In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the
FIRST DIVISION administrative complaint.
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA,
Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents
letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification
with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal
case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent
for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have
enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private
complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore,
he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of
the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were
covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal
charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court. [5] On
January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent
for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who
belong to a powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From
childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he
looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought
respondents help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the
private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when
the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During
the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth
certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga.Respondent
stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea
to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent
also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty
and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for
extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose.
He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances
were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding
office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his
approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public
Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent
in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself
positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was
and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion
and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member
of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the
case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his
cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained
his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin
without first securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
 Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said
section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the
public as a lawyer.
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous
occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his
own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in
court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding
judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by
law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice
prohibited by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice
of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice
of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this
Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,
That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of
the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between
his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.[9]
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
 One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why
is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners
of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the
surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different
one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers'
work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in
the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context
and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado
de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of
a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can
be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced
in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder —
in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social,
and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of
this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served
as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and
since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and
the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as
far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at
the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
 those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's No blade shall touch his skin;
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent. No blood shall flow from his veins.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that
is being defined.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
SO ORDERED.
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused
was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in
the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance
of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City
Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule
to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This
Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not
appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention
whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,
because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no
possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already
pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified
to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently,
the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before
the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before
the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do
so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.
And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office
and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place,
although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the
Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our
Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals,
or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or
patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines
for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right
to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25
and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29,
the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is
warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent
was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not
being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license,
purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production,
the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the
applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training
and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding
in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty
of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal
fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a
patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior
public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to
hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of
the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States
Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar
to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution
of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of
good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary
to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent
to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the
Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to
have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in
scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from
time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent
Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or
other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist
applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten
any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by
word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion
shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition
of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United
States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the
said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence
to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may
take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is
silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent
Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the
Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area
are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the
Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
SUPREME COURT nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen
Manila hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any
EN BANC exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
Resolution March 18, 1954
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
1953; have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

DIOKNO, J.: Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law
all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
to 75 per cent. by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the (1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among 1,168, classified as follows:
others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly 1946 (August) 206 121 18
thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill 1946 (November) 477 228 43
No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 1947 749 340 0
21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in 1948 899 409 11
full as follows:
1949 1,218 532 164

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1952 2,738 1,033 426
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE. 1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled: Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one reconsideration.
hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and (2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing
average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or
not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may
be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez
and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers'
Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos,
Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta
against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de
Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted
almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of
intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the
majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of
the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found
by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become
more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared
individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies
were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them
in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books,
some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new
set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by
the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background
been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-
Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its
lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to
improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of
those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646),
of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is
expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New
York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be
admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of
Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission
to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public
or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court
of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able
professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no
doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by the
act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the
court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary
study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for
that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains
nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as
to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission
of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress
by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions
on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent,
and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as
to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis.,
567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach
to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted
to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element
of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial
entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent,
and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications
for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and
unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard
of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected,
such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which
the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is
no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely
true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D.
43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there
be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law
is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to
the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-
law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become
one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which
they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess
the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such
and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of
the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or
their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial
power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of
New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers
whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his
duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters
of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at
the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art.
VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court
has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys
at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean
that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group
of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing
rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession
requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and
reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that
with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in
the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact
to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and
to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability."
 But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon
motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in
mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that
under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above
citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining
or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions
of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of
his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient
in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule,
provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will
be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to
his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary
and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying
before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school
of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had
studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme
Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court
said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled
"An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall
comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes
in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for
two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by
the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville
Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve
 as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present
rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are
dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No
course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion
of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon
the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two
years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend
only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years,
although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on
the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December
31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest
upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted
by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being
a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are
all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act."
This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses
of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331,
227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of
the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in
their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will
be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations
prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an
equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar
of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only
72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74
per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What
Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who
failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect
of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment
of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in
what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws
and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system
that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned
for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes
a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article
1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by
this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this
Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of
the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner.
This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted
that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and
no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar
assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues
who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for
the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and
effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino
Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members. the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the
Examiner in Civil Law.
Number of candidates 206
August, 1948
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe
73'S 6
Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G.
72'S 6 Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates who passed 85 Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates who failed 121 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18 71's 29
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62 70's 35
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74 Number of candidates who passed 490
Passing grade (per cent) 72 Number of candidates who failed 409
November, 1946 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Number of candidates 481
Passing grade (per cent) 70
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(by resolution of the Court).
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
August, 1949
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty.
Number of candidates who passed 249
Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon.
Number of candidates who failed 228 Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43 Number of candidates 1,218
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80 Number of candidates who passed 686
Passing grade (per cent) 72 Number of candidates who failed 532
(By resolution of the Court).
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
October, 1947
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members. Passing grade (per cent) 74
Number of candidates 749 (by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43 August, 1950
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1 Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique
Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V.
69 per cent 40
Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
Number of candidates who failed 340
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972 of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59 Number of candidates who passed 432
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41 Number of candidates who failed 894
Passing grade (per cent) 69 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
(by resolution of the Court). Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively,
Passing grade (per cent) 75 PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
August, 1951 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
Number of candidates 2,068
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112
1948
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
Number of candidates who failed 879
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
1949
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
Passing grade (per cent) 75
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
August, 1952
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V.
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon.
Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members. 11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
Number of candidates 2,738 12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163 13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
Number of candidates who passed 1,705 14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
Number of candidates who failed 1,033 15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426 16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27 17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73 18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
Passing grade (per cent) 75 19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
August, 1953 20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, 21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members. 22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85

Number of candidates 2,555 23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100 24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9

Number of candidates who passed 1,570 25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284 27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95

Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04 28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4

29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
V.
Passing grade (per cent) 75
MRD- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
30.
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which 31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, 32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
which are still pending, follows: 33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
 36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95 76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7 77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15 78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85 79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6 80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8 81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7 82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65 83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9 84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85 85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6 86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45 87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65 88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70 89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3 90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3 91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15 92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75 93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15 94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4 95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75 96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71 97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7 1950
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55 MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95 99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71 101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
102.
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
1948
104.
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
1951
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1 110.
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05 111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6 112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
 113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85 147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8 MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
148.
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
115. 149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2 150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25 MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
117. 151.
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2 152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
118.
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
120.
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
161.
126.
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
162.
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1 165.
131.
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
132.
167.
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
MRD- Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2 168.
B.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85 171.
MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5 172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
138.
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6 173.
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25 174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
140.
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75 175.
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35 176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1 177. Ramos-Balmori, 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
Manuela
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
179.
 MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35 214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
180.
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
182.
MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
218.
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35 Felicidad
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85 MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
220.
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
221.
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7 222.
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1 223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3 224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35 225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7 MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
226.
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V. 227.
196.
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
230.
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2 231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25 232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
1952 233.
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7 MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
234.
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
204. 235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7 236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
205. 237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7 238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
206.
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
239.
207.
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2 240.
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9 MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65 241.
210. MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85 242. O.
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8 MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
243.
MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
213. MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
 244. 276. B.
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75 277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
245.
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
246.
279.
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15 280.
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9 MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
281.
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
250. 282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5 283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
251.
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
252.
285.
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6 286.
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85 287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
255.
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7 288.
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8 289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
257.
MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8 290.
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95 291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71 MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
292.
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
293.
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
263.
294.
MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
MRP- Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
264.
295.
MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
265.
MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
297.
266.
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
269. 301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2 MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
302.
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
303.
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85 306.
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9 339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
307.
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15 341.
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85 342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75 343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2 344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25 345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
313.
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
1952
314.
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
315. 348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35 349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
316.
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55 350.
317.
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9 351.
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85 MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
319. 352.
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75 353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95 MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
354.
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
356.
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
325.
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
331. MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
364.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332. MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
365.
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
368.
336.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
369.
337.
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
338. 371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
 372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9 402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75 MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
403.
MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
374. 404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95 MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
375. 405.
MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2 406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
376.
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
377.
E.
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9 409.
379.
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8 410.
380.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95 411.
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1 412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
382. D.
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
MRP- Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15 413.
383.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73 415.
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15 MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
386. 416.
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75 417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15 418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15 419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
389.
MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05 420.
390.
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
392.
423.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
393.
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
426.
395.
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
427.
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
399.
430.
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
400.
431.
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
 432. Manuela 463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4 464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
433.
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
434.
466.
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7 468.
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9 MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
469.
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
440. 471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7 MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
472.
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
473.
443.
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
444. MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
475.
445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
Arellano MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
476.
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
477.
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
449.
479.
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95 482.
453.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
454.
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
486.
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
457.
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
488.
458.
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
459. MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
460. MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
491.
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
492.
462.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
 MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15 1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
494.
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1 1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
497. 9. Montano, Manuel M.
MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
498. 1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8

499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95 1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4

500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3 1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65

501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2 10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with 1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were 1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72 1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. 12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M. 1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5 1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4 1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga. 13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9 1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75 1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7 14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
3. Blanco, Jose B. 1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15 1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95 15. Sanchez, Juan J.
4. Condeno, Mateo 1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3 MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85 1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
5. Ducusin, Agapito B. 16. Santos, Constantino
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65 1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1 1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
6. Garcia, Manuel N. 17. Santos, Salvador H.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25 1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3 1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
7. Luna, Lucito A. 1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
18. Sevilla, Macario C. 27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9

MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1 28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45

29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of
those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who 36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. 40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05

1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45 41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85

42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4 43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7

4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7 44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75

45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25 46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95 47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1

48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7 49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6

10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95 50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5

11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35 51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85

12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05 52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35 54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9

15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95 55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9 Av.
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
 6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05 Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05 into account in determining their general average in any subsequent
Concepcion examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35 SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3 general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25 entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71 Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3 It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75 to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in
any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45 this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65 with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6 comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2 while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4 if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70 of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05 time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2 one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25 required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094. requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972 intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We
embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average
The proposed amendment is as follows: with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires
one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to
the practice of law.
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects xxx xxx xxx
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite
their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is
not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or
more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this
question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into
law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the
discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis
of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or
even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than
that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically
and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite
of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this
is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group
of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950
bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year.
Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged
to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to
other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public
accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3
vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered
as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme
Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned,
it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination,
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will
be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of
below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the
last world war.
 In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
President in the Bar Bill of 1951. Executive Secretary.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He (Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable times erroneously cited as No. 974).
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such
precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls
candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous
resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification"
as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.
(Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a
class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only
a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does
not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils
with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide
margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there
be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36,
77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking
 EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 98. July 13, 1953.]
In the case of the lawyer FELIX P. DAVID.
D. Felix P. David in his own representation.
The Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and the Procurator, Mr. Esmeraldo
Umali on behalf of the government.
SYLLABUS
1. LAWYERS; THE TERM IS DEFINED "EXERCISE THE PROFESSION." - To practice the profession
of a lawyer is to practice the acts of that profession. The preparation and presentation of motions
requesting the execution of a sentence, the demolition of the houses of the defendants in the case
asking the Court to order the sheriff to deliver the amounts collected in the case are acts that are part
of the exercise of the profession of advocacy; to present a plea and memorandum before the Court of
Appeal is to practice the profession of lawyer, because an agent can not do so; Collecting rents from
the more than one hundred defendants issuing receipts and signing them as the plaintiff's lawyer
means practicing the profession.
2. ID .; ID; - The fact that the lawyer had not put in his motion asking for execution that he acted as a
lawyer but as agent and employee of the plaintiff, does not alter the nature of his services that are
certainly professional lawyer services. Concealing that he acted as a lawyer and pretending that he
was only an agent, his situation becomes worse; It is more guilty that, covered with a mask, shoot at
your enemy than the one who does it bare-faced and in view of the public.
3. ID .; SUSPENDED LAWYER EXERCISING THE PROFESSION. - The suspended lawyer who
practices the profession during the period of the suspension must be completely disqualified to practice
this profession in the Philippines with the consequent cancellation of the certificate issued in his favor
as such lawyer.
DECISION
PABLO, M .:
In administrative case No. 35, the respondent was suspended for malpractice in the exercise of his
profession of attorney for a period of five years as of November 9, 1949. The respondent admits this
suspension in his written report presented on 17 March 1951; however, he continued to practice the
profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On February 28, 1950, the petitioner presented a plea (Exhibit J) in case CA GR No. 4792-R, Tan Tek
Sy v. Maliwanag, not as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy, but with the following words: "for and on behalf of
Tan Tek Sy"; on January 26, 1951 it was sent by certified mail notification of the decision in said case
(Exhibit G), confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; On March 13, 1951, he filed a motion
in said court - already returned the file - requesting the issuance of an execution order, which motion is
signed as follows: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph
"TAN TEK SI
" By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID,
"c / o Atty, Felix P. David,
" Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,
"Philippines Saw Mill & Construction,
The respondent therefore presented the brief not as lawyers in practice usually do, but as an agent of
Tan Tek Sy.
In Civil Case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against
Tolentino, the respondent filed a brief on September 25, 1950, requesting an order to demolish the
houses of the defendants (Exhibit TO); On October 10, 1950, he filed a motion asking that the Manila
Sheriff be authorized to pay "the amount or such other amount as may be collected by the Sheriff from
time to time" (Exhibit B); on November 13, 1950, he filed another motion (Exhibit C) requesting another
demolition order, signing the three writings, Exhibits A, B and C, as the plaintiff's attorney; exhibits B
through B-34 show that he was receiving payments of amounts from several defendants as the
plaintiff's attorney;
In defense the appellant says that he appeared as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy from the Municipal Court of
Manila in 1948; that, upon being suspended, he had advised his client to seek another lawyer to
prepare the plea that was to be presented before the Court of Appeal; that when there were only two or
three days left and his client could not present it, he wrote and presented it at the request of his
client; that he prepared the plea with the intention that his client sign it, but since this was in Dagupan
and he could not sign it and there was only one day left, then he signed it as follows: "Felix P. David,
for and on behalf of the appellee. " On September 25, 1950, I filed with the Court of Appeal a
memorandum in response to the appellant, signed as is the plea.
"In order - says the appellant - to show that I did not have the intention to disregard the suspension of
the Supreme Court, I did not with the knowledge of Tan Tek Sy even identified myself as the attorney
for the appellee but in good faith, I signed for and on behalf of the appellee without designating that I
am practicing as attorney-at-law. " cralaw virtua1aw library
We do not believe that the action of the respondent is justified in presenting the plea and his
memorandum on behalf of his client being suspended in the exercise of his profession; knowing that he
was suspended, he should not have introduced them as an agent or as a lawyer; he was under an
obligation not to continue serving his client before the Court of Appeal; he had to warn his client that he
was suspended in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer and should advise him to use another in
his place if he wanted representation; it should not contravene the express order of this Court; I should
have known that a non-practicing lawyer can not be brought before a court by a litigant except before a
court of law. When I present your plea and your memorandum with the following words "For and on
behalf of the Appellee" infringed Article 31 of Rule 127 which provides that "In the other courts, a party
may conduct its own litigation personally or with the help of a lawyer, and his appearance shall be
made personally or through a duly authorized member of the Forum." An agent or a proxy or a member
of the suspended Forum can not appear for a litigant.
To explain the filing of the motions in Case No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, the
respondent says that I act in good faith, that I present them not to disobey the decision of this Court but
to charge their fees. As an official of the Forum, the lawyer must comply with the decision of this Court
above any other consideration. We believe that he does not act in good faith who, putting his interest in
the collection of his fees, exercises the profession knowing that he was not allowed to exercise it. Even
if he had not submitted his motions exhibits A, B and C and issued receipts B to B-34 for amounts
collected from the defendants, the respondent could have charged his fees, and demanded directly
from his client, and claimed them in accordance with the article 33 Rule 127.
The appellant says that if he appeared on March 2, 1950 in case No. 7679 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Juan de la Torre against Philippine Trust Co., it was at the request of his brother-in-
law Juan de la Torre and also the I do not charge fees for his appearance because I knew he was
suspended in the exercise of the profession. Although this appearance was not taken into account, the
respondent can not be saved by having provided the various professional services already reported.
To practice the profession of a lawyer is to practice the acts of that profession. The preparation and
presentation of motions requesting the execution of the sentence, the demolition of the houses of the
defendants, asking the court to order the Sheriff to deliver the amounts collected, are acts that are part
of the exercise of the legal profession; to present a plea and memorandum before the Court of Appeal
is to practice the profession of lawyer, because an agent can not do it; Collecting rents from the 109
defendants, issuing 35 receipts and signing them as the plaintiff's lawyer, is practicing the profession.

The fact that he had not put his motion for an execution order in Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against
Tolentino, who acted as a lawyer but as an agent and employee of the Philippines Sawmill and
Construction, does not alter the nature of his services that are certainly professional lawyer
services; but, concealing that he acted as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy and pretending that he was only an
agent, his situation is aggravated: it is more guilty that, covered with a mask, he shoots against his
enemy than the one who does it bare-faced and in sight from the public; hence the criminal law
imposes more severe punishment in the first case.

The evidence in the case file shows that the defendant Felix P. David exercised the profession of a
lawyer by intentionally disregarding the decision of this Court of September 30, 1949, Administrative
Case No. 35.

Therefore, he is disqualified from practicing as a lawyer In the Philippines, the certificate issued in their
favor to exercise the profession is declared canceled and ordered to return it to the Clerk of this Court.

Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Angelo Bautista and Labrador, MM., Are
satisfied.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and
re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in
the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively
— invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of
at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released
this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law
Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of
the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion,
there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made.
It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and
unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by
its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter,
Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations
and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No.
954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No.
954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963,
and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark
for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was
done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average
in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the
Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer
filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified
answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to
verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number
of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as
a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law
also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out
to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation
resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office
Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
(Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where
he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the
basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is
the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation
and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others;
thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No.
5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit
with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is
no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6
and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I
did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that
I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo,
based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and
myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions
as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative
but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to
get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the
chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be
identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original
correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me
the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200
to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my
residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court,
with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested
me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because
it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the
 Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority as
long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code
number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told
me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661
had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I
had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the
entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade
of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the
total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly
initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item
No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P.
Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I
have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman
lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or
suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the
Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which
was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
was about the same hour that he used to see me:
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as
when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to
make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to
have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31,
1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual
that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know
and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee
with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9
points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did
not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and
did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him
before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of,
if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also
the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal
benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at
No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively
low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I
might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can
recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo
however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every
item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I
increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation,
the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of
75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total
grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%,
herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for
not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however,
pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he
was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it
was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant,
that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and
every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that
the said examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade
than that previously given to him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be
mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer
written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the
Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook
(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I
have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should
then be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them
would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now,
we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to
be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to
bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting
a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average
but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he
remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-
de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all
good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the
fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so
merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as
Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early
part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think
of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first
number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw
was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post
standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards
the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of
the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954',
the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the
post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-
Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta.
Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last
three digits corresponded to "954". This number became
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six
digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I
either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as
Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
 The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of
these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941
while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was
still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on February 27,
1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the
ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954".
As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and,
thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-
Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to
them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either
of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the
meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code
No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code
No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general
average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political
and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and
pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or
re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee
that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the
subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954
on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang
"bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio
Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary
course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in
the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to
the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must
have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation
 that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact
that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit
an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant
Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in
effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of
their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to
show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied
and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their
duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers
of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been
submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in
the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on
another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57;
Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal,
with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected
and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test
of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration
was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo,
as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was
in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in
the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1
& 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook
in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66,
rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have
passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass
the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent
Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing
in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to
just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with
leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%.
Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly
initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law —
that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction
of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the
examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent
Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code
Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-
61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him
that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him
before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted
the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p.
16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper.
The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole
paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was
not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-
evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was
only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to
change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with
Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-
examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of
February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had
with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent
Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible,
the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After
clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-
evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%.
Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg
(Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias
ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a
total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It
is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such
steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only
in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to
justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162;
Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he
acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was
not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers
and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164)
and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court
and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that
prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be
admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed
in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25%
— which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed
only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was
referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this
was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any
request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
1. Political Law Public betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
or 30 weighted points leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70%
to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
BAI claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good
faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against
the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of
Labor Laws and Social the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in
Legislations 67% 67% = no re- trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the
evaluation made. other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And
the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
or 33 weighted points.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case
evaluation made.
of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better
situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination
or 30 weighted points. Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela
Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points. The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately
11 pts. or 44 weighted points. clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the
first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
Legal Ethics and Practical March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an
Exercises 81% 81% = no re- after-thought.
evaluation made.
———————————— B

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the
integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR
RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57%
TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by
the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken
and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average,
whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-
51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with
respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI,
pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were
contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI,
pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by
respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law
and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo are as follows:
as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on
leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the
inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not BA
yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22,
29-31, rec.). Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and Civil Law 75% 75% = "
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. Taxation 69% 69% = "
V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in ————————————————
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23- Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in
evidence.
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
Political Law 70%
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that
Taxation 72%
was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to
Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 BA
was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was Civil Law 89% 89% = "
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. Taxation 72% 72% = "
59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the weighted points
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him. Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
—————————————————
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner
in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.:
Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to
Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
Labor Laws 3% violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

Taxation 69% It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo
can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even
at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4)
Mercantile Law 68%
subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5%
in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers
in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in
the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between
the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the
other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act
of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always
be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with
authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the
rules.
B rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec.
2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement
in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or
determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for
the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's
personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is
still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations
provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal
cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal
cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent
Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory
any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his
moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or
applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar.
In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively,
the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to
declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal
of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him."
By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by
the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving
moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor
is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries
which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted
to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966,
1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared
under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he
had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he
had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom
he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the
certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant
and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that
criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to
explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as
early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he
did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed
to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no
other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be
a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an
officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then
to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is
not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico
from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their
report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good
moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations
[People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People
vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found
that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel
G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of
the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same
without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of
the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-
correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and
caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have
required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the
examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee
concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that
the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law.
With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of
Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-
61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in
allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and
increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I
asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it
with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and
tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did
was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade
so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and
initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-
evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
 Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own
accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at
that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973,
Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72,
rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that
I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in
that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I
recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find
their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to
exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian)
before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was
divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous
act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations
demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the
integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo
to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for
the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot
in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage —
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to
D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of
only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of
the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came
from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a
niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII,
pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan
from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit
in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed
under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the
amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because
the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of
$2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even
presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by
them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised
to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was
not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that
his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or
has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared
income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes,
Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled
on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by
respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-
4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo,
the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in
the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956
VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between
January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the
years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot
was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link
or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or
to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the
above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing
the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and
in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13,
1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show
cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the
investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII,
pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation
to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it
is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property
... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.
B He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at
the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of
waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-
law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19
years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator
Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the
private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy
of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ
Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed
and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV,
rec.).
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January
16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-
Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against
the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E.
GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-
94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is Antonio, J., is on official leave.
obliquely across the City Court building.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated
claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he
does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came
across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the
father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the
Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications
with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public
and official documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public
functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices
of the Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the
compositions and other papers and documents having reference to the
examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the months of
August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said
court, confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common
accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar
Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of
the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the
compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis
Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the same, the said accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common
accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%)
given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in
Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay,
and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three
(63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the
composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in
its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative
merits of those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors,
statements and declarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications
made by them in the aforesaid public and official documents in making it appear
that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the
Supreme Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law, as in
fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and
documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by
the prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice
Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on
November 1, 1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar
examinations held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July
11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for
admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as
chairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926, and upon
recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of the
examination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil
Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal
Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-
General Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors
was appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director
of Civil Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in
Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of
Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and
Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the
Bureau of Audits and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law;
Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in
Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of
Lands, as correctors in International Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of Lands,
and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was
substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were
designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of the chairman of the examination
committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of the
questions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the articles, legal
provisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were taken.
The work of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors
designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum,
and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by corrector
Amado del Rosario to guide the correctors in grading the examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject
assigned to them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in a
separate note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector
in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to be given to the
composition.
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the
year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was
published on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there
appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The grades
of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the
publication of the result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in
Penal Law, 76 in Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a later revision of the composition of Luis
Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-
four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said
compositions after striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the
composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the
composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this irregularity by the City
Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the
identity of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the
compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with
the conformity of her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in
parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four
and the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are
also in my regular handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person
who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have
been falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which said
changes and alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for the
defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as private
secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as corrector and at the same
time supervisor of the correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the
compositions already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by
them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the
accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and
explaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand
that in order to do justice to the compositions, she could review the compositions
already graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new
revision was done in order to do justice to the compositions and before the
names of the candidates were known."
Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by
the corresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness
testified that said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said
accused (pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said
that the chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she "was
authorized to correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year
1926 and that she had never corrected any composition after the name of the
corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known
Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this
case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez
may be summarized in two following propositions: 1st — that Justice Romualdez, as
chairman of the examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary,
the accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she
was not a corrector and which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much
less the power to alter or change the grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd
— that granting that the chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the
accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by said
chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the condition that the
revision and the changes of grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to
whom the compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice
Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance
with law and the rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not
by himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among which were the powers
to review, and to change or alter the grades given to the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the
accused Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors to
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom
she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by
the chairman of the examination committee when she was given said authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence
for the prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in
the alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of
raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of
supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is
not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said
Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section 2 of the
rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and
that when said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination
committee without designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and
conferred upon him ample powers to do what in his judgment was most in line with justice
and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety or
illegality of the procedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the
powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was responsible
only to the Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to
whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration of
the grades appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said
accused, corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped in the
preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and
the identification numbers of the candidates were opened just one day before the
publication of the result of the examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place
the names of the candidates on said list, they had to work continuously from 8 o'clock in the
morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to the publication of the result of the
examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense,
the court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the
examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were
considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects assigned to them but
also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and
authority so that neither could consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It
appears, however, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused
Estela Romualdez, to understand that she "was authorized to revise the compositions
already graded by the other correctors provided the new revisions were made for the
purpose of doing justice to the compositions and that the same were mad before the names
of the candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect
to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s.
n.). It also appears that the accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of
the committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in compositions Exhibits B-1
and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to determine whether or not their
merits justified the changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of
the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she made no report
to the chairman of the examination committee of any error or injustice committed by any
corrector, and she only told him during the progress of the work of grading the papers that
they were being graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might be
committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary,
Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind come to her knowledge, she should take
special notice of the same in order to do justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to
her attention any such case in which, in her opinion, some injustice had been committed,
she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s. n.), and the revision in such cases
was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780, s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of
the examination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a
discretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not only
of the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination
committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee
appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was authorized
to confer such power of supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner
did she exercise that power when she made the changes in the compositions in question?
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations
of the grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is
the only person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which
said alterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was
not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When
pressed by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which
she came across those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez
said: "If I were to make any statement with reference to the circumstances under which I
came across these compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really
remember" (page 823, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her
initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and
X-2) bearing her initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials
on said compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she did not put her initials
on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her capacity as
supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to
put her initials when writing the original grade on any composition, but as supervisor "she
was under no obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the
examination committee "has not gone into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being
questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2
on the same line and immediately before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on
that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember
whether or not she exercised her supervisory authority with respect to the other five
compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and
when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given by her to the
grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the general average of
the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answered that "the fiscal
ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With these
answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory
explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement given by Justice
Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left to her discretion
(page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar examinations of
1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject already graded and
increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other words, that she could, at
her pleasure, do or undo the work done by the correctors without the necessity of
accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or memorandum of the
compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.
The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity
as chairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed
motions for reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of
the examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he noted in a
memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate,
but also the total grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such other
data which would explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.
The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand
that she had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating said Justice
as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer
such powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his designation was
made so that he should conduct the examinations in accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by
the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in
support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the compositions,
and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor,
which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the contradictions and
inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain facts
from which such knowledge can be inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering
over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the
intervention of the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina
Pons, Juan Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of
this list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing
the identification numbers attached to each composition were opened. Said numbers were
written either on the upper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and
that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of
the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the compositions were first written
(page 166, s. n.), and then the grades in each subject, followed by the general average
(pages 71, 184, s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s.
n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each composition as
they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the corresponding general average as
computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said
grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used
by Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit C-6.
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of
each candidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number only, was
prepared, the envelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers
written on said list were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the
candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages
166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon
cross-examination, having written many of the names appearing on several pages of said
list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the examination
committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the admission to the bar
and not only for those candidates with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those
who had obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic
increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation was not
approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary
(pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy,
Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names of the candidates who had
originally obtained a general average of 75% without having obtained less than 60% in any
subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s.
n.), which was approved by the Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list
Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2
was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the
compositions; while one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the
adding machine and computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper
used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the
office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the
irregularities in the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the
course of that investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay,
identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been
prepared simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the
grade in Civil Law of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the
same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of candidate No. 898
was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a
difference also being noted between the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-
6, which is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s.
n.). This discovery led to the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the
examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed
that the grades given to, and written by the respective correctors on the compositions of
said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and
further, that the grades that appeared on said compositions before the alterations were
identical with those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of
said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns
corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General Average, respectively, were written
after erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be noted, upon an
examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors, authenticated by their initials, had
been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make out said original grades, leaving,
however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades
written by the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to
make it appear that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second,
that said alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had been noted on
the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared
simultaneously; third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the grades
so altered should agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in
Civil Law and Remedial Law were erased with rubber, and in place thereof were written the
grades now appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having
admitted that she was the author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her
admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only
the grades originally written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but
also those appearing in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the
list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said columns,
and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the
accused Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades originally written, and
substituted for them the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as
well as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it
cannot be doubted that in making such erasures and alterations she not only acted with the
intent of concealing her identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the
candidate to whom said composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the
names of the candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in
the office of Justice Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute
control as private secretary and supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay
called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before the publication
of the results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the
participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other evidence for the
prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong indications that he operated in the
act before or at the time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the
bar examinations in 1926; that the general average obtained by him, according to the
computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally
written in the list Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the
recommendation of the examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and
75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of
successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said
inclusion was due to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial
Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades
theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive
whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not know him
and that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in
view of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay had
been benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the
power to revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the
compositions already graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her
knowledge, or which might be brought to her attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks
foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of her
coaccused Luis Mabunay was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the
prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings account
in the Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the
publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when correlated with the
deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account
(Exhibit H) with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927,
may, perhaps, give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades
of Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach the lowest passing general average. It is
 also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said amount had been sent to her by her
cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise
for sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not
corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as the
bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding check or postal money order, as she had
done when referring other deposits in the bank.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the information
are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as
accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with which they are charged
and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who was a
Government employee at the time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance
with article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and
one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 1,000
pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, and also to
suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis
Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the
provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the
Penal Code, the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of
"falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonment
without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the future
Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous
Government for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and
impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez
with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year
1926, to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon
her, in connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to the
fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and truly
conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that
examination.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the
powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926,
within the limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the
compositions be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the
corresponding candidates were known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general
average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the
list Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo
Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of said
lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly
entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised
by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the
court erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of
1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the
powers which she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she
altered the grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her
identity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers
as supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1
and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay
the sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with
which she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in
its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint
memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the
Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualified
to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were in favor of affirming
the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of acquitting the defendants. The
court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930
to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:
The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No.
31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice
Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere,
 particularly in the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal
division in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment appealed
from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista
Party vs.Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265 — the judgment in the case at bar be
affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns
voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real
voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory
provisions in force in the Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further
order of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be considered
separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewed
his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no severance had been
asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there was a prospect that the membership
of the court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement of
three justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as
attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing before the
court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the
dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a determination
from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been
denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum, to
which the Attorney-General filed a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lower
court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminal
offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that
the appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade the
examination papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the defendant Estela
Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did not
constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this
contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two groups of attorneys:
Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to grade the
papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the way in which the examination was
conducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some eight
thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys
appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a
contention is clearly untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the
grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of
attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the
"correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and the intervention
of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered were
not public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys,
the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be
maintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course of the
examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances
alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In
re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as
"falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of
Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year make all
the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice
Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to prepare
the questions and another group to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys were designated by the
clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of Justice Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the
ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be
committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades
in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted
out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without
indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to the
"correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered
the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the
American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the Massachusetts
Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for admission to the bar by any
person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if
enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the Judicial Department, and
asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a law
would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides
that the marking of the written examinations may be performed by competent persons not members of
the board but acting under the direction of such members, that pertains directly to the ascertainment of
the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the judicial department and not an immaterial
incident." It was also stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking
the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial court
erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the
examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for
the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the
authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he
gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.
The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela Romualdez,
and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as supervisors of the other
"correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an injustice,
without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the
paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereof or any report to him
or to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with
the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his
secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it is
inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the
unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or
any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of such a
claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by him as
a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was regarded as
a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela
Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. Justice
Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand
that if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so
long as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where
she was when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the revision
of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and he was supposed to
be a supervisor of equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority
which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in
question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her
coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial
court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect that
the accused acted within the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere
expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela
Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her
coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not
confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain how
she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question, how she
happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that
had been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely
and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been made by
her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement
of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made
by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimony
and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the
handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the
fiscal's office a photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen of
defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez
made the alterations under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew that
the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention that she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent
evidence, criminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the
introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily
disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred in
failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this assignment of
error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such contention. If the
learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in
arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the stenographic
record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and
a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part embraced
in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already considered. These remain only his
fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of error it is alleged that the
lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria,
and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of said attorneys as
to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys on
the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the members
of the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key
thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true
therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the examination
papers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave them.
The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best
qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other
attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no merit
in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the
accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2
was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committed
the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in concluding that the
accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez ever
reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised
his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, a passing
mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay
so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show that she
raised the grades of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in
the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining committee
recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but
also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an
automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the Supreme Court,
and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had
obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list
submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general average of only
72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in
question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required for admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust
Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose
he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State
the very means by which it may assist him.
In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid
down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge,
and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts
and circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he fails to offer
such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would
tend to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is
manifest that proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10
by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said it
was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could not
name the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did
not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her
cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce
evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that
the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U.
S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in
his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to
inference against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here
the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden
is on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to produce
evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This
seeming paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general
principle, has misled a few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her
coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had
rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made
after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his coaccused
that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present
evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. As this court
said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to
offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the
circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences
against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.
The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the third
time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on an
alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was
subsequently found that alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and Juan
Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility
for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about the making
of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of
taking disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of
public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the falsification
of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the name of an attorney
had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that space, although he had not
admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name in the register under the direction
of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on appeal the
decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that the
offense committed required the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as
the court found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in the
commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except by
circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the acts of all. (U.
S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
 personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual participation,
rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent
to, the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and
generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words
of one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the
evidence.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the
trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712,
and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any
public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day to
twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be
imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penalty
imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day
of prision mayor.

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the
Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the
Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a
conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been
changed by the Revised Penal Code toprision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and
the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one days to four years,
nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three years,
six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional.

The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed, with
the costs against the appellants.

Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses,
the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and
place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
 Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,
1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-
20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued
on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of
the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed
upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety
and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November
17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this
Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was
allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
—
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But
why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet
dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy
eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou
hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do
you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE,
our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
 Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify
their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that
even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its
truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is
used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end,
after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but
who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow.
As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial.
We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a
first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to
decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review.
If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099),
this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this
matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
 even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory
power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought
to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by
Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice
shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.
Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for
a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery
of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him
in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of
the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6
F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
 No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming
a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely
to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to
his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic,
more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is
his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June
26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence
in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations
then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial
error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the
control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND,
but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate
to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle
and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension
of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-
election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a
statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the
court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the
attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116
 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95
Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial
officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify
the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character
than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law
the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public
confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the
judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall
be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to
submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of
the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right,
and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or
has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the
proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends
to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as
my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to
the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court
of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
 The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive
of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of
prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking
man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as
well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such
right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.
The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply
than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than
the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of
morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine
after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct
in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we
have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of
acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect
in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the
officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard
to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced
by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer,
with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive,
vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress
in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned
by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent
his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as
an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on
the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And
there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act,
and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to
others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings
of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court,
for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said
the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a
case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3
N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a
sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in
reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I
have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public
may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
 the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect
much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and
mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of
mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to
the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient
lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of
a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over
a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts
involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements
is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting
on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of
the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching
to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed
during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of
the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a
far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in
then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in
the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision
of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent
and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this
Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
 Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed
from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It
speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference
to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court
as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They
bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members
of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
18
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing
an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after
the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually,
this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the
effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief
Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,
and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt,
to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no
action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct
has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative
is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved
themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore
it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions
as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move
as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with
vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks
for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite
of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and
its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of
the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of
our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed
-by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof.
But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in
one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser
sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that
in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can
be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court
of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified
to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently,
the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before
the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before
the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do
so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.
And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office
and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place,
although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the
Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent
Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our
Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals,
or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or
patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the
inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year
before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines
for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right
to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25
and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29,
the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is
warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent
was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not
being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license,
purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production,
the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the
applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training
and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding
in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty
of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal
fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a
patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior
public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to
hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of
the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States
Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar
to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution
of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of
good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary
to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent
to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the
Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to
have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in
scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from
time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent
Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or
other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist
applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten
any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by
word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion
shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition
of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United
States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the
said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence
to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may
take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is
silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent
Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the
Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area
are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the
Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED
SUPREME COURT and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the
Manila practice of law.

SECOND DIVISION It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is
directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of
complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979 hereby granted.

SANTA PANGAN, complainant SO ORDERED

vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
Aquino, J., concur in the result.

Santos, is on leave.
ANTONIO, J.:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in
this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement.
These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for
hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal
Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty.
Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the
name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers
that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D.
Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio
D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of
those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one
inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in
the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and
frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every
stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent
has violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These injunctions
circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I
nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to
deception or permits his client to do so." 2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration
in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
 Republic of the Philippines On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant
SUPREME COURT Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Manila Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent
had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988.
That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988,
EN BANC respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin

Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992 passed away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant, One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to
vs. take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent. dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality
and has been careful in his actuations in the community."

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then
President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty.
vs. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent. parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed
by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas,
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
stating that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had
not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant, consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that
the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent. by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he
himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin. del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.

RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against
respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which
were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after
considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and
finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall
strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest
standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia
each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were
acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present
Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST
whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good
moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason
therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August
1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is
not aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission
to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No.
3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands,
Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte
and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title
and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free
patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation,
 turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free
patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The
mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed
by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk
of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr.
Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any
pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the
Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from
admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive
Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM
44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989,
that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to
DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to
inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending
before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This
comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against
him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the
Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to
become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly
recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his
oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990,
which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated
thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition
which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to
exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the
importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these
cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to
change or amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in
the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore
should not in the least be considered as anything which is subject and
subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any
permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy
could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court
Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having
availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy
of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was
already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached
between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass
of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant
Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the
Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29
January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to
comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge
Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with
his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in
the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8
June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending
compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on
the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated
29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere
reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there
is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24
September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having
elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his
show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the
objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the
civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of
a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security
for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of
Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26
November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent
surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy
peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil
Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said
amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable
settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that
in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already
been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for
reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that
civil case against him.
859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City,
131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's
Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but
have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased
by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had
pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he
could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by
securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage
and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case
filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair
dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his
lack of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against
him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of
good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619)
have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her
objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint
treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training
as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers
themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the
ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA
 Republic of the Philippines On November 7, 1958, Glicerio Aquino, private respondent, filed his Revocable
SUPREME COURT Permit Application over an area of 8,000 square meters, which was later found to
Manila cover a part of the first parcel already titled in favor of petitioner and of the third
parcel transferred to him by Suyo. On December 29, 1958, private respondent
Florentina Guanzon, Aquino's sister-in-law, also filed Revocable Permit
EN BANC Application over the second parcel.

A.M. No. 1892 July 29, 1988 Eventually, the conflicts were taken cognizance of by the Bureau of Lands (B.L.
Conflict No. 3-953, and B.L.O. Conflict No. 236). On May 21, 1962, the Director
ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA JR., complainant, of Lands rendered a Decision against private respondents, as follows:
vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, respondent. WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Revocable Permit
Application No. V-14105 of Glicerio Aquino be, as hereby it
is, rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever
amount has been paid on account thereof. The Revocable
Permit Application No. V-14142 of Florentina Guanzon
PER CURIAM: shall remain, as it is, rejected. Glicerio Aquino and
Florentina Guanzon shall vacate the land within sixty (60)
days from their receipt of a copy hereof The new Insular
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on April 2, 1978, Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. sought the
Government Property Sales Application of Julian Estolano
disbarment of Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged unethical practices.
shall be given due course after the survey of the land
covered thereby.'
By a resolution dated May 24, 1978, this Court required respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva to
answer the complaint. To the answer of respondent dated July 5, 1978, complainant Atty. Luis V.
Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision,
Artiaga Jr. filed his reply of July 31, 1978.
and the Director of Lands, in an Order of August 13, 1962, amended his previous
Decision as follows:
After considering the answer of respondent, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. The solicitor General forwarded to the Court his
WHEREFORE, our decision of May 21, 1962, is hereby
Report and Recommendation dated May 4, 1988 with the finding that respondent was guilty of
modified by awarding to protesting Glicerio Aquino
misconduct and with the recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
preferential right to that area actually occupied and
at least six (6) months.
cultivated by him, indicated as portion "K" in the sketch
drawn on the back hereof, and amending the Insular
The complaint for disbarment arose from four (4) separate cases and several incidental cases with Government Property Sales Application (New) of Juliano
Juliano Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and Glicerio Aquino and/or Florentina Estolano so as to exclude therefrom the said portion. With
Guanzon, clients of respondent Atty. Villanueva, as adversaries in all of these cases involving the this modification, the decision stands confirmed.
same property.
Petitioner and private respondents appealed the amended Decision of the
The factual background of these cases is summed up in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- Director of Lands to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a
G.R. No. SP06600 dated November 16, 1977, a petition for certiorari and prohibition, an offshoot of Decision dated September 9, 1963, dismissed the appeals of private
Civil Case No. 183-C for Recovery of Possession filed by Estolano against Aquino and Guanzon respondents, set aside the Order of the Director of Lands dated August 13, 1962,
before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI on June 11, 1974. Quoted hereunder are and affirmed the latter's Decision of May 21, 1962. Respondent Guanzon moved
pertinent portions of the Court's decision: for the reconsideration of the Secretary's Decision but said Motion was denied.

There were three parcels of land involved herein. All continuos and adjoining to Respondent Aquino appealed the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
each other and located in Bambang, Los Banos, Laguna. The first covered an Natural Resources to the Office of the President of the Philippines, which
area of 2.6793 hectares; the second, an area of one hectare; and the third, an likewise affirmed the Decision appealed from.
area of one-half hectare. On July 20,1950, petitioner Juliano Estolano was issued
original Certificate of Title No. P-286 in his name over the first parcel. There is no
The Decision of the Director of Lands having become final, an order of Execution
controversy, therefore, in respect of this first parcel, the dispute being confined to
thereof was issued on January 4, 1967, but this notwithstanding, private
the second and third parcels.
respondents remained in possession of the subject property. For failure to obtain
possession thereof, petitioner filed, on June 15, 1974, the principal case, (Civil
The second and third parcels were the object of Revocable Permit Applications Case No. 183-C) in the lower court which eventually gave rise to the proceedings
by Paciano Malabayabas and Canuto Suyo, both filed on March 31, 1951. On now challenged in this Petition." (pp. 3-7, Decision in CA-G.R. No. Sp-06600)
June 12, 1956, Canuto transferred his right over the third parcel to petitioner. On
March 4, 1958, Malabayabas also sold his rights over the second parcel to
The restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 183-C on October 27, 1976 enjoining the Director of
petitioner. On May 15, 1958, petitioner filed Insular Government Property Sales
Lands from enforcing the Order of Execution was set aside by the Court of Appeals and the writ of
Application No. 1772 (New) covering the second and third parcels.
prohibition prayed for by petitioner Estolano was granted.
Meanwhile, on April 13, 1974, respondent's clients, Aquino and Guanzon, filed a complaint for forcible
entry against complainant's client, Estolano, in the Municipal Court of Los Banos Laguna docketed as
Civil Case No. 192. This case was dismissed by the Municipal Court on January 5, 1977. On appeal to
the Court of First Instance (CFI), the order of dismissal was affirmed on November 4, 1979 in Civil
Case No. 386-C. No appeal was interposed from this decision, thus it became final.
The third case for annulment of Estolano's title over the same land was filed by respondent's client,
Aquino, with the CFI on May 15, 1974 docketed as Civil Case No. 179-C which was dismissed on April
23, 1976. On appeal to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62576-R, the
dismissal by the trial court was affirmed on June 25, 1981. On October 21, 1981, the case was
remanded to the trial court for execution.
Finally, while their petition for certiorari and prohibition over Civil Case No. 183-C was pending before
the Court of Appeals, respondent's clients, Aquino, filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) at San Pablo City docketed as CAR Case No. 7043 against Estolano and the Director
of Lands on July 1, 1977. On July 2, 1977, the CAR issued an order requiring Estolano to respect
Aquino's possession. On May 18, 1979, the CAR dismissed the case and on appeal, its dismissal was
affirmed in a decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 5, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR.
Respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva is charged with the following unethical practices: (1) That
respondent had caused his client to perjure himself; (2) That he lacks candor and respect toward his
adversary and the courts; and (3) That he had been abusive of the right of recourse to the courts.
We find respondent Atty. Villanueva guilty as above charged.
Anent the first charge, the complaint and amended complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 192
filed by respondent's client are clear proofs that respondent had indeed caused his client Glicerio
Aquino to perjure himself as to the date he lost possession of the subject property so as to place the
case within the jurisdiction of the court.
Paragraph 5 of the original complaint filed on April 18, 1974 reads:
5. That sometime in the early part of 1960, defendant Julian Estolano was able to
dispossess plaintiffs spouses Glicerio Aquino and Lorenzo Magpantay of a
portion of the above-described parcel of land ... (Emphasis supplied.) 1
Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint dated June 19, 1974 reads:
5. That sometime in the early part of June, 1973, defendant Julian Estolano and
Segundo de los Santos unlawfully dispossessed and/or deprived or turned out
plaintiffs Sps. Aquino and Magpantay thru stealth, strategy, force and intimidation
of and/or possession over a certain portion (now caused by defendant Segundo
de los Santos to be planted to bananas now of less than a year old as of the filing
of the original complaint) located on the southern portion of their above-described
landholding . .... (Emphasis supplied. )2
In the original complaint, respondent's client alleged that he was dispossessed of the subject land in
1960, while in the amended complaint, he alleged it was in June, 1973. Clearly, this was a ploy
concocted by respondent to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case since a forcible entry
case must be filed within one year from the accrual of the cause of action under Rule 70, Section 1.
Such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of his oath that "he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court." 3 A legal counsel is of course expected to defend his client's
cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth. 4 The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ,
for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and
honor cannot be overemphasized. 5 His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and
the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violated his
oath of office when he resorted to deception. 6 Worse, he had caused his client to perjure himself thus
subjecting the latter to criminal prosecution for perjury brought before the Municipal Court of Los
Banos, Laguna. 7 Instead of safeguarding the interests of his client as his responsibility dictates, he did
exactly the opposite by causing his client to commit a felony.
From the foregoing, the lack of candor of respondent counsel towards the court is evident. This lack of
candor and honesty to the courts and his adversary is further demonstrated by other acts of
respondent.
In Civil Case No. 192, respondent's clients were restored to the possession of the 2-1/2 hectares of the
untitled portion of subject property by virtue of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the
court on May 21, 1974 upon filing of a property bond by respondent. Upon the dismissal of the case on
January 5, 1977, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was dissolved and respondent's clients
were ordered to restore possession of subject property to complainant's client Estolano. However,
respondent blocked the order by filing an urgent ex-parte motion seeking clarification as to whether the
dispositive portion of the order of January 5, 1977 was immediately executory and asking the court to
allow his clients to remain in the meantime in the premises. Before the court could even resolve the
motion, respondent perfected his appeal from the order of January 5, 1977 on January 25, 1977. Thus,
when the court's order affirming its previous order came out on January 26,1977, the Provincial Sheriff
of Laguna refused to implement the orders of January 5 and 26, 1977 until the appeal has been finally
disposed of. On appeal, the CFI of Laguna, affirmed the questioned orders of the Municipal Court.
When the decision of the CFI became final because respondent failed to appeal, his clients refused to
abide by the Order of Execution issued by the Municipal Court.
Consequently, Estolano filed an ex-parte motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff be authorized to
forcibly evict respondent's clients. On the date set for the hearing of the motion, respondent did not
appear and instead filed his "Opposition/ Manifestation" informing the court of a petition for certiorari
filed against the presiding judge before the Court of First Instance of Laguna. In deference to this
petition, the Municipal Court resolved to hold in abeyance theex-parte motion of Estolano until
resolution of said petition.
Indeed, the manner in which respondent counsel handled the forcible entry case filed against the client
of complainant shows his total lack of candor and respect for the courts and the rights of his adversary.
He had employed every step necessary to forestall complainant's client from taking rightful possession
of subject property. He has shown utter disregard of the proper rules of procedure to suit his purpose.
While he filed his urgent ex-partemotion for clarification, he chose not to wait for its resolution and
instead perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance. When finally the decision became executory
because of his failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals, he filed a petition for certiorari against the
decision of the CFI which petition is obviously frivolous and a mere tactic to delay enforcement of the
court's decision. In the meantime, the clients of respondents refused to obey the order of execution.
A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the court. 8 He should have counseled his clients
to submit to the order of the court instead of encouraging them to resist such order. The actuations of
respondent of employing dilatory tactics by filing a clearly frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the
administration of justice which constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 9
Respondents counsel further demonstrated his questionable motive by filing another case, this time for
annulment of the title of complainant's client to the other 2-1/2 hectares of subject land with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. This case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and
prescription. Respondent appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals where it was pending resolution
at the time the instant complaint for disbarment was filed. The decision of the trial court was affirmed
and remanded to the lower court for execution.
Not satisfied with the above-mentioned appeal, respondent counsel brought another case against
complainant's client this time before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR Case No. 7043) for
determination allegedly of who had a better right over the subject property when he was well aware e
of the absence of any tenancy relationship between the parties.

An examination of the records shows that respondent did not disclose before the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) prior law suits and decisions rendered relative to the subject land. As a result,
respondent was able to secure ex-parte from the CAR a restraining order against the Director of Lands
and Estolano on July 2, 1977. So when the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil
Case No. 386-C affirming the decision of the trial court in the forcible entry case No. 192 was rendered
on November 4, 1977 ordering the immediate restoration of subject land to Estolano, because of the
restraining order issued by the agrarian court, the execution of the said decision cannot be fully
satisfied, To make matters worse, respondent even filed a criminal complaint against complainant and
his client, among others, for alleged violation of P.D. 316 and the restraining order issued by the Court
of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 7043. 10 The CAR dismissed this case and on appeal, the
dismissal was affirmed.

We also note that after respondent filed the case with the CAR on July 1, 1 977, he filed on July 5,
1977 in Civil Case No. 179-C before the CFI of Laguna, a motion to dismiss the present action without
prejudice to his clients' right to prosecute their present action with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The
lower court denied the motion since it had already dismissed the case on some other ground and their
appeal was already perfected without plaintiffs' manifesting that they are abandoning their appeal.
Thus, respondent was able to elevate two (2) separate appeals--CA-G.R. No. 62576-R re: annulment
of title (Civil Case No. 179-C) and CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR arising from the CAR Case No. 7043,
before the Court of Appeals over the same issues involving the same subject property titled to
Estolano.

The cause of respondent's clients is obviously bereft of merit. Respondent was aware of this fact so he
resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking the court where he may possibly obtain favorable
judgment, thereby adding to the already clogged dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious cases he
filed. He grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing multiple petitions or complaints for a
cause that had been previously rejected in the false hope of getting some favorable action, somehow,
thus, obstructing the administration of justice.11 He was derelict in his duty as counsel to maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.12 He had thus prostituted his office at the expense of justice.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain standards of
mental and moral fitness. 13 For a counsel who has been sworn to assist in the administration of justice
and to uphold the rule of law, respondent has miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a
member of the Bar. Instead of assisting in the speedy disposition of cases, he made a mockery of our
system of justice, thus deserving to be censured and penalized by this Court. No doubt, respondent is
guilty of gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law from
date of notice until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and
deserves to resume the practice of law. Let this decision be noted in the bar records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. X92-1. July 30, 1979.]
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P, FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES,
JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA
K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE
LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS
ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court’s Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of
a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased
partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership." 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized
the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a
deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
— a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in
the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there
is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through
this use. . . ." 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries
now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners’ deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Dean case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased
partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from
including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, "who has long been dead."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty.
E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for
their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of
Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The
Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney
and client and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should
be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys
are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name
of one or more of the partners.
"Those who, not being members of the partnership include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability of a partner."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those
of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to
liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the
firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law
firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-
lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits all agreement for the payment
to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received
from the future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both because the recipients of such division
are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient." Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered
into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no
corresponding liability.chanrobles law library : red
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names
of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first
factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding
Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of
the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which
continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than
of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in
a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9
"As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties
have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it,
(s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of
the firm . . .." (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand,
". . . a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of the members,
such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be distributed us a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is
no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. . . ." (ibid, s 203, p. 115)
(Emphasis supplied).
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals
or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy. 10
"A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. . . . It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or
of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper." 12
"The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a ‘profession.’ . . .
"Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer
from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as ‘a group of men pursuing a learned art as
a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally
be a means of livelihood.’
x x x and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: ‘The continued use of the name of
"Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity,
and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients." 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association 17
in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm
names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed.
"The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is
proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to identify the
active members. . . .
"There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the
name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a
partner with the new one." (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207-208) (Emphasis supplied)
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided
by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently avowed the continued use of a deceased
partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, Et. Al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name
because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties The Court stated
therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or
legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association
a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.’ There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached the conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited.
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x
"Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners." 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom. and of the elements requisite
to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does
not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical
custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When
the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist
from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of
our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23
Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be
considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."cralaw virtua1aw library

". . . It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.’A trade’ . . .’aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind.’ If, as in the
era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and
grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to
acquire as much of the world’s good as he may within the limits allowed him by law. But the member of
a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the
farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers or physicians’ strike. The best
service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is
his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of
reward. This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a
profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure
and maintain that spirit."25cralaw:red

In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediments.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they
served as such.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J. and Abad-Santos, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-
Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to
the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to
the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required
to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted
for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions
of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section
10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section
12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body
to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons
whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed
to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice
of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
5
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State
to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of
the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of
the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate).
Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group
of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment
of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay
a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It
is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration
of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less
real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of
the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect
the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power
will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness
of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5830. January 26, 2004]
MARY D. MALECDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. PERCIVAL L. PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW P.
KOLLIN, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant case arose when Mary D. Malecdan filed a verified Letter-Complaint dated January
19, 2001 addressed to Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion, then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin, with
violation of the lawyers oath, as they committed acts not only prejudicial to [the IBP] but are in
themselves in violation of the oath that they have sworn to uphold as [a] condition for their admission to
the bar.[1]
The undisputed facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On November 25, 1999, the complainant entered into a deed of sale with the Spouses
Washington and Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in Baguio City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-71030.[2] The complainant paid P10,000 as earnest money, and P2,600,000
as the full and final payment of the consideration of the sale. The money was received by Eliza Fanged
and deposited in the account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel for the latter. The complainant
later found out, however, that the said lot was the subject of a controversy[3] between the former
owners and the Fanged Spouses.
When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the latter,
through her new counsel respondent Atty. Kollin, filed a complaint for rescission of contract with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order with damages[4] against the complainant,
Atty. Bustamante, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and Washington Fanged
on December 2, 1999.[5]
Eliza Fanged and the respondents thereafter caused the filing of a Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion dated December 14, 1999.[6] It was prayed, among others, that an order be
issued directing defendant PCIB to transfer the amount of P30,000 from the account of
Atty. Bustamante to a joint account in the name of respondents Atty. Kollin and Atty. Pekas by way of
attorneys fees. The complainant was not a signatory to the compromise settlement, as she was in
the United States at the time. The money was then transferred to the respective accounts as prayed for
in the compromise settlement.
The Complainants Allegations
According to the complainant, respondent Atty. Kollin knew very well that the money entrusted to
him did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. Yet, when the complainants duly authorized
representative Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused to
do so, on the pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter. The respondent, however,
admitted that the money was in his possession.[7] The complainant further averred that:
11. The said lawyers were aware that the money in the bank which was the subject of Civil Case No.
4580-R was the consideration for a supposed sale between me and Eliza Fanged which did not
materialize because it could not be registered aside from the fact that it is void pursuant to the decision
in Civil Case No. 4528-R. They knew that the money is not owned by Eliza Fanged. Yet, despite this
knowledge, they misled the court by making it appear that all the parties agreed to the settlement by
filing the manifestation of compromise settlement with motion (Annex G) knowing that I was abroad
and could not have given my consent thereto.
12. Worse, they made it appear that I was copy furnished of the pleading when in truth and in fact I
never received the same as I was in the United States of America. My investigation of the matter
reveals that the sister of Eliza Fanged, Veronica Buking, received the pleading for me.
13. When confronted, Eliza Fanged admitted to me that the money was actually entrusted to
respondent Atty. Matthew Kollin.[8]
The complainant also alleged that she filed the complaint against the respondents because of
the latters connivance in causing the withdrawal of the money in the bank. She pointed out that while
the manifestation of compromise settlement does not bear the signature of Atty. Kollin, paragraph (b)
of the prayer clearly shows that the amount of P30,000 was appropriated to a joint account belonging
to the respondents by way of attorneys fees.
The complainant explained that respondent Atty. Kollin, as counsel for Eliza Fanged in Civil
Case No. 4580-R, prayed that the sale of the property to her (the complainant) be declared null and
void. Proceeding from this premise, then, Eliza Fanged had no right to the money in the bank; the
respondents, likewise, had no right to withdraw the amount of P30,000 to answer for their attorneys
fees. She further averred that the respondents made it appear to the trial court that she (the
complainant) was duly notified of the purported settlement, when she was, in fact, not a party thereto
as evidenced by the records.Thus:
[T]he records reveal that the person who received the copy of the document purporting to cover the
settlement intended for me is the very sister of his client, Eliza Fanged, in the person of
Veronica Buking. Veronica Buking is not and was never a resident of Dagsian, Baguio City, the
location of my permanent residence. Eliza Fanged could not have thought of this scheme.
9. But lawyer as he is, Atty. Kollin must have anticipated possible legal repercussion[s] that would
ensue as a result of this scheme. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with Motion, he
asked his co-respondent, Atty. Pekas, to sign as counsel for Eliza Fanged. Atty. Pekas seem[ed] to be
too willing to extend assistance to Eliza Fanged if only to get the money from the bank. However, in the
actual release, and the partition of the money, the respondents reportedly actively participated to
insure their share of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. Atty. Pekas did not stop there. As counsel for Eliza
Fanged, he signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999 with a misleading statement that
the parties have extrajudicially settled this case amicably among themselves, when in truth and in fact,
I was never consulted. [9]
The Respondents Allegations
The respondents denied the foregoing allegations in their respective answers.
Respondent Atty. Kollin admitted that he knew that the money in the bank was the complainants
payment for the land purchased from the Fanged Spouses. He pointed out, however, that it was unfair
to state that his client Eliza Fanged was not entitled thereto, since in the first place, she appeared as
the vendor in the deed of sale executed between her and the complainant. Furthermore, although Civil
Case No. 4528-R had already been decided by the trial court, the same was appealed to the Court of
Appeals,[10] and did not become final and executory as erroneously stated by the
complainant. Atty. Kollin also pointed out that he was not the original counsel of the Spouses Fanged
in the said case, but merely inherited the same from Atty. Artemio Bustamante.[11]
The respondent further averred that because Atty. Bustamante and the Fangeds failed to settle
the problem, he filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale, and not for the release of the money in
Atty. Bustamantes possession. According to the respondent:
To me, this is the gist of the problem. Complainant Mary Malecdan strongly believes that she was
swindled because of the said decision. However, the only problem between Dato and Fanged is the
determination of the actual balance and the payment thereof. Settle the balance with Mrs. Dato and
everything would be settled likewise. As of this time, it is very safe to say that the issue is still SUB
JUDICE and complainant could not even be sure of the outcome of said case, although there is a
pending proposal for the eventual settlement of the case by the payment of the unpaid balance.
Moreover, the title of the subject land is in the possession of the Complainant and could transfer said
title in her name anytime. Perhaps, what the complainant is saying is that the title could be transferred
in her name, however, a notice of lis pendens was annotated therein due to the filing of the case
between O. Dato and the spouses Fanged.
For all intents and purposes, complainant could transfer the title in her name and take possession of
the property although the notice of lis pendens will be transferred or be likewise annotated in her title.
Complainant knows very well that the problem between O. Dato and Eliza Fanged is the actual
balance to be paid as per the first deed of sale; [12]
Respondent Atty. Pekas, for his part, admitted that the amount of P30,000 was transferred by
Atty. Bustamante to their account, but averred that it was done voluntarily. He denied the allegation
that they misled the court by making it appear that the parties agreed to the compromise settlement
with motion, since, as can be gleaned from the compromise agreement itself, the complainant was not
a party thereto.[13] The respondent further alleged that:
20. As best as the respondent can recall, on the late afternoon of December 12, 1999, Atty.
Matthew Kollin called up respondent on the telephone. He was requesting for respondent to attend a
hearing of his case the following day, December 13, 1999, for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. This was on the pretext that he has another out of town case on the same date and cannot
attend the hearing. As it is a common practice among lawyers, respondent acceded to the request;
21. As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special
appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only manifest
submission of the matter for resolution;
27. That after Eliza Fanged and Wilfreda Colorado related the foregoing story, respondent asked about
the settlement being proposed by the Honorable Court. Eliza Fanged then expressed her willingness to
accept the counter-offer of Atty. Artemio Bustamante to settle the case in the amount of Two Million;
28. With the new development, respondent contacted the office of Atty. Matthew Kollin to refer the
matter but was informed that the latter is still out of town. Respondent then advised that if Eliza Fanged
is willing, he can assist her in the settlement, to which advice Eliza Fanged acceded;
29. Respondent contacted Atty. Artemio Bustamante who likewise was willing to settle and the details
of the settlement were agreed upon. Afterwhich the proper manifestation and motion was submitted to
the Honorable Court for consideration and ultimately dismissal of the case;
31. That during the whole time that respondent participated in the resolution of the case, he never
committed any act involving deceit and machination. He acted in a way which he thinks is proper [14]
Respondent Atty. Pekas prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit, averring that as a
new and young lawyer, there was no reason for him to risk his future for a measly sum, through
dishonest conduct.[15]
The Proceedings Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline
On May 7, 2002, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan issued the following Order:
When this case was called for hearing, Atty. Percival Pekas appeared. Atty. Matthew P. Kollin failed to
appear despite the notice duly served on him.
Complainant Mary D. Malecdan appeared without counsel. She manifested that she is submitting her
case for resolution based on the pleadings on record.
The complainant was ordered to present certified true copies of Annex A attached to her complaint, the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex B of her complaint in favor of
Mary Malecdan and the Decision Annex D. Complainant is given ten (10) days from today to present
true copies of her documentary evidence.
Atty. Percival Pekas is given ten (10) days from today to file his rejoinder. Atty. Pekas likewise
manifested that after he shall have filed his rejoinder he submits this case for resolution.[16]
In his Rejoinder, respondent Atty. Pekas reiterated that he acted in good faith, and did not
commit any act of deceit or machination. He also averred that Atty. Artemio Bustamante would have
been a great help in determining the truth, but unfortunately, the complainant chose not
to implead him.[17]
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-395, finding
respondent Atty. Kollin guilty of dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to
respondent Atty. Pekas, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Atty. Matthew P. Kollins dishonesty to the
court with resulting damage and prejudice to the complainant, Respondent Atty. Kollins (sic) is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. The complaint against
Atty. Pekas is DISMISSED for there is no evidence on record to prove that he was aware of the defect
in Eliza Fange[d]s right to claim the sales proceeds with a WARNING that Atty. Pekas should be more
circumspect with respect to taking over other lawyers cases and handling sensitive matters such as the
compromise settlement in Civil Case No. 4580-R.
According to IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juans Report dated May 30, 2002, the main
issue to be resolved in the case was factual in nature: whether or not the respondents knowingly
caused the withdrawal from the bank of the purchase price of the lot in question, despite their
knowledge of a defect in their clients right to claim the said amount. The Commission found that
respondent Atty. Kollin knew that his clients title was defective, having represented her in Civil Case
No. 4528-R. He should have been mindful that his client had no right over the purchase price as paid
by the complainant. Respondent Atty. Pekas was, however, exonerated of the charges against him,
thus:
Insofar as respondent Atty. Pekas is concerned, it should be noted that there is no evidence on record
to prove that respondent Atty. Pekas was aware of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim [t]he sales
proceeds. It is likely that respondent Atty. Pekas unwittingly played into the hands of respondent
Atty. Kolin when he signed said Manifestation of Compromise Settlement. [18]
In his October 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing IBP Resolution, respondent
Atty. Kollin alleged that contrary to the finding of the Commission, he was unaware of the defect in his
clients (Eliza Fangeds) right to claim the sales proceeds. He filed the case for nullification of contract
with prayer for the rescission of the sale between the complainant and his client on the ground that the
latter would be disadvantaged if Atty. Bustamante succeeded in taking a huge chunk of the money
deposited in his name. According to the respondent, if he was, indeed, interested in the money, he
could have filed a case to compel Atty. Bustamante to release the money to his client, and not a
complaint for rescission of contract. The respondent also reiterated that the reason why he requested
respondent Atty. Pekas to attend the hearing of the case as collaborating counsel was that he attended
a hearing in Bontoc, Mt. Province on December 14, 2002.[19]
According to the respondent, the complainant should have filed the instant case against
Atty. Bustamante who was the real architect in the release of the money and the execution of the
compromise settlement with motion. The complainant should have also questioned the order of the
RTC judge concerned as to why no notice was issued to her before the money was released.
The Ruling of the Court
It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the
practice of law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service. [20] The practice of law is a
profession and not a money-making trade.[21] As they are an indispensable part of the system of
administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of
professional ethics a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing
criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with
the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards
the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious
matter of public interest. [22]
Respondent Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. He
admitted this much in the complaint he himself prepared in Civil Case No. 4580-R, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court:
I. BEFORE HEARING:
1. That it orders (sic) the issuance of a temporary restraining order directing the manager of
the PCIBank Session Rd., Baguio City branch, through its branch manager, Oscar Aquino, to cease
and desist from allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00 deposit in his
account;
II. DURING HEARING:
1. That it orders the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendant PCIBank or its
agents from disbursing or allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00
deposited in his account;
III. AFTER HEARING:
1. To order defendants Atty. Artemio Bustamante and the PCIBank, Session Rd., Baguio City branch,
to release the amount of P2,450,000.00 in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic);
2. To order defendant Atty. Artemio Bustamante to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
3. To order that the deed of sale executed between the Spouses Washington Fanged and Eliza
Fanged in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic) be declared null and void;
4. To order Atty. Artemio Bustamante to release the original owners copy of title no. T-71030 of the
registry of deeds of Baguio City to the complainant;[23]
Respondent Atty. Kollin cannot now assert that the reason why the prayer in the complaint
included the release of the money in favor of the complainant was that his client realized that P600,000
would be too much to be given to Atty. Bustamante as attorneys fees. The respondent is bound by this
assertion in his pleading,[24] which, as can reasonably be inferred, was made because he himself
believed that his client was not entitled to the money in question. The respondent cannot, likewise, find
refuge in the fact that his signature did not appear in the compromise agreement executed between the
parties. As found by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
[A]lthough it was respondent Atty. Pekas who signed the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with
Motion as counsel for Eliza Fanged, it is unbelievable that respondent Atty. Pekas would dare to sign
said Manifestation without the approval or consent of respondent Atty. Kollin, the counsel of record of
Eliza Fanged. As respondent Atty. Pekas himself stated his authority with respect to Civil Case No.
4580-R was limited as follows: As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall
enter a special appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall
only manifest submission of the matter for resolution. If as respondent Atty. Pekas claims he was only
authorized by respondent Atty. Kollin to attend one hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R, why did he
exceed such authority by executing the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of Eliza
Fanged, respondent Atty. Kollins client?
The most plausible explanation in this matter is that respondent Atty. Kollin in fact authorized
respondent Atty. Pekas to execute the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of his
(respondent Atty. Kollin) client Eliza Fanged in order to pave the way for the release of the sales
proceeds. This maneuver was resorted to by the respondent Atty. Kollin in order to avoid any
responsibility for securing the release of the sales proceeds to his client despite his knowledge that his
client Eliza Fanged had no right thereto. By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of
Compromise Settlement, it was the intention of respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from such
pleading and claim no responsibility or participation therein so that the same would not be tainted by
his apparent knowledge of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim the sales proceeds. In this
respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and his client Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have secured
the release of the sales proceeds to the detriment and prejudice of herein complainant.[25]
Contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent Atty. Pekas cannot validly claim that he acted in
good faith as his superior, respondent Atty. Kollin, merely authorized him to attend the December 2,
1999 hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R. Atty. Pekas, in entering into a compromise agreement,
overstepped the authority he was purportedly given. He was only authorized to manifest submission of
the matter for resolution. Furthermore, respondent Atty. Pekas himself claimed that the complainant
could not question the compromise agreement as she was not a party thereto. Atty. Pekas, thus, knew
that there was no valid compromise agreement, as one of the parties in the case was absent at the
time it was entered into. He knew that no valid notice was given to the complainant, since the signatory
to the notice of the manifestation of compromise agreement was a certain Veronica Buking.[26]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[27] A lawyer is expected,
at all times, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. Whenever it is made to appear that a lawyer
is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but the duty
of the Court which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar
to withdraw the privilege.[28]

A lawyer may legally apply a clients funds in his possession to satisfy professional fees which
the client owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to the legality of the amount thereof.[29] However,
the fact that a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the clients money in his possession or the circumstance
that the client owes him more than the clients funds in his hands may not excuse him from making an
accounting nor entitle him to unilaterally apply the clients money to satisfy his disputed claims. [30] In this
case, the amount of P30,000 which the respondents took for themselves as attorneys fees belonged to
a third person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an
adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the
complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing
of the complaint itself. Thus, the respondents could not, without a claiming partys knowledge, apply the
amount of P30,000 for themselves as attorneys fees. If there was someone liable for the respondents
attorneys fees, it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a real compromise as
to the manner in which the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the complainant was not
present when the said agreement was made.

In the recent case of Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Atty.

Michael Dioneda,[31] we had the occasion to state, thus:

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and
the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[32]

An attorneys only safe guide is high moral principle, as the torch to light his way; his best shield
is a clear conscience and an unblemished personal record; and his just reward is to find his highest
honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a
patriotic and loyal citizen.[33] The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law
profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other
calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only on the individual
lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are
strictly required to, at all times, maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of their profession.[34]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Matthew P. Kollin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) years. Atty. Percival L. Pekas is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it
is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a
Sworn Statement alleging the following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building,
Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible
civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to
secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which
he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited
the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon
the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed
in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would
repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in
my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on
my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao
City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the
building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court;
whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the
Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of my case,
and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf,
copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has
not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and
to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and
June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached
as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for being
totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the
formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against
Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the
business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -
- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so.
Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the formers law office to deliver
the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent
drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and
prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to
draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these
fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to
pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary and told
her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance
and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid
was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
 Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing
of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property
Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations
went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant
proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees.
When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the
amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation
at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted
and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if
anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the
filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the
Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage
and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing
fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount
delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and not for the filing
fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the
interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain
the respect of the community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the
profession.[6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him
and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he
only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been
sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established.[7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees. [8] Hence, despite the
fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed
legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client,
they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.[9] They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[10]
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the mistake -- if indeed
it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost
no time in calling complainants attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest
eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.[15] Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession.
 Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[16] It may be true that they have a
lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession;
that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may
apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do
not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
clients interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.[18] Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former
returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed
as a penalty.[19]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondents file.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than
not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure
questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy,
wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased
into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised
by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits
as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R
Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he
executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979,
and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following
his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation,
to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive
relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation
in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the
private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of
P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the
petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the
court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits — a fact the petitioner himself
concede 4 — for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone
the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the
petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution,
although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the
other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the
said properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to
advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of
mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we
shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily
the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to
redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private
respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to
finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay,
the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of
Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for
Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real
properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of
redemption and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679. . .10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the
respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court
granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining
order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced
disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal
complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On
December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of
document, 13praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and
that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3,
1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a
mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter
would lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for
the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner
moved for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained
of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to
protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly,
that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on
the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section
29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his
own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to
redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot
be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their
clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case
abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually
attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in
the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution
over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order
directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On
December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions,
denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC
G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC
G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC
G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED
THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces
alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the
assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming
annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two
orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we
have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is
explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has
been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it
is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court
reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas
correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it.
Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the
proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court
will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions
and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the
former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent
designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to
him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner
would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R.
Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty.
Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from
being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic
fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an
appeal 26 and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule,
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision
executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in
denying his motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor
had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion
for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for
irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his
lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy
about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his
lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article
1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose,
gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become
final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure — for the enlightenment solely of
the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we
cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his
mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural
rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 31If procedure were to be an impediment to such an
objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the
a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing
entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a
development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his
interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ...
with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not
a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter
of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of
his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to
"delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at
the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule
138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount
to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do
not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify
payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of
fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to
warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices
in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not
likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that
vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in
satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on
compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the
properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation
were purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not
named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in
Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of
sale and transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from
the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever right he
had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40 due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and
subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the
issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We
find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds.
There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the
private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he
would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his
own money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not
get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been
issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for
annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for
naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent
sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-
prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption
over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier
averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's
moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who
"earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep
his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact
that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the
opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall
the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the
same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and
conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in
order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise
Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in
their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a
gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he
cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance
document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted,
provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or
redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds
purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He
admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the
registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the
meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start
with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not
change the tenor of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any
rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party
who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this is not the proper occasion for it —
we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject
to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of
the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the
prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment,
so that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract — not one in pursuance of what had been agreed
upon on compromise — in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights
over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation."
Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession
unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that in this
case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and
the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of
execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.)
The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier
detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear
tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties
have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the
petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of
properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability
for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera,
the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00
representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for
attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper
adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the
petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in
the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets
of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of
general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the
outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we
have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if
the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have
done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a
barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit
and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise
cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what
convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco
Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;

2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for
violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;

3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
execution; and

4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson) and Medialdea, ** JJ., concur.

Paras and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951
MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners in their own behalf.
Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the
respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the Philippine
Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners
from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals,
to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the
Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the
Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly
be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress
during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . .
..
The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in
the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes
the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above
quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel
"in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-
Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are
used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted
unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is
intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold
that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held
is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-
Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case
of Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the
following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power
having no relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is
yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice
as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental
principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in the military code,
it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a
court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate
between the U.S. an the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not
only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of
substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney
General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military
Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by
the same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid
as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it
applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and
that it is limited to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the
United States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter
courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited
sphere are entitled to as untrammeled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime
has the right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so
declared by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a
constitutional provision extending that right to one accused in any trial in any court
whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by
counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear
before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of
State ex rel Huffaker vs.Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved
by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the
character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death
penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.

That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the
Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106,
of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the
Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial
shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."

Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:

In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-
martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a
contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a
criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the
ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)

In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some
meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex
parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24
N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and
not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in
jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:

If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be
accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the
judgment of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; and restricting
our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the
above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army,
having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in
the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority
of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court
exercising authority in that territory.

Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our
Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there exist
the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such
in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi
eadem ibi eadem lex.

Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the
respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions
for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
 SUPREME COURT THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
Manila CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

EN BANC It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
vs. further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
R E SO L U T I O N

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
REGALADO, J.:
position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations
readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements with appreciation and gratitude.
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
other than those allowed by law."
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
Annex A enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. 1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
ANNULMENT. VISA.
xxx xxx xxx
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am—
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
Annex B common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
GUAM DIVORCE. government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
DON PARKINSON foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's
act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have
on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of
all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject
of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and
that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered
by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law
student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of
the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which
is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
 xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon
the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively
at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such
term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent
to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and
then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270).
It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services
are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal
Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that
which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
 xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged
in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest
a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . .
.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . .
. . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate —
moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his
land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered
to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been
pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always
at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to
legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or
that the considerable class of men who customarily perform
a certain function have no right to do so, or that the
technical education given by our schools cannot be used
by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by
law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the
limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations
of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not
per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in
the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are
not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator
is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it
may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if
a controversy between an employer and his men grows
from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it
is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties before such
 agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party
the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney,
and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services
(See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as
that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text
which publication of a legal text which purports to say what
the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that
the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by
a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not
affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of
these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney
and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING
OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale
did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of
the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having
any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting
the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving
of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment,
par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
 solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have
laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
 Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction
of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a
case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or
foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will
not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and
so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where
an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila.
No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem
has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the
bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States
of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered
as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or
have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held
to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be
dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage
in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor
General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is
of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action
in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry,
with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or
before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check
dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the
amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt
of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of
checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due
time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No.
8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all
three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of
the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the
offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action
from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
"to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February
1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of
Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December
1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when
she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on
the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely
by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause
damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she
did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense
which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, the Court explained
2
the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The
thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order.
 xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. (Italics
3

supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide
as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any
of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney
shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
(Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that:
4

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the
1âwphi 1

practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent
shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the record of respondent.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

Footnotes
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez
1
charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The
complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken
advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice,
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was
their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their
authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T.
Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and
recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July
1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead
appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15
June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from
hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both
motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the
Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and
recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation dated 21 June
2
1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor
General presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a
loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C,
Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records). In the said Real Estate Mortgage
lâwphî1.ñèt
document, however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by
complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent
assured complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such
assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by
complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the
same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent. Despite the
assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment
for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants
religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September,
October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial
reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent
prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D,
Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real
estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said
new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per
annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of
respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public
auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30,
1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants,
respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance
that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of
respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso
Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization.
After the document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without
getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real
Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the
status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the
obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's
Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re
extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent.
Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent
sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March
1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No.
2 of case), and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the
second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not
believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that
respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount
of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their
obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years
had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which
indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation
was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went home with
shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for
disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what
appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that
they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on
May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the
alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to
the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00,
plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino
Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus
making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent
denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from
complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a
loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of
his allegation that the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a
loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since
complainants had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from
respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage;
and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their
contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right
of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find
against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual
cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the
P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was
applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was
applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was
supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or
P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975.
Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the
execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed.
Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00
complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection)
totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan
secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such
terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
the writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in
issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages
covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00,
respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that
when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that
they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as
aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the
case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate
Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent
that each of the successive documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a
lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of
the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing
him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on
the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in
practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the
contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through
the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants
by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would
proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This respondent
failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying
their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by
the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this
connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself,
returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30,
1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only
P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of
P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of
P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were able to
mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect.
The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply
because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of
P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at
the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000.
00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have
readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for
only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is
spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the
simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the
execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent
demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for
three years, as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet
of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2). lâwphî1.ñèt
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth
quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this
particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the
complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing
the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and
considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the
complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even
engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when
respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to
the former. However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against
the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the
complainants and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position
financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned,
complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the
respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent
has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to
believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition
thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction
between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order.
Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is
actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest
at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during
the time of the transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who
was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa,
against accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused
without their consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment
for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id
amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement
was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused
Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00.
At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet
strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that
complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent
on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for
P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then
the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both
respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent
did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps because he
was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning
over the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned
P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of
respondent what the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants
had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon
knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to
accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso
Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on
the P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed
complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was
an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by
complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a
motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved
respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the
witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00
from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the
respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in
connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private
offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is
the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge
is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo
Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the
complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the
accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as
alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the
complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the
same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the
complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as
soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent,
the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the
ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement
they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that
they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as
their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying
the claim of the respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent
Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he
may be suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred
may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non- professional attitude
(Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are
punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute,
fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska
C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much.
They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and
considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the
documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by
any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years,
they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their
obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence
contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers
employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years.3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during
the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six
(6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty
4
(40) resettings were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the
5
complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined
by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly
cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and
having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero
posed a change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their
respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of
their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their
documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-
affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28
October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses
by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground
that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross
examination as having been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the
evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-
examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-
examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has
been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the
witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other
witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper)
had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which
indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact
requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8)
under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where
respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his
choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the
hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their
witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim
that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both
parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount
loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the
loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents
and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were
merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants
before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate
mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to
redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of
whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of
course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's
conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done
at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused
Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected
a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent
and approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an
advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and
moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled"
the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants.
Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment
only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never
did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that
lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. Respondent's failure to turn over to
6
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case
underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or
non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so
patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court
must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. The nature of the office of
7
an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross
misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a
member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants
in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered
together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court
to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued
membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken
from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant
and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grñ;no-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.: ñé+.£ªwph! 1
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for
less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively,
as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among
others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being
friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners
Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the
Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are
in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf
from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo
San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed
by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqw â£
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by
an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private
prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the
offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to
institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of
section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution
of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on,
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him
for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila,
who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that
error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or
friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not
necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not
impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow
the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the
other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to
the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under
his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel
or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be
allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately
and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the
prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a
lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby
ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and
SUPREME COURT Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8320 December 20, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIM BEN, defendant-appellant.

Vicente Jayme and Celso C. Veloso for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan Liwag, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor
Antonio A. Torres for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating
paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic films of
indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view
in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without the aid
of counsel.

The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for
trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the
aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the
information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the affirmative. The
court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he
entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the
punishment as provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court
asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal
recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced
him to suffer 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.lawphi1.net

What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected and
safeguarded. The Court complied with its duly when it informed the appellant that it was his right to
have the aid of counse. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain
whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this
precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to
the information.

Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine
would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant
seems to bear out his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the
appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty
such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out
to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990
MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R. GONZALES,
Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 76, Marikina, respondents.
Manuel V. Regondola for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The legal effect of the appearance of a litigant in his own behalf is the focus of controversy in this
petition.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against Perla Y. Corpuz in
an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. By the same token, on
a countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz was charged in an information for the same offense
before the same court.
The cases were consolidated and after a joint trial on the merits where both parties were duly
represented by counsel, the trial court rendered a decision dated January 12, 1989 convicting the
petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of arresto menor in its
medium period of eleven (11) days to twenty (20) days but acquitting Perla Y. Corpuz with costs de
oficio in both cases.
Not satisfied therewith petitioner through counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period
to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein in due course the judgment appealed from was modified
as to the penalty by imposing a straight penalty of eleven (11) days imprisonment.
A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioner was denied by the Regional Trial Court on
August 30, 1989.
On September 20, 1989, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days from September 30, 1989 or up to October 19, 1989
within which to file a petition for review on the ground that she has to look for another lawyer to
represent her and prepare the necessary petition. The motion was granted by the appellate court in a
resolution dated October 16, 1989.
However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner in her own behalf filed on October 9, 1989 a
written manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for review for the purpose of applying for
probation in the court of origin, "she being a first offender and possesses (sic) all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided for under the said probation law." The motion was granted by
1
the appellate court in a resolution dated October 24, 1989, copy of which was received by petitioner on
October 30, 1989.
The division clerk of court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment on October 25, 1989.
On November 17, 1989, the petitioner filed a joint or alternative motion for reconsideration and
reinstatement of petition for review and petition for relief from judgment with prayer for a temporary
restraining order based on the ground that the motion to withdraw the petition for review was filed
without the advice of her lawyer and under the honest impression that her application for probation
pending with the lower court will be granted.
In a resolution dated February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion for lack of merit.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for restraining order dated March 10, 1990
predicated on the following grounds:
I. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING YOUR
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN THE CASES OF
DELGADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 145 SCRA 357; REPUBLIC VS. ARRO,
150 SCRA 626 AND SILVESTRE VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 21, NO. L-
46366, MARCH 8, 1978.
II. THE DENIAL OF YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE HER
PETITION FOR REVIEW WOULD PERPETUATE THE SERIOUS AND PATENT
ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT ESPECIALLY AS TO THE
ALLEGED OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE WITNESSES' DEMEANOR WHEN
THE JUDGE WHO PENNED THE DECISION WAS NOT THE SAME JUDGE
WHO HEARD THE WITNESSES (WHO) TESTIFIED. 2
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.
From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may conduct a litigation either
personally or by an attorney in the courts. He may also be assisted by an agent or friend for the
purpose in the inferior courts. And even if a party may have chosen to appear through counsel, he may
at any time dispense with the services of his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend his/her case
personally.
In this case the Court notes that before the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, the
petitioner was duly represented by counsel. However, when she decided to elevate her case to the
Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally, first, by asking for an extension of time
within which to file a petition for review and second, by filing thereafter a petition to withdraw the
petition for review to enable her to apply for probation. Unfortunately, under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1257 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990 dated October 5, 1985, it is specifically
provided that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted when the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
Thus, as petitioner failed to secure favorable action on her application for probation, she filed a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution of the appellate court — granting her motion to withdraw — or in
the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment alleging that she was not duly assisted by counsel
then and that she was under the honest impression that she could apply for probation, and that if the
motion is granted, petitioner could very well demonstrate that the assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses by the lower court which was relied upon by the Regional Trial Court is misplaced as the one
who decided the case is different from the judge who heard the case.

The said alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment, however, was filed
only on November 17, 1989, beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner received a copy of the
questioned resolution dated October 24, 1989 on October 30, 1989. Hence, said resolution had
become final by the time petitioner filed her motion. Besides, the alternative petition for relief from
judgment is not accompanied by an affidavit of merit as required by the rules. 3

The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be represented by counsel in a
litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in his or her own behalf to prosecute or
defend a cause in court. If in the process petitioner suffered reverses, she has only herself to blame.
She is bound by the consequences of her own voluntary act.

The judgment of conviction of the petitioner for slight physical injuries inflicted by the petitioner upon
the offended party was arrived at by the Regional Trial Court based on the testimony of the offended
party corroborated by her witnesses and proof of the injury. Such judgment has become final and
petitioner must now face the reality of submitting herself for its execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.