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Marine Policy 31 (2007) 535–539

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Work sharing in Kerala’s fisheries

Marrit van den Berga,b,, Bart Jan Lensinga
a
Development Research Institute, Tilburg University, the Netherlands
b
Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, the Netherlands
Received 28 October 2006; accepted 9 December 2006

Abstract

Earlier studies suggest that once population growth and market integration reach a certain critical level, traditional practices of work
sharing tend to degenerate or disappear altogether. Work sharing has, however, survived to date in small-scale fisheries in Kerala, India.
Artisanal fishermen strongly favor the system, for ethical reasons as well as for their personal benefit. Besides, boat owners appear not to
be hindered by the system. Contrary to observations in crop production, work sharing has not inhibited the introduction of modern
technologies like motorization.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Artisanal fisheries; India; Work sharing; Informal insurance

1. Introduction and the hunusan system in the Philippines, all members

The artisanal fishery sector in Kerala harbors an
informal insurance system against unemployment that
has since long disappeared from most other parts of the
world. In traditional village societies, employment is
often shared among more laborers than necessary. This
way income spreads over a relatively large part of the
population: the laborers consciously agree to forsake part
of their current income such that additional people could
have access to work and income and thereby ensure their
livelihood.
Earlier studies suggest that once population growth and
market integration reach a certain critical level, traditional
practices of work sharing (WS) tend to degenerate or
disappear altogether [1]. The open access system in the
shore-seine1 fishery in Sri Lanka, for example, collapsed in
the 1950s [1]. A similar development can be observed in rice
cultivation in South-East Asia. In the bawon system of Java
Corresponding author. Development Economics Group, Wageningen
University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, the Netherlands. Tel.:
+31 317 482548; fax: +31 317 484037.
E-mail address: Marrit.vandenBerg@wur.nl (M. van den Berg).
1
Shore-seining is a type of fishing where a large net, which is attached to
a rope on the shore, is set out close to the shore by a boat, where after it is
pulled in from the shore by a group of men.
belonging to a given village community have a right to join
in rice-harvesting operations and receive a share of the
output [2]. These systems started to decline after the 1960s
and have now largely been replaced by systems involving a
limited number of laborers [3].
WS has, however, survived to date in small-scale fisheries
in Kerala, India. Along most of Kerala’s coast, a labor-
rotation system is operational. The key to this system is
open access to employment: every fisherman from a village
can join a fishing unit, even when no extra crew is needed.
As a result, work is shared equally among the community
workforce and involuntary unemployment does not exist.
Because of this system of WS, every healthy fisherman gets
a chance to earn a living and the excess labor is absorbed.
Despite the observation of Kurien and Vijayan [4] that
system is under great strain, we find that it is very much
alive.
The persistence of the sharing system seems a surprising
but favorable development. No fisherman is unemployed
and without income. Yet, there may be an unfavorable side
to the system. WS lowers the incentives to increase labor
productivity and may thus limit economic development.
Hence, the sharing of income through work spreading may
result in the mere sharing of poverty [5]. The current paper,
therefore, covers two questions: (1) why has WS survived in

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doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2006.12.002
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
536 M. van den Berg, B.J. Lensing / Marine Policy 31 (2007) 535–539
Kerala’s fisheries, while it has disappeared in so many
other situations, and (2) does the system constrain
economic development of the fishery sector?
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 covers
the relation between WS and development as illustrated by
the seminal book of Geertz [5]. Section 3 elaborates on the
workings of the system of WS practiced by fishermen in
Kerala. Section 4 discusses the sustainable of the system
and its effect on development. Finally, the future of
Kerala’s artisanal fishery sector and its WS system is
discussed in Section 5.
2. WS and development
Perhaps the best-known example of WS is the Javan
system described by Geertz [5]. Geertz, however, did not
use the words WS. His terminology reveals a rather
negative outlook on the practice concerned. Geertz
analyzed the state of affairs on the South-East Asian
island of Java during the first half of the 20th century. Due
to increased health care provided by the Dutch colonial
regime, the population density increased sharply from an
already high level. There was no modern sector to absorb
the rising population, and virtually all Javanese found
employment in traditional agriculture. Work was shared
between all laborers of a village. At harvesting, e.g., one-
sixth of the produce was allocated to labor and all village
laborers were allowed to participate in the activity even if
their marginal productivity was negligible [3]. As a result of
the abundance of labor, there were no incentives to
modernize production and per capita income remained
low. Hence, Geertz spoke of ‘involution’ and ‘shared
poverty’.
After the 1960s, Java’s traditional system of WS—or in
the terminology of Geertz: poverty sharing—broke down
[3]. Markets and new technologies penetrated the agricul-
tural sector and landowners shifted from hiring laborers on
a share basis to wage labor. As a result of these
developments, labor productivity increased and part of
labor was driven away from agriculture. This labor sought
employment in non-agricultural activities. Hence, the
abolition of WS corresponded to a spurt in economic
development.
The above indicates that WS is more than the sharing of
employment and income between all people belonging to a
certain group. WS affects incentives to modernize produc-
tion. When labor is abundantly available and employment
is shared, there are no incentives to invest in new
laborsaving production techniques. Put differently, WS is
not only a system of mutual insurance and solidarity. It can
also be a barrier to development.
In many regions, the development of a modern sector
alongside the traditional sector has lead to the breakdown
of WS and the increase in average labor productivity in the
traditional sector. This has resulted in a rise in both
average income and income inequality. The latter is the
reason that some parties try to prevent traditional WS
systems from breaking down. As shown above, however,
equality and poverty may be two sides of the same coin: the
artificial preservation of WS may inhibit development and
the increase of average income.
3. WS among Kerala’s fishermen
Kerala, situated in the southwestern corner of India, is
one of the foremost maritime states in India. The state is
responsible for a quarter of total Indian fish catches and
for 40% of Indian seafood exports [4]. Kerala is the home
of 182,000 active fishermen, and it has a total fisherfolk
population of 844,000 [6]. This group belongs to the poorer
sections of the population and has very limited access to
formal social security. The fisherfolk live in 223 fishing
villages situated along Kerala’s coastline. They are
predominantly Hindu and Muslim in the northern and
central coastal villages and mainly Roman Catholic in the
southern coastal districts [7].
3.1. Field research
We chose to focus our research on the most prominent
type of marine fishing in Kerala: ring-seine fishing. Ring-
seine fishing employs large outboard-motorized canoes,
so-called thanguvalloms. Usually, the length of these
boats varies from 15 to 20 m, and they carry 25–50
fishermen. Also the smaller discovalloms are used. Their
length varies from 12 to 15 m, and they carry a crew of
12–25 men. Both types of boats use a long net with which
they encircle a shoal of fish. When the circle is closed, the
bottom of the net is tightened by a rope so that the fish
cannot escape. Prior to the motorization of the 1980s, the
ring-seine was only used in the districts of Ernaculam and
Alleppy. However, the system of fishing was so successful
that it is now the dominant technique in nearly the whole
of Kerala. In 1998, there were 2300 units in Kerala,
providing work for more than half of Kerala’s active
fishermen [8,9].
The field study was conducted from June 3 to October
20, 2001. Based on the Census Report on the Artisanal
Fishing Fleet of Kerala [8], three villages were chosen with
a relatively large number of thanguvalloms and discoval-
loms. The villages were situated in the so-called chakara (or
mud bank) regions; the only areas where fishing is possible
during the monsoon season (June to September) when the
sea is rough. The villages were selected such that they
represent a large geographical and religious diversity. In
particular, sites were picked that could be expected to have
different magnitudes of WS.
The research started in Arthunkal, a village with about
6000 inhabitants and 1500 active fishermen in the southern
district of Alleppey [7]. Most of the population is Catholic.
Arthunkal is the berth of largest number of thanguvalloms
in Kerala. It is regarded as the place of origin of ring-seine
fishing and the central region of the WS system. According
to local scientists, government officials and fishermen from
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M. van den Berg, B.J. Lensing / Marine Policy 31 (2007) 535–539
Arthunkal, the WS system was either severely restricted or
even non-existent north of Alleppey.
The next research site was up north at Forth Cochin in
the Ernamulum district in central Kerala. Fort Cochin is a
small village with about 2500 inhabitants and 500 active
fishermen [10]. Most fishermen are Catholic or Muslim.
Due to its location near the main fishing harbor of Kerala,
the village attracts many fishing units from other villages.
The presence of a harbor allows the use of inboard motors,
a technology that is increasingly used to power the large
thanguvalloms.
The final site was even further north at the village of
Chavacaud in the Trissur district. Chavancaud has about
5200 inhabitants, including 700 active fishermen [10], which
are mostly Muslim or Hindu. Originally Trissur did not
have a strong WS system. However, when fishermen
from Aleppey went to Trissur to teach the local fishermen
how to use the ring-seine technique, they also spread the
idea of WS.
The core of the study is a small survey about how, how
much, and why the fishermen share their work, about
social values, and about changes in the sharing system.
Fifty-five interviews were completed. The respondents
were recruited randomly on the beach, after all boats were
back from fishing. All respondents belonged to different
fishing units.
The survey is complemented by information from
discussion sessions with many experts and insiders, like
local academics, trade union leaders, governmental offi-
cials, middlemen and leaders of cooperatives. Besides,
valuable background information was obtained from
personal observations that one of the authors made by
going fishing, by monitoring the fish markets and crews on
the beach, and by residing in the houses of local fishermen.
3.2. The WS system
The WS system in Kerala is a system where income
is shared between fishermen working on a single boat.
Every fisherman in a village (not only relatives and close
friends) can join a fishing unit, whether this unit needs
additional labor or not. Part of the superfluous workers
goes along on the boat (simultaneous WS). The remainder
stays ashore and comes along on other shifts (sequential
WS).2 This way, work is shared equally among the (male)
community workforce. The costs of this WS are borne by
the crew alone: the owners of the boat, net and engine
receive a fixed percentage of the catch as a return on
capital.3
The lubricant of sequential WS is the so-called karanila
system. The system came into practice after the peasant
2
There are no strict rules to determine when one should work and when
one is allowed to stay ashore. Some men jump into the boat
spontaneously. Everybody knows he should volunteer to work regularly,
and everybody keeps an eye on each other not to shirk, and to work no
less than others.
3
In most cases 40%. In some cases 45% or 50%
537
uprising of the 1940s, which resulted in the abolition of
bonded labor in fisheries [4]. Karanila means ‘shore status’
and is used to refer to those crewmembers who stay on the
shore. The karanilas share in the catch of a particular day,
even though they have not contributed to this catch.
Usually they receive 75% of a full workers share. This
share is called karapank, or ‘shore share’. It has a dual
purpose: (1) to smooth intertemporarily the income for any
particular fisherman, and (2) to stimulate the willingness
for crewmembers to stay on the shore to give others a
chance to go fishing in the boat.
Two types of karanila system prevail in Kerala. Under
the first type, the ‘liberal version’, the fishermen who stay
on the shore must meet two conditions to receive karapank:
(1) They should be regular crewmembers.4
(2) They should be present to help with the departure of
the boat in the morning, and in some regions also when
the craft lands on the shore.
In the second version of karanila, the ‘restrictive
version’ an additional condition is added:
(3) The other members of the unit should consider the
reason that you want to stay on the shore as legitimate
(illness, funeral, marriage, etc.).
Under this restrictive system, the excess men who stay on
the shore consist of a group of men who receive karapank
(because they comply with rule 3) and a group of men who
do not. Under this second type of karapank system, there
usually is a fixed set rules that stipulates the number of
karanila-days granted under specific circumstances.
There are differences in the extent to which WS takes
place between various fishing units and regions in Kerala.
The 55 respondents were asked how many workers their
unit covered. Next, they were asked how many crewmem-
bers were necessary to operate smoothly. On the basis of
these numbers, the percentage of workers that are super-
fluous—the WS percentage can be calculated:
WS  percentage
actual number of workers  necessary number of workers
¼  100%.
actual number of workers
This percentage equals the share of their income that
the fishermen sacrifice to continue the system of WS—the
WS-premium.
On average, the fishermen sacrifice 26% of their income
for WS, with a range of 2–57% (Table 1). As the fishermen
state that all community members are welcome to join their
crew, differences between villages reflect differences in
labor surplus. Hence, the labor surplus appears to be
highest in Arthunkal. Since the fishermen are free to choose
the boat on which they work, differences in WS of boats
within a village are likely to represent differences in
4
There is no strict criterion for being a ‘regular crew member’ but in
most units you are regarded as a regular member if you have worked in
that unit for several weeks or more.
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538 M. van den Berg, B.J. Lensing / Marine Policy 31 (2007) 535–539

Table 1 Table 3
Average WS-premiums in the three villages The importance of karapank

N Average Minimum Maximum N % not willing to accept

(%) (%) (%) newcomers after the
abolishment of karapank
Arthunkal 22 28 7 38
Fort Cochin 9 46 30 57 Arthunkal 22 90
thanguvalloms Fort Cochin thanguvalloms 9 78
Discovalloms 8 22 11 34 Discovalloms 8 75
Chavacaud 16 14 2 25 Chavacaud 16 84

Total 55 26 2 57 Total 55 84

Source: Own fieldwork. Source: Own fieldwork.

Table 2 careful not to overvalue the importance of karapank, as

Distribution of liberal and restrictive versions of karanila system
N Liberal (%) Restrictive (%)
Arthunkal 22 29 71
Fort Cochin thanguvalloms 9 100 0 with work rotation were not the cause of the breaking
Discovalloms 8 12 88
Chavacaud 16 5 95
Total 55 31 69
Source: Own fieldwork.
productivity. The largest WS percentages are found for
thanguvalloms in Fort Cochin: 30–57%. Many of these
boats have inboard motors and are more seaworthy than
the standard thanguvalloms.
All units in the three research villages practised one of
the two types of karanila system. On most boats, the
restrictive system is used and fishermen need a valid reason
the stay ashore (Table 2). The liberal system is only
dominant for thanguvalloms in Fort Cochin, the most
modern boats in the sample.
4. Sustainability and economic development
Contrary to many traditional WS systems in other
regions of the world, WS in Kerala’s fisheries is very much
alive. As shown above, we did not find ring-seine units that
did not practice WS. Besides, the fishermen are very
optimistic about the continuation of the current WS
practices. Forty-six out of 55 respondents confirmed the
statement that ‘‘the WS system will not disappear in the
future’’. The other 9 answered that ‘‘only God can look
into the future’’, or something of that kind. None of the 55
respondents predicted that WS would disappear.
The fishermen regarded karapank as an essential part
of the WS system: most fishermen stated that they would
not be willing to accept newcomers to their unit if there
would be no karanila arrangement (Table 3). As there are
no strict rules about work rotation, there must be a
voluntary system of rotation. With the payment of
karapank, crewmembers have no problem staying back
on the beach every now and then. One should, however, be
on most boats only part of all members staying ashore
receives karapank.
In any case, the karanila system of work rotation cannot
explain the survival of the WS system in Kerala. Problems
down of the Java system of harvesting rice. The system
involved only simultaneous WS and hence did not require
rotation. Hence, there must be other reasons why WS
survived in Kerala’s fisheries and not in for instance Java’s
rice production.
Javan WS disappeared when rice production was
integrated into the market economy. The landowners
started to remunerate their laborers on a wage instead
of a share basis. This shift removed one of the foundations
of the WS system: the remuneration of labor as a group.
The laborers were now rewarded individually and the
employer decided on the amount of labor to be used. The
same was observed in other traditional WS systems in
agriculture.
Yet market integration has not lead to the abolition of
the share system of labor remuneration in Kerala’s
fisheries, as it did not in the fisheries sector in many other
parts of the world. In fisheries, share contracts, where boat
owner and laborers share the returns, dominate wage and
fixed rent contracts to this very day. There are powerful
reasons—in terms of both risk and transaction costs—for
believing that the basis for these share contracts is very
strong and that the share system is entirely capable of
dynamically adjusting to changing circumstances [11].
Hence, the share system of labor remuneration as a
fundamental of the WS system in Kerala is not under
threat.
While the sustainability of sharing labor remuneration
is a necessary condition for the persistence of WS, it is
not sufficient. Sharing labor remuneration does not
necessarily involve sharing work. WS involves sharing
the remuneration of labor between more than the required
number of workers. Hence, the share system of labor
remuneration gives laborers the opportunity but not
the obligation to share work. In European fisheries, for
example, remuneration is often shared, but not work.
Therefore, the question remains why WS persists in
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M. van den Berg, B.J. Lensing / Marine Policy 31 (2007) 535–539
Kerala, even among people that are not relatives or
close friends.5
At least part of the answer lays the absence of threats
to the system within artisanal fisheries. Given shared
labor remuneration, the WS system practiced in Kerala
does not present costs to the owners of capital: the
share of returns allocated to the boat owner is independent
of the number of workers [11].6 WS, therefore, does not
affect the incentives of capital owners to invest,
which can be seen from the broad modernization of
the artisanal fleet in the 1980s and 1990s. During the
1970s, supportive government policies induced outside
investors to introduce trawlers and trawl nets. This genesis
of capitalist fisheries resulted in decreasing returns
for the traditional sector, and traditional fishermen realized
that they needed to adopt new technologies in order to
survive. Hence, they rapidly purchased outboard motors:
during 1981–88, the outboard motor became the major
production unit in Kerala fishery [12]. The 1990s brought
improved thanguvalloms with outboard motors. These
rapid developments took place in fishing units practising
WS. In some cases, motorization even led to the introduc-
tion of WS.
Capital owners are thus indifferent about the WS system,
and threats from within the system must come from the
fishermen themselves. Our survey has revealed that they
still favor the system very strongly, not only because of
ethical consideration but also because it means job and
income security for them personally.
5. Discussion
In Kerala, WS is strongly established within the
subsector of artisanal fisheries and does not constrain its
economic development. Fishermen benefit, as it ensures
them job and income security, while boat owners are
indifferent to the system as they pay labor a fixed share of
the catch.
This does, however, not mean that WS as a system of
social security for Kerala fishermen is not under threat.
Increased population pressure in the absence of alternative
employment may ultimately lead to the break down of the
system, when the WS-premium required guaranteeing
employment for everyone becomes insupportably high.
This is what probably caused the decline of shore-seine
fisheries in Sri Lanka [1]. This type of fishery involves
5
WS among relatives and close friends is for instance practised by
fishermen on the coast of Senegal [1].
6
Traditionally, many share contracts in fisheries involved a type of WS
in which both the boat owner and the fishermen shared the cost. The net
proceeds from the sale of the catch were apportioned into a number of
fractional shares equal to the number of participating fishermen plus a
fixed number of shares earmarked for the owner of the craft and gear. This
system is gradually being replaced by a single-stage sharing system, where
the share allocated to the owner is independent of the number of workers
[11] As capital intensity increases, boat owners have more to gain in
insulating their income share from variation in crew size and less to lose by
failing to assure access to labor by subsidizing work spreading.
539
casting nets from the shore, and its labor-absorbing
capacity is low relative to ring-seine fisheries in Kerala.
Fortunately, Kerala is renowned for its relatively slow
population growth, and the number of active fishermen
even decreased between 1998 and 2005 [6,10].
A more pressing threat to the WS system may be the
demise of the sector as a whole. Rapid modernization of
the fishery sector has increasingly marginalized artisanal
fishery and may ultimately lead to its collapse. Over-
capitalization has resulted in problems related to fishery
resources. The introduction of trawlers resulted in a drastic
decline in the overall catch. The government reacted only
in 1989, when it promulgated a monsoon ban on trawlers.
As a result of the ban, there was a large jump in output
[12]. A significant part of this increase was for the account
of the motorized artisanal subsector. The artisinal sub-
sector itself, however, also endangers fish resources, as it
uses potentially destructive fishing techniques like mini-
trawl nets.
The future of the Kerala fishery and of the WS system
thus depends on the capability of the sector and the
government to design and maintain mechanisms to prevent
depletion of fishing resources. The current government
programs for the stimulation of fish culture may prove an
important instrument to this respect.
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