Receive briefings and engage in dialogue with briefers; conduct report writing; discuss
findings and recommendations; and discuss fact finding.
Data-gathering sessions were not open to the public as requested by the sponsor and approved by the
Office of General Counsel.

25

FIFTH COMMITTEE MEETING

APRIL 24-28, 2017
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Objectives: Receive a briefing; conduct deliberations; achieve committee concurrence.
The data-gathering session was not open to the public as requested by the sponsor and approved by the
Office of General Counsel.

26

Biographical Sketches of Committee Members
LTC Albert A. Sciarretta, U.S. Army, retired, Professional Engineer, is president of CNS
Technologies, Inc. In this position, he works primarily as an independent consultant, supporting various
Department of Defense (DoD) organizations in assessing the military benefits of new technologies. For
more than 30 years, as a U.S. Army officer and civilian contractor, he has used his operational, research
and development, operations research, and human performance assessment experience to assess the
military benefits of advanced technologies and develop technology investment strategies. For the past 20
years, a significant amount of this time has focused on designing and executing war games, experiments,
and demonstrations for the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) and using combinations of live-virtual-constructive simulations to represent
operations ranging from Joint through tactical urban settings. For the DoD Test and Evaluation/Science
and Technology (T&E/S&T) Program, he has served more than 14 years as a subject matter expert for
advanced test technologies. A recent T&E/S&T task required him to develop a “use case” for identifying
counter unmanned aircraft system (CUAS) test instrumentation needs. He also serves as a senior research
fellow in the National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy
(CTNSP), where he assesses future warfighting system capabilities. He recently developed course content
for an NDU course on prototyping and experimentation (P&E), including blocks of instruction on
defining P&E, experimental design, and a case study focused on CUAS experimentation. He published a
CTNSP technology paper on micro-autonomous air/ground systems for dismounted infantry squads. Mr.
Sciarretta has a B.S. degree in general engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and dual M.S.
degrees in mechanical engineering and operations research from Stanford University. He previously
served as a member of six committees of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine, including committees on Army Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technologies and Making the
Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields. He is currently a member of the National Academies Board on
Army Science and Technology (BAST).
Dr. Julie A. Adams is a full professor in the School of Computer Science and Robotics in the School of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Oregon State University. Previously, she was a professor
of computer science and computer engineering at Vanderbilt University. Dr. Adams develops human-
robot interaction (HRI) and distributed artificial intelligence methods resulting in robot systems for real-
time mission deployment in dynamic environments. Her research in artificial intelligence develops
distributed coalition formation and task planning algorithms for distributed teams of humans and robots.
Her HRI research focuses on capabilities for humans to supervise and task large, heterogeneous robot
teams and understand robot-provided information (supporting human decision making and situation
awareness). She previously served on the National Academies’ Committee on Mainstreaming Unmanned
Undersea Vehicles into Future U.S. Naval Operations, the NASA Technology Roadmap: Robotics,
Communication and Navigation Panel, and on the Panel on Soldier Systems. She received her B.S. in

27

computer science and B.B.A. in accounting from Siena College and a M.S.E. and Ph.D. in computer and
information systems from the University of Pennsylvania.
Dr. Frederick R. Chang is the executive director of the Darwin Deason Institute for Cyber Security, the
Bobby B. Lyle Centennial Distinguished Chair in Cyber Security, and a professor in the Department of
Computer Science and Engineering in the Lyle School of Engineering at Southern Methodist University.
He is also a senior fellow in the John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at SMU’s Dedman
College. He is the former director of research at the National Security Agency (NSA) and has been
awarded the NSA Director’s Distinguished Service Medal. Dr. Chang is a member of the National
Academy of Engineering and is co-chair of the Intelligence Community Studies Board of the National
Academies where he has also served as a member of the Computer Science and Telecommunications
Board. Dr. Chang received his B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, and his M.A. and Ph.D.
degrees from the University of Oregon. He also completed the senior executive program at the Sloan
School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Dr. James A. Freebersyser is director of Advanced Systems at BBN Technologies. In this position, he
leads business development efforts for external funding of new technology development, primarily at
DARPA, and transition of existing technology efforts, including technical concept development, market
strategy, and business planning. Prior to joining BBN, Dr. Freebersyser was the technology portfolio
manager for the Navigation, Communications, and Control (NCC) Directorate at Honeywell. Dr.
Freebersyser also worked as a program manager at the DARPA Advanced Technology Office, on detail
from the Army Research Laboratory. He received his B.S.E. in electrical engineering from Duke
University, an M.S. in electrical engineering from the University of Virginia, and a Ph.D. in electrical
engineering from North Carolina State University. Dr: Freebersyser is also a member of the BAST.
Dr. J. Sean Humbert is the McLagan Endowed Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the
University of Colorado, Boulder. Previously, he was the Techno-Sciences Associate Professor of
Aerospace Engineering Innovation in the Department of Aerospace Engineering at the University of
Maryland. Dr. Humbert’s research interests include bio-inspired robotics, estimation, and control theory,
with applications to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs).
Recent work has focused on the flight mechanics and distributed sensing and estimation approaches in
small-scale organisms, including insect-based perception and navigation in cluttered, uncertain
environments. Best paper honors include the AIAA Conference on Guidance, Navigation, and Control,
the American Control Conference, and the International Conference on Insect Sensors and Robotics. Dr.
Humbert is an AIAA associate fellow, has recently won the AIAA National Capital Section Hal Andrews
Young Scientist/Engineer Award, and is the recipient of an ARO Young Investigator Award. He is
director of the MAST-CTA on Microsystem Mechanics, co-director of the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research Center of Excellence on Nature Inspired Flight Technologies and is the director of the
Autonomous Vehicle Laboratory at the University of Maryland. He is also a member of the BAST. Dr.
Humbert holds a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from the University of California, Davis, and
M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in mechanical engineering from the California Institute of Technology.
Dr. Paul Kolodzy is an independent consultant at Kolodzy Consulting, LLC. He has worked on a wide
variety of technologies, including software defined radios, cognitive radios, and advanced wireless
service. Dr. Kolodzy also has experience in spectrum use and the research and development of new
methods to access the radio frequency spectrum for consumer, commercial, scientific, and government
applications. Dr. Kolodzy also has significant experience with sensor technologies, including acoustic,
ultraviolet, infrared, and laser radar systems. He has served on the National Academies Committee on a
Survey of the Scientific Use of the Radio Spectrum, the Committee to Study Wireless Technology
Prospects and Policy, and the Committee on a Survey of the Active Scientific Use of the Radio Spectrum.

28

Dr. Vijay Kumar1 is the Nemirovsky Family Dean at the School of Engineering at the University of
Pennsylvania. Dr. Kumar’s research group works on creating autonomous ground and aerial robots,
designing bio-inspired algorithms for collective behaviors, and on robot swarms. His expertise in
collaborative and swarming robotic operations make him particularly well-suited to address the study
sponsor’s main point of concern. Dr. Kumar is a member of the NAE, and his selection for NAE
membership was for “contributions in cooperative robotics, networked vehicles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles, and for leadership in robotics research and education.” Dr. Kumar served on Panel G: Human
Exploration Systems and Mobility and Autonomous Systems and Robotics under the Committee for the
Review of NASA’s Capability Roadmaps.
Dr. Terry P. Lewis is an independent consultant. Previously, he was the site executive and senior
systems engineer at the Raytheon Company. He also has a wide base of expertise encompassing
communications, electronic warfare, and cybersecurity. In addition, Dr. Lewis has developed anti-
tampering technologies to prevent or reduce the ability of potential adversaries or competitors to reverse-
engineer critical U.S. communications technologies. He is a Raytheon fellow and received the Most
Promising Engineer of the Year award at the 2002 Black Engineer of the Year Award Conference. Dr.
Lewis is a member of the National Academies Naval Studies Board and the Panel on Assessment and
Analysis at the Army Research Laboratory, and he has served on the Committee on Distributed Remote
Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare and the Committee on Examination of the Air Force Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability Planning and Analysis (CP&A) Process.
Dr. Todd D. Murphey is a professor at the Neuroscience and Robotics Lab at Northwestern University,
where his research focuses on computational methods in dynamics and control with applications in
neuroscience, robotics, and automation. Dr. Murphey’s research group focuses on computational models
of embedded control, biomechanical simulation, dynamic exploration, and hybrid control. The
mathematical approaches used by the group lead to many orders of magnitude improvement in
computational efficiency for reliable real-time implementation. Applications include assistive exoskeleton
control, stabilization of energy networks, bio-inspired active sensing, entertainment robots, and robotic
exploration.
Dr. Gabriel Rebeiz2 is a distinguished professor at the University of California, San Diego. His expertise
includes design of silicon radio frequency integrated circuits for microwave and millimeter-wave systems
with a specialty on phased arrays and low- power circuits; active and passive imaging systems up to
terahertz (THz) frequencies (including thermal imagers); THz complementary metal-oxide-
semiconductors, and SiGe electronics, radio frequency (RF) micro-electro-mechanical systems,
reconfigurable front-ends, including tunable filters and tunable antennas, cognitive radios, planar antennas
from RF to THz frequencies, radars, and collision avoidance systems for automotive applications. Dr.
Rebeiz is a member of the NAE.
LTG Michael A. Vane, U.S. Army, retired, is an independent consultant. Previously, he was group vice
president for Training and Intelligence Solutions, DynCorp International, a leader of approximately 5,000
employees globally, serving areas of training, intelligence, and special operations forces roles to DoD and
State Department customers. General Vane has expertise in training and intelligence solutions with
standards, certifications, and delivery methods to meet customer needs. He managed multiple programs
worth more than $500 million annually for a diverse customer set. Prior to DynCorp, General Vane was
an executive advisor at Booz Allen Hamilton where his responsibility was to advise in the capability area
1
Dr. Kumar resigned from the committee on April 15, 2017. Due to circumstances beyond his control, he
was unable to participate in the report drafting and concurrence process.
2
Dr. Rebeiz resigned from the committee on April 10, 2017. Due to circumstances beyond his control, he
was unable to participate in the report drafting and concurrence process.

29

of Analytics in DoD markets- specifically, working on requirements development, live virtual-training

analysis to improve home station training, improved costing and readiness models, and institutional
transformation. Before retiring to civilian life, General Vane served as the deputy commanding general,
futures/director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) at the U.S. Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC). In his 36-year Army career, he has served as the vice director, J8, Force
Structure, Resources and Assessments; commanding general, U.S. Army Air Defense Center at Fort
Bliss, Texas; deputy chief of staff for Doctrine, Concepts and Strategy at TRADOC; Commanding
General 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command; and Director of Integration, deputy chief of staff
for operations and force development. He is also a member of the BAST. General Vane received a B.S. in
general engineering from U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and an M.S. in systems technology from
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

30

Additional Definitions
Deep magazine versus stowed kills. A magazine for a weapon system stores physical munitions or
energy (e.g., for directed energy weapons). A deep magazine refers to the ability of a system to be fired
numerous times before being resupplied. The “deepness” of a magazine will be limited by the number of
munitions physically carried by a system or, for directed energy or electronic warfare systems, by the
amount of stored energy (e.g., battery power). Stowed kills are the product of the number of firings in the
magazine, the probability of hit for each firing, and the probability of kill given that the target is hit. For
example, a system with a deep magazine (e.g., a high-capacity battery for a radio frequency jamming
system) would have zero stowed kills against targets outside of its maximum effective range, because the
probability of hit would be zero.
Multi-track. This is the ability to follow the flight path of multiple small unmanned aircraft systems
(sUASs) as part of a group or swarm.
Neutralization. This is the action taken to prevent a sUAS(s) from accomplishing its mission(s).
Neutralization may include the following:
 Actively destroying the entire sUAS(s) or critical physical components of a sUAS(s);

 Actively interrupting control of the sUAS(s) (e.g., jamming its communications links to
controllers or other sUASs);
 Actively taking control of the sUAS(s), including the following:
o Manipulating its control mechanism (e.g., a cyber-attack against its control software);
o Using decoys or other means to spoof a sUAS(s) into performing a different mission;
and
o Capturing a sUAS with a net; and
 Passively neutralizing its sensing capability through the use of camouflage, concealment, and
deception.
Target acquisition sequence. The committee describes the target acquisition sequence as consisting of
the following steps: detect, classify, recognize, identify, and identification of friend or foe (RDECOM,
2005). More fully, these are as follows:
 Detect. Determine that an object(s) in the field of view may be of military interest such that
the observer takes an action to look closer.
 Classify. The object(s) is distinguished or discriminated by class-for example, an individual,
group, or swarm of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUASs).
 Recognize. The individual, group, or swarm of sUAS(s) can be distinguished by type, such as
fixed wing, rotary wing, or hybrid.
 Identify. The sUAS(s) can be distinguished by make and model-for example, Raven or DJI

31

Phantom.
 Identification of friend or foe. In none of the above target acquisition levels is the force
allegiance of the object confirmed-that is, it cannot be confirmed whether it is a friendly,
threat, or a neutral sUAS. However, associating the above target acquisition information with
available intelligence information and knowledge of friendly force sUAS operations, the
operator or appropriate leader may make an identification-friend-or-foe assessment.
Track. This is the ability to follow the flight path of a sUAS.
Weapons control order. Weapons control orders are the rules of engagement in air defense operations
(DoA, 2015). Specifically pertaining to counter-sUAS actions, they include the following:
 Weapons hold. Counter-sUAS systems may only be fired in self-defense or when ordered by
an appropriate higher authority.
 Weapons tight. Counter-sUAS systems may be fired only at sUASs recognized as hostile, in
accordance with current rules of engagement.
 Weapons free. Counter-sUAS systems may be fired at any sUAS not positively recognized
as friendly.
REFERENCES
DoA (Department of the Army). 2015. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an
Integrated Air Defense System. FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP 3-2.31. Washington,
D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
RDECOM (U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command). 2005. Acquisition Level
Definitions and Observables for Human Targets, Urban Operations, and the Global War on
Terrorism. AMSRD-CER-NV-TR-235. Fort Belvoir, Va.: Communication-Electronics Research,
Development, and Engineering Center, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate.

32

Decomposition of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Discussions of small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technologies often focus on autonomy,
which is often equated with software and artificial intelligence. However, artificial intelligence is a
component of computer science and refers to the intelligence of a machine. Software code alone does not
fully describe sUAS technology.
To help identify sUAS technologies and how they contribute to future sUAS capabilities, the
committee believes that a decomposition of sUAS capabilities may be of benefit. The functional
decomposition may create redundancies in the listing of technologies-that is, the same technology may
support more than one functional area- but that may be useful information for identifying the importance
and breadth of each technology. The decomposition is first broken down into the following four areas: (1)
autonomous behavior (2) supporting functions, (3) mission packages and (4) additional considerations.
Each area is then broken down into more detailed subareas.1
 Autonomous behavior can be broken down into the following components:
— Perception is a sUAS’s ability to sense and observe its surroundings by relating features
in sensor data to features in the real world.
— Planning includes both path planning and mission planning. Path planning may be
deliberate (i.e., the sUAS takes time to assess large amounts of information) or reactive
(e.g., the immediate avoidance of an air-to-air collision) and includes the development of
a movement trajectory from the current position to the next position(s). Mission planning
provides the best course of military action given the following:
o The situational awareness of the environment, enemy situation, friendly situation,
weather, time available, etc.;
o An assessment of the assigned mission order;
o Doctrine and tactics;
o Standard operating procedures; and
o Other related military planning information.
— Navigation involves having situational awareness of the movement space; knowledge of
the current location, the desired end-state locations, and directions of movement; the
ability to map and find a way through immediate surroundings; and the ability to detect
nearby hazards to mobility.
— Individual behavior and skills is the combination of artificial intelligence with inputs
from perception, planning, and navigation to support cooperative behavior and develop
1
Some of the ideas for subareas were generated by the Committee on Army Unmanned
Ground Vehicle Technology (NRC, 2002).

33

motor commands. These motor commands may include mobility commands for flying,
walking, jumping, and so on; military-related commands for communicating information,
maneuvering with other forces, firing weapons, accomplishing assigned missions (e.g.,
surveillance, reconnaissance, explosive ordnance detection), and so on; interactions with
humans, other sUASs, non-sUAS robots, and command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; control of
mission packages (discussed below); and for accomplishing related skills (e.g., control
actuators to orient and increase speed on rotors to maintain, stable flight or to hover in
windy conditions).
— Group behavior and skills includes advanced swarm and collaborative group behaviors
such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing.
— sUAS-Human, sUAS-sUAS, sUAS-non-sUAS robots, and sUAS- C4ISR system
interactions is the ability to interact with human controllers (including operators and
commanders) and other humans (friendly military, enemy, and non-combatants); sUASs;
non-sUAS robots; and C4ISR systems. This interaction is very important for
collaborative sUAS operations (as defined in this report). It also includes the ability to
communicate with others (see “communications” below) and the ability to understand
“commander’s intent.”
— Learning and adaptation is the ability of a sUAS to enhance or modify its artificial
intelligence and its behaviors based on an evolving friendly situation and/or capabilities
as well as changing enemy tactics and/or capabilities-for example, the ability of a sUAS
to learn new military roles and rules of engagement when transitioning from conventional
to irregular warfare.
 Supporting functions include the following:
— Mobility is the ability of a sUAS to traverse through air, on land (natural and artificial
terrain), or in water (on and under) environments; including combinations of those
environments. For example, hybrid air/sea sUASs may operate in littoral regions and
hybrid air/land sUASs may operate on the ground but transform to fly an assigned
mission or to traverse obstacles or large distances.
— Communications is the ability to convey and receive information with digital
communications systems (including military and non-military communications links),
non-verbal communications (e.g., hand-and-arm signals, gestures), and graphical user
interfaces. In swarms and collaborative groups, sUASs interact with each other using
explicit and/or implicit communications. In collaborative groups, sUASs may
communicate with non-sUAS entities.
— Power and energy includes power sources (e.g., rechargeable and non-rechargeable
batteries, fuel cells, and engines) and energy management to support a sUAS and its
mission package
— Health maintenance is the ability to make a sUAS more robust and to provide
maintenance capabilities for self-monitoring, diagnostics, and recovering from
component failures (naturally occurring or resulting from an attack).
— Safety is the ability of sUASs (especially those with lethal mission packages) to operate
safely in an operational environment. Besides lethality, consider mid-air collisions
(especially between sUASs and manned air platforms) and control of air-to-ground
crashes, which could result in the destruction of military and civilian ground personnel
and property.
 Mission packages include the following:

34

— Modular physical components, including lethal conventional and unconventional

weapons, directed energy and electronic warfare weapons, surveillance systems, and
sensors that are attached to a common sUAS platform to provide it with a unique
capability; and
— Modular software components that vary from sUAS to sUAS (ranging from complex
“decision-focused” software to simple “follow-orders” software) to delineate specific
tasks, such as higher-echelon “leader” sUASs, lower-echelon leaders, “follower” sUASs,
or even one-of-a-kind task sUASs (e.g., the sUAS designated as flying a low-power
jammer).
 Additional considerations. In addition to the above autonomous behavior, supporting

functions, and mission packages, three other areas can be considered in the decomposition of
sUAS technologies. These areas indirectly support the functional capabilities of a sUAS,
support the development of a sUAS, and support the testing of sUASs. The three areas are as
follows:
— Modeling and simulation. This is the use of individual or a combination of computer-

based models and simulations, hardware-in-the-loop simulations, human-in-the-loop
simulations, and live prototype simulations to conduct early user assessments,
developmental and operational tests, and support systems engineering efforts.
— Systems engineering. This is comprised of tools and methodologies to assist with the
optimal design and development of a sUAS; as well as for enhancing the interactions of
the components on a sUAS, and the interoperability of a sUAS with humans, other
sUASs, other non-sUAS robots, and C4ISR systems.
— Test range support functions. This includes time-space-position information, other test
instrumentation (e.g., telemetry), and range safety for instrumenting threat sUASs and
assessing counter-sUAS systems. Including instrumentation to provide time-space-
position information and other test data is a significant problem on sUASs that have little
or no space, weight, or power available for the instrumentation.
REFERENCE
NRC (National Research Council). 2002. Technology Development for Army Unmanned Ground
Vehicles. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.

35


Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability For Battalion-And-Below Operations

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability For Battalion-And-Below Operations

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS

This PDF is available at http://nap.edu/24747 SHARE

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for

48 pages | 8.5 x 11 | PAPERBACK

– Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of scientiﬁc reports

Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Board on Army Science and Technology

Division on Engineeering and Phy

A Consensuus Study Reeport of

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001

Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/24747

Copyright 2018 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Proceedings published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

COMMITTEE ON COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (CUAS) CAPABILITY FOR

BRUCE BRAUN, Director, Board on Army Science and Technology

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

BOARD ON ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

BRUCE A. BRAUN, Director

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Albert A. Sciarretta, Chair

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

DISCUSSION OF SELECTED TOPICS FROM THE RESTRICTED REPORT 3

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

BOX 1 Statement of Task

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Discussion of Selected Topics from the Restricted Report

The Committee on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS) Capability for Battalion-and-

Concern about Commercial sUASs

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

of a terrorist organization above a village or town.

Concern about the Emergence of Swarms and Collaborative Groups4

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

 Command and control elements of the battalion and company;

STUDY APPLICABILITY BEYOND THE ARMY

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

 Immediate (today-2019, 1 to 2 years);

PREPUBLICATION DRAFT—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION