The Role of the Media during

Communal Riots in India

A Study of the 1984 Sikh Riots and the 2002 Gujarat Riots

Secularism is the backbone of the Indian Constitution and India is a land of many religions.
However, one can witness frequent communal conflicts between various religious groups.
In a multi-religious society like India, the role of the mass media in such communal conflicts
becomes extremely important. Two of such horrific communal riots have been the 1984 Sikh
riots and the 2002 Gujarat (Godhra) riots. The coverage by the Indian media on both the
incidents received intense criticisms. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the way in which
the Indian media covered and reported the 1984 Sikh riots and the 2002 Gujarat (Godhra) riots.
In analysing the role of the media in both the riots, the paper would also discuss if the media
have been objective and also as to what ideally should be media’s role in coverage of such
future communal riots in India, if any.

Saifuddin Ahmed

C ommunalism is a pervasive phenomenon in the

public life of India and communal riots are the
ugliest expression (Krishna, 1985). Communal riots
have become an integral part of communalism in India.
An event can be classified as a communal riot on two
grounds: firstly, if there is violence and, secondly, if two
or more communally identified groups confront each
other or the members of the other group, at some point
during the violence (Varshney, 2002). The reason behind
such communal riots can be superficial and trivial; though
deep within, there are political reasons behind such
events (Varshney, 2002). India is not new to communal
riots; the first recorded riots were in the years 1714, 1715,
1716 and 1750 in Ahmedabad (Rajeshwari, 2004). Bipin
Chandra in his book, Communalism in modern India,
writes that the maximum communal riots in India took
place during 1923–1926.
Communal riots in India are not spontaneous and are
rarely due to any religious animosity. They usually arise
due to conflicting political interests, which are often
linked to economic interests (Rajeshwari, 2004). From the
1960s till the late 1980s, the local political and economic
factors played a significant role in instigating the riots
in major parts of India (Engineer, 2002). However, since
then the emergence of Hindtuva1, politics has been the
major cause of communal riots (Engineer, 2002).
The role of the news media in the reportage of
communal riots in India is a major area of concern.
Saifuddin Ahmed is a Master’s in Mass Communications
graduate student at Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore.
Everything is reported in the media, as are communal
riots. The role of the news media has grown in recent
years, perhaps because of the centrality of the news
media in communal violence and conflicts (Wolfsfeld,
2007). Even the most casual of observers will not deny
the increasing significance of news media under such
crisis situations. The influence of the news media in
peace processes is subtler, in part because what is not
reported in the media is in some ways more important
than what is reported.
This paper will look at the way the Indian media
covered and reported the two most horrific incidents
of communal violence in India—the 1984 Sikh riots and
the 2002 Gujarat (Godhra) riots. On both occasions, the
media drew criticisms. The paper would discuss if the
media have been objective in covering both riots and also
as to what should be the media’s role in the coverage of
such future communal riots in India, if any.
The changing face of news media
The global media sphere is changing with each passing
second. New communications technologies such as
camera-enabled mobile phones and laptop computers
are giving journalists an opportunity to gather and
disseminate information easily. This digitisation of the
news industry has led to compression of time and space
and thus enabled us to see news and images of conflicts
as and when they happen. The images broadcast in our
living rooms are not only informing the global audience
of the horrific happenings but might also instigate further
violence in an existing violent situation. As a result, the
media’s reporting of a conflict situation has become as

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MEDIA ASIA, VOL 37 NO 2, 2010
central to the unfolding of the conflict itself. With the
evolution in technology, the tyranny of distance might
have reduced but various hidden realities and factors
still affect the reporting of conflicts. This is suggested by
a study done by Virgil Hawkings, who explains that the
conflict in Africa, which has been in the post-Cold War
world responsible for nearly 90 per cent of the world’s
war deaths, suffered a complete media blackout. Similarly,
the coverage of the massive war in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), which resulted in over one
million deaths in the year 2000, was almost insignificant
(Hawkins, 2008).
The media ignite the opinion-building process and
impact the political decisions and audience’s reactions
in society. This eventually shapes the course of prevalent
crises and conflicts (Ballantine, 2003).
Media, religion and politics
With the planes hitting the Twin Towers on 11 September
2001, the relationship between the media and religion
changed forever. Karim (2003) suggested that religion
would become an important topic for the media and the
way the media cover events would be influenced by the
religious undertones. It is arguable if the world and its
religions have changed or not, but the media coverage
of the same surely has.
Within India, religion has a large impact on the
personal lives of millions of people. The country practises
almost every other religion known to the world and this
is one of the most important facets of the country, as is
politics. The politicians play on the religious issues every
now and then, and the media are used as the platform.
The politicians communicate with the common masses
through the mass media. The way in which we know and
find out about our politicians is through the media. It is the
media that serve as the main channel of communication
between the politicians and the public. Religion is a
subject in India that the politicians intelligently use to
their advantage.
Academic literature has covered the representation of
conflict in religion as well as the media and religion but
not much has been researched on media, religion and
conflict situations in context with each other, especially
within an environment like India. It would be difficult
to understand the relationship between religion, its
construction, presentation and conflict situations covered
in the media, without some reference to the broader
political context within which it takes place because in a
nation like India, religion is certainly driven by political
motives. In order to understand the role the media play
and should play during communal clashes in India, let
us analyse the two worst communal riots India has ever
seen—the 1984 Sikh riots and the 2002 Gujarat riots.
The 1984 Sikh riots
The events
On 31 October 1984, the Indian Prime Minister, Indira
Gandhi, was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards.
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2413930
What followed was complete mayhem, which led to
lethal anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi, India. Sikh homes
were systematically singled out in the capital and brutally
destroyed (Tatla, 2006). The Sikhs were hounded, tyres
were put around their neck, and petrol doused on their
faces and bodies set ablaze to brutal death (Mohanka,
2005). More than 3,000 Sikhs were killed in New Delhi
itself. Two hundred Gurudwaras, the place where Sikhs
worship, were burnt down and many Sikh-owned shops
were looted (Bedia, 2009).
The situation worsened when the newly elected Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the son of Indira Gandhi, said,
“When a big tree falls, the ground beneath is sure to
rumble.” This gave a sense as if Rajiv Gandhi was giving
a boost to the killers who were assassinating hundreds
of Sikhs in the streets of New Delhi (Mohanka, 2005).
Mrs Gandhi’s assassinators were avenging the killings
of Sikhs during the Operation Bluestar. In June 1984, Mrs
Gandhi wanted to flush out a few terrorists led by Jamail
Singh Bhindranwale, who were hiding in the precincts
of the Golden Temple, the holiest shrine for Sikhs in
India. On 3 June 1984, a 36-hour curfew was imposed
in the Sikh-dominated state of Punjab. All methods of
communication and travel were suspended. Electricity
supplies were interrupted, a total blackout was created
and Punjab was cut off from India and rest of the world
(Brar, 1992).
On the night of 5 June, the Indian Army under the
command of Major General Kuldeep Singh Brar stormed
into the Golden Temple. By the morning of 7 June, the
Indian Army had full control of the temple. The militant
leaders were killed in the two-day battle but along with
it, a large number of pilgrims, civilians and children also
died (Ahmed, 1996).
The Sikh community were agitated. Their holiest
shrine was turned into a bloody battlefield and innocent
lives were lost. Saran Singh, a retired bureaucrat and a
famous member of the Sikh community in India said, “It
was sacrilege to send troops inside, open fire and in the
process kill innocent devotees gathered to observe the
martyrdom” (Mohanka, 2005).
From June to September 1984, most members of the
Sikh community nursed a festering wound only to blurt
out in Mrs Indira Gandhi’s assassination.
The Indian media’s coverage of Operation Bluestar
and the riots
The media, by nature, play an extremely important
role for any socio-political situation irrespective of the
boundary they hold (Mohanka, 2005). The media’s role
in the riots of 1984 is an interesting case. Scholars believe
that the media can play a role in focusing on a cause
much before it takes an ugly turn. In the case of Punjab
in 1984, the local media were not supportive of the Sikh
causes. Moreover, since the beginning of the problems in
Punjab, the government had strict control on the media
and imposed heavy censorship. Since independence until
the invasion of cable television in India, the electronic
media had served as the mouthpiece of the government
 The Role of the Media during Communal Riots in India: A Study of the 1984 Sikh Riots and the 2002 Gujarat Riots

(Das, 2009). Similar was the role of the electronic media flow of information is essential to the prevention
in Punjab during the riots. The government had such tight of rights and liberties in a democratic society and
control over the media that the foreign correspondents India claims to be the world’s largest democracy. So,
trying to capture the horrific events were not even allowed they should act as the world’s largest democracy.
in the local land. The Indian government acted as a strict This is the foundation for a democratic nation and
visible gatekeeper and made it impossible to approve is not too much to ask of India to respect the rights
journalist visas for foreign correspondents. The events of of all its people and not just the Hindu majority.
the 1984 riots thus suffered not only from biased media It is not right for any government to deny 16 mil-
coverage but also selective coverage, which projected a lion of its own people the basic political and civil
one-sided, carefully selected perspective (Das, 2009). rights. India has a moral obligation to protect the
The “media blackout” during the Operation Bluestar is Sikh community.2
a prime example of the same.
The national newspaper’s reporting on the Sikhs
The day before the actual invasion by the Indian Army,
made no distinction between a regional political party,
the government ordered all press out of the state and
a handful of militants and the entire Sikh community.
restricted press coverage in Punjab. The press was allowed
Even the senior editors and columnists of the national
only a week later on special organised guided tours. The
newspapers considered all Sikhs accountable for the
aftermath was later described by the press as involving a
assassination of Indira Gandhi and provided no sympathy
small gang of criminals disliked by the majority of Sikhs
to the community during the riots. Through the critical
and Indians. The press described the militants as petty
years of the political crisis in Punjab before the horrific
political agitators rather than leaders of a movement for
riots, the national dailies had not help resolve the issue.
a greater Punjab autonomy, as believed by a majority of
The Times of India, one of the leading national dailies,
Sikhs. Similarly, during the reportage of the 1984 riots,
and The Hindustan Times did more to incite hostility
there were discrepancy between the press release of
between Hindus and Sikhs than perhaps any other
data and images and the actual severity of the violent
national English language newspaper (Das, 2009).
situation that prevailed in the streets of New Delhi (Das,
The media were involved in the dissemination of
2009). This usage of selective information in the Indian
misinformation to the public. The best example of the
media only contributed to the ambiguous image of Sikhs
same would be when a national newspaper carried an
throughout the nation and failed to bring their plight to
article reporting that huge quantities of heroin and drugs
light. During the Sikh Movement, the government of
had been recovered within the Golden Temple complex
India had passed the National Security Act (1980), the
and the same had been used by the militants to illegally
Punjab Disturbed Areas Ordinance (1983), The Armed
fund their operations. Since, the foreign press was banned
Forces Special Powers Act (1983) and the Terrorists
in Punjab; they picked up the story based on the 14 June
Affected Areas (Special Courts Act of 1984). These acts
Press Trust of India (PTI) news report from government
provided the police and army with sweeping powers.
sources. This news was carried in the major international
They could charge and curtail to the right to life under
newspapers. One week into the incident, the government
specific situations. The approach of the media during
retracted the official report on the grounds that the drugs
the crisis had been partisan in taking into account all
had been recovered from the India-Pakistan border and
types of multi-dimensional problem, historical, political,
not the Golden Temple complex. This retraction by the
socio-economic and ideological. The media only focused
government was not picked up by most international
on special restricted information and ignored a careful
news agencies and the damage done by the initial report
examination of all the issues and processes that had led
falsely remained among the masses.3
to the mayhem and the riots. During 1984, Indian leaders
Many scholars believed that the Indian media forgot
were free to make up non-existent stories and broadcast
to prioritise issues and failed to act upon them. Senior
through government-controlled radio and television
Indian journalist, Manoj Mitta along with H. S. Phoolka
channels. Since there was a major restriction on the
in the book When a tree shook Delhi writes that the media
foreign press, all foreign news correspondents were left
focused on the assassination of Indira Gandhi and did
with no choice but to take the twister news of the local
not care enough about the Sikh murders during the riots.
government-controlled media.
Mitta says:
The US House of Representatives had a viewpoint on
the same. It said: The media by and large went by the official line on
the carnage. It focused on the happenings at Teen
As a result the outside world receives a biased
Murti Bhawan, where Indira Gandhi’s body lay
one-side view of what goes on in Punjab because
in state and where from people around the world
the Indian Government has control over most of
had come to pay respect. So photographers were
the domestic media. This contributes to the stere-
flocking to that place and the killings that were
otype that all Sikhs are extremist radicals who are
simultaneously going on in the capital did not get
terrorising the predominantly Hindu nation and
recorded at all. It’s bizarre but true.
that is just not the fact. If the Indian Government
has nothing to hide it should remove the news Not all were pleased by the Indian media’s coverage
blackout and permit outsiders into Punjab. The free of the 1984 Sikh riots.

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MEDIA ASIA, VOL 37 NO 2, 2010
The 2002 Gujarat riots
The events
On 27 February 2002, the Ahmedabad-bound Sabarmati
Express train reached a small town in Gujarat named
Godhra (Yeolekar, 2002). Instead of the usual 5-minutes
stoppage, the train stopped for 25 minutes and then
moved out of the platform. Before the train could run
at its normal speed, the alarm chain was pulled to stop
the train at Signal Falia, a Muslim-inhabited locality.
No one clearly knows what really happened but after
few minutes, the compartment S-6 was on flames. 58
passengers including 26 women and 12 children were
burnt to death (Yeolekar, 2002). Among the passengers
were the Kar Sevaks4 travelling from Ayodhya. There
have been different theories believing that Muslims were
behind this barbaric act.
If this wasn’t barbaric enough, what followed in the days
to come shook the entire secular nation of India. During
the next three days, from 28 February to 2 March 2002,
Muslims were butchered, massacred and burnt alive.
Out of the 24 districts in Gujarat, 16 were entangled by
organised mob attacks in which over 2,000 Muslims were
killed, 200 mosques and religious and cultural monuments
were sent to rumbles (Sawant et al, 2002). The Muslim
community of Gujarat suffered an enormous economic
blow with an overall loss of Rs 35 billion.
The Indian media’s coverage of the riots
The television coverage
For the first time in the history of communal clashes in
India, “violence was carried live” on television (Ninan,
2002) as the cameras brought the horrific images into
viewers’ home in Gujarat and elsewhere. There was no
live coverage of the attacks against the Sikhs back in
1984 or during the Babri Masjid fiasco in 1992. Those
were the era of print media and television was limited to
Doordarshan, a state-owned channel. It was only in 1996
when Rupert Murdoch ventured into India with the STAR
network and STAR News that India’s first 24-hour news
channel made live coverage possible (Page and Crawley,
2001). This addition to the television spectrum of India
added a new visual dimension to politics, violence and
public sphere in India. In 2005, the television newscape
had turned dense with a large number of players entering
the market; several 24-hour news channels were launched.
This led to intense competitive brand of journalism,
which was evident during the Gujarat riots. There were a
large consortium of journalists and television crews from
various channels on the streets in Gujarat, each trying to
outdo each other. When the Gujarat violence happened,
the private television in India had been broadcasting for
about eight years and was easily accessible by 40 million
among the 81.6 million Indians who owned television
sets.5 This option offered by the private television gave
the Indian viewers unprecedented access to independent
broadcasting.
When the first pictures of Gujarat riots were telecast
on Indian screens on 27 February, the three major news
106
networks in India—Star News, Aaj Tak and Zee News—
did not follow the guidelines formulated by the Press
Council of India, a quasi-judicial watchdog organisation
(Mehta, 2006). The guidelines mentioned not to reveal
the identity of victims or attackers in the news reports but
all the news networks carried blaring headlines about the
killing of the Kar Sevaks. The guidelines were against the
mentioning of victims or attackers as Hindus or Muslims
because they feared it could inflame passions and lead to
revenge attacks. The television news networks with its
striking visual images made this guideline redundant.
While covering the riots in Gujarat, the television
journalists openly identified the victims and the attackers.
Varadarajan argues for the naming of communities. He
states that not naming the communities increases a sense
of suspicion and anxiety among the ordinary citizens
not only in the riot-affected area but throughout the
nation. Then people tend to assume that the victims are
“their own” while attackers are “the other” (Varadarajan,
1999).
Famous Indian journalists, Rajdeep Sardesai and
Barkha Dutt of STAR News justified their stand of
naming the communities. Barkha Dutt stated, “Naming
the community under siege in Gujarat was moot of the
story. In fact it was the story, revealing as it did a prejudice
administrative and political system that was happy to just
stand by and watch” (Mehta, 2006).
The bold and independent media coverage by the
television media during the riots invited flak from
the political actors who were shown in the bad light.
Criticising the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the
Hindutva approach in the riots got STAR News and
English newspapers like The Times of India and Indian
Express bad press (Sonwalkar, 2006).
The BJP was in power in the state of Gujarat and at
the centre in New Delhi. After the initial violence, when
the news coverage of the attacks against the Muslims in
Gujarat started to reflect badly on the state and central
government, the leaders came down heavily on the
journalists and media personnel. The Prime Minister,
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, addressed the nation a day after
the attacks, regretting the “disgraceful” violence. He
later on added that the news media were presenting an
“exaggerated” account of the situation in Gujarat.6
The BJP and the state government under Narendra
Modi singled out STAR News and banned cable operators
from showing the channel in the state. The viewers in
Ahmedabad, one of the worst affected regions in the
riots, were left with blank television screens, unaware of
the reality happening on the streets (Mehta, 2006). Cable
operators received calls from local officials in Ahmedabad
and other cities to completely blackout STAR News,
Zee News, CNN and Aaj Tak. Dossiers and “hitlists” on
journalists were reportedly prepared while the channels
which dared to reveal the truth and were critical of the
Chief Minister and his plan of actions were not invited
to the press conferences and hence were denied the basic
right to information by the state itself (Sardesai, 2004).
The main complaint of the BJP and its allies was that
the news media did not cover and criticise those who were
 The Role of the Media during Communal Riots in India: A Study of the 1984 Sikh Riots and the 2002 Gujarat Riots
responsible for the Godhra train tragedy in which 58 Kar
Sevaks were victims. This, however, remains untrue as
most of the news channels and major newspapers covered
the Godhra train tragedy exclusively but the follow-ups
did not remain as “the story of the day” because the Union
Budget followed on 28 February. The budget coverage
was pushed aside when the mass killings and large-scale
retaliation against Muslims started in various parts of
the state (Sonwalkar, 2006).
Another criticism was that, the national media
“inflamed communal passions” by providing graphic
television coverage of the dreadful events. The journalists
and the news professional came out against the criticism
and said that the level of violence would have been much
worse if only the news media brought out the real picture
with the graphic images.
The BJP and its allies also christened the media as
“Marxist-Mullah combine” and the “Secular Taliban” for
criticising the attacks against the Muslims. Members of
the Editors Guild of India visited the affected regions in
Gujarat and were told by a group of Hindutva supporters
that the Hindu community has been defamed with the
coverage only being from the Muslim perspective: “They
only listen to Muslims and ignore the Hindus” (Patel et
al, 2002).
Sardesai explained the predicament faced by journalists
in covering the riots:
[If ] any reporter, whether print or television,
sees large-scale violence being committed, is the
journalist to ignore the hard reality and merely
present the facts as seen through the govern-
ment binoculars? If the Chief Minister says that
the situation is returning to normal even while
reports are streaming in of continuing violence
in several parts of the state, are not the lies to be
exposed? And if the government insists that the
army is out on the street when the fact is that the
army has been kept on stand-by and is waiting for
transport trucks, whose version is to be broadcast?
(Sardesai, 2002)
The press coverage
If the graphic coverage by the television channels hit
the headlines and raised criticisms, the nature of the
press coverage also came under the hammer. There were
two different approaches followed by the local and the
national media. The local section of the press, including
the Gujarati dailies Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar,
covered the events from a pro-Hindutva stand and
justified the killings of hundreds of Muslims. While the
national media, including The Times of India and the
Indian Express, were overtly critical of the channelised
attacks against the Muslims (Sonwalkar, 2006).
The team of Editors Guild of India met several
journalists, correspondents, editors, Chief Minister
Narendra Modi and others to conclude that the English-
language national press played an exemplary role in
coverage of the riots. BJP’s allegations of the media
playing an aggravating role in the coverage of the riots
have been dismissed by many scholars. Patel argues that
the allegation was “specious, self-serving and must be
dismissed” (Patel et al, 2002). The Editors Guild of India’s
team observed that:
Our finding is that the prompt and extensive por-
trayal by the national media of the untold horrors
visited on innocent people in the wake of the God-
hra carnage was a saving grace. The exposure of
the supine is not complicit attitude of the State and
manifest outpourings of communal hatred, stirred
the conscience of the nation, compelled remedial
action, howsoever defensively and belatedly ...
However, the role of the sections of the Gujarat
media, specially the Gujarat Samachar and more
notably Sandesh, was provocative, irresponsible
and blatantly violative of all accepted norms of
media ethics. This cannot be lightly passed over.
(Patel et al, 2002)
Gujarat Samachar is the largest selling daily in Gujarat
with a circulation of nearly 810,000 followed by Sandesh
with 705,000 (Sonwalkar, 2006). These two newspapers
have a large readership and dominate the print market
in Gujarat. A study by PUCL in 2002 found that there
were several instances of distorted and false reporting
in these two newspapers and also that the circulation of
Sandesh rose by 150,000 due to its pro-Hindutva stand.
The coverage analysis found that when Muslims were
at fault, their names were clearly mentioned and the
perpetrators identified. However, when the Muslims
were the victims of murders, loots, arsons and other
heinous crimes, the attackers were unnamed. The study
concluded:
No sources were quoted for headlines, even when
they were simply lifted from speeches by Vishwa
Hindu Parishad (one of the Hindutva political
parties in the state). Headlines were also mislead-
ing, and often followed up by reports that did not
substantiate, and even negated the headlines com-
pletely … The anti-minority stand was obvious in
the slant in news reporting. (PUCL, 2002)
Sandesh was extremely provocative in its reporting.
PUCL states Sandesh’s usage of headlines was to “provoke,
communalize and terrorise people” (PUCL 2002). On 28
Februrary, Sandesh carried a headline saying, “70 Hindus
burnt alive in Godhra”. Another report on the front page
read, “Avenge blood with blood”, which was a quote from
a statement made by one of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
leaders, but the newspaper used the words as a headline
without mentioning the leader (Sonwalkar, 2006).
On 6 March, the headline read, “Hindus beware: Haj
pilgrims return with a deadly conspiracy”, when the fact
remains that hundreds of Haj pilgrims were terrified
by the happenings in the state and had retuned under
police protection. PUCL emphasised in its study that
most news in Sandesh post-Godhra violence began with
the sentence, “In continuing spiral of communal rioting
that broke out as a reaction to the demonic/barbaric, etc
Godhra incident.” The comminatory adjectives used in
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MEDIA ASIA, VOL 37 NO 2, 2010
describing the Godhra incident were strikingly absent
when covering the post-Godhra Muslim annihilation
(PUCL, 2002).
One of the reports mentioned that the breasts of two
Hindu women had been chopped off by Muslim mobs
during the crisis. This report turned out be false and
the editor countered by saying that the information had
been provided by the police. The paper’s editor told that
it was against the policy of the newspaper to carry out
corrections and clarifications for previously published
articles (Patel et al, 2002). The Press Council of India
later censured the newspaper for the fault (Prerna, 2003).
Gujarat Samachar also heightened the tension through
its pro-Hindutva stand in the coverage of the events.
Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi openly praised
Sandesh for its work, which was publishing false and
rumoured reports with a pronounced pro-Hindutva and
an anti-Muslim stance. In a letter to the newspaper’s
editor, Modi writes:
The newspapers of the state played a decisive role
as a link between the people and the government.
You have served humanity in a big way. It is the
state government’s primary duty to restore peace
and security ... It is noteworthy that the newspa-
pers of Gujarat gave their full support to the state
government in undertaking this difficult task ... I
am grateful to you. (Varadarajan, 2002: 286)
The one regional newspaper that stood out amid the
Hindutva ideology was the Gujarat Today, notably started
by a few liberal Muslims in the state. The report suggested
Gujarat Today regularly carried out positive news
items highlighting interdependence of the communities
involved (PUCL, 2002). The two English-language
national newspapers in India, The Times of India and
the Indian Express were critical of the state government
in their articles. However, these two newspapers also
publish editions from Gujarat and a clear divide was
evident between the two English-language dailies and
the two regional editions (Sonwalkar, 2006). While the
English-language version was sharp in its criticisms
of Chief Minister Narendra Modi and his policies, the
two Gujarati dailies propagated the need of Hindutva.
Desai, an Ahmedabad-based correspondent of the Indian
Express writes:
Today, all the people who once used to look at me
with respect question me and abuse me. They do
this because I represented a publication whose
medium is English and because I reported human
misery in its right perspective ... A friend said: “All of
you from the English language media have tarnished
the image of Gujarat”. Today, the “common man”
in Gujarat hates the English language media. Even
a section of the English language media hates the
English language media. (Desai, 2004: 228)
There was a demarcation between the coverage of
the national media and a section of the regional press.
The national media did a commendable job but were
criticised by a few.
108
The role of the media during communal
riots: The road ahead
The result of the multiple and complex interests of regions,
states and/or various types of groups within them leads to
economic, social and political conflicts. Such conflicts are
difficult to handle and requires negotiations between the
parties involved and in this amorphous age of media, the
governments are finding it extremely difficult to handle
such situations (Terzis, 2008). Despite the increased
importance of communication, very few governments
can speak about successful communication during
conflicts because they fail to take into consideration the
perception of the conflict in the minds of the common
mass, the scientific analysis of the causable factors, the
agendas of the parties involved and the changing nature
of the conflict itself (Ballantine, 2003).
The role of the mass media in covering and resolving
conflicts, especially those involving religious differences
that leads to frequent communal riots in India, is extremely
crucial. We are in the age where the basic principles of
reportage of facts are sacred, comment-free, get both sides
of the story and double check the facts before writing
and they are not enough in reporting communal riots.
There are enough challenges faced by a journalist and
media personnel in such a situation. The guidelines for
a reporter in covering communal riots should be to look
out for detailed background information, not continue
with the stereotyping of communities, find residents who
deal with both the communities, talk to victims from
both sides, corroborate the victims’ as well as the police’s
accounts, discover the role of the police, the politicians
and the media and highlight stories where communities
have helped each other.
If we analyse the way Indian media covered the 1984
Sikh riots, we would understand that the media had
failed to understand the causative factors that led to
the riots. The media were criticised for not focusing
on the Sikh plights and paying more attention to the
assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi. The year 1984 was
the time when electronic media were not as huge as
today with the existence of only one television channel,
the state-owned Doordarshan. Thus, it was largely the
work of the print media to cover the issues but that was
not happening for sure. A full day of mass bloodshed had
taken place and there was hardly any media coverage of
the same. The initial coverage was not through any media
or newspaper agency but rather word of mouth. Rahul
Bedia, a correspondent working with Indian Express
back then was informed on 1 November 1984 about
the massive rioting which was taking place in a locality
named Trilokpuri in New Delhi. He rushed to the spot
and covered the story, “When Terror stalked Trilokpuri”,
published in the Indian Express on 2 November 1984.
Rahul Bedia was one of the few to cover the story. Years
later, Bedia recalls:
I was working with the Indian Express. A resident
of Block 32, Mohan Singh, managed to reach our
office. He had cut his hair to save his life. I happened
to be around at that time and heard his story. I went
 The Role of the Media during Communal Riots in India: A Study of the 1984 Sikh Riots and the 2002 Gujarat Riots
to Block 32 with two of my colleagues to come upon
this horrible massacre. (Khandelwal, 2004)
It is understood that there was a limitation on the media
by the government to cover the local issues in Punjab
during the Khalistan movement. However, having said
that, it was a failure on the part of the media for not
doing enough in covering the issues that were simmering
and finally led to Operation Bluestar, the assassination
of Indira Gandhi and eventually the riots. The news
media have a tremendous impact on the prediction and
assessment of humanitarian crises. They play a huge
influencing role if they report on an issue at an early
stage (Gerner and Schrodt, 1998).
Even if the reporters were not officially allowed in
the lands of Punjab during the rebel movement, they
could have done enough to analyse the situation and
bring the issue to light. The media chose to ignore it
over other issues in the country. There is this argument
that prevails: The media were not as large an industry
as today which could cover every issue in the country
but the Khalistan movement was not just any other
small group terrorist movement in any remote corner of
India. If it was indeed an insignificant movement, then
the government would have not banned the media from
getting first-hand information and outlook of the subject.
Reporters would have been freely allowed in the state to
cover the events and come up with their reports, which,
of course, did not happen. The media, as a watchdog of
the society they claim to be, failed miserably during an
event of national crisis.
However, the media industry in India grew by leaps
and bounds and this was truly reflected in the way the
Gujarat riots of 2002 was covered and analysed. One
major difference between the media coverage of the two
riots under discussion is television. Gujarat happened
to be India’s first television riots. There was remarkable
journalism done in the 1980s in India but, somehow, the
power and sanctity of the written word cannot match
the impact and immediacy of the television image. This
was true during the Gujarat riots, when the visuals of
a street carnage in Ahmedabad or the voices of Sangh
Parivar foot soldiers shouting slogans and rejoicing their
“achievements” was broadcasted in each home, thereby
confirming and perhaps magnifying the gravity of the
crime that was being carried on.
Journalism schools in India in the 1970s taught almost
nothing about reporting on communal riots except
that the communities involved should not be named.7
Bland reports about two groups clashing and places of
worship being destroyed will keep all the communities
in the dark. The national print and television media did
a stupendous job in the coverage of the Gujarat riots.
They were criticised for flaming passions and naming
the communities involved, but I think it was the best step
to take under such circumstances. As Phillip observed:
When the television camera focuses on a riotous
mob or its victims, it leaves little to imagination of
the viewers ... The ban on naming the communities
was a fit case for review, although with the advent
of television it has become redundant. Questions
also remain whether the guidelines are applicable
to the electronic media ... The argument that the
violence in Gujarat would have been worse if the
media, particularly electronic, had not aroused
public opinion against the killing spree through
focused and sustained reporting cannot be dis-
missed out of hand. (Phillip, 2002)
The television and the national media were very
aggressive in their reporting of Gujarat riots and were
not hesitant to show the carnage. I would agree with
Phillip that the situation could have been worse if the
media had restrained themselves from reporting in the
manner they eventually did. The common mass out there
needs to know the exact depth and the horrid nature of
the events unfolding. Though the regional media took an
entirely different approach and one could sense Hindutva
being reflected in the way they covered the same events,
it would be wrong to blame the entire regional media but
the likes of Gujarat Samachar and Sandesh were leading
the road to Hindutva.
Whenever a national or regional media reports or
broadcasts images of communal riots as breaking news or
a cover story, millions of people are glued to it. So, what
is reported and the manner in which it is reported is of
enormous significance. The 1991 Gulf War introduced
the CNN effect and with what is happening today, the
current conflicts may produce the NDTV effect or the
Aaj Tak effect. The mass forms its opinions based on the
instant coverage of the conflicts by the reporters on the
ground and how it is analysed by the television anchors
and the media expert analyst sitting in the studios.
Reporters and journalists are human beings and,
therefore, not value-free. Communal riots are a sensitive
issue and their personal thoughts and processes may
get in the way of professional reporting. It would be
extremely difficult for a reporter or a journalist to cover
and report on a communal riot. However, this problem
would cease if the reporter or the journalist keeps the
basic concept reporting in mind, where he or she needs
to understand that conflicts, such as a communal riot, is
a social process in which he or she is an important social
actor, an actor whose job is to facilitate the conflict and
not add to it (Ahmed, 2008).
On the broader aspect, the many functions of the media
in general and reporters in particular include preventing
or moderating a conflict so that a viable solution is reached
and there is peace. During a communal riot, the media
can even get the international perspective on the events
and thereby create an environment where the world
starts to discuss the same. Ultimately, it might force the
national and the state governments to act accordingly.
The media have the capability to provide a great deal of
information during an ongoing communal riot. They can
inform the public or communicate directly with the victims
and their families (Berry et al, 1999). The media should
realise that they can either alleviate or aggravate the situation.
Thus, controlled steps and actions should be taken in order
to prevent the situation from further aggravation.
109
MEDIA ASIA, VOL 37 NO 2, 2010
Thus, we find that the media in India can play a very
significant role during communal riots. Societal changes
at the grassroots level are required for communal violence
to end forever but till then, the media through their
responsible actions can certainly help prevent them from
getting worse.
Summary
There is a difficult and complex relationship between
religion, politics and the media in India. One of the
toughest tasks the media face is during communal riots.
However, through our study, we have seen that there has
been an increase in responsibility by the Indian media in
covering communal riots. The 1984 Sikh riots exposed
the weaknesses of the media but with the 2002 Gujarat
riots, we find that they made efforts to prevent further
atrocities and clashes through their brave reportage of
the events. They even openly criticised the government
for its failures and raised important and tough questions
though there was a section of the regional media that had
their own set of Hindutva agendas and played their part
in heightening the tension between the Muslims and the
Hindus of Gujarat and elsewhere.
There has been criticism of the media in the way
they cover such conflicts and do not adhere to the
guidelines laid by the authorities. Perhaps it is time that
the authorities need to understand that the guidelines
require review because the media are expanding fast and
wide and they have become a major role player in the
Indian society. On the other hand, the media too need to
realise that they can alleviate or aggravate situations and
thus should act far more responsibly than ever before.
Illiteracy is a curse for the Indian society and it
leads to ignorance, deprivation and wrong thoughts
and actions that prove to be major causable factors
that lead to communal riots in India (Verghese, 2002).
The media by themselves cannot bring about a radical
change overnight and stop the communal riots in India
but they certainly can help bring about the change with
their responsible coverage of such incidents of atrocities
and bloodshed where fellow Indians kill each other for
the sake of religion.
Notes
1. Hindutva is widely used as a synonym for political
Hinduism that seeks to win political power on the
basis of India’s Hindu majority votes. However, this
does not reflect the majority of Hindu opinions.
2. 1984 Indian state terrorism against
minorities, retrieved from www.youtube.com/
watch?v=wD__5ekRRU4.
3. 1984: The year in review, retrieved from www.
sikhphilosophy.net/1984-anti-sikh-riots/26028-
1984-year-review-archival-news-coverage.html.
4. The term Kar Sevaks—literally “servants of Ram”—
is often used interchangeably with Ram Sevaks.
5. IRS 2002 Key Findings, reproduced in The Hoot
110
(Internet edition), retrieved on 22 June 2004 from
www.thehoot.org/story.asp?section¼ &lang¼L1&st
oryid¼webhootootL1K0101.
6. Media not playing a constructive role: PM (2002,
March 5), The Times of India.
7. Reporting communal conflict, retrieved on 11
March 2010 from indianchristians.in/news/
content/view/2780/4/.
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