Senate vs.

Ermita

Facts:

The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials

of the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
project. Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the
hearing. On the same day the President issued EO 464 which requires that officials of
Executive Department must obtain the consent of the President first before they can
validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate.

Issue:

Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
considering the petitioners’ contention that it infringes their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementations of laws and considering further that
according to the respondent, petitioners have not shown any specific prerogative, power
and privilege of the HOR which had been effectively impaired by EO 464, there being
no mention of any investigation which was aborted due to its implementation.

Ruling:

Yes, EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of

the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry
– with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The
operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault
case.

Moreover, even though “executive privilege” is a recognized exemption to the

power of inquiry, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to
information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

In this case, the infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting
a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated which is impermissible.
Gudani vs Senga (Article 6 Sec 21)

Facts:

Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) including General Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo emerged. Upon the discretion of the President, AFP
Chief of Staff Senga issued a memorandum prohibiting General Gudani and company
from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However,
General Gudani and Colonel Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance
with Senator Biazon.

Issue:

Whether or not the President can prevent a member of the Armed Forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry. If so, how the members of the military may be
compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise.

Ruling:

Yes. The President, as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines can prevent military officers from testifying in a legislative inquiry.

Article VII Section 18 states that the President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. However, the refusal of
the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject
to judicial relief.

In this case, it was held that remedy to such lies in the courts. The fact that the
executive branch is equal to legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons
summoned to testify before Congress must do so. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other
to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of
government, inheres on judicial power empowered by the Constitution to compel
obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

Gudani vs Senga (Article 7 Section 18)

Facts:
 Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) including General Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo emerged. Upon the discretion of the President, AFP
Chief of Staff Senga issued a memorandum prohibiting General Gudani and company
from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However,
General Gudani and Colonel Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance
with Senator Biazon.

Issue:

Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members
of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry considering the
petitioners’ contention that it interferes with the investigation of the Senate Committee
conducted in aid of legislation and considering further the respondent’s contention that it
was a direct order of General Senga, an order that stands independent of the executive
order.

Ruling:

Yes. The President, as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines can prevent military officers from testifying in a legislative inquiry.

Article VII Section 18 states that the President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.

In this case, the Court ruled that the President could, as a general rule, require
military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is
based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of
the President as commander-in-chief. The exigencies of military discipline and the chain
of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of
the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes
that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.

Neri vs Senate

Facts:
In September 18, 2007 hearing regarding the contract with ZTE-NBN Project,
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri appeared in one hearing and alleged that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He also narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular,
he refused to answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

Issue:

Whether or not the communications elicited by those three (3) questions covered
by executive privilege considering the petitioner’s contention that is based on
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations and considering further the respondents’ contention
that petitioner’s testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid
of legislation and there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege.

Ruling:

Yes, the communications are covered by executive privilege

Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,

appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others. Several jurisprudence provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-

delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, using the above elements, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Garcillano vs. House of Representative

Facts:
The "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor the results of the
2004 presidential elections surfaced. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago recommended a legislative investigation
into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National
Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
However, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the
Court of Appeals, filed a petition seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry.

Issue:
Whether or not Senate be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure considering the petitioners’
contention that without such, continuous violation of laws and blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries might arise and
considering further the respondent’s contention that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

Ruling:
No, Senate should not be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." Publication is important because such rules are imperative.

In this case, the respondent Senate Committees could not use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure."
Bengzon vs. Drilon (Art. 6 Sec 27 Item Veto)

Facts:
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a
resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been
enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices
of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission

Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional considering the petitioners’ contention that the
subject veto is not an item veto and considering further the respondent’s contention that
“they would erode the very foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully and to
enforce strictly the policy and standardization of compensation.”

Ruling:

No, it is unconstitutional.

Section 27 (2), Article VI, 1987 Constitution states that “The President shall have
the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.” Thus, the
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled
to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts.

In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the
justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of
the government.

Bengzon vs. Drilon (Article VIII Sec 3)

Facts:
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a
resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been
enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices
of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission

Issue:
Whether or not the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by
the Constitution considering the petitioners’ contention that it does and considering
further the respondent’s contention that “grant of distinct privileges to select group of
officials whose retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy preferential
treatment should not be permitted”.

Ruling:
Yes, the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy to the Judiciary.

Sec 3, Article VIII mandates that “The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.”

In the case at bar, the veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to
fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows
its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a
free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is
provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

Fortich vs. Corona

Facts:
In a November 1998 resolution, the Supreme Court voted two-two which affirmed
the April 1998 resolution, again on separate motions for reconsideration filed by the
respondents. Now, respondents argue that the November 1998 resolution did not
effectively resolve the matter inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Section 4(3), Article 8 of the Constitution

Issue:
Whether or not the matter should have been brought to the Supreme Court,
sitting en banc considering the respondents’ contention that the required number to
carry a decision is three votes.

Ruling:
No, this matter doesn’t need to be brought to the Court en banc.

A careful reading of Sec 4(3), Article 8 of the Constitution reveals the intention to
draw a distinction between cases and matters such that cases are “decided” while
matters, which includes motions, are “resolved”. Otherwise put, the word “decided”
must refer to “cases”; while the word “resolved” must refer to “matters”, applying the rule
of reddendo singular singulis. Thus, it is clear that only cases are referred to the
Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.

In this case, the rule does not apply where the required three votes is not
obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence
of the aforequoted provision speaks only of case and not matter. The reason is
simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases
by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose
of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting would only mean that such motion is lost. Thus the assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court
in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.

PACU vs. Secretary of Education

Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
No. 180. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the
Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a
private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain
standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of
Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

Issue:
Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is constitutional considering the
petitioner’s contention that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and power granted to the Secretary of Education by this
Act is an undue delegation of legislative power and considering further the
government’s legal representative memorandum contending that the matter constitutes
no justiciable controversy.

Ruling:
Yes. Act No. 2706 is constitutional.

One requisite for the Court to exercise to be able to exercise the power of judicial
review is that there must be before it an “actual case” calling for the exercise of judicial
power. The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Thus, judicial power is limited to the
decision of actual cases and controversies.

In this case, there is no justiciable controversy presented. Hence, the Supreme

Court denied the petition for prohibition because PACU did not show that it suffered any
injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by
the said law.

Tan vs. Macapagal

Facts:
A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by the petitioners for declaratory
relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino
people. It assails the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of
the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Petitioners would like this Court
declare that it is without power, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to
revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than
the form now outlined in the present Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court may exercise it’s judicial review in this case considering
the petitioner’s contention that the Convention is merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down
therein.

Ruling:

No, before the Court can exercise its judicial review, the matter has yet to be ripe
for adjudication.

The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see it. It is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture. Specifically stated, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on
by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight.

In this case, since the assailed resolution has not yet been enacted upon, the
judiciary may not exercise judicial review on this case.