Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ANNÉE · YEAR
2017
DE JUSTICE OF JUSTICE
________
________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TREATIES ....................................................................................................................... ix
STATUTES..................................................................................................................... xiv
ARTICLES ...................................................................................................................... xv
I. Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer does not violate Rahad’s international
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legal obligations governing the proper use of shared resources. ...............................................1
A. Rahad has extracted water from the Aquifer consistent with the Principle of
B. Rahad does not have a customary obligation to equitably use the Greater Inata
Aquifer. .......................................................................................................................2
1. The obligation to equitably use shared rivers does not apply to the
aquifers............................................................................................................2
experienced by Rahad....................................................................................3
C. Rahad has not undertaken a unilateral obligation to equitably use the Aquifer. 4
1. The Rahadi Minister did not make a clear and precise declaration. .........5
obligation. ...........................................................................................5
commitment. .......................................................................................6
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2. The circumstances negate the creation of a binding obligation..................7
obligations. .............................................................................10
D. In any case, Rahad has equitably used the Greater Inata Aquifer. ....................10
3. Rahad has aimed at maximizing the long-term benefits derived from the
II. The Savali Pipeline operations do not violate any legal obligations relating to the Kin
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Canyon Complex. .........................................................................................................................12
A. Rahad complied with its duty to cooperate in protecting the Kin Canyon
Complex. ...................................................................................................................13
1. Rahad notified Atania of its plans to construct the Savali Pipeline. ........13
B. Rahad did not deliberately cause damage to the Kin Canyon Complex. ............16
1. The Kin Canyon Complex did not suffer transboundary damage. ..........16
2. Assuming Rahad has violated any obligations, such are only procedural in
nature. ...........................................................................................................20
1. The Ruby Sipar forms part of the Common Heritage of Mankind. ........21
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2. Atania’s treatment of the Ruby Sipar is an abuse of its right to own the
juris.. ..............................................................................................................23
C. Rahad has no obligation to return the Ruby Sipar by virtue of the 1970
a) When the Ruby Sipar was taken, the 1970 Convention was not in
2. Rahad did not defeat the object and purpose of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention. ...................................................................................................26
b) Rahad has not defeated the object and purpose of the 1970
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3. In any case, the return of the Ruby Sipar is not the proper means of
reparation. ....................................................................................................28
IV. Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and indirect expenses incurred and
accruing as a result of accepting members of Clan Kin fleeing from Atania. ........................29
1. Rahad has standing with respect to the human rights of the Kin. ...........29
living. .............................................................................................................31
4. Atania has deprived the Kin of their right to cultural life. .......................32
C. Atania owes compensation for violating the sic utere principle in relation to the
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Kin migrants. ............................................................................................................36
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TREATIES
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S.
34
137
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1976, 999 29, 31, 32,
U.N.T.S. 171 33, 35
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
34
U.N.T.S. 257
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
14
U.N.T.S. 3
9, 12, 13,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331
15, 24, 26
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J.
5, 6, 7
6
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
1
168 (Dec. 19)
Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) 3
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12
30
(Mar. 31)
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spa.), 1970
29, 30
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5)
Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
30
No. 70 (Jun. 28)
Elettronica Sicula (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep 15 (July 20) 8
Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J.
33
(ser. A), No. 17, 47
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. 3 (July 25) 9, 10, 15
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Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den.v.Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53
5, 6, 30
(Apr. 5)
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Ned) (Ger. v. Den), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20) 2, 8, 15, 23
4, 5, 6, 7,
Nuclear Tests (Austl.v.Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20)
15
2, 4, 10, 13,
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg.v.Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 14, 15, 16,
(Apr. 20) 17, 18, 20,
36
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Lib. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 250 31
The Temple of Preah Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 21 (Jun.
6
15)
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DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of the United States v. The Russian Federation, D.C.
28
Circuit Court, 528 F.3d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
Fed. Rep. of Nigeria v. Alain de Montbrison, Paris Ct. of App., Judgment, Apr.
23, 24
5, 2004
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MOX Plant Case (Ire. V. U.K.) Order, Request for Provisional Measures,
14
ITLOS Case No. 10 (2001)
Opel Austria v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court of First
26
Instance (Fourth Chamber), Jan. 22, 1997, Case T-115/94
US v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F. 3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g 991 F.
24
Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
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STATUTES
BOOKS
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ARTICLES
Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An
27
Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIA REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 311, 343 (1998)
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM.
25
J. OF INT’L L. 834 (1986)
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Joseph Kay, The Disputed Historical Artefacts, 4 INT. J. OF ADV. RES. 207
24
(2016).
Katie Sykes, Hunger Without Frontiers: The Right to Food and State
Obligations to Migrants, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DISASTER RELIEF 34, 35
(DAVID D. CARON, MICHAEL J. KELLY, ANASTASIA TELESETSKY, EDS., 2014)
UN DOCUMENTS
CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (1999) 32
CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Jan. 20, 2003) 29, 32
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CESCR, General Comment No. 16: Art. 3: The Equal Right of Men and
31
Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2005)
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Nov. 2001, 4, 19, 24,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) 26, 28
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UNGA Res. 64/292: The human right to water and sanitation, U.N. Doc. No.
31
A/RES/64/2929, (2010)
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MISCELLANEOUS
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of Apr. 29, 2004 on Minimum Standards for the
Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as
34
Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the
Content of the Protection Granted (2004) OJ L304/12
International Law Association (ILA), The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the
3, 11
Waters of International Rivers, Report of the 52nd Conference 484 (1967)
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WHComm., Mt. Nimba Nature Reserve (Cote d’Ivoire v. Guinea), CONF 002
19
VIII SOC
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Federation of the Clans of Atan (“Atania”) and the Kingdom of Rahad (“Rahad”)
have submitted by Special Agreement this present dispute concerning the differences between
the parties concerning the Sisters of the Sun and other matters to the International Court of
Justice (“I.C.J.”), and have transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court in accordance
with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the I.C.J. (“Statute”). Therefore, both parties have accepted
The Kingdom of Rahad undertakes to accept the judgment of the Court as final and
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether extraction of water from the Aquifer violates Rahad’s international legal obligations
II.
Whether the Savali Pipeline operations violate Rahad’s legal obligations relating to the Kin
Canyon Complex;
III.
IV.
Whether Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and indirect expenses incurred and
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Atania and Rahad are neighboring States that occupy the arid Nomad Coast. The people
of both States descend from the Atan, the original inhabitants of the Kin Canyon Complex (“the
Complex”), a group of canyons cut by long-extinct rivers straddling the border between the
States. When the rivers dried up thousands of years ago, the Atan inhabitants migrated to coastal
regions and separated into 17 clans. Eventually, 16 of the clans elected to enter into the republic
federation of Atania, while members of clan Rahad remained independent and established the
Kingdom of Rahad.
The Greater Inata Aquifer (“Aquifer”) is the largest underground source of fresh water in
the Nomad Coast. It covers more than 274,000 square kilometers, 65% of which is located in
Rahad, while 35% is in Atania. The recharge rate of the Aquifer is negligible, and is classified as
an unconfined fossil aquifer. On the first UN World Water Day, the Rahadi Minister of Water
and Agriculture recognized and honored the importance of the Aquifer to both States, with the
reservation that future generations must never be denied access to these valuable resources.
The Complex has been recognized as a continuing source of fascinating insights into
early human civilizations. Within the Complex is a walled fortress known as “the Stronghold”
and the Sunrise Mesa, a freestanding sandstone butte. While two of the three canyons are within
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the borders of Atania, the third canyon and the Sunrise Mesa are within the territory of Rahad.
On 2 May 1994, the World Heritage Committee listed it as a mixed heritage site.
Due to record low rainfall, the region experienced sustained drought from 1983 to 1988.
Both States were forced to import water from other countries at great expense. Rahad even
permitted the drilling of wells on public land for private, agricultural, and commercial use.
Unfortunately, drought conditions returned to the region in 1999 and continue to the present day.
Queen Teresa of Rahad informed Atania of her order to extract water from the Aquifer as
a short-term solution to the increasingly serious water crisis in Rahad. In response to the
assessment in compliance with Rahadi’s domestic law. Rahad submitted the Savali Pipeline plan
to the World Heritage Committee for review. In constructing the Savali Pipeline, Rahad
complied with the recommendations of the World Heritage Committee and drilled 15 kilometers
Although Rahad’s extraction of water was conducted in accordance with the highest
possible standards of care, there were inevitable repercussions to its extraction. The Atanian
Ministry of Water and Agriculture determined that the Savali Pipeline operations had caused a
lowering of the water table in the region. The World Heritage Committee granted Atania’s
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application to place the Complex in the list of World Heritage in Danger.
To prevent further harm, Rahad committed to undertake regular studies of the long-term
impact of this project on the region and the Complex. Rahad entered into discussions with the
World Heritage Committee on a program of corrective measures. Rahad will present plans for
Atania enacted the Water Resource Allocation Program Act (“WRAP Act”) in response
to the loss of farmable land. The WRAP Act set a quota on water supplied to households, farms,
and businesses and required farming operations to purchase licenses to utilize public water.
However, it exempted virtually all farming operations within Atania, except for subsistence
The Clan Kin remain culturally and politically isolated from Atanian society. They live
off the land through farming, hunting, and gathering. Since their cultural traditions prevented
them from applying for licenses, they were prosecuted, fined, and sent to prison under the
WRAP Act. In order to strengthen the law, the WRAP Act was amended to allow for the
termination of the water supply to those who violate the law. By 2013, the state-controlled water
was cut off for a majority of the Kin farms. Both the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent reported the
lack of access to water has led to severe deprivation, food-deprivation-related illnesses, and
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undernourishment.
Protests in Atanagrad
The Sisters of the Sun, an order of women dedicated to protect and preserve the culture of
the Kin, participated in a series of protests in Atanagrad against the systematic persecution of the
Kin. Carla Dugo, one of the elders, chained herself to a flagpole outside the President’s residence,
and engaged in a hunger strike. Thousands of protesters, comprised of Sisters of the Sun, the Kin,
and their supporters, assembled in the plaza and the immediate vicinity. Claiming that the
protests were seditious, President Vhen dispersed the rallies by firing at the people, deploying
tear gas, and ordering the seizure and destruction of the Ruby Sipar Pendants worn by the
demonstrators.
The Ruby Sipar is a ceremonial shield that was raised by Teppa, the legendary warrior of
the Clan Kin, upon the defeat of the invaders of the Nomad Coast in 500 CE. The Ruby Sipar is a
symbol of respect and represents the unity of the clans within the Nomad Coast. After its
discovery, it was moved to the Cultural Center on the Atanian side of the Complex. However,
the Ruby Sipar was removed from public display in the complex and placed in storage after
Pursuant to President Vhen’s orders, nearly 2,000 Sisters of the Sun and Kin protesters
were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. In light of the discriminatory WRAP Act,
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and suppression of the political demonstrations, the Kin fled to Rahad due to fear of arrest and
starvation.
Carla Dugo was discovered at one of the camps in Rahad. Before entering Rahad, she
entered the Kin Canyon Complex Cultural Center in Atania and took the Ruby Sipar with the
assistance of the employees in the Cultural Center. She turned over the Sipar to the border agents
The Rahadi Parliament enacted the Kin Humanitarian Assistance Act to assist the Kin
who were forced to escape hardship and persecution in their homeland. In cooperation with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Government established three temporary
camps. As of the date of the Special Agreement, roughly 800,000 Kin have crossed the border
into Rahad and have taken refuge within the State. According to the Rahadi Ambassador to
Atania, the expenditures associated with running the camps, damage to national infrastructure,
and the basic needs of the Kin amounts to US$945,000,000 and continues to accrue. The mass
influx has placed a great toll on Rahad’s economy and resources, resulting in sporadic power
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Rahad’s extraction of water from the aquifer does not violate Rahad’s international
legal obligations governing the proper use of shared resources.
Rahad has extracted water from the aquifer consistent with the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources. The obligation to equitably use shared rivers does not apply
to unconfined fossil aquifers. In any case, it is precluded by the emergency situation experienced
by Rahad.
Rahad has not undertaken a unilateral obligation to equitably use the aquifer. The Rahadi
Minister for Water and Agriculture did not possess the authority to bind Rahad, nor was the
declaration clear and precise. In any case, Queen Teresa validly revoked the declaration because
of the drought.
Finally, Rahad has equitably used the aquifer as it established a comprehensive plan
considering the interests of Atania, did not deprive Atania of a reasonable share of the aquifer,
and aimed at maximizing long-term benefits derived from the use of the water.
The Savali Pipeline operations do not violate any legal obligations relating to the
Kin Canyon Complex.
As a State Party to the World Heritage Convention, Rahad has an obligation to protect
and to not deliberately cause damage to the the Kin Canyon Complex. This obligation includes
the duty to cooperate with Atania to protect the Complex, and to observe due diligence in order
Rahad has complied with its obligations when it notified Atania of its plans to construct
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the Savali Pipeline, conducted an environmental assessment consistent with international law,
and negotiated with Atania in good faith. Rahad undertook active and effective measures to
protect the heritage, and observed the precautionary principle. Rahad did not deliberately cause
Rahad acted consistent with its international obligations and is not in any breach. In any
case, the alleged breach are merely procedural and violation of the same does not justify
cessation.
The Ruby Sipar forms part of the common heritage of mankind. Rahad is the lawful
possessor of the Sipar as it can adequately protect the same consistent with its cultural
significance. Atania’s treatment of the Sipar amounts to an abuse of a right of ownership, and
this prohibits the Atania from claiming the return of the property. Moreover, Rahad has no
When the Sipar was taken, the 1970 Convention was not in force with respect to Rahad.
In addition, the Sipar was not properly designated as Atania’s cultural property. As such, Rahad
has not violated the 1970 Convention. Carla Dugo’s acts are not attributable to Rahad. Further,
Rahad did not defeat the object and purpose of the the 1970 Convention which is to protect
cultural property. In any case, the return of the Sipar is not the proper means of reparation as the
property is culturally significant to the Kin and it must remain in their possession.
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Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and indirect expenses incurred and
accruing as a result of accepting members of Clan Kin fleeing from Atania.
Atania owes Rahad compensation as a means of reparation for violating the human rights
of the Kin. The Kin were discriminated through the WRAP Act, which deprived the Kin of their
right to adequate standard of living and the right to a cultural life. Rahad has standing on the
basis of erga omnes partes and is not barred by the clean hands doctrine. Further, Rahad is
entitled to compensation because it is interested in the protection of the rights of the Kin.
influx of Kind migrants in Rahad, and the latter was compelled to fulfill Atania’s human rights
obligations. Atania owes Rahad compensation for violating the doctrine sic utere ut alienum non
laedas. The WRAP Act is linked to the damage incurred by Rahad, including reduced access of
Rahadis to clean water, sporadic power outages all over the country, and security issues related
to the Kin unable to adjust to Rahadi life. Rahad incurred costs amounting to USD 945,000,000,
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I. RAHAD’S EXTRACTION OF WATER FROM THE AQUIFER DOES NOT VIOLATE RAHAD’S
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS GOVERNING THE PROPER USE OF SHARED
RESOURCES.
A. RAHAD HAS EXTRACTED WATER FROM THE AQUIFER CONSISTENT WITH THE
PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
Nations have permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources (“PSNR”),
and must use these resources towards their national development and the well-being of their
people.1 This rule of customary international law2 derives from the principles of sovereignty and
In state practice, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have both unilaterally exploited the Qa-Disi
Aquifer in order to satisfy their sovereign needs.4 The Intercalaire Aquifer shared by Libya,
Algeria, and Tunisia has met similar treatment.5 Since the Aquifer is located within Rahad’s
1
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, U.N./A/5217 (1962) [“PSNR”], pmbl., art. 1(1)-(2), (6)-(7); UNGA Res.
2158 (1966); UNGA Res. 3171 (1973). See UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, A/RES/2994 (1972) [“Stockholm Declaration”] principle 21; UNGA, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 Vol. I (1992) [“Rio
Declaration”] principle 2.
2
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168
¶244.
3
See Island of Las Palmas (U.S. v Netherlands), 1928 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Apr. 4).
4
Renee Martin-Nagle, Fossil Aquifers: A Common Heritage of Mankind, 2 J. ENERGY &
ENVT’L L. 51 (2011).
5
Id.
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B. RAHAD DOES NOT HAVE A CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO EQUITABLY USE THE GREATER
INATA AQUIFER.
1. The obligation to equitably use shared rivers does not apply to the Greater Inata
Aquifer.
While this Court and the PCIJ have affirmed the principle of equitable use in shared
watercourses and rivers,6 it has not considered its application in transboundary aquifers. Even the
1997 Watercourses Convention, which codifies the customary rules on these resources, does not
include in its scope unconfined fossil aquifers.7 Shared rivers and unconfined fossil aquifers
A customary rule exists when there is settled state practice and opinio juris sive
necessitatis.8 The practice of states with respect to the three documented utilized transboundary
fossil aquifers does not establish the existence of custom as regards equitable use.
According to North Sea, state practice must be extensive and virtually uniform.9 When
6
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 [“Pulp
Mills”]; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 [“Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros”].
7
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
A/RES/51/49, May 21, 1997 [“Watercourses Convention”] art. 1(1).
8
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Reports 14 [“Nicaragua”] ¶207; North Sea
Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Ned) (Ger. v. Den), 1969 I.C.J. 3 [“North Sea”] ¶77; Michael P.
Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Custom in International Law, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & C.L. 306
(2014).
9
North Sea, ¶74.
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derive virtually uniform and widespread usage, and the rule cannot be accepted as law.10 In
practice, nations lying above unconfined fossil aquifers extract on a first-come, first-serve
basis.11 Various legal instruments that promote otherwise are not legally binding and do not
b) The equitable use of unconfined fossil aquifers does not arise from opinio
juris.
General Assembly resolutions provide material source13 of the fact that states consider a
particular rule to imbibe a sense of legal obligation depending on the circumstances surrounding
its adoption.14 The Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers were adopted without a vote;15
equitably use a transboundary aquifer would not apply in case of an emergency situation.16 This
10
Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (1950).
11
Martin-Nagle, supra note 4, at 52; See PSNR, pmbl., art. 1(1)-(2), (6)-(7).
12
See International Law Association (ILA), The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the
Waters of International Rivers, Report of the 52nd Conference 484 (1967) [“Helsinki Rules”];
ILA, The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Report of the 73rd Conference 3 (2004).
13
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1(6th ed., 2003).
14
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8) [“Nuclear Weapons”].
15
UNGA Res. 63/124, The law of transboundary aquifers (2009) [“Law of
Transboundary Aquifers”].
16
Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 17.
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is analogous to the customary law on a state of necessity.17 The rationale is that over 97% of
freshwater comes from groundwater,18 and is vital to human survival. 19 Accordingly, states have
an obligation to respond to emergency situations that threaten the rights of its people,20 which is
In light of the record-low rainfall since 1999 and the gradual increase of temperature
throughout the Nomad Coast,22 Rahad experienced a serious water crisis that could not be
resolved by importing water.23 According to Special Rapporteur Yamada, these conditions are
factors that have accumulated over time, which generate a “creeping” emergency situation.24
While it is recognized that unilateral declarations by states may have the effect of
creating legal obligations,25 Rahad has made no such declaration. The statement of the Rahadi
17
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Nov. 2001, Supplement No.
10 (A/56/10) [“Articles on State Responsibility”], art. 25; See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶51.
18
Joseph Dellapenna, The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters, 1
INT. J. GLOBAL ENVT’L ISSUES 264, 274 (2001).
19
International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers, with commentaries, II.2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (YILC)
27, 76 (2008).
20
Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 17; Watercourses Convention, art. 28.
21
Pulp Mills, ¶177.
22
Compromis, ¶19.
23
Id., ¶22.
24
ILC, supra note 19, at 73.
25
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20) [“Nuclear Tests”]
¶46; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), 1990
I.C.J. 146 (Sept. 14) [“Frontier Dispute”] ¶351; ILC, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral
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Minister of Water and Agriculture (“Rahadi Minister”) in 1993 did not bind Rahad to any
obligation with respect to the Greater Inata Aquifer (“Aquifer”). The Rahadi Minister did not
Only heads of State, heads of Government, and ministers for foreign affairs have been
found competent to bind States with their declarations.26 The dictum in the Armed Activities case
states the only time other persons may bind the state is if they hold technical ministerial
portfolios and exercise powers in their field of competence in the area of foreign relations.27
However, according to the ILC, these persons must first be authorized to make such statements.28
In this case, the Queen’s appointment of the Rahadi Minister to act in relation to the Aquifer29
1. The Rahadi Minister did not make a clear and precise declaration.
a) The declaration did not provide the content of the alleged obligation.
In Nuclear Tests, the Court held that a unilateral declaration may only have the effect of
creating legal obligations if it is stated in clear and specific terms. 30 When a statement
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purportedly limits a state’s freedom, a restrictive interpretation is called for.31 In the cases where
courts have found a unilateral obligation to exist, the obligation was always clear – to recognize
the statement of the Rwandi Minister of Justice did not indicate a precise time-frame for the
withdrawal of reservations, the Court found that it was a mere declaration of intent.35
The statement of the Rahadi Minister did not define “equitable use” or what it entails.
When the declaration was made in 1993, the States were not aware of the contents of the Aquifer
or its non-recharging character.36 Rahad could not have bound itself to an obligation that was not
When a state provides multiple exceptions to its unilateral declarations, it tends to prove
that there was no intent to be bound by a legal obligation.37 In practice, states have requested
binding conventions when statements were coupled with exceptions.38 The Rahadi Minister
31
Nuclear Tests, ¶¶44, 47.
32
Eastern Greenland, at 71.
33
The Temple of Preah Vihear (Cam. v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 21 (Jun. 15)..
34
Nuclear Tests, ¶53
35
Armed Activities, ¶52.
36
Compromis, ¶18.
37
ILC, Eighth report on unilateral acts of States, A/CN.4/557 (2005), ¶15.
38
Id., ¶¶113-114.
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explicitly stated that “future generations must be assured that they will never be denied access”
The legal effect of a statement depends on the circumstances in which it was made.40
Based on decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ, unilateral obligations are more likely to arise when
statements are made in the context of an ongoing dispute.41 Greater caution must be exercised
when a unilateral declaration is not directed to any particular recipient.42 In Armed Activities, a
presentation of general policy before an international body was not binding. 43 The Rahadi
Minister’s statement was a general statement of policy made in honor of UN World Water Day.44
legal effect 45 even though other States need not accept obligation. 46 The statement only
39
Compromis, ¶16.
40
Armed Activities, ¶49; Nuclear Tests, ¶51; Frontier Dispute, ¶¶39-40.
41
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Gre. v. G.B.), Judgment, 1924 PCIJ 7, 11 (Aug.
30).
42
Frontier Dispute, ¶39.
43
Armed Activities, ¶53.
44
Compromis, ¶16.
45
Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 3. For examples, see ILC, Guiding
Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations,
with commentaries thereto, II.2 YILC 369, 372, notes 937-40 (2006).
46
Nuclear Tests, ¶46.
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recognized the importance of water to all who live in the Nomad Coast.47 The Atanian Minister
cooperation.”49
According to the ILC, once a State has undertaken a unilateral obligation, it may revoke it
so long as revocation is not done arbitrarily.50 If Rahad did undertake a unilateral obligation,
A revocation may be arbitrary depending on the extent to which those to whom the
obligations are owed have relied on such obligations.52 This embodies the principle of estoppel,
whereby one party has detrimentally relied on the statement of another.53 No one has relied on
47
Compromis, ¶16.
48
Id.
49
Id., ¶17.
50
Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10.
51
Compromis, ¶22.
52
Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10.
53
North Sea, at 26; Elettronica Sicula (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep 15, ¶54.
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b) There was a fundamental change of circumstances that would justify
revocation.
circumstances.54 The elements of a fundamental change in circumstance55 are present in this case.
i. Rahad’s sufficient access to water was the essential basis for Rahad’s
unilateral obligation.
A circumstance forms an essential basis of consent if its change or absence would have
led all States Parties to draft a treaty differently, or not enter into it at all.56 The declaration’s
essential basis was that future generations will never be denied access to water.57 The sufficiency
of water for the people of Rahad was an essential basis for Rahad’s consent to be bound.
temperature was not documented until 2001.60 Since the end of the drought in 1988, 61 Rahad did
54
Unilateral Declarations Guidelines, principle 10; See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104; I
UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL RECORDS 365, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11
(1968) ¶22; II UNCLOT 116. ILC, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries,
(1966) 2 YILC 187, 257.
55
ILC, supra note 45 at 381, note 984. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 115 UNTS 331 [“VCLT”] art. 62; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment,
1973 I.C.J. 3 [“Fisheries Jurisdiction, U.K. v. Ice.”] ¶36; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104.
56
Gerald Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N./A/CN.4/107, 2 YILC
16 (1957) ¶171,.
57
Compromis, ¶16.
58
VCLT, art. 62(1); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶104.
59
Humphrey Waldock, Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 YILC 1, 39 (1966).
60
Compromis, ¶19.
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not foresee in 1993 that the drought would return with even greater severity to the Nomad
Coast.62
Obligations radically transform when they are “something essentially different from that
The droughts returned in 1999 with record-low rainfall resulting in a long-term shortage of
D. IN ANY CASE, RAHAD HAS EQUITABLY USED THE GREATER INATA AQUIFER.
Assuming the obligation exists, Rahad has equitably used the Aquifer because (1) Rahad
established a comprehensive plan that considered the interests of Atania, (2) Rahad has not
deprived Atania of a reasonable share of the Aquifer, and (3) Rahad has aimed at maximizing the
In Pulp Mills, the Court ruled that utilization is equitable if the interests of the other State
are taken into account.67 The prior existence of benefits derived from a shared resource by one
61
Id., ¶14
62
Id., ¶19.
63
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), ¶43.
64
A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 ECR I-3655, ¶54-55, 57;
Fitzmaurice, supra note 56, at 60.
65
Compromis, ¶19.
66
Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 4.
67
Pulp Mills, ¶177.
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state is significant,68 but does not bar future use by the other state.69 As held in Lake Lanoux, the
interests of one State cannot be placed on the same plane as the rights of another State.70
the discharge.72 This cannot be given primacy over Rahad’s right to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources. In any case, the discharge from the Aquifer has only been reduced.73
Hungary’s right to an equitable share of the River Danube because it appropriated for its benefit
nearly 90% of the waters of the Danube notwithstanding the fact that it was a shared
international watercourse.74 In contrast, Rahad has consumed not more than a third of the water
contained in the Aquifer.75 Whether the standard is that of absolute equality, or one based on the
proportional size of the Aquifer within one state’s territory,76 Rahad has not exceeded its share.
68
Helsinki Rules, art. VIII; Washington v Oregon 297 US 517, 527; Inter-American Bar
Association, Principles of Law Governing the Use of International Rivers art. 2, II.2 YILC 208
(1974) ¶1092.
69
Gunther Handle, The Principle of Equitable Use As Applied to Internationally Shared
Natural Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes Over Transfrontier
Pollution, 1978 14 REV. BELGE DR. INT’L 40, at 50.
70
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spa. v. Fr.), 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957) [“Lake Lanoux”] ¶ 23.
71
Compromis, ¶22.
72
Id., ¶28.
73
Id.
74
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶¶78, 85.
75
Compromis, ¶26.
76
Id., ¶15.
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3. Rahad has aimed at maximizing the long-term benefits derived from the use of
the water from the Aquifer.
Aquifer States must take into consideration present and future needs in assessing and
establishing a comprehensive utilization plan in order to maximize the long-term benefits derived
from the limited water contained in unconfined fossil aquifers.77 Further, planning a longer
period of utilization is only more desirable in the case of a recharging aquifer in order to take
advantage of sustained usage.78 The aquifer’s nature determines the duty to maximize. It is
sufficient that Rahad determined the rate of extraction to match its projected consumption,
II. THE SAVALI PIPELINE OPERATIONS DO NOT VIOLATE ANY LEGAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING
TO THE KIN CANYON COMPLEX.
As States Parties to the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”), 80 Rahad and Atania
identified and delineated the Kin Canyon Complex (“Complex”) as rightfully belonging in the
UNESCO World Heritage List.81 The Savali Pipeline operations (“Savali Pipeline”) is consistent
77
ILC, supra note 19, at 42.
78
Id.
79
Compromis, ¶21
80
Id., ¶59; VCLT, art. 26.
81
World Heritage Convention art. 3, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 [“WHC”]. See
William Lipe, Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources, APPROACHES TO THE
ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 1 (Henry Cleere ed., 1984); Irini Stamatoudi, The National
Treasures Exception in Article 36 of the EC Treaty: How Many of Them Fit the Bill?, 3 ART
ANTIQUITY AND LAW 39, 47 (1998); Compromis, ¶6.
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A. RAHAD COMPLIED WITH ITS DUTY TO COOPERATE IN PROTECTING THE KIN CANYON
COMPLEX.
The WHC imposes obligations on all States parties to cooperate in the protection and
conservation of the cultural and natural heritage found in the territory of other States. 82 In light
of the customary rules of treaty interpretation,83 Rahad has complied with its obligations.
The obligation to notify other States of plans that may have transboundary impact is
intended to create conditions for successful cooperation between the parties.84 It enables parties
to assess the risks of the plan and negotiate possible changes.85 Notification is sufficient when
Queen Teresa informed Atania of the plan to extract from the Aquifer through a televised
States are obliged to undertake an environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) when there
82
WHC art. 4, 6(1) & (3).
83
VCLT, art. 31(c).
84
Pulp Mills, ¶113.
85
Id., ¶115.
86
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. V. Fr.), Judgment,
2008 I.C.J. 177, ¶150; Pulp Mills, ¶109-110.
87
Compromis, ¶22.
88
Id., ¶23.
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is a risk that a proposed industrial activity may have adverse impact on a shared resource.89
specifically describe the required content, 90 and are not binding on Rahad. 91 Customary
international law does not specify the scope and content of the EIA, and each State may
determine in its domestic legislation the assessment required in each case.92 The EIA satisfies its
purpose if it helps prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary effects.93
Rahad instructed ILSA to evaluate the long-term effects of directly tapping the Aquifer,94
and to conduct an environmental impact assessment in compliance with Rahadi domestic law.95
Later, Rahad submitted the Savali Pipeline plans to the World Heritage Committee
89
Pulp Mills, ¶204.
90
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 art.
206; See MOX Plant Case (Ire. V. U.K.) Order, Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS Case
No. 10 (2001); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Aug. 30, 1975, 1046 UNTS 138 art. 11.
91
Rio Declaration, principle 17; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Res.
GC14/25 (1987); Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Sept. 10, 1997, 1989 UNTS 309.
92
Pulp Mills, ¶205.
93
XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2003).
94
Compromis, ¶20.
95
Clarifications, ¶3.
96
Compromis, ¶24.
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3. Rahad has negotiated with Atania in good faith.
The duty to cooperate, in light of the principles of treaty interpretation,97 implies a duty to
negotiate in good faith such that negotiations are meaningful.98 In Chile v. Peru, the Tribunal
found that clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to compel such a conclusion.99 The
duty to negotiate does not include giving the other party the right of veto. 100 Neither does it
require lengthy negotiations.101 To prove bad faith, something more must appear than the failure
of negotiations.102
Rahad demonstrated its concern for Atania’s interests through its responses to Atania.103
Since Atania insisted on its position without contemplating any modifications,104 Rahad was
right to proceed with the construction at its own risk.105 To cease extraction because of an
invitation for further discussion would effectively grant Atania a right of veto.
97
VCLT, art. 31.
98
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Mac. v. Gre.), Judgment,
2011 I.C.J. 644 [“Interim Accord”], ¶¶131-132, citing VCLT, art. 26; Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 1984 ICJ 292, ¶87;
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), at 33; Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fra.), ¶46; North Sea, at 46.
99
Arbitration on the Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), Vol. II R.I.A.A., 930 (1925).
100
Lake Lanoux, ¶11.
101
Id.
102
Interim Accord, ¶132.
103
Compromis, ¶¶24-26.
104
North Sea, ¶85; Pulp Mills, ¶146.
105
Pulp Mills, ¶154.
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B. RAHAD DID NOT DELIBERATELY CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE KIN CANYON COMPLEX.
Each State Party to the WHC undertakes not to take any deliberate measures that might
damage cultural and natural heritage identified and designated as such.106 This principle of sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“sic utere”)107 provides that a state must not knowingly allow
activities within its control and jurisdiction to cause injury to the rights of another state.108 This
principle of prevention has its origins in the due diligence required of a state in its territory.109
evidence, and must be “serious”110 or “significant.”111 Not all situations of damage are unlawful,
greater than mere nuisance or insignificant harm.113 The structural degradation was only in
remote sections of the Complex making damage to the actual Complex insignificant.114
106
WHC, art. 6(3).
107
Nuclear Weapons, ¶29; Pulp Mills, ¶101.
108
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 [“Corfu”], 22; Trail Smelter
Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941) [“Trail Smelter]; Stockholm
Declaration, principle 21.
109
Pulp Mills, ¶101. See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶115; XUE, supra note 93, at 163.
110
Trail Smelter, at 1965.
111
In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth), 23 R.I.A.A. 35,
¶59 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005).
112
Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural
Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 270 (2003).
113
J. Barboza, Sixth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, March 15, 1990, UN Doc. A/CN.4/428, arts. 2(b)
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b) There is no clear and convincing evidence of the damage.
The reliability and probative value of expert evidence must be determined in light of the
independence of the experts proffering the report.115 News reports or photographs must embody
public knowledge to ensure reliability. 116 In practice, the Committee either requests a State to
halt operations if such are viewed as deliberate measures likely to cause damage, 117 or
The Savali Pipeline was implemented for the specific purpose of meeting the urgent
needs of Rahad’s people. 119 Independent experts did not corroborate the geologists’ report
ordered by President Vhen that allegedly showed structural degradation,120 and photographs of
foreign tourists and local newspaper reports are not reliable on their own. Finally, the Committee
has neither ordered the cessation of the Savali Pipeline nor determined that there has been
damage.121
& (e).
114
Compromis, ¶30.
115
Pulp Mills, ¶¶166-168.
116
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.A. v. Iran), Judgment,
1980 I.C.J. Reports 3 [“Tehran”] ¶¶12-13; See Nicaragua, ¶63.
117
World Heritage Committee (WHComm.), Lake Turkana National Parks (Kenya), 35
COM 7B.3 [“Lake Turkana”].
118
WHComm., Dresden Elbe Valley (Germany), 33 COM 7A.26; WHComm., Arabian
Oryx Sanctuary, 31 COM 7B.11 [“Arabian Oryx Sanctuary”].
119
Compromis, ¶24.
120
Id., ¶30.
121
Id., ¶¶25, 32.
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2. Rahad observed due diligence to prevent damage to the Complex.
Due diligence mandates a certain level of vigilance in the enforcement of rules and
measures, including the monitoring of activities undertaken, to safeguard the rights of the other
party.122 Measures should be appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary
harm.123 States have a duty to consider alternatives that are less damaging to cultural heritage.124
Aside from notifying Atania of its plans125 and conducting an EIA,126 Rahad had done all
that it could to prevent transboundary damage. It directed ILSA to study the feasibility of the
project, 127 submitted plans to the Committee for review, 128 complied with the Committee’s
decision,129 and conducted operations more than 15 kilometers from the Complex’s Committee-
mandated buffer zone.130 The Savali Pipeline was the only viable option for Rahad after years of
importing water.131
122
Pulp Mills, ¶197.
123
ILC, Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities art. 3, ¶11.
124
See Wangkeo, supra note 112, at 270, in relation to WHC, arts. 4 & 6.
125
Compromis, ¶22.
126
Clarifications, ¶3.
127
Compromis, ¶20.
128
Id., ¶24.
129
Id., ¶26.
130
Id.
131
Id., ¶22.
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3. Rahad observed the precautionary principle.
The inclusion of the Complex in the List of World Heritage in Danger indicates that it is
threatened by serious and specific dangers.132 However, inclusion does not oblige States to halt
operations unless expressly requested by the Committee.133 The precautionary principle states
that the lack of full scientific certainty is not an excuse to postpone the adoption of cost-effective
measures.134
Rahad has pumped waters in accordance with the highest possible standards and
committed to undertake regular studies of the impact of the project. 135 Since 2014, Rahad has
been discussing corrective measures with the Committee to address the potential threats to the
Complex.136
the act is continuing.137 Since Rahad has acted consistently with its international obligations,
132
WHC, art. 11(4); Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World
Heritage Convention (2013) [“Operational Guidelines WHC”], ¶177(b).
133
Lake Turkana. See WHComm., Mt. Nimba Nature Reserve, CONF 002 VIII SOC. See
also WHComm., Concerning Kakadu National Park, Australia, CONF 205 XI.1.
134
Rio Declaration, principle 15.
135
Compromis, ¶33.
136
Clarifications, ¶6.
137
Articles on State Responsibility, art. 30(a); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger.
v. Ita., Gre. intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 ¶137.
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1. There is no continuing breach.
A continuing wrongful act is one that has been commenced but has not been completed at
the relevant time.138 Though the effects or consequences of a wrongful act may extend in time,
such does not prove that an act has a continuing character.139 Rahad had begun discussions with
the Committee on a program of corrective measures,140 and has continued to extract water from
2. Assuming Rahad has violated any obligations, such are only procedural in
nature.
In Pulp Mills, the Court found that the failure to comply with certain procedural
obligations, such as the duty to notify and negotiate, did not justify cessation of the mill as these
obligations were merely procedural in nature.142 Cessation is not an appropriate remedy so long
as the project does not violate substantive obligations.143 Assuming Rahad has failed to comply
138
ILC, Draft articles on Articles on State Responsibility, with commentaries, II.2 YILC
31 (2001), at 60, art. 14, ¶5.
139
Id., ¶6.
140
Clarifications, ¶3.
141
Compromis, ¶26.
142
Pulp Mills, ¶¶267-269.
143
Id., ¶275.
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III. RAHAD IS ENTITLED TO RETAIN POSSESSION OF THE RUBY SIPAR.
A. RAHAD IS THE LAWFUL POSSESOR OF THE RUBY SIPAR.
Cultural property belongs to the global community and should retained by countries with
more capability to protect it.144 Rahad has vowed to treat the Ruby Sipar with the “veneration
The Common Heritage of Mankind encompasses the cultural property of all States.146
International law acknowledges the significance of cultural objects because of its great
importance to humanity.147 Property of cultural significance is excepted even from the traditional
bounds of acceptable behavior in times of war because the same is “the property of mankind at
large [and belongs] to the common interests of the species as a whole.”148 States are obliged to
provide reasonable access as part of its responsibility to preserve and protect cultural property
144
Carol A. Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property- Who Owns the Past? An
Introduction to Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT. J. LEG. INF. 189, 190
(2010).
145
Compromis, ¶52.
146
Craig Forrest, Cultural Heritage as the Common Heritage of Humankind: A Critical
Re-evaluation, 40 COMP. L.J. S. AFR. 124, 128 (2007).
147
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (2003), principle 1. See
Alan Marchisotto, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689,
717 (1974).
148
The Marquis de Somerueles: Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax, Nova Scotia Stewart's
Vice-Admiralty Reports 482, 483 (1813).
149
Marchisotto, supra note 147, at 717.
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The Ruby Sipar is a ceremonial shield raised by the legendary Teppa, a warrior of the
Clan Kin.150 Members of the Sisters of Sun wear miniature replicas of the Sipar as a symbol of
their loyalty to the Sisters and the founder of the order.151 It is central to the history of the people
2. Atania’s treatment of the Ruby Sipar is an abuse of its right to own the Ruby
Sipar under cultural property law.
The abuse of rights doctrine prohibits the exercise of a right for a purpose different from
that for which the right had been created, and as a result, injury is caused.152 There need not be
any sinister intention so that the exercise might amount to abuse.153 The right of ownership of
cultural property does not extend to the right to destroy its symbolic significance. 154 For instance,
the UN General Assembly has denounced the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas.155
Atania ordered the destruction of all Sipar replicas.156 It turned the Ruby Sipar into a
symbol of sedition and banned its public display in the Complex Cultural Center.157
150
Compromis, ¶8.
151
Id., ¶9.
152
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PCIJ
(1934) 164; LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (8th Ed., 1955) 345; MARION
PANIZZON, GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO 27 (2006); Alexandre Kiss, Abuse
of Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Rudolf Bernhardted, 1992);
Beyeler v. Italy, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Application No. 33202/96,
Judgment (2000) .
153
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 286-87 (1966).
154
Wangkeo, supra note 112, at 192.
155
Id., at 248.
156
Compromis, ¶43.
157
Id., ¶¶43-44, 51.
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B. RAHAD HAS NO CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR.
Any practice or belief in the return of cultural property lacks clear rules defining the
bounds of the customary norm alleged to exist.158 The prevalent view is that the world is an
The practice of States that trade and transfer of cultural property has been neither uniform
nor consistent. 160 Greece has failed to secure the Elgin Marbles from Britain despite their
repeated demands.161 France may have recognized Nigeria’s ownership over the Sokoto and Nok
statuettes, but the former still retains possession.162 Even General Assembly resolutions which
2. The limited cases of restitution have not been accompanied by opinio juris.
custom.164 While possession of the Euphronios Krater was returned to Italy, it was subject to the
158
See Maria Granovsky, A Permanent Resolution Mechanism of Cultural Property
Disputes, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 25 (2007).
159
Art Inst. of Chicago et al., Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal
Museums, reprinted in James Cuno, The Object of Art Museums, in WHOSE MUSE?: ART
MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 49, 52 (James Cuno ed., 2004).
160
Roehrenbeck, supra note 144, at 189.
161
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES 25 (2009).
162
Fed. Rep. of Nigeria v. Alain de Montbrison, Paris Ct. of App., Judgment, Apr. 5,
2004. This was upheld by the Court of Cassation in a judgment dated Sept. 20, 2006, J.-M.
Schmitt, Journal des Arts, No. 256, 30 March-12 April 2007, at 27
163
UNSC Res. 1483 (2003); UNGA Res. 70/76 (2015); UNGA Res. 61/52 (2007);
UNGA Res. 50/56 (1995); UNGA Res. 34/64 (1979).
164
North Sea, ¶77.
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condition of continued exhibition. 165 Similarly, Italy returned over 12,000 pre-Columbian
artifacts to Ecuador.166 The Kohinoor Diamond taken from India remains part of the British
C. RAHAD HAS NO OBLIGATION TO RETURN THE RUBY SIPAR BY VIRTUE OF THE 1970
UNESCO CONVENTION.
a) When the Ruby Sipar was taken, the 1970 Convention was not in force with
respect to Rahad.
When a State has consented to a treaty, it begins to be bound on the date the treaty enters
into force as provided by the treaty itself.168 In The Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Alain de
Montbrisson, the claim for the cultural property’s return was denied because the 1970 UNESCO
Convention had not yet come into force for France.169 The 1970 UNESCO Convention enters
into force only three months after the deposit of a State’s instrument of ratification.170 Thus,
165
Aaron Briggs, Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the International Restitution
of Cultural Property, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 623 (2007).
166
ALPER TASDELEN, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS: HARD AND SOFT LAW
Approaches 148 (2016). See, e.g., US v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F. 3d 131 (2d Cir.
1999), aff’g 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For more examples, see, generally, Marilyn
Phelan, Cultural Property, 32 INT’L L. 448, 450 (1998).
167
Joseph Kay, The Disputed Historical Artefacts, 4 INT. J. OF ADV. RES. 207, 208
(2016).
168
VCLT, art. 18(b). See Articles on State Responsibility, art. 13; International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v.
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, (2007) [“M.C.I. Power”] ¶116.
169
Supra note 162, with accompanying text.
170
United Nations Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, November 17, 1970 11806
UNTS 883 [hereinafter “1970 UNESCO Convention”] ¶21; UNESCO, Operational Guidelines
for the Implementation of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
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cultural property that had been illicitly transported across the border prior to the 1970 UNESCO
Since Rahad deposited its instrument of ratification on 30 September 2014, 172 the
Since the Ruby Sipar was taken before 3 October 2014,174 the treaty obligations do not apply.
b) In any case, the Ruby Sipar was not properly designated as Atania’s cultural
property.
Under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, cultural property must be “specifically designated”
as such by a State.175 Unlike other cultural property conventions, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
is not self-executing. 176 For this purpose, States are required to enact specific domestic
neither an act of the legislature nor specific. 178 The declaration is so broad and could cover
Tehran, the adoption of the acts of the militants “[did] not alter the initially independent and
unofficial character” of the acts.180 Taking a position that can be interpreted as endorsement does
Carla Dugo took the Ruby Sipar and brought it to Rahad out of her desire to ensure its
exhibition and protection.182 Rahad retained the Sipar to protect it, and did not endorse Carla
Dugo’s actions.
2. Rahad did not defeat the object and purpose of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
Rahad acknowledges that States are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty from the moment they sign it.183 This obligation of good faith
requires states to refrain from actions that render the enforcement of the treaty, or the
179
Articles on State Responsibility, art. 11.
180
Tehran, ¶¶29-30.
181
ILC, supra note 138, at 53 (1961).
182
Compromis, ¶50.
183
VCLT, art. 18(b).
184
See GAOR, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/62/10), at 67; Opel Austria
v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber),
Jan. 22, 1997, Case T-115/94.
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a) The object and purpose of the 1970 UNESCO Convention is the protection of
designated cultural property.
The interim obligation, which requires states to refrain from violating the essential
provisions of a treaty constituting its raison d’être,185 can only be determined in reference to the
text and particular nature of the treaty.186 Recourse may be had to the preamble of a treaty in
determining the object and purpose.187 The preamble of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides
that it is incumbent on every state to protect the cultural property found in its territory against the
b) Rahad has not defeated the object and purpose of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.
The only way a state could defeat the object and purpose of a treaty that demands
restitution of cultural property would be to destroy the property making return materially
impossible.189 Complying with the object and purpose of a treaty does not involve a retroactive
application of the specific obligations found in it.190 To require the Ruby Sipar’s return would be
to impose the obligation found in Article 7(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.
185
Alain Pellet, Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5 (Definition of the
object and purpose of the treaty) ¶1, Jun. 21, 2006, A/CN.4/572; Isabelle Buffard & Karl
Zemanek, The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIA REV. INT’L & EUR.
L. 311, 343 (1998).
186
Pellet, supra note 185, ¶5.
187
Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco (Fra. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J.
176, 196; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶52.
188
1970 UNESCO Convention, prmb. See Operational Guidelines Cultural Property, at 9.
189
James Garner, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L. L. SUPP. 653,
781-82 (1935).
190
M.C.I. Power, ¶116.
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3. In any case, the return of the Ruby Sipar is not the proper means of reparation.
Restitution must not take a form that is out of proportion to the benefit derived from the
same.191 The rights of a third party may validly preclude a claim for restitution.192 The Kin are
indigenous people193 who have a right to manifestations of their culture194 to the extent that
States must provide them with the means by which they can recover their cultural property.195
The loss of a cultural object’s place of prominence in the community causes immeasurable
damage to that community.196 The Ruby Sipar is culturally significant to the Kin and must
191
Articles on State Responsibility, art. 35.
192
Forests of Central Rhodope (Gre. v. Bulg.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1405, cited in Conor
McCarthy, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2012)
161.
193
José Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7Add.4, ¶379.
194
See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of the United States v. The Russian Federation, D.C.
Circuit Court, 528 F.3d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
195
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Saramaka People v.
Suriname, Judgment, Aug. 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs) ¶62. See UNGA Res. 61/295, UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (2007), art. 11.
196
Lyndel V. Prott, The International Movement of Cultural Objects, 12 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 225 (2005).
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IV. ATANIA MUST COMPENSATE RAHAD FOR ALL DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPENSES INCURRED
AND ACCRUING AS A RESULT OF ACCEPTING MEMBERS OF CLAN KIN FLEEING FROM
ATANIA.
A. ATANIA OWES COMPENSATION AS A MEANS OF REPARATION FOR VIOLATING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE KIN.
Atania is obligated to take steps to ensure the realization of certain rights, such as the
right to be free from discrimination,197 an adequate standard of living,198 and cultural life199 to all
its citizens. The implementation of the Water Resource Allocation Program (“WRAP”) Act
discriminated against the Kin by depriving them of access to food and water, impelling the latter
to flee Atania.
1. Rahad has standing with respect to the human rights of the Kin.
The protection of human rights is an erga omnes obligation and all States have a legal
interest in their enforcement.200 Further, in the 2012 Belgium v. Senegal case, this Court, granted
197
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 19776, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [“ICCPR”] art. 1(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [“ICESCR”] art. 1(2); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Jan. 20, 2003) [“General Comment
15”], ¶¶1, 3.
198
ICESCR, art. 11(1); General Comment 15, ¶¶3, 6; UNGA Res. 217 A(III), Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), (1948), art. 25.
199
ICESCR, art. 12(1); General Comment 15, ¶¶3, 6.
200
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spa.), 1970 I.C.J. 3
[“Barcelona Traction”], ¶¶33-34. See Responsibilities and Obligations of States Parties
Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect to Activities on the Area, Advisory Opinion, 2011
ITLOS 10, 59 (Feb. 1) [“Activities in the Area”], ¶180.
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standing to Belgium under a claim of erga omnes partes.201 The nature of the obligations owed
permits Rahad to bring a claim against Atania as State parties to the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
b) Rahad is not barred by the doctrine of clean hands from invoking the
responsibility of Atania.
A state guilty of unlawful conduct that enjoys a nexus with the subject of its claim is
generally precluded by the clean hands doctrine from invoking the responsibility of the other
state. 202 International tribunals have frequently declined to consider the application of the
doctrine. 203
Rahad has neither breached a reciprocal obligation204 nor a causal obligation.205 Rahad’s
human rights obligations are neither reciprocal nor causal, as they are owed to the international
community as a whole. 206 In any case, the migration of the Kin was caused by the wrongful acts
201
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422 [“Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite”] ¶70.
202
See Nicaragua (Schwebel, J., dissenting), at 272; Eastern Greenland (Anzilotti, J.,
dissenting), at 95; Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. V. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 70 (Jun. 28) [“River Meuse”], (Hudson, J., separate), at 78.
203
Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Guy. v. Sur.) 47 I.L.M. 166, ¶418; Yukos Universal
Limited (Isle of Man) v Russian Federation, PCA Case No 227, [1363] (2014).
204
See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.A.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12
[“Avena”] ¶47.
205
See H. G. Venable Case v. United Mexican States (1927); The Angola Case, Award I
(1928), 2 R.I.A.A., 1011, 1031; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1987), pp. 149-55.
206
Barcelona Traction, ¶¶33-34. See also Avena, ¶47.
207
Compromis, ¶¶1, 19.
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2. Atania has discriminated against the Kin.
All persons are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection before the law.208
This right includes protection against indirect discrimination, which occurs when State action is
not apparently discriminatory, but is discriminatory in effect.209 Some policies can be manifestly
and facially unreasonable such that no alleged legitimate aim can justify them.210
The WRAP Act specifically targets a group of people whose way of life it does not
accommodate, despite the fact that the latter has a long history of subsistence farming.211 The
application process is more burdensome to the Kin who are known to avoid modern
technology.212 Moreover, the exemption under the law was effectively available only to large
profit-generating farms.213
3. Atania has deprived the Kin of their right to an adequate standard of living.
Every person has a right to an adequate standard of living.214 As part of this right, the
right to water must be guaranteed as an essential condition for continued human existence.215
208
ICCPR, art. 26.
209
CESCR, General Comment No. 16: Art. 3: The Equal Right of Men and Women to
the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Aug. 11, 2005). See UNGA Res.
2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1965) art. 1(1); UNGA Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, (1979) art. 1; UNGA Res. 64/292: The human right to water
and sanitation (2010).
210
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Lib. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 250
(Tanaka, J. dissenting), at 310.
211
Compromis, ¶11.
212
Id.
213
Id., ¶¶35-37.
214
ICESCR, art. 11. See UNGA Resolution 64/292.
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According to the Human Rights Committee, States must ensure sustainable access to water
resources for agriculture to realize the right to adequate food.216 Particular attention should be
given to ensuring that disadvantaged and marginalized farmers have equitable access to water.217
Disconnecting water supply for lack of means to pay violates the ICESCR.218
The Kin are subsistence farmers who depend on water for survival.219 In 2013, the
WRAP Act was amended to disconnect their state-controlled water supply. 220 Reports of
international organizations confirmed that the lack of access to water has led to various food-
Persons belonging to ethnic minorities should not be denied the right to enjoy their own
culture.222 This right is violated when a minority’s way of life in relation to the use of natural
215
General Comment 15, ¶3. See UN Commission on Sustainable Development,
Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World, Report Of The Secretary
General (1997), at 39.
216
General Comment 15, ¶7. See CESCR, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate
Food (May 12, 1999).
217
Id.
218
Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others, Constitutional Ct. of S. Afr.
(CCT 39/09), Oct. 8, 2009, ¶¶10-17;. See also European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), The
Protection of Roma Rights in Serbia and Montenegro, prepared in association with the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2003), at 45.
219
Compromis, ¶11.
220
Id., ¶38.
221
Id., ¶¶39-40.
222
ICCPR, art. 27.
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resources is impaired.223 The Kin are culturally and politically isolated from modern society, and
live off the land.224 The WRAP Act prevented the Kin from engaging in traditional farming, their
way of life.225
The commission of a wrongful act entails a state’s responsibility and gives rise to the
obligation to make good the damage it has caused,226 even if the right breached belongs to a
party other than a state.227 In Belgium v. Senegal, the Court found a breach of an erga omnes
partes obligation and granted Belgium’s prayer for reparations.228 Because human rights are
obligations erga omnes, and rights under the ICCPR and ICESCR are erga omnes partes,
Atania’s failure to comply with its obligations violated Rahad’s interests by compelling it to
spend more than US$945,000,000 to ensure the human rights of the Kin.229
223
CCPR, General Comment No. 23: Rights of Minorities (Apr. 8, 1994), ¶6.2. See UN
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), Ominayak v. Canada, Comm. No. 167/1894 (1990);
UNHRC, Mahuika v. New Zealand, Comm. No. 547/1993, ¶9.5 (2000); UNHRC, Länsman v.
Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶9.6 (2000).
224
Compromis, ¶11.
225
Id., ¶40-41.
226
Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A), No. 17 (Jul. 26), 47; Articles of State Responsibility, art. 34; Spanish Zone of Morocco
Claims, II R.I.A.A. 615, 641 (1924).
227
Articles of State Responsibility, art. 48. See Activities in the Area, ¶180.
228
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, ¶131.
229
Compromis, ¶57.
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B. ATANIA OWES COMPENSATION BY VIRTUE OF A QUASI-CONTRACT.
unjust enrichment.230 Though the Kin are Atanian nationals,231 Rahad has protected the Kin as
refugees232 or as migrants.233 Since Rahad has performed Atania’s obligations to protect the
for reasons of […] membership of a particular social group or opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.” 234 Further, the doctrine of complementary protection recognizes that the
230
Arthur Corbin, Quasi Contractual Obligation, 21 YALE L.J. 533 (1912). See also
WILLIAM CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th Ed., 1939).
231
Compromis, ¶11.
232
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[“Refugee Convention”] arts. 20-23; Compromis, ¶48.
233
Katie Sykes, Hunger Without Frontiers: The Right to Food and State Obligations to
MIgrants, in the INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DISASTER RELIEF (David D. Caron, Michael J. Kelly,
Anastasia Telesetsky, Eds.) 191; United States Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 CFR ¶208.16-
208.17 (1952); New Zealand Immigration Act 2009, ¶130-31; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of
Apr. 29, 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country
Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International
Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted (2004) OJ L304/12, arts. 2(e), 15; Canada
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c27, §97; Compromis, ¶49.
234
Refugee Convention, art. 1 & the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 257, art. 1; See Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Cardozo-Fonsetta (1987), 467 US 407; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic (1984),
467 US 407; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Sivakumaran and
Conjoined Appeals (UN High Commissioner for Refugees intervening), (1988) 1 All E.R. 193.
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principle of non-refoulement may apply to persons who do not qualify for refugee status.235
Regardless of the their status, a state is bound to provide complementary protection to persons
The Kin have been persecuted through systematic and deliberate mass arrests on the basis
of their exercise of free speech.237 After the protests, there was a sweep across the country for
those suspected of the same. To date, hundreds remain in prison,238 with no end to detention in
sight.239 Approximately 800,000 Kin have crossed the border and are currently in Rahad’s
territory.240
Since states have a primary duty to provide for the human rights of their nationals,
shifting the cost of caring for its own citizens creates a right of action for compensation.241 In
practice, Germany compensated countries that housed Jewish refugees fleeing from the Third
Reich.242 Rahad has spent a considerable amount relocating and integrating the Kin and repairing
235
Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, AN (Malaysia) [2016] NZIPT
800888; SYKES, supra note 233, at 190-207.
236
ICCPR, art. 2; ICESCR, art. 2. See SYKES, supra note 233, at 193.
237
Compromis, ¶¶41-44.
238
Id., ¶¶45-46.
239
Clarifications, ¶7.
240
Compromis, ¶49.
241
ILA, Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees
(1992), principle 1. See Luke Lee, Declaration of Principles of International Law on
Compensation to Refugees: Its Significance and Implications, 6 J. OF REFUGEE. STUD. 1, 66
(1993).
242
Id., at 67.
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national infrastructure.243 Rahad even built three temporary camps to house the Kin, while they
C. ATANIA OWES COMPENSATION FOR VIOLATING THE SIC UTERE PRINCIPLE IN RELATION
TO THE KIN MIGRANTS.
States have an obligation not to knowingly allow their territory to be used in a manner
injurious to the rights of another.245 They must use all means at their disposal to avoid activities
within their territory that cause damage to another state.246 This rule also applies where a state
adopts domestic policy that leads to the mass migration of its nationals to another state.247 To
claim compensation for damage, a clear causal link between the act and the damage caused must
be shown.248 Although there may be other events occurring in the chain, all that is required is
that “loss can be clearly and unmistakably and definitely traced” to the other state’s acts.249
As a result of the influx of Kin migrants fleeing persecution, 150,000 Rahadi families had
reduced access to clean water, and 85% of the country experienced sporadic power outages.250
243
Compromis, ¶54.
244
See UNHRC, A v. Australia, Comm. No. 560/1993, ¶9.2 (1997); UNHRC, van
Alphen v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 305/1988, ¶5.8 (1990); UNHRC, C v. Australia, Comm. No.
900/99 ¶9 (2002); UNHRC, D and E v. Australia, Comm. No. 1050/2002, ¶7.2 (2006).
245
Nuclear Weapons, ¶29; Pulp Mills, ¶101.
246
Pulp Mills, ¶101. See also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ¶115.
247
Hannah R. Garry, The Right to Compensation and Refugee Flows: A ‘Preventative
Mechanism’ in International Law?, 10 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L 97, 105-06 (1998). See Robert
Yewdall Jennings, Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question, in 20 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 98 (1939).
248
ILC, supra note 138, at 69, ¶7.
249
Administrative Decision No. 11, United States-German Mixed Claims Commission,
Nov. 1, 1923, II R.I.A.A. 29-30.
250
Compromis, ¶53.
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Unable to adjust to Rahadi life, the Kin migrants were also reported to be involved in petty crime
and vagrancy.251 Almost 10% of Rahad’s GDP goes to expenses accruing from the costs of the
Kin refugee crisis.252 Atania must compensate Rahad for the economic damage it has suffered.
251
Id., ¶54.
252
Id., ¶¶3, 57.
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For the foregoing reasons, Rahad requests the Court to declare that:
Rahad’s extraction of water from the Aquifer does not violate Rahad’s international legal
Rahad’s Savali Pipeline operations do not violate any legal obligations relating to the Kin
Canyon Complex;
Atania must compensate Rahad for all direct and indirect expenses incurred and accruing
Respectfully submitted,
Agents of Rahad
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