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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000.]

SERG'S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY,


petitioners, vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., respondent.

Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for petitioners.


Perez & Calima Law Offices for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the
RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin. On March 6, 1998, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its
sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days
and upon payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's
factory and seized one machinery. On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for
special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its
officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to
defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI on the
ground that the properties were personal and therefore still subject to seizure and writ
of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the properties were immovable.
They further stated that PCI was estopped from treating these machineries as personal
because the contracts were totally sham and farcical. On April 7, 1998, petitioners
went to the Court of Appeals via an original action for certiorari. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the subject machines were personal property as provided by the
agreement of the parties. Hence, this petition. TaCEHA

The Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that the
contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal.
After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded
from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the lease
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agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as
personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the
characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the
circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of seizure. Accordingly, the petition
was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; CONTRACTING PARTIES MAY


VALIDLY STIPULATE THAT REAL PROPERTY BE CONSIDERED AS
PERSONAL. — The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that
a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a
party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact
found therein. Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio, the Court upheld the intention of the
parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had been made the subject of
a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled: ". . . . Although there is no specific statement
referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only
have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as
such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by
claiming otherwise." Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance
Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills also held that the machinery used in a factory and
essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject of a writ of
replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. CcaASE

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD PERSONS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH ARE NOT
AFFECTED BY STIPULATION CHARACTERIZING MACHINERY AS
PERSONAL. — In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the
machines in question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section
12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows: "12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all
times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any
part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or
embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or
attached in any manner to what is permanent." Clearly then, petitioners are estopped
from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under
the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. It should be
stressed, however, that our holding — that the machines should be deemed personal
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property pursuant to the Lease Agreement — is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third
persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the
subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific third
party would be adversely affected.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; REPLEVIN; THE


REMEDY OF DEFENDANTS UNDER RULE 60 WAS EITHER TO POST A
COUNTER-BOND OR TO QUESTION THE SUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S
BOND. — The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis mota of the civil
action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is
effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. Hence, they should be threshed out in
the trial, not in the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure. Indeed,
in La Tondeña Distillers v. CA, the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was
that questions involving title to the subject property — questions which petitioners are
now raising — should be determined in the trial. In that case, the Court noted that the
remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond. They were not allowed, however, to invoke the
title to the subject property. The Court ruled: "In other words, the law does not allow
the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery)
on ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon therefor, as
in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction, and thereby put at issue the
matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied, the
policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at
the trial on the merits." THADEI

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be


considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming
otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by
the other contracting party.

The Case
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Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the January 6, 1999
Decision 1(1) of the Court of Appeals (CA) 2(2) in CA-GR SP No. 47332 and its
February 26, 1999 Resolution 3(3) denying reconsideration. The decretal portion of
the CA Decision reads as follows: IEAacT

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated February


18, 1998 and Resolution dated March 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33500
are hereby AFFIRMED. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 15,
1998 is hereby LIFTED." 4(4)

In its February 18, 1998 Order, 5(5) the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City (Branch 218) 6(6) issued a Writ of Seizure. 7(7) The March 18, 1998 Resolution
8(8) denied petitioners' Motion for Special Protective Order, praying that the deputy
sheriff be enjoined "from seizing immobilized or other real properties in [petitioners']
factory in Cainta, Rizal and to return to their original place whatever immobilized
machineries or equipments he may have removed." 9(9)

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:


10(10)

"On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI
Leasing for short) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money
(Annex 'E'), with an application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-98-33500.

"On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing,


respondent judge issued a writ of replevin (Annex 'B') directing its sheriff to
seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and
upon the payment of the necessary expenses.

"On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff


proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery with [the] word that he
[would] return for the other machineries.

"On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective
order (Annex 'C'), invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its
officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the
sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.

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"This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex 'F'), on the ground
that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and
a writ of replevin.

"In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be


seized [were] immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties'
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the
agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further stated that
PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because
the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally
sham and farcical.

"On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure
and take possession of the remaining properties. He was able to take two more,
but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest.

"On April 7, 1998, they went to [the CA] via an original action for
certiorari."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject
machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by
petitioners. It also ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the true intention of the contracting parties." Observing that Petitioner
Goquiolay was an experienced businessman who was "not unfamiliar with the ways of
the trade," it ruled that he "should have realized the import of the document he
signed." The CA further held:

"Furthermore, to accord merit to this petition would be to preempt the


trial court in ruling upon the case below, since the merits of the whole matter are
laid down before us via a petition whose sole purpose is to inquire upon the
existence of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC] in issuing the
assailed Order and Resolution. The issues raised herein are proper subjects of a
full-blown trial, necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties. The
contract is being enforced by one, and [its] validity is attacked by the other — a
matter . . . which respondent court is in the best position to determine."

Hence, this Petition. 11(11)

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our


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consideration:

"A. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by


SERG'S became real property by virtue of immobilization.

B. Whether or not the contract between the parties is a loan or a


lease." 12(12)

In the main, the Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal, not
immovable, property which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. As a
preliminary matter, the Court will also address briefly the procedural points raised by
respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Preliminary Matter:
Procedural Questions
Respondent contends that the Petition failed to indicate expressly whether it
was being filed under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It further alleges that
the Petition erroneously impleaded Judge Hilario Laqui as respondent.

There is no question that the present recourse is under Rule 45. This conclusion
finds support in the very title of the Petition, which is "Petition for Review on
Certiorari." 13(13)

While Judge Laqui should not have been impleaded as a respondent, 14(14)
substantial justice requires that such lapse by itself should not warrant the dismissal of
the present Petition. In this light, the Court deems it proper to remove, motu proprio,
the name of Judge Laqui from the caption of the present case.

Main Issue:
Nature of the Subject Machinery

Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not
proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC because they were in fact real property.
Serious policy considerations, they argue, militate against a contrary characterization.

Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the
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recovery of personal property only. 15(15) Section 3 thereof reads:

"SECTION 3. Order. — Upon the filing of such affidavit and


approval of the bonds, the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ
of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained
and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody."

On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real
property as follows:

ARTICLE 415. The following are immovable property: HCTEDa

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the


owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works.

xxx xxx xxx"

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure
were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they
were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence,
although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have
become "immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements
in the industry." 16(16) In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said
machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
17(17)

Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the
said machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. 18(18) After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a
party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact
found therein.

Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio, 19(19) the Court upheld the intention of the
parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had been made the subject of

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a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled:

". . . Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject


house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by
way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey
the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they
should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming
otherwise."

Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v.


Wearever Textile Mills 20(20) also held that the machinery used in a factory and
essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject of a writ of
replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. Pertinent portions of
the Court's ruling are reproduced hereunder:

". . . if a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above
Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing
a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason
why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only
by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really
because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the
chattel mortgage."

In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in
question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the
Agreement reads as follows: 21(21)

"12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain,
personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may
now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded
in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or
attached in any manner to what is permanent."

Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the
subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper
subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

It should be stressed, however, that our holding — that the machines should be
deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement — is good only insofar as
the contracting parties are concerned. 22(22) Hence, while the parties are bound by
the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation
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characterizing the subject machinery as personal. 23(23) In any event, there is no
showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.

Validity of the Lease Agreement

In their Memorandum, petitioners contend that the Agreement is a loan and not
a lease. 24(24) Submitting documents supposedly showing that they own the subject
machines, petitioners also argue in their Petition that the Agreement suffers from
"intrinsic ambiguity which places in serious doubt the intention of the parties and the
validity of the lease agreement itself." 25(25) In their Reply to respondent's Comment,
they further allege that the Agreement is invalid. 26(26)

These arguments are unconvincing. The validity and the nature of the contract
are the lis mota of the civil action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these
questions, therefore, is effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. Hence, they
should be threshed out in the trial, not in the proceedings involving the issuance of the
Writ of Seizure.

Indeed, in La Tondeña Distillers v. CA, 27(27) the Court explained that the
policy under Rule 60 was that questions involving title to the subject property —
questions which petitioners are now raising — should be determined in the trial. In
that case, the Court noted that the remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to
post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond. They were
not allowed, however, to invoke the title to the subject property. The Court ruled:

"In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to
dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency
of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on
preliminary attachment or injunction, and thereby put at issue the matter of the
title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied, the policy
apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the
trial on the merits." 28(28)

Besides, these questions require a determination of facts and a presentation of


evidence, both of which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under
Rule 65 or in a petition for review in this Court under Rule 45. 29(29)

Reliance on the
Lease Agreement

It should be pointed out that the Court in this case may rely on the Lease
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Agreement, for nothing on record shows that it has been nullified or annulled. In fact,
petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC proceedings, which had ironically been
instituted by respondent. Accordingly, it must be presumed valid and binding as the
law between the parties.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation 30(30) is also instructive on this


point. In that case, the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, which characterized the subject
machinery as personal property, was also assailed because respondent had allegedly
been required "to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was in a blank form
at the time of signing." The Court rejected the argument and relied on the Deed, ruling
as follows:

". . . Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does
not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said
contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code,
by a proper action in court. There is nothing on record to show that the mortgage
has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the
same. . . ."

Alleged Injustice Committed


on the Part of Petitioners

Petitioners contend that "if the Court allows these machineries to be seized,
then its workers would be out of work and thrown into the streets." 31(31) They also
allege that the seizure would nullify all efforts to rehabilitate the corporation.

Petitioners' arguments do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. As


earlier discussed, law and jurisprudence support its propriety. Verily, the
above-mentioned consequences, if they come true, should not be blamed on this
Court, but on the petitioners for failing to avail themselves of the remedy under
Section 5 of Rule 60, which allows the filing of a counter-bond. The provision states:

"SECTION 5. Return of property. — If the adverse party objects to


the sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he
cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so
object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant,
require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a
bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in
the applicant's affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery
be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered
against the adverse party, and by serving a copy bond on the applicant."

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WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. THEcAS

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 177-180.
2. Penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner (Division acting chairman), with the
concurrence of Justices Eloy R. Bello Jr. and Martin S. Villarama Jr.
3. Rollo, p. 189.
4. CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 179.
5. Rollo, p. 356.
6. Presided by Judge Hilario L. Laqui.
7. Rollo, pp. 23-24.
8. Rollo, pp. 78-79.
9. Motion for Special Protective Order, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 76-77.
10. CA Decision, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 177-178.
11. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 21, 1999, upon receipt by
this Court of the petitioners' Memorandum signed by Atty. Victor Basilio N. De Leon
of Antonio R. Bautista & Partners. Respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by
Atty. Amador F. Brioso Jr. of Perez & Calima Law Offices, had been filed earlier on
September 29, 1999.
12. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 376.
13. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
14. Section 4 (a) of Rule 45 provides that the petition shall state the full name of the
parties, "without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents."
15. BA Finance v. CA, 258 SCRA 102, July 5, 1996; Filinvest Credit v. CA, 248 SCRA
549, September 27, 1995; Machinery Engineering Supply v. CA, 96 Phil. 70, October
29, 1954.
16. Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor and Treasurer, 6 SCRA 197, September 29,
1962, per Labrador, J. See also Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence,
1986 ed., pp. 99-100.
17. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Dahican Lumber, 20 SCRA 84, May 16, 1967; Burgos
v. Chief of Staff; 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984; Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,
61 Phil. 709, August 7, 1935.
18. Chua Peng Hian v. CA, 133 SCRA 572, December 19, 1984; Standard Oil Co. v.
Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 630, March 16, 1923; Luna v. Encarnacion, 91 Phil. 531, June 30,
1952; Manarang v. Ofilada, 99 Phil. 109, May 18, 1956; People's Bank & Trust Co.
Copyright 1994-2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2017 Third Release 11
v. Dahican Lumber, supra.
19. 41 SCRA 143, 153 September 30, 1971, per Reyes, JBL, J.
20. 122 SCRA 296, 300, May 16, 1983, per De Castro, J.
21. Rollo, p. 262.
22. Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401, April 23, 1958; Navarro
v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631, November 30, 1963.
23. Vitug, supra, pp. 100-101.
24. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 381.
25. Petition, p. 10; rollo, p. 12.
26. Reply, p. 7, rollo, p. 301.
27. 209 SCRA 553, 567, June 8, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ.
28. Ibid.
29. See Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997.
30. Supra, p. 301.
31. Petition, p. 16; rollo, p. 18.

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Endnotes

1 (Popup - Popup)
1. Rollo, pp. 177-180.

2 (Popup - Popup)
2. Penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner (Division acting chairman), with the
concurrence of Justices Eloy R. Bello Jr. and Martin S. Villarama Jr.

3 (Popup - Popup)
3. Rollo, p. 189.

4 (Popup - Popup)
4. CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 179.

5 (Popup - Popup)
5. Rollo, p. 356.

6 (Popup - Popup)
6. Presided by Judge Hilario L. Laqui.

7 (Popup - Popup)
7. Rollo, pp. 23-24.

8 (Popup - Popup)
8. Rollo, pp. 78-79.

9 (Popup - Popup)

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9. Motion for Special Protective Order, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 76-77.

10 (Popup - Popup)
10. CA Decision, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 177-178.

11 (Popup - Popup)
11. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 21, 1999, upon receipt by
this Court of the petitioners' Memorandum signed by Atty. Victor Basilio N. De Leon
of Antonio R. Bautista & Partners. Respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by
Atty. Amador F. Brioso Jr. of Perez & Calima Law offices, had been filed earlier on
September 29, 1999.

12 (Popup - Popup)
12. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 376.

13 (Popup - Popup)
13. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

14 (Popup - Popup)
14. Section 4 (a) of Rule 45 provides that the petition shall state the full name of the
parties, "without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents."

15 (Popup - Popup)
15. BA Finance v. CA, 258 SCRA 102, July 5, 1996; Filinvest Credit v. CA, 248 SCRA
549, September 27, 1995; Machinery Engineering Supply v. CA, 96 Phil. 70, October
29, 1954.

16 (Popup - Popup)
16. Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor and Treasurer, 6 SCRA 197, September 29, 1962,
per Labrador, J. See also Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1986
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ed., pp. 99-100.

17 (Popup - Popup)
17. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Dahican Lumber, 20 SCRA 84, May 16, 1967; Burgos
v. Chief of Staff; 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984; Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo, 61 Phil. 709, August 7, 1935.

18 (Popup - Popup)
18. Chua Peng Hian v. CA, 133 SCRA 572, December 19, 1984; Standard Oil Co. v.
Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 630, March 16, 1923; Luna v. Encarnacion, 91 Phil. 531, June 30,
1952; Manarang v. Ofilada, 99 Phil. 109, May 18, 1956; People's Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dahican Lumber, supra.

19 (Popup - Popup)
19. 41 SCRA 143, 153 September 30, 1971, per Reyes, JBL, J.

20 (Popup - Popup)
20. 122 SCRA 296, 300, May 16, 1983, per De Castro, J.

21 (Popup - Popup)
21. Rollo, p. 262.

22 (Popup - Popup)
22. Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401, April 23, 1958; Navarro
v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631, November 30, 1963.

23 (Popup - Popup)
23. Vitug, supra, pp. 100-101.

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24 (Popup - Popup)
24. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 381.

25 (Popup - Popup)
25. Petition, p. 10; rollo, p. 12.

26 (Popup - Popup)
26. Reply, p. 7, rollo, p. 301.

27 (Popup - Popup)
27. 209 SCRA 553, 567, June 8, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ.

28 (Popup - Popup)
28. Ibid.

29 (Popup - Popup)
29. See Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997.

30 (Popup - Popup)
30. Supra, p. 301.

31 (Popup - Popup)
31. Petition, p. 16; rollo, p. 18.

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