60637902

May 23 2017
05:03PM

MAY 2 3 2017
CLERK OF THE COUR~
BY: dttW#lttft
p ltrk

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN Case No. CGC-15-546152

FRANCISCO, a Municipal Corporation, and
the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF STATEMENT OF DECISION
CALIFORNIA, by and through DENNIS J.
HERRERA, City Attorney for the CITY AND Date Action Filed: June 4, 2015
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Trial Date: October 31, 2016

Plaintiffs,

vs.
ANNE KIHAGI aka ANNA KIHAGI aka
ANNA SWAIN aka ANNE KIHAGI SWAIN
aka ANNA KIHAGI SWAIN, JULIA
MWANGI aka JULIA MUNENE,
CHRISTINE MWANGI aka CHRISTINA
MWANGI aka CHRISTINE JOHNSON,
XELAN PROP 1, LLC, RENKA PROP, LLC,
NOZARI 2, LLC, ZORIALL, LLC, and DOE
ONE through DOE FIFTY,

Defendants.
 INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ("City") and PEOPLE OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA ("People") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this action on June 4, 2015,

against Defendants ANNE KIHAGI aka ANNA KIHAGI aka ANNA SWAIN aka ANNE KIHAGI

SWAIN aka ANNA KIHAGI SWAIN ("KIHAGI"), JULIA MWANGI aka JULIA MUNENE ("J.

MWANGI"), CHRISTINE MWANGI aka CHRISTINA MWANGI aka CHRISTINE JOHNSON ("C.

MWANGI"), XELAN PROP 1, LLC ("XELAN"), RENKA PROP, LLC ("RENKA"), NOZARI 2,

LLC ("NOZARI"), ZORIALL, LLC ("ZORIALL"). The Complaint contained four causes of action

for: 1) violation of San Francisco Administrative Code 1 section37.lOB ("Tenant Harassment Law");

2) violation of California Health and Safety Code sections 17920-17980.9 (State Housing Law); 3)

public nuisance plead in two counts as per se public nuisance under the San Francisco Housing and

Building Codes and statutory public nuisance under Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480; and 4)

violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17210 (Unfair Competition Law or

"UCL"). Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on September 1, 2015 containing the

same four causes of action. Defendants filed a verified answer on February 2, 2016.
BACKGROUND
I. THE PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs

1. Plaintiff CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO is a municipal corporation

organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California. (JA2 17.)

2. Plaintiff PEOPLE OF THE STATE ,OF CALIFORNIA is acting by and through

DENNIS J. HERRERA, City Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco.

3. Plaintiffs are represented by the San Francisco City Attorney's Office.

4. Defendants are represented by Karen Uchiyama, Esq., and Greg de la Pena and Curtis

Smolar of de la Pena & Holliday, LLP.

1
Throughout this Statement of Decision, the San Francisco Administrative Code will be
referred to as "Admin. Code."
2
On December 27, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiffs' request to deem admitted Defendants'
unqualified admissions. These judicial admissions are hereinafter referred to as "JA."
 B. Defendants
1. Anne Kihagi

5. Defendant Anne KIHAGI ("KIHAGI") uses the aliases "Anna KIHAGI", "Anne/Anna

Swain", and "Anne/Anna KIHAGI Swain." (Tr. 3 213:23-26, 214:5-18, 482:7-22, 485:7-8, 485:1-4;

Exs. 59, 76, 990.4 )

2. Julia Mwangi

6. Defendant Julia Mwangi ("J. MWANGI") uses the alias "Julia Munene." (Tr. 505:22-

506:26, 706:2-4, 782:17-783:2, 784:17-20, 785:5-9, 786:11-15, 786:24-787:10, 3574:16-3575:9;

Exs. 44, 83, 292.)

3. Christine Mwangi

7. Defendant Christine Mwangi ("C. MWANGI") uses the aliases "Christina Mwangi"

and "Christine Johnson." (Ex. 287.)

4. Xelan Prop 1, LLC

8. XELAN was formed on or about May 21, 2013, and is and at all relevant times was, a

limited liability company formed and operating under the laws of the State of California. (JA 25.)

9. At all relevant times, XELAN was a legal owner, manager, operator, and maintainer of

one or more of the properties at issue. (JA 26.)

10. KIHAGI and C. MWANGI have been members of XELAN at all times relevant to this

lawsuit. (JA 27, Tr. 3701:23-3707:17.)

11. KIHAGI and C. MWANGI have been managers ofXELAN at all times relevant to this

lawsuit. (JA 28; Tr. 3701:23-3707:17, 3712: 16-25, Exs. 220, 224, 225.)

12. KIHAGI has been an agent ofXELAN at all times relevant to this lawsuit. (JA 29.)
5. Renka Prop, LLC

13. RENKA was formed on or about December 3, 2013, and is and at all relevant times

was, a limited liability company formed and operating under the laws of the State of California. (JA

30.)

3
The Court refers to the trial transcript in this action as "Tr."
4
All Exhibits ("Ex.") refer to exhibits admitted at trial.
 14. At all relevant times, RENK.A has been a legal owner, manager, operator, and

maintainer of one or more of the properties at issue. (JA 31.)

15. KIHAGI and J. MWANGI have been members ofRENKA at all times since its

formation. (JA 35.)

16. KIHAGI has been a manager and agent of RENK.A at all times since its formation. (JA

34-35.)
6. Nozari 2, LLC

17. NOZARI was formed on or about September 15, 2014, and is and at all relevant times

was, a limited liability company formed and operating under the laws of the State of California. (JA
39.)

18. At all relevant times, NOZARI has been a legal owner, manager, operator, and

maintainer of one of more of the properties at issue. (JA 40.)

19. KIHAGI has been a member, manager, and agent ofNOZARI at all times since its

formation. (JA 42-44.) KIHAGI has been the 100% owner and sole member of NOZARI at all

times relevant to this litigation. (Ex. 293.)

7. Zoriall, LLC

20. ZORIALL was formed on or about May 29, 2014, and is and at all relevant times was,

a limited liability company formed and operating under the laws of the State of California. (JA 46.)
21. At all relevant times, ZORIALL has been a legal owner, manager, operator, and
maintainer of one of more of the properties at issue. (JA 47.)

22. KIHAGI and C. MWANGI have been members of ZORIALL at all times since
formation. (JA 49-50.)

23. KIHAGI has been the managing member and an agent of ZORIALL at all times since
formation. (JA 49, 51.)
Il. PROPERTIES AT ISSUE
A. 394718th Street

24. 18TH STREET is a six-apartment, rent-controlled residential building in the Castro

neighborhood of San Francisco. 18TH STREET is also known as Assessor's Block 3584, Lot 086 in

the City and County of San Francisco, State of California. (Ex. 344; JA 54-55.)

25. 18TH STREET contains six residential apartments. There are two apartments on each

of the three floors, numbered 1and2 on the ground floor, 3 and 4 on the second floor, and 5 and 6

on the top floor. The odd-numbered apartments face the front of the building, and the even-

numbered apartments face the rear of the building. (Tr. 111 :6-112:18, 115:14-17.) Each of the six

apartments has the same floor plan, contains one bedroom and one bathroom, is 750 square feet in

size, and are nearly identical. (Tr. 137:3-16, 151:11-23; Ex. 292.)

26. XELAN purchased 18TH STREET for $2,795,000 on or about June 19, 2013. (Ex.

229.)

27. On June 19, 2013, Apartments 3, 4, and 6 at 18TH STREET were vacant, and

Apartments 1, 2, and 5 were occupied by rent-controlled tenants. Kelly Kimball lived in Apartment

5, Darcy Harris lived in Apartment 1, and Rob Domingues lived in Apartment 2. (Tr. 115:7-21; Ex.
292; JA 58-59.)

28. On or about July 30, 2013, XELAN transferred title and 100% ownership of 18TH

STREET to KIHAGI. KIHAGI did not pay valuable consideration to XELAN for the transfer, and

no transfer tax was paid to the City and County of San Francisco. (Tr. 2927:8-2928:25, 2931 :27-

2934: 17; Exs. 230, 595; JA 60-62.)

29. Between July and September 2013, Defendants furnished Apartments 3 and 4, while
leaving them vacant. KIHAGI uses Apartment 6 as her office. Neither KIHAGI nor C. MWANGI

used Apartment 6 as their primary residence. (119:23-121:19.)

30. On September 15, 2014, KIHAGI transferred title and 100% ownership of 18TH

S~ET to NOZARI. NOZARI did not pay valuable consideration to KIHAGI for the transfer, and

no transfer tax was paid to the City and County of San Francisco. (Tr. 2929:28-2931: 1; Ex. 231; JA
75-77.)
 B. 4018-4022 19th Street

31. 19TH STREET is a six-apartment, rent-controlled residential building in the Castro

neighborhood of San Francisco. XELAN purchased 19TH STREET for $2,495,000 on or about

June 25, 2013. The 19TH STREET property is also known as Assessor's Block 3583, Lot 018 in the

City and County of San Francisco, California. (Exs. 232, 345; JA 80, 82.)

32. 19TH STREET contains six residential apartments. Apartments 1 and 5 each have two

bedrooms and one bathroom. Apartment 1 is 1000 square feet in size, and Apartment 5 is 850

square feet in size. Apartments 2, 3, 4, and 6, each have one bedroom and one bathroom.

Apartment 2 is 500 square feet in size, Apartment 3 is 700 square feet in size, Apartment 4 is 750

square feet in size, and Apartment 6 is 800 square feet in size. (Ex. 292.)

33. 19TH STREET has three floors of residential occupancy, plus a basement level. (Tr.

811 :7-12.) Apartments 3 and 4 are on the second floor of residential occupancy, with two

apartments on the floor above and two apartments on the floor below. Apartment 3 faces 19th Street

and Apartment 4 is behind it. (Tr. 811:14-812:15; Ex. 345.)

34. In June 2013, when XELAN purchased 19TH STREET, two of the six legal residential

apartments, Apartments 5 and 6, were vacant. (JA 85-86; Ex. 292.)

35. In June 2014, Apartments 3 and 4 were vacant and in the process of being remodeled.

(Tr. 809:9-22; 816:6-25; 821:20-823:4.) Defendant K.IHAGI showed both apartments to prospective
tenants in June 2014. (Tr. 823:20-824:4.) Apartment 4 remained vacant until sometime between

July and September 2014. (Tr. 818:5-17.)

36. In the Fall or Winter of2014, the top-floor, one-bedroom, one-bathroom apartment that

faces 19th Street became vacant. It was re-rented before June 2015. (Tr. 825:25-827:21.)
C. 1000-1022 Filbert Street

37. FILBERT STREET is a seven-apartment, rent-controlled residential building in the

Russian Hill neighborhood of San Francisco. It was purchased for $3,025,000 on or about August 7,

2013, by XELAN. The FILBERT STREET property is also known as Assessor's Block 0093, Lot

010 in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California. It is comprised of five apartments
at 1000-1008 Filbert and an attached two-flat residence at 1020-1022 Filbert. (Tr. 2695:25-2698:2;

Exs. 233, 348; JA 87-89.)

38. At FILBERT STREET, Apartments 1000, 1002, 1004, 1008, and 1020 each contain

two bedrooms and one bathroom. Apartment 1008 contains one bedroom and one bathroom.

Apartment 1022 contains three bedrooms and one bathroom. (Ex. 292.)

39. In mid-August 2013, when XELAN purchased FILBERT STREET, Apartments 1000

and 1004 were vacant, and Apartments 1002, 1006, 1008, 1020, and 1022 were occupied by rent-

controlled tenants. (Ex. 292.) By fall or early winter of2013, every apartment at FILBERT

STREET was vacant except for Apartments 1002 and 1020, rented by Mery Rose and Maria

Maranghi respectively. By March or April 2014, all apartments were vacant, except for Maranghi

and her family in Apartment 1020. (Tr. 2712:5-2716:13, 2726:15-2727:15, 2785:17-2786:2; JA 96.)
D. 195 Eureka Street

40. EUREKA STREET is a building with five residential rent-controlled apartments and

one commercial space, in the Castro neighborhood of San Francisco. RENK.A purchased EUREKA

STREET for $2,200,000 on or about December 27, 2013. EUREKA STREET is also known as

4260 19th Street or Assessor's Block 2693, Lot 021 in the City and County of San Francisco, State

of California. (Tr. 158:18-23; Exs. 234, 347; JA 104, 107.)

41. At EUREKA STREET Apartments 1, 3, and 5 have one bedroom and one bathroom.
Apartments 2 and 4 have two bedrooms and one bathroom. (Ex. 292.)

42. On December 30, 2013, Apartments 1, 2, 3, and 4 at EUREKA STREET were occupied

by rent-controlled tenants, and Apartment 5 was vacant. (JA 108-09.) Apartment 1 was occupied by

Sara Hassan and her two minor children. Apartment 2 was occupied by Allison Leshefsky, her

partner Wendy Perkins, and a third roommate, who was only there for a brief period. Apartment 3

was occupied by Jerry James Stone. Apartment 4 was occupied by James Austin and his husband,

Raymond Schreiber. (Tr. 195:12-197:7, 286:10-14, 655:13-20.)

43. Apartments were vacated as follows: Apartment 3 was vacated in September 2014

when Stone moved out; Apartment 4 was vacated in January 2015 when Austin and Schreiber were

forced out through an owner move-in eviction ("OMf'); Apartment 2 was vacated on November 30,

7
2015, when Leshefsky and Perkins were forced out through a Temporary Eviction for Capital

Improvements. (Tr. 266:4-269:8, 504:8-28, 515:12-17, 551:1-3, Exs. 73, 83.)

44. On or around September 16, 2014, RENK.A transferred 25% of its ownership interest in

EUREKA STREET to J. MWANGI. J. MWANGI did not pay valuable consideration to RENK.A

for the transfer, and no transfer tax was paid to the City and County of San Francisco. (Tr. 501 :23-

502:4, 505:22-506:26, 507:15-25; 508:26-509:4; 646:5-23, 2936:27-2938:7, 2939:17-20; Exs. 83,

235, 580, 587; JA 114-17.)

45. On February 25, 2015, J. MWANGI transferred her 25% ownership interest in

EUREKA STREET back to RENK.A. RENK.A did not pay valuable consideration to J. MWANGI

for the transfer, and no transfer tax was paid to the City and County of San Francisco. (Tr. 2938:13-

2939:16, 2939:26-2941 :27; Exs. 236, 597; JA 130-32.)

E. 1135-1139A Guerrero Street

46. GUERRERO STREET is a six-apartment, rent-controlled residential building in the

Mission neighborhood of San Francisco. RENK.A purchased for $2,575,000 on or about June 4,

2014. GUERRERO STREET is also known as Assessor's Block 3646, Lot 014 in the City and

County of San Francisco, State of California. (Exs. 237, 349; JA 138-40.)

47. GUERRERO STREET contains six apartments, two side-by-side on each of its three

floors. The apartments on the left side of the building mirror the apartments on the right. Of the

left-side apartments, Apartment 1135 is on the ground floor, Apartment 1137 faces the front of the

building, and Apartment 1139 is on the top floor. Apartments 1135A, l 137A, and l 139A are on the

right-side of the building. Each of the six apartments has two bedrooms and one bathroom and are

the same size and layout. (Tr. 1728:14-1730:19, 2231:21-28.)

48. In June 2014, when Defendants purchased GUERRERO STREET, Apartment 1135

was occupied by Elizabeth Chavez, Madeline Hall, and Leah Abiol, Apartment 1135A was occupied

by Gail Izaguirre and her roommate, Apartment 113 7 was occupied by Connie Yee and Callie Roth,

Apartment l 137A was occupied by Emma Sheehan, Apartment 1139 was occupied by Sylvia Smith,

Efren Delgado and Apartment 1139A was occupied by Leonard Johnson and Sheila Hembury. (Tr.

1730:25-1731 :9, 1734: 19-1736:4; Ex. 380.)

 49. Yee and Roth vacated Apartment 1137 approximately in March 2015. (Tr. 1809:3-

1810:9, 2279:5-2280:24, 2369:9-2371:15.) Apartment 1137 remained vacant until Amanda

Mahoney-Fernandes, Kelsey Castellow, and Jennifer Laverone moved in on October 1, 2015. (Tr.

2061:18-2062:2, 2062:19-20, 2064:5-9.)

50. Defendants evicted Sheehan from Apartment 1137A approximately in March 2015.

(Tr. 1809:3-1810:9, 2279:5-2280:24, 2369:9-2371:15.) Apartment 1137A remained vacant until

three new tenants moved in no later than January 2016. (Tr. 2062:19-28, 2066:21-27.)

51. Chavez, Hall, and Abiol vacated Apartment 1135 on June 1, 2015. (Tr. 1730:3-4,

1730:25-1731 :9.) Apartment 1135 remained vacant until approximately November 1, 2015, when

three new tenants moved in, paying $5,600 per month in rent. (Tr. 2062: 19-2063 :3, 2066:2, 2067: 1-

5; 2079:23-25.)

52. KIHAGI acted as the point of contact and at RENKA for the tenants, and as the

property manager. (Tr. 1734:4-10, 1736: 18-20.)

F. 69-75 Hill Street

53. HILL STREET is a five-Apartment, rent-controlled residential building in the Castro

neighborhood of San Francisco. ZORIALL purchased HILL STREET for approximately $2,500,000
on or about July 22, 2014. The HILL STREET property, is also known as Assessor's Block 3617,

Lot 036 in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California. (Exs. 238, 350; JA 160.)

54. On March 19, 2015, ZORIALL transferred 27% of its ownership interest in HILL

STREET to C. MWANGI. C. MWANGI did not pay valuable consideration to ZORIALL for the

transfer, and no transfer tax was paid to the City and County of San Francisco. (Tr. 2942:8-2943:14,
2943:17-2945:26; Exs. 239, 596; JA 169-170.)

55. In July 2014 when ZORIALL purchased HILL STREET, Apartment 69 was occupied

by Tim Scoppetta and Bryan Hoffman, Apartment 71 was occupied by Dale Duncan, Marta Munoz,

and their minor daughter Emilia Duncan Munoz, Apartment 73 was oc~upied by Nicholas Reggars

and Erin Fromherz (now Erin Reggars), Apartment 73A was occupied by Brian Smyth, and

Apartment 75 was occupied by Ben Hutchinson. (871:18-22; Ex. 211.)

Q
 56. Tenants vacated their apartments as follows: Tim Scoppetta and Bryan Hoffman

vacated Apartment 69 on October l, 2015 because they were unable to live with Defendants'

harassment and their insecurity regarding their housing situation. Since their departure, Apartment

69 has remained vacant. Dale Duncan, Marta Munoz, and their minor daughter Emilia Duncan

Munoz vacated Apartment 71 on August 31, 2015, after Defendants served them with an OMI

eviction for C. MWANGI on April 17, 2015. Since their departure, Apartment 71 has remained

vacant. Nicholas and Erin Reggars vacated Apartment 73 on April 15, 2015, after Defendants

threatened them with an OMI eviction. Since their departure, Apartment 73 has remained vacant.

Brian Smyth vacated Apartment 73A on December 15, 2015, after receiving a "temporary" eviction

for capital repairs on October 9, 2015. Since his departure, Apartment 73A has remained vacant,

where Defendants refuse to allow Brian Smyth to return to his apartment. Ben Hutchinson vacated

Apartment 75 on November 21, 2015, after receiving a ''temporary" eviction for capital repairs on

October 9, 2015. Since his departure, Apartment 75 has remained vacant, where Defendants refuse

to allow Ben Hutchinson to return to his apartment. (Tr. 942:28-943:3, 1100:1-10; 1335:22-24;

1367:2-7; 1507:11-15; 1509:22-1510:4.).

57. On September 23, 2015 C. MWANGI transferred her 27% ownership interest in HILL

STREET back to ZORIALL. No transfer tax was paid to the City and County of San Francisco. (Tr.

2946:6-24; Ex. 240; JA 174-175.)

G. 650 Church Street

58. CHURCH STREET is a twelve-apartment, rent-controlled residential building in the

Castro/Mission Dolores neighborhood of San Francisco. KIHAGI, on behalf ofNOZARI,

purchased CHURCH STREET for $6,600,000 on or about January 15, 2015. CHURCH STREET is

also known as Assessor's Block 3585, Lot 007 in the City and County of San Francisco, State of

California. (Tr. 2947:4-2948:12; Exs. 241, 346; JA 178, 180.)

59. CHURCH STREET includes a portion with seven apartments with an entrance on

Church Street, and additional apartments in a separate portion that face Hancock Street. In the

Church Street portion of the CHURCH STREET building, Apartments. 6 and 7 are on the top floor,

10
 three apartments are on the floor below the top floor, and one is on each of the bottom two floors.

(Tr. 2614:4-21.)

60. Paul Vanotti lived in Apartment 7, on the top floor of CHURCH STREET. His

neighbor, Jasper Schmidt, lived in Apartment 6. (Tr. Ex. 586 ~ 4.) Four other apartments at

CHURCH STREET were tenant-occupied between January 2015 and December 2015. Defendants

used Apartment 2 for short-term rentals. (Tr. 2641 :7-25.)

61. Paul Vanotti vacated his apartment on December 1, 2015, after Defendants served him

with an unlawful detainer lawsuit for nuisance. (Tr. 2611 :11-13; Ex. 105.)
III. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY

62. On October 5, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Terminating Sanctions, outlining in

detail, the extraordinary level of Defendants' discovery abuses in this case, including disobedience of

at least twelve court orders, including refusing to allow discovery inspections, repeatedly refusing to

attend properly noticed and then court-ordered depositions, refusing to produce documents, refusing

to answer special and form interrogatories in addition to requests for admissions, and failing to

respond to court-ordered production orders.

63. The Court reviewed the discovery abuses in detail, finding that "[i]t is undisputed that

as of mid-September of2016 there was a willful failure to fully comply with at least ten Court orders

regarding discovery on the part of the defendants." (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 92:14-

22; Discovery Order No. 14.) The Court found that even when the discovery referee, Mr. Stein, had

given Defendants additional time to respond to written discovery, they still did not fully comply, and

in some cases did not comply at all. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 92:23-93:6.)

64. The Court further found that "significantly, all the defendants continue to fail to comply

with previous Court orders, ordering production of responsive documents to almost every previous

request for production." (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 93: 13-16.) The Court noted that

the document requests sought "important information, including the LLC's membership,

management records, writings between the LLC and the secretary of state, communications with

various types of contractors, and the tenants relating to those subject properties, writings relating to

construction repair work on each of the properties since 2013, which is 'absolutely critical' to the

11
claims, communications about - in any way relating to owner or relative move-in evictions relating

to the subject properties. Again, which goes to the very crux of some of the claims. Writings

regarding any work performed without permit, and just absolutely fundamental information that's

really important to the plaintiffs in being able to assess and evaluate and prove up their claims."

(Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 93:22-94:12.) The Court further noted, "Then on top of

that, we get to site inspections where the City, back in August, served notices of inspection for each

property for August, and yet to this day has not been able to obtain access to a single property."

(Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 95:3-7.) The Court observed that Defendants denied entry

without authority to do so, and then were given additional opportunities to comply with orders

requiring site inspections and requiring disclosure of tenant contact information so the City could

give the tenants notice, but, "sadly the defense persisted in not complying and willfully not

complying with ... further orders, and again ... refusing to comply with the Court orders of site

inspections." (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 95:11-97:10.) The Court found that this

conduct was "hugely prejudicial to the plaintiff, because they ... have been deprived of their ability

to discuss the conditions, and whether or not the unlawful conditions in the property were

continuing. And the fact that now on the eve of trial, last Friday at 3:30 some tenant contact

information was finally provided is way too little and way too late." (Transcript of October 28, 2016

hearing, 97:11-18.)

65. The Court further observed that Defendants failed to appear for depositions despite at

least four separate Court orders regarding each of the Defendants' depositions. Either the

Defendants showed up and repeatedly refused to answer even the most basic questions, or they failed

to show up at all. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 97:19-98:23.) The Court found that the

Court's orders compelling Defendants' compliance had "zero effect" on deterring Defendant's

continuing misconduct. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 98:24)

66. The Court found that there had been "a continuous, repeated, willful failure to follow

and abide by and comply with numerous Court orders regarding discovery as to documents, requests

for admissions, interrogatories, site inspections, and depositions." (Transcript of October 28, 2016

hearing, 99:14-18.)

1?
 67. Turning to the issue of an appropriate penalty for Defendants' misconduct, the Court

noted that evidentiary sanctions had already been imposed in at least two prior Orders by Judge

Kahn, but had not been effective, and that monetary sanctions had been "completely ineffective."

(Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing 99:19-100:1) The Court foitnd the record before it would

have entitled it to exercise its discretion by striking the answer, thereby terminating the action.

(Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 100:5-10.)

68. Notwithstanding the Court's findings, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for

terminating sanctions. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 100:15-20.) Instead, the Court

sought to find a less severe alternative, and to "select a sanction that is tailored to the harm caused by

the withheld discovery. Sanctions should be appropriate to the dereliction and should not exceed

that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery."

(Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 100:17-101:1.)

69. The Court issued evidentiary sanctions as they related to the willful failures to comply

with Court orders as follows:

a.) Failure to Comply with Repeated Court Orders for Site Inspections. If Plaintiffs

met its burden of proving its claims that the Defendants created unlawful and/or substandard and/or
unsafe conditions on the subject properties, the Court would determine that such conditions still

existed at the time of trial, and the Defendants would be prohibited from presenting evidence that

any such unlawful conditions have been cured or abated. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing,

101 :17-23.)

b.) Repeated and Willful Failure to Appear For Meaningful Depositions.

Defendants were precluded from testifying at trial unless the Plaintiffs elected to call any of them

under Evidence Code section 776. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 101:24-102:5.)

c.) Repeated Failure to Provide Further Responses to Requests for Admissions.

The Court ordered that Defendants were precluded from disputing that KIHAGI did not receive any

monetary compensation from ZORIALL, NOZARI, or XELAN. (Transcript of October 28, 2016

hearing, 102:6-12.)

d.) Failure to Produce Documents. Notwithstanding that prior deadlines for

 production that had been set in multiple court orders had long expired, the Court allowed documents

produced very late on October 28, 2016 to be used, and prohibited Defendants from introducing into

evidence at trial any documents that were not produced as of October 28, 2016, that fell within the

categories that were the subject of prior court orders. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing

102:13-22.) Additionally, notwithstanding at least two prior Court orders setting deadlines for

production that were not complied with, the Court gave Defendants one last chance to provide

responsive financial records that had previously been ordered by Judge Kahn and again by Referee

Stein. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing 104:2-15.) The Court held that Defendants would be

deemed to have a net worth of at least $25 million if Defendants failed to hand deliver the

documents by November 1, 2016 by 2:00 p.m. (Transcript of October 28, 2016 hearing, 104:16-

105:2.)

e.) Net Worth Deemed at least $25 Million. Once again, Defendants failed to

produce any responsive financial documents,.and at a subsequent hearing on November 2, 2016, the

Court deemed Defendants' collective net worth to be at least $25 million for purposes of assessing

civil penalties under California's Unfair Competition Law. (Transcript of November 2, 2016

hearing, 17:24-18:15.)
IV. TRIAL

70. This matter was tried as a court trial on the equitable remedies and penalties sought,
and began on October 31, 2016. Each side gave opening statements on November 15, 2016. Over

the course of approximately twenty-eight trial days, the Parties introduced hundreds of exhibits and·

presented dozens of live witnesses. The Parties completed closing arguments and concluded the

presentation of evidence on January 12, 2017.

71. On January 10, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a notice of election of remedies, in which

Plaintiffs elected to pursue only civil penalties rather than punitive or statutory damages as provided

in Admin. Code section 37 .1 OB, obviating the need for a secondary phase of a jury trial on punitive

damages.
 72. The matter was submitted on March 13, 2017 upon the Parties' concurrent filing of

proposed statements of decision and post-trial briefing. After issuing a tentative statement of

decision and reviewing objections that were filed timely , the Court issues this statement of decision.
V. Unfair Competition Law - LEGAL BACKGROUND

73. California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), codified at Business and Professions

Code sections 17200, et seq., outlaws "unlawful competition," which is defined as "any unlawful,

unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice." (Bus. & Prof. Code§ 17200.) These claims are

disjunctive, with each operating independently. "[I]n other words, a practice is prohibited as 'unfair'

or 'deceptive' even if it is not 'unlawful' and vice versa." (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sup.

Ct. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, abrogated on other grounds in Cel-Tech Communications,

Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 179-82.)

74. The UCL is broadly construed to protect the public. As the Supreme Court has

explained, the UCL "was intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language, precisely to enable

judicial tribunals to deal with the innumerable new schemes which the fertility of man's invention

would contrive." (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 180, internal citations omitted.) For decades,

courts have recognized that unfair business practices may "run the gamut of human ingenuity and
chicanery," and construed section 17200 accordingly. (Id. [citation omitted].)

75. "The 'unlawful' practices prohibited by section 17200 are any practices forbidden by

law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made."

(Saunders v. Sup. Ct. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 838-39 (citations omitted).) The unlawful prong

"borrows violations of other laws" and treats them as "practices independently actionable under

section 17200." (Cel-Tech, supra, (1999) 20 Cal.4th at 179-82.)

76. A fraudulent or deceptive practice under§ 17200 "require[s] only a showing that

members of the public are likely to be deceived" and "can be shown even without allegations of

actual deception, reasonable reliance and damage." (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA. (2013)

214 Cal.App.4th 780, 806 [quoting Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., (2006) 144

Cal.App.4th 824, 838].) "A fraudulent business practice may be accurate on some level, but will

nonetheless tend to mislead or deceive .... A perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that

1 '\
 it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant

information, is actionable under the UCL." (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc., 198 Cal.App.4th

230, 249 (2011) [quoting McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471].)

77. The "unfair" business practices prohibited by 17200 cover "all possible forms in which

unfairness might occur," including those that ''the Legislature cannot anticipate." (Cel-Tech, supra,

20 Cal.4th at 183.) The language of section 17200 "makes clear that a practice may be deemed

unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law." (Id. at 180.)

78. Plaintiffs met their burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each

Defendant violated the UCL by engaging in a business act or practice that is unlawful, unfair, and/or

fraudulent. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 866; People v. E. WA.P. Inc.

(1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 315, 321-22, 324; see also U.S v. Regan (1914) 232 US. 37, 48.) As the

UCL "imposes strict liability, [i]t is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to injure

anyone." (Comm. Apt. Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 886, 891.)

79. Plaintiffs have shown by both a preponderance of and clear and convincing evidence

that each Defendant violated the following laws in the operation and management of their rental

properties.
80. Applying guidance from appellate authority, the Court will count violations

conservatively, and will explain its rationale for doing so as part of its discussion of penalties below.
HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND WRONGFUL EVICTIONS AGAINST TENANTS
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. San Francisco's Tenant Harassment Law

81. The Tenant Harassment Law precludes any "landlord" or "agent, contractor,

subcontractor or employer of the landlord" from engaging in fourteen 5 enumerated acts of tenant

harassment. (Admin. Code§ 37.lOB(a).) "Landlord" is defined as "[a]n owner, lessor, sublessor,

5
The Court of Appeal held that section 37.10(B)(a)(7), which prohibits a landlord, agent,
contractor, subcontractor or employer of the landlord from "continuing to offer payments to vacate
after tenant has notified the landlord in writing that they no longer wish to receive further offers of
payments to vacate," does not survive "intermediate" scrutiny and cannot be enforced. (Larson v. City
& Cty. ofSan Francisco (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4th 1263, 1296.)

1"
who receives or is entitled to receive rent for the use and occupancy of any residential rental

apartment or portion thereof in the City and County of San Francisco, and the agent, representative

or successor of any of the foregoing." (Admin. Code § 37.2(h).)

82. The relevant prohibited acts of tenant harassment are:

• "interrupt[ing], terminat[ing] or fail[ing] to provide housing services required by

contract or by State, County or local housing, health or safety laws"(§ 37.IOB(a)(l));

• "Fail[ing] to perform repairs and maintenance required by contract or by State, County

or local housing, health or safety laws"(§ 37.10B(a)(2));

• "Fail[ing] to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and maintenance once

undertaken or fail[ing] to follow appropriate industry repair, containment or

remediation protocols designed to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint, mold,

asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts" (§

37.10B(a)(3));

• "Abus[ing] the landlord's right of access into a rental housing unit as that right is

provided by law"(§ 37.10B(a)(4));

• "Influenc[ing] or attempt[ing] to influence a tenant to vacate a rental housing unit

through fraud, intimidation or coercion"(§ 37.10B(a)(5));

• "Attempt[ing] to coerce the tenant to vacate with offer(s) of payments to vacate which

are accompanied with threats or intimidation"(§ 37.10B(a)(6));

• "Interfer[ing] with a tenants right to quiet use and enjoyment of a rental housing unit as

that right is defined by California law"(§ 37.lOB(a)(lO));

• "Refus[ing] to accept or acknowledge receipt of a tenant's lawful rent payment" (§

37.lOB(a)(l l));

• "Refus[ing] to cash a rent check for over 30 days"(§ 37.IOB(a)(l2));

• "lnterfer[ing] with a tenant's right to privacy"(§ 37.IOB(a)(13));

• "Request[ing] information that violates a tenant's right to privacy, including but not

limited to residence or citizenship status or social security number"(§ 37.10B(a)(l4));

17
 • Committing "[o]ther repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially

interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of any person lawfully

entitled to occupancy of such dwelling unit and that cause, are likely to cause, or are

intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a dwelling unit to vacate

such dwelling unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy"(§

37.10B(a)(l5)).

83. Plaintiffs must show that Defendants committed the prohibited acts of tenant

harassment in bad faith. (Admin. Code § 37.1 OB(a).) As is discussed below, the Court finds that the

City met its burden in this regard by overwhelming evidence.

B. Anti-Retaliation Protections

84. If a tenant makes a complaint to a landlord or City agency regarding tenantability, or if

a City agency issues a citation after a tenant makes a complaint, a landlord is prohibited, for 180

days, from: 1) recovering possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding; 2) causing the lessee

to quit involuntarily; 3) increasing the rent; or 4) decreasing services. (Civil Code § l 942.5(a).)

85. State law also prohibits a landlord from retaliating against a tenant who lawfully

organized a tenant's association, lawfully participated in a tenant's association, participated in an

organization advocating for tenant's rights, or peaceably exercised any rights under the law, by

increasing rent, decreasing services, causing a tenant to quit involuntarily, bringing an action to

recover possession, or threatening to do any of these acts. (Civ. Code§ 1942.S(c).)

86. Similarly, San Francisco Administrative Code section 37.9(d) provides that: "No

landlord may cause a tenant to quit involuntarily or threaten to bring any action to recover

possession, or decrease any services, or increase the rent, or take any other action where the

landlord's dominant motive is retaliation for the tenant's exercise of any rights under the law. Such

retaliation shall be a defense to any action to recover possession. In an action to recover possession

of a rental unit, proof of the exercise by the tenant of rights under the law within six months prior to

the alleged act of retaliation shall create a rebuttable presumption that the landlord's act was

retaliatory."

1R
 87. The Court finds by a preponderance of, and by clear and convincing evidence, that

Defendants violated both state and municipal laws prohibiting retaliation against tenants for

asserting their legal rights, as outlined below.

C. Abuse of the Landlord's Right of Entry

88. Civil Code section 1954(c) states that a "landlord may not abuse the right of access or

use it to harass the tenant."6 Further, Civil Code section 1954(d)(l) states, "the landlord shall give

the tenant reasonable notice in writing of his or her intent to enter and enter only during normal

business hours." "Twenty-four hours shall be presumed to be reasonable notice in absence of

evidence to the contrary." (Id)

D. Unlawful and Fraudulent Evictions

89. It is unlawful for a landlord, or anyone else to willfully assist the landlord, to recover

possession or to evict a tenant in violation of municipal law. (Admin. Code§ 37.9(e).) Further, no

landlord or agent may influence or attempt to influence a tenant to vacate through fraud,

intimidation, or coercion. (Admin. Code§ 37.10(B)(5).)

90. In finding that the grounds asserted in all of the subject notices of eviction were

fraudulent, and were for ulterior reasons in bad faith, in violation of Admin. Code section 37.9, the
Court does not rely on the contents of the notices. Rather the Court relies on the credible and

competent evidence adduced by the Plaintiff City independent of such notices. As noted by the first

appellate district in Rental Housing Ass 'n ofNorthern Alameda County v. City of Oaldand ("Rental

Housing') (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 741, 767, other acts such as refusing to allow tenants to return

after an eviction to permit repairs or other independent actions of a landlord do not fall within the

litigation privilege. (See also Chacon v Litke ("Chacon") (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1256-57

[holding that the landlord's failure to return the tenants to the property after their temporary eviction

"was the type of independent, noncommunicative, wrongful act that is clearly unprotected by the

privilege"] (internal quotations omitted).) As is discussed in the body of this Decision, Plaintiffs

clearly and convincingly established by evidence of independent acts and words, that Defendants'

6
Abuse of the landlord's right of entry also constitutes tenant harassment under Admin. Code
section 37.IOB(a)(4).

lQ
alleged grounds for eviction were false and in bad faith, and that their ulterior purpose was greed and

not any of the required grounds for eviction stated in Admin. Code section 37.9.
1. Owner- And Relative-Move-In Evictions

91. Admin Code section 3 7 .9B outlines the disclosures a property owner is required to

make to both the affected tenant and the Rent Board when attempting an Owner/Relative Move-In

Eviction ("OMI" or "RMI"). These disclosures, made under penalty of perjury, include:

• Subd. (c)( 1) the identity and percentage ownership of all persons holding full or partial

percentage ownership in property.

• Subd. (c)(2) the dates ownership percentages were recorded.

• Subd. (c)(3) the name(s) of the landlord or name(s) and relationship of the relative(s) for

whom possession is being sought, and a description of the current residence of the

landlord or relative(s).

• Subd. (c)(4) a description of all residential properties owned, in whole or in part, by the

landlord and/or landlord's relative(s) for whom possession is sought.

92. "A landlord may not recover possession under this Section 37.9(a)(8) if a comparable

unit owned by the landlord is already vacant and is available, or if such a unit becomes vacant and
available before the recovery of possession of the unit .... It shall be evidence of a lack of good

faith if a landlord times the service of the notice, or the filing of an action to recover possession, so

as to avoid moving into a comparable apartment, or to avoid offering a tenant a replacement

apartment." (Admin. Code§ 37.9(a)(8)(iv).) Additionally, "it shall be rebuttably presumed that the

landlord has not acted in good faith if the landlord or relative for whom the tenant was evicted does

not move into the rental unit within three months and occupy said unit as that persons principal

residence for a minimum of 36 consecutive months." (Admin. Code§ 37.9(a)(8)(v).)

93. Additionally, while San Francisco Administrative Code does not provide a definition or

any standards for ascertaining what constitutes a "comparable unit," San Francisco Residential Rent

Stabilization and Arbitration Board's Rules and Regulations ("Rules and Regulations") states in the

context of petitions for a rent increase: "[t]he length of occupancy of the current tenant, size and

physical condition of the unit and building, and services paid for by the tenant are important factors
(though not the exclusive ones) in determining whether or not a unit is 'comparable' to another, as

the term 'comparable' is used in the Rent Ordinance and in these Rules. Evidence of reasonably

comparable units is required; however, 'perfect' comparability is not required." (Rules and

Regulations, § 6.l l(a)(B)(3).) Courts in other jurisdictions with similar laws restricting OMI

evictions have held that absent a definition of a "comparable" unit, courts "must construe that term

in accordance with its apparent legislative purpose, and render it reasonable and fair to the parties

affected thereby, after considering the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation."

(Bakanauskas v. Urdan (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 621, 626.) In Bakanauska, the court added that

because the apparent purpose of OMI evictions "is to allow landlords to occupy one of their own

rental units as their personal residence when, in good faith and not for retaliatory or other unlawful

purposes, they wish to do so, reasonable subjective factors affecting the desirability of a unit for

particular landlord must be considered." (Id. at 627.)

2. Ellis Act Evictions

94. Under the Ellis Act, codified in Government Code sections 7060 to 7060.7, landlords

are permitted to go out of business by removing their property from the rental market. "No public

entity, as defined in [Government Code] Section 811.2, shall, by statute, ordinance, or regulation, or
by administrative action implementing any statute, ordinance or regulation, compel the owner of any

residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or

lease." (Gov. Code§ 7060(a).) "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to

supersede any holding or portion of any holding in Nash v. City ofSanta Monica, 37 Cal.3d 97 to the

extent that the holding, or portion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords

to go out of business." (Gov. Code§ 7060.7.) However, the Ellis Act does not "permit an owner to

withdraw from rent or lease less than all of the accommodations." (Gov. Code§ 7060.7(d).)

95. Similarly, San Francisco Administrative Code section 37.9(a)(13) only allows evictions

pursuant to the Ellis Act where a landlord ''wishes to withdraw from rent or lease ALL rental

apartments within any detached physical structure ..."

,, 1
II. FINDINGS OF FACT

96. At trial, Plaintiffs presented substantial evidence and proved, not only by a

preponderance of the evidence but also by clear and convincing evidence, that each Defendant

engaged in conduct that violated municipal and state tenant harassment laws and evictions laws, and

therefore, also California's unfair business practices laws.

A. Tenant Harassment, Retaliation, and Wrongful Evictions at Defendants'
Properties

97. Each Defendant was a "landlord" or "agent of a landlord" when acts of tenant

harassment were committed at the properties at issue below. The Court found all of the tenants who

testified at trial to be credible. Further, much of their testimony was supported by e-mails and other

documentary evidence as well as witnesses with nothing to gain, such as former landlords and

tenants who were paying market rent.

1. 18TH STREET

98. Defendants XELAN and NOZARI are liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation,

and wrongful evictions during their respective periods of ownership of l 8TH STREET. Defendant

KIHAGI is liable for all acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed at

18TH STREET during her period of ownership of l 8TH STREET and during XELAN and
XNOZARI's period of ownership, as well as those she committed or participated in, against tenants

at 18TH STREET.

99. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds sixty-three (63) predicate violations of

law at 18TH STREET for which it assesses a civil penalty under the UCL. Defendant KIHAGI is

individually liable for four (4) of these violations during her sole ownership of 18TH STREET.

Defendants KIHAGI and XELAN are jointly and severally liable for one (1) violation and

Defendants KIHAGI and NOZARI are jointly and severally liable for fifty-eight (58) violations.
a. Harassment and Fraudulent Eviction Against Darcy Harris
(Apartment 1)

100. Darcy Harris ("Harris") rented Apartment 1 at l 8TH STREET at the time Defendants

purchased the property. She paid $1423.26 in rent when Defendants evicted her in June 2014. (Tr.

116:1-4; Ex. 4.)

 101. In February 2014, KIHAGI served Harris with a notice of eviction on the basis that she

was running a commercial business out of her apartment and missed a rent payment. However, the

unrefuted evidence shows that Harris worked at Wells Fargo Bank at the time, and there was not a

scintilla of evidence that she was engaging in any unlawful commercial business out of her

apartment. 7 (JA 64-65; Ex. 4; Tr. 122:18-123:17, 126:1-3, 128:11-129:22.) The eviction forced

Harris to relocate to the East Coast because she was unable to afford to live in San Francisco after

losing her rent-controlled apartment at 18TH STREET. (Tr. 129:23-130:14.)

102. KIHAGI' s eviction of Harris was unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent, for which the Court

imposes penalties under the UCL, on a per tenant, per month basis, for every month Harris has been

out of possession of her apartment. From June 2014, and as of January 1, 2017, 8 Harris has been out

of possession for thirty-one (31) months, for which the Court assesses thirty-one (31) UCL

violations.
b. Harassment and Wrongful Eviction Against Kelly Kimball
(Apartment 5)

103. Kelly Kimball ("Kimball") rented Apartment 5 at 18TH STREET from June 2003 to

August 2014, when Defendants evicted him under the guise of an OMI eviction for KIHAGI. (Ex.

581.) At the time Defendants evicted Kimball, he paid approximately $1,628 in rent. (Tr. 109:2-8;

Exs. 5-7, 55.)

104. In June 2013, KIHAGI, on behalf of XELAN, offered Kimball a buy-out of his

tenancy. When Kimball rejected the offer, KIHAGI threatened to "clear the entire building" and

further threatened that she was "prepared to Ellis Act the building." (Tr. 118: 18-119: 19.)

Defendants' threat violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5) and (6). Accordingly, the Court

imposes one (1) UCL violation. The Court finds that Kimball's assertion of his rights in rejecting

7
KIHAGI previously attempted to evict Harris in August 2013 on an alleged Relative-move-in
eviction ("RMI") on behalf of J. MWANGI, but she was allowed to stay after hiring a lawyer. (Ex. 4.)
As such, the Court declines the City's request to award penalties for the attempted RMI eviction.
8
For all those tenants who remain out of possession of their properties, the Court
conservatively calculates penalties on a monthly basis beginning with the month they were evicted
until January 1, 2017-trial ended on January 12, 2017.
 Defendants' buy-out offer provide the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants,

pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

105. Thereafter, KIHAGI refused to cash Kimball's August 2013 rent check. (Tr. 114:1-

115:6.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l l) and (12), and

was also retaliatory against Kimball, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation. 9

106. On or about June 28, 2014, KIHAGI served Kimball in Apartment 5 at 18TH STREET

with a "60-day Notice of Termination of Tenancy for an Owner Move-In eviction" ("OMI

eviction"), which was also served on the Rent Board. 10 The Rent Board recorded against title a

Notice of Constraints on Real Property as to Apartment 5. (JA 74; Ex. 7.) As noted, the Court

recognizes that the contents of the notices, and any subsequent lawsuit, may be protected by the

litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation on this basis. However,

KIHAGI's attempt to evict Kimball without moving into Apartment 5, as discussed below, is

evidence of bad faith and is an unlawful act, independent of the notice of eviction. (Rental Housing,

171 Cal.App.4th at 767.)

107. At the time KIHAGI initiated the OMI eviction, she declared under penalty of perjury,
in documents submitted to the Rent Board, that she lived "with her sister Christine Johnson, in

Apartment 6" who "rents Apartment 6" from KIHAGI. 11 (Ex. 7.) In fact, KIHAGI at all times

maintained her primary residence in Los Angeles, California. (Tr. 134:23-135:13; Exs. 220, 221-
222, 224, 226-227, 292.) C. MWANGI's principal residence was in Fremont, California. (Tr.

9
The Court declines the City's request to apply an additional penalty for the same conduct.
However, as is the case throughout, in all instances where the Court has found both harassment and
retaliation, a single penalty is imposed in the alternative, unless the victim is a senior citizen or
disabled person in which case a further penalty is imposed. (See Gov. Code§ 17206.l(a)(l).)
10
KIHAGI served Kimball with two previous OMI eviction notices-the first on August,
2013, and the second in February 2014. Both notices of eviction were overturned. (Ex. 5, Ex. 6.) To
be conservative, the Court declines the City's request to impose penalties for each attempted OMI, and
imposes penalties only as to the third OMI, for which Kimball was actually evicted.
11
The Court declines the City's request to impose a penalty for each false representation that
the Defendants made to the Rent Board, but notes that such representations are evidence that
Defendants did not seek to recover possession of their property "in good faith, without ulterior reasons
and with honest intent," pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv).
122:18-123:17; Exs. 220, 224, 285, 287, 422.) Further, KIHAGI told Kimball that she was using

Apartment 6 as an office. (Tr. 119:23-121 :19.) Not a scintilla of evidence was adduced by the

defense that C. MWANGI paid any rent. Additionally, in loan documents pertaining to 4854 Pardee

Avenue, Fremont, executed in July 2014, C. MWANGI represented that her residence was 4854

Pardee Avenue and that her former address was 1735 Steiner Street, Apartment 156. (Ex. 287.)

108. KIHAGI also declared under penalty of perjury, in documents submitted to the Rent

Board, that the only property she owned was 18TH STREET, 19TH STREET, and FILBERT

STREET, stating: "I do not own and my name is not on title to any other real property." (Ex. 7.) In

fact, KIHAGI, through RENKA, had already purchased EUREKA STREET in December 2013 and

GUERRERO STREET in June 2014-a few weeks before serving the OMI and executing the

supporting declaration. (JA 104, 107, 138-139; Ex. 7.) And in April 2014 KIHAGI had purchased a

three-Apartment building located at 1379-1382 Alabama Street, in San Francisco-in her own name.

(Ex. 581 [at Ex. M].)

109. KIHAGI further declared under penalty of perjury, in documents submitted to the Rent

Board: "At this time I do not own any other vacant, available, comparable or incomparable

properties anywhere else." (Ex. 7.) But in June 2014 there were six vacant apartments at FILBERT
STREET, two vacant apartments at 19TH STREET, one vacant apartment at EUREKA STREET

(Apartment 5), and vacant Apartments 1and6 at 18TH STREET-in the same building. (JA 96;

Ex. 292; Tr. 133:5-12, 133:22-134:3, 237:3-238:13, 2785:17-2786:2, 809:9-22; 816:6-25; 821:20-

823:4, 823:20-824:4, 818:5-17.) Evidence was presented that both Apartments 1 and 6 at 18TH

STREET were comparable to Apartment 5-all of the apartments have the same floor plan, contain

one bedroom and one bathroom, and are 750 square feet in size, although Apartment 5 is on the top

floor facing the front of the building whereas Apartment 1 is on a lower floor, and Apartment 6 faces

the rear of the building. (See, 93 [Rules and Regulations,§ 6.l l(a)(B)(3) notes that size and

physical condition of the unit and building is a factor in determining comparability].) (Ex. 24 7, Ex.

292, Tr. 111:6-112:18, 115:14-17.) Even if, assuming, arguendo, these apartments were not

comparable and there were no other comparable apartments, neither of these apartments, nor any

other apartment in KIHAGI's other buildings were offered to Kimball as replacement housing, as
 required under Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv). (Tr. 133:7-21.) As discussed, KIHAGI told

Kimball that she was using Apartment 6 as an office. Moreover, to make Apartment 1 at 18TH

STREET "unavailable" for the purpose of an OMI eviction, KIHAGI began construction of the

apartment in June. (Tr. 119:23-123: 17, 130: 18-131: 10.) The timing of the remodel to coincide with

Kimball's eviction is also evidence of Defendants' "lack of good faith ... to avoid offering a tenant a

replacement unit" under Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv). 12

110. Regardless, the Court need not make a finding as to whether any of the apartments were

comparable, because the overwhelming evidence discussed above shows that KIHAGI did not, in

good faith, intend to use Apartment 5 as her principal residence for a minimum of 36 consecutive

months, and did not so use it, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv). After Kimball

vacated Apartment 5 at the end of August 2014, KIHAGI failed to move into Apartment 5 at 18TH

STREET. As discussed, KIHAGHI has, at all times, maintained her primary residence in Los

Angeles, California. Her driver's license has listed a Los Angeles address since July 2013. In

deposition testimony that was read at trial, she also testified that she has property at 840 Taylor

Street, San Francisco, California 94108 where she lives part of the time. (Tr. 134:23-135:13,

152:19-21; Exs. 220, 221-222, 224, 226-227, 292.) The only evidence offered by the defense that

Kihagi ever moved in was that she opened a PG&E account with respect to the property. However,

the account was not opened until December 2014, over six months after the OMI eviction was

served and four months after Kimball moved out. Significantly, the Defendants chose not to call

anyone from PG&E to testify about usage and no records regarding usage were ever offered in that

regard. The account information also noted that KIHAGI had multiple other PG&E accounts at

other properties at the time. Moreover, at the very same time that a PG&E account was opened,

unrefuted evidence was presented that the subject unit was being advertised for market rent on

Craigslist. (Ex. 98) Ray Schreiber identified the unit at trial.

12
Additionally, in October 2013, between the first attempted OMI eviction and second
attempted OMI eviction, Defendants rented Apartments 3 and 4 to claim improperly that they were
"unavailable" for the purpose of an OMI·eviction. (Tr. 126:21-127:7.) The timing of renting out
Apartments 3 and 4 to coincide with Kimball's eviction is further evidence of Defendants' "lack of
good faith ... to avoid offering a tenant a replacement unit" under Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv).
 111. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendants' OMI eviction was unlawful,

fraudulent, and in bad faith for which penalties will be imposed under the UCL, on a per tenant, per

month basis, for every month Kimball has been out of possession of his apartment. As of January

2017, Kimball has been out of possession for twenty-nine months, constituting twenty-nine (29)

UCL violations. 13

112. Defendants' advertising of Apartment 5 on Craigslist to prospective tenants for $4000

in December 2014-more than $2400 over the legally-allowed limit of $1626.61, separately violated

Admin. Code section 37.9B(a). (Exs. 5-7, 98, 100; Tr. 701:3-706:4, 710:1-24.) Accordingly, the

Court imposes one (I) UCL violation.

2. 19TH STREET

113. Defendant XELAN is liable for all acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful

evictions committed at l 9TH STREET during its period of ownership. Defendant KIHAGI is liable

for all acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed at l 9TH STREET

during XELAN' s period of ownership, as well as those she committed or participated in, against

tenants at l 9TH STREET.

114. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds sixty-five (65) predicate violations oflaw
at 19TH STREET for which it assesses civil penalties under the UCL. Defendants KIHAGI and

XELAN are jointly and severally liable for all sixty-five (65) violations.
a. Harassment and Resulting Constructive Eviction Against Neil Hartz
and Erin Hartz

115. Neil Hartz ("N. Hartz") and Erin Hartz ("E. Hartz") were without adequate central heat

at 19TH STREET for eight months, from June 2014 to January 2015. KIHAGI and XELAN ignored

several requests for repairs, claiming that N. Hartz and E. Hartz did not need heat because it was

summer, and thus failed to exercise due diligence in performing repairs. Defendants' failure to

provide heat and exercise due diligence in performing repairs violated Admin. Code sections

37.IOB(a)(l), (2), (3) and (10). (Tr. 828:1-12; 829:13-830:4; 836:5-7; 843:8-17.) Accordingly, the

13
Because Kimball vacated at the end of August, 2014, to be conservative, the Court starts
counting violations from September 2014 to January I, 2017.
 Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant for each of the eight months that Defendants were

without heat. The total number of UCL violations is sixteen (16).

116. On October 8, 2014, two of Defendants' workers entered the Hartzes' apartment

without prior notice or consent, violating Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and

Civil Code section 1954(d)(l). (Tr. 830:24-832:11; 832:16-833:3.) Accordingly, the Court imposes

one UCL violation per tenant, per unlawful entrant, for a total of four (4) violations.

117. In a separate incident on October 8, 2014, KIHAGI and another man, dressed in

business attire, entered the Hartzes' apartment without prior notice or consent, violating Admin.

Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code section 1954(d)(l). (Tr. 830:24-832:15;

834:2-22; 835:10-14) Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, per unlawful

entrant, for a total of four (4) violations.

118. KIHAGI and XELAN ignored E. Hartz's requests to repair their broken doorbell,

which never worked during their tenancy at 19TH STREET, violating Admin Code sections

37.10B(a)(2) and (10). (Tr. 836:18-837:2.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. The total number of UCL violations is two (2). 14

119. On or about June or July 2015, after N. Hartz and E. Hartz gave notice that they

intended to vacate their apartment, XELAN and KIHAGI listed their apartment on Craigslist,

advertising that the apartment was available for showings on days and times where XELAN and

KIHAGI did not provide notice to either N. Hartz or E. Hartz, violating Admin Code sections

37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13). (Tr. 838:4-839:11.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

14
The Court aggregates Defendants' repeated failure to fix the Hartzes' doorbell for months
and considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties. (See People v. Casa
Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal. App. 3d 509, 535 [where defendants violated
nursing home regulations, finding that it was reasonable to "aggregate[e] certain multiple species of
violations into a single 'act"' and "impose the maximum sanction for certain single egregious acts or
conditions"], abrogated on other grounds by Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.
(1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163.)
 120. During an open house at 19TH STREET, KIHAGI approached N. Hartz and told him

he could not sit on the front steps of the building, violating Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5) and

(10). Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

121. Furthermore, the harassing and unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent conduct described

herein caused N. Hartz and E. Hartz to leave their tenancy, for which the Court will impose penalties

under the UCL, on a per tenant, per month basis for every month that N. Hartz and E. Hartz have

been out of possession of their apartment. As of January 2017, the Hartzes have been out of

possession of their apartment for eighteen (18) months, constituting thirty-six (36) UCL violations. 15
3. EUREKA STREET

122. Defendant RENK.A is liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful

evictions committed at EUREKA STREET during its period of ownership. Defendant J. MWANGI

is liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed during her

period of ownership of EUREKA STREET, as well those she committed, or participated in, against

tenants at EUREKA STREET. Defendant KIHAGI is liable for all acts of tenant harassment,

retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed at EUREKA STREET during RENK.A and J.

MWANGI's periods of ownership, as well as those she committed, or participated in, against tenants

at EUREKA STREET.

123. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds one hundred forty-three (143) predicate

violations of law at EUREKA STREET for which it assesses civil penalties under the UCL. For

forty-nine (49) violations, there is joint and several liability for Defendants KIHAGI and RENK.A.

For ninety-four (94) violations, there is joint and several liability for Defendants KIHAGI, RENK.A,

and J MWANGI.
a. Harassment Against All EUREKA STREET Tenants

124. On or about March 1, 2014, Defendants decreased housing services when they required

all tenants to remove all of their stored items out of the garage, a privilege permitted by the previous

property owner, and no downward adjustment of rent was offered. (Tr. 197:8-199:22, 461:15-

15
To be conservative, the Court imposes monthly penalties starting in July 2015 up to January
1, 2017.

')Q
 464:20, 468:7-21, 714:14-18; Exs. 575, 580, 587.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin.

Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and violated the rights of all eight tenants of EUREKA

STREET, for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of eight (8)

violations. 16

125. In June or July 2014, Defendants further reduced housing services when they decreased

the garbage, composting, and recycling service by half, from two bins for each, to one bin for each.

(Tr. 464:21-465:21, 681:20-683:1; Exs. 575, 580, 587.) This harassing conduct violated Admin.

Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and violated the rights of all eight tenants of EUREKA

STREET, for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of eight (8)

violations.

126. Defendants began unpermitted construction in Apartment 5 around the end of July or

beginning of August 2014, when they ripped out the whole apartment. The construction continued

for about a month and the constant and mostly unlawful construction work was excessively noisy

and dirty. While the Court recognizes the right of a property owner to perform construction and

improvements, that right is not unfettered. Here, the evidence showed that other tenants' basic

utilities such as power, were frequently cut off or otherwise interrupted, which greatly impacted their
use and interfered with the enjoyment of their apartments. {Tr. 206:22-209:19, 240:19-242:3, 470:2-

19, 676:23-677:7, 679:24-681:15, 684:5-15; Exs. 575, 580, 587.) Defendants' harassing conduct

violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(3) and (10), and violated the rights of all eight tenants of

EUREKA STREET, for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of eight

(8) violations.

16
During this period of harassment, the tenants residing at EUREKA STREET were as
follows: Apartment 1 was occupied by Sara Hassan and her two minor children. Apartment 2 was
occupied by Allison Leshefsky, her partner Wendy Perkins. Apartment 3 was occupied by Jerry
James Stone. Apartment 4 was occupied by James Austin and his husband, Raymond Schreiber.
Although Leshefksy and Perkins had a third roommate for a brief period of time, it is not clear how
long the roommate resided at EUREKA STREET. Thus, the Court declines to impose penalties as to
this tenant. (Tr. 195:12-197:7, 286:10-14, 655:13-20.)
 127. In July and August 2014, Defendants began dumping and strewing their construction

debris from their illegal construction in Apartment 5 into the basement, a common area. Defendants

additionally dumped construction materials from other jobs in the basement, and in the already-

overflowing trash, compost, and recycling receptacles, which exacerbated the problem caused by

Defendants' fifty percent reduction of trash receptacles. (Tr. 681:20-682:2, 683:2-11.) No

adjustment of rent was offered. Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(3) and (10), and violated the rights of all eight tenants of EUREKA STREET, for which

the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of eight (8) violations.

128. In late March 2015, after Stone, Schreiber, and Austin vacated their apartments, the

remaining occupants suffered three or four interruptions in water service, often lasting several hours

due to inordinate delays by Defendants in addressing this serious loss of services. (Tr. 252: 12-

254: 12; Ex. 575.) This harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and

violated the rights of all five of the remaining occupants of EUREKA STREET. The Court also

finds that the water outages were retaliatory against the five tenants for exercising protected rights,

violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court

imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of five (5) violations.
129. On June 12, 2015, Defendants dumped a large amount of construction debris from their

gutting of Apartment 4 into the basement/trash room, near the water heater. (Tr. 259: 17-260:26, Exs.

71, 575. Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(3) and (10), and

was also retaliatory against all five tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant, for a total of five (5) violations.

b. Harassment and Fraudulent Eviction Against Allison Leshefsky and
Wendy Perkins in Apartment 2

130. Allison Leshefsky ("Leshefsky") and Wendy Perkins ("Perkins") rented Apartment 2 at

EUREKA STREET at the time Defendants purchased the property in 2013. (Ex. 58.) They were
paying $2,030 in rent when Defendants "temporarily" evicted them in November 2015, a

displacement that was supposed to be for a maximum of three months for capital improvements.
 Leshefsky has resided at this apartment continuously since 2006. (Tr. 157:5-11, 171 :9-16; Ex. 58.).

She has lived in the apartment with her yellow lab, Harvey Milk, with the express permission of the

prior landlords since 2008. 17 (Ex. 58.)

131. In July 2014, KIHAGI, describing herself as the "building manager," called Leshefsky

and began asking her questions about her tenancy. Despite Leshefsky and Perkins having furnished

a completed Rental Information Questionnaire and Pet Addendum at the time Defendants purchased

the building, KIHAGI began asking questions such as ''who gave you permission to have a dog?"

and "who is Wendy Perkins?" and "is she your registered domestic partner?" Leshefsky, justifiably,

told KIHAGI that she was uncomfortable with the questions, and requested that KIHAGI put her

questions in writing. KIHAGI said she would do so by the end of the week. However, KIHAGI did

not do so until many months later, in December 2014, when she raised these issues again. (Tr.

199:23-204:26, 204:27-206:16, 287:13-15; Ex. 575.) KIHAGI's harassing conduct violated Admin.

Code sections 37.10B(a)(5), (13) and (14), for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

132. On December 14, 2014, KIHAGI sent a harassing and nonsensical text message to
Leshefsky: ''wrong text on December 3rd ... looks like you do not plan to respond to written
request for additional information on privileges outside your lease? Sending another request." (Ex.

61.) On December 15, 2014, Leshefsky and Perkins sent a letter to Defendants to stop sending

harassing text messages. (Tr. 223:24-225:15, 226:16-25, Exs. 62, 63, 575.) KIHAGI's harassing

conduct violated Admin. Code section 37.IOB (a)(lO). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant, for a total number of two (2) UCL violations.

133. On December 14, 2014, KIHAGI sent another letter to Leshefsky, entitled, "Second

Notice to Provide Requested Evidence"-when Defendants had never sent a "First Notice"-asking

for written evidence of her agreement with the prior landlord to have a dog. (Ex. 64.) The letter also

complained that Defendants had not heard from Leshefsky in many months, and demanded

17
The Court declines the City's request to find that the tenants' rejection of Defendants' House
Rules regarding pets per se provided the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants. It is
not illegal to provide for house rules, although they cannot be a basis to evict.
information about their dog walker. (Tr. 227:7-230:11, Exs. 64, 575.) Leshefsky and Perkins

responded to Defendants' letter on December 19, 2014, attaching copies of their previously

submitted questionnaire and pet addendum. (Tr. 231:16-232:25, Exs. 65, 575.) KIHAGI's harassing

conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13). Accordingly, the Court imposes

one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

134. KIHAGI subsequently followed Leshefsky and Perkins' dog walker around the

neighborhood and took pictures of him. (Tr. 230:12-17, Ex. 575.) KIHAGI's harassing conduct

violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

135. On December 19, 2014, KIHAGI sent another harassing text message to Leshefsky and

Perkins: "So I will make it easy to see your poor conduct like taping notice on door [and] by getting

surveillance." (Tr. 233:19-235:22, Exs. 66, 575.) KIHAGI's harassing conduct violated Admin.

Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

136. On December 23, 2014, Leshefsky and Perkins filed a Report of Alleged Wrongful

Eviction with the San Francisco Rent Board. (Tr. 236:5-23, Exs. 67, 575.) Their exercise of their
lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin.

Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

137. On March 18, 2015, Defendants continued harassing and retaliating against Leshefsky

by spying on her, following her in the neighborhood, and sending her harassing text messages

calling her "shameful," "desperate," and "pathetic." (Tr. 244:25-248:16; Ex. 575.) Defendants'

harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5) and (13), and was also retaliatory

against Leshefsky for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

138. On March 19, 2015, shortly after the City conducted a health and safety inspection of

EUREKA STREET, Defendants installed two surveillance cameras, aimed directly at Leshefky and
Perkins' front and back doors, violating Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13), and Civil

Code section 1708.8(b). (Tr. 248: 17-251 :25, Exs. 69, 575.) Leshefsky testified: "It was extremely
 threatening. It caused further anxiety and confusion." (Tr. 235:10-11.) She also testified that the

presence of the surveillance cameras made her feel "[e]xtremely anxious, extremely fearful and

nervous of continued harassment. At this point, I didn't think it could get any worse, but it just kept

getting worse." (Tr. 243:21-23.) She added, "I could not leave or enter the apartment without a

surveillance camera on me, regardless of which door I chose to use." (Tr. 249:7-9.)

139. As observed by the California Supreme Court in the Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009)

47 Cal.4th 272, 292, a tenant's privacy is violated where the landlord's intent is to capture a picture

of someone engaged in personal or familial activities. Courts must consider the motives and

objectives of the intruder and whether the conduct is offensive to a reasonable person. (Shulman v.

Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 237.) Here, the timing and substance of

KIHAGI's statements threatening installation of surveillance cameras, the timing of the installation

being within days of the City's inspection, the positioning of the cameras' lenses directly at the

tenants' front and rear doors, and the tenants' testimony about how offended they were, establishes

by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants invaded their privacy. Accordingly, the Court

finds that Defendants' placement of cameras .constituted a violation of Admin Code section 37.1 OB

(a)(l3) and constitutional right of privacy, for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per
tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.1 8

140. On April 15, 2015, Leshefsky and Perkins received a 24-Hour Notice of Intent to Enter

Premises, which claimed to need access to Leshefsky and Perkins's home for repairs on five

consecutive workdays, from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Ex. 70.) This unreasonably overbroad Notice

required Leshefsky and Perkins to rearrange work schedules, and take personal time off from work.

Despite staying home for two days, no one came, and when the workers showed up on the third day,

the repair took less than one hour. (Tr. 254:17-258:5, Exs. 70, 575.) Defendants' harassing conduct

violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code section 1954(c), and was

also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

18
To be conservative, the Court declines the City's request to impose a penalty for each
camera the Defendants installed. Instead, the Court aggregates Defendant's installation of multiple
cameras and considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant, for a total of two (2) violations. 19

141. On June 12, 2015, Defendants reduced housing services when they interrupted the hot

water service. (Tr. 259:1-16; Ex. 575.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Adm.in. Code

sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected

rights, violating Adm.in. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the

Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

142. On September 29, 2015, Defendants served Leshefsky and Perkins with a 60-Day

Notice of Temporary Eviction for Capital Improvements. (Ex. 73.) The Notice provided that

Leshefsky and Perkins leave the apartment by December 1, 2015, but could return on March 1, 2016.

The Notice also claimed that the work to be performed was replacement of waste pipes and electrical

re-wiring of the apartment. Leshefsky and Perkins were the only EUREKA STREET tenants to

receive a temporary eviction notice. (Tr. 266:4-271:21; Exs. 4 pp.1-2 (affidavit of custodian of

records), 15, 73, JA 137.)

143. The tenants vacated by November 30, 2015. Leshefsky had to place Harvey Milk into

temporary foster care in San Mateo, sell all of her furniture on Craigslist, and hire people with a
truck to move the other belongings into a neighbor's garage. Leshefsky then spent several months

couch surfing from place to place. (Tr. 266:4-271 :21; Exs. 4 pp.1-2 (affidavit of custodian of

records), 15, 73, JA 137.)

144. On March 1, 2016, Defendants failed to provide Leshefsky and Perkins an opportunity

to move back in to their apartment. As of November 2016, they had still not been able to move back

in. By the end of the school year, Leshefsky was forced to resign from her tenured teaching job with

the San Francisco Unified School District, and to move to Portland, Oregon so she could be with

Harvey Milk, while she waited to move back into her home. (Tr. 266:4-271:21; Exs. 4 pp.1-2

(affidavit of custodian of records), 15, 73, JA 137.)

19
The Court declines the City's request to impose a penalty for each day the Defendants failed
to appear. Instead, the Court imposes one penalty for the notice itself.
 145. As of May 24, 2016, KIHAGI considered Leshefsky's apartment to be "vacant" and

worth $4000 per month in rental income, even though Leshefsky was still waiting to return to her

apartment. (Ex. 292.)

146. The Court recognizes that the contents of the Notice, and any subsequent lawsuit, may

be protected by the litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation on this

basis. However, the inexcusable failure of Defendants to timely return Leshefsky and Perkins to

their apartment is evidence of bad faith and is an unlawful act, independent of the notice of eviction.

(Rental Housing, at 171 Cal.App.4th, 767; Chacon, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1256-57.) Admin. Code

section 37.9(a)(l 1) only allows a landlord to evict a tenant for capital improvements temporarily, for

up to three months, absent an extension approved by the Rent Board. Defendants neither sought nor

obtained any extension of time from the Rent Board to keep Leshefsky and Perkins out of their

apartment past March 1, 2016. (Exs. 4, 15, 73.) The nature of the work was described as electrical

rewiring and replacement of old pipes and was virtually identical to the description of the work in all

other Admin. Code section 37 .9(a)( 11) notices that Defendants sent to other tenants at other

properties. (Ex. 73.) Defendants failed to offer one scintilla of evidence as to whether the work was

ever done or why it could not be timely completed, or even completed by the time of the trial. The
''temporary eviction" was performed in bad faith, in an attempt to permanently displace Leshefsky

and Perkins from their home, violating Admin. Code section 37.10(B)(a)(5). Defendants' conduct

was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights under law, violating Admin.

Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Defendant's "temporary" eviction for capital improvements was an unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent

eviction, for which penalties will be imposed under the UCL, on a per tenant, per month basis, for

every month Leshefsky and Perkins have been out of possession of their apartment. As of January

2017, Leshefsky and Perkins have each been out of possession for thirteen ( 13) months, for a total of

twenty-six (26) UCL violations. 20

20
Leshesfky and Perkins vacated on November 20, 2015. To be conservative, the Court
imposes monthly penalties from December 2015 up to January 1, 2017.
 c. Harassment and Wrongful Eviction Against James Austin and Ray
Schreiber in Apartment 4

147. James Austin ("Austin") and Ray Schreiber ("Schreiber") rented Apartment 4 at

EUREKA STREET at the time Defendants purchased the property in 2013. They paid $1,458.89 in

rent when Defendants evicted them in January 2015. Austin has lived in Apartment 4 since 1995

and his domestic partner, Schreiber, moved into Apartment 4 in 2010 with the prior landlord's

expressed consent. (Tr. 448:27-449:3, 454:21-455:2, 457:4-6; Exs. 74, 83.)

148. In July 2014, KIHAGI frightened and invaded Austin and Schreiber's privacy, when,

on a Friday or Saturday evening, she stood on the rear staircase landing outside their open kitchen

door, an area inaccessible by the public, looking into their apartment with a "catatonic, bizarre look

on her face." This was the first time Austin and Schreiber ever saw KIHAGI in person. (Tr. 663:16-

666:8, 737:4-742:24.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO)

and (13). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant for a total of two (2)

violations.

149. On August 3, 2014, KIHAGI, representing herself as the "property manager," left a

voicemail message for Austin and Schreiber, which she described as a "courtesy" call. When they

called her back the same day, she told them "her bookkeeper had told her" that they were delinquent
on a month's rent, but she did not know which month. On August 4, 2014, Austin and Schreiber

sent a certified letter to Defendants and included documentation proving they paid rent every month
since Defendants bought the building. In the letter, they requested that all communication be in

writing. (Tr. 471:4-473:6,473:9-474:22; Exs. 75, 580, 587.)

150. On August 19, 2014, KIHAGI ignored their request for written communication, and left

them another voicemail instead. In the voicemail message, she reasserted the false claim that the

tenants were delinquent on rent for an unspecified month, and unfairly put the burden on the tenant

to prove they were not delinquent on rent, or face eviction. KIHAGI stated that she had already told

''the attorney" to issue a three-day notice on Friday. In response, on August 20, 2014, Austin and

Schreiber sent another letter to Defendants, telling them that they had sent her a letter with canceled

checks, and again requesting communication to be in writing. (Tr. 485:2-488:12, 659:2-19; Exs. 78,
 355, 356, 580, 587.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5), (10) and

(11 ). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant for a total of two (2)

violations.21

151. On September 16, 2014, around the same time that tenant Jerry James Stone moved out

of Apartment 3 at EUREKA STREET, leaving it vacant, Defendants transferred 25% of the Eureka

property to J. MWANGI, giving her sufficient individual ownership to perform an OMI eviction.

(Tr. 501 :23-502:4, 505:22-506:26, 507:15-25; 508:26-509:4; 646:5-23; Exs. 83, 580, 587.)

152. Also on September 16, 2014, Defendants sent a letter to Austin and Schreiber, finally

acknowledging that they were no longer delinquent in rent. However, Defendants now claimed that

after having "more time to review your files and records," they had no "documentation" showing

that Schreiber was an authorized additional occupant of Apartment 4. However, as confirmed by

Austin and Schreiber's former landlord, Rachel Beckert, Defendants had copies of their Rental

Information Questionnaire since 2013, which disclosed Schreiber as Austin's domestic partner. The

letter implied that Austin and Schreiber would face a no-fault eviction, as KIHAGI expressly stated

that she needed information from them to calculate "relocation amounts." (Tr. 494:27-496:20,

496:28-498:13, 504:8-505:4, 582:10-17, 589:25-28, 661:11-662:18, 633:8-15; Exs. 80, 83, 580,

587.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5) and (10).

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant for a total of two (2) violations.

153. On September 30, 2014, Austin and Schreiber sent another letter to Defendants

demanding they stop harassing them, asserting their belief that Defendants were unlawfully

harassing them to coerce them to vacate their home, and insisting again that all communications be

in writing. (Tr. 498:16-499:12; 662:19-663:13; Exs. 81, 580, 587.) Their exercise of their lawful

rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

154. On October 19, 2014, KIHAGI again ignored their request for written communication

when she left another harassing voicemail message. In the message, KIHAGI, stated that Austin

21
The Court declines the City's request to find that the tenants' rejection of Defendants' House
Rules regarding guests provided the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants.
would be receiving $5,261 in relocation payments, and suggested that Austin and Schreiber call her

"before [the lawyer's] office gets to them," if they wanted to discuss a different amount. Despite the

clear threat of eviction, Defendants did not serve an eviction notice until November 18, 2014, a

month later. (Tr. 499:19-502:25, 504:14-505:4, 557:1-558:15; Exs. 83, 357, 358, 580, 587.)

Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5), (6) and (10), and was

also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant, for a total of two (2) violations.

155. The next day, on October 20, 2014, Austin and Schreiber filed a Report of Alleged

Wrongful Eviction with the San Francisco Rent Board. (Tr. 502:28-503:27, 687:16-689:4; Exs. 82,

580, 587.) Their exercise of their lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation

by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

156. On or about November 19, 2014, Austin and Schreiber received a 60-Day Notice of

Termination of Tenancy, allegedly so J. MWANGI could move into Apartment 4. Defendants

fraudulently altered the date of the Notice, and the proof of service of the Notice, to cut short their

sixty days. (Tr. 504:14-505:4, 508:7-23, 574:12-575:5, 689:5-690:12; Exs. 83, 580, 587.)

157. On December 19, 2014, KIHAGI sent another harassing text message to Austin and

Schreiber, saying: "So I will make it easy to see your poor conduct like taping notice on door by

getting surveillance. Will send official letter to both of you. Plus your sixty-day period is almost
over ... " (Tr. 511:7-512:10, 512:13-514:1, 707:10-709:2; Exs. 85, 580, 587.) Defendants' threats

violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5), (10) and (13), and was also retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant, for a total of two (2)

violations.

158. Austin and Schreiber were evicted from their apartment on January 10, 2015.

159. The Court recognizes that the contents of the 60-day Notice, and any subsequent

lawsuit, may be protected by the litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation
on this basis. However, J. MWANGI's attempt to evict Austin and Schreiber without any intent to

1Q
move into Apartment 4, and her failure to occupy the unit as her principal residence, as discussed

below, are evidence of bad faith and constitute unlawful acts, independent of the notice of eviction.

(Rental Housing, 171 Cal.App.4th at 767.)

160. At the time J. MWANGI initiated the OMI eviction, Defendants falsely represented to

the Rent Board that J. MWANGI was not a member of RENKA, which also owned six apartments

on GUERRERO STREET. (Tr. 505:12-21, 506:27-507:10, 532:20-533:18, 533:26-535:5, 535:17-

536:23, 537:24-538:20; 538:27-541:5, 549:19-551:6; 570:12-571:22, 574:12-578:21; 606:6-607:5,

691 :3-18, 693:1-17, 699:11-22, 699:23-700:1, 700:2-4; Exs. 83, 228, 237, 580, 587.) Defendants'

false representation to the Rent Board regarding the extent of their real estate holdings is evidence of

their bad faith intent to wrongfully evict Austin and Schreiber under the guise of an OMI eviction.

161. Additionally, Apartments 3 and 5 were vacant at 195 EUREKA STREET. At trial,

evidence was presented that both apartments were comparable to Apartment 4-they were very

close to the square footage in Apartment 4, and while both apartments had a larger bathroom than

Apartment 4, Apartment 4 had a larger kitchen. (See~ 93 [Rules and Regulations,§ 6.1 l(a)(B)(3)

notes that size and physical condition of the unit and building is a factor determining

comparability].) (Tr. 570:7-19, 647:14-648:13, 457:1-3.) Even assuming, arguendo, these

apartments were not comparable and there were no other comparable apartments, neither of these

apartments was offered to Austin and Schreiber as replacement housing, as required under Admin.

Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv). Though Defendants maintain that they rented Apartment 3 in October

2014, prior to serving the OMI eviction on Austin and Schreiber, and Apartment 5 was being

remodeled, the timing of the rental and remodel to coincide with the OMI eviction is further

evidence of Defendants' "lack of good faith ... to avoid offering a tenant a replacement unit" under

Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv). (Tr. 505:12-21, 549:19-551:6, 570:1-19, 570:12-571:22,

574:12-578:21, 606:6-607:5, 644:17-648:17, 694:18-696:3, 696:5-18, 696:19-698:20, 760:23-

761:19, 761:20-765:15; Exs. 83, 580, 587, 990.)

162. Regardless, the Court need not make a finding as to whether any of the apartments were

comparable, because the evidence shows that J.MWANGI did not, in good faith, intend to use

Apartment 4 as her principal residence for a minimum of 36 consecutive months, and did not so use

40
 it, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(ii).22 (Ex. 426.) J. MWANGI's principal place of

residence was on Pardee Avenue in Fremont, CA. (Exs. 220, 421.) Additionally, J. MWANGI

admitted that in April 2016, she accepted a position in a one-year residency program in Portland. To

do so, she would have had to apply for the position much earlier, and would have known during the

relevant times that she was going to be living elsewhere. (Ex. 426.) Further, J. MWANGI falsely

claimed that she moved her furniture into Apartment 4, but stayed with her sister C. MWANGI in

Apartment 6 at l 8TH STREET-KIHAGI' s office-until the renovations in Apartment 4 were

completed in June 2016. (Ex. 426.) As discussed, the record before this Court established that C.

MWANGI never lived at 18TH Street. Rather, she lived at her single-family residence on Pardee

Avenue in Fremont, CA. She listed on her loan applications under penalty of perjury that her former

address was 1735 Steiner Street. (Exs. 220, 285, 287, 422.). She never mentioned 18TH STREET.

Finally, J. MWANGI stated under penalty of perjury that she moved into Apartment 4 in June 2016,

over eighteen months after the Notice to evict, yet also declared that she moved to Portland in June

2016. (Ex. 426.) (Tr. 120:10-16, 123:18-124:20, 126:17-25, 130:15-17, 132:1-14, 133:22-25, 551:7-

554:3, 628:10-13, 701:3-706:4, 709:3-24; Exs. 4, 14, 44, 98, 220, 285, 287, 421, 422, 426, 580, 580,

581, 587.)

163. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that J. MWANGI's OMI eviction was an

unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent eviction, for which penalties will be imposed under the UCL, on a

per tenant, per month basis, for every month Austin and Schreiber have been out of possession of

their apartment. As of January 2017, Austin and Schreiber have been out of possession for twenty-

four (24) months. 23 The total number of UCL violations is forty-eight (48).

22
There was evidence that J. MWANGI was seen at 195 EUREKA STREET after Austin and
Schreiber moved out and while construction in other units was ongoing. While the Court has
considered such testimony, the overwhelming evidence described above established that J. MWANGI
did not intend to use Apartment 4 as her "principal residence for a minimum of 36 consecutive
months."
23
Schreiber and Austin vacated on January 10, 2015. Accordingly, the Court imposes monthly
penalties from January 2015 up to January 1, 2017. Additionally, although J. MWANGI transferred
her ownership interest back to REN.KA on February 25, 2015, she is jointly and severally liable for all
monthly penalties after Schreiber and Austin vacated their apartment, given her role in the OMI
eviction.

A.1
 164. The Court is not basing any part of its findings on J. MWANGI spending one year in

Oregon for educational purposes. Rather, the Court's findings are based on the numerous

inconsistencies and inaccuracies of other representations made, and the Court's finding herein that,

based on the credible and competent evidence presented, the City established by the preponderance

of the evidence that the ulterior motive of the Defendants was to evict Austin and Schreiber for

greed, that J. MWANGI never intended to occupy the premises as her primary residence for a

continuous period of three years, and that the eviction was done in retaliation for the tenants'

exercise of their protected rights.

4. FILBERT STREET

165. Defendant XELAN is liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful

evictions committed at FILBERT STREET during its period of ownership. Defendant KIHAGI is

liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed at FILBERT

STREET during XELAN's period of ownership, as well as those she committed, or participated in,

against tenants at FILBERT STREET.

166. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds one hundred and two (102) predicate

violations oflaw at FILBERT STREET for which it assesses a civil penalty under the UCL.
Defendants KIHAGI and XELAN are jointly and severally liable for all one hundred and two (102)

acts.
a. Harassment Against Maria Maranghi, her husband Sergio
Maranghi, and her mother, Martha Bini (Apartment 1020)

167. Following Defendants' mid-August 2013 purchase of the FILBERT STREET property,

Defendants falsely claimed that Maria Maranghi ("Maranghi"), Sergio Maranghi (''S. Maranghi")

and Martha Bini ("M. Bini") had not paid their August 2013 rent. Maranghi told Defendants that

she had already paid the August 2013 rent to Hill & Company and Hill & Company had cashed the

check; however, Defendants asked for a second check for August 2013, which Maranghi paid

because she "just didn't want a problem." Maranghi was under the impression that her landlords

would sort it out, and would reimburse the second rent payment, but Defendants never reimbursed

her for her second payment for one month's rent. (Tr. 2707:17-2708:21, 2709:23-2710:18, 2710:19-
 2711:1, 2719:11-23, 2721:27-2722:9, 2750:17-2752:3; Ex. 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct

violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l 1) and (12). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant. In addition, Maranghi is sixty-five years old and disabled, S. Maranghi is

seventy-five years old and disabled, and M. Bini is ninety years old and disabled. Because

Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one

additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).

168. In September 2013, Defendants' workers cut the wires to the doorbell to Maranghi's

home. This reduction in housing services made things difficult for Maranghi's family. Since they

relied on mail order shipping for clothes, without a doorbell, they would miss deliveries. Between

September 2013 and April 2014, Maranghi verbally requested that Defendants repair the doorbell

multiple times, but Defendants were only willing to install a little battery-operated doorbell that did

not work at all. On April 21, 2014, Maranghi and M. Bini sent a certified letter to Defendants

requesting repair of the inoperable doorbell, to which they received no response. Finally, Maranghi

reported the doorbell to DBI in May 2014, which prompted Defendants to fix it by June 2014,

approximately ten months after Defendants cut the wires. (Tr. 2728:16-2730:11, 2787:14-2789:1,

2824:28-2825:7, 2826:1-6, 2826:15-17; Exs. 130, 132, 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct
violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(2) and (10), for which the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled

victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL
violations is six (6). 24

169. On or about September 2013, somebody removed the house numbers from the front

door to Maranghi' s home. Despite numerous verbal requests and at least one written request to

Defendants and their agents to replace the house numbers, Defendants did not replace the door

numbers until May 2014, nine months later. This reduction in housing services similarly made

things difficult for Maranghi's family. It caused confusion for those delivering mail and packages,

and Maranghi would have to wait outside for cab drivers, to ensure they could find her. (Tr.

24
The Court aggregates Defendants' repeated failure to fix the Maranghis' doorbell for months
and considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
 2734:20-2737:11; Exs. 419, 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(2) and (10), for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because

Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one

additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).25

170. On or about January 17, 2014, KIHAGI called Maranghi to set up a meeting. KIHAGI,

representing herself as the property manager, wanted to discuss the plans for the building. A couple

of days later, the meeting took place in Maranghi's apartment. KIHAGI told Maranghi that she

should move out because KIHAGI wanted to remodel the unit, and offered a buyout for $4,000 per

person. Maranghi had lived in this unit continuously since 1988. Maranghi declined, saying it

would be very hard to move for several reasons, including her ninety-year old mother's poor health.

KIHAGI responded that they should put M. Bini in a nursing home, and move to more affordable

places like San Rafael or Stockton. (Tr. 2738:1-2741:9, 2741:25-2743:8, 2743:9-19; Ex. 585.) The

tenants' exercise of their lawful right in rejecting Defendants' buy-out offer provide the basis for

subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5. Defendants' harassing conduct also violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(5) and (10), for which the Court imposes one UCL violation of the UCL per tenant.
Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court

imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six (6). 26

171. On or about January 23, 2014, less than a week after the tenants rejected the so-called

buyout offer, Defendant KIHAGI showed up at Maranghi's apartment again to harass the elderly and

disabled tenants about moving. KIHAGI delivered a copy of a relocation payment schedule, but

Maranghi told her again that they were not going to move. (Tr. 2742:27-2745:13; Exs. 117, 585.)

Defendants' harassing conduct violated under Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5), (6) and (io), and

was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

25
The Court aggregates Defendants' repeated failure to fix the Maranghis' house number for
months and considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
26
The Court declines the City's request to impose penalties for Defendants' imposition of
House Rules.
 tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the

Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six

(6).

172. The next day, Maranghi received a 24-hour notice, informing her that Defendants

would enter her family's home on January 29, January 30, February 5, and February 6, 2014, from

11 a.m. to 2 p.m. so that Defendants' contractor could look around. Due to M. Bini's age and

disabilities, it generally takes Maranghi two hours to get her mother ba.thed, dressed, and ready to

receive visitors. On January 29, it took nearly two hours to get M. Bini ready. However,

Defendants did not come, did not call to say that the plans had changed, and did not call later to

explain why they didn't come, or apologize for not coming. On January 30, Maranghi and M. Bini

again spent two hours getting ready, but Defendants did not come, call to cancel, or call to explain or

apologize. (Tr. 2745:14-2747:5; 2747:6-8; 2747:9-2748:4, 2748:5-23; Exs. 118, 585.) Defendants'

harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code

section 1954(c), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and
disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is six (6). 27

173. On February 5, 2014, KIHAGI and her contractor came to Maranghi's apartment to

take measurements and look at the layout. While there, KIHAGI again harassed Maranghi's family

about moving out. KIHAGI said, "As you can see, I want to demolish here and I want to, you know,

remodel." (Tr. 2745:14-2747:5; 2747:6-8, 2748:24-2749:5, 2749:6-20; Exs. 118, 585.) Defendants'

harassing conduct was an abuse of the landlord's right of access, and violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(4), (5) and (10), and Civil Code section 1954(c), and was also retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi,

27
The Court declines the City's request to impose multiple penalties for each day Defendants
failed to appear, but imposes one penalty for the harassing notice itself.
S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation per tenant. The total nwnber of UCL violations is six (6).

174. On February 6, 2014, KIHAGI came to Maranghi's house again, with the family's

September 2013 rent check, on which Defendants had written "VOID." Defendants falsely claimed

that the check was "not good." Maranghi checked with her bank which confirmed that nothing was

wrong with the check or the account, and which indicated that there had been no attempt to even

cash the check. Not wanting any more harassment, Maranghi wrote Defendants a replacement check

anyway. On March 25, 2014, Maranghi followed up with a letter to Defendants about the September

2013 rent check, stating again that nothing was wrong with the check, and asking why they had not

cashed it. Maranghi delivered the letter to Defendants' post office box, but received no response.

(Tr. 2749:25-27, 2752:7-27; 2753: 13-2754: 15, 2754:25-2755:6, 2821 :8-14; Exs. 119, 585.)

Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(IO), (11) and (12), and was

also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the

Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total nwnber of UCL violations is six
(6).

175. On or about February 11, 2014, Defendants delivered a "Notice oflntent to Enter

Premises" on February 13 and 18 from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. On February 13, 2014, KIHAGI

came with a contractor or architect. KIHAGI continued harassing Maranghi about moving out,

saying she had plans for Maranghi' s apartment, and that it would be demolished. Maranghi told

KIHAGI, again, that they were not going to move. (Tr. 2759:17-2760:2, 2760:15-17; 2760:20-

2761:11; Exs. 121, 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(4), (5) and (10), and Civil Code section 1954(c), and was also retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi,

S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional
UCL violation per tenant. The total nwnber of UCL violations is six (6).
 176. On February 18, 2014, Maranghi, in response to the notice of entry by Defendants,

went through the usual two hours of preparation to get her mother ready to receive visitors, but

Defendants did not show up. KIHAGI called late at 1:00 p.m. to cancel. (Tr. 2761: 12-2762:6; Exs.

121, 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and

(13), and Civil Code section 1954(c), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and

M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per

tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).

177. Later in the day on February 18, 2014, KIHAGI called Maranghi again to harass her

about moving out. Maranghi again told her that they were not going to move. KIHAGI told

Maranghi that Defendants would demolish the apartment and that they would need to leave. Then

KIHAGI abruptly hung up. (Tr. 2762:7-22.) Defendants' threats violated Admin. Code sections

37.IOB (a)(5) and (10), and were also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights,

violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court

imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each
elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total

number of UCL violations is six (6).

178. At approximately 11 :00 p.m., on the night of February 24, 2014, Defendants again

posted another "24-Hour Notice to Enter" for entry the next morning, February 25, and for February

26, from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. This notice was improper as to the February 25th entry as

Maranghi and her family only received eleven hours' notice. (Tr. 2763:3-2764:10; Ex. 122, 585.)

Defendants' improper notice violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil

Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l ), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and

M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per
tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).

117
 179. On April 26, 2014, Maranghi and M. Bini sent a certified letter to Defendants

requesting repair of a clogged sink and a leaking pipe, to which they received no response. On May

2, 2014, Maranghi and M. Bini sent a letter requesting repair to their inoperable stove. In early May

2014, frustrated with the lack of response to her maintenance requests, Maranghi reported the

problems to DBI. On May 5, 2014, DBI issued a notice of violation requiring Defendants to fix a

clogged sink and a broken oven, among other things. DBI had to come out more than twice for re-

inspections, and it took Defendants approximately a month to abate the violations. (Tr. 2777: 1-15,

2777:27-2778:23, 2778:27-2780:21, 2780:23-2782:10, 2787:14-2789:1, 2844:1-7; Exs. 127, 128,

129, 130, 132, 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l),

(2), and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and

disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is six (6).

180. On or about the time ofDBI's inspections, Defendants "yanked" the screen door from

the back ofMaranghi's apartment. After that, M. Bini, who was mostly housebound, was unable to

open the rear door to get fresh air. Maranghi wanted to lodge another complaint with Defendants,

but at that point, she had lost hope that it would result in change. (Tr. 2804:4-2805:3.) Defendants'

harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (5) and (10), and was also retaliatory

against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or

Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because

Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one

additional UCL violation per tenant for the harassment. The total number of UCL violations is six

(6).

181. On May 13, 2014, Maranghi and M. Bini sent another letter to Defendants because

Defendants had installed a new lock and new door to the yard from FILBERT STREET, but had not

provided them with a key. Defendants did not respond to the letter, and never provided Maranghi

and her family with a key; however they did provide a key to the newer tenants who were paying
market rents. This reduction of housing service negatively affected the elderly and disabled tenants

because it has forced them to use the steep rear stairs to get to their storage area or the garbage area,

which they could not manage. (Tr. 2783:11-2785:10, 2851:6-2852:2, 2906:3-18; Exs. 131, 585.)

Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l), (5) and (10), and was

also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the

Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six

(6).

182. Around midnight on December 3, 2014, Defendants posted another 24-Hour Notice to

Enter Premises on Maranghi's front door. The Notice stated that Defendants intended to enter

Maranghi's home the next day, on December 4, 2014, from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., less than 24-

hours after the posting, and again on December 5, 2014, from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. (Tr. 2797:27-

2798:28, 2849: 19-2850: 1; Ex. 134, 585.) Defendants' improper notice violated Admin. Code

sections 37.IOB(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1945(c) and (d)(l). Defendants'

conduct was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin.
Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and M. Bini are each elderly and disabled

victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL
violations is six (6).

183. On December 4, 2014, Maranghi put a note on her front door denying Defendants'

entry due to less than 24 hours notice, and requested that Defendants call her lawyer. That

afternoon, KIHAGI, along with her worker, knocked on Maranghi's door despite her notice.

Maranghi, on the other side of the closed front door, said: "You cannot come in because you did not

give me a 24-hour notice. Call your lawyer. You cannot come in." KIHAGI responded, "Want to

make a bet?" Then Maranghi heard KIHAGI say to the worker: "Go get the drill in the garage."

Maranghi said, "If you do that, I'm going to call the police." Maranghi did call the police, but by the
time they came, KIHAGI and her worker were gone. The elderly and disabled tenants were left

i::lQ
terrified. After this event, M. Bini was so scared of Defendants that she refused to leave the house,

even to get medical care. This forced Maranghi to hire someone to stay with her mother when she

left the house to run errands. This fear persisted until M. Bini's death on July 19, 2015. (Tr. 2799:7-

2806:4, 2847:10-26, 2848:17-22; Ex. 585.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code

sections 37.10B(a)(4), (5) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Maranghi, S. Maranghi, and

M. Bini are each elderly and disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per

tenant. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).

184. As further evidence of Defendants' bad faith, Maranghi testified, "She [KIHAGI] said

that she could-I should put my mother in a nursing home. I told her I wasn't going to do that

because, you know, we wanted to be with my mother. I didn't feel that anyone could take care of

her as well as myself and my husband. And my mother would not want to feel like-I know she

would feel like abandoned or just not part of the family, and that was out of the question." (Tr.

2742:23-2743:4.) Maranghi also testified that KIHAGI refused to acknowledge her elderly mother:

"She would come in so many times into my apartment, and she would ignore my mother like my
mother was not even there. She never referred to her as anything, no Martha, not anything. Even in

court, she would call her 'the old lady."' (Tr. 2768:20-2769:3.) Maranghi testified about the effect

this had on M. Bini: "My mother was terrified. You know, she couldn't believe that that was

happening. It was just something very frightening for somebody of 90 years old-at that point she

was 91-you know, to go through." (Tr. 2803:3-7.) The devastating impact ofKIHAGI's bad faith

and harassing conduct was vividly described by Maranghi: "Well, of course it caused me a lot of

distress to see my mother in that condition, living in that condition, just in fear of every little noise

that she heard. You know, my mother was a good woman, and she didn't deserve to have her last

year oflife be living in fear like that, not wanting to go anywhere. You know, she didn't have any

joys, and so, you know, somebody old like that, and sick, she had no joys left in her life because

Anna [KIHAGI] made sure she took that away. She [KIHAGI] even had her workers yank the
screen door from the back, and my mother used to open the door to get some fresh air." (Tr.

2803:23-2804:6.)
5. GUERRERO STREET

185. Defendant RENKA is liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful

evictions committed at GUERRERO STREET during its period of ownership. Defendant KIHAGI

is liable for all acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed at

GUERRERO STREET during RENKA's period of ownership, as well as those she committed, or

participated in, against tenants at GUERRERO STREET.

186. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds eight hundred and ninety (890) predicate

violations of law at GUERRERO STREET for which it assesses a civil penalty under the UCL.

Defendants KIHAGI and RENKA are jointly and severally liable for all eight hundred and ninety

(890) violations.
a. Harassment Against Multiple GUERRERO STREET Tenants

187. Sylvia Smith (''S. Smith") in Apartment 1139, Leonard Johnson ("Johnson") in

Apartment l 139A, and Sheila Hembury ("Hembury") in Apartment 1139A are each over 65-years of

age, and each is a "disabled person" as defined by Bus. & Prof. Code section 17206.1. (Tr. 193 7 :21-
25, 2104:19-2105:8, 2105:26-27, 2107:9-12, 2108:27-28, 2229:27-2230:15, 2232:7-8, 2233:5-

2234: 10, 2305:5-8, 2331: 17-2332:22.) Elizabeth Chavez ("Chavez") in Apartment 1135, and Gail

Izaguirre ("Izaguirre") in Apartment l 135A are each a "disabled person" as defined by Bus. & Prof.
Code section 17206.1. (Tr. 1843:17-1844:16, 2407:9-19, 2462:8-15.)

188. In July 2014-within a month of purchasing GUERRERO STREET, Defendants

denied all tenants access to the common space in the rear yard-the only open air space at the

property-by locking the access door, placing a padlock and throwing away the tenants' patio

furniture and barbecue pit without notice. Previously, the tenants were entitled to use the common

areas of the building, including the rear yard. Indeed, the prior landlord Julio Valdivieso testified

that he expressly gave all the tenants permission to use it. Defendants did not compensate the tenants
for their loss of use of the yard. (Tr. 1742:1743:17-27, 1798:15-1797:19, 1820:19-22, 1838:7-

1839:26, 2009:25-2010:4, 2243:15-2244:17, Tr. 4217:11-22; Ex. 382, 391.) Defendants' actions

'\ 1
violated Ad.min. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10), for which the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant for each of the thirteen (13) tenants. 28 Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith,

Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation for each of these five (5) tenants. The total number of UCL violations is eighteen

(18).

189. Also beginning in July 2014, Defendants refused to repair a broken lock on the front

door to the building, leaving the building unsecured for about more than a month. As a result,

people dumped trash and urinated in the GUERRERO STREET lobby, which Defendants forced

tenants to clean up repeatedly. (Tr. 1756:8-1757:21, 1826:19-1827:4, 1869:5-11; Exs. 385, 386.)

Defendants refused to respond to tenants' requests that they fix the lock, in violation of Admin. Code

sections 37.lOB(a){l), (2) and (10), for which the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the

thirteen (13) tenants. Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly

and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five (5)

tenants. The total number of UCL violations is eighteen (18).

190. On August 6, 2014, Defendants caused a significant disruption in water service after

ignoring several notices of unpaid water bills that were posted on the building in July as well as
notices that were forwarded to them by the tenants. The outage lasted for four hours, and affected all

tenants in the building. Tenants reported the water outage to DBI and the Housing Rights

Committee, who were able to restore water service. (Tr. 1750:6-1753:19, 1835:18-24, 1841 :26-

1842:2, 1846:12-15, 2341:12-17; Exs. 384, 385.) In September 2014, Defendants received another

past due bill after they again failed to pay their water bill. (Ex. 384; Tr. 1848:11-22.) Defendants'

reduction in water service violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also

retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d)

28
1. During this period of harassment, Apartment 1135 was occupied by Elizabeth
Chavez, Madeline Hall, and Leah Abiol, Apartment l 135A was occupied by Gail Izaguirre and her
roommate, Apartment 1137 was occupied by Connie Yee and Callie Roth, Apartment l 137A was
occupied by Emma Sheehan, Apartment 1139 was occupied by Sylvia Smith, Efren Delgado, and
Colin Wilson, and Apartment l 139A was occupied by Leonard Johnson and Sheila Hembury. (Tr.
1730:25-1731:9, 1734:19-1736:4, 1935:8-1936:2, 2045:1-20, 2181:11-14; Ex. 380.)
and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of

the thirteen (13) tenants. Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly

and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five (5)

tenants. The total number of UCL violations is eighteen (18).

191. In early September 2014, the electrical service to the common areas at GUERRERO

STREET was shut off. (Tr. 1929:20-1930:2.) Defendants' reduction in electrical service violated

Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for

exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the thirteen (13) tenants. Because

Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court

imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five (5) tenants. The total number of UCL

violations is eighteen (18).

192. On or around September 19, 2014, the GUERRERO STREET tenants lost electrical

service in the common areas a second time, for eleven to fifteen days, after Defendants failed to pay

the electric bill that they were responsible for. Because of the outage, the tenants had no light in the

common areas, and the door buzzer/intercom system was inoperable. The lack of illumination
created a "very unsafe" environment for all tenants, and was "devastating" for some of the older

and/or mobility-impaired tenants who had to navigate the stairs to and from their apartments in the

dark. Because the doorbell could not function during the power outage, tenants also had difficulty

receiving packages, including medications. The tenants reported the outage to Defendants several

times-in writing and by phone-but received no response, and eventually reported the problem to

DBI. (Tr. 1758:9-26, 1760:18-1764:14, 1766:9-21, 1835:25-27, 1859:4-10, 1864:15-24, 1957:7-23,

1958:3-17, 2122:15-2123:2, 2265:16-2267:19, 2369:1-6; Exs. 144, 388.) Defendants' failure to fix

this lengthy and serious disruption in electrical service violated Admin. Code sections 37 .1 OB(a)( 1)

and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Moreover, Defendants did not

compensate their tenants for the reduction in electrical service. (Tr. 1766:2-5.) Due to the egregious

and ongoing nature of the violation, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the thirteen
 (13) tenants for each day that the tenants were without electricity. 29 Because Izaguirre, Chavez,

Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one

additional UCL violation for each of these five tenants for each day the tenants were without

electricity. The total number of UCL violations is one hundred and ninety- eight (198).

193. The September 2014 power outage caused the alarm system at GUERRERO STREET

to go off constantly for eleven to fifteen days. Defendants failed to shut off the alarm for days,

despite multiple requests from the tenants, forcing the tenants to report the problem to DBI. They

also failed to compensate the tenants for the disruption. (Tr. 1758:27-1759:10, 1760:18-1765:17,

1766:5-21, 1855:12-21, 2124:9-21; Exs. 387, 388.) Defendants' failure to shut off the alarm

substantially disrupted the tenants' right to quiet enjoyment, violating Admin. Code sections

37.lO(B)(a)(l), (2) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising pro~ected

rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Due to the

egregious and ongoing nature of the violation, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the

thirteen (13) tenants for each of the eleven days that Defendants failed to shut off the alarm.

Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims,

the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five tenants for each of the eleven
days. 30 The total number of UCL violations is one hundred and ninety-eight (198).

194. Defendants reduced garbage services to all tenants for three weeks by changing the

exterior lock to the garbage room and refusing to provide a key to Recology or their tenants. As a

result, garbage overflowed in the basement area, forcing tenants to take their garbage off-site for

disposal. The problem was also exacerbated because Defendants used the existing garbage bins for

their construction debris. Defendants did not respond to tenants' complaints, or compensate their

tenants for the reduction in garbage services. (Tr. 1780:27-1784:23, 2068:24-2069:4, 2245:25-

2248:27, 2258:23-2259:11; Ex. 394, 406.) Defendants' reduction in garbage services violated

Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for

29
As the record is unclear as to whether the period was for more than eleven days, the Court
imposes penalties for only eleven days.
30
As the record is unclear as to whether the period was for more than eleven days, the Court
imposes penalties only for eleven days.
exercising protected rights, violating Ad.min. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the thirteen (13) tenants. Because

Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Bembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court

imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five tenants. The total number of UCL

violations is eighteen (18).

195. Defendants refused to provide Chavez, Johnson, and Smith with the new key to the

garbage room, even though they made several written requests to Defendants. However, KIHAGI

gave the garbage room key to new tenants who moved into the building in 2015 and were paying

market-rate rent, and specifically instructed them not to give a copy of the key to the other tenants.

(Tr. 1780:27-1784:23, 2068:24-2069:4, 2245:25-2248:27, 2258:23-2259: 11; Ex. 394, 406.)

Defendants' failure to provide Chavez Johnson, and Smith with keys to the garbage room violated

Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (5) and (10), and was retaliatory against them for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because these tenants were elderly

and/or disabled, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

violations is six (6).

196. For several months, beginning in November 2014, Defendants caused a complete

disruption in mail service to all GUERRERO tenants by removing the master key from the lockbox

and refusing to replace it until February 2015. During this time, tenants had to travel to the Post
Office on Bryant Street to retrieve their mail-which was far enough away it required several elderly

and disabled tenants to pay for a taxi to obtain their mail. Because of this disruption, tenants did not

receive medical documents, paychecks, holiday cards, medications, and packages. Defendants failed

to respond to the tenants' requests that they restore mail service-which tenants made in person, by

phone, and by mail-and did not compensate their tenants for the reduction in service. (Tr. 1767:6-

1770:20, 1772:25-1773:12, 1954:6-1955:28, 1956:23-25, 2123:3-27, 2269:17-2270:19; Exs. 389,

391, 392.) Defendants' reduction in mail service violated Ad.min. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and

(10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin.

Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL
 violation per tenant. 31 Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly

and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five

tenants. The total number of UCL violations is seventeen (17). 32

197. In March 2015, after the tenants in Apartments 1137 and 1137A vacated,33 Defendants

begin construction work involving a ''total reconstruction" of both apartments, including ''tearing

down walls." Defendants' construction workers would fill the tenants' garbage bins and rear

porches with their construction debris, thereby disrupting the tenants' garbage service for "months."

This caused the "garbage to be piled up so bad ... all you saw was garbage everywhere." (Tr.

1746:17-1747:18, 1809:3-1810:9, 1831 :21-1832:7, 1833:8-17, 2245:12-24, 2259:15-2262:22,

2279:5-2280:24, 2369-2371:15; Exs. 148, 383, 405.) Defendants' disruption of the tenants' garbage

service violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was retaliatory against the tenants

for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the remaining nine tenants.

Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims,

the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five tenants. The total number of

UCL violations is fourteen (14).

198. Defendants' construction workers improperly disposed of their construction debris,

failing to exercise due diligence and follow industry protocols designed to minimize the tenants'

exposure to dust, lead paint, mold, asbestos, and other building materials with potentially harmful

health impacts. The construction made the tenants' "carpets turn white because of the dust." (Ex.

383; 1831:21-1832:7, 2188:12-2189:1, 3186:21-26, 3187:20-3188:6.) Defendants' failure to

properly dispose of construction debris violated Admin. Code section 37.IOB(a)(3), and was

retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d)

31
Izaguirre's roommate moved out of her apartment in October 2014, so there were twelve
tenants at GUERRERO STREET at that time. (Tr. 2404:23-2405:16.)
32
The Court aggregates Defendants' disruption in mail services over four months, and
considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
33
Yee and Roth vacated Apartment 1137 in March 2015, and Sheehan vacated Apartment
1137A in March 2015.
and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one violation of the UCL for

each of the nine tenants. Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly

and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five

tenants. The total number of UCL violations fourteen (14).

199. For two weeks in March and April 2015, Defendants failed to provide heat to all

tenants at GUERRERO STREET. It was cold, and the tenants survived using their own space

heaters and blankets. The tenants reported the lack of heat to Defendants, but, again, they failed to

respond. Defendants also failed to compensate the tenants for the lack of heat. (Tr. 1777:4-1778:15,

1780:18-20, 1918:25-1919:11, 2435:28-2436:13.) Defendants' failure to provide heat to their

tenants for two weeks violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory

against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or

Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the nine

tenants. Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled

victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five tenants. The total

number of UCL violations is fourteen (14).

200. On March 4, 2015, the GUERRERO STREET tenants participated in the City's task
force inspection of the property, over KIHAGI's protestations. Before the inspection began;

Defendants sent hired security to knock on tenants' doors, in an attempt to intimidate the tenants so

they would not participate in the City's inspections. (Tr. 1784:24'-l 787:3, 2125:8-21, 2126:28-13,

2271:13-26.) Such acts violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5), and were also retaliatory against

the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the nine tenants.

Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims,

the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each of these five tenants. The total number of

UCL violations is fourteen (14).

201. On or around March 10, 2015, days after the task force inspection, Defendants installed

surveillance cameras in retaliation for the tenants' cooperation with City officials. All of the

surveillance cameras were pointed toward the interior of the building. None of the cameras were
 positioned to capture the areas of the building that had previously been vandalized, and where

tenants had raised security concerns. Most importantly, the cameras were pointed directly at each of

the tenants' front doors-capturing the interior of tenants' apartments when they opened their front

doors. The cameras made tenants feel "like we were being watched." Johnson testified: ''to have a

camera pointing right directly at your front door and looking in on you ... it's an invasion ... they

don't even do that in prison." (Tr. 1772:13-24, 1799:6-1804:1, 1878:2-15, 2128:18-2129:24,

2274:16-2276:21, 2292:10-17, 2422:21-2426:2; Ex. 148.) The Court incorporates all of its previous

findings of violating Defendants' privacy rights by reason of installing cameras pointed directly at

tenants' front doors. Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13),

and Civil Code section 1708.8, and was retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights,

violating Adm.in. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court

imposes one UCL violation for each of the nine tenants. Because Izaguirre, Chavez, Smith, Johnson,

and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL

violation for each of these five tenants. The total number of UCL violations is fourteen (14).

202. In November 2015, there was another power outage at GUERRERO STREET. (Tr.

2285:10-21.) Defendants' disruption in electrical service violated Adm.in. Code sections

37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights,

violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court

imposes one UCL violation for each of the eight tenants.34 Because Izaguirre, Smith, Johnson, and

Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes an additional UCL violation

for each of these four tenants. The total number of UCL violations is twelve (12).
34
Mahoney-Fernandes, Castellow, and Laverone moved into Apartment 1137 on October 1,
2015. (Tr. 2061:18-2062:2, 2062:19-20, 2064:5-9.) As Defendants gave Mahoney-Fernandes and
Castellow permission to have a subtenant in the apartment pursuant to an addendum to the lease,
penalties for harassment are assessed as to Laverone. (Tr. 2070: 1-20; see Adm.in. Code section
37.2(t), defining tenant as "a person entitled by written or oral agreement, sub-tenancy approved by
the landlord, or by sufferance, to occupy a residential dwelling unit to the exclusion of others.")
Chavez, Hall, and Abiol vacated Apartment 1135 on June 1, 2015. (Tr. 1730:3-4, 1730:25-1731:9.)
Three new people moved into Apartment 1135 approximately around November 1, 2015. (Tr.
2062:19-2063:3, 2066:2, 2067:1-5; 2079:23-25.) As the record is not clear whether the new tenants
had moved in when the outage occurred, the Court declines to impose penalties as to the new tenants.
Additionally, the record is unclear as to whether Wilson was a tenant in Apartment 1139 for more than
one year past June or July 2015. (Tr. 1935:8-1936:2, 2181:11-14.) Thus, the Court also declines to
impose a penalty as to Wilson.
 203. In December 2015, the entire building at GUERRERO STREET lost electrical service

for between seven and eight hours after one of Defendants' workers "destroyed" the fuse box to

harass tenants by disrupting their electrical service. Immediately after the power went out, several

tenants saw Defendants' worker getting into his truck and speeding away from the scene.

Defendants did not compensate the tenants for the reduction in services. (Tr. 1958:18-1962:14,

1963:1-16, 2263:6-2264:27, 2318:24-2319:25.) Defendants' disruption in electrical service violated

Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for

exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation of the UCL for each of the eleven tenants. 35

Because Izaguirre, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court

imposes one additional violation UCL violation for each of these four tenants. The total number of

UCL violations is fifteen (15).

204. About a week later, tenants at GUERRERO STREET lost power again, for about ten

hours, after someone removed and destroyed another fuse. (Tr. 2264:28-2265:13.) Defendants'

disruption in electrical service violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also

retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d)

and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of

the eleven tenants. Because Izaguirre, Smith, Johnson, and Hembury are each elderly and/or

disabled victims, the Court imposes an additional violation of the UCL for each of these four tenants

for both the harassment and the retaliation. The total number of UCL violations is fifteen (15).

205. In April 2016, Defendants cut a vent through the entire building at GUERRERO

STREET running from the floor of Apartment 1135A to the ceiling of Apartment 1139A.

Defendants left the vent hole open for three months. The three affected tenants (Izaguirre, Johnson,

and Hembury) were unable to use their heat during this time. (Tr. 2297:6-2298:8, 2299:1-6; Ex.

408.) Defendants' failure to provide heat to Apartments l 135A and 1139A violated Admin. Code

sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected

35
This includes the three new tenants who moved into Apartment 1135 in November 2015.
(Tr. 2062:19-2063:3, 2066:2, 2067:1-5; 2079:23-25.)
 rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the

Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the three affected tenants. Because Izaguirre, Johnson,

and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes an additional violation of

the UCL for each of these three tenants. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).

206. A few months before December 2016, GUERRERO STREET lost electrical power

again, for less than an hour. Tenants unsuccessfully attempted to get in touch with KIHAGI about

the outage. (Tr. 1962:15-28.) Defendants' disruption in electrical service violated Admin. Code

sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected

rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the

Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the eight tenants. 36 Because Izaguirre, Smith, Johnson,

and Hembury are each elderly and/or disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL

violation of the UCL for each of these four tenants. The total number of UCL violations is twelve

(12).
b. Harassment Against Elizebeth Chavez, Leah Abiol, and Maddie
Hall (Apartment 1135)

207. Elizebeth Chavez ("Chavez") rented Apartment 1135 at GUERRERO STREET, with

her roommates, Leah Abiol ("Abiol") and Madeline Hall ("Hall"), from May 2013 until June 1, 2015

when they surrendered possession of their apartment due to Defendants' incessant harassment. They
paid $3, 150 per month in rent. (Tr. 1730:3-4, 1730:25-1731 :9; Ex. 380.)
208. Chavez was disabled from a back injury from the time Defendants purchased

GUERRERO STREET until she vacated Apartment 1135, and had a disability within the definition

of Bus. & Prof. Code section 172016.1. (Tr. 1843:17-1844:16)

209. When Chavez first met KIHAGI, she misrepresented herself as only the building

manager, falsely indicating that she had no ownership interest in GUERRERO STREET, and merely

worked for RENKA. (Tr. 1902:23-27.) KIHAGI's false representation violated Admin. Code

36
Mahoney-Fernandes, Castellow and Laverone vacated Apartment 1137 on October 1, 2016.
(Tr. 2087:2-10.) As the record is unclear whether Mahoney-Fernandes, Castellow and Laverone had
already vacated when the electricity went out, the Court declines to impose penalties as to these
tenants.
 section 37.10B(a)(5), for which the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Chavez is

a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of UCL

violations is four (4).

210. On one occasion KIHAGI entered Apartment 1135 without notice or permission, while

Chavez was home recovering from back surgery. (1773:16-1774:14, 1843:17-1844:16.) KIHAGI's

illegal entry violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code section

1954(d)(l), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. Because Chavez is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation of the UCL. The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

211. On multiple occasions Defendants gave Chavez a 24-hour notice of intent to enter, but

did not show up. At one point, Defendants gave notice of intent to enter for up to seven days

straight, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. each day, but did not show up for several days, or showed up

after the noticed period. These notices forced Chavez to change her plans, including cancelling

medical appointments, so she could wait at home for Defendants. (Tr. 1774:21-1776:4.)

Defendants' overly broad and improper notices violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10)

and (13), and Civil Code section 1954(c). Defendants' conduct was also retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one violation of the UCL per tenant. 37 Because

Chavez is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of
UCL violations is four (4).

212. On other occasions, Defendants attempted to enter Chavez's apartment with less than

the requisite 24-hours' notice. Defendants' improper notices violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l). Defendants' conduct was

also retaliatory again~t the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one violation of the UCL

37
The Court aggregates Defendants' repeated notices and failure to appear, and considers this
conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.

"1
 per tenant. 38 Because Chavez is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation.

The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

213. Defendants failed to diligently complete construction work in Apartment 1135 in

March and April 2015, leaving a gaping hole in the exterior wall of the apartment for more than a

week. (Tr. 1779:9-1780:17; Ex. 393.) Defendants' lack of diligence in completing repairs and

exposing the tenants to the elements violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(2) and (10), and was

retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d)

and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant.

Because Chavez is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional violation of the UCL. The

total number of UCL violations is four (4).

214. Chavez, Abiol and Hall finally were forced to leave because of the above-described

constant interruptions in utilities and basic services, reductions of services and Defendants' repeated

refusal to respond. Defendants' recovery of possession Apartment 1135 was an unlawful and unfair

constructive eviction, for which the Court will impose penalties under the UCL, on a per tenant, per

month basis, for every month Chavez, Abiol, and Hall have been out of possession of their

apartment. As of January 2017, each of the three tenants has been out of possession for nineteen

(19) months, constituting fifty-seven (57) UCL violations. Because Chavez is a disabled victim, she

is entitled to an additional penalty for each of the nineteen months. The total number of violations is

seventy-six (76).
c. Harassment Against Gail Izaguirre (Apartment 1135A)

215. Gail Izaguirre ("Izaguirre") has rented Apartment 1135A at GUERRERO STREET

since 2008. 39 She pays $2119.97 in rent. Izaguirre has had a disability, within the definition of Bus.

& Prof. Code section 17206.1, at all times that Defendants owned GUERRERO STREET. (Tr.

2407:9-19, 2462:8-15.)

38
Because the record is unclear as to how many notices were given with less than 24 hours
notice, the Court aggregates Defendants' repeated improper notices, and considers this conduct a
single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
39
As noted, Izaguirre had a roommate when she signed her lease in 2008 up until the end of
October 2014. (Tr. 2405: 1-20.)

fi.')
 216. Starting in August 2015, "dark" and "yellow" water began seeping through the walls of

Izaguirre's apartment. Izaguirre immediately reported the leaks to Defendants' workers, who were

remodeling Apartment 1137A upstairs. She reported the problem directly to Defendants by phone

and in writing, but Defendants did not respond. She ultimately notified DBI of the problem during

an inspection. Izaguirre testified that the water intrusion became a recurring problem throughout the

apartment, and is still ongoing. The water leaking into her apartment appeared to be wastewater.

(Tr. 2426:3-2430: 14, 2431 :25-2432:24, 2442:23-27, 2429:28-2450: 12, 2481 :22-26; Ex. 411, 414.)

Defendants' breach of the warranty of habitability and failure to make repairs violated Admin. Code

sections 37.10B(2) and (10). Due to the egregious and ongoing nature of the violation, the Court

imposes one UCL violation for each of the seventeen months that Defendants failed to fix the water

leak as of January 2017. Because Izaguirre is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation for each month Defendants failed to fix the water leak as of January 2017. The total

number of UCL violations is thirty-four (34).

217. For four months, from November 2015 through the end of February 2016, Izaguirre had

no heat in Apartment l 135A. Workers told Izaguirre that they had to cap her heat vent to install an

electric heater in Apartment 113 7A, which Defendants were remodeling to rent to tenants paying

market rent. The weather was "cold" and Izaguirre was unable to use portions of her apartment that

she could not heat using her personal space heater. Izaguirre reported the lack of heat to Defendants'

workers in December, and subsequently received a text from KIHAGI claiming that fixing

Izaguirre's heat would be "complicated." However, after Izaguirre reported the lack of heat to DBI

in February 2016, Defendants were able to restore heat within two weeks. (Tr. 2436:14-2441:6,

2514:2-2516:14.) Defendants' breach of the warranty of habitability and failure to make repairs

violates Admin. Code sections 37.10B(2) and (10). Due to the egregious and ongoing nature of the

violation, the Court imposes one UCL violation for each of the four months that Izaguirre was

without heat. Because Izaguirre is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL

violation for each of the four months. The total number of UCL violations is eight (8).

218. In February 2016, DBI scheduled an inspection oflzaguirre's apartment. On the day of

the inspection, in retaliation for reporting the lack of heat to DBI, KIHAGI called Izaguirre and said,
"I was at DBI and one of the inspectors told me they were coming by. Did you get my Ellis notice?

And Happy New Year." Not surprisingly, Izaguirre found the phone call threatening. (Tr. 2443:10-

2445:9.) KIHAGl's harassment violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5), and was also retaliatory

against Izaguirre for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one violation of the UCL. Because Izaguirre

is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional violation of the UCL. The total number of

UCL violations is two (2).

219. Defendants performed substandard repair work in Apartment 1135A. Izaguirre testified

that "nothing was done to keep the work area clean ... holes were left in the wall between the inside

of the apartment and the back stairwell. Just debris everywhere. Particulate in the air that made it

really uncomfortable. I was coughing and had scratches everywhere, itching." Workers would not

clean up after making repairs in lzaguirre's apartment, forcing her to clean up after them when she

returned from work. Defendants made a hole through Izaguirre's exterior wall that they left for

"days" without any plastic or other weatherproofing. (Tr. 2432:25-2434:28, 2435:5-20.)

Defendants' substandard repairs violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(2) and (10), and was also

retaliatory against Izaguirre for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d)
and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation. Because

Izaguirre is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of

UCL violations is two (2).

220. Between January and March 2016, in retaliation for making complaints regarding

habitability, Defendants served Izaguirre with at least five separate eviction notices pursuant to the

Ellis Act. (Tr. 2451:3-23; Ex. 412.) The Court recognizes that the contents of the notices, and any

subsequent lawsuit, may be protected by the litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find

any violation on this basis. However, Defendants' ulterior motive in serving her with an Ellis Act

Notice was not to permanently remove all units from the rental market, but rather to get rid of long-

time tenants paying below market rents. This was demonstrated by independent clear and convincing

evidence. In this regard, another tenant, Amanda Mahoney-Fernandes(" Mahoney-Fernandes"),

who was paying full market rent, credibly testified that she vividly recalled KIHAGI telling her "I'm
just not going to be their landlord anymore," referring to the long-time tenants who were paying less

than market rent. KIHAGI sent Mahoney-Fernandes an email on March 4, 2016 referring to the

"difficult experience with some of the tenants," which was why "we need to Ellis the property."

Significantly, the email also stated that "after the year [is up] only friends and family can reside in

the units." (Ex. 402.) KIHAGI told Mahoney-Fernandes that she hoped she would stay and that she

considered her "a friend." Such credible evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that in fact Kihagi

intended to continue renting units in the property long after the expiration of the notices and that the

grounds stated were a sham. As Izaguirre remains in possession of Apartment l 135A, the Court

declines to award penalties for any wrongful eviction under the Ellis Act. However, the Court issues

the accompanying Permanent Injunction After Trial, which, inter alia, prohibits the Defendants from

wrongfully evicting her.

221. After serving the Ellis Act eviction notice, KIHAGI repeatedly confronted Izaguirre in

the doorway of her apartment to demand private information regarding Izaguirre's disability. (Tr.

2516:18-2517:16.) KIHAGl's invasion oflzaguirre's right to privacy violated Admin. Code

sections 37.lOB(a)(lO), (13) and (14), and was also retaliatory against Izaguirre for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.
Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation. Because Izaguirre is a disabled victim, the

Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is two (2).
d. Harassment Against Amanda Mahoney-Fernandes, Kelsey
Castellow, and Jennifer Laverone (Apartment 1137)

222. Mahoney-Fernandes, Kelsey Castellow ("Castellow"), and Jennifer Laverone

("Laverone") lived at Apartment 1137 at GUERRERO STREET from October 1, 2015 to October 1,

2016. They paid $5,600 per month in rent. (Tr. 2061:18-2062:2, 2062:19-20, 2064:5-16, 2065:26-

2066:1.)

223. In January 2016, KIHAGI showed up at Apartment 1137 at GUERRERO STREET.

After making small talk in the doorway, Mahoney-Fernandes eventually invited her in. KIHAGI

began complaining about Sylvia Smith and Efren Delgado in Apartment 1139, saying that they

"were acting ridiculous," and "harassing her." She then stated: "I'm just not going to be their
landlord anymore." She told Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow that there would be protests at the

building, and other "repercussions" due to her legal battles with Smith and Delgado. (Tr. 2071: 10-

2074:8, 2076:2-3, 2100:17-2101:4.) KIHAGI then offered to lower the rent for Apartment 1137 by

$200 per month. KIHAGI represented, and Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow understood, that the

offered rent reduction would be compensation for dealing with the upcoming protests and

"repercussions." KIHAGI pulled a prepared amended lease out of her bag and falsely represented

that it was "an exact copy" of their prior lease, and that the "only change" was the rent reduction. At

the top of the new lease KIHAGI wrote "all terms ofrent agreement remain same +in effect",

further misrepresenting the terms of the new lease. KIHAGI requested Mahoney-Fernandes and

Castellow sign the new lease immediately. KIHAGI refused to give them a copy of the lease

addendum when they signed it, and continued to refuse for several weeks afterward, despite their

repeated requests. (Tr. 2071:10-2078:12, 2100:17-2101:4; Exs. 399, 400.)

224. Approximately three weeks later, on or around January 29, 2016, Defendants served

Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow with a Notice of Termination of Tenancy pursuant to the Ellis

Act. At that time, KIHAGI still refused to give them a copy of their lease addendum. (Ex. 400;

2079:6-8.) Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow learned that the three new tenants in Apartment 1135
had also received the Ellis Act Notice, and that KIHAGI had also induced the tenants in Apartment

1135 to sign a lease addendum, purportedly giving them a rent reduction. (Tr. 2079:9-22, 2080:27-
2081 :7.)

225. When Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow finally received the lease addendum three

weeks later, they discovered that KIHAGI had changed the term of their l~ase from a year lease to

"month-to-month"-a change she actively hid from the tenants to avoid paying them statutorily

required relocation payments. They further discovered that KIHAGI had similarly misled the three

tenants in Apartment 1135 and had made the same changes to their lease addendum. (Tr. 2080:27-

2083:28.) Defendants' misrepresentations violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5) for the
tenants in Apartments 1135 and 1137. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant, for a total of three (3) UCL violations. 40

226. Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow felt forced to vacate Apartment 1137 on October 1,

2016, after their experience with Defendants and the Ellis Act Eviction Notice. They were very

concerned and uncomfortable with the apparent fraud in this regard. (Tr. 2087:2-10.)

227. Defendants refused to attend a walk-through inspection with Mahoney-Fernandes and

Castellow when they vacated Apartment 1137, violating Civil Code 1950.5(f)(l). (Tr. 2087:11-17.)

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant named on the lease, for a total of two

(2) UCL violations.

228. Defendants failed to timely return Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow's security

deposit, violating Civil Code 1950.5(g)(l). (Tr. 2087:18-21.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant named on the lease, for a total of two (2) UCL violations.

229. After being evicted from GUERRERO STREET, Castellow was unable to find

additional housing in San Francisco, forcing her to quit her job and relocate to Austin, Texas. (Tr.

2012:5-14.)

230. As described above, Defendants induced Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow to sign a

new lease to fraudulently effect a pretextual Ellis eviction, changing the terms to force them to

surrender possession of Apartment 1137 in October 2016. Accordingly, the Court will impose
penalties under the UCL, on a per tenant, per month basis, for every month they have been out of

possession of their apartment. As of January 2017, Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow have been

out of possession for three months. The total number of UCL violations is six (6).

40
2. As only Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow were named on the lease for Apartment
1137, and as the record is not clear whose names were on the lease for Apartment 1135, to be
conservative, the Court imposes one penalty as to the tenants in Apartment 1135, and one penalty
each for Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow. (Tr. 2061:18-2062:2, 2062:19-20, 2064:5-16, 2065:26-
2066:1.)
 e. Harassment Against Sylvia Smith, Efren Delgado, and Colin Wilson
(Apartment 1139)

231. Sylvia Smith (''S. Smith"), a 72-years old disabled former postal worker, has lived in

Apartment 1139 at GUERRERO STREET for 43 years and has never had a written lease agreement.

She pays $1007.54 per month in rent. (Tr. 1937:21-25, 2104:19-2105:8, 2105:26-27, 2107:9-12,

2108:27-28.) Her grandson, Efren Delgado ("Delgado") is a full-time student and has been a co-

tenant in Apartment 1139 since he was a minor. Delgado does not pay rent to S. Smith. (Tr. 1931: 1-

7, 1933:17-25, 1934:4-8, 1935:2-7, 2107:13-19, 2179:21-23; Ex. 396.) S. Smith notified Defendants

in July 2014 that her godson, art student Colin Wilson ("Wilson"), was living in Apartment 1139.

Wilson lived in Apartment 1139 for a year ortwo.41 (Tr. 1935:8-1936:2, 2181:11-14.)

232. S. Smith is a senior, and at all times that Defendants owned GUERRERO STREET, she

suffered from a disability within the definition of Bus. & Prof. Code section 17206.1. (Tr. 1957:2-

1958:2, 2104:21-22, 2110:25-2111:20; Ex. 398.)

233. When Delgado and S. Smith first met KIHAGI, on April 8, 2014, she misrepresented

herself as a representative of Paragon Real Estate, rather than the owner of GUERRERO STREET.

(Tr. 1934:16-21, 1936:5-11, 1941:7-12, 2112:9-12; Ex. 398.) Defendants' false representation

violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per
tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The

total number of UCL violations is three (3).

234. On April 8, 2014, KIHAGI, on behalf of RENK.A, offered S. Smith and Delgado a buy-

out of their tenancy. KIHAGI told S. Smith that "an association bought this building, and they want

you to leave immediately. You leave here this weekend." When they refused, KIHAGI became

"belligerent" and put her head within inches of S. Smith's face, threatening: "I already bought the

house. As soon as I sign the papers, you guys have to leave ... I bought the building now. It's

mine." KIHAGI then told S. Smith: "Start packing lady." S. Smith and Delgado's exercise of their

lawful right to reject the buy-out offer provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by

Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. S. Smith

41
As the record is not clear when Wilson moved out of Apartment 1139, to be conservative,
the Court imposes penalties as to Wilson only between July 2014 and July 2015.
and Delgado felt threatened and fearful of eviction after this interaction with KIHAGI. (Tr. 1936:5-

1939:23, 1941:7-12, 2015:7-17, 2113:2-28; Ex. 398.) Defendants' buyout offer coupled with a

threat of eviction violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5) and (6). Accordingly, the Court

imposes one UCL violation of the UCL per tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court

imposes one additional violation of the UCL. The total number of UCL violations is three (3).

235. After they rejected KIHAGI's buyout offer, S. Smith and Delgado sought legal advice

from Causa Justa ("Justa"), who helped them prepare a letter to Paragon Real Estate (where

KIHAGHI falsely claimed to work), dated May 6, 2014. The letter informed Defendants of the

terms of S. Smith's tenancy, notified Defendants of needed maintenance work in Apartment 1139,

noted KIHAGl's buyout attempt, and warned Defendants not to retaliate against S. Smith for

exercising her legal rights. (Tr. 1940:1-1941:25; Exs. 167.) S. Smith and Delgado's exercise of

their lawful rights provide the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

236. After S. Smith and Delgado declined the buyout offer and sent the May 6, 2014 letter,

KIHAGI, "stepped on the gas" by "stepp[ing] up the attacks, [and] the postings of the notices ....

The belligerence, the attitude and the way she tried to communicate was very aggressive." When
S. Smith notified KIHAGI that a portion of her floor needed to be repaired, KIHAGI laughed and

said: "For the peanuts you pay me, you are not getting any floor ... Fuck off." ( Tr.1943 :10-12) .On

another occasion, KIHAGI called S. Smith a "hija de puta" meaning "son of a bitch. In this case it

would be daughter." (Tr.1944:10-11.) On another occasion, KIHAGI told Delgado and his mother

that she was smiling because "I am going to be happy when your grandmother is dead." Specifically,

Delgado testified "my mom asked (KIHAGI), "Why are you so happy?" She is smiling cheek to

cheek. And she says, "I am going to be happy when your grandmother is dead." ( Tr.1947:12-15.)

KIHAGI engaged in these and other personal attacks against S. Smith in a direct and calculated

attack on her health to force her to vacate her apartment, knowing that Smith suffered from anxiety

and panic attacks. (Tr. 1942:18-1947:19, 2115:25-2116:7.) KIHAGI's harassment and intimidation

violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for

exercising protected rights, in violation of Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section
1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation of the UCL per tenant. Because S.

Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional violation of the UCL. The total number

of UCL violations is three (3).

237. On July 18, 2014, S. Smith informed Defendants that her grandson, Delgado, and

godson, Wilson, were staying with her "as family members" but were not paying rent. S. Smith also

informed Defendants of her "delicate health situation and need to minimize stressful situations

according to [her] doctor." (Ex. 167.) Their exercise of their lawful rights provides the basis for

subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5.

238. On September 9, 2014, Defendants posted a letter falsely accusing S. Smith and

Delgado of illegally subletting the apartment, and indicated that they would be "investigated." S.

Smith and Delgado responded to the letter, and confirmed that they were not subletting the

apartment to anyone. (Tr. 1983:12-1984:12, 1985:5-13; Ex. 165.) Further, their former landlord,

Julio Valdivieso, who was called by the Defense at trial, testified that he permitted up to four tenants

to occupy the apartment. Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code section

37.IOB(a)(5), and was also retaliatory against the tenants, for exercising protected rights, violating
Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation of the UCL. The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

239. On October 24, 2014, in further retaliation, Defendants posted a letter on the door of

Apartment 1139 falsely titled "3rd Warning Letter"-when Defendants had never sent a "1st" or

"2nd" warning letter-again falsely accusing S. Smith and Delgado of illegal subletting in violation

of the "House Rules," claiming S. Smith's use of medical marijuana in her apartment was improper,

and demanding "proof' that Delgado was Smith's grandson, among other accusations. (1984:15-

1985:16, 1987:19-1988:28; Ex. 166.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code section

37 .1 OB(a)(5), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

70
 UCL violation per tenant. Because Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

240. On one occasion, KIHAGI approached Delgado, his mother, and two neighbors, who

were unloading items from a car parked in front of GUERRERO STREET, and began intimidating

them by holding her camera within two-three inches of their faces, taking pictures of them, and

demanding to know the identity of Delgado's mother and the neighbors-who were not tenants at

GUERRERO STREET. (Tr. 1946:8-1947:19.) KIHAGl's intimidation tactics and invasion of

privacy violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO), (13) and (14), and were also retaliatory

against Delgado for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

241. On another occasion, KIHAGI approached Delgado and his 12-year old sister, who

were sitting on the front steps of GUERRERO STREET, and told them they could not sit on the

front steps of the building, stating, "I don't like kids in front of my building." (Tr. 1947:20-

1948:12.) Denying Delgado access to the common area of the front steps violated Admin. Code

sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10), and was also retaliatory against Delgado for exercising protected

rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the
Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

242. On several occasions, S. Smith and Delgado reported needed maintenance to KIHAGI,

who not only refused to make basic repairs for months, forcing S. Smith and Delgado to report the

code violations to DBI, but also cursed and threatened S. Smith for reporting the needed

mainte~ce. KIHAGI also instructed her workers not to make basic repairs. (Tr. 1948:23-1949:18;

2116:25-2117:20.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(2), (5) and (10),

and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation per tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL

violation of the UCL. The total number of UCL violations is four (4). 42

42
The Court aggregates Defendants' threats and refusals to make repairs, and considers this
conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.

71
 243. On December 17, 2014, Defendants backdated a notice of intent to enter Apartment

1137 to the previous day, December 16, 2014. (Ex 397; Tr. 2133:24-2134:13.) Defendants' conduct

violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and was also retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, in violation of Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because S.

Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of

UCL violations is four (4).

244. On January 30, 2015, S. Smith and Delgado called KIHAGI asking her to reschedule

her workers because S. Smith was ill with shingles. S. Smith posted a note on the door indicating

that she was ill and KIHAGI did not have permission to enter. Yet KIHAGI arrived at Apartment

1139, put her key in the door and attempted to enter the apartment without knocking or permission.

Although KIHAGI was unable to enter their apartment because Smith had dead bolted an additional

lock, she made continued attempts to enter the apartment for several minutes. When S. Smith said,

"I'm sick. I'm sick," KIHAGI responded by saying, "This is my house" and continued to try to

unlock S. Smith's door to let herself into the apartment. (Tr. 1966:2-1968:10, 2136:10-24, 2138:12-

27.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and
was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The

total number of UCL violations is four (4).

245. On another occasion, KIHAGI let herself into Apartment 1139, without notice or

permission, while S. Smith, Delgado, and Wilson were each in their respective bedrooms. She

walked down the hall, entered Wilson's bedroom, and proceeded to interview him, asking for his

phone number, his employer, where he goes to school, and whether he paid rent to S. Smith. S.

Smith and Delgado did not even realize KIHAGI had been in the apartment until S. Smith heard

KIHAGI's voice, and Wilson left his bedroom and asked them who she was. (Tr. 1969:11-22,

2196:19-2197:13.) Defendants' unlawful entry violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10),

and (13), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating
 Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

246. On multiple occasions Defendants gave Delgado and S. Smith 24-hour notice of intent

to enter, but did not show up. Defendants also gave notice of intent to enter for multiple days, from

9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. each day, and did not show up for several days, or showed up after the noticed

time frame. Overall, Defendants gave notices of intent to enter Apartment 1139 from 9:00 a.m. to

4:00 p.m. for 15 of the 30 days of April 2015, but never showed up. These notices forced Smith and

Delgado to change their plans, including cancelling medical appointments, so they could wait at

home for Defendants. (Tr. 2132:24-2141 :8; Ex. 397.) Defendants' overly broad notices and failure

to appear violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections

1954(c) and/or (d)(l). Defendants' conduct was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one violation of the UCL per tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled

victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is four
(4).43

247. On other occasions, Defendants attempted to enter Apartment 1139 with less than the

requisite 24-hours' notice. Defendants' improper notices violated Admin. Code sections

37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and/or (d)(l). Defendants' conduct

was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one violation of the UCL

per tenant. Because S. Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation.

The total number of UCL violations is four (4). 44

43 The Court aggregates Defendants' multiple notices and failure ,to appear, and considers this
conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
44
As the record is not clear as to how many notices were given with less than 24 hours notice,
the Court aggregates Defendants' multiple improper notices, and considers this conduct a single "act"
for the purposes of awarding penalties.
 248. Delgado and S. Smith participated in rallies and picketing events protesting

Defendants' property management practices "a couple" of times. Various news articles about tenant

harassment featured S. Smith. S. Smith and Delgado also posted a flyer about KIHAGI in the

window of their apartment. (Tr. 2041:15-19, 2042:1-8, 2205:13-2206:22.) Their exercise of their

lawful free speech rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants,

pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

249. After S. Smith appeared on the news in March 2015 to discuss the City's March 4,

2015 task force inspection of GUERRERO STREET, Defendants posted a letter on S. Smith and

Delgado's door in retaliation, accusing Smith--a 72-year old retiree with the US Postal Service for

20 years and a longtime volunteer at St James School,-ofworking for "900 SEX TALK" for extra

money, and selling drugs. (Ex. 396; Tr. 2054:10-2055:21, 2128:3-14.) There was not a scintilla of

evidence presented by Defendants to support these serious accusations. Defendants' conduct violated

Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5) and was retaliatory against Smith for exercising protected rights,

violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court

imposes one UCL violation. Because Smith is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional

UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is two (2) ..

250. At one point, KIHAGI harangued Wilson for personal information while he was

waiting for a ride, including asking for his phone number and asking about his living situation. She
even followed him to school one day. KIHAGI's harassment was so invasive it forced Wilson to

move out of GUERRERO STREET because he was concerned he would flunk his finals. Wilson

put his belongings in storage and slept in Dolores Park rather than continue to live with KIHAGI's

harassment. (Tr. 2199:5-11, 2202:3-10.) Defendants' invasion of Wilson's privacy violated Admin.

Code sections 37.IOB(a)(IO), (13) and (14). Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

251. Living at GUERRERO STREET under Defendants' ownership and management has

turned Delgado and Smith's lives "upside down," and created a "hostile" and "very stressful"

environment. Smith is afraid to leave her apartment in fear that KIHAGI will break in while she is

gone, and the situation has been detrimental to her health. (Tr. 1981 :13-1982:10.)

7A.
 252. When S. Smith and Delgado stayed in their apartment-despite the harassment-

Defendants served them with a 3-day notice to quit. (Ex. 169; Tr. 2144:17-2145:11.)

253. S. Smith and Delgado reached a settlement with Defendants that allowed them to stay

in the apartment, in exchange for waiving all claims against Defendants. They executed the

agreement on a Friday. The following day, Defendants served them with a fraudulent notice of

eviction pursuant to the Ellis Act. (Tr. 1997:2-1998:14, 2146:18-26, 2213:12-26; Ex. 852.) The

Court recognizes that the contents of the notice, and any subsequent lawsuit, may be protected by the

litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation on this basis. However,

Defendants' ulterior motive in serving them with an Ellis Act Notice was not to permanently remove

all units from the rental market, but rather to get rid of long-time tenants paying below market rents.

The Court will not repeat the wealth of independent evidence in this regard. Defendants' conduct

was also done in retaliation for Smith and Delgado for speaking to the media and reporting

violations to DBI, violating Civil Code sections 1942.5(a) and (c). As S. Smith and Delgado remain

in possession of Apartment 1139, the Court declines to award penalties for any wrongful eviction

under the Ellis Act. However, the Court issues the accompanying Permanent Injunction After Trial,

which, inter alia, prohibits the Defendants from wrongfully evicting them.
f. Harassment Against Leonard Johnson and Sheila Bembury
(Apartment 1139A)

254. Leonard Johnson ("Johnson") and Sheila Hembury ("Hembury"), a married couple,

have lived in Apartment 1139A at GUERRERO STREET for 23 years. They pay $1,128.37 in rent.

Johnson is a 73-years old retired ironworker and Army Corporal. Hembury is a 68-year old program

director for Bayview Senior Services. Both Johnson and Hembury are elderly and/or disabled within

the definition of Bus. & Prof. Code section 17206.1. (Tr. 2229:27-2230:15, 2232:7-8, 2233:5-

2234: 10, 2305:5-8, 2331: 17-2332:22.)

255. Hembury organized with the other tenants at GUERRERO STREET and the tenants in:

Defendants' other San Francisco properties to communicate about the Defendants. (Tr. 2399:23-

2400:1.) Hembury's exercise of her lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of
retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5.

256. On July 15, 2014, Defendants sent a letter to all tenants at GUERRERO STREET,

telling them they could no longer use the rear porches or basement area for storage. Johnson and

Bembury, however, had used both areas for storage since 1993 with the knowledge and permission

of the prior landlord. Nevertheless, Johnson and Bembury complied with Defendants' request and

removed their items from their storage areas. (Tr. 2238:14-2240:1; Ex. 150.) Defendants' reduction

in services violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10). Accordingly, the Court imposes

one UCL violation per tenant. Because Johnson and Bembury are disabled victims, the Court

imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

257. On November 9, 2014, despite Johnson and Bembury's immediate compliance in

removing items from their rear porch, Defendants sent them a second letter falsely accusing them of

continuing to store items on the porch. (Ex. 143; Tr. 2240:2-27.) Defendants' conduct violated

Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.
Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Johnson and Bembury are
disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is four (4).

258. On December 16, 2014, Johnson and Bembury sent a letter to Defendants asserting

their tenancy rights, notifying Defendants that they had unilaterally reduced housing services, and

notifying Defendants that they had abused the landlord's right of entry. Defendants did not respond

to the letter. (Tr. 2269:14-16; Ex. 145.) Their exercise of their lawful rights provides the basis for

subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5.

259. Throughout 2015 Defendants gave Johnson and Bembury multiple 24-hour notices of

intent to enter, but did not show up. Defendants gave notice for 4-5 consecutive days at a time from

9:00 a.m. to as late at 8:00 p.m. Between March 26 and April 21, 2015, Defendants gave notice of
intent to enter for 13 days from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. each day. During these noticed periods,
 Defendants' workers "rarely" showed up. These notices forced Johnson and Hembury to change

their plans so they could wait at home for Defendants, and forced Hembury to take time off work.

(Tr. 2282:8-2283:18; Ex. 148.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4),

(10) and (13), and Civil Code section 1954(c), and was retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Johnson and Hembury are

disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is four (4). 45

260. In March 2015, the intercom system for Apartment 1139A stopped working, which

Hembury reported to Defendants. To date, Defendants have refused to fix it. The lack of a

functional intercom has caused the third-floor tenants in Apartment l 139A to miss packages, and

affected their safety since they can no longer screen the identity of people ringing the doorbell for

entrance into the building. (Tr. 2373:19-2375:18.) Defendants' failure to make basic repairs

violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(2) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for

exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Johnson and Hembury are
disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is four (4). 46

261. On April 22, 2015, Johnson was home when KIHAGI used her key to open the door of
Apartment l 139A and walked into the apartment, without any notice to or advance permission from

the tenants. (Tr. 2284:6-26.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(4),

(10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l), and was also retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because Johnson

45
The Court aggregates Defendants' multiple improper notices and considers this conduct a
single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
46
The Court aggregates Defendants' repeated failure to fix the intercom and considers this
conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.

77
 and Hembury are disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total

number of UCL violations is four (4).

262. On July 28, 2015, while performing work in the downstairs apartments, Defendants'

workers cut electricity to portions of Apartments 1139andl139A. Johnson and Hembury

immediately informed Defendants' worker. By November 22, 2015, Defendants still had not

remedied the lack of electricity to Apartment l 139A. Defendants' disruption of electrical services

violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10), and was retaliatory against the tenants for

exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Due to the egregious and ongoing nature of the violation, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant for each of the four months that Defendants failed to provide electricity. 47 Because Johnson

and Hembury are disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant for

each of the four months that Defendants failed to provide electricity. The total number of UCL

violations is sixteen (16).

263. Defendants served notices of intent to enter for September 2 and 3, 2014. Hembury

called KIHAGI and said that she was unavailable on September 2, but could be available the

morning of September 3 until the noticed period expired at 11 :00 a.m. Hembury waited at home all
morning but no one came on September 3. She left for work at 11 :00 a.m., and left a note requesting

that Defendants arrange another time when she could be home. When Hembury returned home later
that day, she discovered that Defendants had entered her apartment while she was gone, including

entering the bedrooms where no work was scheduled to be performed. (Ex. 151; Tr. 2338:11-

2340:21.) Defendants' unlawful entry violated Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(4), (10) and (13).

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation of per tenant. 48 Because Johnson and Hembury

are disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each tenant. The total

number of UCL violations is four (4).

47
To be conservative, the Court imposes monthly penalties starting August 2015. Further, as
the record is not clear when after November electricity was restored, the Court imposes monthly
penalties only through November 2015. ·
48
The Court aggregates Defendants' failure to appear and improper entry, and considers this
conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
 264. On November 13, 2015, Johnson and Hembury filed a petition with the Rent Board,

seeking a rent reduction due to the substantial decrease in housing services since Defendants

purchased GUERRERO STREET. The Rent Board compensated Johnson and Hembury with a rent

reduction for the lost storage on their rear porch and lost use of the yard. (Ex. 28; Tr. 2315 :27-

2316: l 9, 2244:20-2245:1; Ex. 28.) Their exercise of their lawful rights provides the basis for

subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil

Code section 1942.5.

265. In November 2015, Defendants sent Hembury and Johnson a retaliatory and harassing

letter falsely accusing them of ''tampering" with the electricity to create "an opportunity to claim

[they] slipped on a stair," and threatening to "warn the authorities." (Ex. 404; Tr. 2286:7-2287:24.)

Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5) and was retaliatory

against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or

Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. Because

Johnson and Hembury are disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per

tenant. The total number of UCL violations is four (4).

266. In Spring 2016 Defendants walled over Johnson and Hembury's hallway window. As a

result, Johnson and Hembury have no light in that portion of their apartment. (Tr. 2298:4-21; Ex.

408.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (5) and (10), for which the

Court imposes one violation of the UCL per tenant. This conduct was retaliatory against the tenants

for exercising protected rights, in violation of Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5, for which the Court imposes one violation of the UCL per tenant. Because Johnson

and Hembury are disabled victims, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per tenant. The

total number of UCL violations is four (4).

267. Johnson testified that living under Defendants ownership and management has ''turned

our life around," and that "it's been pretty rough ... [because of] constant harassment with the power

failure, not being able to get your mail, water, and then power failure again. And just various

things ... being accused of things that we didn't do. So it's been really hard living there." (Tr.

2299:27-2300:28.)

70
 268. Eventually, Johnson and Hembury were served with a fraudulent Ellis Act Notice. (Ex.

403.) The Court recognizes that the contents of the Notice, and any subsequent lawsuit, may be

protected by the litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation on this basis.

However, Defendants' ulterior motive in serving them with an Ellis Act Notice was not to
permanently remove all units from the rental market, but rather to get rid of long-time tenants paying

below market rents. The Court will not repeat the wealth of independent evidence in this regard. As

Johnson and Hembury remain in possession of Apartment 1139A, the Court declines to award

penalties for any wrongful eviction under the Ellis Act. However, the Court issues the

accompanying Permanent Injunction After Trial, which, inter alia, prohibits the Defendants from

wrongfully evicting them.

6. HILL STREET

269. Defendant ZORIALL is liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful

evictions committed at HILL STREET during its period of ownership. Defendant C. MWANGI is

liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful evictions committed during her period

of ownership of HILL STREET, as well those she committed, or participated in, against tenants at

HILL STREET. Defendant KIHAGI is liable for all acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and
wrongful evictions committed at HILL STREET during ZORIALL and C. MWANGI's periods of

ownership, as well as those she committed, or participated in, against tenants at HILL STREET.
270. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds two hundred and eighty-one (281)

predicate violations of law at HILL STREET for which it assesses a civil penalty under the UCL.

Defendants KIHAGI and ZORIALL are jointly and severally liable for one hundred and forty-six

(146) violations. Defendants KIHAGI, ZORIALL, and C. MWANGI are jointly and severally

liable for one hundred and thirty-five (135) violations.

a. Harassment Against All IDLL STREET tenants

271. In August 2014, Defendants reduced the number of recycling bins at HILL STREET by

fifty percent, from two bins to one bin for all nine tenants. As a result, the sole remaining recycle

bin would become full and overflow, forcing tenants to save their recyclables in their apartments for

later disposal. No tenant received a rent reduction for this decrease in service. (Tr. 882:20-883: 11;
 1046:27-1047:26.) ZORIALL's unilateral reduction in services violated Admin Code sections

37.IOB(a)(l) and (10). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation of per tenant. The total

number of UCL violations is nine (9). 49

272. On at least two occasions during ZORIALL's ownership of HILL STREET, and for at

least a week at a time, Defendants failed to maintain the shared laundry services at HILL STREET,

rendering the laundry inoperable for several days on each occasion. As a result, the tenants were

unable to do their laundry, and had to take their dirty clothes to a laundromat. This interruption in

services violated Admin Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l) and (10). (Tr. 883:17-884:6; 1052:27-1053:22;

Ex. 193.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. 50 The total number of

UCL violations is nine (9).

273. In both November 2014 and February 2015, Defendants caused the power to the

common areas of HILL STREET to be disrupted for several days, leaving the tenants without

exterior security lighting, lighting or power in the garage, or laundry service. The loss of lighting

reduced the security and safety of HILL STREET, forcing tenants to navigate the dark exterior

hallways and pathways with flashlights, and arrive home at night from work to a building shrouded

in darkness. Dale Duncan sent a text message to KIHAGI informing her that the power was turned
off and provided her with the meter number to HILL STREET. KIHAGI responded with a series of

text messages, falsely claiming there was no meter at HILL STREET to open an electrical account.

ZORIALL's reduction in service violated Admin Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10). (Tr. 884:7-

17; 885:14-887:12; 1051:1-1052:4; 1286:11-17; 1522:4-18, 1525:2-12, 1530:6- 1531:28; 1634:17-

21.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant for each month that tenants were

without power. The total number of UCL violations is eighteen (18).

49
During this period of harassment, Apartment 69 was occupied by Tim Scoppetta and Bryan
Hoffman, Apartment .71 was occupied by Dale Duncan, Marta Munoz, and their minor daughter
Emilia Duncan Munoz, Apartment 73 was occupied by Nicholas Reggars and Erin Fromherz (now
Erin Reggars), Apartment 73A was occupied by Brian Smyth, and Apartment 75 was occupied by Ben
Hutchinson. (871:18-22; Ex. 211.)
50
To be conservative, the Court aggregates Defendants' failure to maintain laundry services on
multiple occasions into a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.

Rl
 274. On November 19, 2014, Defendants sent all tenants at HILL STREET a backdated

letter dated November 9, 2014 regarding the mailboxes and storage in the garage. The letter

contradicted the previously-imposed House Rules and tenants' leases regarding the storage of

bicycles, and unilaterally eliminated tenants' storage in the garage, including ability to store bicycles

and other personal items. (Exs. 175, 195, 211, 371; Tr. 887:18-25; 888:6-889:3; 1152:27-1153:3;

1486:13-26.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (5) and (10).

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations

is nine (9).

275. By December 2014, the HILL STREET tenants formed a tenants' union, and had at

least two meetings in 2014 and January 2015. (Ex. 30 p. 24, Ex. 839; Tr. 1058:11-20; 961:19-28;

1034:23-1035:1; 1224:27-1225:9; 1346:20-1347:5; 1382:18-24.) Their exercise of their lawful

rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

276. In December 2014, Defendants removed the tenants' mailboxes at HILL STREET,

leaving all tenants without access to mail for one week. In January 2015, after Defendants installed

new mailboxes, the tenants could not secure their mail from thieves for several weeks. Sometime
later in January 2015, the HILL STREET tenants were again unable to access their mail for another

week, as Defendants failed to provide the tenants with keys to their mailboxes. (Tr. 889:7-19;

893:10-19; 1241:26-1242:4; Tr. 1256:23-1257:3.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin Code

sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (3) and (10), and was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation of the UCL per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is nine (9). 51

277. On March 4, 2015, immediately after City inspectors left HILL STREET, Defendants

denied all HILL STREET tenants access to the garage, laundry, and storage area without notice, by

51
The Court declines the City's request to impose two penalties for each disruption in mail
service. Instead, the Court aggregates Defendants' acts of disrupting mail service into a single "act"
for the purposes of awarding penalties.

sn
 creating a wooden barricade that prevented access from the rear staircase, and changing the lock to

the garage door. When Dale Duncan and Marta Munoz confronted KIHAGI about why the laundry,

storage, and parking areas were being boarded-up. KIHAGI refused to answer their questions,

responding only, "The laundry is gone." Defendants did not offer a reduction in rent to the HILL

STREET tenants for these reductions in services, nor did Defendants ever respond to repeated

requests from tenants to provide an explanation for these reductions in services. (Tr. 900:22-901 :6;

901:15-902:6; 902:13-903:1; 904:26-905:5; 987:26-988:6; 1077:16-17.; 1078:6-19; 1260:15-1261:4;

1353:1-22; 1469:16-24; 1477:5-19. 1479:14-1480-15.) Exs. 195, 198, 362, 363.) Defendant

KIHAGI and Defendants' workers returned to HILL STREET on March 20, 2015. Defendants'

workers removed the laundry machines from the garage, and boarded-up the garage door,

permanently preventing the HILL STREET tenants from accessing the interior of the garage and

removing the shared laundry facilities. Defendants also forced tenants to remove all personal

belongings from the common storage area. (Ex. 217, 366; Tr. 1268:4-23; 1272:12-25; 13576:26-

1357:13.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10), and was

retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, in violation of Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. 52 The total number of UCL violations is nine (9).

278. On March 20, 2015, shortly after the City task force inspection and shortly after

KIHAGI made a phone call in the presence of Reggars , Duncan and Munoz to order surveillance

because of their complaints, KIHAGI and ZORIALL installed at least one video surveillance

camera above the garage at HILL STREET. (JA 172; Ex. 366; Tr. 1097:18-20.) The timing of the

installation and KIHAGI's comments regarding surveillance proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that the installation was retaliatory against the tenants for cooperating with the City's

inspections and for making complaints about access to the garage and to the laundry being cut off.

Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13), and Civil Code 1708.8,

52
The Court declines the City's request to impose two penalties for March 4 and March 20.
Instead, to be conservative, the Court aggregates Defendants' acts of denying tenants access to the
garage, laundry, and storage into a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
and was retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. The total number of UCL violations is nine (9).

279. On April 7, 2015, the HILL STREET Tenants' Union mailed Defendants a letter,

signed by all remaining tenants at HILL STREET, stating they were aware that Defendants had

transferred title in HILL STREET from ZORIALL to C. MWANGI. The HILL STREET Tenants'

Union informed Defendants that Nicholas Reggars and Erin Reggars were vacating 73 HILL

STREET as of April 15, 2015, due to the oral threat of a relative-move in eviction by KIHAGI at the

March 4, 2015 inspection. The HILL STREET Tenants' Union informed Defendants that any owner

move-in eviction by C. MWANGI would be a show of a lack of good faith and improper ulterior

motive, given that Apartment 73 would be vacant and available as of April 15, 2015. (Ex. 199;

1488:20-1491:19.) Their exercise of their lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of

retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5.
b. Harassment Against Tim Scoppetta and Brian Hoffman

280. Tim Scoppetta ("Scoppetta") and Brian Hoffman ("Hoffman") lived in Apartment 69
Hill Street from June 2013 until they were forced to vacate their apartment in October 2015. They

paid $3150 in rent for a two-bedroom apartment, which included storage in the garage. (Tr.

1250:22-25; 1251: 12-25.)

281. In approximately July and August 2014, shortly after Defendants took ownership of

HILL STREET, Scoppetta and Hoffi:nan attempted to contact Defendants repeatedly by telephone

regarding their broken dishwasher. Eight weeks passed with no response from Defendants, forcing

Scoppetta and Hoffman to purchase a new dishwasher. Defendants refused to reimburse Scoppetta

and Hoffman for their dishwasher. (Tr. 1254:27-1255:13; 1255:16-1256:8; 1297:14-23; 1299:23-27;

1302:14-17; Ex. 590 if 18.) Defendants' failure to repair their broken dishwasher despite repeated

requests violated Admin. Code sections 37.10(B)(2) and (10). Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. The total of UCL violations is two (2).
 282. On March 20, 2015, Scoppetta was working from home when he observed KIHAGI

and her workers tow Brian Smyth's car out of the garage, remove the laundry machines from the

garage, and board-up the garage door to prevent the HILL STREET tenants from accessing the

garage space. KIHAGI approached Scoppetta, who was sitting on the front steps to HILL STREET

taking detailed notes of the incident, and threatened Scoppetta, telling him that, "loitering in public

places was prohibited." She then forced Scoppetta to move to the public sidewalk, thereby denying

him access to the common stairway. (Ex. 217; Tr. 1265:4-12; 1266:14-1267:4; 1267:26-28.)

KIHAGI's harassing conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5) and (10). Accordingly,

the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

283. In that same interaction, KIHAGI further threatened Scoppetta by stating he "should be

more mindful of the rules, especially given that [you have] cats, and it would be a shame if they got

out." (Tr. 1267:1-25; 1329:8-10.) KIHAGI's threat violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5).

Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

284. Again on March 20, 2015, KIHAGI harassed and threatened Scoppetta by telling him

that she could enter his apartment "whenever she pleases" so long as "she deems it an emergency."

(Ex. 217; Tr. 1270:24-1271:1271:12.) KIHAGI's threat violated Admin Code sections 37.10B(a)(5)
and (10). Accordingly, Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

285. After the City's inspection, Defendants posted at least four notices of intent to enter

Scoppetta and Hoffman's apartment, and Scoppetta stayed home from work to ensure he would be

home. Defendants never came to perform repairs on any of the notices. (Tr. 1273:12-1274:23.)

Defendants' conduct violated Admin Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code

section 1954(c). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is two (2). 53

286. At least one of the notices of intent to enter was posted with less than 24 hours' notice,

violating Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and

53
The Court aggregates Defendants' multiple improper notices and failure to appear into a
single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties. Additionally, as the record is not clear what dates
the notices were posted, and C. MWANGI received 27% ownership of HILL STREET on March 19,
2015, the Court will not consider C. MWANGI liable for this act.
 (d)(l). (Tr. 1274:24-1275:4.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation per tenant.

The total number of UCL violations is two (2). 54

287. Scoppetta and Hoffman were constructively evicted from their apartment and vacated

on October 1, 2015. After they gave 30 days' notice, they attempted to contact Defendants by

telephone, letter, and certified mail to schedule a walk-through and return their apartment keys.

Defendants refused to respond to Scoppetta and Hoffman's requests, and refused to perform a walk-

through inspection, violating Civil Code section 1950.5(f)(l). (Tr. 1275:9-1276:19; 1335:22-25.)

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations

is two (2).

288. After Scoppetta and Hoffman felt forced to move out, Defendants ignored Scoppetta's

three letters seeking a return of their security deposit, and refused to return their security deposit of

$3150, violating Civil Code section 1950.5(g)(l). (Tr. 1276:21-26; 1330:24-1331:9; 1333:7-17; Ex.

590 if 21.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL

violations is two (2).

289. Defendants' recovery of possession of Scoppetta and Hoffman's apartment was an

unlawful, unfair and fraudulent constructive eviction, for which the Court will impose penalties
under the UCL, on per tenant, per month basis, for every month Scoppetta and Hoffman have been

out of possession of their apartment. As of January 2017, Scoppetta and Hoffman have been out of

possession for fifteen months. The total number of UCL violations is thirty (30).
c. Harassment Against Brian Smyth

290. Brian Smyth ("Smyth") lived at 73A Hill Street from May 2001 until Defendants

forced him to vacate in December 2015 for "temporary" capital improvements. Smyth paid $1,926

per month in rent, which included a covered parking space in the garage. (Tr. 1341:21; 1342:17-22;

Ex. 211.)

54
As the record is unclear as to how many notices were posted with less than 24 hours' notice,
the Court imposes only one violation. Additionally, as the record is not clear what date the notice was
posted, and C. MWANGI received 27% ownership of HILL STREET on March 19, 2015, the Court
will not consider C. MWANGI liable for this act.

su;;
 291. On approximately December 12, 2014, Defendants served a backdated "Notice

Terminating Parking Space" dated December 9, 2014, under Smyth's door. The Notice falsely

stated that Defendants were terminating Smyth' s parking due to seismic repair work. Defendants

never provided Smyth with any permit or other evidence indicating that seismic work was needed in

the basement, and no evidence was presented that any seismic repair work was ever done. (Ex. 29

p. 17; Tr. 1344:11-1345:21.) Defendants' fraudulent Notice and termination ofSmyth's parking

violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (5) and (10). Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1)

UCL violation.

292. Smyth continued to pay the full amount of his rent until he vacated his apartment, and

continued to park his car in the garage after receiving the Notice. (Tr. 1347:12-21.)

293. On December 15, 2014, Smyth filed a Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service with the Rent Board for the termination of his parking. On December 26, 2014, the

Rent Board sent notice to Defendants that Smyth had filed a complaint and recorded sending the

notice in its action log. (Ex. 29 pp. 1, 14-17; Tr. 1346:1-7.) Smyth's exercise of his lawful rights

provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

294. On January 19, 2015, Smyth received a "2nd Notice Terminating Parking Space" from

Defendants, again terminating his parking space in the garage. This second notice no longer claimed

that seismic repair work needed to be done in the basement. However, the second notice attached a
check for $50, and informed Smyth his rent would be reduced by $100 per month as that was the

amount his parking was valued at in his lease. Given that only a month before, Smyth received the

first notice claiming to terminate parking for seismic repairs that were never done, the Court finds

that KIHAGI failed to provide any evidence of ''just cause" for severing his parking space pursuant

to Admin. Code sections 37.2(r). 55 Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

55
· Although KIHAGI offered Smyth a rent adjustment for the reduction in services, this is
irrelevant to the Court's finding of lack of just cause to remove the parking space in the first place.
Moreover, the evidence shows that Smyth continued to pay full rent until he vacated the apartment,
which KIHAGI accepted. (Tr. 1347:12-21.)

sn
 -295. On January 25, 2015, Smyth filed a second Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service with the Rent Board for the termination of his parking. On February 26, 2015, the

Rent Board mailed Defendants a letter regarding Smyth's complaints, and recorded sending the letter

in its action log. Defendants never responded to Smyth or the Rent Board. (Ex. 29 pp. 1-2, 9-1 O;Tr.

1348:24-1349:8.) Smyth's exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of

retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5.

296. On March 4, 2015, after the City's inspection of HILL STREET, Defendants changed

the lock to the garage door and barricaded the rear entrance, leaving Smyth's car locked in the

garage. (Tr. 1090:28-1091:2.) Defendants' conduct was retaliatory against Smyth, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. (Penalties were already awarded as

to Defendants' conduct in this regard. See~ 277.)

297. On March 11, 2015, Smyth filed a third Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service with the Rent Board for the termination of his parking, this time disclosing he had

an attorney and also submitted a Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a Housing Service with

the Rent Board for the termination of his laundry. The Rent Board sent Defendants a letter on
March 26, 2015, informing Defendants ofSmyth's complaint. (Ex. 32; Tr. 1351:16-1252:25.)

Smyth' s exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by

Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

298. A few weeks after the City's March 4, 2015 inspection, Defendants posted a notice on

Smyth' s door stating their intent to enter his apartment and perform repairs, with less than 24 hours

notice. (Tr. 1359:28-1360:15.) Defendant's improper notice violated Admin Code sections

37.IOB(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l), and was retaliatory against

Smyth for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation. 56

56
As the record is not clear what date the notice was posted, and C. MWANGI received 27%
ownership of HILL STREET on March 19, 2015, the Court will not consider C. MWANGI liable for
this act.
 299. On March 20, 2015, KIHAGI made a harassing call to Smyth while he was at work.

KIHAGI informed Smyth that his car was going to be towed, falsely accused Smyth of breaking the

lock to the garage door, and threatened Smyth by telling him Defendants would be installing

surveillance cameras at HILL STREET. (Tr. 1353:27-1355:12; Ex. 577 if 15.) Defendants' threats

and false accusations violated Admin Code sections 37.IOB(a)(S), (10) and (13), and were also

retaliatory against Smyth for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37 .9(d)

and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

300. KIHAGI called Smyth a second time while he was at work, again on March 20, 2015,

informing Smyth that his car had been towed out of the garage and that he needed to move his car

off the street near the HILL STREET property. (Tr. 1356:12-17; Ex. 577 if 15.) KIHAGI's towing

of his car and attempt to deny Smyth access to a public street was retaliatory against Smyth for

exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

301. On October 9, 2015, ZORIALL served Smyth with a "60-Day Notice to Temporarily

Vacate the Premises," allegedly so Defendants could conduct repairs. (JA 176; Ex. 37.) The Notice

required that Smyth vacate by December 15, 2015, and estimated that Defendants would complete

their capital improvement work in March 2016. (Tr. 1367:2-7, 1367:19-21.)

302. On or about October 20, 2015 and continuing until Smyth vacated his apartment on

December 14, 2015 after receiving the 60-day notice, Defendants engaged in construction in

Apartment 73 next door, and failed to properly contain the debris on the back deck that Smyth

shared with Apartment 73. As a result, Defendants denied Smyth access to the entire deck. (Tr.

1367:22-1371 :4.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (3) and (10),

and was retaliatory against Smyth for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

303. In December 2015, Smyth lost electrical power to two rooms in his apartment due to

Defendants' construction work. Defendants' failure to provide electricity violated Admin Code

sections 37.lOB(a)(l), (3) and (10), and was also retaliatory against Smyth for exercising protected
rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the

Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

304. After Smyth vacated his apartment pursuant to the notice of"temporary" eviction for

capital improvements, Defendants failed to pay him the second relocation payment of $2,775.50 as

required by Admin Code section 37 .9C(e), and had not paid Smyth this amount owed as of the date

of his testimony at trial. This conduct was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, in violation of Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. (Tr.

1367:8-18; Ex. 37.) Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

305. Defendants did not allow Smyth to reoccupy his home in March 2016, and he remained

displaced as of the dates of his testimony at trial. (Tr. 1367:2-7, 1367:19-21.)

306. The Court recognizes that the contents of the 60-day Notice, and any subsequent

lawsuit, may be protected by the litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation

on this basis. However, the inexcusable failure of Defendants to timely return Smyth to his

apartment is an unlawful act, independent of the notice of eviction. (Rental Housing, at 171

Cal.App.4th, 767; Chacon, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1256-57.) As previously discussed, Admin. Code

section 37.9(a)(l l) only allows a landlord to displace a tenant for capital improvements temporarily,

for up to three months, absent an extension approved by the Rent Board. Defendants neither sought

nor obtained any extension of time from the Rent Board to keep Smyth out of his apartment past

March. The Notice described work that was similar to the work described in temporary notices

given to Leshefsky and Ben Hutchinson (Ex. 577.) Defendants failed to offer one scintilla of

evidence as to whether the work was ever started, why it could not be completed within the three-

month period under Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(l l) and that it was ever completed. The

''temporary eviction" was performed in bad faith, in an attempt to permanently displace Smyth from

his home, violating Admin. Code section 37.10(B)(a)(5). Defendants' ''temporary eviction" was

also retaliatory against Smyth for exercising his protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant's

''temporary" eviction for capital improvements was an unlawful, unfair and fraudulent eviction, for

which the Court will impose penalties under the UCL, on a per month basis, for every month Smyth

QO
has been out of possession of his apartment. As of January 2017, Smyth has been out of possession

for thirteen months, for a total of thirteen (13) UCL violations.

d. Harassment Against Ben Hutchinson

307. Ben Hutchinson lived at 75 Hill Street from December 1, 2011 to November 2015,

paying $2, 100 per month in rent, when Defendants forced him to vacate for a ''temporary" capital

improvement eviction. (Tr. 860:22-25; 938:28-939:18; 949:21; Ex. 38.)

308. On March 22, 2015, Hutchinson filed a "Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service" with the Rent Board regarding the termination of the laundry services at HILL

STREET, and disclosed in the application that he had hired an attorney. On March 27, 2015, the

Rent Board sent a "Memorandum" notice of receipt to Hutchinson, his lawyer, and KIHAGI, and

recorded the mailing of the notice in its action log. Also on or around March 22, 2015, Hutchinson

sent a letter to Defendants after the telephone call on March 18, 2015, demanding information about

the terminated laundry services. Defendants never responded. (Ex. 34; 907: 17-909: 10.)

Hutchinson's exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by

Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

309. On March 25, 2015, at approximately 9:00 p.m. Defendants placed a "24 Hour Notice
oflntent to Enter Premises" on Hutchinson's door. Defendants backdated the Notice to March 24,

2015, to claim-falsely-they were providing 24 hours' notice to enter Hutchinson's apartment on

Thursday March 26, 2015, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. The Notice also indicated that Defendants intended

to enter Hutchinson's apartment, on Friday March 27, 2015 from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., and on Thursday

April 22, 2015, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Ex. 176, Tr. 910:9-911:15.) Hutchinson stayed home from

work to be present for Defendants' noticed entry into his apartment on April 22, 2015, but

Defendants did not appear. (Ex. 178, Tr. 932:25-933:10.) Defendants' improper notice as to the

March 26 entry and failure to appear violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and

Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l). Defendant's conduct was also retaliatory against Hutchinson

for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

01
 310. On March 26, 2015, Hutchinson taped a letter on the door to his apartment denying

Defendants entry for March 26, 2015 due to Defendants' failure to provide 24 hours' notice. (Ex.

176, Tr. 912:5-7.) Hutchinson's exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts

of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5.

311. On March 27, 2015, Hutchinson stayed home from work so he could be present for

Defendants' entry into his apartment. Defendants told Hutchinson they planned to remove his over-

stove light, fan, and vent after a DBI inspection found that the wiring was improper. When

Hutchinson stated he needed those items replaced, KIHAGI refused to replace them, telling

Hutchinson he "didn't need" a vent or light in the kitchen. No reduction in rent was offered. (Tr.

915:6-26.) KIHAGI's statements and conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (5),

and was retaliatory against Hutchinson for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL

violation.

312. On April 15, 2015, Defendants posted a "24 Hour Notice oflntent to Enter Premises"

on Hutchinson's door. The Notice falsely claimed to be providing 24 hours' notice to enter on April
16, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. However, it was not served until the night before. (Ex. 176; Ex. 178; Tr.

918:27-919:26; 920:17-19; 932:25-933:2.) Defendants' improper notice violated Admin. Code

sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l). Defendant's

conduct was also retaliatory against Hutchinson for exercising protected rights, violating Admin.

Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1)

UCL violation.

313. On April 16, 2015, Hutchinson stayed home from work to be present for Defendants'

noticed entry into his apartment. When Defendants removed Hutchinson's over-stove vent,

microwave, and light device, they left holes in Hutchinson's walls for days, and refused to re-paint

his kitchen to cover the mis-matched paint. (Ex. 179; Tr. 923:1-12, 933:19-24; 1018:19-20.)

Defendants' substandard repairs violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (2), and was

Q?
retaliatory against Hutchinson for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d)

and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

314. In June 2015, when Hutchinson's mother came to visit him from Australia, Defendants

invaded Hutchinson's privacy by asking neighbors for information about his mother. (Tr. 933:25-

934:12.) Defendants' conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO), (13) and (14), and was

retaliatory against Hutchinson for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37. 9(d)

and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

315. On October 15, 2015, ZORIALL served Hutchinson with a "60-Day Notice to

Temporarily Vacate the Premises," supposedly so Defendants could conduct repairs. (JA 177; Ex.

38.) The Notice required Hutchinson to vacate by December 15, 2015, and estimated that

Defendants would complete their capital improvement work by March 2016.

316. On or about October 20, 2015 and continuing until Hutchinson vacated his apartment

on November 21, 2015 after receiving the 60-day notice, Defendants engaged in construction in

Apartment 73 next door, and failed to properly contain the debris from their construction, forcing

Hutchinson to live in a construction zone. (Tr. 936:5-10, 943: 2-3, 1368:12-14.) Defendants'

conduct violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(3) and (10), and was retaliatory against
Hutchinson for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation..

317. On October 22, 2015, KIHAGI sent Hutchinson three harassing text messages

regarding his personal security cameras installed in his apartment, that were pointed outwards

toward the street and front walkway. Her texts included the following: "Today you were trying to

intimidate the handyman and contractor by taking their pictures? You have also continued to point

your camera at all of us coming to the property despite notice.... Plus you already know your

camera is illegal. I will look into charges as you continue despite warnings .... Fantastic. Aim it at

me in the driveway. I am sure your picture taking yesterday when I arrived was legal!!!!" (Ex. 180;

Tr. 943:4-946:12.) (Tr. 943:4-946:12; 947:25-948:7; Ex. 180.) KIHAGI's harassing text messages

violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5) and was retaliatory against Hutchinson for exercising
protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one (1) UCL violation.

318. After Hutchinson vacated his apartment in November 2015, Defendants did not allow

him to reoccupy his home in March 2016, and he remained displaced as of the dates of his testimony

at trial. (Tr. 942:16-27.)

319. The Court recognizes that the contents of the 60-day Notice, and any subsequent

lawsuit, may be protected by the litigation privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation

on this basis. However, as with Leshefsky and Smyth, the inexcusable failure of Defendants to

timely return Hutchinson to his apartment is an unlawful act, independent of the notice of eviction.

(Rental Housing, at 171 Cal.App.4th, 767; Chacon, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1256-57.) As previously

discussed, Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(l 1) only allows a landlord to displace a tenant for capital

improvements temporarily, for up to three months, absent an extension approved by the Rent Board.

Defendants neither sought nor obtained any extension of time from the Rent Board to keep

Hutchinson out of his apartment past March. The Notice described work that was similar to the

work described in notices given to Leshefsky and Smyth. Defendants failed to offer one scintilla of

evidence as to whether the work was ever started or why it could not be completed within the three-

month period under Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(l 1) or that it has ever been completed. The

"temporary eviction" was performed in bad faith, in an attempt to permanently displace Hutchinson

from his home, violating Admin. Code section 37.10(B)(a)(5). Defendants' ''temporary eviction"

was also retaliatory against Hutchinson for exercising his protected rights, violating Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Defendants' alleged ''temporary" eviction for

capital improvements was an unlawful, unfair and fraudulent eviction, for which the Court will

impose penalties under the UCL, on a per month basis, for every month Hutchinson has been out of

possession of his apartment. As of January 2017, Hutchinson has been out of possession for

fourteen months, for a total of fourteen (14) UCL violations.

04
 e. Harassment Against Dale Duncan, Marta Munoz, Minor Child
Emilia Duncan Munoz

320. Dale Duncan ("Duncan"), his wife Marta Munoz ("Munoz"), and their eight-year old

daughter, Emilia Duncan Munoz ("E. Munoz") (collectively "the Duncans"), lived at 71 HILL

STREET from early 1994 until August 31, 2015, when Defendants forced them to vacate for a

fraudulent and retaliatory Owner Move-In Eviction from C. MWANGI. The Duncan family paid

$1,261.85 per month in rent, which included storage in the garage and parking in an exterior space

outside the garage for the entire twenty-one years of Dale Duncan's tenancy. (Tr. 1456:7-18,

1456:23-28; 1458:7-14; 1459:1-1460:17; Ex. 211.)

321. In September 2014, Duncan notified KIHAGI that his water heater, which had passed

its viable life, was leaking so much that the Duncans were forced to mop the water from their floor

every couple of hours for two weeks. KIHAGI cut Duncan off while he was speaking, and told him

never to call, but to communicate only by text message or letter. Duncan continued to make

repeated requests to Defendants by phone, text message, and letter to repair their water heater.

Defendants eventually replaced Duncan's water heater only after Duncan reported the problem to

DBI in approximately October 2014. Defendants' bad faith is evidenced by KIHAGI's statement to

Duncan, just one month earlier, "I am not spending any damn money on maintenance." (Tr.
1471:26-1465:19, 1608:1-9; 1608:20-1609:9; Ex. 195, Ex. 193, 195.) Defendants' conduct violated

Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(2) and (10). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation

per tenant for each of the two months that Defendants failed to repair the water heater. The total

number of violations is six (6). Duncan's exercise of his lawful rights in reporting needed

maintenance to Defendants and to DBI, provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by

Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

322. Although Defendants replaced Duncan's water heater in October 2014, they did so

without obtaining required City permits and without proper ventilation or proper drainage. On

March 4, 2015 during the City's inspection, the plumbing inspector demanded that Defendants

remedy the Code violations the same day, declaring it was an emergency and saying, "I want

somebody here right now." Defendants failure to exercise due diligence in completing repairs and
maintenance to Duncan's water heater, and to follow appropriate industry repair protocols, violated

Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(3) and (10). Defendants' conduct was retaliatory against the

tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code

section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is three (3).

323. On March 9, 2015, Duncan filed a "Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service" with the Rent Board regarding the termination of the garage access, bicycle

storage, and laundry services at HILL STREET, and disclosed in the application he was represented

by an attorney. On March 26, 2015, the Rent Board sent a "Memorandum" notice of receipt to

Duncan and KIHAGI, and recorded the mailing of the notice in its action log. Duncan's exercise of

his lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. (Ex. 31; Tr. 1470:10-23.)

324. Also on March 9, 2015, the Duncan family sent Defendants a letter outlining the

harassment from Defendants since July 2014, and asking Defendants restore the terminated services

and stop harassing them. (Ex. 195; 1471 :6-25.) Their exercise of their lawful rights provides the

basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.9(d)
and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

325. On March 25, 2015, at approximately 9:00 p.m. Defendants placed a "24 Hour Notice
of Intent to Enter Premises" on Duncan's door. Defendants backdated the Notice to March 24, 2015,

and falsely claimed to be providing 24 hours' notice to enter Duncan's apartment on Thursday

March 26, 2015, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The Notice also indicated that Defendants intended to

enter Duncan's apartment on Friday March 27, 2015 from 9am to 4pm, and on Thursday April 2,

2015, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Ex. 372, Tr. 1480:25-1481:21.) Duncan and Munoz made plans

for one of them to take time off work on March 26, March 27, and April 2, 2015, so someone would

be home when Defendants entered their apartment pursuant to the Notice to Enter. Over the course

of those three days, Defendants appeared and entered Duncan's apartment for only one hour. (Tr.

1481:2-1482:9.) Defendants' improper notice as to the March 26 entry and failure to appear violated

Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l).
 Defendants' conduct was also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is three (3). 57

326. On April 2, 2015, at approximately 7:00 p.m. Defendants placed another "24 Hour

Notice of Intent to Enter Premises" on Duncan's door. Defendants backdated the Notice to April 1,

2015, and falsely claimed to be providing 24 hours' notice to enter Duncan's apartment on Friday,

April 3, 2015, from 9am to 4pm. The Notice also indicated that Defendants intended to enter

Duncan's apartment on Tuesday, April 7, 2015 from 9am to 4pm. (Ex. 373, Tr. 1482:19-1483:4.)

Duncan and Munoz again made plans for one of them to take time off work on April 3 and April 7,

2015, so someone would be home when Defendants entered their apartment pursuant to the Notice to

Enter. Defendants did not appear on April 3. On April 7, one of Defendants' workers appeared at

3:00 p.m. to perform repairs to Duncan's apartment, and stayed until 7:00 p.m.-three hours past the

noticed time of intent to enter. (Tr. 1483:5-1484:2.) Defendants' improper notice as to the April 3

entry, failure to appear, and improper entry violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(4), (10) and

(13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l). Defendants' conduct was also retaliatory against

the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code
section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is three (3). 58

327. On April 15, 2015, Defendants posted a third "24 Hour Notice of Intent to Enter
Premises" on Duncan's door, which indicated that Defendants intended to enter Duncan's apartment

on April 16 and "Wednesday April 24"-which was not an accurate date as the 24th was not a

Wednesday-between lOam and 4pm. Defendants did not appear on April 16, and did not appear on

the following Wednesday in April. (Ex. 374; Tr. 1484:11-1485:11.) Defendants' notice was an

excessive abuse of the landlord's right of entry, and violated Admin Code sections 37.IOB(a)(4),

57
The Court declines the City's request to impose a penalty for each day the Defendants failed
to appear. Rather, the Court aggregates Defendants' improper notice and repeated failure to appear,
and considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.
58
The Court declines the City's request to impose a penalty for each day the Defendants failed
to appear. Rather, the Court aggregates Defendants' improper notice, failure to appear, and improper
entry, and considers this conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.

Q7
 (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l). Defendants' conduct was also retaliatory

against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Adm.in. Code section 37.9(d) and/or

Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total

number of UCL violations is three (3). 59

328. On April 17, 2015, C. MWANGI served the Duncans with a 60-day Notice of

Termination of Tenancy for an Owner Move-In eviction, which was served on the Rent Board. (Ex.

36.) The Rent Board recorded against title a Notice of Constraints on Real Property as to Apartment

71. (Ex. 36.)

329. On April 22, 2015, at approximately 6:00 p.m. Defendants placed a fourth "24 Hour

Notice oflntent to Enter Premises" on Duncan's door. The Notice falsely claimed to be providing

24 hours' notice to enter Duncan's apartment on April 23, 2015, from 8:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (Ex.

375, Tr.1485:19-1486:12.) Defendants' improper notice violated Adm.in. Code sections

37.10B(a)(4), (10) and (13), and Civil Code sections 1954(c) and (d)(l). Defendants' conduct was

also retaliatory against the tenants for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per

tenant. The total number of UCL violations is three (3).

330. On June 17, 2015, Defendants served the Duncans with a "Three Day Notice to Cure or

Quit" claiming the Duncans breached their lease in 17 separate ways including "complaining to the

press" about Defendants, "organizing, conspiring and mobilizing other tenants" against Defendants,

and "parading building inspectors through each rental apartment to look for possible Code

violations." (Ex. 378; 1501:4-1505:17.)

331. On August 31, 2015, the Duncan family finally vacated Apartment 71 at HILL

STREET pursuant to the OMI notice. (Tr. 1507:11-16.) Defendants never paid the Duncan family

the second relocation payment of$10,l 77 after they vacated. (Tr. 1495:24-28.) Defendants' failure

59
The Court declines the City's request to impose a penalty for each day the Defendants failed
to appear. Again, the Court aggregates Defendants' repeated failure to appear, and considers this
conduct a single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties.

QR
 to pay the Duncans relocation expenses violated Admin. Code section 37.9B(c)(7)(d). Accordingly,

the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of violations is three (3).

332. The Court recognizes that the contents of the 60-day Notice for C. MWANGI's claimed

OMI eviction, the three day notice, and any subsequent lawsuit, may be protected by the litigation

privilege, and the Court thus declines to find any violation on this basis. However, C. MWANGI's

fraudulent attempt to evict the Duncans without any intent to move into Apartment 71, and failure to

occupy the unit as her principal residence, as discussed below, are evidence of bad faith and are

unlawful acts, independent of the notice of eviction. (Rental Housing, 171 Cal.App.4th at 767.)60

333. At the time C. MWANGI initiated the OMI eviction, she stated under penalty of

perjury, in documents submitted to the Rent Board, that she lived at 3947 18TH STREET in

Apartment 6 and had been residing there for "the last two years." (Ex. 36, C Mwangi decl.at § 5.)

As discussed, the record before this Court established that C. MWANGI did not live at l 8TH

STREET, but resided at 4854 Pardee Avenue, Fremont, which was her principal residence at the

time of serving the notice. In this regard in July 2014 ,she had executed other affidavits and a loan

agreement representing that she would occupy Pardee Avenue as her principal residence for at least

one year, and that her former address was 1735 Steiner Street, Apartment 156. (Ex. 287 at 45 and

47.) Additionally, her driver's license listed her home address as Pardee Avenue, and she has

maintained her voter registration in Alameda County since 2008. (Ex. 220, 422.) The notarized

affidavits of occupancy that C. MWANGI signed with respect to the Pardee Avenue property, which

contained her intention to live there for at least a year, were accompanied by warnings of the

consequences of providing false statements under Title 18, United States Code, sec. 1001, et. seq.

334. Defendant C. MWANGI further stated under penalty of perjury, in documents

submitted to the Rent Board, that Apartment 73 at HILL STREET, which Nick and Erin Reggars had

vacated only two days earlier on April 15, 2015, discussed below, was not immediately available for

60
The Court notes that Defendants' dominant motive in serving the 3-day Notice was done in
retaliation for Duncan for speaking to the media, participating in a tenants' union, and cooperating
with the City's inspection, violating Civil Code sections 1942.5(a) and (c). However, to be
conservative, the Court declines to award penalties based on the alleged breach of lease eviction, but
will award penalties based on the OMI eviction in the alternative.

QQ
 the Duncans to rent, as Defendants intended to perform renovations to Apartment 73. C. MWANGI

offered Apartment 73 to the Duncans after it was renovated, in approximately for four or five

months, at a rent of$4,250 per month. The timing of the remodel to coincide with the OMI eviction

is further evidence of Defendants' "lack of good faith ... to avoid offering a tenant a replacement

unit" under Admin. Code section 37.9(a)(8)(iv). Moreover, Defendants did not begin any

construction work in the Reggarses' apartment until October 2015-over six months after the

Reggars vacated. (Tr. 935:19-936:10, 937:11-938:3, 959:2-6, 1100:6-10; Ex. 36.)

335. The Court need not make a finding as to whether there were comparable apartments

available, as C. MWANGI claimed, because the evidence is overwhelming that she did not, in good

faith, intend to use Apartment 71 as her principal place of residence for a minimum of 36

consecutive months, pursuant to Admin. Code 37.9(a)(8)(iv.) and, indeed, that she was prohibited

from so doing based on her own affidavits stating, at all relevant times, that she was occupying the

Pardee Avenue property as her principal residence. The preponderance of the evidence also

establishes that the property was left vacant for at least a year after Duncan moved out. (Tr. 1509-

1512.) Accordingly, the Court finds that C. MWANGI's alleged owner move-in eviction was

unlawful, unfair and fraudulent, for which the Court will impose penalties under the UCL, on a per

tenant, per month basis, for every month the Duncan family has been out of possession of their

apartment. As of January 2017, the Duncan family has been out of possession for sixteen months. 61

The total number of UCL violations is forty-eight (48).

f. Harassment Against Nicholas and Erin Reggars

336. Nicholas Reggars ("Reggars") lived at 73 HILL STREET from November 1, 2010 to

April 15, 2015, living with his then-girlfriend Erin Fromherz, now wife, Erin Reggars ("E.

Reggars") (collectively "the Reggars") from April 2013 until they surrendered possession on April

15, 2015. They paid $2,900 per month in rent, which included one interior parking space in the

garage. (Tr. 1039:2-1040:18; 1100:6-10.)

61
As the Duncans vacated on August 31, 2015, the Court imposes monthly penalties beginning
in September 2015 up to January 1, 2017. Additionally, although C. MWANGI transferred her
ownership interest back to ZORIALL on September 23, 2015, she is jointly and severally liable for all
monthly penalties after the Duncans vacated their apartment, given her role in the OMI eviction.

1()()
 337. On December 12, 2014, Defendants served a backdated "Notice Terminating Parking

Space" dated December 9, 2014, under the Reggarses' door. The Notice falsely stated that

Defendants were terminating the Reggarses' parking due to seismic repair work. Defendants never

provided the Reggars with any permit or other evidence indicating that seismic work was needed in

the basement, and no seismic repair work was ever done. (Ex. 30 at 24; Tr. 1055:26-1056:28;

1057:8-12.). Defendants' fraudulent Notice and termination of the Reggarses' parking violated

Admin. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(l) and (10). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation

per tenant. The total number of violations is two (2).

338. The Reggars continued to pay the full amount of their rent until they vacated their

apartment, and continued to park their car in the garage after receiving the Notice. (Tr. 1057:13-18.)

339. · On December 15, 2014, Reggars filed a Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service with the Rent Board for the termination of his and E. Reggars' parking, and

disclosed he had an attorney. On December 26, 2014, the Rent Board provided notice to Defendants

that Reggars had filed a complaint and recorded sending the notice in its action log. (Ex. 30 pp. 1,

21-25; Tr. 1057:19-1058:20.) Reggars' exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for

subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants against him and E. Reggars, pursuant to Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

340. In mid-January 2015, Defendants served Reggars with a "2nd Notice Terminating

Parking Space," backdated to December 9, 2014, terminating his and E. Reggars' parking space in

the garage. This second notice no longer claimed that seismic repair work needed to be done in the

basement, but stated that Defendants would "be changing the locks to the area effective

immediately." This second notice also claimed that the proportional value of parking in the

Reggarses' lease was $150 per month, and attached a check for $75 to refund the Reggars the

"proportional" amount of parking for the remainder of the month. The Reggars never cashed the

check. (Ex. 30 p. 15; Tr. 1059:18-1060:24; 1062:11-1063:2.) Given that only a month before, the

Reggars received the first notice claiming to terminate parking for seismic repairs that were never

done, the Court finds that KIHAGI failed to provide evidence of"just cause" for severing his and E.

101
------------------------------------------·---""··

Reggars' parking space pursuant to Adm.in. Code section 37.2(r). 62 Accordingly, the Court imposes

one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations is two (2).

341. On January 23, 2015, Reggars filed a second Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of

a Housing Service with the Rent Board for the termination of his and E. Reggars' parking, and again

disclosed he had an attorney. (Ex. 30; Tr. 1061:2-27.) On February 26, 2015, the Rent Board sent

another notice to Defendants regarding Reggars' complaints, and recorded sending the notice in its

action log. (Ex. 30 pp. 1, 8.) Defendants never responded to Reggars or the Rent Board. (Ex. 30

pp.I; Tr. 1094:26-27.) Reggars' exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for subsequent acts

of retaliation by Defendants against him and E. Reggars, pursuant to Adm.in. Code section 37.9(d)

and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

342. The Reggars finally reluctantly gave up their parking space inside the garage at HILL

STREET on February 2, 2015, and began parking at a rented, unsecured, open-air parking space near

their apartment for $200 per month. The Reggars continued paying their full $2,900 in rent to

Defendants, which Defendants accepted. (Tr. 1063:12-1064.:24.) Reggars testified: "At all costs I

was trying to avoid any communication with Anne KIHAGI. My attitude to communication with

Anne -- my attitude to staying at the home was, if we just acquiesced and kept our head down, this
wave of harassment would pass over us. And so I was willing to take a $200 a month hit for an extra

car park in an effort to be left alone." (Tr. 1128:8-13.)

343. On March 4, 2015, during the City's inspection of the HILL STREET property,

Reggars was sitting at his dining room table with his front door open. Reggars observed and heard

KIHAGI point behind her back towards his apartment and say to one of her security guards, "I am

going to move my sister into this apartment." KIHAGI's statement was also observed and heard by

Scoppetta. Immediately after hearing KIHAGI make the statement about moving her sister into their

apartment, Reggars got up and walked to the front door, demanding to know more from KIHAGI.

KIHAGI then entered the Reggarses' apartment far enough so she could grab the door handle and

62
Although KIHAGI offered the Reggars a rent adjustment for the reduction in services, this is
irrelevant to the Court's finding of lack of just cause to remove the parking space in the first place.
Moreover, the evidence shows that the Reggars continued to pay full rent until they vacated the
apartment, which KIHAGI accepted. (Tr. 1347:12-21.)
shut the front door in Reggars' face. (Tr. 1070:26-1073:7; 1258:28-1259:22.) KIHAGl's conduct

violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(5), and was retaliatory against the tenants for exercising

protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL violations

is two (2).

344. Also on March 4, 2015, KIHAGI arrived at HILL STREET and screamed at E.

Reggars, demanding to know who she was. KIHAGI then got out her mobile phone, and, within

earshot of Reggars, proceeded to tell a person on the other end of the line to "Speed up surveillance

on Hill Street. How quickly can you get that done?" KIHAGI's statement was also heard by Duncan

and Munoz. (Tr. 1080:13-20, 1208:26-28, 1211:18-19; Ex. 195.) KIHAGI's harassing conduct

violated Admin. Code sections 37.10B(a)(5), (10) and (13), and was retaliatory against the tenants

for exercising protected rights, violating Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section

1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of UCL

violations is two (2).

345. On March 11, 2015, Reggars filed a third Report of Alleged Wrongful Severance of a

Housing Service with the Rent Board for the termination of their parking and laundry, and again
disclosed he had an attorney. Reggars included a letter outlining the events of the March 4, 2015

inspection. He also described Defendants' conduct of locking-up the garage and included a diagram

of HILL STREET showing where Defendants locked and boarded-up access. On March 18, 2015,

the Rent Board sent Defendants a copy of Reggars' complaint, demanded that Defendants provide a

reply and proof of permits to perform seismic retrofitting work in the garage within seven days, and

recorded sending the letter to Defendants in their action log. Defendants never submitted a reply to

the Rent Board. (Ex. 30 pp. 1-7.) Reggars' exercise of his lawful rights provides the basis for

subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants against him and E. Reggars, pursuant to Admin. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

346. When KIHAGI threatened to move her sister into the Reggarses' apartment, they were

only nine weeks away from their May 9, 2015 San Francisco wedding and their subsequent

honeymoon. The Reggars planned to have out of town family stay with them. However, they were
terrified of receiving an OMI eviction so close to their wedding, or while they would be out of the

country for several weeks on their honeymoon. Because of the "duress" from the harassment and

immediate threat of an OMI eviction, the Reggars felt they had no choice but to give up their home.

They therefore vacated the apartment on April 15, 2015 after giving 30 days' notice. (Tr. 1039:14-

15; 1074:25-1075:9; 1092:6-27; 1098:27-1100:1-10.)

347. Reggars testified: "I certainly felt like our decision to move wasn't voluntary. There

was certainly a level of duress in regards to all of the actions going on. Hill Street wasn't a fun place

nor felt like a secure place to continue to live in." (Tr. 1100:2-5.) "We moved out because we

wanted to get away from Anne and be safe and secure for our wedding and for the time that we were

away and into the future." (Tr. 1193:14-16.) He added, ''the reason we left is because we were tired

of harassment. This woman had just been shouting at my wife. And this was the core catalyst for us

making the decision that, why would we want to continue to rent from a landlord who would shout

at my wife, who would also lock up the rear door, remove access, and just be -- just -- I am so used

to dealing with people in my life who you can kind of almost guarantee how they are going to

behave. But there was not one part of me that could guarantee how Anne was going to behave to me

and my wife and the people who were tenants after that particular day or even beforehand. We
wanted to get away." (Tr. 11:93:14-16, 1210:28-1211:11.)

348. After Reggars and E. Reggars surrendered possession of their HILL STREET

apartment, Defendants refused to return the full amount of their security deposit, falsely claiming

Defendants were entitled to deduct the cost of garbage for their entire tenancy at HILL STREET.

(Tr. 1100:20-1101 :9; Ex. 799.) Defendants' refusal to return the security deposit violated Civil

Code 1950.5(g). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation per tenant. The total number of

UCL violations is two (2).

349. Defendants' recovery of possession ofReggars and E. Reggars' apartment was an

unlawful, unfair and constructive eviction that resulted from KIHAGI's unlawful harassment, for

which the Court will impose penalties under the UCL, on per tenant, per month basis, for every

lfl.d.
 month they have been out of possession of their apartment. As of January 2017, the Reggars have

been out of possession for twenty-one months, constituting forty-two (42) UCL violations. 63
7. CHURCH STREET

350. Defendant NOZARI is liable for acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, and wrongful

evictions committed at CHURCH STREET during its period of ownership. Defendant K.IHAGI is

liable for all acts of tenant harassment, retaliation, .and wrongful evictions committed at CHURCH

STREET during NOZARl's periods of ownership, as well as those she committed, or participated in,

against tenants at CHURCH STREET.

351. Altogether, as outlined below, the Court finds forty (40) predicate violations oflaw at

CHURCH STREET for which it assesses a civil penalty under the UCL. KIHAGI and NOZARI are

jointly and. severally liable for all forty (40) acts.

a. Harassment Against Paul Vanotti

352. Paul Vanotti ("Vanotti") occupied Apartment 7 at CHURCH STREET from March

2013 until December I, 2015, when Defendants forced him to relocate due their ongoing harassment

and the negative impact on his health. Vanotti paid $3,631.15 per month in rent for a two-bedroom,

one-bath apartment. (Ex. 9, Tr. 2611:11-13,2613:5-10, 2623:24-25; Ex. 9, Ex. 105.)

353. Vanotti is aged 65 or older and suffers from advanced cancer that constitutes a

disability under the definition of Bus. & Prof. Code section 17206.1. (Tr. 2608:4-2609:14, 2614:1-

3.)
354. K.IHAGI and NOZARI refused to accept and cash Vanotti's February 2015 rent check,

violating Admin. Code sections 37.IOB(a)(l l) and (12). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation. Because V anotti is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation.

The total number of UCL violations is two (2).

355. On or about February 21, 2015, KIHAGI, acting on behalf ofNOZARI, sent Vanotti a

backdated letter dated February 10, 2015, that falsely accused Vanotti of impersonating his neighbor

63
As the Reggars vacated their apartment on April 15, 2015, the Court imposes monthly
penalties from April 2015 up to January 1, 2017. C. MWANGI is jointly and severally liable for all
monthly penalties after the Reggars vacated their apartment as she contributed to the Reggarses'
constructive eviction.
and of subletting his and his neighbor's apartments. (Tr. 2619:10-2622:1; Ex. 9.) There was no

evidence at trial that NOZARI and KIHAGI sent the letter in good faith anticipation of imminent

future litigation. (Ex. 9, 586.) Defendants' harassing conduct violated Admin. Code section

37.IO(B)(a)(5). Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation. Because Vanotti is a disabled

victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is two

(2).

356. Also on or about February 21, 2015, Vanotti sent a text message to KIHAGI informing

her that he would be discussing her tactics with lawyers, community activists, and other tenants. (Tr.

2675:8-13; Ex. 586 if 14.) Between February and April 2015, Vanotti spoke with at least two

different media outlets, including television and print media, about his experience as a KIHAGI

tenant. (Ex. 9; Tr. 2629:11-2630:15; Ex. 586 ifif 11, 18.) Vanotti's exercise of his lawful rights

provides the basis for subsequent acts of retaliation by Defendants, pursuant to Admin. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5.

357. Defendants refused to accept and cash Vanotti's March and April 2015 rent checks

when due. However, on or about May 6, 2015, Defendants attempted to cash Vanotti's March,

April, and May rent checks all at once. On or about May 6, 2015, Defendants sent Vanotti a 3-day
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for failure to pay rent for February through May 2015, after Defendants

were unable to cash three rent checks at once. (Tr. 2623:15-2625:5; 2630:16-2631:6; Ex. 9.)

Vanotti subsequently paid all four months' back rent, totaling $14,524.60. (Tr. 2624:26-2625:5.)

Defendants' refusal to cash Vanotti' s March and April rent checks violated Amin. Code sections

37.9(B)(a)(l l) and (12), and was retaliatory against Vanotti for exercising protected rights, violating

Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation for each of the two months Defendants refused to cash the checks. Because Vanotti

is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation per month. The total number

of UCL violations is four (4).

358. On or about March 25, 2015, shortly after the City task force inspection, NOZARI

installed a video surveillance camera pointed directly at Vanotti's front door in violation of his right

to privacy. (Tr. 2627:15-2628:14; Ex. 418; Ex. 586 if 13; JA 182.) He was offended by such
intrusion which was ''the last straw." The Court incorporates all of its previous findings of violating

Defendants' privacy rights by reason of installing cameras pointed directly at tenants' front doors.

Defendants' conduct violated Ad.min. Code sections 37.lOB(a)(lO) and (13), and Civil Code section

1708.8, and was retaliatory against Vanotti for exercising protected rights, violating Ad.min. Code

section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL

violation. Because V anotti is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation.

The total number of UCL violations is two (2).

359. On or about May 6, 2015, Defendants sent Vanotti a 3-day Notice to Cure or Quit,

falsely claiming Vanotti breached his lease in 21 separate ways including by speaking to the media

about KIHAGI. (Ex. 9; Tr. 2625:11-2633:16.) Vanotti responded by letter on May 11, 2015, stating

he would consult a lawyer and file a complaint with the Rent Board. He sent a copy of the letter to

Causa Justa, a tenant's organization, and filed a complaint with the Rent Board the same day, a copy

of which was sent to Defendants. (Ex. 9; 2633:17-2634:8; 2635:5-2636:1.)

360. At some point in Vanotti's tenancy, NOZARI workers at CHURCH STREET also

removed the lock to Vanotti's mailbox completely, and did not provide him with a key. All other

tenants at CHURCH STREET had mailboxes with a working lock. (Tr. 2643:3-21, 2645:24-26;
2645:28-2646:8, Ex. 110.) Defendants' failure to repair the lock violated Amin. Code section

37.10B(a)(2), and was also retaliatory against Vanotti for exercising protected rights, violating

Ad.min. Code section 37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one

UCL violation. Because Vanotti is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL

violation. The total number of UCL violations is two (2).

361. On July 8, 2015, KIHAGI tampered with and opened Vanotti's mailbox. (Ex. 110; Ex.

586, 28; Tr. 2643:3-18.) KIHAGI's conduct violated Admin. Code section 37.10B(a)(13), and was

also retaliatory against V anotti for exercising protected rights, violating Ad.min. Code section

37.9(d) and/or Civil Code section 1942.5. Accordingly, the Court imposes one UCL violation.

Because Vanotti is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation. The total

number of UCL violations is two (2).

107
 362. On December 1, 2015, Vanotti finally surrendered possession of Apartment 7, unable to

live with Defendants' harassment. The stress was the last thing he needed that was not helping his

very serious illness. (Tr. 2611: 11-13.) The Court finds that Defendants' recovery of possession of

Vanotti's apartment was an unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, and constructive eviction that resulted from

repeated acts of harassment by the defendants described above, for which the Court will impose

penalties under the UCL, on per month basis, for every month V anotti has been out of possession of

his apartment. As of January 2017, Vanotti has been out of possession for thirteen (13) months.

Because V anotti is a disabled victim, the Court imposes one additional UCL violation for each

month. The total number of violations is twenty-six (26).

B. Defendants' Harassing, Fraudulent and Retaliatory Conduct Was Done in Bad
Faith

363. The Court finds that Plaintiffs proved, not only by the preponderance of the evidence,

but by the overwhelming evidence, that Defendants' repeated harassment and fraudulent evictions of

multiple tenants in multiple buildings, as outlined in Section A, was in bad faith in violation of

sections 37.IOB and 37.9 of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. As described in the body of this

decision, the record is replete with outrageous, unlawful and fraudulent violations that were

specifically targeted against often long term tenants who were protected by San Francisco's rent

control laws. This overwhelming record of a pattern and practice of unlawful harassment of

protected tenants under Admin. Code § 37 .1 OB, was further buttressed by declarations and affidavits

under penalty of perjury by the individual Defendants themselves that are wholly at odds with their

stated grounds for evictions and constitute further evidence of bad faith.

364. In connection with OMI and RMI evictions, the Rent Board is a regulatory body, which

requires filings of certain documents for several important regulatory purposes. Information must be

disclosed to the Government regarding no-fault evictions so that the Government may store and

retain that information for the public benefit, including for public viewing and for maintaining a

record of evictions or other restrictions such as limits on future rent increases at properties where

constraints are recorded against title that affect future owners of property. These records permit the

Government as well as tenants and the public to monitor future compliance with special restrictions.

1 fUl
 It is essential that this information be accurate for these important regulatory purposes to be fulfilled.

The Rent Board does not independently investigate compliance with the OMI and RMI provisions of

the Rent Ordinance. (Admin. Code section 37.9B(c); Tr. 2537:20-2538:12.) Defendants' mandatory

submissions to the Rent Board of no-fault 3-day and 60-day notices to quit are not immunized by the

litigation privilege simply because they may serve some litigation purpose in addition to the

regulatory functions outlined above. (See Stacy & Whitbeck, Inc. v. City and Cnty. ofSan Francisco

(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1, 7-8.) The Court finds that the Defendants' representations to the Rent

Board are also evidence that Defendants' alleged grounds for eviction were false and in bad faith,

and that Defendants did not intend to use the affected tenants' apartments as their principal residence

for at least 36 continuous months, pursuant to Admin. Code 37.9(a)(8)(ii).

365. With regards to Defendants' Ellis Act Evictions, the overwhelming evidence

established that at all relevant times Defendants did not intend, in good faith, to withdraw all units

from the rental market. Significantly, Defendants offered certain tenants paying market rents at

GUERRERO STREET-Mahoney-Fernandes and Castellow in Apartment 1137 and two other

tenants in Apartment 113 5-an opportunity to stay as "friends" and continue to pay rent after the

Ellis notices expired. Mahoney-Fernandes credibly testified to this, and to the e-mail she received an
e-mail from KIHAGI, which stated: "given the difficult experience with some of my

tenants ... [KIHAGI] would need to Ellis the property." Mahoney-Fernandes also testified that

KIHAGI told herthat she wanted S. Smith "gone." (Tr. 2071:10-2074:8, 2076:2-3, 2100:17-2101:4;

2084:26-2085:23, 2086:17-2087:4; Ex. 402.) 64 Despite the fact that all six apartments at

GUERRERO STREET were tenant-occupied, Defendants initially only served the first of several

Ellis notices on Izaguirre in Apartment l 135A, S. Smith and Delgado in Apartment 1139, and

Johnson and Bembury in Apartment l 139A-the only remaining original tenants paying below-

market rent. (Tr. 2217:13-26, 2292:25-2294:21, 2377:10-13, 2451:24-2452:1; Ex. 403.)

64
The Court declines the City's request to find any violation or to impose penalties for
Defendants' offers to let new tenants stay in the building, since the record is unclear that they were
given tenancy terms beyond the expiration of the Ellis Act notices.

l()Q
 C. Defendants Failed To Register Their Businesses
1. Legal Standard

366. "No person may engage in business within the City unless the person has obtained a

current registration certificate ... " (S.F. Bus. & Tax Reg. Code§ 853.) This requirement covers any

person receiving rental income from a residential structure containing more than four apartments.

(Id. § 853(d).) "Each registration certificate, and each duplicate thereof, shall set forth the name

under which the person transacts or intends to transact business, the location of the registrant's place

of business and such other information as the Tax Collector may require, and be prominently

displayed therein. In the case of a sole proprietorship, the registration certificate shall be signed by

the sole proprietor; in the case of a partnership, the registration certificate shall be signed by a

general partner; in the case ofa limited liability company, the registration certificate shall be signed

by the managing member; and in the case of a corporation, the registration certificate shall be signed

by the person authorized by the corporation to sign on its behalf." (S.F. Bus. & Tax Reg. Code

§856(h) (emphasis added.))

2. The City Met Their Burden of Proof Regarding Defendants' Failure to
Register

367. Plaintiffs presented unrefuted evidence from Mr. Sutanto Darsono, an investigator with

the San Francisco Tax Collector's Office. Mr. Darsono testified that his job is to register

unregistered business owners and to make sure that the business owner becomes fully compliant

with the San Francisco business tax ordinance. Mr. Darsono testified that since 1980, owners of

residential rental properties with four or more apartments in a particular building must annually

register the properties with the Tax Collector's office, as a business. The owner is required to

register within fifteen days of the purchase of the property. The owner is required to pay an annual

registration fee and obtain a business registration certificate from the Tax Collector's Office. The

second part of the registration requirement compels the owner to annually file and report their gross

receipts for their rental income, and then may have to pay gross receipts tax. Mr. Darsono testified

that on May 6, 2015, after determining that Defendants had not registered any of their properties

containing four or more rental apartments, he sent letters/notices of non-registration to Defendants.

Defendants have owned some of these properties since 2013. The City sent separate notices to

110
 RENKA, NOZARI, XELAN, ZORIALL, and KIHAGI, related to the EUREKA STREET,

GUERRERO STREET, CHURCH STREET, 18TH STREET, 19TH STREET, HILL STREET, and

FILBERT STREET properties. Each letter/notice provided Mr. Darsono's name and phone number,

and gave Defendants fifteen days to respond. Defendants never responded to any of the

letters/notices, and never registered the properties. Defendants are therefore almost into their fourth

year of non-registration. (Tr. 2570:6-26, 2571:24-2572:14, 2573:1-2574:20, 2574:22-2585:7,

2592:21-2593:2; 2601:24-2603:28; Ex. 245.)

368. Defendants purchased the 18TH STREET, 19TH STREET, and FILBERT STREET

properties in 2013, and failed to comply with the registration requirements for each building for

2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

369. Defendants purchased the EUREKA STREET, GUERRERO STREET and HILL

STREET properties in 2014, and failed to comply with the registration requirements for each

building for 2014, 2015, and 2016. 65

370. Defendants purchased the CHURCH STREET property in 2015, and failed to comply

with the registration requirements for 2015 and 2016.

371. The Court imposes one UCL violation per property for each year that Defendants failed
to register their properties. Each Defendant is liable as a managing member, agent, and/or owner of

record as follows:

372. 18TH STREET: KIHAGI and XELAN are jointly and severally liable for one (1) UCL

violation. KIHAGI is individually liable for one (1) UCL violation and NOZARI and KIHAGI are

jointly and severally liable for two (2) UCL violations. The total number of violations is four (4).

373. 19TH STREET. KIHAGI and XELAN are jointly and severally liable for four (4) UCL

violations.

374. FILBERT STREET: KIHAGI and XELAN are jointly and severally liable for four (4)

UCL violations.

65
Defendants purchased EUREKA STREET on December 27, 2013. As such, the Court
imposes penalties starting in 2014.

111
 375. EUREKA STREET: KIHAGI and RENKA are jointly and severally liable for one (1)

UCL violation. KIHAGI, RENKA, and J. MWANGI are jointly and severally liable for two (2)

UCL violations. The total number of violations is three (3).

376. GUERRERO STREET: KIHAGI and RENKA are jointly and severally liable for three

(3) UCL violations.

377. HILL STREET: KIHAGI and ZORIALL are jointly and severally liable for two (2)

UCL violations. KIHAGI, ZORIALL, and C. MWANGljointly and severally liable for one (1)

UCL violation. The total number of UCL violations is three (3).

378. CHURCH STREET: KIHAGI and NOZARI are jointly and severally liable for two (2)

UCL violations.
CODE VIOLATIONS RELATING TO NOTICES OF VIOLATION ISSUED BY THE CITY
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The State Housing Law

379. California Health and Safety Code section 17920.3 outlines the required elements to

prove that a property is substandard, in violation of the State Housing Law. Plaintiffs were required

to show that Defendants' building(s) "endanger[ed] the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare
of the public or the occupants," based on certain conditions enumerated in the subdivisions of
section 17920.3. The relevant enumerated conditions include:

• subd. (a) "inadequate sanitation," including:

o (5) "lack of hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in a dwelling unit;"
o (6) "lack of adequate heating;"

o (8) lack of minimum amounts natural light/ventilation;

o (10) "lack of required electrical lighting;"

o (14) "general dilapidation or improper maintenance;"

o (16) "lack of adequate garbage and rubbish storage and removal facilities;"

• subd. (c) any nuisance;

11 ':>
 • subd. (d) "all wiring, except that which conformed with all applicable laws in effect at

the time of installation if it is currently in good and safe condition and working

properly;"

• subd. (e) "all plumbing, except plumbing that conformed with all applicable laws in

effect at the time of installation, or that may not have conformed with all applicable

laws in effect at the time of installation, but is currently in good and safe condition and

working properly ... ;"

• subd. (k) "any building or portion thereof that is determined to be an unsafe building

due to inadequate maintenance, in accordance with the latest edition of the Uniform

Building Code."

380. Plaintiffs were also required to show that each Defendant violated the State Housing

Law by refusing lawful inspections by an enforcement agency. (Health & Safety Code§ 17970.)
B. Public Nuisance

381. Plaintiffs' plead their cause of action for public nuisance in two counts.
1. Count 1: Public Nuisance Per Se

382. Both the San Francisco Housing Code ("Housing Code") and San Francisco Building
Code ("Building Code") define conditions that constitute a per se public nuisance.

383. San Francisco Building Code section 102A provides that, "all buildings structures,
property, that are regulated by this code that are structurally unsafe or not provided with adequate

egress, or that constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human life, safety, or health of

the occupants or the occupants of adjacent properties or the public by reason of inadequate

maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence or abandonment, or by reason of occupancy or use in

violation of law or ordinance, or were erected, moved, altered, constructed or maintained in violation

oflaw or ordinance are, for the purposes of this chapter, unsafe" and "[a]ll such unsafe buildings,

structures, property, or portions thereof, are herby declared to be public nuisances ...." Thus, under

the San Francisco Building Code, any work without permit is deemed unsafe and declared to be a

public nuisance.

111
 384. Housing Code section 401 defines "nuisance" to include, among other things' "any

public nuisance known at common law or equity jurisprudence" (subd. (1)), "whatever is dangerous

to human life or is detrimental to health" (subd. (3)), any "fire hazard" (subd. (9)), and any

"substandard building" (subd. (10)). Housing Code section 1001 defines a "substandard building" as

including "any dwelling units, guest room or suite of rooms, or the premises on which the same is

located, in which exists any of the conditions enumerated in this chapter to an extent that endangers

the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or occupants .... " The enumerated

conditions in section 1001 largely track the conditions under California Health and Safety Code

section 17920.3, and include, inter alia, the following:

• subd. (b) "inadequate sanitation and safety," including:

o (5) "lack of hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in a dwelling

apartment."

o (8) "lack of minimum amounts of natural light and. ventilation required by this

Code"

o (I 0) "lack of required electrical illumination"

o (12) "infestation of insects, vermin or rodents"

o (13) "general dilapidation or improper maintenance"

• subd. (d): "any nuisance as defined in this code (see section 401)"

• subd. (e)(I) Hazardous Wiring - "all wiring except that which conformed with all

applicable laws in effect at the time of installation or the laws in effect at the time of

any subsequent alterations ... "

• subd. (f) Hazardous Plumbing - "all plumbing except that which conformed with all

applicable laws in effect at the time of installation or the laws in effect at the time of

any subsequent alterations"

• subd. (g) Hazardous Mechanical - "all mechanical equipment, including vents, except

that which conformed with all applicable laws in effect at the time of installation or the

laws in effect at the time of any subsequent alterations, and which is maintained in

good condition ... "

1 1.::1
 • subd. (I) Inadequate Maintenance - "any building or portion thereof which is

determined to be an unsafe building in accordance with Section 102A of the Building

Code"
2. Count 2: General Public Nuisance

385. "Anything which is injurious to health ... or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an

obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment oflife or

property .. .is a nuisance." (Civ. Code§ 3479.) "A public nuisance is one which affects at the same

time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the

extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." (Civ. Code § 3480.)
II. FINDINGS OF FACT

386. When a City official assesses code violations at a property, DBI issues a Notice of

Violation ("NOV") to the property owner by posting the notice on the property, and mailing it to the

owner's address of record on file with the San Francisco Assessor-Recorder's Office. The NOV

identifies the code sections violated, provides an abatement deadline, and outlines the consequences

if the violations are not timely abated. If an owner fails to timely abate violations at the property,

DBI will refer the case to a Director's Hearing. IfDBI determines that the violations are outstanding
at the Director's Hearing, it issues an Order of Abatement, which is recorded against title to the

property, posted on the property, and mailed to the owner's address of record on file with the

Assessor-Recorder. (Tr. 2961:21-2972:2.)

387. When DBI cites a property owner for code violations, the owner is responsible for

obtaining all requisite permits, doing all necessary work, ensuring that all inspections are completed,

and having DBI abate the Notice of Violation. (Tr. 2965:6-14, 2972:10-23.)

388. As outlined below, DBI cited Defendants repeatedly for code violations and

unpermitted work.

3 89. In addition, the tenants testified to construction work occurring over a significant

timeframe that predates DBI's access to the property, or that DBI did not document because

Defendants barred the City access to their buildings and impeded lawful inspections, both before and

during this litigation. However, DBI Deputy Director Dan Lowrey confirmed that this additional

11 "
 work, testified to by Defendants' tenants, was done without permits. (Tr. 206:22-208:23, 2727:26-

2728:11, 2730:12-2732:4, 2733:7-23, 2797:8-26.)

A. Code Violations and Unpermitted Construction at Defendants' Properties
1. 18TH STREET

390. Kelly Kimball testified the entirety of Apartment 1 at 18TH STREET was gutted

"down to the studs" in June 2014. (Tr. 130:22-131:13.) Since the record is unclear how long before

June construction started, the Court will treat the start date of this construction at that time as June

15, 2014. Defendants had no permits for this work. (Tr. 2981:4-2982:4.) Defendants' conduct

violated Building Code sections 102A and 106A, Housing Code sections 103 and 301, San Francisco

Electrical Code ("Electrical Code") section 89.120, and San Francisco Plumbing Code ("Plumbing

Code") section 103.1.1. On October 10, 2014 DBI issued NOV 201489221 citing Defendants for

the work without permit in Apartment 1 at l 8TH STREET, including covering up electrical and

plumbing work without inspections. DBI gave Defendants a 90-day grace period, until January 8,

2015, to obtain all necessary permits and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants did

not abate the violations until August 3, 2015-207 days after DBI's abatement deadline. (Ex. 248;

Tr. 2983:26-2984:15, 2985:5-15, 2986:5-17.) The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL

violation. 66

391. Based on the foregoing, 18TH STREET was out of compliance with the Building,

Housing, Plumbing, and Electrical Codes from June 15, 2014 through August 3, 2015. DBI granted

a 90-day grace period to cure the violations from October 10, 2014 until January 8, 2015, which the

Court will not count as days in violation. (City and County ofSan Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77

Cal.App.4th 1302.) The property was out of compliance for 117 days before DBI cited Defendants,

and for 207 days after DBI's grace period expired. Therefore, Defendants maintained 18TH

STREET as a public nuisance, and in violation of municipal law and the State Housing Law, for a

total of three hundred twenty-four (324) days. 67

66
The Court aggregates multiple code violations for Defendants' conduct and considers this a
single "act" for the purposes of awarding penalties under the UCL.
67
The Court calculates dates starting from the day after the grace period ends until the
violation was abated (including the end date). As Plaintiff notes in its post trial brief, an NOV is not
abated until the property owner fixes the condition, has it inspected and approved, and pays all
 392. KIHAGI, as the owner of record, is individually liable for ninety-two (92) days 18TH

STREET was out of compliance. KIHAGI, as agent, and NO ZARI as owner of record are jointly

and severally liable for two hundred thirty-two (232) of the days 18TH STREET was out of

compliance.

393. KIHAGI, as agent, and NOZARI as owner of record are jointly and severally liable for

one (1) UCL violation.

2. 19TH STREET

394. Defendants performed remodeling work in Apartment 3 at 19TH STREET in June

2014. (Tr. 816:16-24; 821 :20-823:4.) Defendants failed to obtain the required permits for this work

and as of the time of trial still had not obtained them. (Tr. 3058:5-7.) Defendants' conduct violated

Building Code sections 102A and 106A, Housing Code sections 103 and 301, Electrical Code

section 89.120, and Plumbing Code section 103.1.1. The Court will treat the start date of this

construction as June 15, 2014. Therefore, Defendants have maintained code violations at this

property since at least June 15, 2014 through the conclusion of evidence in this case on January 12,

2017-for 943 days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

395. Defendants performed construction in the basement of 19TH STREET between June

2014 and June 2015. (Tr. 819:8-24.) Defendants did not obtain, and have not obtained, any permits

for this work. (Tr. 2987:7-20, 3058:5-19). This violated Building Code sections 102A and 106A,

Housing Code sections 103 and 301, Electrical Code section 89.120, and Plumbing Code section

103.1.1. The Court will treat the start date of this construction as July 15, 2015. Therefore,

Defendants have maintained code violations at this property since at least July 15, 2015 through the

conclusion of evidence in this case on January 12, 2017-for 548 days. The Court finds that this

constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

396. Based on the foregoing l 9TH STREET was out of compliance with the Building,

Housing, Plumbing, Electrical, and/or Mechanical Codes from at least June 15, 2014 through at least

outstanding fines to DBI. However, to be conservative, the Court adopts the Plaintiff's calculation of
the abatement date as the date DBI determined the violations were abated, which is either the date of
the final inspection, or a few days afterward, in cases where a supervisor needed to review and
approve the final sign off. (Plaintiff's Amended Post Trial Brief, at 15.)

117
January 12, 2017. Therefore, Defendants maintained 19TH STREET as a public nuisance, and in

violation of municipal law and the State Housing Law, for a total of nine hundred forty-three (943)

days.

397. KIHAGI, as agent, and XELAN, the owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for all nine hundred forty-three (943) days 19TH STREET was out of compliance.

398. KIHAGI, as agent, and XELAN, the owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for two (2) UCL violations.

3. FILBERT STREET

399. On April 15, 2014, DBI's Plumbing Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201466901) citing Defendants for plumbing work without permit in violation of Plumbing Code

section 103.1.1. DBI gave Defendants a 15-day grace period, until April 30, 2014, to obtain permits

and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants did not abate the violations until July 16,

2014. (Ex. 255; Tr. 3020:19-3023:1.) Excluding DBI's grace period, these Plumbing Code

violations existed at the property for seventy-seven (77) days. The Court finds that this constitutes

one (1) UCL violation.

400. On April 17, 2014, DBI's Electrical Division issued a Notice of Violation
(#201465525) citing Defendants for electrical work without a permit in violation of Electrical Code

section 89.120 and Building Code section 106A, in Apartments 1000, 1006, 1008, and 1022. The

violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation# 201465525 existed at FILBERT

STREET on April 17, 2014. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period, until May 17, 2014, to

obtain permits and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants did not abate the violations

until February 16, 2016. (JA 94-95; Ex. 254; Tr. 3019:5-3020:13.) Excluding DBI's grace period,

these Electrical Code violations existed at the property for six hundred forty (640) days. The Court

finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

401. On May 5, 2014, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation (#201471351)

citing Housing Code violations including but not limited to, damaged floors, stairs and sink,

malfunctioning doorbell, oven, and missing smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. The violations

and conditions described in Notice of Violation# 201471351 existed at FILBERT STREET on May

11 Sl
 5, 2014. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period, until June 4, 2014, to abate all violations.

Defendants failed to abate the violations until August 5, 2014. (JA 97-98; Exs. 259-261; Tr. 3046:9-

3047:24.) Excluding DBl's grace period, these Housing Code violations existed at the property for

sixty-two (62) days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (I) UCL violation.

402. On May 29, 2014, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation (#201475731),

for work without and in excess of permits in violation of the Building Code, including missing

framing inspections, and installation of ducts and drywall. The NOV included a stop work order

because Defendants' permits had been suspended. On June 12, 2014, after Defendants continued

their unlawful construction work despite the suspended permits and stop work order, DBI issued a

second Notice of Violation (#201475731). On June 18, 2014, because Defendants again continued

their unlawful construction work, DBI issued a third Notice of Violation (#201475731). Defendants

failed to abate these violations, by obtaining the necessary permits and inspections, until February

25, 2016, causing these Building Code violations to persist at the property for six hundred thirty-

eight (638) days. 68 (JA 99; Ex. 256; Tr. 3023:10-3026:24.)

403. On August 22, 2014, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#2014491445) citing Defendants for violations of the Building Code for kitchen and bathroom
remodels in excess of permits in Apartments 1000, 1002, 1006, and 1008-despite the stop work

orders issued on May 29, 2014, June 12, 2014, and June 18, 2014. The NOV required Defendants

to stop all work. DBI gave Defendants a 3-day grace period, until August 25, 2014, to obtain the

requisite inspections to abate the violations. Defendants did not abate the violations until February

25, 2016. (JA IOI; Ex. 257; Tr. 3027:16-3029:9, 3029:27-3030:18.) Excluding DBI's grace period,

these Building Code violations existed at the property for five hundred forty-nine (549) days. 69 The

Court finds that this constitutes one (I) UCL violation.

68
A stop work order was issued pending resolution of an appeal of the permit to the Board of
Permit Appeals at a hearing scheduled for July 16, 2014. (Ex. 256.) As the record is not clear when
the permit was re-instated, the Court will not count these days in violation and will not impose a
penalty under the UCL.
69
A permit for the work was issued May 8 2014, but the permit was suspended per a Board of
Permit Appeals request May 29 2014 and then reinstated February 10, 2016. (Ex. 928.) The Court
will not count violations during this period.

1 lQ
 404. On or about August 22, 2014, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201486121) again citing work without permit and in excess of permit in Apartment 1022, in

violation of Building Code section 106A, and ordering Defendants to stop all work. DBI gave

Defendants a 3-day grace period, until August 25, 2014, to obtain all necessary permits and

inspections, and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants did not abate the violations

until January 14, 2016. (JA 100; Ex. 262; Tr. 3054:1-3055:25.) Excluding DBI's grace period,

these Building Code violations existed at the property for five hundred seven (507) days. The Court

finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

405. On or about February 20, 2015, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201528401) again citing violations of the Building Code for continued work without permit in

Apartments 1000, 1002, 1006, and 1008-despite multiple prior stop work orders-including

removing walls throughout the property and installing heating vents without permits or structural

drawings. DBI gave Defendants a 60-day grace period, until April 21, 2015, to obtain permits and

complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations until February

22, 2016. (JA 102; Ex. 258; Tr. 3043:1-3046:1.) Excluding DBI's grace period, these Building

Code violations existed at the property for three hundred seven (307) days. The Court finds that this
constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

406. On or about February 20, 2015, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201528411) citing even more work without permits and inspections in Apartment 1022, in

violation of Building Code sections 106A and 108A, and several prior stop work orders. DBI gave

Defendants an 80-day grace period, until May 11, 2015, to obtain all necessary permits and

inspections, and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations

until January 27, 2016. (JA 103; Ex. 263; Tr. 3056:2-3057:9.) Excluding DBI's grace period,

Building Code violations existed at the property for two hundred sixty-one (261) days. The Court

finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

407. Despite the fact that Defendants continued their unlawful construction at FILBERT

STREET after DBI issued many stop work orders, the Court excludes from its calculation any days

that FILBERT STREET had ongoing violations while the permits were suspended pending a

1 ')()
determination by the Board of Appeal. The Court also excludes DBl's grace periods, which the

Court will not count as dates in violation (City and County ofSan Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77

Cal.App.4th 1302). Further, the Court will not count days in violation that preceded June 4, 2014-

one year prior to the day the Complaint was filed because of the statute of limitations which is

discussed below. Accordingly, the Court finds that FILBERT STREET was out of compliance with

the Building, Housing, Plumbing, Electrical, and/or Mechanical Codes from at least June 4, 2014

though February 25, 2016. Therefore, Defendants maintained FILBERT STREET as a public

nuisance, and in violation of municipal law and the State Housing Law, for a total of six hundred

thirty-two (632) days.

408. KIHAGI, as agent, and XELAN, the owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for all six hundred thirty-two (632) days FILBERT STREET was out of compliance.

409. KIHAGI, as agent, and XELAN, the owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for seven (7) UCL violations.

4. EUREKA STREET

410. On March 19, 2014, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201459451) citing violations of the Building Code for "unsafe building." DBI gave Defendants a
28-day grace period, until April 16, 2014, to obtain a structural engineer's report. On August 21,

2014, DBI issued a second Notice of Violation (#201459451) for failing to comply with the first

Notice of Violation. Defendants failed to abate the violations until February 24, 2015. (JA 110; Ex.
266; Tr. 3067:3-3069:7, 3098:12-18.) Excluding DBl's grace period, these Building Code violations

existed at the property for three hundred fourteen (314) days. The Court finds that this constitutes

one (1) UCL violation.

411. On August 22, 2014, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201491191) citing violations of the Housing Code, including but not limited to, improper garbage

storage and missing smoke detectors, and deeming the property a public nuisance. The violations

and conditions described in Notice of Violation# 201491191 existed at EUREKA STREET on

August 22, 2014. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period, until September 21, 2014, to

complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations until December

1')1
18, 2014. (JA 111-112; Ex. 267; Tr. 3059:9-3060:3.) Excluding DBI's grace period, these Housing

Code violations existed at the property for eighty-eight (88) days. The Court finds that this

constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

412. On December 30, 2014, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201412021) citing unpermitted construction in Apartment 5 and addition of an illegal apartment in·

the basement, in violation of Building Code section 106A. DBI gave Defendants a 90-day grace

period, until March 30, 2015, to abate the violations. Defendants failed to fully correct or abate the

violations listed, contained, or described in Notice of Violation # 201412021 within 90 days, and the

violations remain outstanding. (JA 123-124; Ex. 268; Tr. 3060:4-3061:18.) Therefore, excluding

DBl's grace period, Defendants have maintained Building code violations at this property from

March 31, 2015 through the conclusion of evidence in this case on January 12, 201 7-for six

hundred fifty-four (654) days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

413. On February 3, 2015, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201523691) citing work in excess of permits in Apartment 5 for gutting a kitchen and bathroom

down to the studs, and removing and rebuilding interior walls, and because ''the entire apartment has

been demolished." DBI gave Defendants a 90-day grace period, until May 4, 2015, to obtain permits
and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations until July 27,

2015. (JA 129; Ex. 270; Tr. 3064:6-3065:4.) Excluding DBI's grace period, the Building Code

violations existed at the property for eighty-four (84) days. The Court finds that this constitutes one

(1) UCL violation.

414. On March 19, 2015, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201531531) citing Housing Code violations including but not limited to, damaged exit stairs,

missing carbon monoxide detectors, damaged floors, windows, paint, and ceilings, and missing

weatherproofing. The violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation # 201531531

existed at EUREKA STREET on March 19, 2015. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period,

until April 18, 2015, to abate the violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations until June 11,

2015. (JA 134-135; Ex. 269; Tr. 3062:24-3063:21.) Excluding DBI's grace periods, these Housing
Code violations existed at the property for fifty-four (54) days. The Court finds that this constitutes

one (1) UCL violation.

415. The Court excludes DBI's grace periods, which the Court does not count as dates in

violation (City and County ofSan Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1302). Further, the

Court will not count days in violation that preceded June 4, 2014-one year prior to the day the

Complaint was filed. EUREKA STREET was out of compliance with the Building, Housing,

Plumbing, Electrical, and/or Mechanical Codes from at least June 4, 2014 through February 24, 2015

(266 days), and from March 31, 2015 through at least January 12, 2017 (654 days). Therefore,

Defendants maintained EUREKA STREET as a public nuisance, and in violation of municipal law

and the State Housing Law, for a total of nine hundred twenty (920) days.

416. KIHAGI, as agent, and RENK.A, an owner of record, are jointly and severally liable for

seven hundred fifty-eight (758) of the days EUREKA STREET was out of compliance. KIHAGI, as

agent, and RENK.A and J. MWANGI, as owners of record, are jointly and severally liable for one

hundred sixty-two (162) of the days EUREKA STREET was out of compliance.

417. KIHAGI, as agent, and RENK.A, an owner of record, are also jointly and severally

liable for three (3) UCL violations. KIHAGI, as agent, and RENK.A and J. MWANGI, as owners of
record, are jointly and severally liable for two (2) UCL violations.
5. GUERRERO STREET

418. On June 30, 2014, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation (#201482791)

for violations of the Housing Code in Apartment 1139, including damaged flooring and

weatherproofing. The violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation(# 201482791)

existed at GUERRERO STREET on June 30, 2014. DBI gave Defendants a 15-day grace period,

until July 15, 2014 to obtain all necessary permits and complete all work to abate the violations.

Defendants failed to abate the violations by July 15, 2014. On August 26, 2014, DBI granted

Defendants an extension of time until September 10, 2014, to abate all violations. Defendants did

not abate the violations until November 4, 2014. (JA 144-145; Ex. 273; Tr. 3006:4-21.) Excluding

DBI's grace periods, these Housing Code violations existed at the property for ninety-seven (97)
days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.
 419. On or about July 3, 2014, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201484471) citing violations of the Housing Code. The violations and conditions described in

Notice of Violation(# 201484471) existed at GUERRERO STREET on July 3, 2014. DBI gave

Defendants a 15-day grace period, until July 18, 2014, to abate all violations. Defendants did not

abate the violations until September 12, 2014. Excluding DBI's grace period, these Housing Code

violations existed at the property for fifty-six (56) days. (JA 146-147; Ex. 274; Tr. 3006:24-

3007:28.) The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

420. On or about September 24, 2014, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201496361) citing violations of the Housing Code related to the disruption of electrical service in

the common areas. The violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation# 201496361

existed at GUERRERO STREET on September 24, 2014. DBI gave Defendants a 2-day grace

period to abate the violations until September 25, 2014. Defendants failed to abate the violations

until October 30, 2014. Excluding DBI's grace period, these Housing Code violations existed at the

property for thirty-five (35) days. (JA 150-151; Ex. 275; Tr. 3008:9-3009:7.) The Court finds that

this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

421. On or about November 6, 2014, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation
(#201406891) citing violations of the Housing Code including lack of adequate lighting, failure to

secure entry doors, damaged windows and floors, and missing handrails. The violations and

conditions described in Notice of Violation(# 201496361) existed at GUERRERO STREET on

November 6, 2014. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period, until December 6, 2014, to abate

all violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations until February 12, 2015. Excluding DBI's

grace period, these Housing Code violations existed at the property for sixty-eight (68) days. (JA

152-153; Ex. 276; Tr. 3009:10-3010:3.) The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

422. On March 4, 2015 DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation (#201531211)

citing violations of the Housing Code, including but not limited to, hazardous mechanical

equipment, missing smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, and damaged windows and walls. The

violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation(# 201531211) existed at GUERRERO

STREET on March 4, 2015. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period, until April 3, 2015, to
abate the violations. Defendants failed to abate the violations until June 4, 2015. Excluding DBI's

grace period, these Housing Code violations existed at the property for sixty-two (62) days. (JA

158-159; Ex. 277; Tr. 3010:6-3011:17.) The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

423. On March 4, 2015, DBI's Plumbing Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201532021) citing violations of the Plumbing and Mechanical Code, including improper

installation of a water heater. The violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation#

201532021 existed at GUERRERO STREET on March 4, 2015. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day

grace period, until April 3, 2015, to obtain all necessary permits and abate the violations.

Defendants did not abate the violations until June 5, 2015. Excluding DBI's grace period, these

Housing Code violations existed at the property for sixty-three (63) days. (JA 156-157; Ex. 278;

3011:21-3012:25.) The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

424. In March and April 2015, Defendants began construction on the heating system of

Guerrero Street before they obtained a permit for the work. Conservatively, the Court will treat the

start date of this construction as April 15, 2015. The construction work involved cutting holes

through exterior walls, and creating a hole that went from the bottom of the ground-floor apartments,

through the intervening floors and ceilings to the top of the third-floor apartments. (Tr. 1778:19-
1780:17, 2242:25-27, 2994:18-2995:23, 3002:12-28; Ex. 393.) Defendants have not obtained

permits that cover this scope of work. (Tr. 2989:15-23.) Defendants' conduct violated Building

Code section 106A, and Housing Code sections 103 and 301, and Plumbing Code section 103.1.1.

Therefore, code violations have existed at this property since at least April 15, 2015 through the

conclusion of evidence in this case on January 12, 2017-for six hundred thirty-nine (639) days.

The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

425. From November 2015 until February 24, 2016, Defendants failed to provide heat to

Apartment 1135A. The Court will treat the start date for the lack of heat as November 15, 2015.

Defendants' failure to provide heat violated Housing Code sections 701 and 1001. The property was

out of compliance due to these violations for one hundred two (102) days. (Tr. 2436:14-2441:6,

2514:2-2516:14.) The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.
 426. In April 2016 Defendants cut another vent through the entire building at GUERRERO

STREET running from the floor of Apartment 1135A to the ceiling of Apartment 1139A. The Court

will treat the start date of this construction as April 15, 2015. Defendants then walled over the

hallway window in Apartment 1139A to create the vent. As a result, Johnson and Hembury have no

light in that portion of their apartment. (Tr. 2297:6-2298:21; Ex. 408.) Defendants have not

obtained permits that cover this scope of work. (Tr. 2989:15-23, 2994:18-2995:23, 3002:12-28,

3004:24-3005:11.) Defendants' conduct violated Building Code section 106A, and Housing Code

sections 103 and 301. Therefore, code violations existed at this property since at least April 15,

2015 through the conclusion of evidence in this case on January 12, 2017-for 639 days. The Court

finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

427. Based on the foregoing, and excluding DBI's grace periods which the Court does not

count as dates in violation (City and County ofSan Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th

1302), GUERRERO STREET was out of compliance with the Building, Housing, Plumbing,

Electrical, and/or Mechanical Codes from July 16, 2014 through November 4, 2014 (112 days), from

December 7, 2014 through February 12, 2015 (68 days), and from April 4, 2015 through January 12,

2017 (650 days). Therefore, Defendants maintained GUERRERO STREET as a public nuisance,
and in violation of municipal law and the State Housing Law, for a total of eight hundred thirty (830)

days.

428. KIHAGI, as agent, and RENK.A, the owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for all eight hundred thirty (830) days GUERRERO STREET was out of compliance.

429. KIHAGI, as agent, and RENK.A, the owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for nine (9) UCL violations.

6. HILL STREET

430. In October 2014, Defendants replaced the leaking water heater in Apartment 71 without

permits and in a substandard manner, in violation of Plumbing Code section 103.1.1. (Tr. 1473:16-

1474:2; 1474:12-23, 3013:7-12; Ex. 193, 195.) The Court will treat the start date of this violation as

October 15, 2014. Defendants did not correct this condition until ordered to do so by a Plumbing

Inspector on March 4, 2015. (Tr. 1474:3-9; 1474:27-1475:19, 1608:1-9; 1608:20-1609:9.)

Therefore, these Plumbing Code violations existed at the property for one hundred forty-one (141)

days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

431. On March 4, 2015, Defendants constructed a barricade wall at the bottom of the rear

exterior staircase, blocking egress and access to the garage. (Tr. 900:22-901 :6; 901: 15-902:6;

902:13-903:1; 904:26-905:5; 987:26-988:6; 1077:16-17.; 1078:6-19; 1260:15-1261:4; 1353:1-22;

1469:16-24; 1479:14-1480-15.) Exs. 198, 362, 363.) Defendants did not obtain permits for this

work, which violated Building Code sections 102A and 106A. (Tr. 3012:26-3013:6.) The

unpermitted barricade wall remains at the property, posing a safety hazard since egress is restricted.

Therefore, these Building Code violations existed at this property since March 4, 2015 through the

conclusion of evidence in this case on January 12, 2017-for six hundred eighty-one (681) days.

The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

432. On March 13, 2015, DBI's Housing Division issued a Notice of Violation·

(#201531221) citing many violations of the Housing Code, including but not limited to hazardous

mechanical equipment, missing smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, and broken windows. The

violations and conditions described in Notice of Violation# 201531221 existed at HILL STREET on

March 13, 2015. DBI gave Defendants a 30-day grace period, until April 12, 2015, to abate the
violations. (JA 167-168; Ex. 282; Tr. 3013:21-3014:11) Defendants did not abate the violations

until June 4, 2015. Excluding DBI's grace period, these Housing Code violations existed at the

property for fifty-three (53) days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (1) UCL violation.

433. On February 10, 2016, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201693601) citing work beyond the scope of Defendants' permits, in violation of Building Code

section 106A. DBI gave Defendants a 90-day grace period, until May 10, 2016, to obtain permits

and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants have not abated the violations to date.

(Tr. 3016:1-3018:22; Ex. 284.) Excluding DBI's grace period, these Building Code violations

existed at the property from May 10, 2016 through the conclusion of evidence in this case on

January 12, 2017-two hundred forty-seven (247) days. The Court finds that this constitutes one

(1) UCL violation.

1"J7
 434. On March 24, 2016, DBI's Building Division issued a Notice of Violation

(#201608101) citing substantial work without permit in violation of Building Code section 106A.

Tenants testified that this work began in October 2015. DBI gave Defendants a 90-day grace period,

until June 22, 2016, to obtain permits and complete all work to abate the violations. Defendants

have not abated the violations to date. (Tr. 935:19-936:10; 937:11-938:3, 3014:14-3015:26; Ex.

283.) Using October 15, 2015 as the start date for the unpermitted construction, the property was out

of compliance for 161 days before DBI cited Defendants on March 24, 2016, and for 204 from the

end ofDBI's grace period on June 22, 2016 through the conclusion of evidence in this case on

January 12, 2017. Therefore, excluding DBI's grace period, these Building Code violations existed

at the property for three hundred sixty-five (365) days. The Court finds that this constitutes one (1)

UCL violation.

435. Based on the foregoing, and excluding DBI's grace periods, which the Court does not

count as dates in violation (City and County ofSan Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th

1302), HILL STREET was out of compliance with the Building, Housing, Plumbing, Electrical,

and/or Mechanical Codes from October 15, 2014 through at least January 12, 2017. Therefore,

Defendants maintained HILL STREET as a public nuisance, and in violation of municipal law and
the State Housing Law, for a total of eight hundred twenty-one (821) days.

436. KIHAGI, as agent, and ZORIALL, an owner of record, are jointly and severally liable

for six hundred thirty-three (633) days HILL STREET was out of compliance. KIHAGI, as agent,

and ZORIALL, an owner of record, are also jointly and severally liable for four (4) UCL violations.

KIHAGI, as agent, and ZORIALL and C. MWANGI, as owners of record, are jointly and severally

liable for one hundred eighty-eight (188) of the days HILL STREET was out of compliance.

437. KIHAGI, as agent, and ZORIALL, an owner of record, are also jointly and severally

liable for four (4) UCL violations. KIHAGI, as agent, and ZORIALL and C. MWANGI, as owners

of record, are jointly and severally liable for one ( 1) UCL violation.
 B. The Conditions at Defendants' Buildings Substantially Endangered the Safety or
Welfare of the Occupants and General Public, Entitling Plaintiffs to Recover
Attorney's Fees and Costs.

438. California Health and Safety Code section 17980.7(d) provides, in relevant part: "If the

court finds that a building is in a condition which substantially endangers the health and safety of

residents pursuant to Section 17980, upon the entry of any order or judgment, the court shall do all

of the following: (1) Order the owner to pay all reasonable and actual costs of the enforcement

agency, including but not limited to, inspection costs, investigation costs, enforcement costs,

attorney fee or costs, and all costs of prosecution." (Health & Safety. Code§ 17980.7(d)(l).)

439. Plaintiffs presented overwhelming evidence in the form of credible and competent

testimony from both DBI Deputy Director Dan Lowrey, and DBI Chief Housing Inspector Rosemary

Bosque that Defendants substantially endangered the safety or welfare of residents, and the general

public by creating and maintaining serious code violations. (Ex. 420.)

440. Both witnesses testified that DBI requires property owners to obtain permits for certain

work to protect "life safety" and that it is inherently dangerous to perform work without permits and

inspections. Obtaining a permit triggers DBI oversight for construction work in the form of

inspections and project review. This DBI oversight is critical to ensure both that all work is

performed in a safe and timely manner with minimal environmental effects on a building's

occupants, and that the end-result is code-compliant and does not endanger public safety. It is also

critical to providing occupants and neighbors with their due process to object or appeal. (Tr. 2957:8-

16, 2958:17-2959:3, 3182:17-3184:28, 3185:8-13.)

441. The Court found Chief Bosque to be highly qualified in building safety issues and a

highly credible witness. She testified that if work is performed without permits in buildings built

before 1979-such as each building at issue in this case-no safeguards will be put in place to

protect tenants from exposure to lead and asbestos, including proper containment barriers and

adequate notice to the occupants. It is particularly important where, as here, children are present in

the building. (Tr. 3186:21-26, 3187:20-3188:6.)

442. Chief Bosque also serves as the chair of the San Francisco Fire Task Force. She

testified that the City passed legislation triggering property owners of multi-family buildings to

1 ')Q
make retroactive safety improvements when obtaining a permit for work over a certain monetary

threshold. Where, as here, a property owner has a pattern and practice of performing work without

permits, it will not trigger those particular retroactive conditions, which is very dangerous for the

occupants of the building. (Tr. 3185:14-25.)

443. Both witnesses testified that during their tenure at DBI, they have seen work without

permit result in serious life safety hazards, including cross-contamination of plumbing water and

waste lines causing illness, faulty electrical wiring causing a fire, improper venting causing carbon

monoxide poisoning, and substandard construction resulting in building collapse. (Tr. 2957:17-

2958:12, 3029:19-26, 3066:15-20, 3189:10-28, 3190:4-10.) It is critical for DBI to supervise and

inspect this work, which the permitting process triggers, to ensure construction does not substantially

endanger public safety.

444. Deputy Director Lowrey testified that uninspected modem electrical wiring could be

"hazardous." (Tr. 3161:2-14.)

445. Chief Bosque testified that failure to perform adequate maintenance at a property, such

as failing to ensure that a central alarm system at GUERRERO STREET is functional, directly and

substantially endangers the occupants of the property, the occupants of adjacent structures, and of

the first responders. (Tr. 3189:10-28.)

446. Chief Bosque testified regarding the threat of harm to residents created by Defendants'

unpermitted construction at 18TH STREET, built in 1912. She testified that DBI's Building

Division had cited Defendants for performing work beyond the scope of their permit, such as

sheetrock replacement throughout the living and bedroom areas, and electrical and plumbing work

that had been covered up thereby creating significant safety hazards. She testified that, in addition to

the significant lack of agency oversight, the removal of sheetrock takes away the required

fireproofing in an occupied building, which creates a fire hazard for the occupants within the

building, as well as the neighboring structures and occupants within those structures. Because l 8TH

STREET is an older building, it is more vulnerable to fire because the building lacks up to date fire

protections. Further, covering up plumbing and electrical work without inspections denies DBI the

opportunity to verify ifthe work was done properly, and by definition under state and local law, that

110
makes the building unsafe. Electrical work done improperly creates a risk of fire. Plumbing work

done improperly creates risk of cross contamination, sewer gases, leaks, and moisture retention. By

doing work without permit on this older building, Defendants heightened the degree and likelihood

of harm. Buildings of this age also carry the risk of environmental hazards such as disturbing

surfaces presumed to have lead paint, which requires the undertaking of special precautions. (Tr.

3198:27-3201:17, 3202:27-3205:8; Exs. 248, 420.)

44 7. Chief Bosque testified about the numerous and varied threats of harm to residents

caused by Defendants unpermitted construction and remodel work at FILBERT STREET, built in

1912. First, she testified that DBI's Electrical Division cited Defendants at FILBERT STREET for

performing unpermitted electrical work, including new subpanel, feeders, wiring installed to all five

units, and service panels, in Apartments 1000-1008, and then later discovered additional unpermitted

remodel work in Apartment 1022. Undertaking such extensive electrical work creates a threat of fire

from overloading the system, impacting the electrical service to the whole building, and rendering

items such as fire alarms inoperative, creating a risk of a "serious tragedy." Chief Bosque further

testified that DBI' s Plumbing Division had also cited Defendants for extensive unpermitted

plumbing work, including new waste vent and gas piping serving eight apartments, in a seven-

apartment building. The risk of harm to residents for the improper plumbing work like water heater

installations, which requires proper venting and properly installed pressure relief valves, includes

explosions. She testified that Defendants' practice of continuing to do work after there had been

three stop work orders, the lack of framing inspections, and the duct work, was troubling. She

testified that DBI' s Building Division cited Defendants again for completing kitchen and bath

remodels in Apartments 1000, 1002, 1006, and 1008 without inspections, and then renting the

apartments. She also testified that DBI's Building Division cited Defendants again for completing

construction work without the benefit of rough framing and insulation, and for removing walls

without required structural drawings in Apartments 1000, 1002, 1006, and 1008, as well as heating

ducts installed in garage without permit. Chief Bosque described the extensive unpermitted work as

''troubling," stating that the "threat of harm goes up exponentially, because now you are dealing with

structural components of the building with no regulatory oversight." Chief Bosque also testified that

111
the Housing Division had cited Defendants for dangerous dry-rotted staircases, which is a serious

safety hazard. She testified that DBI's Building Division had also cited Defendants for construction

in Apartment 1022 without required framing inspections, which raises the risk of compromising the

building's structural integrity and possible collapse. Chief Bosque further testified that the level of

substantial endangerment to the people at FILBERT STREET increased when Defendants again

performed substantial kitchen and bath remodels in Apartment 1022 without required inspections,

and removed walls in the kitchen area without permits or structural drawings. (Tr. 3210:3-3217:15,

3221 :22-3223:28, 3226:19-3230:12, 3230:18-3233:22, 3233:24-3238:15, 3238:19-3240:19; 3241 :3-

3243:6, 3243:7-3248:2, 3248:4-3250:9; Exs. 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 420.)

448. Chief Bosque testified to the risk of harm caused to residents by Defendants'

unpermitted construction at the EUREKA STREET property. The danger to residents includes the

threat of fire, structural issues, and lingering questions as to the extent of Defendants' unpermitted

and uninspected electrical and plumbing work. She also testified to the dangers presented by the

damaged stairway system, including extensive wood deterioration, a lack of handrails, and

improperly installed flue pipe for the water heater. In addition, she testified that DBI's Building

Division cited Defendants for performing work exceeding the scope of permit when they relocated

the kitchen, gutted the walls to the bare studs, removed a partition wall, relocated the kitchen sink

and stove, relocated water and gas connections, and gutted the bathroom, a scope of unpermitted

work she described as "disturbing" and "alarming." (Tr. 3252:26-3254:25, 3254:27-3256:25;

3261:11-3263:20; Exs. 268, 269, 270, 420.)

449. Chief Bosque testified that failure to perform adequate maintenance at a property, such

ensuring that a central alarm system at GUERRERO STREET is functional, directly and

substantially endangers the occupants of the property, the occupants of adjacent structures, and of

the first responders. Likewise, Defendants' unpermitted and improper installation of wall heater

flues and water heater flues created risk of carbon monoxide poisoning. (Tr. 3189: 10-28, 3266: 19-

3273:21, 3278:19-3280:16; Exs. 275, 278, 420.)

450. Chief Bosque testified regarding the risk of harm to residents caused by Defendants'

unpermitted construction at HILL STREET, built in 1880. Raising the roof ceiling by 12 inches

11?
without permits created enormous structural risk issues, as did the installation of windows with new

openings, which also created the risk of moisture intrusion. (Tr. 3283:24-3287:7, Exs. 283, 284,

420.)

451. Hartz, a former tenant at 19TH STREET, from June 2014 to July 2015, testified that

when he and his wife toured the 19th STREET building, at the very beginning of2014, Defendant

KIHAGI showed them two vacant units - Apartment 3 (one bedroom/one bath) and Apartment 4

(two bedroom/one bath) - which they witnessed in the process of being remodeled. They eventually

leased Apartment 3, and their lease began June 18, 2014. When they moved in, Apartment 4 was

still vacant, and remained vacant for several months before becoming occupied. During most of the

year they lived in Apartment 3, there was unpermitted construction going on in an unpermitted

basement apartment, which was eventually rented. In June 2014, when they moved in, the heating

system was not working. They made several complaints about it to KIHAGI, but did not report it to

DBI. It was not fixed until January 2015. While DBI was not made aware of the unsafe conditions

described by Hartz, the undisputed facts remain that Defendants created substantial danger to

residents when they performed illegal remodeling, illegally constructed a seventh unit which was

rented, and rented apartments without a functional heating system. (Tr. 809:9-22, 810:12-15;
814:17-20; 815:7-817:2, 818:5-21, 819:5-820:22, 821:20-824:4, 827:22-830:4, 840:17-20, 842:25-

844:1, 3057:10-3058:19.)

452. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that several of Defendants' buildings were at

various times between 2014 and the present, in a condition which substantially endangered the

health and safety of residents, at all of the following properties: 18TH STREET, FILBERT

STREET, EUREKA STREET, GUERRERO, HILL STREET, and l 9TH STREET.

453. Upon the entry of judgment, the Court will order the owner(s) to pay all reasonable and

actual costs of the enforcement agency, including but not limited to, inspection costs, investigation

costs, enforcement costs, attorney fees or costs, and all costs of prosecution.
C. Defendants Refused or Impeded Lawful Inspections

454. San Francisco Building Code section I 02A.3 provides, in relevant part: "The Building

Official may inspect or cause the inspection of any building, structure or property for the purpose of

111
determining whether it is unsafe whenever: (a) The Building Official, with reasonable discretion,

determines that such inspection is necessary or desirable; or, (b) Any person or agency or department

of the City submits to the Building Official a complaint which, in the Building Official's opinion,

establishes reasonable cause to believe that the building, structure or property or any portion thereof

is unsafe." (Building Code§ 102A.3.) Likewise, San Francisco Housing Code section 303

provides, in relevant part: "Inspections may be performed throughout dwelling units, guest rooms,

guest room suites, or portion of a building used for or intended for residential use, or accessory to

residential use, upon receipt of occupant complaints, or ifthe Director of the Department of Building

Inspection with reasonable discretion finds that such an inspection is necessary to determine if an

unsafe or substandard condition exists as defined by this code." (Housing Code §303(a).)

455. Plaintiffs presented evidence of Defendants' numerous refusals to permit lawful,

noticed inspections of their tenant-occupied properties, following numerous complaints made to DBI

regarding illegal, unpermitted construction, hazardous conditions, and other violations of state and

local health and safety codes at those properties.

456. Defendants repeatedly refused DBI access to their properties so that DBI inspectors

would be unable to verify complaints of code violations. (Tr. 3061: 19-3162:6.)

457. On March 4, 2015, KIHAGI, on behalf ofNOZARI, refused lawful inspections of

18TH STREET. (Tr. 3819:3-3821:3.) Accordingly, the finds that KIHAGI and NOZARI are jointly

and severally liable for one (I) UCL violation.

458. On March 4, 2015, KIHAGI, on behalf ofRENKA refused the City access, when

conducting a lawful inspection, to portions of the GUERRERO STREET common areas, and

interrupted the City's inspection. (Tr. 1785:28-1786:26, 2126:28-2127:11, 2420:18-2421 :25,

3821:4-13.) Accordingly, the Court finds KIHAGI and RENKAjointly and severally liable for one

(1) UCL violation.

459. On March 4, 2015, KIHAGI, on behalf of ZORIALL impeded the City's lawful

inspection of HILL STREET. Defendant KIHAGI attended the inspection, and used her car to

physically block the driveway and closed the front gate to the HILL STREET property. Defendants

also three hired security guards to block the inspectors' access to the main entryway at HILL
 STREET. All tenants at HILL STREET consented to have their apartments and common areas

inspected by the City, and arranged to be present for the inspection or provided their apartment key

to another tenant to provide the City access to their apartment. The City gained access to HILL

STREET when Duncan and Reggars welcomed the City into the common areas and the tenants'

apartments. Defendants' agents, security guards hired by them, then physically prevented tenants

and inspectors from inspecting several common areas, including the entirety of the rear staircase, the

garage, laundry area, and "vacant space" below Hutchinson's apartment, telling tenants "You can't

come down here." Accordingly, the Court finds that KIHAGI and ZORIALL are jointly and

severally liable for one (1) UCL violation for this conduct.

460. On March 5, 2015, KIHAGI, on behalf ofXELAN, refused lawful inspections of

FILBERT STREET. (Tr. 3824:1-7.) Accordingly, the Court finds that KIHAGI and XELAN are

jointly and severally liable for one ( 1) UCL violation for this conduct.

461. On March 5, 2015, KIHAGI, on behalf ofRENKA, attempted to impede lawful

inspections of EUREKA STREET, and prevented inspections of vacant units and common areas.

(Tr. 3822:21-3823:28.) Accordingly, the Court finds that KIHAGI and RENKA are jointly and

severally liable for one (1) UCL violation for this conduct.

462. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that each instance where Defendants refused,

impeded, or attempted to impede lawful health and safety inspections by the City was an unfair

and/or unlawful business practice, in violation of the UCL, and subject to a civil penalty, for a total

number of five (5) UCL violations.

REMEDY
I. EACH DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO PAY CIVIL PENALTIES

463. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges four causes of action, three of which-

Plaintiffs' first, 70 third, and fourth causes of action-provide for statutory civil penalties. At the

close of trial, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend the prayer of the Complaint to conform

70
On January 11, 2017, Plaintiff City and County of San Francisco ("Plaintiff City" or ''the
City") filed a notice of election of remedies, withdrawing its request for statutory and punitive
damages under Plaintiff City's first cause of action for violation of San Francisco Administrative Code
section 37.lOB.
to proof to seek mandatory daily civil penalties pursuant to Plaintiffs' second cause of action for

violations of the Building and Housing Codes, including the applicable penalty sections, and the

third cause of action for public nuisance. (Tr. 4629:8-4632:9; see Housing Code § 204(c)(2);

Building Code§ 103A- both sections were named in§ 175 of the FAC.) Concomitantly, the City

dropped its prayer for statutory and punitive damages under Admin. Code section 37.lO(B).

Additionally, Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for violation of the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"),

codified under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., provides for mandatory civil

penalties which were sought in the prayer. (Bus. & Prof. Code§ 17206(a).) The latter penalties are

cumulative to any other statutory penalties as a matter of law. (Bus. & Prof. Code§ 17205.)
A. Each Defendant is Liable for Civil Penalties for Violating the San Francisco
Housing and Building Codes

464. Defendants are liable to Plaintiff under the San Francisco municipal codes pursuant to

Plaintiff's second cause of action for violating the San Francisco Building and /or Housing Codes,

and the third cause of action for per se public nuisance for violations of the San Francisco Building

and/or Housing Codes.

465. "Any person, the owner or the owner's authorized agent, who violates, disobeys, omits,

neglects, or refuses to comply with, or resists or opposes the execution of any of the provisions of

[the San Francisco Building] code, shall be liable for a civil penalty, not to exceed $500 for each day

such violation is committed or permitted to continue, which penalty shall be assessed and recovered

in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the City and County of San Francisco by the

City Attorney in any court of competent jurisdiction." (Building Code § 103A; Electrical Code §

89.125; Plumbing Code§ 106.3; Mechanical Code§ 106.7 (each provision awarding up to $500 in

mandatory daily civil penalties).)

466. "Any person or entity violating [the San Francisco Housing] Code shall be liable for a

civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each day such violation is committed or permitted to continue,

which penalty shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of

the City and County of San Francisco by the City Attorney in any court of competent jurisdiction."

(Housing Code§ 204(c)(2).) Under the Housing Code, the term "person" is defined as "any person,
 firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, company, municipal, state or

federal agency, executors, administrators, successors, assigns or agents or their heirs." (Housing

Code§ 401.)

467. The imposition of civil penalties is mandatory and cannot be waived. The penalties are

cumulative. (Building Code§ 103A.3.5; Housing Code§ 204(c)(3).) The penalties are not

exclusive, and are in addition to any other relief Plaintiff City is entitled to under law. (Building

Code§ 102.A.8; Housing Code§ 204(c)(3).)

468. Based on the statutory language of the municipal codes, which imposes liability on

"any person, the owner or the owner's agent" under the Building Code, and "any person or entity"

under the Housing Code, Defendants are jointly and severally liable for penalties under the Building

and/or Housing Codes. 71 Because KIHAGI was a manager, agent and/or owner of every Defendant

LLC, she is individually liable for all penalties while she was the sole owner of record of a property,

and jointly and severally liable for all other penalties. Every Defendant LLC is jointly and severally

liable for all penalties associated with a property during its period of ownership. 72 C. MWANGI and

J. MWANGI are jointly and severally liable for all penalties associated with a property during their

periods of ownership.
469. In its post trial brief, Plaintiff City recognized the applicable one-year statute of

limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340a, and that only civil penalties under the San

Francisco Housing and/or Building Codes going back in time one year from the date of Plaintiff's

original complaint, which was filed on June 4, 2015, are recoverable. (See Plaintiffs' Amended Post

Trial Brief, at 14 n.6.) The Court has not considered, and not factored into its award, any violations

pertaining to notices of violation that preceded the applicable one year statutory period. Plaintiff

City requests civil penalties of $500 per day for every day that Defendants' buildings were out of

compliance with any of the Municipal Codes, and is not seeking duplicative penalties under both the

71
The phrase "any person," is the same phrase used in Business and Professions Code section
l 7206(a) governing the UCL, which has case law allowing for joint and several liability, as discussed
below.
72
The Building Code defines "any person" as ''the owner or the owner's authorized agent."
(Building Code§ 103A.) Thus, each Defendant LLC is liable as an owner of record. In the
alternative, the Court finds that each Defendant LLC is liable under the Housing Code.

117
 Building and Housing Codes. 73 (Id. at 14.) The Court declines Plaintiff's request to impose $500

per day per violation, and, as explained below and applying all of the statutory factors, finds that a

penalty of $250 per day per violation is reasonable.

470. In determining what constitutes a reasonable penalty within the parameters of the

Building Code and/or Housing Code, the Court considers the factors set forth in Housing Code

section204(c)(2), which states: "In assessing the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall

consider any one or more of the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case,

but not limited to, the following: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of

violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred,

the willfulness of the defendant's misconduct, and the defendant's asset's, liabilities and net worth."

These factors are the same factors set forth in Business and Professions Code section l 7206(b),

which the Court discusses in detail below in Section B. Given the inordinate number of violations,

the willfulness of them that includes failing to comply with stop work and abatement orders, the

seriousness of the violations, many of which posed significant safety hazards, the persistence of the

conduct and the length of time of the conduct, and that Defendants' net worth is at least $25 million,

the Court would have been within its discretion to award maximum penalties of $1000 per day under

the Housing Code.

471. The Court is also guided by the Court of Appeal in City & Cty. ofSan Francisco v.

Sainez ("Sainez'') (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1302 1313-23. As in Sainez, the Court finds that there is
no evidence in the record that "any good faith efforts at remediation or compliance were impeded by

unreasonable inaction or demands by the City." (Id at 1314.) Defendants' expert Mr. Harrington

said he had the utmost respect for the building and housing inspectors, and could not point to one

example of city inspectors somehow impeding remediation or making unreasonable demands of

Defendants.

73
Since the penalties under the San Francisco Building, Plumbing, Mechanical, and Electrical
Codes are the same, the Court addresses penalties based on the San Francisco Building Code and the
Housing Code.

1'.Hl
 4 72. The Court further finds the amount of penalties to be "proportional to the number of

violations" and "the flagrant disregard of the violations," as evidenced by Defendants' efforts to

cover up violations, attempts to prevent inspectors from accessing certain areas of the properties,

failure to show up for re-inspections, failure to appear at Directors hearings, failure to correct

violations despite the City and DBI's warning and extensions of the correction or abatement periods,

failure to comply with stop work orders and misrepresentations of the scope of work. (Id at 1313,

citing Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 398.) As

discussed in detail in mf 438-453 herein, the Court finds substantial evidence exists as to the

egregious nature of the violations. As in Sainez, the Court finds that Defendants allowed serious

conditions to worsen and persist and then used those very conditions as an excuse to try to evict

elderly or disabled, long term low rent tenants. Numerous violations consisted of unacceptable

health and safety violations that jeopardized tenants' well being. Additionally, there were repeated

unacceptable delays in responding to tenants, even for emergencies such as power failures or water

being cut off. Indeed, the record shows KIHAGI reprimanding tenants for calling her. As KIHAGI's

own property management expert testified, it is crucial that the landlord be reachable 24 hours a day

seven days a week for emergencies.

473. The Court also considered that, similar to the defendants in Sainez, KIHAGI is a highly

sophisticated property owner, owning multi rental and residential properties throughout San

Francisco and other areas of California. She was a frequent visitor to the building department. She

has engaged numerous attorneys from the outset of her acquisition of the properties at issue. She

graduated from University of California and was a financial analyst for many years.

474. Moreover, "substantive due process protection against civil penalties ... allows inquiry

into a defendants' full net worth for purposes of civil penalties, not just the value of the particular

property at issue in the case." (Id. at 1319.) The total amount of penalties imposed here is a

relatively small percentage ( between 10 and 11 %) of defendants' net worth, which has been

deemed to be at least $25 million, and a far lower percentage than has consistently been upheld by

appellate courts. Thus, the Court finds that the penalties are not excessive. (See Sainez, supra, 77

Cal. App. 4th at 1319 [upholding penalties of $663,000 constituting 28.4 percent of defendants' net

110
worth and 120 percent of total rents due for the two-year period in which the violations existed]; cf

Ba/moral Hotel Tenants Assn. v. Lee (1990) 226 Cal. App. 3d 686, 696 [finding penalties of$4.8

million excessive as exceeding 50 percent of defendant's net worth of $7 million].)

475. In Sainez, the court further assessed whether the penalties violated the Excessive Fines
Clause, based on the defendants' ability to pay the penalty, the nature of the defendant's crime and

the criminal punishment, the harm the defendant caused, and other penalties for like offenses. (Id. at

1322, citing United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334, and United States v. Lippert (8th

Cir. 1998) 148 F.3d 974, 978.) As in Sainez, the Court finds that Defendants are able to pay the

penalty imposed here based on their net worth of $25 million. As discussed throughout the body of

this Decision, the Court finds that Defendants committed numerous and repeated violations of health

and safety, building, and housing codes, seriously affecting public health and safety. Finally, the

Court finds no serious disparity between the penalty imposed here and other comparable and

permissible penalties. As noted, the Court imposes a penalty of $250 per day per violation.

Building Code section 103(A) allows for penalties up to $500 per day per violation, and the penalties

under Housing Code section 204(c)(2) are more severe, allowing up to $1000 per day per violation.

Also, comparably harsh is the Business and Professions Code section 17206, which allows up to

$2500 "for each violation." (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206(a).) Notwithstanding that counsel for

Plaintiff People of the State of California indicated in closing argument and post trial briefing that it

was no longer requesting such penalties for the Building /Housing Code violations, since the Court

finds that each violation of the municipal codes is an unfair business practice, it must impose a

penalty under the UCL as a matter of law. (People v. Custom Craft Carpets, Inc. ("Custom Craft")

(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 676, 686 ["[T]he court must exact a penalty for each violation committed"

(emphasis in original)].) Accordingly, the Court imposes a nominal $1 penalty per violation under

the UCL in addition to the $250 per day per violation imposed under the Building and/or Housing

Codes. (See Sainez, supra, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1331 [upholding penalties where the trial judge

imposed an unstayed penalty of$1 per violation under the UCL].)

140
 B. Each Defendant is Liable for Civil Penalties for Harassment, Fraud and
Retaliation in Violation of the UCL

476. Under Business and Professions Code section l 7206(a), "[a]ny person who engages,

has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty not to

exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and

recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the

Attorney General, by any district attorney, by any county counsel authorized by agreement with the

district attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, by any city attorney of a city

having a population in excess of750,000, by any city attorney of any city and county, or, with the

consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any city having a full-time city prosecutor, in

any court of competent jurisdiction." The term "person" is defined as "natural persons, corporations,

firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other organizations of persons." ((Bus.

& Profs. Code § 17201.)

477. Business and Professions Code section 17206. l provides an additional civil penalty of

up to $2,500 per violation for "acts of unfair competition are perpetrated against one or more senior

citizens or disabled persons," as defined by the statute (Bus. & Profs. Code§ 17206.l(a)(l).)

478. Civil penalties and other remedies under the UCL are "cumulative to each other and to
the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state." (Bus. & Profs. Code§ 17205.)

4 79. "[P]arties may be held jointly and severally liable for unfair competition and for

making false and misleading statements." (People v. First Federal Credit Corp. ("First FederaI")

(2002), 104 Cal.App.4th 721, 734.) Every defendant that owned part of a building is jointly and

severally liable for the penalties associated with the property. (See, e.g., (People v. Witzerman

("Wizterman") (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 169, 180-21; First Federal, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at 735

[finding that defendants need not participate in a wrongful act directly: allowing it to occur from a

"position of control" is sufficient to trigger joint and several liability]; Myrick v. Mastagni (2010)

185 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1091 [explaining that defendants are liable for all obligations of partnership

or object of joint venture, regardless of share of ownership].) Further, liability under the UCL may

be imposed where a defendant aided and abetted one or more other defendants. (See, e.g., People v.

1 A.1
Toomey ("Toomey") (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 15 [citing cases].) A defendant who aids and abets is

equally liable with those who directly violate the UCL, even if that defendant takes only a small

profit or leaves the actual unlawful acts to others. (See People v. Bestline Products, Inc. (1976) 61

Cal.App.3d 879, 918-19 (quoting American Philatelic Soc. V. Claibourne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 689 696-

97.)

480. Accordingly, because KIHAGI was a manager, agent and/or owner of every Defendant

LLC, and personally engaged in virtually all of the harassing conduct testified to at trial, she is

individually liable for all penalties while she was the sole owner of record of a property, and jointly

and severally liable for all other penalties. Every Defendant LLC is jointly and severally liable for

all penalties associated with a property during its period of ownership. C. MWANGI and J.

MWANGI are jointly and severally liable for all penalties the Court imposes as to unlawful acts that

they contributed to or participated in, as well as all penalties associated with a property during their

periods of ownership.

481. The trial court may determine the UCL penalty amount by considering "any one or

more of the relevant circumstances" including the following statutory factors under Business and

Professions Code section 17206(b): (1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (2) the number

of violations; (3) the persistence of the misconduct; (4) the length of time over which the misconduct

occurred; (5) the willfulness of the defendant's misconduct; and (6) the defendant's assets, liabilities,

and net worth. No one factor is "essential for determining the penalty." (See First Federal, supra,

104 Cal.App.4th at 728.)

482. A trial court need not make findings as to each of the factors enumerated in section

17206 to act within its discretion. (See, e.g., First Federal, supra, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 729

(concluding that the statutory language directing courts to "consider any one or more of the relevant

circumstances" does not require a court to make a finding as to any one of the enumerated

circumstances).) However, in the interest of a complete record the Court makes the following

findings as to each of the statutorily enumerated factors.

1.4')
 1. The Nature and Seriousness of the Violations

483. As discussed throughout the body of this Decision, The Court finds that Defendants'

unlawful acts, proven at trial, are egregious. Courts have long recognized, "The home is a place of

refuge, a sanctuary." (Cambou v. Marty (1929) 98 Cal.App. 598, 603.) Defendants purposefully

destroyed their tenants' quiet enjoyment and any sense of sanctuary, through their long, continued,

and unrelenting campaign of harassment, reductions in services, and unlawful and fraudulent

evictions. Their reprehensible conduct had a terrible effect on the lives of multiple San Francisco

citizens, even to the point of forcing one tenant to quit a cherished career and move out of state and,

in another case, forcing a tenant out of his long time home as he battled terminal cancer. Defendants

flagrantly and in bad faith flouted the laws. The record before this Court establishes, not only by a

preponderance of the evidence, but by overwhelming evidence, the most egregious pattern and

practice of harassment and wrongful evictions against multiple tenants in multiple buildings by

Defendants in violation of Admin. Code sections 37.lOB and 37.9.

484. The gain or opportunity to gain is a factor the Court may consider when weighing the

seriousness of the violations. To adequately deter future misconduct, courts may assess civil

penalties that "reasonably relate to the gain or opportunity for gain achieved by the unlawful acts and

can fairly be determined through expert testimony, the facts elicited at trial and circumstantial

evidence," and that "offset[s] the benefits of any such monetary gain." (People v. Nat 'l Ass 'n of

Realtors ("Realtors") (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 578, 586); see People v. Morse (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th

259, 272 (upholding $400,000 civil penalty award where defendant received $1.8 million in fees).)

Here, Defendants substantially profited from their unlawful scheme. Plaintiff' expert witness

testified that Defendants have gained over $8,800,000 in value to their properties through their

unlawful conduct. (Ex. 425.)

2. The Court's Reasoned Methodology for Assessing the Number of
Violations

485. In setting a civil penalty for violations of the UCL, the Court has broad discretion to

determine what constitutes a "violation." Section 17206 does not define what constitutes a single

violation, "leaving it to the courts to determine appropriate penalties on a case-by-case basis."

1 A.1
(Wizterman, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at 180; accord Toomey, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at 22.) Instead,

"[f]or the purpose of calculating civil penalties, what constitutes a violation of the UCL. .. depends

on the circumstances of the case, including the type of violations, the number of victims, and the

repetition of the conduct constituting the violation." (People v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th

1539, 1566.) However the law is clear that this Court must impose a penalty for each violation.

(Realtors, 155 Cal.App.3d at 585.)

486. A single act may constitute multiple violations of the UCL, based both on the

defendant's conduct and on the number of victims affected. (People v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd.

("Beaumont") (2003), 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 129-130 ["Given the circumstances of this case, the trial

court did not err in calculating the number of statutory violations based on defendants' actions as

well as the number of affected tenants"]; People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co.

("Fremont Life Ins. Co.") (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 528 [same]; see also Toomey, supra, 157

Cal.App.3d at 23 [finding the per victim basis for calculating violations reasonable]; People v.

Superior Court ("Olson") (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 196 [same].) Citing to Beaumont, the City

urges that the Court employ a hybrid method of calculating the number of violations under the UCL

in a way that "properly takes into account the nature and extent of the public injury that defendants

inflicted" by factoring in both the number of victims and the cumulative efforts of the violations over

time. (Beaumont, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at 130.)

487. The Court.assesses one civil penalty for each victim affected by each unlawful act

proven at trial. The Court assesses an additional civil penalty under section 17206.1 for each act

against a senior or disabled tenant. Significantly, the Court assesses only one penalty for the same

unlawful act, notwithstanding that the act often resulted in a violation of more than one law, such as,

for example, where the act was both retaliatory, in violation of Admin. Code section 37.9(d) and/or

Civil Code section 1942.5, and harassing, in violation of Admin. Code section 37. lO(B)(a).

488. Because many of Defendants' unlawful acts of tenant harassment and retaliation were

not single events but were ongoing and repeated, such as decreases in services that lasted for months,

the Court also follows the guidance of appellate and Supreme Court authorities such as People v.

Superior Court ("Jayhill Corp") (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283. While it would be within the Court's
discretion to assess monthly (or even daily) penalties for each recurring act against each victim, the

Court instead has instead assessed a recurring monthly penalty only for the most egregious

conditions and acts and has otherwise assessed only a single penalty for other repeated unlawful acts

(plus additional monthly violation for senior and disabled tenants under 17206. l )-greatly reducing

the number of penalties assessed against each Defendant.

489. Because the Court has assessed only a single penalty for the majority of Defendants'

recurring bad acts, this factor further weighs in favor of awarding substantial civil penalties.
3. The Persistence of Defendants' Misconduct

490. The evidence at trial showed that Defendants' long pattern of harassment and

retaliation against multiple tenants in multiple properties has been unceasing and unrelenting . (See

Witzerman, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at 180 [explaining "the repetition of the conduct constituting the

violation" is relevant to determining UCL violations].)

491. Even the filing of this lawsuit has not deterred Defendants' unlawful conduct. (Fremont

Life Ins. Co., supra, I 04 Cal.App.4th at 530 [the court may look to continued behavior after the

Defendant has notice of the unlawful nature of their behavior].) While this lawsuit has been

pending, since June 2015, Defendants have unlawfully "gutted" Reggars' former apartment at HILL

STREET, including by raising the rear roof line, without permits. They fraudulently induced new

tenants at GUERRERO STREET to sign new leases so they could perform an Ellis Act eviction

immediately and without having to pay relocation benefits. They have initiated an unlawful "spot

eviction" of S. Smith, Izaguirre, Johnson, and Hembury under the Ellis Act.

492. This factor further weighs in favor of awarding substantial civil penalties.
4. The Length of Time Over Which the Misconduct Occurred

493. The conduct proven at trial has continued, unceasing, for four years. This more than

justifies an award of substantial civil penalties. (Fremont Life Ins. Co., supra, I 04 Cal.App.4th at

530). Here, the evidence at trial established Defendants' unlawful tenant harassment has continued

unabated since Defendants began their unlawful scheme in San Francisco in June 2013 beginning

with the purchase of 18th STREET.

494. This factor also weighs in favor of awarding substantial civil penalties.
 5. The WilHulness of Defendants' Misconduct

495. Just as Defendants' conduct is persistent, it is willful and in bad faith. Defendants even

executed false affidavits and declarations to support their fraudulent OMI evictions. The Court

incorporates all of its findings of bad faith throughout the body of this Decision.

496. This factor further weighs in favor of awarding substantial civil penalties.
6. Defendants' Assets, Liability, and Net Worth

497. This Court has already determined that the Defendants joint net worth is at least $25

million. (November 14, 2016 Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Terminating Sanctions.)

This factor weighs in favor of issuing a larger amount of civil penalties to deter future misconduct.

(People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Cappuccio, Inc. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 750, 765 ["In selecting the

amount of the penalty to be imposed, the court may consider the defendant's financial condition, and

ifthe penalty imposed is sufficient to deter such conduct in the future"].)

498. Therefore, in considering all of the relevant circumstances, including each of the factors

enumerated in § 17206(b), the Court awards a penalty of $1000 for each UCL violation based on

each harassment, retaliation, and/or wrongful eviction violation. Based on the record before it, the

Court believes it would have been within its discretion to award the maximum of $2500 for each
violation.
7. Additional Penalties for Senior and Disabled Tenants

499. When determining the appropriate amount of the additional civil penalty of up to

$2,500 for acts of unlawful competition against senior or disabled tenants, the Court "shall consider,

in addition to any other appropriate factors, the extent to which one or more of the following factors

are present: ( 1) Whether the defendant knew or should have known that his or her conduct was

directed to one or more senior citizens or disabled persons; (2) Whether the defendant's conduct

caused one or more senior citizens or disabled persons to suffer any of the following: loss or

encumbrance of a primary residence, principal employment, or source of income; substantial loss of

property set aside for retirement, or for personal or family care and maintenance; or substantial loss

of payments received under a pension or retirement plan or a government benefits program, or assets

essential to the health or welfare of the senior citizen or disabled person; and (3) Whether one or
 more senior citizens or disabled persons are substantially more vulnerable than other members of the

public to the defendant's conduct because of age, poor health or infirmity, impaired understanding,

restricted mobility, or disability, and actually suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic

damage resulting from the defendant's conduct." (Bus. & Profs. Code § 17206. l (c). )

500. The Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence established that Defendants

knew, or should have known, that the following tenants were elderly or suffered a disability under

law: Gail Izaguirre, Leonard Johnson, Sheila Hembury, Sylvia Smith, Elizabeth Chavez, Paul

V anotti, Maria Maranghi, Sergio Maranghi, and M. Bini.

501. The Court further finds that Defendants' conduct caused Elizabeth Chavez and Paul

V anotti to each lose their principal residence.

502. The Court further finds that these elderly and/or disabled tenants are substantially more

vulnerable to Defendants' conduct than other members of the public because of age, poor health or

infirmity, or restricted mobility or disability. Further, the elderly and/or disabled tenants actually

suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic damage resulting from the Defendants'

conduct. Therefore, as to these tenants, the Court assesses an additional penalty of $1,000 per

violation, per victim under the UCL.

II. A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS IS APPROPRIATE
AND NECESSARY

503. "Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition

may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or

judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or

employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this

chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or

personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition." (Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17203.) An injunction may be as comprehensive as needed to stop deceptive and illegal conduct:

"while an injunction may not go against statutory law, it may go beyond statutory law. A court

sitting in equity has broad power to fashion relief to fit the facts before it." (People v. Custom Craft

147
Carpets, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 676, 684.) Moreover, the City Attorney may seek such an

injunction pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17204.

504. Based on all of the evidence at trial, the Court concludes that an injunction shall be

issued against Defendants. The Court finds that Defendants' unlawful and deceptive business

practices are ongoing. The Court finds that an injunction is necessary to stop Defendants' unlawful

and deceptive conduct, to prevent Defendants from engaging in unlawful and deceptive conduct in

the future, and to at least partially restore the status quo ante regarding certain tenants who have lost

possession of their apartments due to Defendants' unlawful and deceptive conduct. Further,

Defendants engaged in a long and continuous "pattern and practice which violates ... section

37.IOB," warranting an injunction pursuant to Admin. Code section 37.10B(c)(4) that contains

provisions similar to those that have been upheld on appeal. The facts contained in the record

establish conduct even more egregious, widespread, and ongoing than those in City ofSanta Monica

v. Gabriel ("Gabrief') (2012) 186 Cal.App.4th 882. In Gabriel, the appellate court upheld the trial

court's injunction enjoining the landlord from having any managerial role at any rental properties for

five years and from having any contact with any past, present, or future tenants. The Gabriel court

also noted the landlord's history of failing to comply with court orders. Similarly, here the long

history of Defendants' flagrant disregard of repeated court orders, egregious and repeated

harassment of tenants and fraudulent attempts to evict them, attempts to deny the City access to their

properties, and failure to comply with the City's Notices of Violation and stop work and abatement

orders, causes the Court to conclude that, as in Gabriel, Defendants simply do not appreciate the

illegal and offensive nature of their conduct.

505. Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendants' properties have been a public nuisance,

that this public nuisance is ongoing, and that this public nuisance must be abated; and further public

nuisances must be prevented. The Court finds that injunctive relief is necessary in the interest of the

health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the City and County of San Francisco and the citizens

of the State of California, and to ensure that Defendants comply with all applicable laws related to

maintenance and use of real property and related to Defendants' rental business. Therefore, pursuant

to the authority of California Health and Safety Code section 11573, Business and Professions Code
 section 17203, Civil Code sections 3491 and 3494, Code of Civil Procedure section 731, and San

Francisco Administrative Code section 37.lOB, the Court issues the accompanying Permanent

Injunction After Trial, the terms of which are necessary, appropriate, and a proper exercise of the

Court's statutory and equitable authority.

DECISION

506. For all of the foregoing reasons, judgment is awarded in favor of Plaintiffs and against

all Defendants as described below.

I. LIABILITY

507. First Cause of Action: Each Defendant is found liable and judgment is awarded to

Plaintiff City and County of San Francisco ;

508. Second Cause of Action: Each Defendant is found liable and judgment is awarded to

Plaintiff City and County of San Francisco;

509. Third Cause of Action: Each Defendant is found liable on both counts and judgment is

awarded to Plaintiff City and County of San Francisco on count one and to Plaintiff People of the

State of California on count two ;

510. Fourth Cause of Action: Each Defendant is found liable and judgment is awarded to
Plaintiff People of the State of California .
II. REMEDY
A. CIVIL PENALTIES

511. In awarding Civil Penalties the Court considered each factor set forth in Business and

Professions Code section 17206(b) and San Francisco Housing Code section 204(c)(2).

512. As for Plaintiff City's claim of civil penalties under the San Francisco Housing,

Building, Plumbing, Mechanical, and Electrical Codes, which are cumulative-at trial Plaintiff

stated it was seeking only a single penalty of $500 per day that a building was out of compliance

with any of the above Municipal Codes. The Court finds $250 per day in civil penalties-which

considerably aggregates and reduces the number of daily penalties owed by Defendants-is

reasonable and conservative, when considering the maximum potential daily penalties.

1.d.Q
 513. The Court finds that the buildings were, collectively, noncompliant with state and

municipal law for four thousand four hundred and seventy (4,470) days, and assesses a daily civil

penalty of $250 for each violation, under San Francisco Building Code section 103A and/or Housing

Code section 204(c)(2), for a total amount of One Million One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Five

Hundred Dollars ($1,117,500). As explained previously, the Court must also award penalties under

the UCL. The Court finds a total of twenty-nine (29) violations and assesses an additional $1 penalty

per violation under the UCL for a total of Twenty-Nine Dollars ($29). The Court in this decision has

made specific findings as to the allocation of the building and/or housing code penalties between

Defendants (KIHAGI is severally, jointly or individually liable for all of them) and those allocations

shall be added and totaled in the judgment.

514. The Court has found one thousand six hundred twelve (1,612) additional violations of

the UCL related to Defendants' unlawful, harassing and retaliatory conduct against tenants,

impeding inspections, and failure to register their businesses. At $1000 per violation, this computes

to a total penalty amount under the UCL of One Million Six Hundred and Twelve Thousand

($1,612,000). The Court in this decision has made specific findings as to the allocation of the UCL

penalties between Defendants (KIHAGI is severally, jointly or individually liable for all of them)

and those allocations shall be added and totaled in the judgment.

515. Thus, based on the foregoing, the total penalty amount imposed for all

Building/Housing Code violations and UCL violations is: Two Million Seven Hundred Twenty-

Nine Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($2,729,529), that is computed as follows:$

1,117,500 + $1,612,000 + $29.

516. Given the conservative calculation and aggregation of penalties against Defendants,

and when considering the six enumerated statutory factors, the total amount is "reasonable.... given

the great number of victims, the economic benefit to [Defendants], ... and the continuing nature of

the unlawful business practices.") (Toomey, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at 23.) The Court finds this total

civil penalty award commensurate with Defendants' gain or opportunity gain, and necessary to deter

Defendants from continuing their unlawful course of conduct. (Van de Kamp, supra, 204

Cal.App.3d at 765.)
 B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

517. Pursuant to the authority of California Health and Safety Code section 17980(a),

Business and Professions Code section 17203, Civil Code sections 3491 and 3494, Code of Civil

Procedure section 731, and San Francisco Administrative Code section 3 7 .1 OB, the Court issues the

accompanying Permanent Injunction After Trial.

C. ATTORNEY FEES

Pursuant to San Francisco Administrative Code section 37.10B(c)(5), the Court finds that Plaintiff

City is entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Pursuant to California Health and Safety Code section

17980. 7(d)(l) the Court also finds that Plaintiff City is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and to

reasonable and actual enforcement costs, including but not limited to, inspection and investigation

costs.

Plaintiffs shall prepare a judgment which conforms with this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: MAYl32017
Hon_ Angb:!:- ISVC:U~
Judge of the California Superior Court

CCSF, et al. v. Kihagi, et al.

SF Sup. Ct. Case No. CGC-15-546152

1 "1
 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
(CCP 1010.6(6) & CRC 2.260(g))

I, Rosallie Gumpal, a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of the County of San
Francisco, certify that I am not a party to the within action.
On May 23, 2017, I electronically served the attached STATEMENT OF DECISION
via File & ServeXpress on the recipients designated on the Transaction Receipt located on the
File & ServeXpress website.

Dated: May 23, 2017

T. Michael Yuen, Clerk

By: