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James Dodd
New School University
§1. Introduction
In his reflections on inner time consciousness written in the years 1917-1918,
Husserl makes use of an illustrative device he apparently developed in fits and
starts between 1905-19112: the so-called “time-diagram.” It proves to be an
important instrument for several of the texts published in Husserliana XXXIII, in
particular Text Nr. 2: “Die Komplexion von Retention und Protention.
Gradualitäten der Erfüllung und das Bewusstsein der Gegenwart. Graphische
Darstellung des Urprozesses”. More, the diagram appears in these texts in a much
more refined and complete manner than anything found in Husserliana X, which
in turn allows us to sharpen a number of questions that had already arisen with
original 1928 publication of Husserl’s 1905 Zeitvorlesungen.
The very employment of a diagram in the analysis of time consciousness is
itself a source of questions. And this is not only due to the concern that spatial
1
A version of this paper was presented at the June 2003 meeting of the Husserl Circle at Fordham
University. Many thanks to the members of the Circle for their comments and suggestions.
2
See Hua X, §10 and Text Nr. 53, p. 365. See Hua X, Text Nr. 27 for earliest (1904) use of
diagrams. The diagrams in the 1928 edition of Husserl’s lectures apparently date from 1911 (See
Hua X 410, “Textkritische Anmerkungen” to §§8-10; cf. the figures on Hua X 365, from Text Nr.
53). Also cf. the discussion on these early diagrams in Alexander Schnell, “Das Problem der Zeit
bei Husserl,” Husserl Studies 2002. Schnell’s article provides a close reconstruction of Husserl’s
use of time diagrams in light of the developments of his analyses of inner time-consciousness from
1904 until 1918. By contrast, the main focus here will be on only one part of this story, i.e., the
use of the diagrams in the Bernau Manuscripts from 1917/18, and their relation to the diagrams
reproduced in the 1928 edition of Husserl’s Zeitvorlesungen.
1
2 James Dodd
3
Space, in other words, should not be completely out of the picture. Cf. Merleau-Ponty: “In order
to arrive at authentic time, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to condemn the spatialization of
time as does Bergson. It is not necessary, since time is exclusive of space only if we consider
space as objectified in advance, and ignore that primordial spatiality which we have tried to
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 3
describe, and which is the abstract form of our presence in the world. It is not sufficient since,
even when the systematic translation of time into spatial terms has been duly stigmatized, we may
still fall very short of an authentic intuition of time.” Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin
Smith (London: Routledge, 1962): 415fn.
4 James Dodd
4
Hua X 22:28-23:3.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 5
5
Hua X 23:4-6.
6
Cf. Alexis Meinong, “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren
Wahrnehmung”, in: Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane XXI (1899):
248. Also cf. the discussion in Hua X, Texte 29-33.
7
Why is the problem of time posed in just this way? The key may very well be difficulties that
had already emerged in the VI. Logical Investigation, in particular with respect to the coherence of
the use of inner perception in addressing two key issues: (1) the question of the cogency of the
notion of “categorial representation,” or whether there is a presentational basis for categorial
intuitions parallel to sensations in sensuous intuition; and (2) the expressivity of non-objectifying
6 James Dodd
The result of these two aspects taken together is that the sense in which these
immanent time-objects “appear” is not really free and independent of the sense in
which transcendent (or objective) time-objects appear; the former appear only to
the extent to which they are likewise laden with the appearances of the latter.
Immanent objects are articulated at all, thus manifest, only to the extent to which
they play a role in the articulation of transcendence. This does not undermine the
distinction, it only situates it. Thus it may be the case, as Husserl himself
emphasizes, that to perceive an appearing object is not the same as to perceive an
object in its appearing, and thus that, at least for the sake of analysis, we may
focus on the latter as our principal theme;8 but that does not change the fact that to
perceive an object in its appearing surely involves, at the very least, the prior
perceptual theme of an appearing object. Yet this situatedness is not without its
tensions, for it is structured in such a way that, for example, phenomenological
reflection can move only from what is given to its givenness; one cannot, in
reflection, move through to the given from an original perception, or originary
thematization, of its givenness, or the “given its appearing.” The course or
passage through givenness must already be marked out in an accomplishing
experience, prior to reflection.
This tension, perhaps quite manageable in principle, nevertheless leads
directly to a curious difficulty in understanding just what the time-diagram
introduced in §10 is supposed to represent. For already on the level of the
immanent object, when one speaks of the structure or order of its passage, one is
already being guided by what is being made present in that structure or order of
passage, understood as an intentional structure. This is because the immanent
order of passage is not an object arrayed alongside of what it presents to
consciousness, but the very presentation of what it presents, taken as such; the
sense of its passage is the sense of the unfolding of the accomplishment that it is,
acts. The problematic character of inner perception, which is used at Hua XIX/2 708:3-9 to form
the basis for categorial representation and at XIX/2 749:1-6 the content for the expressions of non-
objectifying acts, threatens both to undermine the consistency of categorial intuition as well as the
delimitation of the scope of the logical in terms of the class of objectifying acts. Thus it is of no
surprise that, by 1904/5, Husserl is very concerned with the problem of the phenomenality of
consciousness taken as an immanent sensuousness.
8
Hua X 23:6-13.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 7
9
This is how I would gloss Hua 25:35-26:1.
10
See Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000),
Chapter Five, “The Temporality of Self-Awareness,” where he argues against the interpretation of
Robert Sokolowski and John Brough that lived experiences (Erlebnisse) can be given “in”
absolute time-consciousness only qua constituted “objects” of a certain order. Cf. Robert
Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974) §§60-61.
8 James Dodd
Let us consider this point more closely. The diagram represents the modes in
which the duration-unity of the immanent temporal object “runs off,” as Husserl
describes it; the time-object, or “appearance,” is thus cast in terms of a givenness
articulated in these running-off modes.11 Thus the time-object, the immanent
sensation, is not being described in terms of its temporal extension as such, but
rather in the terms in which this temporal extension appears thanks to the
perspective that belongs to the concrete consciousness in which it unfolds.12 The
diagram is thus meant to illustrate the “way” or “manner” in which the unfolding
of time unfolds through a graphic representation of the inner perspective
consciousness has on the temporality of its own object-saturated intentionality.
Husserl appends two warnings in these sections where he introduces this
notion of “running off phenomena” or “running off modes.” The first is that these
modes should not be identified as consciousness itself. They belong to
appearances, and it is within the fold of phenomenality that they should be
thought. If we are to relate them to consciousness, is can only be in terms of the
sense in which consciousness itself is manifest within this fold. The point is not to
trace phenomenality back to an originating structure, but rather, and in some ways
contrary to a basic thesis of the Logische Untersuchungen, to fix a description of
the manner in which “appearances” (whether qua hyle or full fledged lived
experiences) themselves “appear.”13
11
The passage I am referring to here still reflects some hesitation with respect to the Auffassungs-
Auffassungsinhalt schema: the time object under consideration is not the lived experience
(Erlebnis) as a whole, but rather only its hyletic components. To the extent to which this schema
remains in effect, Erlebnis and Erscheinung remain at least potentially quasi-distinct, if we take
Erscheinung to refer to the hyletic component alone, and an Erlebnis as an apprehension of an
appearance that is directed towards what is given in the appearance (das Erscheinende). The result
of rejecting the schema, in my view, is that Erscheinung is no longer a distinct component or reell
content of Erlebnis, or even a “level” within the same, but a title for the constitutional
accomplishment of the latter.
12
These reflects the two options Husserl presents in the first paragraph of Hua X, §9.
13
Cf. XIX/1, 360:3-4. Here is the passage in Hua X (27:4-10): „Diese Erscheinung ‚Objekt im
Ablaufsmodus’ werden wir nicht Bewusstsein nennen können (so wenig wir das Raumphänomen,
den Körper im Wie der Erscheinung von der oder jener Seite, von nah oder ferne, ein Bewusstsein
nennen werden). Das ‚Bewusstsein,’ das ‚Erlebnis’ bezieht sich auf sein Objekt vermittelst einer
Erscheinung, in der eben das ‚Objekt im Wie’ dasteht.“ Again, it is perhaps the case that this
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 9
This passage allows us to sharpen the inherent ambiguity of the time diagram
noted above. The structure being distinguished can be taken to be either
(1) The temporal modes which orient consciousness towards the
appearance of the immanent sensation (“Modis der zeitlichen
Orientierung”), or
(2) The stamp this orientation leaves on the appearance of the
immanent sensation (“Ablaufscharakteren”).
In the 1928 edition of the Zeitvorlesungen, it is not altogether clear what this
difference amounts to. However, using the language of the 1917 Bernau
manuscripts, this could perhaps be rephrased as the difference between what
Husserl calls the originary process (Urprozess) of consciousness and the shape
that the passage of a lived experience takes thanks to the structure of this
originary process, thus reading (1) as an early and important point of departure for
the theme of the self-manifestation of absolute time consciousness.
This way of reading Husserl’s text could perhaps be brought to bear on the
passage at the end of §9, where Husserl highlights what he calls a “double sense”
15
„Offenbar muessen wir die Rede von der “Intentionalitaet” als doppelsinnig erkennen, je
nachdem wir die Beziehung der Erscheinung auf das Erscheindende im Auge haben oder die
Beziehung des Bewusstseins einerseits auf das <<Erscheinende im Wie>>, andererseits auf das
Erscheinende schlechthin.“ Hua X 27:11-15.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 11
awareness is an awareness of. The notion of perspective is perhaps the best guide:
when I realize that the manner in which something appears is a function of
perspective, say that when I approach my garden from the south side, the
flagstones on the east side will appear to converge around the marigolds thanks to
a particular perspective, I do not shift from a consideration of the appearance of
the garden to another dimension called “perspective.” All I do is shift focus to the
given sense that this manner of appearance is intrinsically linked to the arc of a
process of manifestation, grasped from “within” the appearance, in the unity of its
happening. Perspective is not an origin that stamps the given with certain features
from a position somewhere on the margins of its manifestation, but is already “in”
it, though for all of that not really completely “of” it. The way or manner in which
the flagstones appear is not itself a perspective; the perspective belongs instead to
the process of making the stones appear in the way that they do, coming from the
south side of the garden. Their “look” carries the sense of coming from
somewhere, precisely “from” a place traced by, and visible within, the arc of my
approach, but without showing this arc of manifestation to me.
Husserl’s argument, then, is that consciousness is not only consciousness of
the immanence of lived experience from the perspective of the time modi, but that
it is consciousness of this perspective as well. Consciousness is conscious of
where it is coming from, or at least that it is coming from somewhere, thanks to
which the objects given to it are given the way that they are. In this way, we can
say that in the “how” of the appearing of an immanent object in its duration there
is implicit a givenness of the intentionality of consciousness itself; in the “how”
of the temporal manifestation of the object, there is an awareness of the passage
through which this manifestation moves, or unfolds. In short, implicit in every
lived experience is the living through of that experience as its “origin.”16
In his manuscripts Husserl occasionally invokes the Brentanian notion of a
distinction between a “primary” and “secondary” object of consciousness to
describe the implicit givenness of living-through (Erleben) in a lived experience
(Erlebnis), but it is clear that once again the parameters of the very notion of
“object” are here being challenged in a way that was not the case in Brentano’s
16
Cf. Text Nr. 4 (Hua XXXIII) where Husserl experiments with different ways to re-interpret the
original notion of “zeitliche Orientierung” in terms of “Zeitperspektiven.”
12 James Dodd
17
Cf. Hua XXXIII 29:3-16.
18
William Stern, “Psychische Präsenzzeit,” in: Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der
Sinnesorgane” XIII (1897): 330-331.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 13
“present” act of consciousness that fuses the real with the irreal. In other words,
the intentionality in which the past is articulated, and the intentionality in which
the present is given, are not coordinated within a total-act of consciousness that
could be said to be “now” in the sense of inhabiting the same moment.
Figure 1
Thus instead of the Brentano-inspired diagram (Figure 119), where the irreal
or “non-genuine” perceptual presence of the elapsed moments (A-B-C-D) of a
duration is indicated by their being placed along the vertical axis at an angle of
ninety degrees, thus expressing the idea that their sense is encapsulated within the
19
This is a version of a diagram that can be found in Carl Stumpf, “Erinnerungen an Franz
Brentano,” in: Oskar Kraus, ed. Franz Brentano. Zur Erkenntnis seines Lebens und siner Lehre.
(München: Beck, 1919): 136. Cf. the discussion in Toine Kortooms, Phenomenology of Time.
Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of Time Consciousness (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001): 28-38. Also, I am
particularly indebted here to Nicolas De Warren’s discussion of these issues in his The Promise of
Time: Time-Consciousness and the Breakthrough of Phenomenology, Chapter 2: The Conduit of
Inheritance: Brentano and Stern”. (Dissertation: Boston University, 2001).
14 James Dodd
Figure 2
Thus in the diagram from §10 of the Zeitvorlesungen (Figure 2), the series
AE is as it were “shadowed” by a progressively “sinking” past AA′, with which it
is nevertheless in constant contact, and in a two fold sense: First, (a) the continued
20
Hua X 28:figure.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 15
Figure 3
22
Again, I must cite De Warren’s excellent study (“The Promise of Time”), where he
demonstrates that this notion is already implicit in the analyses found in the manuscripts of Hua X.
See in particular p. 405. For a contrary opinion, see Schnell, “Das Problem der Zeit bei Husserl,”
who argues (pp. 103-105) that the constitutive function of the protentiality of the stream is not
recognized until 1917. Cf. Text Nr. 1 in Hua XXXIII, “Das Ineinander von Retention und
Protention im Ursprünglichen Zeitbewusstsein. Urpräsentation und Bewusstsein der Neuheit,”
cited by Schnell in this context.
23
Txt Nr. 2, Hua XXXIII 21:figure
18 James Dodd
Figure 4
Setting aside for a moment any Bergsonian worries that might arise given the
following turn of phrase, let us say that an event has elapsed from E1 to E2, and
that we stand at E2. In retentional consciousness, this passage from E1 to E2
“continues” with each coming moment—or better “will” continue, given the
emergence of a series of new phase continua (illustrated by the vertical lines),
each of which will be said to be generated by the coming now-points (Ek>E3)
along the EE axis.
There are two aspects of this that needs to be emphasized. First, (1) from our
perch at E2, intentionality is manifest as a tendency towards E3E4…Ek, but in a
particular sense. It is not the emergence of the series E3E4…Ek as such that is
protended, but rather the further or continued sinking into the past of the
retentional continua already present at E2. Or, in other words, what is protended is
the increase of distance (“sinking”) that will be accomplished at E3E4…Ek.24
Second, (2) Husserl’s description of the intermingling of protention and retention
in texts from 1917 suggests reading each vertical line not only in terms of the
demarcation of a horizon of retention (where each moment along the EE axis has
its own phase continuum of pasts), but also as the horizon of protention. The
infinity of phase-points illustrated by the vertical axis is thus given the double
24
Cf. Dieter Lohmar, “What do Protentions Protend?” in: Philosophy Today 46 (2002): 154-167.
Lohmar suggests using the term “R-Protentions” to designate this sense of protention.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 19
Figure 5
26
Lohmar (“What Do Protentions Protend?”) suggests modifying the symbols designating the
oblique lines by adding parentheses, thus avoiding confusion with the symbols for points along the
EE axis. Thus the oblique E1E1 could be expressed [E1].
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 21
distance from all the other elements in the time-continuum marked off by the
horizontal line to which no intrinsic protentionality, or retentionality, belongs;
reading the diagram, when we look to the horizon of the past, we look down;
when we look to the horizon of the future, we look up; and when we look to the
flow from future to past, we look askance, never left to right along the EE axis.
The symbolization of the horizon opened up within the intentional structure to
which the presence of the past itself belongs, and in accordance with which
consciousness is not only open, but oriented towards a “not-yet”, is thereby
limited to an extension of the vertical lines. E3, in its mode of being “not yet” or:
the not yet “filled” intention of the “next” which “will be” filled by E3, is
accordingly symbolized in the diagram by E′3 (Figure 5).
This means that advance consciousness (Vorbewusstsein) with respect to E3
is not really oriented, in an intentional sense, towards E3 in its pure individuation,
represented by the originality of the nows symbolized by the horizontal axis-
continuum, but then again nor it is it really oriented towards E′3 as such. Rather, it
is oriented solely towards the continuing passage of E1 in its modification as [E1]
(also, but in a different sense, in continuity with that of [E2]), an aspect of which
involves the “falling” or “sinking” of E3 thanks to it being immediately modified
retentionally in its very emergence along the horizontal axis. The “falling” or
“sinking” from E’3 to E3 is the “protentional” manifestation of the very becoming
past of E3, thus of the continuous modification-in-generation of the elapsed phases
E1E2. But this means that the becoming present of E3 threatens to be obscured,
precisely as the result of a deeper understanding of the interrelatedness of
protention and retention. This leads us to the necessity of a reflection on how to
read the horizontal axis EE.
§4. Interpretation of the Horizontal Axis
There are in fact two aspects of the intentional structure of inner time
consciousness that together lead to the question about how to interpret the
horizontal axis. First, (1) if every phase of the flow is an intermingling
(Ineinander) of retention and protention, then clearly the difference between past
and future marked by the horizontal axis does not correspond to the difference
between protention and retention, as has already been shown above. The “now”
along the horizontal axis is not a site where consciousness accomplishes two
22 James Dodd
separate acts, one projecting a future and the other a past; the “now,” in other
words, is not an origin in the sense of a position from which consciousness
projects various structures of protentional and retentional continua. These
modifications are instead continuously accomplished along the oblique lines set
against the horizon indicated by the vertical lines, themselves marking off the
continua of the former continua. All the action seems to be taking place in these
continua of continua, to the extent that one could even argue that nothing is
accomplished by intentional consciousness in the dimension of the flow marked
off by the now-points arrayed along the horizontal line, that the past and the
future have their own presence in a time and in a consciousness that functions, in
a way, always just “outside” of the originary now. However tempting this
argument may be, it is in fact misleading: the originary nows along the horizontal
make all the difference in the world, even when, and perhaps especially when,
Husserl moves away from the conceptual constraints characteristic of a narrow
conception of hyletic contents (Urimpressionen). But what difference does a now
make, in the consciousness of time?
Second, (2) the tendency-consciousness (Tendenzbewusstsein27) towards the
“now” has a structure mediated by the flowing of the past. Thus if the horizontal
line is meant to play a role in illustrating the constitution of the “one after the
other” basic to every succession, then it does this not by fixing each now-point
along a horizontal continuum of nows that would represent a forward moving
unity. It cannot, since each now along the horizontal axis does not remain on the
horizontal axis, but is fixed into a “one after the other” only to the extent to which
it has “fallen away” from the horizontal axis that symbolizes its own emerging
presence. Put another way: the presence (or the consciousness of) a now comes
“after” another now (in an order) only once (which is immediate) it is assimilated
into the phase continuum (thus modified) the horizon of which is represented by
the vertical line. There is thus no true “one after the other” of the originary nows,
if by that we mean a kind of ordering of elements: if we stand at E2 in Figure 5,
there “is” no E1 “before,” all “befores” in time “are” only as non-originary
presences, thus the E1 in the mode of “before” is symbolized as E12, or “E1 at E2.”
There is a sense here in which the originary nows along the horizontal have a kind
27
Hua XXXIII 25:24.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 23
given “objective” structure manifest in this order, or even this order itself as a
structure of “objective time” that could be described along the lines of real-valued
functions.
In §4 of Text Nr. 2 published in Hua XXXIII, Husserl walks through a step-
by-step construction of the time-diagram that illustrates the point I wish to
make.28 He begins by ignoring the particular structure of any given process-phase
Ux,29 instead indicating with a series of parallel lines the bare transition from one
Urprozess-phase Ux to another Uy (Figure 630).
Figure 6
it does underpin any ordering of phases in terms not so much of an “earlier” and
“later” as a “coming” and “going.” On this level of the diagram, the mathematical
metaphor of the projection of the plane is meant to evoke not so much the sense of
the ordering of a series (of points/nows) as the tracing of a surface; more, the
metaphor is meant to bring the theme of fulfillment (Erfüllung) expressly into
play.31 The second step in the construction of the diagram is to emphasize that this
tracing out of a geometrical surface is fixed and irreversible, or that it arises only
in the wake of a transition from one process to another, where each Ux at every
point unambiguously shifts over into Uy. This unambiguous shifting of Ux to Uy,
the traditional “arrow of time,” where nothing is left behind and nothing is not in
transition, is emphasized by the downward sloping diagonals that represent the
“sinking” of each phase into the “next” (Figure 732):
Figure 7
31
Hua XXXIII 30:34-31:5: “Erfüllung heisst hier ‘im Sinne einer Tendenz kommen.’ Und zwar ist
Tendenz hier ein Bewusstseinsmodus, und das im Sinne der Tendenz Kommende, Eingetretene ist
als das im Buwusstsein selbst bewusst und ist seinerseits wieder Tendenz auf ein ‘Kommendes’.
Da ist jede Phase Intention und Erfüllung ins Unendliche.”
32
Hua XXXIII 32:figure.
26 James Dodd
But why “sinking”? Initially, this need have no other significance than the
emphasis on the transition itself: “Was dieses Sinken besagt, darauf kommt es
zunächst noch nicht an, es mag zunächst nur eine Eindeutigkeit der erzeugenden
Zuordnung besagen.“33 It takes on greater significance, however, once the
horizontal axis is introduced. Why? Because it is the contrast between the
horizontal and the oblique lines that symbolizes the unique sense of distance that
belongs to time, and not the fixed order of transitions that constitute the
continuum of phases Ux, thus not the contrast between the horizontal and the
obliques.
More precisely: the manner in which the transition from Ux to Uy takes place
excludes, thanks to the inner structure of each phase Ux, the possibility
considering time-transitions as a kind of change that could be modeled via an
operation of a one-to-one mapping of points that would canvass a uniformly
continuous plane of continua projected by the verticals. I would suggest that even
if it is a transition that can be likened to a differential, the point where the
metaphor of differential fails is precisely this inner resistance of the transition of
time to be captured by a function. This is for the simple reason that the transition
from one phase to the next does not simply take place from one process to
another; instead, all transitions of time phases move both towards and away from
a “now” that occupies no position definable in separation from this approach and
recession of movement.
It is only in its simultaneous coming towards and moving away from the now
that a process Ux “goes over” to Uy, Uz, … Un. There is thus a sense of distance
built into this tendency of protentionality, but it is one that is best described as a
peculiar kind of density within the passage of the given (its “fulfillment”). The
recognition of this phenomenological density of temporality underpins a specific
way of reading the diagram: when each additional phase Ux marks off the
flowing-off of a later, this “later” is to be read primarily in the sense of a
“deeper,” that is, submerged deeper in the density of the manifestation of the flow
itself. The consciousness of the moment is precisely the appearance of this
submersion in the depth of time, which is also a kind of disappearance. What is
“later” is thus further away, but not in the sense of, for example, being located
33
Hua XXXIII 32:1-3.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 27
two or three units away from the origin, but in the sense of having “sunk” into a
depth of temporalization that belongs to its intrinsic phenomenality. Here we need
to guard against our habitual way of navigating the Cartesian coordinate plane,
even as it remains strongly associated with the diagram; for progression here does
not signify tracing a course each moment of which has a punctile “address” on the
plane, but rather the increase of a modification that can be adequately described
only if we take into account other, intuitive qualities of space that are not
necessarily evident when charting out positions on the surface of a two-
dimensional grid.
The distance in question here is thus not at first related to the fact that time is
something distributed across a plenum of differentiated quanta. It is originarily a
depth of the temporal, before it is a span of the temporal; a density before a
distribution. Above all, the difference between the “now” of any given moment
and the “then” (or “not yet”), that peculiar phenomenological differential that
charts this sense of passage into depth, does not have its origin in the fact that the
sense of the passage of time is dependent on its representation in a space
conceived as a plenum of mutually external but immobile points. Again, as long
as it is read properly, Husserl’s time-diagram is not susceptible to Bergsonian
objections; space is here brought into play just enough to evoke the sense of depth
that belongs to time, and the difference (thus distance) that is basic to its structure.
The origin of this differential lies, not in the representability of passage, but in the
structure of the originary now itself. This structure is not itself schematized in the
diagram, but rather involves our sense of the difference that a particular mode of
being “now” (the present now, the now-now) makes in our apprehension of the
flow of time, and in turn how that sense of passage leads us to read the projection
of the plane “mapped out” by the diagram.
The question how the originary now plays the role of source point with
respect to the depth-distance of time leads us to point (2) above. As origin, the
originary now is not as such already a part of the order of transitions; it comes, in
a sense, from the “outside”; it is something that itself does not have depth, which
precisely marks its status as “new.” The originary now thus understood can be
considered as part of the structured generation of the plane only thanks to a two-
fold modification: first, as a falling away from itself, or the retentional
28 James Dodd
35
We should note here the interesting fact that, as can be seen in the recently published revisions
to the VI Logische Untersuchungen (see Hua XX/1, Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband.
Erster Teil), the theme of “Leerheit” (also Leervorstellungen, Leermodifikationen) plays a very
conspicuous role, both in the transition from the second chapter of the VI LU and within the third
chapter itself. See in particular Text Nr. 3, “Überarbeitete und erweiterte Druckfahnen des zweiten
bis vierten Kapitels (Juli-August 1913),” §§16-19. It is in these revisions, more so than the Ideas,
that one can see the impact of Husserl’s reflections on time on his conception of evidence and
evident givenness, something that is even more evident in Hua XI, Analysen zur passiven
Synthesis.
30 James Dodd
Figure 8
36
Hua XXXIII 33:figure.
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 31
or a point that structures a double process of filling and emptying (Figure 937).
Figure 9
indicated here in the diagram by the structural division or separation of the upper
and lower plane.39
This bears directly, of course, on the phenomenological problem of intuition,
or how to describe the manner in which intuitivity is manifest in consciousness. If
the notion of core density along the horizontal axis implies a kind of compressed
distance (or the compression then decompression of emptiness), then it is
questionable whether this can any longer be meaningfully illustrated by invoking
the notion of a differential, or at least by relying on such a comparison, which the
mathematical baggage of these diagrams tends to promote. What needs to be
brought to bear is a description of the compressed distance of a living proximity,
one that is more akin to Descartes’ conception of clarity in the Regulae than to
anything that one can find in the physics of motion. In Descartes, clarity is the
essence of manifestation as proximity, as being brought "closer" to the mind. For
a given to be brought closer within the sphere of res cogitans means that it
exercises a grip, that it is a vivacity that "takes hold" of consciousness, fusing the
various into the unity of a focus. And for Descartes, such clarity or intuitus takes
place within the figure of the moment, which effectively compresses all the
"distances" that amount, ultimately, to unclarity.40
Something similar is the case for Husserl, but with an important difference:
the living present is not itself a "place" where clarity has taken root in
consciousness thanks to the exclusion of distance; nor is the living present a
sphere of clarity that stands as an exception to a distance that belongs to unclarity.
The originary moment is, instead, the original tension of distance that, opening up
or unfolding the protentional-retentional continua of Ux, first constitutes the
intuitivity of a lived experience as such. It is, in other words, only as a streaming
that intuitivity has any root in consciousness; proximity here is fixed solely in
terms of a tendency, and not in terms of a terminus that would represent an
arrival. Or rather, the arrival is in the “living present,” which is illustrated by the
entire diagram. The future does not stop at the moment, for its very arrival is
already falling away, as a “coming and going” that does not refuse clarity its
39
Cf. Hua XXXIII 44:11-27.
40
Cf. Rule 7 in Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, in: Ouevres de Descartes, vol. X, ed.
Adam and Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964-76).
Reading Husserl’s Time Diagrams 33
Figure 10
41
Husserl does not actually produce a diagram in §5, he only provides a description (Hua XXXIII
34:31-35:17). This diagram is reproduced from Schnell, “Das Problem der Zeit bei Husserl,” p.
112.
34 James Dodd
structure.42 Again, one needs to read the diagram “dynamically,” but more: one
also needs to recognize that the fundamental phenomenological character of the
temporal flow, its characteristic mode of manifestation, is the lived tension of the
passage of an order, not the being-ordered itself. It is for this reason that time
presented itself to Husserl as the best candidate for the self-manifestation of
consciousness: the ordering of past-present-future as a phase-continuum is not in
and of itself the manifestness of time, but the lived tension of its passage, the
upsurge of its movement, the being-lived-through (Erleben) of whatever order
may otherwise belong to time. If the ordering of past-present-future were
sufficient to capture the experiencing of time, then time would simply be the
content of a representation, the object of a thought; its sense, however, is
intimately linked to the apprehension, the “perception,” of not simply what-is-
thought, or even perceived, but the perceiving of the perception, the thinking of
the thought.
Here we will close with the following quote from §7 of Text Nr. 2 in Hua
XXXIII, which strongly suggests that the key issue is precisely an appropriation,
and refinement, of the notion of an immanent perception to do justice to this inner
apprehension of the temporal flow:
Das Bewusstsein ist und ist als Fluss, und es ist Bewusstseinsfluss,
der sich selbst als Fluss erscheint. Wir können auch sagen, das
Sein des Flusses ist ein Sich-selbst-“Wahrnehmen” (wobei wir das
aufmerksame Erfassen nicht mit zum Wesen des Wahrnehmens
rechnen), in welchem das Sein des Wahrgenommenen immanent
beschlossen ist. Wie das möglich und zu verstehen ist, das ist ja
das grosse und beständige Problem diser Abhandlung gewesen.43
42
Cf. Schnell, “Das Problem der Zeit bei Husserl,” p. 113, where, in discussing this diagram, he
suggests the notion of a “Spannungsfeld”.
43
Hua XXXIII 44:20-27.