The Aristotelian hylemorphism is not mereological

Abstract
Recently the Aristotelian metaphysics concerning compounded substances (hylemorphism) has
been considered from a mereological viewpoint: the neo-Aristotelian mereology (1) sustains that
hylemorphism – according to which ordinary material objects are σύνολοι, namely compounded
substances (οὐσίαι) composed by matter (ὕλη) and form (μορφή, εἶδος)1 – is a mereological theory
wherein the σύνολοι are mereological complex objects and (2) develops the mereological
hylemorphism (MH) towards a mereological theory alternative to Classical Extensional
Mereology.
I shall not discuss whether neo-Aristotelian theories provide a consistent and exhaustive alternative
to standard mereology, rather my purpose is to show that a mereological interpretation of
Aristotelian hylemorphism is wrong, presenting (in section 1.) and criticizing (in section 2.) an
example argument – that of Kathrin Koslicki (2006)2 – on proper parthood relation of matter and
form3. No mereological proper parthood can be pointed out in Aristotle’s hylemorphism (AH),
except that violating some textual evidences and some of his fundamental metaphysical
assumptions: this would be a result which should suggest that the interpretation is misleading.

1. An argument for neo-Aristotelian hylemorphism

K. Koslicki’s argument goes as follow:
K1) In Met. Z.17 Aristotle distinguishes things that are simple (ἁπλοῦν) and things that are
compounded (σύνθετον)4.
K2) There are compounds which are one (ἕν) (CU) and compounds which are not one, rather they
are heap (σωροί).
K3) CU have matter (ὕλη) – that is divisible into elements (στοιχεῖα) – as its proper part because:

1) The matter is part of CU.

2) The matter has different properties from CU, because: (textual evidence)
2.1) According to Met. Z.7-9 the matter exists before the CU, that
comes to existence from (ἐκ) the already existing matter.
2.2) According to Met. Z.17 the matter has different persistence
conditions from the CU, in fact it persists even after the
dissolution of the CU, as the elements of the flesh or the
letters of the syllable BA that persist after the whole’s
dissolution.

1
Here I understand μορφή and εἶδος as synonyms. Aristotle often uses them interchangeably,
though this does not imply that they always have the same meaning. But this is not crucial for the
present purpose and for the Aristotelian texts that I have quoted.
2
That is the same of K. Koslicki (2007) and (2008).
3
Not all the proponents of MH sustain Koslicki’s argument in which both matter and form are
mereological parts. However, the arguments for rejecting Koslicki’s MH correspond to a general
rejection of MH, because, as we will see, in Aristotle there is no room for proper parts at all.
4
K. Koslicki (2006: p. 720).
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 3) Aristotle endorses Leibniz’s Law on Indiscernibility of Identicals by (textual evidence)
which numerically identical objects are qualitatively indiscernible5
and its equivalent contrapositive formulation by which objects with
different properties are numerically distinct6, in fact he states that a
thing and its matter are different objects for their different properties,
namely their different persistence conditions.
4) The matter is numerically distinct from the CU, it preserves its own (2) and (3)
identity before, in and after the CU.
5) The matter is a proper part of the CU. (1), (4) and Proper
Parthood def.7

K4) If CU, unlike heap, is not identical to its matter (for K3), then there have to be in CU something-
other (ἐτερόν τι), namely an additional component that causes the difference between CU and heap.
K5) The something-other (SO) falls in a different ontological category from that of the matter,
because it cannot be itself matter neither (1) like an element nor (2) like a compound of elements
as stated by the regression argument. 1) If it were an element en+1 then it would be added to en and
in order to obtain a CU another SO would be required to give unity to the compound; moreover, if
this latter were an element too, then one more SO would be demanded and so on. 2) If it were a
compound of elements, then it would be composed by one or more elements: in the former case
the whole SO would coincide with the single element and this case would fall under (1); the latter
case would fall under (1) too, as a more complicated scenario wherein the elements themselves are
compounded and before wondering on the unity of the main CU we should wonder about the unity
of its compounded elements with the very same problems.
K6) SO is the form (εἶδος) of the CU and its principle (ἀρχή) and cause (αἴτιον) of unity that
differentiates it from a heap.
K7) Form is a proper part of CU because:

1) Matter is a proper part of CU. (K3)

2) In Met. Z.17 1041b22-23 8 Aristotle endorses Weak (textual evidence)10

Supplementation Principle (WSP), according to which an object

5
x = y ⇒ ∀F (Fx ⇔ Fy).
6
∃F (Fx ∧ ¬Fy) ⇒ x ≠ y.
7
PPxy =df Pxy ∧ x ≠ y, where ‘PP’ denotes ‘proper part’ and ‘P’ denotes ‘part’.
8
“[…] if it [the SO] is a compound, clearly it will be a compound not of one but of many (or else
it will itself be that one) […]” (W. D. Ross’ translation quoted by Koslicki).
10
Is quite risky to infer from only two Greek lines that Aristotle endorses WSP, mostly if the very
same lines could represent another mereological principle as Company (C): (x≪y) ⇒ ∃z (z≪y
∧ z ≠ x). Koslicki does not consider this possibility and gives no criterion to choose between
WSP and C. However, note that C would be destructive for Koslicki’s argument, because matter
and form could not be proper part, since they could overlap. In fact, C does not exclude that z is
numerically distinct from x still being an improper part of x. (P. Simons, 1984: p. 27).
2
 that has a proper part x must have at least another proper part z
disjointed from x9.

3) Form is a proper part of CU11 . (1), (2) and WSP

K8) By K3 and K7 follow the MHK thesis:

MHK The compounded substance, made out by matter and form, is a

mereological complex object because its matter and form are proper
parts.

2. Aristotelian hylemorphism12
I shall criticize two focal points without which MHK is inacceptable: (AM) by denying K3.4
because matter in the CU has not an independent identity from the CU; (AL) by denying K7 since
matter and form cannot be disjointed parts neither from a logical viewpoint nor from a metaphysical
one and this because they have the same being. Moreover, (AP) I shall present that it is impossible
an account of proper parthood in AH and finally (AZ) I shall re-interpret Met. Z.17.

AM1) Matter persists: generation (γένεσις) and corruption (φθορά) need continuity of being, there
is no generation ex nihilo from the absolute non-being nor total annihilation towards the absolute
non-being 13 , therefore something has to persist during the change, namely the matter (as
ὑποκείμενον) that in a sense is the same before, in and after the generated and in another sense
changes – referring to the form, from not-F to F and from F to not-F – (“ὃ μὲν γάρ ποτε ὂν
ὑπόκειται τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δ'εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό”)14. I.e. the wood changes from not-being bed (not-F) to
being bed (F) and menses changes from not-being human (not-F) to being human (F) and they also
cease to exist (not-F).
AM2) Matter is re-identified in the CU15: the matter from (ἔκ) which the generated comes to exist
becomes part of the generated (“ὥστε, καθάπερ λέγεται, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι εἰ μηδὲν προϋπάρχοι.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τι μέρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρξει φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη μέρος”). Becoming part means to
produce in the generated something of the same own nature (“τι αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον”), so the marble
produces in the statue something like itself, namely the ‘marbleness’. CU’ matter is of the same
nature of the matter-ἔκ, but is not the same thing because the matter-ἔκ itself changes during
generation (“γὰρ καὶ γίγνεται αὕτη”) or corruption. This is a substantial change that modifies the

9
(x≪y) ⇒ ∃z (z≪y ∧ z ∫ x).
11
“[...] there is of course no better candidate, within Aristotle’s ontology, for this additional part
than form” (K. Koslicki, 2006: p. 726). Following Koslicki’s interpretation, why does WSP imply
that form is the other proper part? If the premises on matter’s parthood are clear, conversely there
is no argument about form’s parthood and the reason why it should be numerically distinct from
CU.
12
Aristotle’s Greek texts from I. Bekker (1831), English translations from J. Barnes (1991) and W.
D. Ross (1928).
13
Physics I.8, 191a23-b17.
14
On Generation and Corruption, I.3.
15
Metaphysics Z.7, 1032b15-1033a23.
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individual μορφή, then matter-ἔκ has to transmute and it will not be the same thing anymore (“διὰ
τὸ δεῖν μεταβάλλοντος γίγνεσθαι ἐξ οὗ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπομένοντος”)16.
This metaphysical view is represented in the grammatic of ordinary language: the name of the
generated is given referring to the matter-ἔκ, but not using the matter’s noun as if the matter in the
generated did not change, rather using its adjective form (“ἐξ οὗ δὲ ὡς ὕλης γίγνεται ἔνια λέγεται,
ὅταν γένηται, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἐκείνινον”). Therefore, because the marble is the cause of the statue’s
‘marbleness’, the statue is ‘marmoreal’ (λίθινος ἀνδριὰς), and is not marble (λίθος).
AM3) Matter is re-identified after the CU: CU’s matter does not persist to CU’s dissolution, it
changes its being as stated by the principle of homonymy. CU’s matter and the matter out of the
CU have in common only the name, but they are different things: dead human flesh is not human,
but is said ‘human’, an eye out of the body is not an eye, but is said ‘eye’17.
AM4) Matter’s persistence involves identity in the species: the individual identity of matter before
and of matter after CU is different from that of CU’s matter18, but there are many senses in which
things are said identical (ταὐτά) and one of these is the identity by matter’s species (“καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἡ
ὕλη μία ἢ εἰδει”)19. Therefore, marble-ἔκ and the statue’s marble are identical by species, in this
sense the marble persists and the same applies to corruption.

AL1) Disjointness requires that two things must not overlap, that is, they must not have any part in
common. This entails that if we make a mereological operation such as mereological difference20,
subtracting a proper part (x) still another proper part remains (z)21.

AL2) Matter and form cannot be metaphysically disjointed: the relation between form and matter
of the σύνολος is in terms of potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια) as stated in Met. H.
Subtracting matter form is no more actuality, rather a sort of virtuality as a part of the ability of the
generator – viz. the virtual form on the producer’s mind and the virtual form in the sperm’s πνεῦμα
– . Subtracting the form matter is no more potentiality, if it is considered independently by the form
that it actually has (wood qua bed) or that it potentially could be (wood potentially bed), then it is
no more a determinable but it is considered in itself as a determined (wood qua wood).
AL3) Matter and form cannot be logically disjointed: the definitions of matter and form refer to
each other. On form there is the emblematic case of De An. B.1-2 where the matter-body

16
Aristotle uses the very same concepts in the successive section Met. Z.8, that – surprisingly and
without any explanation – according to Koslicki (2006: p. 725) is “quite overtly mereological”.
17
De Anima B.1, 412b10-22, Meteorology IV.12, 389b31, Politics A.2, 1253a19-29.
18
A general remark on matter’s persistence: Met. Λ.5 1071a24-29 states clearly that the causes of
CU are different for each individual, even though they are the same from the universal viewpoint.
Therefore, how is it possible that the matter of CU' is the very same matter of CU'', i.e. the wood
of a bed in t' and the bed transformed in bedside table in t''?
19
Metaphysics Δ.9, 1018a5-6, look also at Metaphysics Δ.6.
20
P. Simons (1987: pp. 11-14).
21
It would be really anti-Aristotelic sustaining that matter and form are real parts, as the form were
a sort of platonic idea with its own independent ontological status, therefore I shall consider only
whether is possible a metaphysical and a logical disjointness.
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(‘σώματος’) occurs in the definition of the form-soul (‘ψυχή’) (“ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη
σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔκοντος”) and on matter, considering AM, if its being is
determined by the CU and CU’s being is that of its form, and if the definition is the linguistic
formula of something’s being, then defining the matter, i.e. the living body, is defining it in terms
of the form: living body is a corps that is potentially alive.

AP) Impossibility of proper parthood: proper parthood requires that parts are not-identical to the
whole. In Aristotle the identity of an object is determined by its individual form and to have an
individual form is to be actively and not potentially. Therefore, if there are proper parts they have
to be actively. But in Met. Δ.13, Z.17 Aristotle states that parts (μόρια, μέρη) which are actively,
which have an own nature and which are something determined by themselves are in a whole only
potentially, because when they become actively parts they are no more in the whole – that is
absolutely coherent with AM2 – . When a substance is dissolved and each material part acquires
its own being, we have a heap (σωρός), namely a non-unite compound of n objects that are in a
certain configuration. This configuration is also called σχῆμα and represents the lower unity degree,
founded, i.e., on spatial continuity, as in the case of a heap of things, or on spatial proportions, such
as the configuration according to which someone places the furniture in the living room.
This kind of things considered a unity by configuration, but that are not a unity, are also called
ποσοί, viz. a quantitative unity on which each part is a determinate thing with its own being. Ποσοί
are πλήθη if there is a plurality of parts that are numerable and are not continuous (μὴ συνεχῆ), or
they are μεγέθη if the parts are measurable and are continuous (συνεχῆ).

AZ) In Met. Z.17. neither (1) Aristotle distinguishes compounded things and simple things (K1)
nor (2) he speaks about a composition between matter (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος) (K8).
(1) The topic is what οὐσία is, and it is an ἀρχή and αἴτιον, namely the answer to a precise kind of
research: not that which inquires an object considering it simple (ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι) without
separating something from something other (μὴ διορίζειν ὅτι τάδε τόδε) – i.e. “Why a is a?”, “Why
a is?” – , but that which divides the object articulating (διαρθρώσαντας) it in parts, wondering why
something belongs to or is something other (τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει) – i.e., about a natural object
“Why this flesh stays such and such (“ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον”)?”. The distinction between
simple and compound is given in the consideration and not in the objects, the very same object can
be inquired in both ways, moreover answering positively to the simple question on its existence is
a pre-requirement for inquiring it as a compound of parts.
(2) The composition in the articulated research is between matter and configuration (τοδὶ ἔχον, that
is to stay that way) and the form is the answer to this articulation – “Why this flesh stays such and
such (τοδὶ ἔχον)?”, “Because it is a dog [form]” –
If the answer is the form, the matter is not simply configurated in a certain way, but it is something
other over the configuration. To underlying this feature Aristotle distinguishes unitary compound
of matter and configuration (σύνθετον ἕν) and non-unitary compound (heap, σωρός). The form, the
οὐσία, is the answer only to those questions concerning objects that are one, such as the syllable
BA that is not only letters (στοιχεῖα)22 putted together in a certain configuration, but they – letters

22
Here ‘στοιχεῖα’ is ‘letters’ and not ‘elements’, referring to material elements; ‘στοιχεῖα’ is
introduced only concerning the syllable BA but Koslicki applies it as ‘elements’ also to the parts
of the dissolved flesh that in the text are not ‘στοιχεῖα’ but ‘earth’ (“γῆ”) and ‘fire’ (“πῦρ”). This
is an important point of Koslicki’s argument, because using ‘στοιχεῖα’ as ‘elements’ she states that
the regression argument involves only material elements and not parts tout court, since in the text
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in a certain position – are also a syllable. On the contrary, the question on a heap has not the οὐσία
as the answer, because the configuration of its parts is not explained by the heap’s being – a being
which it does not possess at all – but by the parts’ being, by their ability to stay in such an such
way – as stated in AP – .
Therefore, the ἐτερόν τι (SO), that is the εἶδος and the οὐσία, is the being that a unitary compound
is and that a non-unitary compound is not. Obviously, the form cannot be itself matter or
configuration, otherwise we have the regression argument: if being-syllable were a letter, we would
need another being shared by letters and the added part, and so on. That is because our research is
of the type (2) and the answer cannot be one of the terms articulated in the question, namely matter
and configuration: if we do not find nothing else over the parts articulated, then we have a heap.

Bibliography
Aristotle,
English translation of Aristotle’s texts from:
Barnes J. (1991), The Complete Work of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton
University Press, New Jersey.
Ross W. D. (1928), The works of Aristotle, vol. VIII, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Aristotle’s Greek texts from:
Bekker I. (1831), Aristoteles Grecae. Ex recognitione Immanuelis Bekkeri, editit Academia Regia
Borusica, Berolini ex Officina Academica.
Koslicki K.,
(2006), Aristotle's Mereology and the Status of Form, in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 103, n.
12, pp. 715–736.
(2007), Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology, in Dialectica, vol. 61, n. 1, Blackwell, Oxford-
Malden, pp. 127-159.
(2008), The Structure of Objects, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Simons P. (1987), Parts. A study in Ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

does not occur the term ‘μέρη’. But as we have seen from AP Aristotle rejects μόρια and μέρη and
not only elements.
6