Ikatan Authoriti

DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM
DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN
GUAMAN NO. BA-B53CY-02-07/2017
ANTARA
JEGANARTH A/L SAMIKANU

(NO. K/P: 890621-10-5129) …PLAINTIF
DAN
VASANTHAN A/L SINNAPPAN

(NO. K/P: 850629-14-5591) …DEFENDAN
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IKATAN AUTHORITI PIHAK PLAINTIFF
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MESSRS KALAIVANI LETICIA & PARTNERS

NO.15-1-2 BLOCK I JALAN 3/101C
CHERAS BUSINESS CENTRE, 56100
CHERAS, KUALA LUMPUR
TEL: 03-91331990
EMAIL: legal.klpartners@gmail.com
[FILE REF: KLP/Jega/Lit-31/2017]
INDEKS
No Dokumen Tab
1. SYNERGISTIC DUO SDN BHD v. LAI MEI JUAN [2017] 9 CLJ 244 A
2. LING WAH PRESS (M) SDN BHD & ORS v. TAN SRI DATO' VINCENT B
TAN CHEE YIOUN & OTHER APPEALS
3. CHIN CHOON v. CHUA JUI MENG [2005] 2 CLJ 569 C

4. NOR IZAWATI ABD RAHMAN lwn. SHEIKH MOHD FAIZAL OMAR D
[2016] 1 LNS 597
5. ROSLAN ALI v. THE NEW STRAITS TIMES (M) BHD & ANOR [2017] 1 E
LNS 1356
6. WAN MAZLAN WAN MOHAMED WOOJDY v. THASLEEM MOHAMED F

IBRAHIM AL-HAJ [2016] 1 LNS 558
7. DR KHAIRUL AZHAR MAT DAUD lwn. DR ZUKERI IBRAHIM [2016] 1 G

LNS 483
8. NORMAL AHMAD @ SALIMAN v. SISTEM TELEVISYEN MALAYSIA H

BERHAD & ORS [2017] 1 LNS 1044
9. MAJLIS AMANAH RAKYAT & ANOR v. MAT NAWI AWANG & I

ANOTHER APPEAL [2016] 1 LNS 1160
10. ABU HASSAN HASBULLAH v. ZUKERI IBRAHIM [2017] 1 LNS 1754 J
11. MOHD IQBAL ZAINAL ABIDIN lwn. MOHD KHAIDIR AHMAD [2017] 1 K
LNS 1319
12. ROOKES V. BARNARD [1964] AC 1129 L

A
244 Current Law Journal [2017] 9 CLJ
SYNERGISTIC DUO SDN BHD v. LAI MEI JUAN A
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR

FAIZAH JAMALUDIN JC
[CIVIL SUIT NO: WA-23CY-3-01-2017]
11 MAY 2017
B
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction – Interim injunction – Application for interim

injunction to restrain publishing of defamatory postings on social media until
hearing and final disposal of defamation suit – Whether there was evidence of
intention to publish impugned statements pending trial – Whether injunction
ought to be granted C
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Locus standi – Tort – Application for interim injunction

to restrain publishing of defamatory postings on social media until hearing and final
disposal of defamation suit – Whether applicant had locus standi to bring action
TORT: Defamation – Libel – Injunction – Application for interim injunction to D
restrain publishing of defamatory postings on social media until hearing and final
disposal of defamation suit – Whether there was evidence of intention to publish
impugned statements pending trial – Whether statements in postings had tendency
to have defamatory meaning – Whether injunction ought to be granted – Whether
defence of justification and/or fair comments prima facie likely to succeed at trial E
The plaintiff filed the present ex parte application, seeking an order of interim
injunction to restrain the defendant whether by herself, her servants, agents
or otherwise, howsoever, from publishing or causing to be published in her
Facebook account, two postings (‘the postings’) or similar words which the
plaintiff alleged were defamatory, in any manner whatsoever until the F
hearing and final disposal of the suit. The postings were in relation to the bad
service by BGT Lakeview Restaurant (‘the restaurant’) operated by the
plaintiff. The second posting went viral and were shared more than 9,500
times and was reposted and published in newspapers, websites, blogs and
other Facebook pages. The High Court had earlier granted an ad interim G
injunction but the defendant failed to comply with the same and continued
to publish or caused to be published the postings. The plaintiff submitted
that: (i) because of the postings, many of its customers cancelled their
bookings and reservations; and (ii) if the defendant was not restrained by way
of an interim injunction, the plaintiff would continue to suffer grave
H
irreparable loss and damage to its reputation and goodwill. The defendant
raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff was not an aggrieved party
and did not have the locus standi to bring the present action against the
defendant as: (i) her husband paid the booking fee to a bank account in the
name of ‘BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd’ and not the plaintiff; and (ii) as the
defendant had entered into a contract with ‘BGT Lakeview Lakeview Sdn I
[2017] 9 CLJ Synergistic Duo Sdn Bhd v. Lai Mei Juan 245
A Bhd’, the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against the defendant. The
defendant pleaded the defence of justification and/or fair comments, arguing
that the postings were a matter of a public interest to ensure that others were
not deceived by the restaurant’s advertisements. The issues that arose for the
court’s adjudication were: (i) whether the plaintiff had the locus standi to bring
B the action against the defendant; (ii) whether the impugned statements in the
postings had a tendency to have defamatory meaning; (iii) whether the
defendant’s defence of justification and/or fair comments was prima facie
likely to succeed at trial; and (iv) whether there was evidence of intention
to publish the impugned statements pending trial and whether an injunction
C
ought to be granted to restrain the defendant from continuing to publish the
postings.
Held (allowing application):
(1) The official Companies Commission of Malaysia search results showed
that the plaintiff and the restaurant were related companies as both
D companies shared common directors and all the shares in the restaurant
were held by the plaintiff’s directors. Therefore, the plaintiff was the
operator of the restaurant and accordingly, owned the reputation and
goodwill of the restaurant. The doctrine of privity of contract did not
apply in this case as the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant
E was for the tort of defamation; not for breach of contract. The
defendant’s preliminary objection was not allowed. (paras 32, 34 & 37)
(2) The defendant’s statement in the postings were defamatory of the
plaintiff. An ordinary person’s understanding of the postings would be
that: (i) many customers were disappointed with the food and service at
F the restaurant; (ii) the defendant was cheated by the plaintiff; and (ii) if
the ordinary and reasonable person dined at the restaurant, he or she
would be subjected to bad food and bad service and would be cheated
by the plaintiff. Any reasonable person reading the postings would
understand them in defamatory sense. (paras 45-47)
G
(3) The defendant failed to adduce any evidence to support her contention
of the events that transpired in the postings. The defendant failed to
establish that her defence of justification on balance of probabilities was
true or substantially true. In addition to that, the defendant did not
provide any evidence to show that her comments at the time of
H publishing the postings were made based on true facts and without
malice. The defendant’s defence of justification and/or fair comment
was, prima facie, unlikely to succeed. (paras 58, 65, 66, 67 & 73).
I
(4) The defendant continued to publish the postings on her Facebook A

account notwithstanding the ad interim injunction ordered by the court
restraining her from publishing or causing to publish the postings. Based
on the presumption of fact under s. 114A of the Evidence Act 1950, she
was presumed to continue publishing the postings unless she proved the
contrary. The defendant’s failure and/or refusal to comply with the ad B
interim injunction to date was evidence that she would continue to
publish or cause to be published the postings until trial. The continued
publication of the postings on the defendant’s Facebook would cause the
plaintiff to suffer further damage to their reputation and goodwill as the
potential re-publication of the postings to potentially an unlimited C
number of internet users would irreparably harm the plaintiff’s
reputation. This harm could not be adequately compensated with
damages. (paras 69-72).
Case(s) referred to:
Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152 HC (refd) D
Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor
[2014] 3 CLJ 560 CA (refd)
International Times & Ors v. Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 1 LNS 31 FC (refd)
Khalid Abdul Samad v. Datuk Aziz Isham & Anor [2011] 1 LNS 1161 HC (refd)
Ngoi Thiam Woh v. CTOS Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 4 CLJ 765 HC (refd)
Petroliam Nasional Bhd (PETRONAS) v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 CLJ 303 HC (refd) E
Superboom Projects Sdn Bhd dan Satu Lagi lwn. Yap Seng Loong dan Lain-Lain [2009]
9 CLJ 155 HC (refd)
Suwiri Sdn Bhd v. Government of The State of Sabah [2008] 1 CLJ 123 FC (refd)
Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146
HC (refd)
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch [1991] 4 All ER 817 HL (refd) F
The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v. Airasia Bhd [1986] 1 LNS 80 SC (refd)
Wong Yoke Kong & Ors v. Azmi M Anshar & Ors [2003] 6 CLJ 559 HC (foll)
Worker’s Party v. Tay Boon Too & Anor [1975] 1 LNS 193 HC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
Evidence Act 1950, s. 114A G
Rules of Court 2012, O. 41 r. 5
Other source(s) referred to:
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn, vol 28, para 166
For the plaintiff - Lim Jit Kiong; M/s JK Lim
For the defendant - Guok Ngek Seong; M/s Guok Partnership H
Reported by Najib Tamby
I
A JUDGMENT
Faizah Jamaludin JC:
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff had filed an ex parte application dated 23 January 2017
B (encl. 5) together with a certificate of urgency seeking an order of interim
injunction to restrain the defendant whether by herself, her servants, agents
Facebook account, posting 1 and posting 2 or similar words which the
plaintiff pleads are defamatory of the plaintiff, in any manner whatsoever
C until the hearing and final disposal of this suit.
[2] On 31 January 2017, John Louis O’Hara J issued an ad interim
injunction (“ad interim injunction”) pending the inter partes hearing of the
plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction, which ordered as below:
D
MAKA ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN BAHAWA:
Satu Perintah Injunksi Ad Interim untuk menghalang defendan Lai Mei
Juan sama ada melalui diri sendiri, pengkhidmat-pengkhidmatnya, ejen-
ejennya atau bagaimana juapun daripada menerbitkan atau
mengakibatkan penerbitan Pernyataan Fitnah 1 dan Pernyataan Fitnah 2
(sepertimana Lampiran “A”) atau perkataan-perkataan sama yang
E menfitnah plaintiff, dalam apa-apa cara sekalipun sehingga perbicaraan
dan pelupusan muktamad Lampiran 5 secara inter partes.
[3] The plaintiff had served, by way of personal service, the ad interim
injunction on the defendant on 6 February 2017.
F [4] On 25 April 2017 this court heard the plaintiff’s application inter partes
and after reading the written submissions and hearing the oral submissions
of counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant, I reserved judgment to today.
Salient Facts
[5] The plaintiff is a private limited company with its registered address
G
at 31A, Jalan Satu, Kawasan 16, Berkeley Town Centre, 41300 Klang,
Selangor and business address at C-06-1, C-06-2 and C-06-3, Block C, Plaza
Kelana Jaya, Jalan SS 7/13A, Kelana Jaya, 47301 Petaling Jaya, Selangor.
[6] The defendant is an individual and uses the name “Lai Mei Juan” on
H her Facebook account.
[7] On 22 December 2016, the defendant’s husband, Jerry Ong, made a
booking at a restaurant known as “BGT Lakeview Restaurant” in SS 7,
Kelana Jaya (“the restaurant”) and paid a booking fee of RM105.20 to BGT
Lakeview Sdn Bhd. The booking was confirmed for two people at 8pm to
I be seated at table no. B17.
[8] On 25 December 2016, the defendant and her husband attended the A
restaurant but neither of them dined or ate at the restaurant.
[9] On or around 25 December 2016, the defendant published or caused
to be published posting 1 in her Facebook account. Posting 1 contained
edited photographs of the restaurant and the following words:
B
(a) “Never come to BGT Lake view at SS7!!”

(b) “This is my conversation wit the person in charge named JOYCE!
Me: i have made early dinner reservation n paid the same deposit
amount as other ppl total cost rm100+ why i been arrange to C
sit at this type of shaking table n chair ya? Macam mamak chair..
Ur advertisement not like tat de wor..
J: u coming here for food only. If u wan nicer chair, u should go
ikea!
Me: this is not the same as u promote in ur advertisement. N I feel D
cheated and the environment not the same.
J: u know is advertisement dy la! KFC chicken advertisement oso
not same la.. n the lake is still here. The environment still same!
Me: so now u r saying u cheating on ur customer lar! I wan my
refund. E
J: sorry, no refund as we already stated in the reservation term.”

(c) “And u r doing service. U giving such manner to ur customers! I can
only pray for ur business going to hell!! Fxxk ur!”
(d) “BAN BGT Lake View!” F
[10] On or around 26 December 2016, the defendant published or caused

to be published posting 2 in her Facebook account (“posting 2”) with content
that is almost similar as posting 1. Posting 2 was in the Chinese language.
A true and accurate translation of posting 2 in Bahasa Malaysia is as below: G
(a) “Kalian jangan di tipu oleh Kelana Jaya SS7 BGT Lake View lagi.”
(b) “Tetapi masih juga ada kawan internet yang lain amat marah dan
beritahu saya mereka terpaksa tunggu dengan begitu lama baru di
hidang makanan, makanan juga sangat tak sedap, berbeza dari H
gambar, mereka amat kecewa.”
(c) “Fikirlah, makan malam RM210 untuk 2 orang. Bukan murah
sangat. Harga ini dan di atur duduk di tempat begitu. Memanglah
(emoji). Cara perkhimatan teruk sangat.”
(d) “Ini merupakan perbualan saya dengan beliau. I
Saya: Saya telah tempah meja. Dah bayar jumlah yang sama dengan
orang yang duduk di sana, kenapa tempat duduk kami tak sama?
Juga tidak sama dengan gambar.
A
J: Ada datang untuk makan saja! Nak yang cantik, pergilah Ikea
beli!
Saya: Ini tidak sama langsung dengan iklan anda, saya rasa anda
tipu kami. Kalaulah ramai pelanggan sangat, tidak dapat
duduk yang sama, haruslah beritahu kami terlebih dahulu
B semasa kami buat tempahan.
J: Apa yang tak sama? Tasik masih ada! Kan anda kata iklan!
Adakah ayam KFC yang anda makan sama dengan iklan?!
Saya: Sekarang anda menipu. Saya nak balik wang deposit saya.
C J: Tidak boleh! Kami tidak boleh kembalikan. Sudah tulis atas
nota tempahan.”
(e) “Tetapi saya tidak mahu orang lain tertipu pada masa akan datang,
dan meraikan hari perayaan dengan muram. Terutamanya kita
semua ingin makan riang. Seperti pada hari perayaan yang begitu
D penting hari Natal, hari Kekasih dan lain-lain.”
[11] Posting 2 went viral1. It was shared more than 9,500 times on
facebook and was reposted and published in newspapers, websites, blogs and
other Facebook pages including Guang Ming Daily, Huarenwang
E [www.huarenpost.blogspot.com] and Damatoutiao [damatoutiao.com]
(where it was shared about 18,000 times). Posting 2 and the re-postings are
currently still accessible to the public at large.
[12] The plaintiff had on 29 December 2016, through their solicitors,
issued a notice of demand to the defendant demanding, inter alia, that the
F defendant:
(i) immediately cease and desist from further defaming the plaintiff;
(ii) immediately remove the defamatory statements and photographs of the
plaintiff from the posting;
G (iii) publish and display a full and complete notice of withdrawal and
apology;
(iv) give an assurance and undertaking in writing that the defendant will not
repeat the publication of the defamatory statement or similar allegations
against the plaintiff; and
H
(v) compensate the plaintiff by way of damages.
[13] The defendant replied the plaintiff, through her solicitor’s letter dated
24 January 2017, stating that she would be relying on the defence of
justification and fair comment.
I
[14] The defendant has not complied with the ad interim injunction and A
continued to publish or caused to be published posting 1 and posting 2 to
date.
Plaintiff’s Case
[15] The plaintiff pleads that at all material times, it is the operator of the B
restaurant. For the reasons pleaded in the statement of claim, the plaintiff
claims that it has acquired an excellent reputation and valuable goodwill in
the restaurant and food and beverage industry since 2007 and that it has more
than 31,900 followers in its Facebook account at the date of the writ of
summons in this suit.
C
[16] The plaintiff pleads that posting 1 and posting 2 are manifestly
defamatory and that in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or in the
alternative, by way of innuendo, meant and/or were understood to mean
that:
(i) the plaintiff was dishonest and/or untrustworthy; D
(ii) the plaintiff has cheated its customers and/or committed a criminal
offence;
(iii) the plaintiff’s restaurant was terrible;
E
(iv) the plaintiff’s food was bad/terrible; and
(v) the plaintiff’s service was terrible.
[17] The plaintiff avers that because of the defendant’s act in publishing
posting 1 and posting 2, many of the plaintiff’s customers cancelled their
bookings and reservations at the plaintiff’s restaurant. It claims that the F
nature of the damage caused by the defendant’s postings in posting 1 and
posting 2 is so severe that damages would not be an adequate remedy.
[18] The plaintiff submits that if the defendant is not restrained by way of
an interim injunction, the plaintiff would continue to suffer grave irreparable
G
loss and damage to its reputation and goodwill.
Defendant’s Case
[19] The defendant raises a preliminary objection that the plaintiff is not an
aggrieved party and thus does not have locus standi to bring this action against
the defendant. The defendant pleads that her husband had paid the booking H
fee of RM105.20 to a bank account in the name of “BGT Lakeview Sdn.
Bhd.” and not the plaintiff. The defendant submits as the defendant had
entered into a contract with “BGT Lakeview Sdn. Bhd.”, it is “BGT
Lakeview Sdn. Bhd.” and not the plaintiff that has a cause of action against
the defendant. The defendant cites the case of Suwiri Sdn Bhd v. Government I
of The State of Sabah [2008] 1 CLJ 123; [2008] 1 MLJ 743 as authority for
A their argument that under the doctrine of privity of contract, a contract

cannot confer rights or impose obligations on persons who are not parties to
the contract.
[20] The defendant admits publishing posting 1 and posting 2. However,
she does not admit that the postings conveyed the meanings pleaded by the
B plaintiff. She denies that the postings were maliciously published with the
intent to defame the plaintiff and pleads that posting 2 going viral was not
within her control.
[21] The defendant pleads the defence of justification and avers that the
contents of posting 1 and posting 2 really happened on the night in question2.
C
She denies that she published the postings maliciously with intent to defame
the plaintiff3.
[22] The defendant pleads that after posting 2 went viral, on 27 December
2017 (Note: this date in the defendant’s statement of defence is incorrect as
D it is date that has yet to take place. I have assumed for purposes of this
judgment that the date is a typographical error and that the defendant meant
to plead 27 December 2016] the defendant’s husband (Jerry Ong) received
a WhatsApp message from a Mr Teh. The WhatsApp exchange between the
Jerry Ong and Mr Teh read as follows:
E
Mr. Teh: Gd. Afternoon Jerry, this is Mr. Teh, the owner of BGT
Lakeview. Firstly, we would like to extend our sincere
apology on your seating arrangement complaint on 25th
December at our premise.
Hence, our management intends to dissolve this matter by
F
trying to reach an agreement with you and your partner, to
see whether both of you intend to solve it privately.
Hope to hear from you soon. Have a blessed day and
fruitful day.
G
Jerry: Hi and good evening Mr. Teh, what seems to be on your
mind sir. It has been a real eye opener as your customer to
receive such overwhelming services from your professional
colleague. Don’t mean to be rude but it was really shocking
to hear phrases such go buy your own furniture from Ikea
if you are not happy with what we provide. Please kindly
H advise your opinion as a restaurant owner and also a
consumer. Thanks.
[23] It is not disputed that Mr Teh is Teh Chuan Khoon who is one of the
plaintiff’s directors. He is also a director and shareholder of BGT Lakeview
I
Sdn Bhd.
[24] The defendant posted the WhatsApp message from Mr Teh on her A
Facebook page. She pleads that the message shows the restaurant’s admission
that what happened to the defendant and her husband on “25 December
2017” is true (Note: the date of “25 December 2017” is incorrect and I have
made the same assumption as stated in para. [22] above). The defendant’s
claim is denied by the plaintiff who pleads that Mr Teh in the WhatsApp B
message had apologised for the seating arrangement and wanted to privately
settle any dissatisfaction that Jerry Ong has in relation to the seating
arrangement.
[25] The defendant avers that the 3,600 comments she received after
publishing posting 2 on Facebook supports her statement. C
[26] The defendant pleads that posting 1 and posting 2 are fair comments
on a matter of public interest: they were published to ensure that others were
not deceived by the restaurant’s advertisements and that the public as
consumers have the interest and/or right to know the truth about the quality
of the restaurant’s service4. D
[27] She pleads that the 3,600 comments she received after publishing
posting 2 on Facebook supports the defence of fair comment as the other
readers also faced the same issues as the defendant.
Analysis E
[28] The questions before this court are:

A. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to bring this suit against the
defendant; and
B. Whether an injunction ought to be granted to restrain the defendant from F
continuing to publish posting 1 and posting 2.
Does The Plaintiff Have Locus Standi To Bring An Action For Defamation Against
The Defendant?
[29] The plaintiff pleads that at all material times, it is the operator of the G
restaurant and submits that it owns the reputation, goodwill, trademark and
assets of the restaurant.
[30] The plaintiff avers that BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd is an investment arm
of the plaintiff and has the same management as the plaintiff. The official
Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (“SSM”) search results exhibited in the H
plaintiff’s affidavit in support5 (affirmed by one of the plaintiff’s directors,
Yiap Shed Li) shows that the plaintiff’s nature of business is “Restaurant
Operator” with a paid-up capital of RM500,000. The SSM search results for
BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd6 shows that its nature of business is “Dormant” and
its paid-up capital is RM2. The SSM search results also show that both the I
A plaintiff and BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd have the same directors (ie, Teh Chuan
Khoon and Yiap Shed Li) and that both directors are the shareholders of
BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd.
[31] The plaintiff avers that all the booking deposits for the restaurant are
paid into the account of BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd for accounting reasons. The
B plaintiff claims that as it is subject to goods and services tax (“GST”), if
booking deposits are paid directly into the plaintiff’s account, their customers
would be subject to a double tax charge: first, when they pay the booking
deposit and second, when they pay the balance of the invoice after the meal.
This is because the plaintiff has a “point of sales” system at the restaurant,
C which can only capture the current payment and not the deposit paid earlier.
[32] The SSM searches show the plaintiff and BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd are
related companies as both companies share common directors and all the
shares in BGT Lakeview Sdn Bhd are held by the plaintiff’s directors. For
this reason, I am satisfied based on the evidence before me that the plaintiff
D is the operator of the restaurant and accordingly, owns the reputation and
goodwill of the restaurant. I also find that the statements in posting 1 and
posting 2 refers to the plaintiff.
[33] The defendant argues that as her husband had paid the deposit to
“BGT Lakeview Sdn. Bhd.” the contract is between “BGT Lakeview Sdn.
E
Bhd.” and not the plaintiff. Therefore, she argues it is “BGT Lakeview Sdn.
Bhd.” that has a cause of action against the defendant
[34] The defendant’s preliminary objection is premised on the legal
principle that under the doctrine of privity of contract, a third party does not
F have any rights and obligations under a contract. However, in this case, the
plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant is for the tort of defamation.
It is not for breach of contract. Therefore, the doctrine of privity of contract
does not apply to this action.
[35] It is trite law that in an action for defamation, the onus lies on the
G plaintiff to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the impugned
statement published referred to the plaintiff and that it had defamatory
imputations. There must be publication of the alleged defamatory statement
and it is publication as soon as it is published to a third person: see Ayob Saud
v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152; [1989] 1 MLJ 315.)
H [36] The defendant admits that she had published both posting 1 and
posting 2 on her Facebook account. It is not disputed that the postings were
published to third persons. For the reasons set out in paras. [29] to [32]
above, I find that the impugned statements refer to the plaintiff.
I
[37] Therefore, for these reasons, I disallow the defendant’s preliminary A

objection.
B. Whether An Interim Injunction Ought To Be Granted To Restrain The
Defendant From Continuing To Publish Posting 1 And Posting 2?
[38] The defendant relies on the Supreme Court decision in The New Straits B
Times Press (M) Bhd v. Airasia Bhd [1986] 1 LNS 80; [1987] 1 MLJ 136
(which was followed by the High Court in Ngoi Thiam Woh v. CTOS Sdn Bhd
& Ors [2001] 4 CLJ 765; [2001] 4 MLJ 510 and Superboom Projects Sdn Bhd
dan Satu Lagi lwn. Yap Seng Loong dan Lain-Lain [2009] 9 MLJ 368; [2009]
9 CLJ 155; [2008] 1 LNS 815) to support its contention that interim
C
injunctions should not be granted in defamation suits.
[39] In The New Straits Times v. Airasia case, the Supreme Court confirmed
that in law the High Court has the power to grant an interlocutory injunction
to restrain a defendant in a defamation action. Abdul Hamid Ag LP in
delivering the decision of the Supreme Court7 quoting from Halsbury’s Laws D
of England, 4th edn, vol. 28 para. 166 said:
There is, in law, no doubt that the High Court may grant an interlocutory
injunction restraining the defendant, whether by himself or by his servants
or agents or otherwise, from publishing or further publishing matter which
is defamatory or of malicious falsehood. It is not necessary to show that
E
there has already been an actionable publication or that damage has been
sustained. In appropriate cases an injunction may be granted ex parte and
before the issue of a writ.
[40] In exercising the discretion, Abdul Hamid Ag LP cautioned that the
court should exercise its discretion judicially and should balance the freedom
F
of speech which is related to the freedom of the press against the reputation
of a single individual who, if wronged, can be adequately compensated in
damages. He said that:
The Court should act cautiously in granting interim injunction to restrain
publication of an alleged defamatory statement.8
G
[41] Following the decision in New Straits Times v. Airasia case, Abdull
Hamid Embong J (as he then was) in Ngoi Thiam Woh v. CTOS Sdn Bhd
[2001] 4 CLJ 765; [2001] 4 MLJ 510 held that the court should be slow in
granting interim injunctions in a defamation action and that the court may
only grant interim injunctions in a defamation action if (i) the statement is H
unarguably defamatory; (ii) there are no grounds for concluding that the
statement may be true; and (iii) there is evidence of an intention to repeat
or publish the defamatory statement.
I
A [42] The plaintiff relying on the decision in Petroliam Nasional Bhd

(PETRONAS) v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 CLJ 303; [2003] 4 MLJ 216
submits that this court should grant the interlocutory injunction restraining
the defendant from further publishing posting 1 and posting 2 because both
postings are manifestly defamatory. In the PETRONAS case, the learned
B Judicial Commissioner granted an interim injunction to restrain the
defendant from further publishing the impugned statements on the internet
as she found that the impugned statements were manifestly defamatory and
that publication or further publication of the impugned statements would
cause the plaintiffs to suffer
C immediate and irreparable injury and damage to the plaintiffs’ trading
reputation because the impugned statements could be further published
to an unlimited number of internet users including local and foreign
players and corporations. Therefore, an interlocutory injunction should be
granted to restrain the defendant from further defaming the plaintiffs on
the internet which is a borderless unrestricted environment or elsewhere.9
D
[43] In deciding whether or not this court should grant an interim
injunction restraining the defendant from publishing posting 1 and posting
pending trial, this court must first establish:
(i) whether the impugned statements in posting 1 and posting 2 have a
E tendency to have a defamatory meaning?;
(ii) whether the defendant’s defence of justification and/or fair comments is
prima facie unlikely to succeed at trial?; and
(iii) whether there is evidence of intention to publish the impugned
F
statements pending trial?.
(a) Do The Impugned Statements In Posting 1 And Posting 2 Have A Defamatory
Meaning?
[44] In deciding whether the impugned statements in posting 1 and posting
2 have a defamatory meaning, this court takes guidance from:
G
(1) the judgment of Mohd Azmi J (as he then was) in Syed Husin Ali
v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146;
[1973] 2 MLJ 56 where he said:
Thus, the test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency
H to excite against the Plaintiff the adverse opinion of others,
although no one believes the statement to be true. Another test
is: would the words tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation
of right-thinking members of society generally?
and
I
(2) the judgment of Helilah Yusof J (as she then was) in Wong Yoke Kong A
& Ors v. Azmi M Anshar & Ors [2003] 6 CLJ 559; [2003] 4 MLJ 96 where
she held that:
There are therefore two steps involved in deciding whether or not
the alleged offensive sentence is defamatory or not. The first is to
consider what meaning the words would convey to the ordinary B
person. Having established the meaning the next stage is whether
under the circumstances in which the words were published, the
reasonable person would be likely to understand them in a
defamatory sense. The abstraction or measuring stick of an
ordinary man is but a measure to strike a balance between freedom
of speech and the safeguard of reputation.10 C
…
An imputation is defamatory if it tends to lower a person in the
estimation of others when it affects any aspect of his reputation.11
[45] Applying the two-step test in Wong Yoke Kong to this case, I find that D
an ordinary person’s understanding of posting 1 and posting 2 would be that:
(i) many customers are disappointed with the food and service at the
restaurant;
(ii) the defendant was cheated by the plaintiff; and E
(iii) if the ordinary and reasonable person dined at the plaintiff’s restaurant
he/she would be subjected to bad food and bad service and would be
cheated by the plaintiff.
[46] In my view, any reasonable person reading the posting 1 in the
F
defendant’s Facebook page and posting 2 in the newspapers, websites, blogs
and Facebook pages in which the posting was published and re-published,
would understand them in the defamatory sense. It can be reasonably
inferred from the comments which the defendant says she had received after
publishing posting 2 (some of which are exhibited as exh. “F” in her affidavit
in reply dated 17 February 2017) shows that those who had read posting 2 G
understood the posting in the defamatory sense.
[47] After having considered the natural and ordinary meaning of the
impugned words used and having regards to what meaning and understanding
they would convey to the ordinary and reasonable person, this court finds
H
that the defendant’s statement in posting 1 and posting 2 are defamatory of
the plaintiff.
I
A (b) Whether The Defendant’s Defence Of Justification And/Or Fair Comments Is

Prima Facie Unlikely To Succeed At Trial?
Defence Of Justification
[48] Defamation Principles and Procedure in Singapore and Malaysia12 states:
B To succeed in the defence of justification, the defendant has to prove that
the defamatory imputations are true in substance and in fact. This is done
in two parts: the defendant has to plead and prove the defamatory
meanings which he will be justifying, and the facts that support the same.
[49] It was held in Worker’s Party v. Tay Boon Too & Anor [1975] 1 LNS 193;
C [1975] 1 MLJ 47, that to establish a plea of justification, the defendant must:
(i) prove the defamatory imputation is true; (ii) justify the precise imputation
complained of; and (iii) prove the truth of all material statements in the libel.
[50] The Court of Appeal explained in Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar
Jamaluddin v. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 3 CLJ 560; [2014]
D 4 MLJ 242, the burden that has to be discharged in proving justification.
Abang Iskandar JCA in delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal said
as follows:
[24] Again, perhaps we should go back to what in essence is required to
be established by a defendant who is desirous of putting up a defence of
E justification in facing up a defamation suit. In relying on the defence of
justification, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that the
allegations made are true or are substantially true. The defendant must
prove it on the balance of probabilities, that is, the allegation is more
likely than not to be true. For example, an allegation published by
repeating a rumour cannot be justified by proving that there was such a
F
rumour. A defendant is required to prove the substance of the allegation.
Since the burden of proving the truth of an allegation is on the defendant,
claimants enjoy a distinct advantage in defamation claims. Justification
has to be used with great care. It can often be difficult to obtain sufficient
admissible evidence to persuade the judge that the statement is true. This
G will sometimes result in the media being unable to publish allegations
which are generally believed to be true, but which they may not be able
to prove to the standard required in court. Further, an unsuccessful
defence of justification is likely to increase the level of any damages
awarded.
[25] But once the defence is successfully established, it affords a complete
H defence against a defamation suit by a claimant. It is not necessary for
a defendant to show that there was a public interest in publication and
it does not matter whether he or she acted maliciously. The law
recognises that to be the case because the defendant has established the
truth of what he had stated however defamatory it has been against the
plaintiff.
I
(emphasis added)
[51] In this present case, the defendant pleads that the statements in posting A
1 were based on the defendant’s and her husband’s experience at the
restaurant. The plaintiff denies the defendant’s claim and pleads that the
person named Joyce in posting 1 had explained to the defendant that all the
tables are booked and they had to wait if they wanted another table. Yiap
Shed Li in the plaintiff’s affidavit in reply, averred that she is known as B
“Joyce” and that she denies the defendant’s allegations.
[52] Apart from the defendant’s averment in her affidavit in reply that the
statements in posting 1 is based on her and her husband’s experience at the
restaurant and her conversation with a person named “Joyce”, which
averment is denied by Yiap Shed Li (a.k.a. Joyce) in her affidavit, the C
defendant did not adduce any evidence to substantiate the truth of her
allegation.
[53] It is not disputed that the statements in posting 2 are substantially the
same as the comments in posting 1 except for the additional statements:
D
(a) “Kalian jangan di tipu oleh Kelana Jaya SS7 BGT Lake View lagi.”
(b) “Tetapi masih juga ada kawan internet yang lain amat marah dan
beritahu saya mereka terpaksa tunggu dengan begitu lama baru di
hiding makanan, makanan juga sangat tak sedap, berbeza dari
gambar, mereka amat kecewa.”
E
(c) “Fikirlah, makan malam RM210 untuk 2 orang. Bukan murah
sangat. Harga ini dan di atur duduk di tempat begitu. Memanglah
(emoji). Cara perkhimatan teruk sangat.”
[54] It is the defendant’s case that posting 2 was based on comments from
other internet users who claim that they were customers of the restaurant and F
not from her actual experience of eating the food and dining at the restaurant.
The defendant averred that posting 2 is true and that it is substantiated from
3,600 comments after she had published posting 2. The defendant included
copies of some of the comments she received in exh. F of her affidavit in
reply. G
[55] It is not disputed that at all material times, the defendant and her
husband neither dined nor ate any food at the restaurant. The defendant
admitted in her affidavit in reply that after the alleged encounter with Joyce
at the restaurant, the defendant and her husband were no longer interested
in having dinner at the restaurant. H
[56] To successfully establish the defence of justification, the defendant

must adduce evidence to prove that the allegations made in posting 1 and
posting 2 are true or substantially true. Mere averments are insufficient to
discharge the defendant’s burden of proof. The Federal Court held in
International Times & Ors v. Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 1 LNS 31; [1980] 2 MLJ I
86 that the burden of proof for the defence of justification does not shift and
remains with the defendant throughout.
A [57] Publishing a statement based on comments she received from other

internet users is insufficient to discharge the defendant’s burden of proof that
the impugned statement was true or substantially true. In the case of Khalid
Abdul Samad v. Datuk Aziz Isham & Anor [2011] 1 LNS 1161; [2012] 7 MLJ
301, Prasad Abraham J (as he then was) ruled as follows:
B [19] In this case, the evidence is clear that the second defendant just
picked up the article of YB Zulkifli Noordin from his official blog and
republished it in toto without any verification of the article at all. The
second defendant maintains that the impugned article was extracted from
the official blog of YB Zulkifli Noordin and as he was MP, it was thought
safe to rely on it. The court rejects that argument in toto.
C
[58] Based on the affidavits before me, I find that the defendant had failed
to establish that her defence of justification on a balance of probabilities was
true or substantially true for the following reasons:
(i) she failed to adduce any evidence to support her contention that the
D events and conversation between her and Joyce on 25 December 2016
evening was as she had stated in posting 1 and posting 2;
(ii) she failed to verify the truth of the comments she received from the
internet users who claimed to have been customers of the restaurant
prior to publishing posting 2 as a basis of her genuine belief that the
E
impugned statement she had published in posting 2 was true or was
substantially true.
[59] With regards to comments from the internet users exhibited in the
defendant’s affidavit in reply to support her defence of justification, the
F
defendant’s counsel submitted that under O. 41 r. 5 of the Rules of Court
2012, an affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory
proceedings may contain statements of information of belief with the sources
and grounds thereof.
[60] With respect to the defendant’s counsel, the issue here is not that the
G hearsay evidence is used in the affidavit but that the comments exhibited in
exh. F of the defendant’s affidavit in reply are comments the plaintiff
received after posting 2 went viral. The defendant did not exhibit in any of
her affidavits, any of the comments she claims to have received after
publishing posting 1 (but before publishing posting 2), which she says were
H
the basis of her statements in posting 2.
Defence Of Fair Comment
[61] The Court of Appeal in Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin
v. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia summed up the law on the defence of fair
comment as below:
I
[50] The law on the defence of fair comment is that if a defendant can A
prove that the defamatory statement is an expression of opinion on a
matter of public interest and not a statement of fact, he or she can rely
on the defence of fair comment. The courts have said that whenever a
matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately
interested in, or concerned at, what is going on or what may happen to
them or to others, then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone B
is entitled to make fair comment.
[51] The comment must be based on true facts which are either contained
in the publication or are sufficiently referred to. It is for the defendant to prove
that the underlying facts are true. If he or she is unable to do so, then the defence
will fail. As with justification, the defendant does not to have to prove the C
truth of every fact provided the comment was fair in relation to those facts
which are proved. However, fair in this context, does not mean reasonable, but
rather, it signifies the absence of malice. The views expressed can be
exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, provided they are honestly held. If
the claimant can show that the publication was made maliciously, the
defence of fair comment will not succeed. D
(emphasis added)
[62] The task of determining what is fact and what is comment is not easy,
as alluded by Lord Ackner in the case of Telnikoff v. Matusevitch [1991] 4 All
ER 817 HL where he said: E
However, the fundamental question which remains is whether the words
complained of in that letter were capable of being understood as a
statement or statements of fact, since if they were, they were defamatory,
there being no attempt to justify them. It is common ground that it is for
the judge alone to decide whether the words complained of are capable
of being a statement of a fact or facts and whether his ruling is right or F
wrong is a matter of law for the decision of an appellate tribunal. Drake
J decided that the words were not so capable and his decision was upheld
by the Court of Appeal. It is not always easy to draw the distinction
between an expression of an opinion and an assertion of fact. The very
same words may be one or the other according to their context. This point
G
is cogently made in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 11th ed., (1979) where this
example is provided:
To say that ‘A is a disgrace to human nature’ is an allegation of
fact, but if the words were ‘A murdered his father and is therefore
a disgrace to human nature’ the latter words are plainly a comment
on the former. H
I do not take it to be disputed that whether the words complained of were

reasonably capable of being understood as comment or a statement of fact
must depend on a consideration of the whole of the words used, their
context and the circumstances of publication. The vital issue in this case
is – what is their context? ... I
A [63] To succeed in a defence of fair comment, the defendant must prove all
the following elements on a balance of probabilities:
(i) that the postings were comments not statement of facts;
(ii) the comments were made as a matter of public interest;
B (iii) the comments were based on true or substantially true facts; and
(iv) the comments were made without malice.
[64] In my view the question of whether the postings are a statement of fact
or comment and whether they were made as a matter of public interest, are
C matters that are better decided after hearing all the parties at trial rather than
based on affidavits. Accordingly, for purposes of determining prima facie the
likelihood of success of the defendant’s defence of fair comment, I have
tipped the scale towards the defendant’s freedom of speech and made the
assumptions that (1) the impugned statements are fair comments; and (2) they
D were made as a matter of public interest. Based on these assumptions and the
facts before me, I have to determine whether the defendant has discharged
her burden of proof as regards the two other elements required for a defence
of fair comment to succeed, namely that (3) the comments were based on true
facts; and (4) they made without malice.
E [65] It is the defendant’s case that the 3,600 comments she received after
publishing posting 2 on Facebook supports her defence of fair comment. She
has not provided any evidence to show that her comments at the time of
publishing the postings were made based on true facts.
[66] In my view, the following expletives in posting 1:
F
“I can only pray for ur business going to hell!! Fxxk ur!”
“BAN BGT Lake View!”
would make it difficult for any objective and reasonable person to agree with
the defendant’s averment that the impugned statements were fair comments
G and made without malice. She has not provided any evidence to prove that
they were made without malice.
[67] Therefore, notwithstanding my assumption that posting 1 and posting
2 are comments made in the public interest, I find that defendant’s defence
of fair comment is prima facie unlikely to succeed. This is because the
H
defendant has failed to prove that the postings were based on true or
substantially true facts and that they were made without malice.
I
(c) Whether There Is Evidence Of Intention To Publish The Impugned Statements A

Pending Trial?
[68] Section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 provides three types of
presumptions of fact in publication of contents on the internet, which are as
follows:
B
114A: Presumption of fact in publication
(1) A person whose name, photograph or pseudonym appears on any
publication depicting himself as the owner, host, administrator,
editor or sub-editor, or who in any manner facilitates to publish or
re-publish the publication is presumed to have published or re-
C
published the contents of the publication unless the contrary is
proved.
(2) A person who is registered with a network service provider as a
subscriber of a network service on which any publication originates
from is presumed to be the person who published or re-published
the publication unless the contrary is proved. D
(3) Any person who has in his custody or control any computer on
which any publication originates from is presumed to have published
or re-published the content of the publication unless the contrary is
proved.
E
(4) For the purpose of this section:
(a) “network service” and “network service provider” have the
meaning assigned to them in section 6 of the Communications
and Multimedia Act 1998; and
(b) “publication” means a statement or a representation, whether in F
written, printed, pictorial, film, graphical, acoustic or other form
displayed on the screen of a computer.”
[69] It is not disputed that the defendant continues to publish posting 1 and
posting 2 on her Facebook account, notwithstanding the ad interim injunction
ordered by this court restraining her from publishing or causing to publish G
posting 1 and posting 2. She has failed and/or refused to comply with the
ad interim injunction. There is currently an application by the plaintiff before
this court (encl. 18)13 for leave to commence an application for a committal
order against the defendant for failing and/or refusing to comply with the
ad interim injunction.
H
[70] Moreover, based on the presumption of fact under s. 114A of the
Evidence Act she is presumed to continue publishing posting 1 and posting
2 unless she proves the contrary.
[71] This court finds that the defendant’s failure and/or refusal to comply
with the ad interim injunction to date is evidence that she will continue to I
publish or cause to be published posting 1 and posting 2 until trial.
A Decision
[72] For the reasons stated above, I find that the defendant’s statements in
posting 1 and posting 2 to be defamatory. I also find that the continued
publication of posting 1 and posting 2 on the defendant’s Facebook would
cause the plaintiff’s to suffer further damage to their reputation and goodwill
B as the potential re-publication of the postings to potentially unlimited
number of internet users would irreparably harm the plaintiff’s reputation:
which harm cannot be adequately compensated with damages.
[73] I have taken cognizance of the caution expressed by the Supreme
Court in The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v. Airasia Bhd that this court
C
should exercise its discretion judicially and should balance the freedom of
speech which is related to the freedom of the press against the reputation of
the plaintiff. Based on the affidavits before me and for the reasons set-out
above, I find that prima facie the defendant’s defence of justification and fair
comment is unlikely to succeed. In order to successfully prove justification
D and fair comment, the defendant would need to adduce evidence at trial to
support her plea that the impugned statements are based on true facts and
were made without malice. Furthermore, unlike the defendant in the The
New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v. Airasia Bhd, the defendant is not the press
but a member of the public with a Facebook account. Her publications in her
E Facebook account are not subject to the same fact-checking and editorial
process as that of a newspaper. Also, her Facebook posting, unlike an article
published in a printed newspaper like The New Straits Times, can reach any
person worldwide who visits her Facebook page. As the learned Judicial
Commissioners observed in the PETRONAS case, the internet is a
F “borderless unrestricted environment”. The damage that her continued
publication of posting 1 and posting 2 can cause irreparable damage to the
plaintiff’s reputation which cannot be adequately compensated with
damages. I have also taken account the fact that any interim injunction
restraining her from publishing posting 1 and posting 2 on her Facebook
would not restrain her from publishing other postings on her Facebook
G
account. Also, as the plaintiff is a company with a paid-up capital of
RM500,000, I am satisfied that the plaintiff would be able to honour its
undertaking of damages for any damages suffered by the defendant due to any
interim injunction granted against her, in the event she succeeds in proving
the defence of justification or fair comment at trial.
H
Order
[74] Accordingly, after weighing all the facts before me and balancing the
defendant’s freedom of speech and the continuing damage to the plaintiff’s
reputation with the continued publication of posting 1 and posting 2 on the
I defendant’s Facebook, I hereby grant an interim injunction effective
immediately to restrain the defendant whether by herself, her servants, agents A

facebook account, posting 1 and posting 2 (as pleaded in the plaintiff’s
statement of claim) or similar words which the plaintiff pleads are
defamatory of the plaintiff, in any manner whatsoever until the hearing and
final disposal of this suit. B
[75] I order the defendant to pay the plaintiff damages of RM5,000
forthwith subject to payment of the allocator fee.
Endnotes:
1. “Viral” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean “an image, C
video, piece of information etc. that is circulated rapidly and widely
from one Internet user to another.”
2. See afidavit jawapan defendan at para. 8.16 and para. 9.
3. Supra. para 8.17 and para. 9. D
4. Para. 12.18 of the statement of defence.
5. Exhibit “P1” to Yiap Shed Li’s Affidavit Sokongan Plaintiff (encl. 7)
dated 20 January 2017.
6. Exhibit “P11” to Yiap Shed Li’s Affidavit Jawapan Plaintiff (encl. 14) E
dated 3 March 2017.
7. At [1987] 1 LNS 79; [1987] 1 MLJ 39.
8. At [1987] 1 LNS 79; [1987] 1 MLJ 39.
9. At [2003] 4 CLJ 331b-c. F
10. At [2003] 6 MLJ 590h.

11. At [2003] 6 MLJ 594g.
12. Doris Chia, LexisNexis 2016
G
13. Under O. 52 r. 3 of the Rules of Court 2012
I
B
a LING WAH PRESS (M) SDN BHD & ORS

v.
TAN SRI DATO’ VINCENT TAN CHEE YIOUN &
OTHER APPEALS
b
FEDERAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
EUSOFF CHIN CJ
WAN ADNAN ISMAIL CJ (MALAYA)
CHONG SIEW FAI CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK)
c [CIVIL APPEAL NOS: 02-6-95(W), 02-5-95(W) & 02-2-96(W)]
12 JULY 2000
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Damages - Appellate court - Defamation cases -
Whether award outrageously exorbitant, shockingly excessive or manifestly
unreasonable - Whether trial judge acted on wrong principle of law -
d Whether appellate court should reduce awards
TORT: Defamation - Damages - Assessment of damages - Whether personal
injury cases can be used as guidance - Seriousness and gravity of
allegations made - More than one tortfeasor - Whether liable jointly -
When no defence filed whether must enter judgment in default
e
These three appeals were mainly against the quantum of damages awarded.
The High Court judge awarded RM2 million as general and aggravated
damages against the appellant in appeal no. 02-5-95(W), RM3 million and
RM2 million as general damages against the respective appellants in appeal
f no. 02-2-96(W). The Court of Appeal upheld these awards. The appellants
appealed to the Federal Court on the ground that these award were
excessive and ought to be reduced.
Held:
Per Eusoff Chin CJ
g
[1] The awards in personal injury cases for pain and suffering cannot and
should not be used to provide any guidance when considering what is the
reasonable award of damages in defamation cases.
[2] The trial judge was correct in finding the appellants liable as several
h
tortfeasors and not as joint tortfeasors since the culpability and liability
of each of the appellants was different.
[3] The assessment of damages is the province of the trial judge, and an
appellate court is not entitled to substitute its own judgment merely
i because it would have arrived at a different figure. Unless the verdict is
so outrageously exorbitant or shockingly excessive or manifestly
Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Tan Sri
[2000] 3 CLJ Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals 729
unreasonable, unjust or irrational, the appellate courts should proceed with a

caution before making any variation in assessment of damages in libel
cases.
[4] Serious and grave allegations had been made against the respondents.
Low and cheap awards will only send a wrong signal and may be
b
interpreted as trivialising the incident. Appropriate awards must be
made to nail the falsity of the allegations and to vindicate the
respondent.
[5] The appellants failed to show that the trial judge had acted on a wrong
principle of law or had misapprehended the facts or had made a wholly c
erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. Therefore the awards were
not erroneous or excessive to warrant any interference by the court.
[6] One cannot compare a particular libel case with another libel case
because each libel case has its own particular and peculiar facts, is
unique and in a class by itself. d
[7] A plaintiff in a libel action is not bound to enter default judgment.

He is entitled to proceed and to set the action down for hearing for
the purpose of vindicating his reputation and to have his damages
assessed. e
[Appeal dismissed.]
[Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes]
Ketiga-tiga rayuan ini adalah rayuan terhadap kuantum ganti-rugi yang telah
f
diberikan oleh hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Beliau telah memberi award ganti-
rugi umum dan ganti-rugi tertambah (‘aggravated damages’) sebanyak RM2
juta kepada perayu di dalam rayuan no. 02-5-95(W), ganti-rugi umum
sebanyak RM3 juta dan RM2 juta masing-masingnya kepada perayu-perayu
di dalam Rayuan No. 02-2-96(W). Pada rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan,
mahkamah mengesahkan award-award ini. Perayu-perayu merayu ke g
Mahkamah Persekutuan atas alasan yang award-award ini sangat melampau
dan wajar dikurangkan.
Diputuskan:
Oleh Eusoff Chin KHN h
[1] Award dalam kes kecederaan diri untuk kesakitan dan penderitaan (‘pain
and suffering’) tidak boleh dan tidak patut digunakan sebagai panduan
apabila mempertimbangkan award yang munasabah bagi kes fitnah.
i
a [2] Hakim bicara sememangnya betul apabila memutuskan bahawa perayu-

perayu bertanggungjawab sebagai pelakutort berasingan dan bukannya
sebagai pelakutort bersama kerana kesalahan dan liabiliti setiap perayu
adalah berbeza.
[3] Penafsiran ganti-rugi adalah dibawah skop hakim bicara, dan mahkamah
b
rayuan tidak berhak untuk menggantikan penghakimannya semata-mata
kerana ia mencapai angka yang berbeza. Kecuali jika keputusan tersebut
terlalu melampau atau teramat berlebihan atau ternyata tidak munasabah
atau tidak rasional, mahkamah rayuan harus berhati-hati sebelum
membuat sebarang perubahan kepada taksiran ganti rugi dalam kes
c libel.
[4] Dakwaan yang serius dan teruk telah dibuat terhadap responden. Award
yang rendah dan murah hanya akan memberi anggapan yang silap dan
boleh ditafsirkan sbegai meremeh-remehkan insiden tersebut. Award
d yang munasabah mestilah diberi untuk menunjukkan kepalsuan dakwaan
tersebut dan untuk membuktikan kebenaran responden.
[5] Perayu gagal menunjukkan bahawa hakim bicara telah bertindak
berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang yang salah atau telah tersalah faham
fakta kes atau telah membuat taksiran yang tidak betul mengenai tahap
e kecederaan yang dialami. Oleh yang demikian award-award ini tidaklah
salah atau melampau dan tidak perlu sebarang campur tangan dari
mahkamah.
[6] Satu kes libel tidak boleh dibanding dengan satu kes libel yang lain
f
kerana setiap kes libel mempunyai fakta yang khusus dan tersendiri,
ianya unik dan dalam kelasnya yang tersendiri.
[7] Plaintif di dalam tindakan libel tidak terikat untuk memasukkan
penghakiman ingkar. Beliau berhak untuk meneruskan prosiding dan
menetapkan tindakan ini untuk bicara bagi tujuan menebus reputasinya
g dan menaksirkan kecederaan yang telah dialami.
[Rayuan ditolak.]
Associated Newspapers v. Dingle [1964] AC 371 (refd)
h Baltrop v. Canadian Corporation [1978] 86 DLR 61 (refd)
Blackshaw v. Lord [1984] 1 QB 1 (refd)
Cassell & Co v. Broome [1972] 1 All ER 801 (refd)
Dato’ Musa Hitam v. SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 (refd)
Dato’ Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’akub v. Abang Mohammad Abang Anding [1979]
2 MLJ 185 (refd)
i Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd [1942] AC 601 (refd)
Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1964] AC 371 (refd)
Hayward v. Thompson & Ors [1981] 3 All ER 450 (refd)
Humphries v. TWT Ltd [1994] 120 ALR 693 (refd) a

Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1992] 2 SLR 310 (refd)
John v. MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 (refd)
Mahmood Kailan v. Goh Seng Choon & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 239 (refd)
Smith Newspapers Ltd v. Becker [1932] 47 CLR 279 (refd)
Sutcliffe v. Pressdram Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 269 (refd)
b
Defamation Act 1957, s. 18
Federal Constitution, art. 10
For the 1st appellant - Apparao Apana; M/s KC Yap Kamaluddin & Partners
For the 2nd appellant - Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo & Gobind Singh Deo with c
him); M/s Karpal Singh & Co
For the 3rd & 4th appellants - Shamsul Bahrain; M/s Skrine & Co
For the respondent - VK Lingam (Adam Bachek & W Satchithnandhan with him);
M/s Adam Bachek & Assoc
Reported by Izzaty Izzuddin d
JUDGMENT
Eusoff Chin CJ:
These three appeals were with consent of parties, set down for hearing e
together. At the outset counsel for appellant Ling Wah Press Sdn. Bhd.
informed the court that he had received no instruction to proceed, and as no
one from Ling Wah Press was present in court, the appeal was struck out with
costs.
Encik Karpal Singh for 1st appellant (Encik M.G.G. Pillai) drew the attention f
of the court to a newspaper cutting where the Chief Justice when interviewed
by the press two years earlier on 24 October 1996 had expressed his views
that in libel cases persons of higher status would receive higher damages than
those of lower status. He asked whether in view of that expression, the Chief
Justice should disqualify himself from hearing these appeals. Both the Chief g
Judges on the panel, however, felt that each case must be dealt with on its
merits and that this was no good reason to disqualify a judge from hearing a
case. Otherwise, a judge who has expressed his opinion on an issue in an
earlier decision would not be able to hear a case involving the same issue
later on. Encik Karpal Singh withdrew his objection. h
The Bar Council sent three of its members, Tuan Hj. Sulaiman Abdullah, Encik
Mah Weng Kwai and Puan Anita Sockalingam to watch brief on the issue of
quantum. The court allowed them to do so, as indeed the court is an open
court and anyone can come in and go provided he does not disturb the court’s
proceedings. i
a The facts of the case have been clearly set out both by the High Court and
the Court of Appeal in their judgments which have been reported in 1995, 1
MLJ 39, and 1995, 2 MLJ 493 respectively, and we need not repeat them
here.
The High Court had awarded RM2 million against the first appellant as general
b
and aggravated damages; RM3 million as general damages against the second
appellant, Encik Hassan bin Hj. Hamzah; and RM2 million as general damages
against the third appellant, Media Printex (M) Sdn. Bhd.
The Court of Appeal had upheld the awards made by the High Court.
c
These appeals are mainly against quantum of damages awarded. The appellants
argued that they are excessive, and ought to be reduced.
It is well settled that the principle upon which an appellate court will interfere
with an award of damages by a trial judge, has been laid to rest in Davies v.
d Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd. [1942] AC 601, which was followed
by Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. and Ors [1964] AC 371, and that
is, the appellant must show that the trial judge had acted on a wrong principle
of law or has misapprehended the facts or has made a wholly erroneous
estimate of the damage suffered. See also Mahmood bin Kailan v. Goh Seng
e Choon & Anor. [1976] 2 MLJ 239 at 240.
Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd had stated
as follows:
Where, however, the award is that of the judge alone, the appeal is by way
f of rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so
much room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is more
like an exercise of discretion than any ordinary act of decision, the appellate
court is particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount
of damages. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule which will cover all
cases, but a good general guide is given by Greer LJ in Flint v. Lovell. In
g effect the court, before it interferes with an award of damages, should be
satisfied that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has
misapprehended the facts, or has for these or other reasons made a wholly
erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. It is not enough that there is a
balance of opinion or preference. The scale must go down heavily against the
figure attacked if the appellate court is to interfere whether on the ground of
h excess or insufficiency.
Damages in a libel case are essentially matters of impression. The Federal

Court of Australia in Humphries v. T.W.T. Ltd. [1994] 120 ALR 693 at 700
agreed with Dixon J in Smith Newspapers Ltd v. Becker [1932] 47 CLR 279
i at 300 who described the role to be performed by the appellate court in appeals
against damages assessed by a judge in defamation cases:
We are not in the same position as the judge at the trial for assessing damages a
for defamation. He has an opportunity denied to us of judging the true character
of the plaintiff whose sensibility, refinement and feelings of honour are, where
they exist, of no little importance when he is held up to public obloquy and
infamy. So far as the conduct of the trial forms an aid in estimating the degree
of impropriety involved in the publication complained of, the trial judge has
peculiar advantages. The question what amount awarded to the victim of a b
public outrage is enough to serve at once as a solatium, vindication and
compensation to him and a requital to the wrongdoer can only be solved by
an exercise of a discretionary judgment, and a court of appeal should not, in
my opinion, interfere and review the sum fixed unless it is able to infer from
the amount adopted by the trial judge, or otherwise, that in some way his
c
discretion must have miscarried.
The assessment of damages is the province of the trial judge, and an appellate
court is not entitled to substitute its own judgment merely because it would
have arrived at a different figure. Unless the verdict is so outrageously
exorbitant, or shockingly excessive in relation to the libel, or manifestly d
unreasonable, unjust or irrational, the appellate courts should proceed with
caution before making any variation in assessment of damages in libel cases.
Learned counsel for the first appellant submitted that the award of RM2
million was excessive compared with awards given in other defamation cases.
He said in Singapore, the highest award given in a defamation case was e
S$400,000. In the case of Dato’ Musa bin Hitam v. S.H. Alattas & 2 Ors.
[1991] 1 CLJ 314, the High Court awarded RM100,000 as damages. In the
case of Dato’ Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’akub v. Abang Mohammad bin
Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185, the plaintiff was awarded RM25,000.
f
We find that we cannot compare a particular libel case with other libel cases.
Each libel case has its own particular and peculiar facts, is unique and a class
by itself. We cannot by our judgment set a precedent on the damages to be
awarded. The court must consider a number of factors when assessing damages
in a libel case. In John v. MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 at 607, Sir Thomas
g
Bingham MR (now CJ) said:
In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important
factor is the gravity of the libel; the more closely it (the defamation) touches
the plaintiff’s personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty
and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be.
h
The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions
has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of
people. A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to
vindicate his reputation but the significance of this is much greater in a case
where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or
apology than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what i
was published, and publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took
place.
a Damages in defamation cases are described as being at large. The law has
not fixed any exact measure for assessment of damages in an action for
defamation. There is no mathematical formula by which the quantum can be
determined; nor is there any requirement that the damages be assessed with
mathematical certainty. But a small sum awarded to a prominent public figure
b for a serious libel could be interpreted as trivialising the incident.
The learned counsel for the first appellant submitted that the damages awarded
in defamation cases should not be more than damages awarded in personal
injury (and road accident) cases because a man’s arm is worth more than a
man’s reputation. The Court of Appeal considered this same submission, and
c had concluded that such proposition must be rejected. We, too, hold the same
view. The Courts of England have also unequivocally rejected the comparison
of libel and personal injury cases – see Cassell & Co. v. Broome [1972] 1
All ER 801; Blackshaw v. Lord [1984] 1 QB 1; and Sutcliffe v. Pressdram
Ltd. [1990] 1 All ER 269. These authoritative views supported by global
d authorities is that awards of damages in defamation cases cannot be equated
with awards of damages in personal injury cases. In personal injury cases there
is no intention to cause harm or damage to the plaintiff. If there was such an
intention he would be charged with committing a criminal offence. The tort
is based purely on negligence of the defendant and breach of duty of care
e owed to the plaintiff. The award in personal injury cases is to compensate
the plaintiff for the pain and suffering which the plaintiff has suffered or will
suffer in the future. The element of punishment or deterrence does not enter
into an award in a personal injury cases. In defamation cases, the defendant
intentionally publishes the injurious false statement to cause humiliation and
f anguish to the plaintiff, and to injure his reputation. True, the intention to
defame the plaintiff is not necessary to impose liability on the defendant
because the intention to defame can be inferred from the publication of the
defamatory statement which gives rise to the presumption of malice on the
part of the defendant. The plaintiff in a defamation case gets compensation
not for his damaged reputation. He gets it because he was injured in his
g
reputation by being publicly defamed. The award of damages given to him
serves as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as a consolation to
him for a wrong done. That is why it is wrong and unfair to compare awards
of damages in defamation cases with those in personal injury cases. The
awards in personal injury cases for pain and suffering cannot and should not
h be used to provide any guidance when considering what is a reasonable award
of damages in a defamation case.
The learned counsel for the first appellant argued that since his client did not
file any defence, he should not have been allowed to give evidence by the
i court at the trial. But we note that the record of appeal shows that the first
appellant had agreed to proceed with the trial. He wanted to give evidence
on oath at the trial. Had the trial judge stopped him from doing so, there would
have occurred a grave miscarriage of justice. By allowing the first appellant
to give evidence on oath, the judge was giving him an opportunity to reduce a
or mitigate his liability and affording him an opportunity to apologise to the
respondent. But he aggravated the injury done to the plaintiff by giving
evidence on justification and fair comment.
The learned counsel for the first appellant also complained why the respondent
b
had not taken judgment in default of defence. The Court of Appeal had dealt
with this issue, and we have nothing useful to add to it. It stated [1995] 2
MLJ 511:
Faced with the first appellants default in delivering a pleading, the respondent
had a choice. He could have entered interlocutory judgment and moved for
c
an assessment of his damages. Alternatively, he could have set the action down
for trial. He chose the latter course. In this he is supported by authority. It is
the decision in Nagy v. Co-operative Press Ltd [1949] 2 KB 188; [1949] 1
All ER 1019, which also concerned a libel action. The remarks of Cohen LJ
(as he then was) when dealing with the precursor to O. 19 r. 7 are pertinent.
This is what he said ([1949] 2 KB 188 at p. 193; [1949] All ER 1019 at pp. d
1022-1023):
Order 27 r. 11, seems to me to be in its natural meaning permissive. I
think the purpose of the rule was to provide a cheap method for the
plaintiff to obtain in most cases the relief he seeks. But circumstances
might well arise in which a real hardship would be inflicted on a
e
plaintiff if he was compelled to proceed by a motion for judgment and
could not exercise the right which he would otherwise have had of
setting down the case for trial and letting it come on for trial in the
usual way.
In my judgment a plaintiff in a libel action is not bound to enter default
judgment. I certainly see no such compulsion in the language of O. 19 r. 7 of f
the Rules of the High Court 1980. He is entitled to proceed and to set the
action down for hearing for the purpose of vindicating his reputation and to
have his damages assessed. I do not think that it lies in the mouth of a
defendant who has publicly assailed a person’s character to suggest that
vindication ought not to be properly obtained.
g
The hearing of the action commenced on 10 October 1994, having been set
down for trial pursuant to an order for directions made on 22 August 1994. It
has been suggested that the action had come up for trial with undue haste.
But this suggestion overlooks the fact that none but the second appellant had
delivered a defence. If, in the ordinary way, there had been a motion or
summons for judgment that would no doubt have come on much earlier and h
the very same result achieved with one important difference. The evidence of
the respondent would in that event have been confined to an affidavit. The
judge would not have been able to see and gauge the respondent’s demeanour
and this may have well affected the size of the award. More importantly, the
respondent would have lost the chance of denying the libel from the witness
i
box, in the eye of the very same public before whom he was held up to
ridicule. These are matters of practical concern to lawyers who practise in this
area of the law.
a The question then arises: should a plaintiff suffer delay in the vindication of
his character because he chooses not to take advantage of a defendant’s default
in delivering his defence? I would answer that question in the most vehement
negative. To my mind, it does not seem right that merely because a plaintiff
in a libel action elects not to opt for a less expensive method provided by the
rules of court, he should be made to wait for several years in order to clear
b his name as against a defendant who displays little or no interest in the
proceedings.
Learned counsel for the second and third appellants raised the issue of s. 18
of the Defamation Act 1957. The Court of Appeal had dealt at length on this
issue – See [1995] 2 MLJ 529-531, and held that “the short answer to the
c
submission mounted on s. 18 is that it was never raised before the learned
judge, a fact that was conceded by counsel, and it is therefore too late in the
day to argue it on appeal”. But the reasons for making separate awards were
obvious. There were four separate articles in three different issues of the
magazine. The culpability and liability of each of the defendants in the High
d Court is different for the reasons that: (i) the four articles were written by
four different writers; (ii) although all the articles attacked the plaintiff there
is a difference in the gravity and degree of each attack; (iii) the first appellant
here relied on justification and aggravated the libel and he showed no remorse;
(iv) two writers had apologised to the plaintiff in the court and this was a
e mitigating factor; (v) the second appellant had openly admitted liability and
had agreed that the articles had defamed the plaintiff; and (vi) the court had
done justice to the parties by taking these factors into account and made
separate awards. The trial judge was therefore correct in finding the several
defendants liable as several tortfeasors and not as joint tortfeasors. In Hayward
f v. Thompson & Ors. [1981] 3 All ER 450 at 458 Lord Denning MR held:
More to the point would have been the observations of Lord Hailsham LC in
Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 All ER 801 at 817 when he said that
both in exemplary damages and in aggravated damages, the jury must award
‘the lowest sum for which any of the defendants can be held liable on this
g score’. I do not think that this is at all satisfactory. Suppose there are some
circumstances of aggravation available against the Sunday Telegraph. There may
be other circumstances of aggravation against Mr. House. Likewise there may
be mitigating circumstances in the one and not in the other. No one can say
what is the ‘lowest’ sum.
h The learned counsel for the second and third appellants had argued that the
award should be reduced because these appellants had published their apologies
(see pp. 389 & 390 of the appeal record). While an apology may be taken
into consideration in assessing an award, in this case the counsel for the second
and third appellants had by cross-examining the plaintiff at the trial had further
i aggravated the libel by insisting the truth of the defamatory publication. The
sad truth is that no apology, retraction or withdrawal can ever be guaranteed a

completely to undo the harm the libel has done, or the hurt it has caused –
see Associated Newspapers v. Dingle [1964] AC 371 at 399.
The learned counsel for the second and third appellants also alleged that the
Court of Appeal had awarded exemplary damages and aggravated damages
b
against them. The fact is that the Court of Appeal did not do so. The High
Court had only awarded general damages, which the Court of Appeal did not
disturb but upheld. The Court of Appeal, when considering the issue of
apology raised by the second and third appellants had stated [1995] 2 MLJ
527 as follows:
c
An apology, although not exonerating a defendant, has the effect of reducing
and in some cases substantially reducing the quantum of damages. The corollary
of this proposition is that where the purported apology in effect aggravates the
libel, a court will be entitled to award aggravated and exemplary damages to
reflect its disapproval of the defamer’s conduct.
d
Counsel also submitted that large damages if allowed to stand would have a
chilling effect on the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by art.
10 of the Federal Constitution. We are of the view that freedom of speech is
not an absolute right. Freedom of speech is not a licence to defame people.
It is subject to legal restrictions. An absolute or unrestricted right to free e
speech would result in persons recklessly maligning others with impunity, and
the exercise of such right would do the public more harm than good. Every
person has a right to reputation and that right ought to be protected by law –
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1992] 2 SLR 310 at
332.
f
Article 10 of the Federal Constitution itself while guaranteeing every citizen
the right to freedom of speech and expression has imposed restrictions by
authorising Parliament to enact laws which it deems necessary to provide
against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence.
g
But, one must not forget that the ‘chilling’ effect that a large amount of
damages has on the freedom of speech is nothing or is too mild compared to
the great pains and sufferings that the libel had inflicted upon the respondent
due to the venomous accusations made by the appellants against the
respondent.
h
We have considered whether the award of RM2 million damages against the
first appellant is excessive. We do not think so. The first appellant relied on
justification which is a very serious plea. In the course of giving evidence he
had repeated the defamatory statements. He is a prominent journalist of
international standing and has a large following. We find that the trial judge i
a had taken all relevant factors and circumstances of the case into consideration,
and had also considered all the leading authorities to justify his award of
general and aggravated damages against the first appellant who showed no
remorse or apology to the respondent. Lord Denning in the Associated
Newspaper’s case [1970] 2 QB 450 at 455 stated:
b
The defendants, in putting this plea of justification on the record, run a very
grave risk. If it fails, the damages, which might otherwise have been modest,
would now be colossal.
Nourse LJ in Sutcliffe v. Pressdam Ltd. [1991] 1 QB 153 at 184 held:

c The conduct of a defendant which may often be regarded as aggravating the
injury to the plaintiff’s feelings, so as to support a claim for ‘aggravated’
damages, includes a failure to make any or any sufficient apology and
withdrawal; and a repetition of the libel ... persistence by way of prolonged
or hostile cross-examination of the plaintiff ...
d In Baltrop v. Canadian Corporation [1978] 86 DLR 61 at 79 (N.S.S.C. App.
Div) the court held:
Serious damage to reputation requires heavy compensation, even if no specific
loss is or can be shown. Here, a man of international reputation is vilified in
the eyes of his professional confreres. He thus suffers greatly, though he may
e
not lose a single dollar.
As regards the general damages awarded against the second and third
appellants, we too find no good reasons to interfere. The trial judge had
considered all the relevant factors, circumstances and the leading authorities.
f The Court of Appeal had affirmed the awards made. Serious and grave
allegations of corruption and underhand dealings had been made against the
respondent. An apology can never undo the harm done to the respondent. Low
and cheap awards will only send the wrong signal, and will become a licence
to libel the respondent and other people with impunity. Appropriate awards
g
must be made to nail the falsity of the allegations and to vindicate the
respondent.
We find the awards made by the judge and affirmed by the Court of Appeal
are reasonable in the circumstances, and are based on established principles
of law. The appellants have failed to show to us that the trial judge had acted
h on a wrong principle of law or has misapprehended the facts or has made a
wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. Therefore the awards are
not erroneous or excessive to warrant any interference by this court.
We, therefore dismiss these appeals with costs.
i
C
[2005] 2 CLJ Chin Choon v. Chua Jui Meng 569
CHIN CHOON a
v.
CHUA JUI MENG
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA b
GOPAL SRI RAM JCA
ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN JCA
NIK HASHIM JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02-372-2000]
14 OCTOBER 2004
c
TORT: Damages - Defamation - Libel - Compensatory, aggravated and
exemplary damages - Fair quantum - Separate award for each head - Whether
against practice - Awards thereof - Whether to be globalised
The appellant, an advocate and solicitor, had published a libel against the d
respondent, the Deputy Minister for International Trade and Industry. The
defamatory statement, which was published in two Chinese newspapers, spoke
of the appellant as having ‘boxes of evidence’ that the respondent was corrupt
and had accepted gratification of RM500,000 or RM600,000. At the trial, the
appellant could not however prove his allegations, and was forced to abort
e
his justification plea. The learned judge, in the circumstances, found the
appellant liable and ordered him to pay RM500,000 in damages in respect of
each of the three categories of damages (compensatory, aggravated and
exemplary). Aggrieved, the appellant appealed and argued that the RM1.5
million award was excessive, that the respondent deserved only nominal
damage, and that, since he did not profit monetarily from the attack on the f
respondent, the award for exemplary damages was unwarranted and unjustified.
It was further argued that the learned judge ought to have awarded a global
quantum, instead of apportioning the sums under the respective categories.
Held (setting aside and substituting the award of the High Court) g
Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA delivering the judgment of the court:
[1] Bearing in mind the appellant’s conduct, aggravated damages is justified
and should be awarded. Here is a case of an arrogant appellant who
not only put a plea of justification on record but said that he had ‘boxes
of evidence’ against the respondent to show that the latter had accepted h
RM500,000 or RM600,000. The boxes, as it transpired, were empty and
the plea of justification was withdrawn. (p 575 e)
CLJ
a [2] It is not a fair interpretation of Lord Devlin’s speech in Rookes v.

Barnard [1964] AC 1129 to say that he had intended that grant of
punitive or exemplary damages should be limited to cases of monetary
profit. That is too narrow an interpretation. On the contrary, any form
of advantage gained by a defendant in a defamation case suffices.
b Further, such an advantage need not produce an immediate profit in
money terms. Suffice that it produces an immediate non-pecuniary
advantage that may later translate into a monetary reward. (p 575 h &
576 a-b)
[2a] The appellant, by his tortuous act, had wanted to impress upon members
c of the Chinese community that he was an advocate who feared no one,
not even a Deputy Minister of the Government, when it came to
advancing his client’s cause. Reasonable persons who read his statement
may well decide to retain his services because of the impression created
by him. So the appellant stood to gain from what he did. Accordingly,
d this is a suitable case to make an award of exemplary damages. (p 576 c)
[3] The High Court should not be making separate awards for aggravated
and exemplary damages, but should instead maintain the age-old practice
of making a global award so as to limit the size of awards. Be that as
it may, the award of RM1.5 million, even after taking into account all
e
factors in the respondent’s favour, is manifestly excessive. Having regard
to the very special circumstances of this case, an award of RM200,000
is a fair sum by way of a global award of damages. This award should
include in it compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages. (p 576
e-h & 577 a-b)
f
[Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes
Perayu, seorang peguambela dan peguamcara, telah menyiarkan fitnah libel
terhadap responden, yang merupakan Timbalan Menteri Perdagangan
Antarabangsa dan Industri. Kenyataan fitnah tersebut, yang disiarkan di dalam
g
dua surat khabar harian China, adalah bahawa perayu mempunyai ‘berkotak-
kotak bukti’ bahawa responden adalah seorang yang korap dan telah menerima
suapan sebanyak RM500,000 atau RM600,000. Di pendengaran, perayu
bagaimanapun gagal membuktikan tuduhannya, dan terpaksa meninggalkan
pembelaan justifikasinya. Dalam halkeadaan sedemikian, yang arif hakim
h mendapati perayu bertanggungan dan seterusnya memerintahkan perayu
membayar gantirugi sebanyak RM500,000 bagi setiap satu dari tiga kategori
gantirugi (pampasan, teruk dan teladan). Terkilan, perayu merayu dan berhujah
bahawa award sebanyak RM1.5 juta adalah terlampau tinggi, bahawa responden
CLJ
hanya berhak kepada gantirugi nominal sahaja, dan bahawa, oleh kerana beliau a
tidak mendapat apa-apa keuntungan kewangan daripada serangannya ke atas
responden, pemberian gantirugi teladan adalah tidak wajar dan tidak
berjustifikasi. Perayu selanjutnya berhujah bahawa yang arif hakim seharusnya
memberikan suatu award global, dan tidak mengagihkan award mengikut
kategori-kategori di atas. b
Diputuskan (mengenepi dan menggantikan award Mahkamah Tinggi)
Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:
[1] Mengambil kira kelakuan perayu, gantirugi teruk adalah wajar dan harus
diberi. Kes di sini adalah mengenai seorang perayu yang bongkak yang c
bukan sahaja telah memplidkan pembelaan justifikasi pada rekod, tetapi
mengatakan bahawa beliau mempunyai ‘berkotak-kotak bukti’ terhadap
responden untuk menunjukkan bahawa responden menerima RM500,000
atau RM600,000. Kotak-kotak tersebut, bagaimanapun, dan sepertimana
yang berlaku, adalah semata-mata kosong dan pembelaan justifikasi d
terpaksa ditinggalkan.
[2] Ucapan Lord Devlin dalam Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 tidak
boleh diertikan sebagai memberi gambaran bahawa apa yang ingin
dikatakan oleh beliau adalah bahawa pemberian gantirugi teladan harus
dihadkan kepada kes-kes yang melibatkan keuntungan kewangan semata- e
mata. Sebarang bentuk faedah yang diperolehi oleh seseorang defendan
di dalam kes fitnah, sebaliknya, adalah memadai. Faedah sedemikian juga
tidak perlu mencetuskan keuntungan kewangan dengan serta merta.
Memadai jika ia dengan serta merta membangkitkan faedah bukan
kewangan tetapi kemudian bertukar kepada suatu faedah kewangan. f
[3] Mahkamah Tinggi tidak seharusnya memberikan award yang berasingan

bagi gantirugi-gantirugi teruk dan teladan, tetapi harus sebaliknya
mengekalkan amalan lama yang memberikan award secara global demi
mengurangkan saiz award. Apapun, award berjumlah RM1.5 juta adalah
g
terlampau tinggi, jikapun setelah dipertimbang kesemua faktor-faktor yang
menyebelahi responden. Mengambil kira halkeadaan istimewa kes di sini,
suatu award gantirugi global sebanyak RM200,000 adalah adil. Award
ini meliputi gantirugi-gantirugi pampasan, teruk dan teladan.
CLJ
a Case(s) referred to:

Cassell v. Broome [1972] AC 1027 (refd)
Chong Siew Chiang v. Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 CLJ 173 HC (refd)
Dato’ Musa Hitam v. SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314; [1991] 2 CLJ (Rep) 487
HC (refd)
Karpal Singh v. DP Vijandran [2001] 3 CLJ 871 CA (refd)
b Liew Yew Tian v. Cheah Cheng Hoc [2001] 2 CLJ 385 CA (refd)
Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (refd)
Other source(s) referred to:

Gatley on Libel & Slander, 9th edn, para 32-49, p 826
Price & Duodu, Defamation Law, Procedure & Practice, 3rd edn, para 20-04, p 208
c
For the appellant - Mohamed Zaini Mazlan; M/s CL Chin & Assoc
For the respondent - Darryl SC Goon (Yvonne Ong with him); M/s Raja, Darryl &
Loh
[Appeal from High Court, Kuala Lumpur; Civil Suit No: S2-22-503-1994]
d
Reported by WA Sharif
JUDGMENT
Gopal Sri Ram JCA:
e The appellant is an advocate and solicitor. He was the second defendant in
the court below. This is his appeal against the award of damages made against
him in respect of the libel admittedly committed by him upon the respondent.
The trial judge awarded a total sum of RM1,500,000 made up of RM500,000
as compensatory damages, RM500,000 as aggravated damages and a further
RM500,000 as exemplary damages. The appellant complains that these awards
f
are excessive.
At the date of publication of the admitted libel, the respondent was the Deputy
Minister for International Trade and Industry. The appellant made a charge
against the respondent that was of the gravest nature. He alleged that the
g respondent had acted corruptly in the discharge of his duties. This charge was
made at a press conference called at the appellant’s behest. The story was
carried by two newspapers of the Chinese vernacular. Later, the appellant
repeated the defamatory words to a very limited audience – three or four
journalists – outside the office of the Anti Corruption Agency where he had
h gone to lodge a report. He said that he had “boxes of evidence” against the
respondent. As it turned out, there was no such evidence. Further, the appellant
who had taken the plea of justification abandoned it in the course of the trial.
We would add that there is evidence to show that the appellant was acting
for a client who was facing a possible charge of extortion and had embarked
i
CLJ
upon his chosen course of action against the respondent for the purpose of a
demonstrating to the world at large that he was a fearless advocate who was
prepared to take on anyone irrespective of his standing.
When this appeal was called on for argument this Monday past, 11 October
2004, this court formed the view that the quantum of damages under all three
b
heads was excessive having regard to the recent trend of awards in defamation
cases. Accordingly, counsel for the respondent was called upon to show why
the appeal should not be allowed and the damages reduced. Learned counsel
for the respondent then drew our attention to the matters set out in para. 2 of
this judgment as grounds that justified the awards in this case. He also
submitted that the evidential materials relied on by the respondent were c
sufficiently weighty, on the very special facts of this case, to justify the very
large awards made by the High Court.
Attention was called to Liew Yew Tian v. Cheah Cheng Hoc [2001] 2 CLJ
385, where this court held that the width or extent of a publication is always d
a relevant consideration when assessing compensatory damages. Counsel argued
that since in that case damages of RM100,000 were awarded when the
publication was only to two persons, the award of RM500,000 was not
manifestly excessive here because the publication was to two newspapers,
namely, China Press and Shin Min Daily News. According to the evidence,
e
the former has a very large daily circulation while the latter has only a
circulation of about 2000 copies per day. On the other hand, counsel for the
appellant pointed out that the article in the China Press was not disparaging
in any way of the respondent and that only that in the Shin Min was. He
then argued that only nominal damages should be awarded.
f
In Defamation Law, Procedure & Practice by Price & Duodu (3rd edition,
para 20-04 at p. 208) the learned authors set out the several factors that a
court must take into account in assessing compensatory damages. This is what
they say:
The amount of damages awarded in respect of vindication and injury to g
reputation and feelings depends on a number of factors:
1. The gravity of the allegation.
2. The size and influence of the circulation.

h
3. The effect of the publication.
4. The extent and nature of the claimant’s reputation.
5. The behaviour of the defendant.
6. The behaviour of the claimant. i
CLJ
a This list is most helpful. But it must be borne in mind that this is not by any
means exhaustive of the matters which the court may take into account when
making an assessment.
In Karpal Singh v. DP Vijandran [2001] 3 CLJ 871, this court reduced an
award of RM500,000 to RM100,000 on the ground that the award was out of
b
sync with the latest trend of awards. The plaintiff in that case was also a
politician. So was the defendant. Both were lawyers. The conduct of both of
them was relevant and was taken into account as follows:
The respondent relied on his position as a public figure in this suit. But the
c same members of the public who would have read the reports in the two
newspapers would also have read in all the newspapers in the country about
him and the reasons leading to the resignation of the respondent from the post
of Deputy Speaker and his downfall in politics. It would not be correct to say
that the plaintiff’s standing, character, credit and reputation as a public figure
was at its pinnacle at the time the libel was committed and totally collapsed
d because of this libel. In any event, he certainly cannot claim to enjoy a higher
standing, credit and reputation as a public figure than Dato’ Musa bin Hitam
who was only awarded RM100,000 for such a serious libel published just before
the UMNO General Assembly.
...
e
Now, coming to the appellant. He is a well known lawyer and politician. He
was a member of Parliament and a state Assemblyman representing opposition
at that time. It is common knowledge that he was responsible for exposing the
respondent culminating in the respondent's political downfall. The cheque
incident gave him another opportunity to further ruin the respondent. He utilized
f it to the fullest. The fact that his press statement was typed on his ‘Member
of Parliament’ letterhead with his party symbol and the fact that he signed the
press statement as ‘Deputy Chairman, DAP, Malaysia’ and ‘Member of
Parliament, Malaysia’ shows his political motive. He did not apologize. And
he stood his ground throughout. That is the scenario.
g In the circumstances, I am of the view that the award made by the learned
trial judge is excessive. A total award of RM100,000 would be more reasonable.
Karpal Singh v. DP Vijandran is readily distinguishable from the present case.

The conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant there was fairly similar and
more or less cancelled each other out. So the award of RM100,000 was entirely
h justified. But that is not the case here. In the present instance, the respondent
is a man of high reputation and has in no way misconducted himself either
before or at the trial. By contrast, the appellant made a monstrous charge
against a man whose honesty has never been called into question. As such
the award in Karpal Singh v. DP Vijandran is not a useful comparable.
i
CLJ
Dato’ Musa bin Hitam v. SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314; [1991] 2 CLJ a
(Rep) 487 is also distinguishable on the ground that at the date of the libel
the plaintiff in that case no longer held public office as a member of the
elected Executive. But it is to be observed that in that case Lim Beng Choon
J made a single global award of RM100,000 that included both compensatory
and aggravated damages. b
On the award of aggravated damages learned counsel for the respondent
referred us to Gatley on Libel & Slander (9th edn, para 32-49 at p. 826) which
reads:
However, the defendant is not confined to evidence of malice when seeking c
aggravated damages. Thus the fact that the defendant has pleaded justification,
and attempted at the trial to establish the plea by persisting in the charge, can
be taken into account by the jury in assessing damages if they find that the
plea is not sustained. A fortiori if the defendant does not attempt to establish
the plea at the trial but does not abandon it. Indeed it has been held that the
mere fact that the defendant has placed a plea of justification on the record is d
a matter the jury can consider when estimating damages, even though the
defendant withdraws the plea at trial. It has been doubted whether mere failure
to make an apology can ever justify aggravation of damages. But the weight
of recent authority is to the effect that the absence of an apology can, depending
on the facts of the case, increase injury to feelings.
e
It was submitted that based on the appellant’s conduct aggravated damages
should be awarded. We think that there is merit in the respondent’s submission.
Here we have a case of an arrogant appellant who not only put a plea of
justification on record but said that he had “boxes of evidence” against the
respondent to show that the latter had accepted RM500,000 or even f
RM600,000. The boxes, as it transpired were empty and the plea of
justification was withdrawn. We are therefore unable to accept the submission
by the appellant that the respondent should receive only nominal damages. That
submission contains the suggestion that the respondent is of poor character
meriting to receive only nominal damages, in our view, itself constitutes an g
aggravating factor. It is established that in an action in defamation, the way
in which a defendant conducts the trial or an appeal may be grounds for
awarding aggravated damages.
Next is the claim for exemplary damages. It is the submission of learned
counsel for the appellant that no exemplary damages should be awarded as h
his client did not profit monetarily from the attack on the respondent. In
support of his submission he relies on the well-known passage in the speech
of Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 affirmed by the House
in Cassell v. Broome [1972] AC 1027. The learned Law Lord said that there
are only two category of cases in which exemplary damages may be awarded. i
The first is not relevant here. Of the second he said:
CLJ
a Cases in the second category are those in which the defendant’s conduct has
been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed
the compensation payable to the plaintiff.
With respect, we do not think it a fair interpretation of Lord Devlin’s speech

when read as a whole that he intended that grant of punitive or exemplary
b damages to be limited only to cases of monetary profit. That is too narrow
an interpretation. In our judgment, any form of advantage gained by a
defendant in a defamation case suffices. It need not produce an immediate
profit in money terms as happened in Dato’ Musa bin Hitam v. SH Alatas &
Ors. It may produce an immediate non-pecuniary advantage that may translate
c itself into a monetary reward sometime later. Take this very case. The appellant
by his tortuous conduct wanted to impress members of the Chinese community
that he was an advocate who feared no one, not even a Deputy Minister of
the Government when it came to advancing his client’s cause. Reasonable
persons who read his statement may well decide to retain his services because
d of the impression created by him. So, he stood to gain from what he did. This
is accordingly a suitable case to make an award of exemplary damages. We
agree with the approach adopted by Richard Malanjum J in Chong Siew
Chiang v. Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 CLJ 173, where he suggested
that the benefit obtained by a defendant who libels a plaintiff may be financial
e
or otherwise.
There is one matter of some importance that this case has raised. It appears
to be the respondent’s argument that separate awards for aggravated and
exemplary damages should be made. That is what the High Court did. With
respect, we disagree with this approach. For many years it was thought that
f in all cases of tort global awards should be made, including in claims for
personal injuries. However, only in respect of claims for personal injuries,
when the courts started awarding interest at different rates on the different
heads of damages, it became necessary for courts to make separate awards
for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, actual loss of income, future loss
g and special damages. But in defamation cases it is never the practice to award
interest on each separate head of damages. Interest is merely granted on the
single award. In our judgment, we should, in defamation cases, maintain the
age old practice of making a global award in order to limit the size of awards.
Otherwise we will have runaway damages once again. The speech of Lord
h Hailsham in Cassell v. Broome appears to fairly support the view we take of
the matter.
CLJ
We have considered and taken into account all the factors operating in the a
respondent’s favour. Yet, we are of the view that the award of RM1,500,000
is manifestly excessive. It is certainly far in excess of the range of awards in
defamation cases. In our judgment, having regard to the very special
circumstances of this case, an award of RM200,000 is a fair sum by way of
a global award of damages. We are conscious that this award is twice the b
size of those made in recent cases. But it is made to meet the very special
circumstances of this case. The award herein includes in it compensatory,
aggravated and exemplary damages.
For the reasons already given, this appeal is allowed. The award of
RM1,500,000 made by the High Court is set aside. In its place a sum of c
RM200,000 is substituted.
Now for the question of costs. This is a case in which liability is not in issue.
It is only a quantum question. In our view, the appellant has misconducted
himself both at the trial and on the appeal in the manner already explained. d
He should therefore be deprived of his costs here. We would therefore make
no order as to costs in this appeal and direct the deposit to be refunded to
the appellant. But we will not disturb the order for costs made by the High
Court. Those proceedings were necessitated by the appellant’s conduct. He
must pay those costs.
e
CLJ
D
[2016] 1 LNS 597 Legal Network Series
DALAM PERKARA MENGENAI MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA

DI IPOH
[GUAMAN SIVIL NO: 23NCVC-2-02/2015]
ANTARA
NOR IZAWATI ABD RAHMAN ... PLAINTIF
DAN
SHEIKH MOHD FAIZAL OMAR ... DEFENDAN
PENGHAKIMAN
1
Pendahuluan
[1] Di dalam tindakan ini, plaintif, Nor Izawati binti Abd Rahman
mendakwa telah difitnah secara lisan (slander) dan juga secara
bertulis (libel) oleh defendan, Sheikh Mohd Faizal bin Omar.
[2] Pada masa berkaitan, plaintif, seorang pengusaha restoran serta
ketering dan mempunyai perniagaan yang dikenali sebagai ‘Mai
Cuba Corner’ (MCC) yang terletak di Behrang Stesen, Tanjung
Malim, Perak. Pada masa yang sama, plaintif mendakwa dia turut
dikenali sebagai seorang yang mampu mengubati penyakit pesakit
tanpa mengenakan sebarang bayaran. Plaintif juga adalah bekas
pengerusi Madrasah Tahfizul Quran Al-Muqarrabin (Madrasah) dan
dikenali penduduk setempat dengan panggilan ‘Ummi’.
[3] Defendan pula adalah seorang jurutera kelulusan Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia dan pernah berkhidmat dengan beberapa buah
syarikat sebelum menceburi bidang Perubatan Islam. Pada masa
berkaitan, defendan ada menubuhkan syarikatnya sendiri yang
dinamakan Darul Nuraniyyah Sdn Bhd. Selain menjadi pengamal
perubatan Islam, defendan juga merupakan perunding pemakanan
sunnah, perunding motivasi, perunding kursus, ahli perniagaan dan
penulis buku.
2
[4] Plaintif dan defendan tinggal berjiran dan mengenali satu sama lain
sejak tahun 2006 lagi.
Dakwaan Plaintif
[5] Defendan telah melakukan slander dan libel terhadap plaintif di

dalam dua keadaan dan masa yang berlainan. Pertama, dalam satu
mesyuarat berkaitan dengan pelajar Madrasah pada 20.5.2014,
defendan telah mengungkap kata-kata fitnah di hadapan pelajar, ibu
bapa dan pekerja Madrasah. Secara verbatim kata-kata fitnah
tersebut adalah:
“Dhia terkena sihir”
“Zikri terkena ilmu penunduk”
Satu Mirza telah bertanya secara verbatim seperti berikut:-
“Siapa punya, Ummi ke?”
Defendan menjawab secara verbatim seperti berikut:-
“Pada pengamatan saya Ummi... untuk kepentingan dirinya,

supaya tunduk dan takut dan memberi apa yang Ummi minta”
(perenggan 6 Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif)
[6] Kedua, pada 21.5.2014, melalui satu pesanan ‘WhatsApp’ (teks)

dari telefon bernombor 019 5747210 yang ditujukan kepada
3
Kamarul Berahim bin Lasa (SP1), defendan telah menulis dan

menyiarkan kata-kata fitnah seperti mana berikut:
“Assalamu’alaikum
Saya sekadar nak maklumkan berkenaan hal malam tadi di

maahad tahfiz. Berlaku insiden saya cuba diserang oleh
suami ummi.
Puncanya mungkin disebabkan selepas mesyuarat ada di

kalangan ibu bapa yg berjumpa dgn saya. Maka saya
memberikan penjelasan berkenaan konsep rawatan Islam yg
syumur & penyelewengan yg dilakukan oleh ummi.
Saya tak menyedari dia berada di luar. Sebaik saya keluar dr

maahad tahfiz, dia beritahu tak puas hati dengan saya & cuba
serang tetapi Alhamdulillah ada hadirin yg menghalang.
Untuk makluman tuan banyak penyelewengan & penipuan yg

dilakukan oleh ummi.
1) Yg berbaju merah berhampiran saya dlm mesyuarat

semalam adalah kawan saya yg merupakan pemilik
asal restoran mai cuba tu. Isterinya pensyarah
politeknik. Selepas berhenti kerja beliau melabur RM50k

utk berniaga. Ummi gunakan modus operandi menerusi
4
rawatan utk berbaik dgn mereka & berhasrat
menumpang restoran mrk. Tetapi dgn licik dia seleweng
duit deposit kedai & ambil alih restoran tu.
2) Pernah ada laporan polis berhubung penyelewengan
rm40k oleh mangsa lain.
3) Ramai lg mangsa yg ditipu melibatkan jumlah yg agak
byk termasuk isu-isu berunsur jenayah.
Dr segi isu amalan sesat, byk bukti & saksi yg sedia tampil
terutama dr aspek kaedah rawatan & sanad rawatan.
Saya tidak berhasrat nk memburukkan dia tetapi dah
berlarutan terlampau lama & nk elakkan lebih ramai lg jd
mangsa.
Tiada timbul isu berhubung sape lebih hebat dlm rawatan
kerana saya ada klinik sendiri & telah established dlm bidang
ini. Saya nk selamatkan aqidah umat lslam khususnya qariah
behrang 2020.
Ada banyak pihak sedia tampil utk membantu terutama
mangsa-mangsanya dlm penyelewengan & rawatan.
5
Mohon jasa tuan menguruskan perkara ini dengan sebaik
mungkin. Saya menyanjungi kredibiliti tuan sebagai pengerusi
masjid & kariah behrang 2020.
sheikh mohd faizal bin omar”.
(perenggan 9 Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif)
[7] Kesan dari slander dan libel tersebut, plaintif telah mengalami
tekanan perasaan, malu, tidak ditegur sapa jiran-jiran, hilang
kepercayaan oleh orang ramai dan perniagaan MCC diboikot
penduduk sekitar kawasan Behrang 2020 sehinggakan terpaksa
ditutup. Plaintif menuntut ganti rugi am dan gantirugi khas dari
defendan.
Pembelaan Defendan
[8] Defendan menafikan segala dakwaan plaintif dan menghendaki
pembuktian yang kukuh. Bagi dakwaan slander, defendan tidak
mengungkap apa dikatakan di dalam mesyuarat tetapi ianya
diungkap semasa perbincangan dengan ibu bapa pelajar Madrasah
selepas mesyuarat. Ungkapan tersebut juga berbentuk umum dan
tidak ditujukan kepada plaintif. Secara alternatifnya, defendan
menyatakan ungkapan yang dikeluarkan tersebut bukannya fitnah
atau untuk memburukkan plaintif, sebaliknya ianya berdasarkan
6
kepada fakta yang benar. Defendan bergantung kepada s. 8 dan
s. 12 Akta Fitnah 1957 iaitu kata-kata yang diucap ada justifikasi
(justification) dan perlindungan bersyarat (qualified privilege).
[9] Bagi dakwaan libel pula, defendan menyatakan bahawa
penghantaran teks hanya ditujukan kepada SP1 sahaja, sebagai
Pengerusi Masjid dan Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Penduduk
setempat. Defendan telah mengambil langkah berhati-hati semasa
menghantar teks tersebut. SP1 yang bertanggungjawab
menyiarkan teks tersebut kepada suami plaintif dan beberapa pihak
lain. Selain itu, defendan menghantar teks dengan niat murni, jujur,
ikhlas dan bermoral setelah mendapat aduan dari beberapa pihak
di atas perbuatan plaintif. Defendan bertanggung jawab dari segi
moral untuk memanjangkan aduan tersebut kepada pihak yang
berautoriti, iaitu SP1. Defendan turut bergantung kepada s. 8 dan
s. 12 Akta Fitnah 1957 iaitu justifikasi dan perlindungan bersyarat.
[10] Oleh itu, Pernyataan Tuntutan plaintif tidak mendedahkan sebarang
kausa tindakan, remeh serta satu penyalahgunaan proses
mahkamah. Plaintif tidak berhak kepada sebarang ganti rugi atau
pun pampasan.
7
Analisis dan Dapatan Mahkamah
[11] Undang-undang berkait dengan pembuktian bagi tuntutan fitnah
adalah mantap. Plaintif yang mendakwa defendan membuat fitnah
perlulah membuktikan dakwaan tersebut. Mohamed Dzaiddin H
(beliau pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Ayob Bin Saud v. TS
Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 telah memutuskan:
In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act
1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the
words are defamatory; (2) the words refer to the plaintiff; and
(3) the words were published. Where a defence of qualified
privilege is set up, as in the present case, the burden lies on the
defendant to prove that he made the statement honestly,
and without any indirect or improper motive. Then, if he
succeeds in establishing qualified privilege, the burden is
shifted to the plaintiff in this case to show actual or express
malice which upon proof thereof, communication made under
qualified privilege could no longer be regarded as privileged.
(Rajagopal v. Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45.)
Jelasnya, terdapat 3 elemen yang perlu dipenuhi plaintif bagi
membuktikan defendan melakukan fitnah. Setelah plaintif berjaya,
tugas beralih kepada defendan bagi membuktikan bahawa kata-
8
kata yang diucap ada justifikasi atau defendan layak bergantung
kepada pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat.
i. Elemen Pertama
[12] Bagi melepaskan beban pembuktian elemen pertama, plaintif perlu
membuktikan ungkapan kata-kata bagi slander dan tulisan teks bagi
libel adalah fitnah. Ujian bagi menentukan sama ada kata-kata
defendan satu fitnah atau tidak adalah mantap. Mahkamah
Persekutuan di dalam kes Rajagopal v. Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 telah
memutuskan:
... In deciding whether the words complained of were per se
defamatory, it would be necessary to construe the words in
their natural and ordinary meaning in the sense in which
reasonable men of ordinary intelligence would be likely to
understand them. Where, as alleged by paragraph 5, that the
words complained of have a secondary meaning by innuendo,
consideration must be taken as to the manner of their
publication and the persons to whom they were published.
Sementara itu, Mahkamah Rayuan di Singapura di dalam kes
Microsoft Corp v. SM Summit Holdings Ltd [1999] 3 SLRR 465 telah
memutuskan:
9
The principles applicable in determining the natural and
ordinary meaning of the words complained of in a defamation
action are well established. The court decides what meaning
the words would have conveyed to an ordinary, reasonable
person using his general knowledge and common sense:
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Goh Chok Tong [1983/1984]
SLR(R) 745 and Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan
Yew ([50] supra). The test is an objective one: it is the natural
and ordinary meaning as understood by an ordinary,
reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal.
The meaning intended by the maker of the defamatory
statement is irrelevant. Similarly, the sense in which the words
were actually understood by the party alleged to have been
defamed is also irrelevant. Nor is extrinsic evidence
admissible in construing the words. The meaning must be
gathered from the words themselves and in the context of the
entire passage in which they are set out. The court is not
confined to the literal or strict meaning of the words, but takes
into account what the ordinary, reasonable person may
reasonably infer from the words.
10
Manakala di dalam kes Mohd Jali bin Haji Ngah (T/A Peranan
Pusat Pendidikan Dan Pemulihan Anak Yatim Dan Cacat
Tenggara Asia) v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Anor
[1998] MLRH 665 / [1998] 5 MLJ 773 di muka surat 183, Arifin
Zakaria H (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan.
Whether the impugned words were capable of being, or were
in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff is, the test to be considered

is whether such words were calculated to expose him to
hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man
or would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-

thinking members of society generally. If the words have such
a tendency, they could still be defamatory even if they did not
really lower a plaintiff in the estimation of those to whom they

were published. (see JB Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong [1985]
1 MLJ 334 and Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan
Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56).
[13] Oleh itu, setiap ungkapan kata-kata yang diucapkan atau ditulis
defendan perlulah diteliti. Berdasarkan kepada slander yang
didakwa, defendan telah dikatakan mengucapkan kata-kata;
“Dhia terkena sihir”
“Zikri terkena ilmu penunduk”
11
... “Pada pengamatan saya Ummi... untuk kepentingan

dirinya, supaya tunduk dan takut dan memberi apa yang
Ummi minta”
Jelasnya, perkataan yang diucapkan mudah dan senang difahami

orang yang mendengarnya, lebih-lebih lagi bagi orang yang ada
pengetahuan kepada latar belakang kejadian yang berlaku. Dari
segi makna asal perkataan tersebut jelaslah terdapat tohmahan

yang ungkapkan. Tohmahan tersebut ditujukan kepada seseorang
yang dikatakan mengamalkan ilmu sihir dan juga ilmu penunduk
bagi kepentingan dirinya supaya orang tunduk dan takut serta
memberikan apa yang diminta.
[14] Sementara itu, libel yang didakwa ditulis defendan adalah
seperti mana berikut;
... Untuk makluman tuan banyak penyelewengan & penipuan

yg dilakukan oleh ummi.
1) Yg berbaju merah berhampiran saya dlm mesyuarat

semalam adalah kawan saya yg merupakan pemilik
asal restoran mai cuba tu. lsterinya pensyarah
politeknik. Selepas berhenti kerja beliau melabur RM50k

utk berniaga. Ummi gunakan modus operandi menerusi
rawatan utk berbaik dgn mereka & berhasrat
12
menumpang restoran mrk. Tetapi dgn licik dia seleweng
duit deposit kedai & ambil alih restoran tu.
2) Pernah ada laporan polis berhubung penyelewengan
rm40k oleh mangsa lain.
3) Ramai lg mangsa yg ditipu melibatkan jumlah yg agak
byk termasuk isu-isu berunsur jenayah.
Dr segi isu amalan sesat, byk bukti & saksi yg sedia tampil
terutama dr aspek kaedah rawatan & sanad rawatan. ...
Adalah didapati bahawa kata-kata yang digunakan bagi libel juga
jelas dan mudah difahami. Sesiapa sahaja yang membacanya,
walau pun tidak ada pengetahuan kepada apa yang berlaku, masih
boleh faham maksud dakwaan yang dibuat. Ringkasnya, gambaran
yang diberikan kepada ‘ummi’ adalah sebagai seorang yang
terlibat dalam banyak penyelewengan dan penipuan.
[15] Daripada makna kedua-dua slander dan libel yang didakwa
diucapkan dan ditulis defendan tersebut, adalah didapati bahawa
jika dapat dibuktikan apa yang didakwa sekali pun, ianya adalah
kata-kata fitnah per se. Di dalam masyarakat orang Melayu
beragama Islam, tuduhan terlibat dengan perbuatan sihir dan
menjalankan amalan sesat adalah merupakan tuduhan yang sangat
13
berat. Pengamalnya dikaitkan dengan perbuatan menyekutukan
tuhan maha esa dan menyimpang dari ajaran Islam sebenar.
Masyarakat akan mengutuk dan memandang rendah orang yang
terlibat dengan amalan sedemikian. Begitu juga dengan tuduhan
menipu dan menyeleweng. Pengamalnya bukan sahaja akan
dipandang serong oleh masyarakat tetapi juga melibatkan tuduhan
di bawah kesalahan jenayah.
ii. Elemen Kedua
[16] Defendan di dalam pembelaannya, mendakwa bahawa ungkapan
yang dibuat adalah berbentuk umum dan tidak ditujukan kepada
plaintif. Persoalannya, adakah nama sebenar perlu sebut secara
jelas di dalam kata-kata fitnah bagi membolehkan plaintif berjaya
membuktikan tuntutan di bawah tort fitnah? Privy Council di dalam
kes Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Limited [1944] AC 116,
telah memutuskan:
It is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation
that the words complained of should be punished “of the
Plaintiff”, where he is not named the test of this is whether the
words would reasonably lead people acquainted with him to
the conclusion that he was the person referred to. The
14
question whether they did so in fact does not arise if they
cannot in law be regarded as capable of referring to him.
Hasil penelitian ke atas keterangan yang ada, didapati bahawa
semua saksi-saksi termasuklah keterangan defendan sendiri
merujuk individu yang digelar ‘ummi’ sebagai plaintif. Keterangan
juga menunjukkan penduduk sekitar juga dikatakan mengenali
plaintif dengan nama ‘Ummi’.
[17] Oleh itu, pihak plaintif dengan mudah dapat membuktikan elemen
kedua. ‘Ummi’ yang dirujuk di dalam slander dan libel yang
dikatakan dituturkan dan ditulis defendan tersebut tanpa ragu-ragu
lagi merujuk kepada plaintif.
iii. Elemen Ketiga
[18] Akhirnya, plaintif perlulah membuktikan bahawa slander dan libel
telah disiarkan defendan kepada pihak yang ketiga. Di dalam kes
S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ Rep.
233 Mahkamah Agung memutuskan:
In order to constitute publication, the defamatory matter must
be published to a third party, and not simply to the plaintiff. By
publication is meant the making known of the defamatory
matter, after it has been written, to some person other than the
15
person of whom it is written. The uttering of a libel to the party
libelled is no publication for the purposes of a civil action:
Wennhak v. Morgan [1880] 20 QBD at p. 637. ...
[19] Di dalam tindakan ini, defendan menafikan telah menyiarkan
slander dan libel berkenaan. Hakikatnya, penafian tersebut tidak
digambarkan di dalam Pernyataan Pembelaan defendan sendiri.
Di perenggan 4 Pernyataan Pembelaan, defendan tidak menafikan
telah mengungkap slander yang didakwa plaintif di hadapan
pelajar, ibu bapa pelajar dan pekerja Madrasah. Apa yang
dipertikaikan hanyalah masa ungkapan tersebut dibuat sahaja.
Defendan menegaskan ianya dibuat selepas mesyuarat dan
bukannya semasa mesyuarat diadakan. Adalah didapati bahawa
persoalan sama ada slander dibuat semasa mesyuarat, seperti
yang didakwa di dalam pliding plaintif atau selepas mesyuarat,
seperti yang diakui di dalam pliding defendan tidaklah menjejaskan
tuntutan plaintif. Ungkapan slander tersebut sememangnya telah
dibuat defendan pada hari mesyuarat dilangsungkan dan
perbezaan masa, sama ada semasa atau selepas mesyuarat,
tidaklah memudaratkan tuntutan plaintif.
[20] Selain itu, defendan sendiri semasa disoal balas tidak menafikan
mengucap kata-kata slander tersebut. (lihat muka surat 126 dan
16
127 Nota Keterangan (NK)). Begitu juga dengan keterangan saksi
ketiga defendan Basree bin Bustaman (SD3), semasa disoal balas.
(lihat muka surat 180 dan 181 NK).
[21] Berhubung dengan penulisan dan penyiaran libel pula, defendan
secara jelas mengakui telah menghantar teks kepada SP1 (lihat
perenggan 13 Pernyataan Pembelaan). Berdasarkan kepada
peruntukan subseksyen 58(1) Akta Keterangan 1950, fakta yang
diakui pihak di dalam prosiding sivil tidaklah perlu dibuktikan lagi.
Bagi memudahkan rujukan, peruntukan tersebut adalah seperti
mana berikut:
No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the
parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or
which before the hearing they agree to admit by any writing
under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at
the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:
Provided that the court may, in its discretion, require the facts
admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.
Selain itu, keterangan pihak plaintif terutamanya SP1 yang
menerima teks dan Shahrulazli bin Zakaria (SP2), suami kepada
plaintif yang dimaklumkan isi kandung teks oleh SP1, jelas
17
membuktikan defendan telah menyiarkan teks tersebut kepada

pihak ketiga.
[22] Peguam defendan di dalam hujahnya mendakwa bahawa pihak
plaintif telah gagal untuk memanggil mana-mana saksi yang hadir

semasa pengungkapan kata-kata slander tersebut dibuat. Oleh itu,
plaintif gagal melepaskan beban pembuktian asas bagi
membuktikan wujudnya slander. Keputusan kes-kes Tan Kim

Khuan v. Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697, Tenaga
Nasional Bhd v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 MLJ 673 dan U.N.
Pandey v. Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4 dirujuk. Dengan
hormatnya didapati bahawa hujahan tersebut adalah meleset. Di
dalam pembuktian kes sivil, pliding pihak-pihak dan keseluruhan
keterangan yang ada perlulah diambil kira semasa pertimbangan.
[23] Berdasarkan kepada analisis dan dapatan tersebut, jelaslah

bahawa di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, pihak plaintif telah
berjaya membuktikan ketiga-tiga elemen bagi mendakwa

defendan telah melakukan slander dan libel terhadapnya.
Pembelaan Defendan
[24] Defendan telah membangkitkan pembelaan justifikasi di bawah s. 8

Akta Fitnah 1957 dan alternatifnya pembelaan perlindungan
bersyarat di bawah s. 12 Akta yang sama. Wan Hamzah HMA di
18
dalam kes S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another Case (supra)
di muka surat 177 dan 178 telah memutuskan:
The burden lies upon the defendant to establish justification.
The burden does not lie on the plaintiff to prove that the
defamatory words are false, because the law presumes this in
his favour: Belt v. Lawes [1882] 51 LJQB 359 361. To establish
justification, the defendant must prove that the defamatory
imputation is true. It is not enough for him to prove that he
believed that the imputation was true: Peters v. Bradlaugh
[1884] 4 TLR 467. ...
Sementara itu, di dalam kes Rajagopal v. Rajan (supra) Mahkamah
Persekutuan memutuskan:
In a case in which it is sought to rely on this defence, it is for
the defendant to prove the facts and circumstances which
establish that occasion as privileged. If he does that, the
burden of showing actual or express malice rests upon the
plaintiff and, if this is shown, communications made, even on
a privileged occasion, can no longer be regarded as privileged.
(Halsbury’s Laws of England (3 rd ed.), Vol. 24, section 98,
page, 55.) In paragraph 2 of his reply, the respondent had
charged the appellant with express malice. It is true the
19
learned judge found that the appellant was acting in

pursuance of his duty as secretary within the scope of the
resolution and was under a duty to obey. But in sending copies
of the resolution to persons he was not required to send, he

had abused his position. As is said in Brown v. Croome [1817]
Starkie (NP) 297; 171 ER 652:
“The fact that a communication between A and B is

privileged does not justify A in making the communication
in a manner or at a time which would involve its
publication to other persons who have no such interest or

duty. No privilege would prima facie attach to the
publication.”
Jelasnya, beban bagi membuktikan pembelaan justifikasi dan

perlindungan bersyarat di dalam kes slander dan libel terletak di
bahu defendan. Setelah defendan berjaya, beban bukti kembali
dipikul plaintif untuk membuktikan motif tidak baik atau niat jahat
defendan semasa mengungkap atau menulis kata-kata fitnah
tersebut.
i. Pembelaan Justifikasi
[25] Bagi slander, defendan bergantung kepada pembelaan kata-kata yang

diucap ada kebenarannya. Jika diteliti ungkapan yang
20
diucapkan, bolehlah difahami bahawa defendan telah mengatakan
plaintif menggunakan ilmu sihir, ilmu penunduk ke atas orang ramai
bagi kepentingan dirinya. Plaintif juga dikatakan mengamalkan
amalan sesat semasa melakukan proses pengubatan pesakit. Bagi
mewajarkan kata-kata yang diucapkan, defendan bergantung
kepada pandangan bahawa kaedah dan sanad rawatan yang
diamalkan plaintif adalah bercanggah dengan perubatan Islam dan
garis panduan yang dikeluarkan Jabatan Agama Islam di peringkat
Negeri atau pun Persekutuan (JAIPk atau JAKIM).
[26] Bagi libel pula, teks dikatakan hanya dihantar dan ditujukan kepada
SP1 sahaja, pihak yang dikatakan sebagai berwibawa untuk
menyiasat dan mengambil tindakan sewajarnya ke atas aduan yang
dibuat. Defendan juga telah mengambil langkah berhati-hati untuk
memastikan hanya SP1 yang menyelesaikan aduan yang dibuat.
Defendan tidak bertanggung jawab sekiranya SP1 menyiarkan teks
tersebut kepada pihak lain. Selain itu, segala kandungan teks yang
dihantar adalah benar dan merupakan aduan-aduan yang diterima
defendan daripada orang ramai. Tugas defendan hanya
menyampaikan sahaja aduan tersebut sahaja kepada SP1.
[27] Persoalannya, adakah defendan berjaya membuktikan kebenaran
kata-kata yang diucap atau teks yang ditulis tersebut melalui
21
keterangan di mahkamah? Hasil penelitian, tidak ada sekelumit
keterangan kukuh yang dibawa defendan bagi membuktikan
pembelaan justifikasi. Bagi slander, tidak ada keterangan saksi yang
boleh mengesahkan perbuatan plaintif adalah tergolong dalam
pengamalan ilmu hitam atau amalan sesat. Saksi-saksi yang
dipanggil defendan gagal menyokong dakwaan defendan berkait
dengan kaedah dan sanad rawatan plaintif. Keterangan defendan
sendiri yang mendakwa dirinya sebagai seorang ustaz, imam dan
pengamal perubatan Islam tidak dapat membuktikan kaedah rawatan
plaintif berlawanan dengan hukum syarak. Tidak ada saksi dari
JAIPk atau JAKIM dipanggil bagi sekurang-kurangnya boleh
mengesahkan dakwaan pengamalan kaedah dan sanad rawatan
yang diamalkan plaintif. Defendan gagal membuktikan kebenaran
kata-katanya itu. Oleh itu, kata-kata defendan tinggal sebagai suatu
tohmahan yang tidak berasas.
[28] Bagi libel pula, keterangan pihak defendan gagal membuktikan
kebenaran dakwaan penyelewengan dan penipuan plaintif seperti
yang disenaraikan di tiga perenggan teks. Orang yang dirujuk dan
dikatakan teraniaya akibat perbuatan plaintif di perenggan 1 teks
adalah Shamsol bin Muda (SD2). Keterangan SD2 secara jelas
berlawanan dengan dakwaan defendan. SD2 bukannya pemilik asal
22
MCC sebaliknya hanya penyewa yang ada perjanjian penyewaan
dengan plaintif. Begitu juga dengan keterangan Basree bin
Bustaman (SD3). Dakwaan plaintif menyeleweng dengan
mengambil alih perniagaan SD3 tidak dibuktikan. Sebaliknya, SD3
yang menyerahkan perniagaannya kepada plaintif setelah
menghadapi masalah kewangan dan perlu menjaga 4 orang anaknya
selepas bercerai dengan isterinya. Begitu juga dengan
penyelewengan dan penipuan lain seperti yang didakwa di dalam
teks, kesemuanya tidak langsung dapat dibuktikan kebenarannya.
Dengan itu, defendan gagal membuktikan pembelaan justifikasi.
ii. Pembelaan Perlindungan Bersyarat
[29] Defendan mengatakan pihaknya bertanggung jawab dari segi
undang-undang, sosial dan moral untuk mengungkap kata-kata
yang dikatakan telah memfitnah plaintif dan pihak ketiga yang
menerima pernyataan yang diungkap defendan ada kepentingan
untuk menerima pernyataan tersebut. Keputusan Lord Atkinson di
dalam kes Adam v. Ward [1971] AC 309 dirujuk.
[30] Bagi memenuhi kehendak pembelaan bersyarat, defendan
menyatakan bahawa sebagai seorang ustaz dan imam di kariah
Behrang 2020, dia berkewajipan untuk memaklumkan sebarang
perkara negatif yang menyentuh isu-isu akidah dan keharmonian
23
masyarakat setempat. Dengan mengambil kira budaya masyarakat
Melayu yang lebih suka menyelesaikan masalah di peringkat
komuniti, defendan tidak membelakangkan SP1 sebagai ketua
masyarakat sebelum membawa masalah tersebut ke peringkat yang
lebih tinggi. SP1 adalah pihak yang layak menerima aduan
tersebut.
[31] Persoalannya, adakah keadaan yang dikatakan berlaku atau
perbuatan yang dikatakan dilakukan plaintif melayakkan defendan
mengungkap dan menulis kata-kata yang didakwa fitnah dan
defendan boleh berselindung di sebalik perlindungan bersyarat?
Di dalam konteks tindakan ini, apa yang perlu dilihat adalah punca
kepada slander atau libel dibuat. Defendan mendakwa ada
menerima aduan dari orang ramai berkait dengan cara pengubatan
yang diamalkan plaintif yang pada pandangan defendan tidak
mengikut cara perubatan Islam. Bagi slander, defendan
mengeluarkan kata-kata selepas satu mesyuarat dan mengungkap
kata-kata yang merujuk plaintif kepada pengamalan ilmu sihir, ilmu
penunduk serta terlibat dengan amalan sesat semasa mengubat
pesakit. Dari keterangan yang ada, jelasnya kata-kata tersebut
merupakan pandangan defendan semata-mata tanpa sebarang
bukti sokongan yang kukuh. Defendan sendiri dalam keterangannya
24
merujuk kepada garis panduan pihak berkuasa berkenaan berkaitan
perubatan Islam. Namun begitu, tidak ada aduan atau rujukan
dibuat kepada pihak berkenaan untuk mengesahkan
pandangannya terhadap amalan perubatan plaintif tersebut.
Defendan tidak sepatutnya mengungkap kata-kata yang boleh
menjejaskan kredibiliti plaintif di hadapan orang ramai hanya
semata-mata dia seorang ustaz, imam atau pun pengamal
perubatan Islam.
[32] Bagi libel pula, SP1 hanyalah seorang Pengerusi Masjid dan
Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Penduduk yang dilantik penduduk
setempat. Tidak dibuktikan bahawa SP1 berautoriti menerima
aduan seperti yang diajukan defendan. Defendan sepatutnya tahu
had dan keupayaan bertindak SP1. Dia tidak ada kuasa menyiasat
aduan seperti yang disebut di dalam teks. Defendan juga
sepatutnya tahu bahawa SP1 adalah pengerusi masjid dan
jawatankuasa kampung yang sudah pastinya ada jawatankuasa
bagi membincangkan dan memutuskan sesuatu perkara atau
tindakan. Sudah pastilah defendan boleh menjangkakan yang
aduannya kepada SP1 akan sampai juga kepada ahli jawatankuasa
yang lain. Selain itu, defendan tahu JAIPk atau JAKIM dan polis
adalah pihak yang berwibawa menyiasat sebarang aduan berkaitan.
25
Penghantaran teks yang dikatakan mewakili aduan orang ramai
yang mengandungi tohmahan yang ada unsur jenayah di bawah
undang syariah atau pun undang-undang sivil kepada SP1 sudah
tentu tidak kena pada tempatnya.
[33] Selain itu, kesahihan tohmahan yang dibuat defendan terhadap
plaintif telah dibuktikan tidak benar di mahkamah. Defendan gagal
membuktikan pihaknya telah mengambil langkah berhati-hati yang
sewajarnya semasa penghantaran teks.
[34] Sehubungan itu, defendan gagal membuktikan yang dia berada di
dalam kedudukan yang membolehkannya membangkitkan isu yang
menyentuh kepentingan penduduk setempat. Defendan sendiri
adalah seorang pengamal perubatan alternatif, itu adalah fakta yang
tidak dipertikaikan. Defendan berada di dalam kedudukan yang ada
kepentingan untuk bersaing dengan pihak plaintif. Defendan
sepatutnya berhati-hati mengeluarkan pandangannya terhadap
cara pengubatan plaintif. Sekiranya terdapat penyelewengan di
pihak plaintif sekali pun, defendan sepatutnya melaporkan perkara
tersebut kepada pihak berwajib dan bukannya membuat dakwaan
tanpa asas. Dengan itu, defendan juga gagal membuktikan
pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat.
26
[35] Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan tersebut, mahkamah
mendapati bahawa di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, pihak plaintif
telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap plaintif dan
defendan gagal membuktikan pembelaannya. Oleh itu, mahkamah
tidak perlu lagi membuat penilaian bagi melihat sama ada pihak
plaintif berjaya membuktikan ‘malice’ atau niat jahat defendan.
Ganti Rugi
[36] Setelah diputuskan defendan telah melakukan memfitnah, plaintif
berhak mendapat ganti rugi. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Dato’
Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia
Bhd & Anor [2014] 3 CLJ 560 di muka surat 582 telah memutuskan:
[55] It is trite law that in a defamation suit, whether for slander
or libel, the law presumes that some damages will flow from
the publication. This position has long been established by
learned Lord Justice Bowen in the case of Ratcliffe v. Evan
[1982] 2 QB at p. 528 when he said:
The law presumes that some damages will flow in the
ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of his
absolute right of reputation.
27
[37] Selain dari menuntut ganti rugi am sebanyak RM1 juta bagi
kehilangan reputasi, defendan turut menuntut sejumlah
RM64,000.00 ganti rugi khas bagi kehilangan pendapatan akibat
penutupan perniagaannya.
[38] Setelah diteliti keterangan, adalah didapati bahawa perniagaan

plaintif di MCC sememangnya telah ditutup kerana ketiadaan
kepercayaan dari pelanggan setelah plaintif difitnah. Namun begitu,
pihak plaintif didapati tidak dapat mengemukakan bukti kukuh
mengenai jumlah sebenar kerugian bagi menuntut ganti rugi khas.
Walau bagaimana pun, kerugian plaintif tersebut akan diambil kira

semasa mahkamah memberikan ganti rugi am.
[39] Sebagai panduan menentukan jumlah ganti rugi, keputusan
Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn. Bhd
& Ors v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Ghee Yioun & Other Appeal
[2000] 3 CLJ 728 adalah dirujuk. Eusoff Chin KHN di muka surat
733 dan 734 membuat pemerhatian berikut:
We find that we cannot compare a particular libel case with

other libel cases. Each libel case has its own particular and
peculiar facts, is unique and a class by itself. We cannot by

our judgement set a precedent on the damages to be
awarded. The court must consider a number of factors when
28
assessing damages in a libel case. In John v. MGN Ltd [1997]
QB 586 at p. 607, Sir Thomas Bingham R (now CJ) said:
In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to
reputation the most important factor is the gravity of the
libel; the more closely it (the defamation) touches the
plaintiff’s personal integrity, professional reputation,
honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his
personality, the more serious it is likely to be. The extent
of publication is also very relevant a libel published to
million has a greater potential to cause damage that a
libel published to handful of people. A successful plaintiff
may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate
his reputation but the significance of this is much greater
to a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the
libel and refused any retraction or apology than in a case
where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what
was published and publicly expresses regret that the
libelous publication took place.
Damages in defamation cases are described as being at
large. The law has not fixed any exact measure for
assessment of damages in an action for defamation. There is
29
no mathematical formula by which the quantum can be
determined; nor is there any requirement that the damages be
assessed with mathematical certainty. But a small sum
awarded to a prominent public figure for a serious libel could
be interpreted as trivialising the incident.
[40] Sebagai pertimbangan umum, latar belakang masyarakat setempat
perlulah diberi perhatian. Plaintif dan defendan berbangsa Melayu,
beragama Islam dan hidup di dalam masyarakat yang dikelilingi
orang Melayu beragama Islam. Perkara yang berkait dengan
amalan agama sangat sensitif dan boleh memberikan impak yang
besar kepada masyarakat. Orang yang dituduh mengamalkan
amalan sesat akan dipandang serong dan akan dipulaukan.
Begitulah yang terjadi kepada plaintif. Plaintif terpaksa menutup
perniagaan MCC dan mengalami kehilangan pendapatan.
[41] Setelah menimbangkan elemen reputasi, kredibiliti dan integriti
plaintif di mata masyarakat setempat serta kerugian pendapatan
dari perniagaan di MCC, mahkamah mendapati bahawa jumlah
ganti rugi secara keseluruhan sebanyak RM100,000.00 adalah
wajar. Mahkamah tidak memberikan ganti rugi yang berasingan
bagi slander dan libel kerana keduanya adalah saling berkait dan
bolehlah dikatakan datangnya dari satu insiden yang sama.
30
Keputusan
[42] Penghakiman kepada pihak plaintif. Ganti rugi am sebanyak
RM100,000.00 diberikan kepada plaintif. Kos tindakan sebanyak
RM20,000.00 juga diperintahkan dibayar oleh defendan kepada
plaintif.
(CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI)

HAKIM
Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh
Bertarikh: 10 MEI 2016
Kaunsel:
Bagi pihak plaintiff - Zuraifah Abdul Rahman & Sharina Sharil; T/n
Ridha & Rai
Bagi pihak defendan - Awtar Singh Mukha Singh, Ghazali Mohd

Ramli & Hayati Yahya Udin; T/n Awtar Ghazali Augustine & Co
31
Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Ayob Bin Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315
Rajagopal v. Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45
Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Limited [1944] AC 116
S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ Rep.
233
Tan Kim Khuan v. Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697
Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 MLJ 673
U.N. Pandey v. Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4
Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v. Sistem Televisyen
Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 3 CLJ 560
Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn. Bhd & Ors v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan
Ghee Yioun & Other Appeal [2000] 3 CLJ 728
Perundangan yang dirujuk:

Akta Fitnah 1957, s. 8, 12
Akta Keterangan 1950, s. 58(1)
32
E
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI IPOH
DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN
[GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AA-22NCVC-54-04/2016]
ANTARA
ROSLAN ALI … PLAINTIF
DAN
1. THE NEW STRAITS TIMES (M) BHD

2. MOHD HAFIZEE BIN MOHD AROP … DEFENDAN-
DEFENDAN
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a civil claim for damages for alleged libel of the plaintiff
by the defendants, pursuant to an article entitled “Raja Arak bertukar
Bilal Rockers” which was written by the 2 nd defendant (journalist at
Harian Metro) and was printed and published by the 1 st defendant (a
registered company under the Companies Act, 1965) at page 4 of the
20 th November 2015 issue of the Harian Metro [(“the said article”)-
exhibit P3].
[2] The plaintiff filed a Writ of Summons (enclosure 1) and

Statement of Claim (enclosure 2) against the defendants, claiming as
follows (briefly):
1
“5. Pada semua masa berkenaan Plaintif adalah seorang bilal

di Masjid Panglima Kinta Ipoh, Perak dan pada masa yang
sama beliau juga menjalankan perniagaan menjual barang
harian pada waktu siang dan menjual kitab-kitab agama pada
waktu malam.
6. Selain itu, Plaintif juga sedang menjalani rakaman album

berunsurkan ketuhanan untuk di pasarkan pada bulan Januari
2016.
7. Plaintif plid bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah secara

salah dan berniat jahat menyebabkan untuk dicetak dan
disiarkan di dalam akhbar tabloid hariannya tersebut, iaitu
edisinya bertarikh 20.11.2015, sebuah artikel di bawah
tajuk’Raja Arak bertukar Bilal Rockers’, yang mana
mengandungi perkataan-perkataan berunsur fitnah yang
berikut:
“Dia pernah digelar Raja Arak oleh rakannya. Sebut apa

sahaja saja jenis minuman keras, semua pemah diteguk
sehingga ia sebati dengan darah dagingnya sejak berusia
awal 20-an.”
“Dia pernah berniaga kecil-kecilan, tetapi menghabiskan

semua hasil jualan untuk minuman haram iaitu RM800
hingga RM2,000 hanya untuk beberapa hari.”
“Arak seperti air kosong bagi saya dan akan meneguknya

sehingga mabuk serta marah sekiranya tidak mendapat
arak dalam sehari.”
“Saya sudah berkahwin dan kehidupan saya lebih banyak

dihabiskan dengan minuman itu berbanding isteri.”
2
“Dia tidak sedarkan diri pada awal 2010 akibat masalah

paru-paru berpunca daripada kesan pengambilan arak
yang berlebihan sehingga terlantar hampir sebulan.”
Selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Kenyataan-kenyataan Fitnah

tersebut”.
[3] The defendants denied the allegation and pleaded that the
impugned statements contained in the said article do not bear the
defamatory meanings as pleaded by the plaintiff and therefore are not
defamatory of the plaintiff. The defendants further pleaded that the
said article was based on information, words and statements given by
the plaintiff (SP1) himself to the 2 nd defendant (SD2) during an
interview with SP1 somewhere in June-July 2015 (during the month of
Ramadhan) within the compound of Panglima Kinta Mosque Ipoh
(“the said mosque”) and the defendants have also pleaded that the
plaintiff had consented to the publication of his life history in the said
article. From their statement of defence, the defendants rely on the
defence of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.
[4] The full hearing of the matter was held on the 22 nd - 24 th May
2017 consecutively, with the list of witnesses as follows:
(a) The plaintiff had called one witness Encik Roslan bin Ali,
the plaintiff [SP1].
(b) The defendants had called two witnesses, Encik Yahya bin
Zainuddin, Executive Photographer [SD1] with the 1 st
defendant and Encik Mohd Hafizee bin Mohd Arop [SD2],
a journalist at Harian Metro.
[5] The evidence from the parties have been duly recorded and upon
perusing all the evidence, relevant cause papers and the respective
written submissions by the counsels, on 16 th June 2017, I find the
3
plaintiff has succeeded in making out part of its case on balance of

probabilities. For general damages, I awarded the plaintiff with an
award of RM70,000.00 and cost of RM15,000-00 and with a further
order that Harian Metro to publish an apology statement within two
(2) weeks of this judgment. Dissatisfied with the above decision, the
defendants are now appealing against the said decision. It is to be
noted too that I have also found the plaintiff had failed to prove other
damages claimed and I have dismissed it accordingly and no appeal
was filed in this regard.
BRIEF FACTS
[6] SP1 in his evidence stated that he was a Bilal at the Masjid
Panglima Kinta, Ipoh (“the said mosque”) and was planning to
produce an album of religious songs (album berunsurkan ketuhanan).
He got acquainted with SD1 as being in the congregation (jemaah) of
the said mosque and it was known that he is working for Harian
Metro. Upon learning of SP1’s intention to produce a religious album,
SD1 introduced SP1 to SD2 with the intention of promoting and
gathering funds for the new album.
[7] According to SP1, during the interview, SD2 did asked him
regarding the new song and had also asked him on why did he
changed from a night club singer to a religious post as a Bilal. Not
long after the said interview, somewhere around the month of
November, SP1 received a message (WhatsApp) from SD2 informing
him of the good sale (jualan laris) of Harian Metro and the story of
the plaintiff was published on the front page of the said newspaper.
On the next day, one of the members of the mosque congregation
showed the plaintiff the paper cutting of the said article. At that time,
the plaintiff was shocked and he felt embarrassed by the said article.
After the said article was published, the plaintiff said that he was
ridiculed (mengata) by the committee of the said mosque and he also
4
received threatening calls from the public. His appointment as Bilal

was later not renewed. Apart from claiming for damages, the plaintiff
is also claiming for loss of income since his business has slumped
(merosot) after the publication of the said article and other damages.
[8] SD1 affirmed the evidence of the plaintiff, regarding the fact
that he had introduced SP1 to SD2 and even though he was around
during the said interview but he didn’t know the contents of the said
interview.
[9] SD2 in his evidence stated that the said article, were written,
printed and published by the defendants based on information, words
and statements furnished by SP1 himself to SD2 during an interview
in the month of Ramadhan, at the premise of SP1 within the
compound of the said mosque. The information provided by SP1 to
SD2 during the said interview was recorded (hand written) by SD2 in
his diary/note book (exhibit D7) and were later transcribed (exhibit
D7A). SD2 said SP1 had consented to the said article which shows the
plaintiff’s process of transition in his life, from an alcoholic has
successfully changed his way of life to being a religious person. SD2
admitted that the title on the front page of the newspaper “Raja Arak
bertukar Bilal Rockers” was not on his notes but was decided by the
head office in Kuala Lumpur.
THE LAW
[10] A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a

person in the estimation of right thinking members of society
generally or cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to
hatred, contempt or ridicule (see Ummi Hafilda Bte Ali v. Ketua
Setiausaha Parti Islam (PAS) [2006] 4 MLJ 761 at p.770 per Gill FCJ
citing Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237), or to convey an
imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office,
5
profession, calling, trade or business [see section 5-Defamation Act

1957 (Act 286)-(“the Act”)]. What may lead to a tendency to lower a
person’s reputation in the eye of the public depends largely on the
facts and circumstances in each case. Mere hurt feelings are
insufficient for the award of damages under defamation. The interest
to be protected by this tort is a person’s good name and reputation.
The law on defamation in Malaysia is primarily anchored on the
English common law principles except as far as it had been modified
by the Act which is in pari materia with the English Defamation Act
1952 (see Soh Chun Seng v. CTOS-EMR Sdn Bhd [2004] 5 CLJ 46).
Defamation is committed when the defendant publishes to a third
person words or matters containing untrue imputation against the
reputation of the plaintiff. Liability for defamation is divided into two
categories, that of libel and slander. If the publication is made in a
permanent form or is broadcast or is part of a theatrical performance,
it is libel if it is in some transient form or is conveyed by spoken
words or gestures, it is slander.
[11] The civil law of defamation is largely based on case law

although the Act does not define defamatory matter but has given
statutory force to some well-known common law principles. Libel or
published defamation, for example a newspaper article or television
broadcast or pictures as well as words can be libelous (see Civil Trial
Guidebook by Marsden Law Book).
[12] In Kian Lup Construction v. Hongkong Bank Malaysia Berhad

[2002] 7 CLJ 32 Ramly Ali J (at that time) said:
“In a tort of defamation, the plaintiff must prove three elements,

namely the statement must bear defamatory imputations, must
refer to the plaintiff’s reputation and must have been published
to a third person by the defendant”.
(See also Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152)
6
[13] In Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v. Haji Hasan Bin
Hamzah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 39 where it was held that it is a question
of law for the court to decide whether the natural and ordinary
meaning of the words used in the articles were capable of conveying a
defamatory meaning of and concerning the plaintiff. Libel does not
depend on the intention of the defamer but on the fact of defamation
and it was irrelevant to consider the meaning the writer and publisher
intended to convey. The question is to be determined by an objective
test
[14] Therefore, based on the above authorities, the plaintiff has to

prove the following:
(a) the statement was defamatory;
(b) it referred to him; and
(c) it was published, that is communicated, to a third party
Once proven, the onus then shifted to the defendants to prove any of
the defences:
(a) justification or in other words the truth of the utterance;
(b) fair comment on a matter of public interest; or
(c) that it was made on a privileged occasion.
FINDINGS OF THIS COURT
[15] In the present case it was not disputed that the said article
referred to the plaintiff and since it was published in the local tabloid
Harian Metro, it was in fact communicated to a third party. The
primary issue before this court today is in applying an objective test
as enunciated in Tan Sri Vincent Tan’s case (supra), is whether the
7
alleged statements and/or words complained of in the said article are

defamatory of the plaintiff in nature and has lowered him in the
estimation of right thinking members of society causing him to be
shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule
as stated in Ummi Hafilda’s case (supra).
[16] The plaintiff argued that the impugned statements in the said
article, in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were
understood to mean as follows:-
(a) the plaintiff is a muslim who practices the way of life

which is not in accordance with the Islamic principles by
being an alcoholic;
(b) the plaintiff is an irresponsible husband and neglected his

wife;
(c) the plaintiff is a person who accentuates alcohol in his life

by spending his earnings to purchase liquor;
(d) the plaintiff cannot live without alcohol;
(e) the plaintiff is a Bilal with a bad dark history until he was
in a coma due to excessive consumption of liquor; and
(f) the plaintiff will become a hot-tempered person if he did

not consume any liquor in his daily life.
[17] It is the defendants’ pleaded case that the impugned statements

contained in the said article do not bear the defamatory meanings as
pleaded by the plaintiff and thus, are not defamatory of the plaintiff.
The said article, particularly the impugned statements were written,
printed and published by the defendants based on information, words
and statements furnished by SP1 himself to SD2 during an interview
and the said article if read as a whole is not defamatory of the
8
plaintiff as the said article shows the plaintiff’s process of transition

in his life from an alcoholic to a religious person. As such, the
plaintiff’s life history would serve as guidance to youngsters not to
consume liquor and to move themselves towards religion. It is also the
defendants’ pleaded case that the plaintiff consented to the
publication of his life history in Harian Metro. Based on the facts of
the present case, the said article was published with bona fide
intention and without any malice as the information contained in the
said article was provided by the plaintiff himself, in which the
defendants have no reason to doubt the veracity of the said
information. As a defence, the defendants rely on the defences of
justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.
[18] There is no precise test whether or not any given words are
defamatory. Statements or words were defamatory if they tended to
lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking men or if they
would expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or cause him to be
shunned or avoided. Before the words were said to be defamatory, the
court must first look at the particular group in whose eyes the
estimation of the plaintiff was lowered. The court would thus look at
the words from the point view of the law-abiding citizen or that of the
ordinary, reasonable person or that of the right-thinking members of
society in general. Further, the court did not look at the actual effect
of the allegations on the person’s reputation or the meaning of the
words actually understood or taken by listeners. In this respect,
however, it is not enough that the listeners actually took the words as
defamatory for they must be reasonably justified in so taking or
understanding the words.
[19] In the present case, the plaintiff is a Bilal in a mosque and it is

understood that he must attain a standard of moral stature to be in that
position. To my mind, for him to be referred to as Raja Arak Bertukar
Bilal Rockers in the said article is in my considered view, defamatory
9
in nature that has lowered the plaintiff in the estimation of the general
public, especially to which the plaintiff is stationed in life. The
impugned statements read together would by their natural meaning or
by innuendo, in my opinion, carry a tendency to excite against the
plaintiff the adverse opinion of others. The impugned statements
could also lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking
members of society generally. Based on that, I hold that the impugned
statements complained are defamatory in nature.
[20] The legal issue that the said article refers to the plaintiff and
that there was in fact publication by the 1 st defendant is never in
dispute in the present case, leaving only the finding on the language
employed in the said article whether they are considered defamatory
in nature or not. In my considered view, looking at the facts and
circumstances of the case presented to this court, the three legal
requirements as set out in Kian Lup Construction’s case (supra) has
been satisfied in the determination of defamation in the present case.
DEFENCES
[21] Based on the above, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proven
its case and I now moved on to consider the defences raised by the
defendants which I will discuss as follows:
(a) DEFENCE OF TRUTH AND JUSTIFICTION
[22] It is settled law that in a suit for defamation, justification is a

complete defence. The defendants also relied on section 8 of the Act
as a complete defence. It is the defendants’ pleaded case that the
information contained in the said article was the truth and furnished
by the plaintiff himself during an interview session with SD2 and the
plaintiff consented to the story of his life history to be published in
Harian Metro to serve as guidance to youngsters. The learned counsel
10
for the defendants further submitted that it is a defence to an action

for libel for the defendants to plead and prove that the plaintiff
authorised or assented to the publication of the words complained of
and this defence is based on the maxim volenti non fit injuria, i.e. any
person who has expressly or impliedly assented to the act.
[23] The defendants further submitted that the contemporaneous

evidence led during trial would suggest that the plaintiff did in fact
provides the information contained in the said article to SD2, i.e.
information pertaining to the plaintiff’s life history who was once an
alcoholic and has now became a better person. SD2 in his evidence
stated, at the material time the plaintiff was not known to him and
therefore there is no need to publish the said article if it contains
statements which are untrue and/or not given by the plaintiff. In the
circumstances, there was no bad faith in publishing the statements
and/or information obtained from the plaintiff. As such, there is no
reason to doubt the veracity of the said information and accept it as
the truth before proceeding to publish the said article.
[24] In reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the
plaintiff had never consented to the words used for the publication of
his life story. The learned counsel referred to the cross examination
SD2 who admitted that the contents of the said article was not
consistent with the notes taken by SD2. The example are as follows:
(a) The words that was published in the said article are as
follows: “beliau akan minum arak sehingga mabuk serta
marah sekiranya tidak mendapat arak dalam sehari” were
not in the notes taken by SD2 (exhibit 7).
(b) During cross examination, SD2 admitted that SP1 said as

follows “time tu doktor kata saya ada masalah paru2
mungkin sebab banyak sangat minum arak” but the words
that was published in the said article are as follows: “Sinar
11
keinsafan dalam hidup Roslan muncul selepas dia tidak

sedarkan diri pada awal 2010 akibat masalah paru-paru
berpunca daripada kesan pengambilan arak yang
berlebihan sehingga terlantar hampir sebulan”.
[25] Based on the evidence before me, there are certain facts reported
by the defendants that are incorrect or inaccurate (as submitted by the
learned counsel above). I refer to the case of Abdul Rahman Talib v.
Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66, Barakbah CJ (Malaya) which
stated as follows:
“Where the plaintiff proves publication of defamatory words it

is for the defendant if he wishes to set up the defence of
justification to plead and prove the facts on which he relies to
show justification. It is for the defence to show that the
defamatory imputation is true.”
[26] I refer to the case of Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd v. Othhman bin Hj
Omar [2017] 2 MLJ 800, [2017] 2 CLJ 413 where the Court of Appeal
said that it has always been the case in our own jurisdiction as
decided in plethora of cases, that the test to determine whether the
words complained of are capable of bearing defamatory meaning is
based on the ordinary and natural meaning of the words published. It
may be either the literal meaning or it may be implied or inferred or
indirect meaning. It does not require the support of extrinsic facts
passing beyond the general knowledge. It is an objective test in which
it must be given a meaning a reasonable man would understand it. In
order to understand it, the whole article has to be considered. In the
present case, I agree with the submission by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff in that there are words published in the said article which
are not the words of the plaintiff and I believe there are elements of
falsity in the said impugned statement and consequently therefore, I
12
am of considered view that the defence of truth and justification is

successfully rebutted.
(b) FAIR COMMENT
[27] The defendants submitted that the comments contained in the

said article were made based on the truth of the facts obtained from
the information furnished by the plaintiff to SD2. The defendants rely
on section 9 of the Act. By referring to the case of Jeyaretnam v. Goh
Chok Tong [1989] 1 WLR 1109, the Privy Council laid down the four
(4) elements of the defence of fair comments as follows:
(i) The words complained of are comments, although it may

consist or include inference of facts;
(ii) The comment is a matter of public importance;
(iii) The comment is based on facts; and
(iv) The comment is one which a fair-minded person can

honestly make on the facts proved.
[28] The learned counsel for the defendants submitted although SD2
did in fact slightly vary some of the wordings and/or statements in the
said article from those which were furnished by the plaintiff, the
contents and meanings of the wordings and/or statements remain the
same.
[29] The defense of fair comment is frequently relied upon by the

press, as it is designed to protect statements of opinion on matters of
public concern. I hold that the said article by the defendants do not
carry any element of public interest (which I will elaborate below) to
which the defense of fair comment could be attached to it.
13
(c) QUALIFIED PRIVILEDGE (REYNOLDS DEFENCE)
[30] This is a common law defence as the Act does not provide the
defence of statutory qualified privilege for individuals. However,
section 12 of the Act gives qualified privilege to publication in a
newspaper of any report or other matter as is mentioned in Part 1 of
the schedule to the said Act unless off course such publication is
proved to be made with malice.
[31] There are three (3) elements necessary to establish the defence
of qualified privilege which are as follows:
(a) the occasion must be fit;
(b) the matter must have reference to the occasion’ and
(c) it must be published from right and honest motives.
[32] This defence could only apply to “responsible journalism” (see

YB HJ Khalid Bin Abdul Samad v. Datuk Aziz Bin Isham & Anor
[2012] 7 MLJ 301). This defence, essentially, is a defence of
publication in the public interest or in other words whether the
defendants had practices responsible journalism according to the
Reynolds privilege in order to avail themselves of the defence of
qualified privilege. In order to rely on this defence, there are guided
steps, though not exhaustive, to be taken by a defendant before
publication is made.
[33] The defendants submitted the plaintiff cannot be heard to

complain of a tort to which he himself has assented. The learned
counsel submitted that the plaintiff himself furnished the information
contained in the said article during the interview sessions with SD2;
and had consented to the publication of the same, particularly by the
plaintiff’s conduct in responding to the WhatsApp message sent by
SD1 on the day of publication of the said article (exhibit D6). In view
14
thereof, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to complain that the said

article is defamatory of him and attempt to take advantage over the
defendants by filing the present suit premised on the publication of
the said article which was written, printed, and published.
[34] The defendants further argued that the contemporaneous

evidence led during trial suggested that the plaintiff did in fact
provided the information contained in the said article to SD2, i.e.,
information pertaining to the plaintiff’s life history who was once an
alcoholic and has now became a better person. SD2 in his evidence
stated that he did not at that material time knew the plaintiff, and
therefore there was no need to publish the said article if it contains
statements which are untrue and/or not given by the plaintiff. In the
circumstances, there was no bad faith in publishing the statements
and/or information obtained from the plaintiff. As such, there is no
reason to doubt the veracity of the said information and accept it as
the truth before proceeding to publish the said article. The learned
counsel also submitted that it is justified for the said article to be
written and published in the manner as it is, as the information
contained therein was provided by the Plaintiff himself to SD2.
[35] The defendants had relied on the common law defence of

qualified privilege and referred to the principles set out in Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 4 All ER 609 and submitted that the
said articles fall under the scope of responsibility of the media to
publish them as it relates to an issue of public interest and/or
importance. The learned counsel submitted that they are entitled to
rely on the statutory defence of qualified privilege pursuant to section
12 of the said Act 1957 as it is the responsibility of the defendants,
having legal, social and moral duties to write and publish the
information contained in the said article to the public and it is of
public interest to receive the reporting facts. The learned counsel
referred to Kian Lup Construction (supra), where Ramly Ali J (as he
15
was then) referred to the judgment by the Federal Court in John Lee &
Anor v. Henry Wong Jen Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 which held that
where a statement made by a person having the legal duty to make it
and the recipient has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it,
such communication is privileged.
[36] As I had stated earlier, it is my considered view in the

circumstances of the present case, the said article does not carry any
element of public interest. An issue is considered of public interest if
it affects the public at large, especially if it affects the public rights,
health or finances and possess a common concern among the people in
the society. It is absurd to think that the contents of this article
skewed in the way that it was could possibly carry with it the
importance of public interest and how such rights will be affected by
the publication of this adverse article. Embellishing an article targeted
for publication is one thing but to embellish it irresponsibly to target
the general population of readers interest to the detriment of the
plaintiff is quite another. I find that there were no steps taken by the
defendants to verify the said article and to ascertained whether the
said article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. There
must be a balance of publication in the public interest and responsible
journalism. The fact that SD2 just forward the front image of the said
article is not sufficient in my mind to say that the defendants had
taken the step to verify the information except to inform SP1 that the
said article had occupied the front page of Harian Metro. As was
discussed earlier the contents of the said article do vary from the
notes taken by SD2 during the interview and SD2 had admitted that
the title of the said article were words from the headquarters or
referred to as Kuala Lumpur in his evidence.
[37] In the circumstances, I find that the action taken by the

defendants were inadequate to satisfy “responsible journalism” and
the said article was published recklessly by the defendants without
16
due regard to the adverse impact it would have on the standing of the
plaintiff as a working Bilal in the said mosque. Commercial
consideration was the paramount importance on the part of the
defendants when the title of the said offensive article was named and
decided by the defendants to attract readers interests and sale of the
tabloid newspaper without due regard the adverse impact it had on the
life and standing of the plaintiff. This in the circumstances of the case
constitute malice on the part of the defendants. In an action for libel
or slander it is the practice to allege that the words were published
falsely and maliciously. The plaintiff however does not have to prove
falsity and malice to establish his cause of action. If the words are
defamatory, the law presumes that they are false (see International
Times v. Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86 at 89, FC, per Salleh Abas
FJ), and it is for the defendant to plead and prove the words are true
(see S. Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 at 179, SC).
The malice signified by the phrase falsely and maliciously is malice
in law, that is to say a wrongful act done intentionally without just
cause or excuse. Malice in that sense is presumed from the fact of the
publication of defamatory words, so that the plaintiff need not prove
it (see S. Pakianatahan case (supra), per Wan Hamzah SCJ). I
therefore hold that the defendants are not entitled to rely on the
defense of qualified privilege for this tortuous wrong committed
against the plaintiff.
DAMAGES
[38] It is trite law that once libel is proven, there is no requirement

for the plaintiff to prove resulting damage for such damage is
presumed. In the statement of claim, the plaintiff prayed for general
damages which includes aggravated damages and exemplary damages.
The normal factors the court would consider in assessing damages
would be the nature of the defamation, the position and standing of
17
the plaintiff, the gravity and seriousness of the libel and the extent of
the circulation of the defamatory statements. It cannot be disputed
that the plaintiff was a working Bilal and has high religious standing
among the jemaah masjid (congregation of the mosque) and the
libellous allegation is serious as he was allegedly an alcoholic and the
libel was of grave and serious nature. It also has tendency to damage
the reputation of the plaintiff as the Bilal and his appointment as Bilal
was not renewed after the publication of the said defamatory article.
In respect of the extent of the circulation, Harian Metro is a tabloid
that has wide circulation in the Peninsular Malaysia and I find that the
publication was in fact extensive.
CONCLUSION
[39] After having considered the above and in the upshot, I therefore
awarded the plaintiff an award for general damages of RM70,000.00
and cost of RM15,000.00 to be paid to the plaintiff. I have however
dismissed the claim for special damages as it was not pleaded and
failed to be proven by the plaintiff. The claim for exemplary damages
must be dismissed for want of evidence and as it did not come within
the principles set out in the case of Rookes v. Barnard & Ors [1964]
AC 1129. I have also further ordered that the defendants are to print a
written apology in regard to the said article in Harian Metro two (2)
weeks from today (this judgment). On further application by the
counsel for the defendants and with no objection from the counsel for
the plaintiff and since I find there are circumstances that warrant a
stay to be granted to preserve the status quo of the parties, therefore
stay was granted pending appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Dated: 20 AUGUST 2017
18
(HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ)

Judicial Commissioner
High Court of Malaya
Ipoh Perak Darul Ridzuan
COUNSEL:
For the plaintiff - Syahidah Hanum Mohd Ghazali & Sharul Shabaath
Ali; M/s Syahidah Ghazali & Partners
For the defendants - Muhammad Farhan Abd Ghani & Oazair Huneid
Tyeb; M/s Sharizat Rashid & Lee
Ummi Hafilda Bte Ali v. Ketua Setiausaha Parti Islam (PAS) [2006] 4
MLJ 761
Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237
Soh Chun Seng v. CTOS-EMR Sdn Bhd [2004] 5 CLJ 46
Kian Lup Construction v. Hongkong Bank Malaysia Berhad [2002] 7

CLJ 32
Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152
Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v. Haji Hasan Bin Hamzah &
Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 39
Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66
Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd v. Othhman bin Hj Omar [2017] 2 MLJ 800,
[2017] 2 CLJ 413
Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong [1989] 1 WLR 1109
19
[2012] 7 MLJ 301
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 4 All ER 609
John Lee & Anor v. Henry Wong Jen Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108
International Times v. Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86
S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173
Rookes v. Barnard & Ors [1964] AC 1129
Defamation Act 1957, ss. 5, 8, 9, 12, schedule
20
F
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM

DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA
[GUAMAN NO: 23NCVC-40-11/2013]
ANTARA
WAN MAZLAN WAN MOHAMED WOOJDY ... PLAINTIF
DAN
THASLEEM MOHAMED IBRAHIM AL-HAJ … DEFENDAN
DI HADAPAN
Y.A. TUAN GUNALAN A/L MUNIANDY
PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI
GROUNDS OF DECISION
[1] This is a defamation claim by the Plaintiff against the

Defendant for alleged defamatory words maliciously published by the
latter to 3 rd parties concerning the Plaintiff (PW1). The defamatory
publication was in the form of a letter written by the Defendant
(DW1) addressed to the President of the Malaysian Medical Council
(‘MMC’)
[2] In his statement of claim, the Plaintiff prayed for the

following orders / reliefs:
“(a) The Defendant to apologize in writing to the Plaintiff

without condition;
(b) The Defendant advertises the apology in the Malay daily

national newspaper and a national newspaper in Malaysia
for one (1) day;
(c) An injunction to restrain the Defendant and / or employees

and / or agents from giving comments, repeated and / or
1
cause the publication of the works and / or any defamatory

statements of the Plaintiff;
(d) An injunction to restrain the Defendant and / or the

employees or agent relying on the statements to take any
action which is or may be prejudicial to the Plaintiff;
(e) General damages of RM 5,000,000.00;
(f) Exemplary damages and / or punitive damages as assessed

by this Honourable Court;
(g) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the compensation

in paragraph (e) and (f) from the date of filing of the writ
until full settlement;
(h) Costs, and …..”
[3] After a full trial, I found the Defendant liable for defamation
by libel as alleged and entered judgment for the Plaintiff on liability
and assessed general damages payable by the Defendant in the sum of
RM 100,000.00 and costs in the sum of RM 15,000.00.
[4] The Plaintiff is dissatisfied with my decision on the issue of

quantum only.
Background Facts
[5] The material facts are well summarized in the written

submission of the Plaintiff. The same is reproduced below so far as is
relevant to the issues in dispute in this case.
[6] The Plaintiff at all material times was a Malaysian citizen

with address at No. 7, Jalan P11K/3, Precint 11, 62300 Putrajaya and
also the Secretary of the Malaysian Medical Council. The Defendant
2
at all material times was a Malaysian citizen of age and bearing an

address at No. F510, Block F, Phileo Damansara 1, No. 9, Jalan
16/11, Off Jalan Damansara, 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul
Ehsan. The Defendant, at the material time, sent a letter dated
22.10.2013 to the President of the Malaysian Medical Coucil (MMC)
which has been copied to Health Minister Datul Dr. S. Subramaniam
and the 30 members of MMC (hereinafter referred as “the letter”).
This was never denied by the Defendant. Contents of the letter sent by
the Defendant to the President of MMC are as follows:
“Our Ref: TMI/JIHAD/jk/2666/L/Oktober/13

17 Zulhijjah 1434H
22 nd October 2013
President
Malaysian Medical Council
Ministry of Health Malaysia
Block B, Ground Floor
Jalan Cenderasari
50590 Kuala Lumpur
Attn: YBhg Datuk Dr. Noor Hisham Abdullah
YBhg Datuk,
Assalamualaikumwarahmatullahiwabarakatuh
CSMU – OUR MEETING AT YOUR OFFICE ON 10 TH

OCTOBER 2013
We refer to our letter ref Our Ref.: TMI/JIHAD/jk/2659/L/

Oktober/13 and hope it has reached YBhg Datuk’s table
for reading and further action.
The very first meeting with YBhg Datuk has given me the
impression that you are pious and a good Muslim and
3
RACE/RELIGION are not in your agenda but QUALITY,

Wallahu a’lam. To me Allah SWT was the witness to our
conversation and the only recording is by our
Malaks/Angels who were with us. Wallahu a’llam.
I am told that some quarters within Malaysian Medical

Council and Ministry of Health have branded me as ANTI
– MELAYU, Wallahu a’llam. I am not ANTI – ANYBODY
but ANTI the following:
1. Ultra Racists immaterial from whichever race

Malay/Chinese/Indians etc.
2. Corrupt Politicians/Civil Servants
3. Race recruitments / promotion and single

domination on any Government / Quasi Government
organizations.
All the above are UNDEMOCRATIC and totally contrary

to Islamic teachings / value systems.
The above will tantamount to INJUSTICE which is

HARAM.
“MALAYSIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL SECRETARY IS

AN ULTRA-RACIST
There was an article in Tamil Malar on 16 th October 2013

(copy enclosed) and YBhg Datuk kindly refer to the mail
sent by Dr. Wan Mazlan to CSMU which is self –
expalanatory.
In good governance, when a letter is written on behalf of

the organization in this letter on behalf of Malaysian
Medical Council:
4
1. It is stated on behalf of the Malaysian Medical

Council. Our question is whether Malaysian Medical
Council endorsed the contents of this email where
there is a request for ethnic origin of students which
is a racist attitude?
2. We are aware from some Malaysian Medical

Council members that no authorization was given
to the Secretary / Secretariat of Malaysian
Medical Council to request ethnic based statistics
from any University. Why the Secretary Dr. Wan
Mazlan did then took this approach? He should
have been “SACKED” there and then but again
there must have been “YOU SCRATCH MY
BACK AND I SCRATCH YOURS” arrangement
with the Chairman of Malaysian Medical Council,
Wallahu’ alm.
3. From day one CSMU was a target by Ultra-Malay

racist officers because of the high number of
Indian students. Prepared to debate this with Dr.
Wan Mazlan and team.
4. The integrity of Malaysian Medical Council has

been completely destroyed by ONE ULTRA –
MALAY RACIST Dr. Wan Mazlan.
Yes Datuk, I am copying this letter to all Malaysian

Medical Council members including Dr. Wan Mazlan to
avoid being accused of FITNAH and MUNAFIK.
A Muslim/Mukmin will not be a RACIST and this

KETUANAN MELAYU must be eradicated as poor
5
ignorant and several Malays are fed with this deadly

poison by Ultra – Racists Politicians/ NGO’s.
……….
JIHAD for JUSTICE has and will function without

“FEAR ON FAVOUR” to uphold the basic democratic
rights and more importantly to safeguard Islamic value
systems and fight INJUSTICE. We will not be
apologetic for our hand stance unless we are proven
wrong in our findings and allegations.
We do not question the qualifications and personal

integrity of the President and Malaysian Medical
Council Members. However of you actions do not meet
the “Malaysia for Malaysians” agenda then we will not
spare the Malaysian Medical Council members too.
Last but not least, we humbly once again stress that

Malaysian Medical Council’s reputation has been
tarnish by ONE SINGLE ULTRA-RACIST Dr. Wan
Mazlan and he must be removed instantly. Civil
Societies / NGO’s will be mobilizing a 2000 strong
peaceful demonstration with documentation to highlight
Dr. Wan Mazlan’s RACIST attitude. Kindly do not
treat this statement lightly.”
This letter will be made public, if Dr. Wan Mazlan

continues to remain as Secretary of Malaysian Medical
Council.
Looking forward to a positive response and Malaysian

Medical Council given a new lease of life with a new
Secretary (preferably Non-Medical) and the Secretariat
6
to reflect Malaysia at all levels and NOT single race

domination, Insya Allah.
……..
DATO THASLEEM MOHAMED IBRAHIM AL-HAJ

PMP (PERAK), PMP (PERAK)
Chairperson / Humble Servant of Allah
Recipient – Anugerah Khas Maal hijrah 2007,
Perak Darul Ridzuan
– Anugerah Saidina Umar Al-Khattab

(RA) – 2012
cc.
YB DATUK SERI DR. S. SUBRAMANIAM T: 03-8883 2511

Menteri Kesihatan Malaysia
Aras 13, Block E7
Pusat Pentadbiran Kerajaan Persekutuan
62590 Putrajaya
Dr. Wan Mazlan Bin Mohamed Woojdy

Secretary of Malaysian Medical Council, Ministry of Health
Malaysia
Block B, Ground Floor
Jalan Cenderasari
50590 Kuala Lumpur
- Malaysian Medical Council Members as APPENDIX 1

Enclosure attached (30members) …..”
7
[7] The Defendant did not deny sending the letter containing the
alleged defamatory words and/or comments to the President of the
MMC and the numerous parties to whom it was copied.
Assessment of Damages in Defamation Cases
[8] It is trite law that the tort of libel is actionable per se without
the need to strictly prove damages. Upon the libel being established,
the law assumes that the Plaintiff has suffered damage to his
reputation and that he is entitled to an appropriate award of damages.
It is settled principle that the award of damages in defamation cases is
within the province of the trial Court and entirely at its discretion.
Any discretionary power is however required to be exercised
judicially in accordance with established principles and all relevant
considerations in the particular case.
[9] A leading case on this aspect of the law is the Federal Court
case of Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. Tan Sri Dato’
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and Other Appeal [2000] 3 CLJ 728 where
Eusoff Chin, CJ held inter alia:
“Damages in a libel case are essentially matters of impression.

The Federal Court of Australia in Humphries v. T.W.T. Ltd.
[1994] 120 ALR 693 at 700 agreed with Dixon J in Smith
Newspapers Ltd v. Becker [1932] 47 CLR 279 at 300 who
described the role to be performed by the appellate court in
appeals against damages assessed by a judge in defamation
cases:
We are not in the same position as the judge at the trial for
assessing damages for defamation. He has an opportunity
denied to us of judging the true character of the plaintiff
whose sensibility, refinement and feelings of honour are,
8
where they exist, of no little importance when he is held

up to public obloquy and infamy. So far as the conduct of
the trial forms an aid in estimating the degree of
impropriety involved in the publication complained of, the
trial judge has peculiar advantages. The question what
amount awarded to the victim of a public outrage is
enough to serve at once as a solatium, vindication and
compensation to him and a requital to the wrongdoer can
only be solved by an exercise of a discretionary judgment,
and a court of appeal should not, in my opinion, interfere
and review the sum fixed unless it is able to infer from the
amount adopted by the trial judge, or otherwise, that in
some way his discretion must have miscarried.
The assessment of damages is the province of the trial judge,…
We find that we cannot compare a particular libel case with

other libel cases. Each libel case has its own particular and
peculiar facts, is unique and a class by itself. We cannot by our
judgment set a precedent on the damages to be awarded. The
court must consider a number of factors when assessing damages
in a libel case. In John v. MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 at 607, Sir
Thomas Bingham MR (now CJ) said:
In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to

reputation the most important factor is the gravity of the
libel; the more closely it (the defamation) touches the
plaintiff's personal integrity, professional reputation,
honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his
personality, the more serious it is likely to be. The extent
of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to
millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a
libel published to a handful of people. A successful
9
plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to

vindicate his reputation but the significance of this is
much greater in a case where the defendant asserts the
truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than
in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of
what was published, and publicly expresses regret that the
libellous publication took place.
Damages in defamation cases are described as being at large.

The law has not fixed any exact measure for assessment of
damages in an action for defamation. There is no mathematical
formula by which the quantum can be determined; nor is there
any requirement that the damages be assessed with mathematical
certainty. But a small sum awarded to a prominent public figure
for a serious libel could be interpreted as trivialising the
incident.”
[10] On the element of deterrence or punishment in defamation

actions, this is what the learned CJ remarked:
“In defamation cases, the defendant intentionally publishes the

injurious false statement to cause humiliation and anguish to the
plaintiff, and to injure his reputation. True, the intention to
defame the plaintiff is not necessary to impose liability on the
defendant because the intention to defame can be inferred from
the publication of the defamatory statement which gives rise to
the presumption of malice on the part of the defendant. The
plaintiff in a defamation case gets compensation not for his
damaged reputation. He gets it because he was injured in his
reputation by being publicly defamed. The award of damages
given to him serves as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public
and as a consolation to him for a wrong done. That is why it is
wrong and unfair to compare awards of damages in defamation
10
cases with those in personal injury cases. The awards in

personal injury cases for pain and suffering cannot and should
not be used to provide any guidance when considering what is a
reasonable award of damages in a defamation case.”
[11] In support of the Plaintiff’s claim on quantum, reference was

made to a few authorities as follows:
“In Lau Yeong Nan v. Life Publisher Berhad & 2 Ors [2004] 7
MLJ 7 [TAB P of the PBOA], the defendant newspaper
published an article which meant that the singer Plaintiff was a
liar, an incompetent singer and that he was attempting to
deceive the public that his music was heard by the world at large
and had cheated the Chinese public in China. The High Court
held that the newspaper article was sarcastic, withering,
demeaning, scandalous and outright false and showed how
heartless and unfair the defendants were, and awarded RM
300,000.00 for general and aggravated damages.
The Court in M.G.G. Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee
Yioun & 2 Other Appeals [1995] 2 CLJ 912 [TAB Q of the
PBOA] the learned judge had awarded RM3 Million as general
damages against the first Defendant/Appellant which arose out
of the finding of defamation and of conspiracy to defame the
Plaintiff.
In Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Wan Muhammad Azri Wan Deris

[2014] 3 MLRH 21 [TAB R of the PBOA] the Court awarded
RM 800,000.00 as damages and RM 50,000.00 as costs against a
blogger for defamation in alleging that the Plaintiff had engaged
in sodomy.”
[12] In Lim Guan Eng v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd. [2012] 2 MLJ
394 the Court awarded the Plaintiff, the Chief Minister of Penang,
11
damages in the sum of RM 200,000.00 with interest and costs fixed at

RM 25,000.00 as the Defendant published in its newspaper that the
Plaintiff was a racist and anti-Malay.
Finding
[13] The Plaintiff submitted that the following are important

factors that must be taken into consideration in assessing on the
appropriate award:
“a) The Plaintiff was an important person in the Malaysian

Medical Council (‘MMC’) and the statement had reflected
badly on the integrity and reputation of the Plaintiff as the
Secretary of the MMC at that material time and as a
government official.
b) The impugned article and the offending statements leveled

very serious allegation of dishonesty and lack of integrity.
c) The adverse consequences suffered by the Plaintiff.
d) The conduct of the Defendant from the time of libel down

to the very moment of the verdict.
e) The Plaintiff had been put into a ‘cold storage’ position

and lost his prospects of promotion together with the
benefits that come with it.”
[14] The grounds for the Plaintiff’s claim for a substantial sum of
RM 5.0 million as general damages are in essence two pronged:
First, that consequent upon the widely published defamatory

statements by the Defendant he suffered, over and above the loss of
integrity and reputation, loss of promotional prospects from being in
an important position and instead, being placed in a ‘cold storage’
12
position; and second, that he had lost business as a result of the

defamatory imputations which, in turn, caused his removal from the
post of Secretary of the MMC.
[15] First and foremost, with reference to the authorities cited by

the Plaintiff, he was at all material times a civil servant performing
public duties appointed to the above position of responsibility by the
Director – General of Health. He was neither a prominent political
figure, no less than a former Deputy Prime Minister as in the case of
Dato; Seri Anwar Ibrahim [supra] nor a prominent entrepreneur as in
the case of MGG Pillai [supra] or a person widely known to the
general public. Further, in the case of Lan Yeong Nan [supra] the
Plaintiff was a singer cum entertainer well known to the Chinese
community. In this instance, the Plaintiff did not fall within the
category of persons well known to any particular section of society.
His prominence was confined specifically to the medical profession.
[16] As regards his promotional prospects in the Government

medical service being affected or jeopardised as alleged, no evidence
whatsoever was adduced to prove the same. On the contrary, the
evidence elicited during cross-examination of the Plaintiff appeared to
indicate otherwise. In fact, his counsel, in submissions on quantum,
conceded that there was no evidence to substantiate his allegations for
a substantial award of damages as pleaded. The question of being
relegated to a ‘cold storage post’ is purely a matter of perception and
opinion without any facts to substantiate the assertion. A civil servant
should be prepared to serve in any position commensurate with his
qualifications and not just choice positions that suit his preference. In
any event, even if true, this cannot be used to seek substantial
damages as it cannot be considered a serious loss. It is recognized that
in principle exorbitant awards should not be made for civil servants
performing public duties in defamation cases commenced by them in
the course of their service. Damages are meant to compensate the
13
Plaintiff and not for the purpose of self-enrichment or penalizing the

tortfeasor.
[17] Lastly, on the Plaintiff’s claim that he had lost business, he

himself conceded that he was referring to future business ventures
upon retirement some years away. This claim is clearly vague and
speculative in nature. I agree with the defence contention that a claim
of this nature is not acceptable and credible at all in the case of a
public officer who is not currently in business. The Plaintiff has also
clearly failed to prove actual loss of business to warrant any
consideration of this loss in assessing damages for defamation.
[18] In view of the foregoing factors and all relevant

considerations, including the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, inter alia, that the Defendant was then leading an Indian human
rights group which perceived that the Plaintiff had acted unfairly
towards and practised racial discrimination against, Malaysian Indian
students pursuing their medical degree at the Crimea State University
(‘CSMU’) in Russia, I assessed the fair and reasonable award for
General Damages to be in the sum of RM 100,000.00. It was a fact
that DW1 had played a major role in causing the Government to
withdraw its derecognition of the medical qualification from CSMU,
which had a substantial number of Malaysian Indian students who
were seriously affected by the Government’s decision. Under the
totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances in this case, I
was of the view that this was an appropriate award and not
inadequate.
[19] As regards the issue of exemplary and/or punitive damages, it

was indisputable that the Plaintiff had plainly failed to satisfy / fulfill
the essential criteria or ingredients for this category of damages to be
awarded. This head of damages as claimed requires no further
consideration and ought to be dismissed in limine. In accordance with
14
established principles, exemplary or punitive damages must be

restricted to situations where there are oppressive, aribitrary or
unconstitutional actions by servants of the government or where the
defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for
himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the
plaintiff.
[See Roshairee bin Abdul Wahab v. Mejar Mustafa bin Omar & Ors
[1996] 3 MLJ 337; Rookes Barnard [1964] AC 1129].
[20] None of the conditions for exemplary damages to be awarded

had been satisfied in this case, as no evidence was adduced in this
respect.
DAted: 10 MAY 2016
(GUNALAN MUNIANDY)
Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman
Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya
Shah Alam
COUNSEL:
For the plaintiff - Parvinder Kaur, M/s Jasbeer Nur & Lee
Kuala Lumpur
For the defendant - Manogar, M/s Manogar & Co

Kuala Lumpur
15
Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan
Chee Yioun and Other Appeal [2000] 3 CLJ 728
Humphries v. T.W.T. Ltd. [1994] 120 ALR 693
John v. MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586
Lim Guan Eng v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd. [2012] 2 MLJ 394
Roshairee bin Abdul Wahab v. Mejar Mustafa bin Omar & Ors [1996]
3 MLJ 337
Rookes Barnard [1964] AC 1129
16
G
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU

DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM
ANTARA
DR KHAIRUL AZHAR MAT DAUD ... PLAINTIF
DAN
DR ZUKERI IBRAHIM ... DEFENDAN
TORT: Fitnah - Libel - Penyebaran - Pernyataan berunsur fitnah

disebarkan melalui emel - Tuntutan ganti rugi - Kata-kata fitnah
merujuk terus kepada plaintif - Kata-kata fitnah tersebar di laman
blog dan sosial - Dakwaan berunsur fitnah terhadap penjawat awam -
Sama ada penyebaran kata-kata fitnah telah menyebabkan maruah
dan integriti plaintif tercemar - Sama ada kata-kata fitnah
menanamkan rasa kebencian dan kehinaan orang ramai terhadap
plaintif - Sama ada terdapat penyebaran kepada pihak ketiga
TORT: Fitnah - Pembelaan - Justifikasi - Komen berpatutan dan

perlindungan bersyarat - Dakwaan berunsur fitnah terhadap penjawat
awam - Pendedahan salah laku penjawat awam di laman sosial -
Sama ada kebenaran pernyatan yang dikatakan bersifat fitnah berjaya
dibuktikan - Sama ada komen yang dibuat adalah atas kepentingan
awam - Sama ada defendan mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk
mendedahkan pernyataan - Sama ada pernyataan defendan adalah
berdasarkan komen yang adil - Sama ada pendedahan berkenaan
salah laku terhadap plaintif wajar didedahkan melalui penyebaran di
laman social
[Tuntutan plaintif dibenarkan dengan kos.]

Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1964] 1 LNS 2 HC
(dirujuk)
Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 321 HC (dirujuk)
1
Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461 CA (dirujuk)
Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Anor [2013]
3 MLJ 534 (dirujuk)
Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ
814 HC (dirujuk)
Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors
[1995] 1 LNS 304 HC (dirujuk)

Akta Fitnah 1957, s. 8
ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN
A. LATAR BELAKANG
[1] Ini adalah rayuan Perayu/Defendan terhadap keputusan

Mahkamah ini yang dibuat pada 28-2-2016 yang membenarkan tuntutan
Plaintif terhadap Defendan untuk fitnah.
[2] Di dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah memanggil 5 orang saksi untuk
membuktikan kesnya. Manakala Defendan telah memanggil 4 orang
saksi. Di akhir kes, setelah mendengar hujahan kedua-dua pihak,
Mahkamah telah memutuskan untuk membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif
terhadap Defendan. Seterusnya mahkamah telah memerintahkan agar
gantirugi sebanyak RM70,000.00 (secara global) serta kos sebanyak
RM10,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. Defendan yang
tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan tersebut telah merayu ke
Mahkamah Rayuan. Ini adalah alasan-alasan Mahkamah terhadap
keputusan tersebut.
2
B. FAKTA KES
[3] Plaintif dan Defendan adalah merupakan rakan sekerja dan

Pensyarah di Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK). Plaintif mendakwa
bahawa pada 29-10-2014 Defendan dengan menggunakan akaun e-mel
zukeri@umk.edu.my telah menyebarkan fitnah kepada sejumlah
Pegawai Pentadbiran dan Staf UMK melalui satu e-mel bertajuk “150
kesalahan, penyelewengan dekan” bersama satu lampiran bertajuk
“Senarai penipuan, salah laku dan pengakuan yang dilakukan oleh
Dekan Abu Hassan” yang mana mengandungi kenyataan-kenyataan
berunsur fitnah terhadap Plaintif. Antara lain kata-kata fitnah di dalam e-
mel tersebut adalah seperti berikut, sepertimana yang dinyatakan di
dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan:-
i. “Menggunakan title Engr Dr kepada Dr. Khairul yang hanya

ada ijazah pertama dalam bidang Mechanical Engineering,
sedangkan gelaran itu tidak digunakan dalam dunia
akademik”
ii. “Membiarkan budaya kasar berleluasa di fakulti seperti

membiarkan TDA Dr. Kahirul menengking staf bawahan
tanpa sebarang teguran”
iii. “Memberi ucapan yang mengelirukan berkenaan agama

dalam mesyuarat hingga menyebabkan TDA Dr. Khairul
selalu mengeluarkan statement bahawa staff akademik dan
pentadbiran mesti mengikut segala arahan dekan kerana
Allah, walaupun arahan tersebut bersifat membazir,
menyalahi MQA dan bersifat mengampu”.
3
iv. “Mencelarukan fakulti dengan membiarkan staf

kesayangannya iaitu TDA Khairul mengeluarkan statement
“saya akan ikut semua arahan dekan”, iaitu tanpa mengira
adakah arahan tersebut logic, legal, serasi dengan MQA
atau sebagainya.”
v. “Mencelarukan fakulti dengan membiarkan staf

kesayangannya iaitu TDA Khairul mengeluarkan statement
“boleh menipu dengan niat supaya staff buat kerja”
vi. “Dengan salah melantik TDA Dr. Khairul sebagai pengajar

dan penyelaras Kursus Asas Multimedia sedangkan Dr.
Khairul tidak memiliki sebarang sijil akademik untuk
mengajar dan menyelaras kursus tersebut. Beliau ada first
degree mechanical engineering dan Masters serta PhD
dalam pendidikan. Maka mengikut MQA beliau tiada
kelayakan akademik untuk mengajar atau menyelaras
kursus multimedia”
vii. “Membiarkan Dr. Khairul menipu bahawa beliau melakukan

apa saja di FTKW kerana Allah tapi hakikat sebenarnya
beliau sanggup melakukan apa saja kerana sijil
akademiknya tidak sesuai untuk terus kekal di FTKW maka
terpaksa mengampu untuk sah jawatan dan dapat kerja di
Kelantan, walaupun UMK tiada Fakulti Pendidikan. Kalau
betul kerana Allah pasti beliau tidak bersubahat dalam salah
laku akademik dan salah guna kewangan fakulti untuk tujuan
bermewah-mewah dan membazir. Beliau tidak pernah
menegur salah laku Dekan dalam mana-mana mesyuarat”.
4
viii. “Membiarkan TDA Dr. Khairul menyalahgunakan student

praktikal untuk mengisi markah ke dalam system Ecomm
sedangkan student praktikal tidak layak untuk mengisi
markah sehingga student tersebut bertanya mengapa
mereka dilayan seperti kuli”.
ix. “Membiarkan TDA Khairul menindas student UIA yang

melakukan praktikal supaya menjalankan kerja-kerja
pengkeranian yang langsung tiada kaitan dengan bidang
pengajiannya iaitu sains computer sehingga student tersebut
mengalami tekanan emosi yang teruk. Student itu juga
diugut supaya senyap dan terus melakukan tugas
pengkeranian jika mahu markah penilaian yang baik atau
dihalau saja dari fakulti”
x. “Menggalakan budaya keganasan di fakulti dengan

membiarkan TDA Dr. Khairul menakut-nakutkan staff dengan
berkata bahawa beliau tidak takut kepada mana-mana staff
kerana mempunyai adik yang baru sahaja memukul orang sampai
hampir mati. Pengakuan pelakuan jenayah ini hendaklah
dilaporkan kepada polis dan disiasat kerana ia adalah sah
dan diucapkan di sebuah institusi pengajian tinggi”.
ix. “Dekan sedar menyokong jawatan TDA Dr. Khairul sekalipun

beliau tahu bahawa Dr. Khairul memiliki pelbagai sifat
negative seperti mempergunakan agama, menengking staff
akademik dan pentadbiran serta menakut-nakutkan staff
dengan kelakuan jenayah yang dilakukan oleh adiknya”.
5
[4] Plaintif mendakwa bahawa kata-kata fitnah tersebut adalah

merujuk kepada Plaintif dan boleh difahami bahawa ianya merujuk
kepada Plaintif yang pada masa yang material merupakan seorang
Timbalan Dekan Akademik atau singkatannya “TDA” di Fakulti Teknologi
Kreatif dan Warisan (FTKW) di UMK.
[5] Plaintif mendakwa bahawa kata-kata fitnah tersebut adalah suatu

fitnah yang jahat terhadap Plaintif kerana di dalam maknanya yang
semulajadi dan biasa adalah bermaksud:
i. Plaintif tidak mempunyai kelayakan akademik yang wajar

dengan kehendak Universiti.
ii. Plaintif merupakan seorang staff akademik yang kasar
dengan staf bawahan.
iii. Plaintif telah menggunakan agama untuk mendapat
kepentingan peribadi.
iv. Plaintif hanya merupakan alat kepada Dekan.
v. Plaintif menyuruh staf-staf bawahan menipu.
vi. Plaintif menggunakan pelajar latihan amali untuk membuat
kerja-kerja peribadi.
vii. Plaintif mengugut pelajar-pelajar amali untuk kepentingan
diri.
viii. Plaintif seorang yang disokong oleh penjenayah dan
melakukan ugutan jenayah terhadap staf.
[6] Akibat daripada penyebaran kata-kata fitnah tersebut, maruah dan

harga diri Plaintif telah tercemar bukan sahaja dikalangan Universiti
malah kepada masyarakat luar kerana penyebaran kata-kata fitnah
tersebut telah masuk ke dalam laman blog dan laman sosial di internet
6
serta boleh dicapai oleh orang awam. Menurut Plaintif, kata-kata fitnah
tersebut telah menanamkan rasa kebencian dan kehinaan orang ramai
terhadap Plaintif yang merupakan seorang yang berjawatan tinggi di
Universiti dan dihormati oleh pelbagai lapisan masyarakat.
[7] Oleh yang demikian Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap
Defendan untuk fitnah serta menuntut Ganturugi Am, Gantirugi Teruk,
Gantirugi Teladan sebagaimana yang akan ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah
berserta faedah dan kos. Plaintif juga memohon agar Defendan
menerbitkan permohonan maaf secara bertulis di akhbar tempatan
untuk dikenalpasti dan dalam bentuk dan istilah yang akan ditentukan
oleh Plaintif.
C. HUJAHAN PLAINTIF
[8] Plaintif berhujah bahawa isu mengenai siapakah penghantar e-mel

tersebut tidak timbul apabila Defendan di dalam Pernyataan Saksinya
sendiri telah mengaku bahawa beliau adalah penulis e-mel
bertarikh 29-10-2014 tersebut. Pegawai Teknologi Maklumat yang
bertanggungjawab menyelia email di UMK telah dipanggil sebagai saksi
oleh pihak Plaintif dan telah juga mengesahkan bahawa akaun e-mel
“zukeri@umk.edu.my” tersebut adalah milik Defendan. Beliau juga
mengesahkan bahawa e-mel tersebut telah dihantar dan diterima oleh
sejumlah staf dan Pensyarah di UMK melalui nama-nama kumpulan e-
mel dan juga alamat e-mel peribadi di dalam senarai penerima e-mel
tersebut.
[9] Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa tiada pertikaian bahawa perkataan

TDA Khairul di dalam e-mel tersebut merujuk kepada Plaintif dan
7
perkataan “TDA” tersebut merujuk kepada Timbalan Dekan Akademik

iaitu jawatan yang disandang Plaintif. Saksi Plaintif, Dr Nik Zulkarnaen
bin Khidzir, seorang Pensyarah Kanan di UMK turut mengesahkan
bahawa tiada Timbalan Dekan Akademik lain di FTKW selain Plaintif
yang mempunyai nama seperti yang disebutkan di dalam e-mel
tersebut.
[10] Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan di

dalam e-mel tersebut dalam maksud semulajadinya adalah jelas
membawa maksud yang merendahkan maruah dan integriti Plaintif di
mata masyarakat. Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa Plaintif tidak perlu
membuktikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan fitnah tersebut adalah tidak
benar tetapi adalah menjadi bebanan Defendan untuk membuktikan
sebaliknya jika Defendan menyatakan perkataan-perkataan tersebut
adalah daripada fakta yang benar.
[11] Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa selepas tersebarnya e-mel tersebut

Plaintif telah ditukarkan daripada Fakulti Teknologi Kreatif dan Warisan
(FTKW) ke Pusat Pembangunan Infra dan Perkhidmatan (PPIP) tanpa
sebarang jawatan dan tugasan. Plaintif yang dahulunya memegang
jawatan yang penting sebagai Timbalan Dekan Akademik tidak lagi
diberi kepercayaan menjawat apa-apa jawatan penting di UMK.
[12] Plaintif selanjutnya berhujah bahawa Pembelaan Justifikasi,

Komen Berpatutan dan Perlindungan Bersyarat atas kepentingan awam
adalah tidak terpakai terhadap Defendan kerana Defendan tidak berjaya
membuktikan apa-apa yang benar berkaitan pernyataan-pernyataan
yang dibuat berkenaan Plaintif. Sebaliknya Defendan membawa isu-isu
8
lain berkaitan masalah dalaman Universiti ke dalam perbicaraan seperti

isu pertindihan jadual waktu kelas dan isu kelulusan program-program di
UMK yang mana tidak relevan langsung dalam tuntutan Plaintif.
[13] Malah Plaintif berhujah bahawa keterangan SD2 dan SD3 semasa
disoal balas bersetuju bahawa apa-apa jua tindakan yang dibuat oleh
Plaintif dalam menjalankan tugas pentadbiran sebagai Timbalan Dekan
Akademik adalah atas arahan pihak atasan Universiti sahaja. Oleh itu
tiada masalah dalaman di Fakulti dan Universiti perlu dikaitkan dengan
kes ini.
[14] Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa Defendan adalah tidak layak untuk
menggunakan Pembelaan Perlindungan Bersyarat (Qualified Privilege)
memandangkan status maklumat yang diterima oleh Defendan adalah
meragukan dan Defendan tidak pernah berusaha untuk mendapatkan
maklumat sebenar selain mendengar maklumat daripada kata-kata
orang lain.
[15] Malah penyebaran e-mel tersebut juga menjadi elemen penting di

dalam kes ini kerana ianya disebarkan selepas Defendan gagal
mendapat pengesahan jawatan di UMK kerana diberikan markah
prestasi yang rendah oleh Plaintif.
[16] Oleh itu Plaintif berhujah bahawa wujudnya dendam peribadi oleh
Defendan terhadap Plaintif yang menunjukkan terdapatnya niat jahat
(malice) oleh Defendan di dalam menyebarkan email tersebut. Oleh itu
Defendan adalah tidak layak menggunakan Pembelaan Perlindungan
Bersyarat di dalam kes ini.
9
D. HUJAHAN DEFENDAN
[17] Defendan berhujah bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan terhadap

Plaintif melalui e-mel tersebut bukanlah suatu fitnah kerana kandungan
e-mel tersebut adalah berdasarkan kepada fakta-fakta benar yang
diperolehi melalui penyiasatan oleh Defendan. Defendan tidak pernah
berniat untuk menghina, memfitnah, memalukan atau menyakiti pihak
Plaintif.
[18] Defendan selanjutnya berhujah sekiranya Mahkamah memutuskan

bahawa kata-kata tersebut dalam maksud semulajadinya adalah
berunsur fitnah, Defendan adalah layak untuk pembelaan justifikasi,
komen berpatutan dan juga perlindungan bersyarat.
[19] Defendan berhujah bahawa tulisan e-mel tersebut telah dibuat

berdasarkan dan merangkumi ulasan saksama mengenai Plaintif
sebagai Timbalan Dekan Akademik yang mewakili FTKW di UMK dan
juga selaku seorang Pendidik. Plaintif sebagai ahli akademik dan
Pensyarah harus mengetahui bahawa segala tindakannya diteliti oleh
masyarakat awam. Defendan menyatakan bahawa ulasan-ulasan
tersebut telah dibuat secara adil dan saksama berdasarkan pandangan,
pendapat yang jujur mengenai perkara-perkara tersebut dan bahawa
ulasan-ulasan tersebut tidak dibuat dengan niat jahat untuk
mencemarkan reputasi Plaintif seperti yang didakwa. Oleh itu Plaintif
adalah layak untuk pembelaan justifikasi dan komen berpatutan.
[20] Defendan selanjutnya berhujah bahawa pembelaan justifikasinya

juga telah disokong oleh bukti-bukti seperti ekshibit P7, IDD-10, D11,
D17, D18, D23, D32, D37, D45 dan D46 yang antara lainnya
10
membuktikan dakwaan Plaintif berkaitan pengurusan staf akademik

yang tidak teratur, Pensyarah yang mengajar di luar bidang kepakaran,
berlakunya pertindihan jadual kelas pelajat-pelajar, isu program-program
di FTKW yang tidak mendapat kelulusan MQA dan sebagainya.
[21] Defendan selanjutnya berhujah bahawa di dalam “common law”

Defendan adalah dikehendaki membuktikan kebenaran keseluruhan
pernyataannya yang dikatakan bersifat fitnah untuk berjaya di dalam
pembelaan justifikasi. Namun s. 8 Akta Fitnah 1957 memberikan
kedudukan yang berbeza di Malaysia di mana Defendan masih boleh
berjaya di dalam pembelaan justifikasinya sekiranya ia dapat
membuktikan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut adalah benar
dari segi “substance”. Dalam hal ini s. 8 Akta Fitnah adalah berbunyi
seperti berikut:-
“In an action for libel or slander in respect of words

containing two or more distinct charges against the Plaintiff, a
defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the
truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to
be true do not materially injure the Plaintiff's reputation
having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.”
[22] Defendan juga berhujah bahawa beliau adalah layak untuk

pembelaan Komen Berpatutan dan Perlindungan Bersyarat kerana
pernyataan-pernyataan di dalam e-mel tersebut telah dibuat sebagai
komen daripada Defendan yang dibuat atas kepentingan awam.
Defendan telah menulis di atas kapasitinya sebagai seorang yang
mempunyai hak dan bidangkuasa selaku Pensyarah Kanan yang juga
memegang jawatan sebagai Pegawai Akreditasi di peringkat Fakulti dan
11
oleh itu mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk mendedahkan pernyataan-

pernyataan tersebut.
[23] Defendan mengakui bahawa adalah menjadi undang-undang yang

mantap bahawa pembelaan Komen Berpatutan dan juga Perlindungan
Bersyarat akan dapat dikalahkan jika Plaintif membuktikan terdapatnya
unsur “malice” atau niat jahat daripada pihak Defendan-Defendan.
Namun begitu Defendan berhujah bahawa niat jahat ini langsung tidak
diplidkan oleh pihak Plaintif didalam pliding beliau. Justeru itu pihak
Plaintif tidak boleh menggunapakai isu ini dan membawa keterangan-
keterangan berkaitan niat jahat atas kegagalan mereka untuk
memasukkan atau memplidkannya di dalam pliding mereka.
E. UNDANG-UNDANG BERKAITAN
[24] Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa di dalam

membuktikan kes-kes fitnah, terdapat 3 element yang perlu dibuktikan
oleh Plaintif sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Ayob Saud v.
TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 321 seperti berikut:
“In our law on libel which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957 the
burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff to show:
i. The words are defamatory
ii. The words refer to the Plaintiff
iii. Those words were published.”
F. ISU-ISU YANG PERLU DIPUTUSKAN DAN DAPATAN

MAHKAMAH MENGENAINYA
Berdasarkan kes Ayob Saud (Supra), isu-isu yang perlu ditentukan

adalah seperti berikut:-
12
i. Adakah kata-kata atau pernyataan Defendan bersifat

fitnah?
ii. Adakah kata-kata atau pernyataan Defendan merujuk
kepada Plaintif?
iii. Adakah pernyataan atau kata-kata Defendan tersebut telah
disiarkan atau disampaikan (published) kepada pihak
ketiga?
Sekarang Mahkamah akan menilai satu persatu isu-isu tersebut:-
I. Adakah kata-kata atau pernyataan Defendan bersifat fitnah?
[25] Di dalam menentukan sama ada kata-kata atau pernyataan

Defendan adalah berbentuk fitnah, ujian yang harus digunapakai adalah
sama ada perkataan itu secara semulajadi dan dengan maksud biasa
membawa pengertian yang merendahkan maruah dan integriti Plaintif.
Prinsip ini dinyatakan di dalam kes Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press
Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461 seperti berikut:-
“In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in

question: do the words published in their natural meaning
impute to the Plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable
conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the
question invite affirmative response, then the words
complained of are defamatory.”
[26] Di dalam kes ini Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif

bahawa merujuk kepada perkataan-perkataan Defendan mengenai
Plaintif di dalam e-mel tersebut, terdapat beberapa perkara yang secara
semulajadinya memberi maksud seperti berikut:
i. Plaintif tidak mempunyai kelayakan akademik yang wajar dengan

kehendak universiti.
13
ii. Plaintif merupakan seorang staf yang kasar dengan staf bawahan.
iii. Plaintif telah menggunakan agama untuk kepentingan peribadi.
iv Plaintif hanya merupakan alat kepada Dekan
v. Plaintif telah menyuruh staf-staf bawahan untuk menipu.
vi Plaintif telah menggunakan pelajar Latihan amali untuk membuat
kerja-kerja peribadi.
vii Plaintif telah mengugut pelajar-pelajar Latihan amali tersebut untuk
kepentingan diri.
Viii Plaintif telah melakukan ugutan Jenayah terhadap staf.
[27] Perkataan-perkataan ini jelas memberikan maksud yang telah

membawa imej negatif serta mejatuhkan kedudukan dan maruah Plaintif
di mata masyarakat. Oleh itu Mahkamah mendapati bahawa perkataan-
perkataan Defendan mengenai Plaintif di dalam e-mel tersebut adalah
jelas di dalam maksud semulajadinya adalah suatu yang bersifat fitnah
terhadap Plaintif.
II. Adakah kata-kata atau pernyataan Defendan merujuk kepada

Plaintif?
[28] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa adalah jelas dan ketara bahawa

kata-kata tersebut telah merujuk kepada “TDA Khairul, Dr. Khairul Azhar
atau pun “TDA” yang bermaksud Timbalan Dekan Akademik. Bagi
maksud ini keterangan menunjukkan bahawa tiada sesiapa pun di
Fakulti Teknologi Kreatif dan Warisan (FTKW) UMK pada masa itu
bernama Khairul yang menjawat jawatan Timbalan Dekan Akademik
kecuali Plaintif sahaja. Oleh yang demikian mahkamah memutuskan
bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut memang merujuk kepada Plaintif
di dalam kes ini.
14
III. Adakah pernyataan atau kata-kata Defendan tersebut telah

disiarkan atau disampaikan (published) kepada pihak ketiga?
[29] Defendan di dalam keterangannya telah mengakui bahawa salinan

e-mel tersebut adalah benar dan telah dihantar oleh beliau. Namun
begitu beliau hanya mengakui fakta bahawa email tersebut telah hanya
dihantar kepada staf-staf fakulti FTKW dan Pensyarah-Pensyarah UMK
sahaja. Defendan tidak pernah menyebarkan perkara itu ke media sosial
atau laman-laman blog.
[30] Namun demikian mahkamah berpuashati bahawa adalah

memadai untuk suatu fitnah dikatakan telah disebarkan kepada pihak
ketiga apabila ianya dihantar kepada orang lain selain daripada Plaintif
seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Ayob Saudi v. TS
Sambanthanmurti (Supra) seperti berikut:
“In law, to constitute publication the defamatory matter must

be published to a third person other than the Plaintiff. In other
words, it is the making known of the defamatory matter, after
it has been written, to some person other than person to
whom it is written.”
[31] Oleh itu Mahkamah mendapati bahawa sekiranya pun benar

Defendan bukanlah orang yang bertanggungjawab dalam penyebaran
kata-kata tersebut di medial sosial atau pun laman-laman blog, apa yang
penting adalah kata-kata tersebut telah disebarkan kepada pihak ketiga
iaitu bukan sahaja staf-staf pentadbiran UMK tetapi sebilangan staf-staf
fakulti FTKW. Oleh itu kata-kata tersebut boleh dikatakan telah disiarkan
atau disampaikan kepada pihak ketiga.
15
[32] Oleh yang demikian berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan yang

dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak Plaintif
telah pun membuktikan atau memenuhi kesemua 3 elemen yang
dikehendaki bagi maksud membuktikan fitnah. Namun begitu setelah
Mahkamah mendapati bahawa ketiga-tiga keperluan untuk kes fitnah
telah dibuktikan, Mahkamah selanjutnya perlu menilai dan
mempertimbangkan pembelaan-pembelaan yang telah dibangkitkan
oleh Defendan di dalam kes ini.
G. PEMBELAAN DEFENDAN
[33] Defendan melalui pembelaannya telah mengemukakan 3

pembelaan seperti berikut:
i. Justifikasi (Justification)
ii. Komen berpatutan (Fair Comment)
iii. Perlindungan bersyarat (Qualified Privilege)
i) Pembelaan Justifikasi
[34] Untuk menggunakan pembelaan justifikasi, Defendan perlu

membuktikan pernyataan-pernyataan yang dibuat terhadap Plaintif
adalah benar. Di dalam kes Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn
Bhd & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ 814 Mahkamah ada menyatakan seperti
berikut:
“In a defamation action, the defence of justification is

complete defence if it succeeds. And the question of malice
or bad faith does not arise. But in order to succeed in the
defence of justification a Defendant must establish the truth
of all the material statements in the words complained of
which may include defamatory comments made therein. And
16
in order to justify such comments, it is necessary to show

that the comments are the correct imputations or conclusions
to be drawn from the proved facts. However the plea of
justification does not fail by reason only that the truth of
every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true
do not materially injure the Plaintiff’s reputation having regard
to the truth of the remaining charges (see s. 8 of the
Defamation Act 1957 and Abdul Rahman Talib v.
Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66). It also to be noted
that partial justification may be useful in the mitigation of
damages.”
[35] Di dalam kes Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Utusan Melayu (M)
Bhd & Anor [2013] 3 MLJ 534 pula, Mahkamah memutuskan seperti
berikut:
“For defence of justification, the Defendants failed to provide

that the articles published were true in substance and effect. In
other words, the defence of justification requires the
Defendants to prove the same to be true in substance or
materially different from the truth.”
[38] Di dalam hujahannya Defendan telah menyatakan bahawa beliau

telah membuktikan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataannya terhadap Plaintif
telah dibuktikan walaupun bukan secara keseluruhannya tetapi telah
dibuktikan secara “substance”. Hujahan Defendan adalah berdasarkan
kepada ekshibit-ekshibit P-7, D-11, D-17, D-18, D-23, D-32, D-37, D-45
dan D-46 yang dikatakan ekshibit-ekshibit yang menyokong bahawa
pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan terhadap Plaintif adalah benar.
17
[39] Mahkamah telah meneliti kandungan dokumen-dokumen tersebut.

Namun begitu mahkamah tidak dapat melihat bagaimanakah dokumen-
dokumen tersebut boleh dikatakan menyokong pernyataan-pernyataan
Defendan terhadap Plaintif. Ekshibit-ekhibit tersebut sekiranya diteliti
hanya menyokong sebahagian pernyataan Plaintif mengenai bidang
ijazah dan kepakaran Plaintif serta masalah-masalah dalaman yang
dihadapi UMK seperti pertindihan jadual dan juga isu kelulusan
program-program di UMK sahaja.
[40] Ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut tidak sama sekali membuktikan

pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan terhadap Plaintif mengenai isu
salahlaku sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di dalam e-mel yang diadukan
tersebut adalah benar. Oleh yang demikian mahkamah berpendapat
bahawa Defendan telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa pernyataan-
pernyataannya terhadap Plaintif adalah benar bukan sahaja secara
keseluruhan malah juga secara “substance”. Oleh itu Mahkamah
memutuskan bahawa Defendan telah gagal dalam pembelaan
justifikasinya.
ii) Pembelaan Komen berpatutan
[41] Garis panduan untuk menggunakan pembelaan komen berpatutan

telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman
Ya’kub b Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 seperti berikut:
“For the defence of fair comment, in order to succeed the

following basic elements must be established by the
Defendants, namely:
I. that the words complained of are comments, though they

may consist of or include inference of facts.
18
II. that the comments are on a matter of public interest; and
III. that the comments are based on facts, truly stated. They
must also be fair and which a fair minded person can
honestly make on the facts proved.”
[42] Berdasarkan kepada garis panduan di atas, Mahkamah

memutuskan bahawa Defendan telah gagal di dalam pembelaan komen
berpatutan kerana pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan terhadap Plaintif
sebagaimana yang telah dinyatakan sebelum ini, telah gagal untuk
dibuktikan sebagai benar dari segi “substance” atau secara
keseluruhannya. Malah pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut telah ditulis
dengan intonasi dan perkataan-perkataan yang jelas memburukkan
dan merendahkan reputasi Plaintif. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa
pernyataan tersebut sekiranya pun boleh dikatakan sebagai suatu
komen ianya bukanlah suatu komen yang adil sebagaimana dinyatakan
di dalam garis panduan di atas. Perkataan-perkataan tersebut,
sebaliknya berunsur tuduhan-tuduhan yang serius dan melibatkan
salahlaku penjawat awam yang boleh menyebabkan Plaintif hilang
kelayakan untuk menjawat jawatan di UMK serta boleh dikenakan
tuduhan Jenayah.
iii) Pembelaan Perlindungan Bersyarat (qualified privilege)
[43] Bagi mewujudkan suatu keadaan yang dilindungi bagi tujuan

pembelaan “qualified privilege”, perlu dibuktikan bahawa terdapatnya
hubungan dua hala di antara orang yang membuat penyataan dengan
orang yang ditujukan untuk menerima dan membaca pernyataan
tersebut. Orang yang membuat pernyataan tersebut perlu mempunyai
kepentingan atau tangggungjawab untuk mendedahkan pernyataan
19
tersebut kepada orang yang menerimanya dan orang yang

menerimanya juga mempunyai kepentingan atau tanggungjawab untuk
menerimanya.
[44] Namun di dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa

Defendan hanyalah seorang Pensyarah di UMK dan perlu melaporkan
apa jua salah laku yang diketahuinya kepada Naib Canselor dan
bukannya menyebarkan perkara tersebut kepada Pensyarah lain, staf
dan kakitangan. Malahan keterangan SD-1 iaitu Pegawai Pusat Jaminan
Kualiti UMK juga telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan bukanlah salah
seorang ahli yang dilantik oleh Pusat Jaminan Kualiti UMK.
[45] Oleh itu Defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang tanggungjawab

sebagai seorang ahli Pusat Jaminan Kualiti sebagaimana dakwaan
Defendan. Sekiranya pun benar Defendan mempunyai tanggungjawab
sosial untuk melaporkan salahlaku Plaintif, ianya seharusnya dibuat
melalui saluran yang betul iaitu mengadu kepada pihak berkuasa
berkenaan yang mempunyai kuasa untuk mengendalikan aduan
tersebut dan bukannya secara menyebarkannya kepada Pensyarah lain,
staf dan kakitangan.
[46] Di dalam kes Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor

[1965] MLJ 142 Mahkamah ada menyatakan seperti berikut:
“It is the duty of everyone, in the interest of public efficiency

and good order, to bring any misconduct or neglect of duty
on the part of a public officer or employee or any public
abuse, to the notice of the proper authority for investigation.
Any complaint or information as to such misconduct, neglect
20
of duty, or abuse, though volunteered, is privileged, provided

it is made in good faith to the person or body who has the
power or duty to remove, punish or reprimand the offender or
merely to inquire into the subject matter of the complaint.”
[47] Oleh yang demikian, berpandukan kes di atas, Mahkamah

memutuskan bahawa pembelaan Perlindungan Bersyarat tidak terpakai
kepada Defendan kerana beliau bukan merupakan orang yang
mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk mendedahkan salahlaku tersebut dan
sekiranya beliau mempunyai tanggungajawab dari segi sosial dan moral
untuk melaporkan salah laku tersebut, ianya harus dilaporkan kepada
pihak yang mempunyai kuasa untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap
Plaintif seperti Naib Canselor, Timbalan Naib Canselor, Dekan Hal
Ehwal Akademik, pihak Senat Universiti atau pihak pengurusan
Universiti yang berkenaan dan bukannya secara menyebarkannya
melalui e-mel kepada Pensyarah-Pensyarah lain dan kakitangan dan
staf Fakulti FTKW.
H. KESIMPULAN
[48] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan yang

telah dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa di atas
imbangan kebarangkalian, Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan
tuntutannya terhadap Defendan, (Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Malaysia
[2008] 2 CLJ 814) dan justeru itu tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan
adalah dengan ini dibenarkan dengan kos.
21
Mahkamah telah menangguhkan kes ini untuk memberi peluang kepada

pihak-pihak untuk berhujah mengenai jumlah award gantirugi yang
sepatutnya diawardkan serta kos tindakan ini.
Setelah mendengar hujahan kedua-dua pihak, mahkamah

mengawardkan sejumlah RM70,000.00 (secara global) kepada Plaintif
dan kos sebanyak RM10,000.00.
Bertarikh: 9 MEI 2016
(AHMAD BACHE)
Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu
Kelantan
Kaunsel:
Bagi pihak plaintif - Nik Saiful Adli Burhan @ Jaohari; T/n

Irmohizam Rosley & Nik Adli
PT361, Tingkat 1
Kompleks Niaga Melor
16400 Kota Bharu
Kelantan
Bagi pihak defendan - Hisham Fauzi & Intan Nor Nadirah; T/n
Hisham Fauzi & Associates
Peguambela & Peguamcara
Tingkat 2, Kompleks Niaga Lembaga Tabung Haji
Jalan Dato’ Pati
15000 Kota Bharu
Kelantan
22
H
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU

DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA
ANTARA
NORMAL AHMAD @ SALIMAN

(berniaga di bawah nama perniagaan
Tetuan A. Normal Architect) ... PLAINTIF
DAN
1. SISTEM TELEVISYEN MALAYSIA BERHAD

(juga dikenali sebagai TV3)
2. DATO’ MOHAMAD ASHRAF ABDULLAH
3. JAFFRY AZMAN DAHALAN

4. ALT MEDIA SDN BHD ... DEFENDAN-
DEFENDAN
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff, an architect by profession, complained that the

two news reports in audio visual form that were screened nationwide
by the 1 s t defendant contained defamatory statements, and those
defamatory statements have caused the plaintiff to suffer
considerable embarrassment, distress and he has been brought into
1
public scandal, odium and contempt. The impugned defamatory
statements have also lowered the plaintiff as an individual and/or
professional in the estimation of right-thinking men in general, the
plaintiff claimed.
[2] The parties have gone through a full trial. On 30.5.2017, this
Court delivered its decision. This Court allowed the plaintiff’s claim.
This judgment sets down the reasons for the decision of this Court.
The Salient Facts
[3] The 1 s t defendant is a television broadcasting station, more

popularly known by the locals as ‘TV3’. The 1 s t defendant is
responsible for broadcasting and publishing the news programme
known as Buletin Utama.
[4] The 2 n d defendant is the Group Managing Editor of the 1 s t

defendant and overall in-charge and responsible for the said news
programme.
[5] The 3 r d defendant is the reporting journalist of a news segment

known as Aduan Rakyat screened in the said news programme.
[6] The 4 t h defendant is a company that publishes or permits the

publication and republication of various programmes broadcast by
TV3, including the news programme Buletin Utama, on its website
known as “www.tonton.com.my”.
[7] On 17.1.2015 and 18.1.2015, the 1 s t defendant broadcasted two

news reporting respectively through a segment known as Aduan
Rakyat in the news programme.
[8] The essence of the two news reporting was about the grievances
of the house owners in a residential housing project known as Taman
Bayu Damai, Johor Bahru.
2
[9] The footage from the news reporting revealed houses in the
housing project were unfit for occupation after vacant possession had
been delivered. There were serious cracks on the internal and external
walls of the houses. Cracks could also be seen on the drains
surrounding the houses. The footage also revealed the construction
of the foundation of the houses was seriously in question. Soil
erosion and soil settlement could be a factor that caused the cracks
in the houses.
[10] It was reported that the housing project was implemented and
managed by the Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Johor (UPEN).
The developer of the said project was Tebrau Teguh Sdn Bhd. The
plaintiff’s firm was the architect of the housing project.
[11] In one part of the footage aired on 17.1.2015 (the first footage),
the 3 r d defendant, being the anchor reporter of the news, interviewed
some house owners. The first footage ended with a note to inform the
viewers that the news reporting will be continued the following day
with the outcome and reactions of UPEN, the architect firm and the
developer involved in the housing project.
[12] On 18.1.2015, the news reporting (the second footage)

continued in the said news programme. One part of this second
footage showed the 3 r d defendant’s interview session with the
director of UPEN, Encik A. Rahim Nin. Encik A. Rahim Nin made
several statements that affronted the plaintiff in the reporting. The
news reporting in this second footage ended with information that
there was no response from the architect firm and the developer at
the time of the reporting.
The Plaintiff’s case
[13] The plaintiff complains there are statements made and reported
in the first footage that were defamatory of him. Those impugned
statements are as follows:
3
(a) “Projek dilaksana Unit Perancangan Ekonomi (UPEN) J ohor,
yang melantik perunding arkitek bagi mereka bentuk, dan
pembinaannya.” - A statement uttered by the narrator.
(b) “Ada rumah saya semua, longkang semua pecah, makna bawah
tanah ini semua bawahnya semua tanah kosong, takda tanah.
Longkang dia cuma bikin, dia bikin cuma dia ‘celet- celet’ je.” -
A statement uttered by one Hamaidon Salleh, a house owner
interviewed by the 3 r d defendant.
(c) “Saya pindah mari satu haribulan May tahun lepas la, ahh..dapati
rumah yang kami dapati ni retak, retak tu mula mula longkang tu
pecah, longkang-longkang pecah, retak, kemudia reta k itu
semakin hari semakin membesar bila masa hujan turun membesar
pecah tu.” - A statement uttered by one Lugiman Sastro during the
interview carried out by the 3 r d defendant at the site.
(d) “Esok Aduan Rakyat dapatkan reaksi UPEN Johor, syarikat

arkitek serta pemaju yang terbabit dengan perumahan Bayu
Damai.” - A statement uttered by the narrator.
[14] The plaintiff also complains that there are statements made and
reported in the second footage that also contained defamatory
statements. Those impugned statements are as follows:
(a) “UPEN Johor memberitahu project Taman Bayu Damai dibina

pemaju, Tebrau Teguh Sdn Bhd. Pembinaan berlandaska n
rekabentuk dan penyeliaan syarikat arkitek A.Normal. Kontrak
yang dimeterai mensyaratkan, pihak terbabit menyera hkan
perumahan yang bebas kecacatan kepada kerajaan Johor ...” - A
statement uttered by the narrator.
(b) “Setiap CCC tu telah disahkan, di “certified” oleh arkitek bahawa

rumah itu dibina mengikut aspek yang telah ditentuk an dan
maknanya diluluskan untuk kediaman. Kalau berlaku k erosakan
4
selepas itu dan kerosakan itu kata kerosakan yang b esar,
maknanya salah arkitek yang mereka dan seterusnya
mengesahkan.” - A statement uttered by Pengarah UPEN Encik A.
Rahim Nin.
(c) “Aduan Rakyat ke pejabat arkitek di Taman Universit y dan

pejabat pemaju di Iskandar Waterfront untuk mendapatkan ulasan.
Sehingga siaran laporan ini, kedua-dua pihak belum memberi
sebarang ulasan.” - A statement uttered by the narrator.
[15] The plaintiff pleads that the above impugned statements

whether taken individually or otherwise, whether viewed in the
context of each segment of Aduan Rakyat in the reporting news or
otherwise, whether viewed in overall totality or otherwise, together
with the accompanying visual imagery referred to or were understood
to refer to the plaintiff personally and in his capacity as architect.
[16] The plaintiff also pleads that those impugned statements and
visual imagery by their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by
implication meant and were understood to mean, inter alia, the
followings:
• The plaintiff had been appointed by UPEN as both designer and

contractor of the houses;
• The plaintiff was answerable as the constructor of those house;
• The plaintiff constructed the houses that were not fit for
habitation;
• The plaintiff constructed defective houses;
• The plaintiff was negligent when issuing the CCC;
• The plaintiff is an unprofessional architect;
5
• The plaintiff did not take his responsibilities or his tasks
seriously;
• The plaintiff disregarded the welfare of Taman Bayu Damai home

owners;
• The plaintiff had let down his profession as a whole;
• The plaintiff did not have the support of UPEN;
• The plaintiff is dishonest;
• The plaintiff was not a man of integrity;
• The plaintiff cut corners so as to maximize his pro fits;
• The plaintiff was a disreputable professional.
[17] The plaintiff further pleads that by way of innuendo, the

impugned statements meant and were understood to mean, inter alia,
that:
• The plaintiff was silly to have undertaken construction of the

houses when construction is not and should be within the normal
scope of works of a professional architect;
• The plaintiff should not be allowed to hold office in the Malaysian

Institute of Architects (PAM) Southern Chapter;
• The former Vice-Chairman of the Malaysian Institute of

Architects (PAM) Southern Chapter was not a man of integrity or
responsibility;
• As an office bearer in the architectural community, the plaintiff

had disparaged the profession;
• The plaintiff was not fit and proper person to hold positions of
responsibility;
6
• The plaintiff is a disreputable professional;
• The plaintiff managed to secure his appointment as consultant

architect not on merit but because of the position he held in the
Malayan Institute of Architects (PAM) Southern Chapter and now
he could not deliver on his appointment;
• The plaintiff, by being an office bearer in the Malaysian Institute

of Architects (PAM) Southern Chapter was able to es cape sanction
for his irresponsible conduct;
• The plaintiff by being an office bearer in the Malaysian Institute of

Architects (PAM) Southern Chapter, could practice his profession
indiscriminately without fear of reprisal.
[18] The first and second footage were broadcasted in the said news
programme in the news segment Aduan Rakyat on 17.5.2015 and
18.5.2015 respectively. In addition, the two news reporting were
uploaded and available for viewing on the website which is owned
and/or managed and/or administered by the 4 t h defendant.
[19] The above are the pith of the plaintiff’s complaints.
The Finding of the Plaintiff’s Case
Essential Facts Proved
[20] In chief, the plaintiff’s case in relation to the facts leading to

the broadcasting of the two impugned news reporting were proved in
the trial. Likewise, the impugned statements were also proved and
admitted by the defendants that they were made and broadcasted in
the news reporting.
[21] The learned counsel for the defendants conceded that two out
of the three elements necessary in order to establish the plaintiff’s
7
case have been established and proved in the trial, namely, the
impugned statement referred to the plaintiff and that they have been
published, i.e. publication has been satisfied. The only contention
left for the consideration of this Court in the plaintiff’s case is
whether the impugned statements are capable of or have a tendency
of having a defamatory meaning.
Defamatory Statement
[22] This Court is of the considered view that the impugned

statements in the first footage, read together in totality, would convey
the following meanings to the viewers:
i. The plaintiff, being the appointed architect of the project, was also
appointed to construct the houses in the project;
ii. There were serious cracks and defects in those houses purportedly
constructed by the plaintiff; and
iii. The plaintiff has to be accountable whether as an architect or a

contractor.
[23] With regard to the impugned statements in the second footage,

this Court is of the considered view that if the impugned statements
are read together in totality would convey the following meanings:
i) UPEN informed that the developer was Tebrau Teguh Sdn Bhd and
that the houses were constructed based on the desig n facilitated
by the plaintiff, and the parties supposed to hand over the houses
free from defects;
ii) The plaintiff, who was the architect in the project, had certified
the CCC, therefore, the plaintiff has to be responsible if there are
serious defects in the houses;
8
iii) The architect failed to respond to the enquir y by the defendants
for comment.
[24] The news reporting stated that the plaintiff as the appointed
architect in the housing project was also involved in the construction
of the said houses. This report suggests that the plaintiff has violated
the Architects Act 1967. A professional architect is not supposed to
undertake construction works in a project in which he is the architect,
otherwise the architect would be in conflict of interest. Viewers who
are familiar with the duties of professional architects would think
that the plaintiff had gone outside his scope as a professional
architect. This reporting places the plaintiff into disgrace within the
architect profession.
[25] The footage showing the defects and cracks of the houses would
convey a message to the viewers that the professionalism of the
plaintiff as a professional architect is highly questionable. The
statements made by the Director of UPEN impressed upon the fact
that the CCC was issued by the plaintiff, and therefore, the plaintiff
and parties who were involved should be answerable. The footage
then ended with the fact that there was no response from the plaintiff
up to the time of reporting. The last statement in the second footage
seems to convey the message the plaintiff was avoiding from making
any comment.
[26] The impugned statements read together would by their natural

meaning or by innuendo, in the opinion of this Court, carry a
tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others.
The impugned statements could also lower the plaintiff in the
estimation of right thinking members of society generally. Based on
that, this Court finds the impugned statements complained are
defamatory in nature.
9
[27] The learned counsel for the defendants has condensed the
impugned statements in the two news reporting into two parts. The
first part, as he termed it as the 1 s t sting as follows:
“That the plaintiff, as the consultant architect, w as involved not only in

the design and supervision works but also wrongly involved in the actual
building or construction of the houses in the TBD h ousing project, and
thus going beyond the permitted scope of duties, expertise and
qualification as a professional architect. Hence, h e is to blame for the
damage to the houses which arose due to soil settlement issues.”
[28] The second part, also referred to as the 2 n d sting, is as follows:
“The plaintiff had issued the Certificate of Compli ance & Completion
(CCC) certifying that the houses built were safe and fit for occupation.
And if the houses suffered damage subsequently rendering them unsafe
and unfit for occupation, the plaintiff architect w ho designed and issued
the CCC is to be blamed.”
[29] With regard to the 1 s t sting, the learned counsel for the
defendants submitted that the impugned statements in the first
footage must be understood as a whole, and that the court must take
into consideration the other parts of the reporting which are capable
to take away the 1 s t sting.
[30] The learned counsel for the defendants cited statements

reported in the first footage which were capable of removing the 1 s t
sting. The statements are as follows:
i) “Dakwa penduduk, perumahan mereka dibina atas tanah gambut,

dan pemaju gagal menstabilkan tapak perumahan.” - Statement
made by the narrator.
ii) “Dakwa pengadu aduan yang dibuat kepada pemaju baga ikan
mencurah air ke daun keladi....” - Statement made by the narrator.
10
iii) “Esok Aduan Rakyat dapatkan reaksi UPEN Johor, syarikat akitek
serta pemaju yang terbabit dengan perumahan Bayu Damai.” -
Statement made by narrator.
[31] The learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the above
statements, read together with the 1 s t sting, would convey to the
viewers the following messages:
i) It is the developer, as opposed to the architect (plaintiff), who

built the houses and they failed to stabilize the site of the housing
project;
ii) Complaints with reg ard to the unstable site wer e made to the
developer, as opposed to the architect (plaintiff) but there was no
response;
iii) The first news reporting on 17.1.2015 invited the viewers to

follow the broadcast the following day which was th e second
footage broadcasted on 18.01.2015.
[32] In the second footage, the narrator stated the following:
“UPEN johor memberitahu project Taman Bayu Damai dibina pemaju,

Tebrau Teguh Sdn Bhd. Pembinaan berlandaskan rekabentuk dan
penyeliaan syarikat arkitek A. Normal.”
[33] The learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the above
statement in the second footage has clarified and made clear the point
that the houses in the project were built by the developer, not the
plaintiff. When read as a whole, in its entirety and in context, the
impugned statements make it abundantly clear that: (i) the houses in
the project were built by the developer; and (ii) in addition to the fact
that the developer had failed to ensure the stability of the housing
project site, complaints made to the developer by the residents and
requests for remedial action to be taken were ignored by the
developer, the learned counsel for the defendants submitted. Hence,
11
st
the 1 sting arising from the words complained of is taken away by
several other passages which does not give any meaning which is
capable of defaming the plaintiff, the learned counsel for the
defendants further submitted.
[34] In response to the learned counsel for the defendants’

submission, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that
whether the defendants made an honest mistake about the definition
of a developer could not be ascertained, because no evidence was led
in the trial. Further, there was no reported correction of the positive
statement that the plaintiff constructed the houses, the learned
counsel for the plaintiff submitted. With regard to the second footage
clarifying the facts, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted
that the viewers of the first footage may not have viewed the second
footage the following day.
[35] This Court is inclined to accept the submission of the learned

counsel for the plaintiff. Although several statements were reported
that the developer (pemaju) could be responsible for the complaints
of the house owners, this does not affect the opinion of the viewers
of the plaintiff as a professional architect. The reporting was not
distinctly clear that the plaintiff was not involved in the construction
of the houses. Further, it is very true that not all viewers of the first
footage would have viewed the second footage the following day.
What was reported in the second footage could not militate the
opinion formed by the viewers in the first footage against the
plaintiff, and it also could not correct the wrong perceptions of the
viewers of the first footage against the plaintiff. The last part of the
second footage saying the plaintiff did not respond to the news
reporting was the final nail in the coffin for the perception of the
viewers against the plaintiff.
[36] With regard to the 2 n d sting, the learned counsel for the
defendants conceded that those impugned statements in the second
12
footage are prima facie defamatory or capable of having a defamatory
meaning.
[37] Based on the above consideration, this Court is satisfied that

the plaintiff has proved his case, i.e. all the three elements of a
defamation action have been established - the statements are
defamatory, the statements were referring the plaintiff and they were
published.
Defences
[38] This Court, after being satisfied that the plaintiff has proved his
case, moved on to consider the defences raised by the defendants.
[39] The defendants raised two defences, namely, justification in the

defendants’ pleaded meaning and Reynolds public interest privilege.
Justification - Defendants’ pleaded meaning (The Lucas-Box

Defence)
[40] The thrust of the defendants’ argument is that the true facts are
that the houses were not fit for occupation; and that the plaintiff,
being the principal submitting person (PSP), submitted the CCC
dated 5.3.2014 in Form F pursuant to the Street, Drainage and
Building Act 1974 which replaced the old system and procedural
rules for the issuance of Certificate of Fitness for Occupation (CFO),
therefore, the plaintiff has to be responsible and accountable for his
act of issuing the CCC under the new procedural law. The learned
counsel for the defendants has submitted at length in regard to the
new regime of the issuance of CCC, and that based on this new regime
of procedural requirements of the issuance of CCC, the PSP must be
made accountable for his action when he decided to issue and submit
the CCC. On this score, the defamatory statements, particularly those
in the second footage, or the 2 n d sting, is indeed true and justified.
13
[41] In response to this first defence, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff submitted that the Lucas-Box defence was not pleaded. After
examining the defendants’ Statement of Defence, I find that the
Lucas-Box defence was indeed not pleaded. The decision of the
Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v. Tony Pua
Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, at pp. 209-210, states:
“...a defendant in defamation proceedings who wishes to rely on a plea

of justification must make clear in the particulars of justification the
case which he is seeking to set up and must accordingly state clearly and
explicitly the meaning which seeks to justify.”
[42] The defendants’ Statement of Defence did not offer an

alternative meaning for the impugned statements, as they are
understood to mean by the defendants. It is trite that parties are bound
by their pleadings and neither party should be caught by surprise with
the other party’s assertion. Relying on this established principle, this
Court has no option but to find that the defendants’ alleged meaning
imputed from the facts revealed as true could not be accepted (see
Perunding Alam Bina Sdn Bhd v. Errol Oh & Ors [1999] 6 MLJ 101).
For this reason alone the Lucas-Box defence must fail.
[43] This Court is of the considered view that the issue whether an
architect could be accountable for the issuance of the CCC under the
new regime of the procedural law in the event the construction of
houses suffer serious defects is not an issue to be tried in this present
case. The crux of this case is not about the extent of liability of an
architect in relation to the issuance of CCC. No clear evidence was
adduced before this Court on the said issue, and the said issue was
not fully ventilated during trial. The counsels are not to be blamed,
because it was not an issue agreed to be tried at the first place.
Perhaps, this intricate issue could be fully ventilated and adjudicated
in another appropriate case.
14
[44] Still on the defence of justification, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff brought to the attention of this Court that an interim
injunction was granted by this Court (by the previous judge) on
30.9.2015. In order to obtain an interim injunction in a defamation
case, the plaintiff must satisfy the court that the impugned statement
is untrue. Hence, the defendants could not rely on the defence of
justification in their defence now, the learned counsel for the plaintiff
submitted. The learned counsel for the plaintiff cited a Supreme
Court decision in The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v. Airasia
Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36, wherein it states:
“(1) There was no reason to depart from the general rule that an
interlocutory injunction will not be granted against a defendant in a
libel action if he intends to pled justification unless the plaintiff can
prove that the statement is untrue; (2) The plaintiff had not shown that
the defendant’s statement was untrue.”
[45] Based on the evidence before the Court, there are certain facts
reported by the defendants that are incorrect or inaccurate. In the
interest of justice and fairness, a defendant ought not to be precluded
from leading evidence in support of his defence of justification in the
trial as well as relying on the defence of justification in the
submission. The determination of an interim injunction is not the
final of determination of the case. Evidence will not been fully
adduced during the interlocutory stage. Therefore, a court can only
make a finding of fact after evidence has been led in a trial. It is only
then that a court can determine whether a fact is or is not true. This
Court is of the opinion that at the interlocutory stage, all the plaintiff
is required to prove is that there are elements of untrueness in an
impugned statement. In the course of the trial, the defendant will lead
evidence to defend the assertion that the statement is not ‘untrue’.
Having said that, in this instant case, as the Lucas-Box defence was
not pleaded, as explained above, therefore, this Court could not
consider this defence.
15
Reynolds Defence - Qualified Privilege
[46] This defence could only apply to “responsible journalism” (see

[2012] 7 MLJ 301). This defence, essentially, is a defence of
publication in the public interest. In order to rely on this defence,
there are guided steps, though not exhaustive, to be taken by a
defendant before publication is made.
Public Interest
[47] The learned counsel for the defendants submitted five reasons
why the defendants believed that the impugned reporting was of
public interest. However, these five reasons submitted are again not
pleaded in the Statement of Defence. For this reason, the
consideration of whether the reporting is or is not of public interest
ought not to be considered by this Court, and it follows that the
Reynold defence must fail. However, having said that, it is the
considered view of this Court that the impugned news reporting does
not carry any element of public interest. An issue is considered of
public interest if it affects the general public at large, especially if it
affects the public rights, health or finances. An issue said to be of
public interest must possess a common concern among the people in
the management of the welfare of the society by the state, local
authorities, public bodies and the government, or any institution is
authorised to carry out the duties, functions and responsibilities of a
state, local authorities, public bodies or the government. In short, an
issue that concern the public weal or that the public weal is at stake.
[48] In the instant case, the impugned news reporting concerns only
a specific group of persons, i.e. only those house owners in the
housing project. Matters concerning public interest must necessarily
affect across the breadth of the society as a whole. Housing projects
with defective houses is not something that would affect the public
16
at large, but only affect a small group of house buyers. There are
avenues provided by the local and federal government for house
owners to complain and seek remedies. These affected house owners
could also bring civil suits in court. Hence, the impugned news
reporting could not be characterized as being of public interest.
Pushing further the argument of public interest in the defendants’
defence, if the concern in the news reporting is to highlight what the
extent of the responsibility of an architect who issued the CCC is (as
argued in the Lucas-Box defence), though the issue would in
substance affect the general public rights, health and finances, such
reporting would be unfair to the plaintiff. This is because the plaintiff
would become the scapegoat for such argument before the courts of
law to have decided this point.
Steps Taken by the Defendants to Verify and Publish the Information
[49] For completeness, this Court will consider the submission of the
learned counsel for the defendants on the steps taken by the
defendants verifying the information and publishing the information
as fair and responsible. This Court has considered submission of the
learned counsel for the defendants, and found two out of ten items
listed by the learned counsel for the defendants in his submission
warrant a comment of this Court. They are (i) the steps taken to verify
the information; and (ii) whether the article contained the gist of the
plaintiff’s side of the story. These two items are interrelated to a
certain extent in relation to the actions taken by the 3 r d defendant.
[50] On 7.1.2015, the 3 r d defendant went to the plaintiff’s office for

purposes of verifying the information that he had gathered at the site
and wanted to obtain the plaintiff’s side of the story before publishing
his reporting. The 3 r d defendant visited the plaintiff’s office after
lunch hour. There was no appointment made before appearing at the
plaintiff’s premises. To this Court, it would be a surprise visit, and
it was hastily carried out by the 3 r d defendant and his camera crew.
17
rd
Upon arrival, the 3 defendant introduced himself and went into the
office. He told the staff (Hanis Nazurah Bte Abu Hassan - PW1) who
received him the purpose of his visit. He was then informed by the
staff that the person-in-charge was not in. The 3 r d defendant then left
his calling card with the staff and told the staff to pass his calling
card to the person-in-charge to call him. The 3 r d defendant and his
camera crew left the plaintiff’s office.
[51] The above event prompted the learned counsel for the
defendants in his submission to submit as follows:
“i) Despite the 3 r d defendant (SD1) leaving behind his contact details
as alluded to above for the Plaintiff Architect to call, no such call was
ever made by the Plaintiff Architect to the 3 r d Defendant (SD3) [sic]
even up to and after the time when the impugned bro adcasts were aired
on 17.01.2015 and 18.01.2015, some 12 days since wh en the contact
details were first left behind on 07.01.2015.”
“k) Had the Plaintiff Architect contacted the 3 r d Defendant (SD1), his
explanation, comments or answers in respect of the problems plaguing
the residents of the TBD housing project, or his response to the
comments of the En. Rahim, the Director of UPEN, could have been aired
as part of the impugned broadcast on 18.01.2015.”
“m) According to 3 r d Defendant, it was his practice to allow a

‘cooling-off period’ before proceeding with broadcasting so as to allow
time to any party whom he had not managed to interview but with whom
he had left his contact details for them to call ba ck [see Witness
Statement....].”
“n) It is hence submitted that adequate steps were indeed taken, which
were possible in the circumstances of that time, to obtain the Plaintiff’s
comments and to verify the information prior to its broadcasting albeit
they were never forthcoming.”
18
[52] This Court is of the considered view that the actions taken by
the 3 r d defendant were inadequate to satisfy ‘responsible journalism’.
Firstly, the 3 r d defendant did not make an appointment with the
plaintiff before he went to the plaintiff’s office. Being a professional
journalist, it would be more appropriate to arrange for a meeting with
the person concern before attending to the person’s premises,
especially a working place. The plaintiff is not an ordinary lay
person, but a professional architect. Secondly, leaving a calling card
at the plaintiff’s office could not be construed as the 3 r d defendant
has notified the plaintiff of his intention of the visit to the plaintiff’s
office. Thirdly, there was no obligation for the plaintiff to call the
3 r d defendant, because the real intention of the 3 r d defendant’s visit
was not properly related to the plaintiff. Fourthly, having a cooling
off period does not give the 3 r d defendant or other defendants the
carte blanche to report statements which could be defamatory in
nature. Fifthly, reporting something which in nature could affect a
person’s professional credibility is a serious matter. Therefore, it
would be unjust not to obtain a response from the person, unless it is
unnecessary or impracticable. In this instant case, the response of the
plaintiff could not be said unnecessary or impracticable (see Dato’
Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Sdn Bhd
& Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 492). Sixthly, the 3 r d defendant did not attempt
to follow-up to contact the plaintiff after his unscheduled appearance
at the plaintiff’s working place before the publication of the
impugned news reporting. Seventhly, not notifying the plaintiff of
the comment made by the director of UPEN before publication would
be unfair to the plaintiff. It is like springing a surprise ‘attack’ on the
plaintiff’s professional conduct without giving him a chance to
respond. Lastly, the news reporting did not make clear that the 3 r d
defendant’s visit to the plaintiff’s work place was an unscheduled
one. The manner in which the news reporting was reported was as if
the plaintiff did not want to respond to the defendants.
19
[53] With regards to the submissions of the learned counsel for the
defendants on the other steps taken by the defendants, this Court has
considered the reply submissions of the learned counsel for the
plaintiff. This court, after having considered both counsels’
submissions, is more inclined to accept the rebuttals raised by the
learned counsel for the plaintiffs in his reply submissions.
Malice
[54] With regard to the proving of malice on the part of the

defendants, both learned counsels for the respective parties have
correctly submitted that malice is no longer required to be considered
in the instant case, because the defendants’ conduct is built into the
ten factors (steps taken) under which the material is privilege in the
Reynolds defence (see Bonnick v. Morris [2003] 1 AC 200; Sivabalan
P Asapathy v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [2010] 7 CLJ
885).
Trespass
[55] With regard to the issue of trespass raised in the plaintiff’s

claim, this Court finds there was no trespass by the 3 r d defendant and
his camera crew into the plaintiff’s premises. They were invited into
the premises and did not enter by force. When they learned that the
person-in-charge (the plaintiff) was not in, they left. There was no
untoward incident in the plaintiff’s premises and the 3 r d defendant
and his camera crew were not stopped from entering into any part of
the plaintiff’s premises. With regard to the filming of the visit, it was
not done discreetly or with a hidden camera. Perhaps, it would have
be more professional if the 3 r d defendant had informed the staff that
the camera was in recording mode. This Court finds no civil wrong
has been committed by the 3 r d defendant and his camera crew.
Conclusion
20
[56] Based on the above reasoning, this Court allowed the plaintiff’s
claim. This court has, before awarding the damages to the plaintiff,
taken into consideration of the following factors:
i) The plaintiff is a professional architect of 10 years standing;
ii) He serves in the committee of the Malaysian Institute of Architects

(PAM) Southern Chapter;
iii) In his career, he had been appointed as a prof essional architect in

numerous mega projects in the State of Johore;
iv) The injur y caused to the plaintiff not only to his professional
career but also to his personal integrity, honesty and trustworthy
as a person;
v) The impugned news programme was aired at the primetime and

was uploaded at the 4 t h defendant’s website;
vi) The impugned news programme could have caused l oss of public
confidence in the plaintiff as a professional architect; and
vii) to the plaintiff among his friends, family members,

contemporaries, staff and other professionals in th e construction
industr y, particularly in the State of Johor.
[57] After having considered the above, the Court awards the
plaintiff as follows:
i) RM100,000.00 as damages for libel; other claims, such as damages

for trespass and/or invasion of privacy, aggravated damages and
exemplar y damages are not allowed;
ii) Interest at 5% per annum on the awarded sum calculated from

30.5.2017 until the date of full settlement;
21
iii) The prayer in paragraph 24(g) in the Statement of Claim is not
allowed;
iv) The pray ers in paragraph 24(h) and (i) in the State of Claim are
allowed; and
v) Costs of RM20,000.00 to be paid to the plaintiff by the defendants.
DATED: 5 JULY2017
(CHOO KAH SING)

Judicial Commissioner
High Court Johor Bahru
Counsel:
For the plaintiff - David Peter; M/s Jerald Gomez & Associates
For the defendants - Rueben Mathiavaranam; M/s Suflan TH Liew &

Partners
22
I
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA
(CIVIL JURISDICTION)
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: D-02(IM)-2015-12/2015]
BETWEEN
1. MAJLIS AMANAH RAKYAT
2. MUHAMAD ISMAIL
(No. KP 4212165) ... APPELLANTS
AND
MAT NAWI AWANG

(No. KP: 500915-03-5473) ... RESPONDENT
HEARD TOGETHER WITH
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: D-03(IM)-1-01/2016]
BETWEEN
MAT NAWI AWANG

(No. KP: 500915-03-5473) ... APPELLANT
AND
1. MAJLIS AMANAH RAKYAT
2. MUHAMAD BIN ISMAIL ... RESPONDENTS

(No. KP 4212165)
1
(Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kota Bharu
Dalam Negeri Kelantan Darul Naim, Malaysia
Guaman Sivil No: 22-41-2008
Antara
Mat Nawi Awang

(No. KP: 500915-03-5473) … Plaintif
Dan
1. Majlis Amanah Rakyat
2. Muhamad Ismail (No. KP 4212165)
3. Apandi Ali & Co.
4. Sukri Hasyim
(No. KP: 761124-03-5667) … Defendan-Defendan
Coram:
ABANG ISKANDAR ABANG HASHIM, JCA

ZAMANI A. RAHIM, JCA
ZALEHA YUSOF, JCA
JUDGMENT
[1] This is an appeal by the appellants vide Enclosure 105 against

the decision of the High Court at Kota Bharu made on 23.11.2015
wherein the learned Judicial Commissioner (JC) affirmed the award
given by the Deputy Registrar in an assessment of damages
proceedings. The respondent also filed a cross appeal vide
Enclosure 107 because the damages awarded to him were said to be
inadequate.
2
[2] The judgment against the appellants was a Judgment in Default

of Defence recorded before Justice Mohd Azman bin Husin on
1.12.2008.
[3] The facts giving rise to a claim for damages are narrated by the
learned JC in his judgment in Bahasa Malaysia at p.9 of Rekod
Rayuan Tambahan as follows:
“[6] Tuntutan Plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah berasaskan

kausa tindakan konspirasi atau komplot untuk
mencederakan Plaintif dan pakatan jahat atau pendakwaan
niat jahat oleh Defendan-Defendan terhadap Plaintif;
[7] Secara ringkasnya Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa

Defendan-Defendan secara salah telah menyebabkan
Plaintif diisytiharkan sebagai seorang bankrap pada
28.8.1999. Akibat daripada status kebangkrapan tersebut,
perniagaan Plaintif telah musnah sama sekali dan beberapa
hartanah Plaintif juga telah turut dilelong;
[8] Plaintif pada mulanya mendakwa tidak menyedari

akan tindakan kebangkrapan yang telah diambil oleh
Defendan-Defendan terhadapnya kerana tidak pernah
diserahkan dengan apa-apa perintah Mahkamah, Notis
Kebankrapan atau apa-apa Petisyen Pemiutang. Hanya
pada 29.7.2003 Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Cawangan
Kelantan telah memanggil Plaintif untuk menghadiri
mesyuarat pemiutang kali pertama dan barulah Plaintif
telah sedar akan tindakan yang curang dan berniat jahat
telah dilakukan Defendan-Defendan yang telah secara
salah menyebabkan Plaintif diisytiharkan bankrap;
[9] Pada 10.7.2004 Plaintif telah membuat satu laporan

polis memohon siasatan dijalankan pihak polis terhadap
3
keseluruhan transaksi dan prosiding kebankrapan

terhadapnya kerana mengesyaki wujudnya penipuan,
konspirasi dan pendakwaan niat jahat (malicious
prosecution) telah dilakukan Defendan-Defendan terhadap
Plaintif;
[10] Setelah siasatan polis dimulakan, Defendan Pertama

dengan rela hati telah memfailkan satu Saman Dalam
Kamar bertarikh 28.11.2004 untuk membatalkan Perintah
Penerimaan dan Penghukuman (AO/RO) terhadap Plaintif
dan membebaskan Plaintif daripada belenggu kebankrapan
yang telah dibawa secara salah terhadapnya selama lebih
dari 5 tahun;
[11] Plaintif oleh itu telah memfailkan tindakan terhadap

Defendan-Defendan pada sekitar tahun 2007. Pada
1.12.2008 Plaintif telah memperolehi Penghakiman Ingkar
terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Kedua untuk perintah-
perintah antara lainnya seperti berikut:
a) Deklarasi bahawa tindakan kebankrapan, Petisyen

Pemiutang dan juga Perintah Penerimaan dan
Penghukuman (AO/RO) terhadap Plaintif adalah
tidak sah dan terbatal;
b) Gantirugi-gantirugi berikut untuk ditaksirkan:
i) Gantirugi Kehilangan Pendapatan Perniagaan;
ii) Gantirugi Kecederaan Reputasi dan Perniagaan;
iii) Gantirugi Khas;
iv) Gantirugi Teladan;
v) Gantirugi Teruk (Aggravated)
4
vi) Faedah dan Kos.
[4] The assessment of damages proceedings was heard before the

Deputy Registrar and the award in favour of the respondent was given
on 25.6.2015.
[5] Dissatisfied with the award made by the Deputy Registrar, the
appellants filed an appeal to the Judge in Chambers who, on
23.11.2015, affirmed the order of the Deputy Registrar. The
appellants were ordered to pay the respondent as follows:
a) General damages for loss of profit in the sum of

RM3,627,360.00;
b) Injury to reputation and business in the sum of

RM50,000.00;
c) Exemplary damages in the sum of RM20,000.00;
d) Aggravated damages in the sum of RM20,000.00;
e) Interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the whole amount

of RM3,627,360.00 from the date of judgment until full
settlement; and
f) Costs of proceedings of assessment of damages.
[6] Dissatisfied with the award of the High Court, the appellant
filed an appeal in part to this court regarding his loss of profit in the
sum of RM3,627,360.00 and payment of 8% interest on the total
amount of RM3,627,360.00 from the date of filing the Writ of
Summons on 17.3.2008 until full settlement.
[7] As the judgment against the appellants was a Judgment in

Default of Defence, it, therefore, follows that all the averments in the
cause of action are merged in the judgment until it is set aside. The
5
damages should therefore be assessed on the basis of the pleadings

contained in the amended statement of claim: see Kamaruzaman bin
Omar & Ors v Yakub bin Husin & Ors [2014] 1 CLJ 987.
[8] To prove his loss of profit, the respondent pleaded the “Kertas
Kerja”, exhibit P2 in his amended statement of claim. In his
application for a bank loan facility, the respondent had submitted the
“Kertas Kerja”, exhibit P2 to the 1 st appellant. Initially the 1 st
appellant approved a loan of RM100,000.00 to the respondent and
subsequently agreed to increase the amount to RM150,000.00, thereby
making a total amount of RM250,000.00. According to the
respondent, during 6 months of his bankruptcy, an estimated net profit
stated in exhibit P2 was RM302,280.00: see Bank Bumiputra Malaysia
Bhd, Kuala Terengganu v. Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Anor [1993] 2
CLJ 495. Counsel for the respondent argued that the amount awarded
for loss of profit in the sum of RM3,627,360.00 was reasonable.
[9] Learned counsel for the appellants argued that exhibit P2 was
merely “Kertas Cadangan” prepared by the respondent’s friend and it
was hearsay and inadmissible as the friend was not called to testify.
At any rate, exhibit P2 is only an estimation which is nothing more
than a mere speculation, conjecture and projection which is not a
sufficient basis to prove loss of profits. The respondent had failed to
prove the actual loss as no audited accounts had been tendered to
support the claim. There was no supporting evidence to show how the
figures in the said projection in exhibit P2 were arrived at. There was
also no evidence shown as to the prospect of achieving the future
projected income: see Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd v. Sophisticated
Pipe Industry Production Sdn Bhd [2011] 9 CLJ 748.
[10] The appellants also relied on the authority of Sime UEP

Properties Bhd v. Woon Yoke Lin [2002] 3 CLJ 719 where this court
observed that:
6
“…in order to succeed in claims for damages for loss of

profit one must establish the actual losses one would have
suffered as a result of the breach. A projection as in this
case is not sufficient to establish the would be losses of
profit. A venture into a business would not necessarily
mean that one can make a profit out of it because there are
instances where people suffer losses. Not all business end-
up with a profit. It is clear to us that the respondent failed
to establish the expected losses as a result of the
breach…”
[11] The appellants also disputed the estimation for every 6 months
as stated in P2 for a period of 6 years from the year 1999 to the year
2005 (see Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2, Bahagian C) which amounted to
RM50,380.00 per month. Yet with this so-called profit, learned
counsel for the appellants argued that the respondent could not afford
to settle his loan to the 1 st appellant in the sum of RM96,057.05.
Going by his profit margin (if true), the respondent should have been
able to fully settle the loan with the 1 st appellant within 2 to 3 months
before the legal action was instituted against him.
[12] In his written submission, learned counsel for the appellants also
argued that the learned JC had erred inter alia:
“…apabila gagal untuk melihat kepada data Akaun

Untung Rugi Responden bagi jangkamasa 6 bulan yang
berakhir 30.1.1994 yang mencatatkan jumlah Untung
Bersih sebanyak RM22,150.00 (yang didakwa oleh
Responden sebagai Untung Bersih sebenar) sebagai
asas/basis pengiraan bagi kehilangan pendapatan
Responden sekiranya benar iaitu sebanyak RM22,150.00
(untuk tempoh 6 bulan) x 2 x 6 tahun = RM265,800.00.
Tiada sebarang bukti dokumen juga yang telah
7
dikemukakan oleh Responden bagi menunjukkan bahawa

beliau telah membayar cukai pendapatan kepada Lembaga
Hasil Dalam Negeri bagi jumlah keuntungan sebanyak
RM265,800.00 sebagaimana yang didakwa telah
diperolehinya tersebut (see Appeal Record, Jilid 2,
Bahagian C)”.
[13] By merely relying on exhibit P2 which is purely a mere

estimation, speculation and assumption without proof of actual loss it
would indeed be unsafe to allow the respondent’s claim of
RM3,627,360.00. As the respondent could not prove his loss of earning
as required by law, he was therefore entitled to nominal damages only.
[14] As regards the rate of interest at 8% per annum from the date of
filing the Writ of Summons on 17.3.2008 to date of full settlement
was contrary to Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012. The
proper interest should be at 5% per annum from date of judgment to
date of full settlement.
[15] The order of interest in the assessment of damages was premised

on the Judgment in Default of Defence recorded on 1.12.2008.
Therefore Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 is inapplicable
as the Rules are enforceable on 1.8.2012 (except for Order 91): see
also Chief Justice Practice Direction Bil 1 Tahun 2012.
[16] It is a well-established principle that a court in assessing the

quantum of damages to be awarded exercises a discretionary
jurisdiction. It is mainly a matter of opinion or of impression that
differences of calculation or assessment are to be expected. The
quantification of damages cannot be assessed with precision or
mathematical certainty.
[17] The bone of contention between the appellants and respondent

was loss of profit as shown in exhibit P2. We are not prepared to hold
8
that exhibit P2 is a hearsay documentary evidence and thus,

inadmissible. The exhibit P2 was prepared by the respondent with the
aid of his friend. The respondent was the maker of exhibit P2 and was
therefore admissible. Though admissible, exhibit P2 does not
represent the actual profit of the respondent’s business. The exhibit
P2 was prepared by the respondent to support his bank loan
application which he submitted to the appellants. The projected profit
in exhibit P2 was said to be viable. Under the circumstances, it is
reasonable to infer that the profit margin in exhibit P2 has been
inflated for the purposes of supporting his bank loan application.
Furthermore, exhibit P2 was prepared by the respondent who was an
untrained financier and appraiser. As such P2 is unlike the project
papers and feasibility study in exhibit D20 in the Mae Perkayuan Sdn
Bhd & Anor, supra where exhibit D20 was prepared by Mohd Anuar &
Co, who were financial and land consultants, housing developers and
first class appraisers. These papers in exhibit D20, gave the details of
the works to be carried out for purposes of the project, including
construction costs, management costs, consultant’s fees, legal fees,
contractors profits etc.
[18] We, however, were inclined to agree with the submission for the
appellants as alluded to in paragraph 15 above that the actual loss of
profit by the respondent is RM22,150.00 (for a period of 6 months).
Thus, the actual loss suffered by the respondent is RM22,150.00 x 2 x
6 = RM265,800.00.
[19] There are 3 other heads of damages claimed by the respondent,

namely (a) injury to reputation and business, (b) exemplary damages
and (c) aggravated damages.
[20] The respondent had given evidence in the assessment of

damages proceedings. The respondent is a successful bumiputra
9
entrepreneur in the “pembinaan badan lori” for over 23 years, the

details of which are as follows:
1) Worked as a mechanic of Rahman Workshop from 1969 to

1971 (about 3 years);
2) Operated a workshop from 1972 to 1977 (about 6 years);
3) A transportation agent of motor lorries from 1978 and

1982 (about 5 years);
4) Attended courses pertaining to the construction of bodies

of motor lorries at Kuala Lumpur from 1983 to 1985
(about 3 years); and
5) Operated a workshop for the construction, repairs and

modification of bodies of motor lorries from 1986 to 1991
(about 6 years).
[21] The respondent’s bankruptcy status was published and circulated

in the media or public documents, namely, exhibits P11, P12, P13,
P15, P16, P17, P18, P19, P20, P27, P28 and P29. The respondent’s
standing was badly tainted and tarnished for being adjudged a
bankrupt. The Defamation Act 1957 viewed defamation against a
man’s profession or business as very serious, which requires no proof
of special damage: see Section 5. In the case of Dato’ Paduka Husam
Musa v. Norzula Mat Diah & 2 Ors [2014] 1 LNS 1411, the award
allowed was RM350,000.00.
[22] The respondent prayed for an award of RM500,000.00 for loss

of reputation and business.
[23] Secondly, the principles for an award of exemplary damages are

demonstrated in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 and Cassell & Co
Ltd v Broome [1972] 1 ALL ER 801. In the present suit, the
10
appellants’ action and conduct against the respondent was very

oppressive, outrageous and appalling. Their action was unlawful and
invalid.
[24] Under this head (exemplary damages), the respondent prayed for
an award of RM500,000.00.
[25] Thirdly, the award for aggravated damages has been succinctly
stated in Gatley on Libel & Slander, 11 th Edition Sweet & Maxwell at
pp 282 and 283. There are two situations to assess aggravated
damages, namely:
1) The manner of committing the wrong may be such as to

injure the plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity and pride;
and
2) The conduct calculated to deter the claimant (i.e.

respondent) from pursuing, continuing and persisting the
claim by way of a prolonged or hostile cross-examination
of the claimant (i.e. respondent).
[26] In brief, the conduct of the appellants, commencing from the

filing of bankruptcy proceedings, despite the respondent was a
borrower-cum-chargor (i.e. secured borrower), a bankruptcy notice
dated 15.7.1998 containing a false additional amount of RM50,000.00
which was calculated to result in profit to the appellants: see per Lord
Devlin in Rookes, supra. The fact that the respondent was said to
surrender himself was false, the filing of creditors petition without
disclosing that the respondent was also a chargor and instead the 2 nd
appellant who was a “Pengarah” of the 1 st appellant sworn a false
affidavit on 6.12.1998 which was filed in the High Court alleging that
no security was charged to the appellants, caused the RO/AO to be
recorded against the respondent, the filing of proof of debt to the
Insolvency Department, the advertisement and gazette by the
11
Insolvency Department and later annulled and notified the

respondent’s status as a bankrupt to all relevant agencies, to mention
a few such as the respondent status as a bankrupt was gazetted and
advertised in The New Straits Times, exhibit P27, publication of
CTOS report, exhibit P28, publication proof of debt dated 19.8.2004,
exhibit P15, minutes of the creditors meeting dated 29.7.2003, exhibit
P13, publication of the letters of Insolvency Department dated
16.2.2005 to various agencies such as the Bank Managers, CTOS,
Persatuan Syarikat-Syarikat Kewangan Malaysia, Kelantan Credit
Management, Telecom Malaysia, Tabung Haji and Amanah Saham
Berhad etc, exhibits P20 and P20A.
[27] The RO/AO against the respondent were rescinded and annulled,
exhibit P19 when the police stepped in to conduct criminal
investigation based on a police report lodged by the respondent
alleging deceit, conspiracy and malicious prosecution by the
appellants. All the actions and conduct of the appellants had caused
exemplary, aggravated damages and injury to the respondent’s
reputation. They provided ample basis for exemplary and aggravated
damages to be awarded to the respondent.
[28] Further, there had been continuous conduct of unabated appeals

by the appellants against the Judgment in Default of Defence which
was obtained on 1.12.2008. Dissatisfied with the said Judgment, the
appellants had filed an appeal to this court vide Civil Appeal No. D-
01-7-2009, but it was dismissed on 12.7.2010. No appeal was filed to
the Federal Court. However, the appellants were still unhappy and
filed an Originating Summons No. 24-329-2010 to set aside the
Judgment in Default of Defence entered on 1.12.2008. The
Originating Summons, however, was ordered by Justice Azman bin
Abdullah to be dismissed on 4.4.2011. Again, dissatisfied with the
order dated 4.4.2011, the appellants had filed the appeal to this court
vide Civil Appeal No. D-01-275-2011. This court dismissed the
12
appellants’ appeal on 14.2.2013. The above indignant attitude shows

the persistent and unrelenting behaviour of the appellants towards the
respondent.
[29] As regard to quantum, the respondent relied on the case of

Suzana Md Aris v. DSP Ishak Hussain & Ors [2011] 1 CLJ 226 where
the sum of RM500,000.00 was awarded for aggravated damages.
[30] The respondent also prayed for a similar award of

RM500,000.00 as aggravated damages.
[31] The appellants replied that the amounts of RM50,000.00 for loss
of reputation and business, RM20,000.00 for exemplary damages and
RM20,000.00 for aggravated damages, making a total of RM90,000.00
awarded by the Deputy Registrar was sufficient and reasonable. The
appellants did not advance any appeal on the aforesaid heads of
damages.
[32] Having perused the Rekod Rayuan and heard the submissions of
both parties, we agreed with learned counsel for the appellants that
the actual loss of profit by the respondent was RM22,150.00 (for a
period of 6 months in a year). We therefore, allowed the appellants’
appeal in part, that is, the loss of profit of the respondent be varied to
a formula of RM22,150.00 x 2 x 6 = RM265,800.00. We set aside the
amount of RM3,627,360.00 awarded by the Deputy Registrar whose
award was affirmed by the learned JC.
[33] We do not agree with the amount of damages suggested by

learned counsel for the respondent in respect of injury to reputation,
exemplary and aggravated damages. They are excessive. On the other
hand, the awards of damages given by the learned JC are insufficient
in the circumstances of this case and require our intervention. We,
therefore, allow the cross appeal by the respondent on the following
heads of damages:
13
a) Injury to reputation in the sum of RM50,000.00 is

enhanced to RM100,000.00;
b) Exemplary damages in the sum of RM20,000.00 is

enhanced to RM50,000.00; and
c) Aggravated damages in the sum of RM20,000.00 is

enhanced to RM50,000.00.
[34] We had also ordered each party to bear their own costs in
respect of this appeal. The deposit is to be refunded.
Date: 11 NOVEMBER 2016
(ZAMANI A. RAHIM)
Judge
Court of Appeal
Malaysia
Counsel:
For the appellants - Zakiah Mohammed, Nurhayati Juha & Nor Akmar
Shamsuddin; M/s Akmar & Co
B3A-3, 3 rd Floor,
Block B, Dataran Palma,
Jalan Selaman 1,
Off Jalan Ampang,
68000 Ampang,
Selangor Darul Ehsan
For the respondent - Yusfarizal Yussoff, Wan Rohimi Wan Daud &
Mohd Faizi, Che Abu; M/s Tengku Amalin’ A-Ishah, Putri, Faizi &
Wan Rohimi
17-04-02 Block A,
Jalan Semarak Api 1,
Diamond Square,
Off Jalan Gombak,
53000 Kuala Lumpur
14
Kamaruzaman bin Omar & Ors v. Yakub bin Husin & Ors [2014] 1
CLJ 987
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd, Kuala Terengganu v. Mae Perkayuan

Sdn Bhd & Anor [1993] 2 CLJ 495
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd v. Sophisticated Pipe Industry

Production Sdn Bhd [2011] 9 CLJ 748
Sime UEP Properties Bhd v. Woon Yoke Lin [2002] 3 CLJ 719
Dato’ Paduka Husam Musa v. Norzula Mat Diah & 2 Ors [2014] 1
LNS 1411
Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129
Cassell & Co Ltd v. Broome [1972] 1 ALL ER 801
Suzana Md Aris v. DSP Ishak Hussain & Ors [2011] 1 CLJ 226
Defamation Act 1957, s. 5
Rules of Court 2012, O. 42 r. 12
Others referred to:
Gatley on Libel & Slander, 11 th Edition Sweet & Maxwell at pp 282

and 283
15
J
DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI MALAYSIA

(BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)
[RAYUAN SIVIL NO: D-02(NCVC)(W)-349-02/2016]
ANTARA
ABU HASSAN HASBULLAH

(NO. K/P: 670802-03-5073) ... PERAYU
DAN
ZUKERI IBRAHIM
(NO. K/P: 720506-03-5741 ... RESPONDEN
[Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Kota Bharu, Kelantan
Guaman No. 23NCVC-1-01/2015)
ANTARA
ABU HASSAN BIN HASBULLAH

(NO. K/P: 670802-03-5073) ... PLAINTIF
DAN
ZUKERI BIN IBRAHIM

(NO. K/P: 720506-03-5741 ... DEFENDAN
CORAM:
HAMID SULTAN ABU BACKER, JCA

ABDUL KARIM ABDUL JALIL, JCA
ASMABI MOHAMAD, JCA
(Asmabi Binti Mohamad JCA, delivering Judgment of the Court)
1
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an appeal arising from the decision of the learned Judge of
the High Court at Kota Bharu dated 24 th January 2016 which dismissed the
Appellant’s claim for defamation with costs of RM10,000.00.
[2] After having perused the appeal records, the written submissions of
the respective parties as well as hearing the oral arguments on the issues
raised, we allowed the appeal with costs of RM20,000.00 herein and below.
We also ordered damages in the sum of RM70,000.00 to the Appellant.
[3] Our reasons for doing so now follow.
[4] For ease of reference the parties will be referred to as they were
described in the High Court.
BRIEF BACKGROUND FACTS
[5] The Plaintiff, Abu Hassan bin Hasbullah was at all material times a
senior academician/lecturer and political analyst and also the Dean of the
Faculty of Creative Technology and Heritage (“FTKW”) at the University
Malaysia Kelantan (“UMK”). The Plaintiff was the superior of the
Defendant in FTKW.
[6] The Defendant, Zukeri bin Ibrahim was at all material times a
lecturer on probation in FTKW.
[7] The Plaintiff had commenced an action against the Defendant for the
tort of defamation. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant had authored
two (2) offensive emails dated 29 th October 2014 and 30 th October 2014
respectively (“the impugned emails”) (see pages 841-844, Part B of
Appeal Record (“AR”)) and caused the same to be published via the
Defendant’s UMK email address ie, zukeri@umk.edu.my to various groups
of people namely:
2
(a) All academic staff of FTWK at the email address of

academic.ftkw@groups.umk.edu.my;
(b) All administrators of FTKW at email address of

admin.ftkw@groups.umk.edu.my; and
(c) The FTKW at email address at ftkw@groups.umk.edu.my.
[8] The Plaintiff contended that the words in the impugned emails as
underlined, in their natural and ordinary meaning, were defamatory of the
Plaintiff and in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were
understood to mean as described in paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim
(see pages 36-38 of Part A, Volume 1 of AR).
[9] These impugned emails were calculated to disparage the Plaintiff and
were issued with malicious intent and published and circulated to the
above-stated groups.
[10] As a consequence of the publication of these impugned emails which

was likely to be circulated and read by the recipients of the above-stated
addresses, the Plaintiff suffered distress and embarrassment and his
personal reputation and that of his office have been adversely affected and
had caused him to be despised and injured and brought into public scandal,
odium and contempt.
[11] Between 28 th October 2014 to 31 st October 2014, the Defendant too

had sent various text messages from his mobile phone to the Plaintiff, inter
alia threatening to have the Plaintiff sent to jail and falsely accusing the
Plaintiff of cheating on his grading.
[12] The Plaintiff had also come to know on 4 th November 2014, a group
of lecturers and students from his faculty had assembled and signed a
memorandum demanding for his removal as the Dean of the FTKW.
[13] Subsequent to the said impugned emails and text messages, there had
been a barrage of articles, news, reports, statements posted almost daily
3
since 5 th November 2014 on online news portal Suara TV stating that Suara
TV had been informed by an individual who is a lecturer in UMK that the
Plaintiff had committed fraud, that a police report had been lodged against
him in Bachok Police Station, Kelantan on 1 st November 2014 and yet no
steps were taken against the Plaintiff.
[14] Vide the Plaintiff’s solicitors letter dated 20 th November 2014, the
Plaintiff demanded the Defendant to withdraw and / or retract the two
impugned emails, render an apology to the Plaintiff as well as to give an
undertaking that he would not repeat similar publication of defamatory
statements concerning the Plaintiff to the public at large. The Plaintiff had
also demanded that the Defendant ceases to cause any further threats and
harassments to the Plaintiff.
[15] The Plaintiff then commenced this Suit seeking for, amongst others,
injunctive relief, damages for defamation, interest and costs.
[16] In response to the Plaintiff’s claim, the Defendant pleaded the

defence of justification. He also claimed that the impugned emails were
“fair comments” on matters of “public interest” to UMK, FTKW and all its
students. The Defendant had also relied on the defence of “qualified
privilege” stating that the impugned emails were a proposal to resolve
pending problems and to raise matters concerning the administration and
management of FTKW. The impugned emails too were to highlight
wrongdoings of the Plaintiffs in FTKW specifically and UMK generally.
[17] The case proceeded by way of a full trial with three witnesses for the
Plaintiff and four witnesses for the Defendant having testified. After
perusing the respective submissions filed therein and having heard oral
arguments of both parties, the learned Judge accepted the Defendant’s
defences and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with costs.
[18] Aggrieved by the said decision, the Plaintiff then appealed to this
Court against the whole decision.
4
THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT
[19] The findings of the learned Judge were as follows:
(a) The issue on plagiarism is successfully justified by the

Defendant as it was proved that the Plaintiff’s PHD Thesis
entitled “Film As A Lens of Cultural Identity: A Critical
Analysis on Malaysia Film” was copied exactly from the
writing of Viola Shafiq from the book of “Arab Cinema”.
(b) Although the Plaintiff’s thesis was not 100% copied, there
were certain parts that were copied and the references and / or
sources of which were not stated and / or quoted.
(c) The Defendant was justified in making the remarks that the
Plaintiff had created on his own, a University known as
“University Manggis”, in order to give the impression certain
insertions or materials he fabricated and / or cooked up in his
thesis were actually sourced from credible and influential
academic references.
(d) The Defendant was the Accreditation Officer at the Quality

Management Centre of UMK and was responsible to review the
courses in FTKW to determine whether those courses were in
accordance with the requirement set by the Malaysian
Accreditation Agency (“MQA”).
(e) On the issue of courses offered without approval of MQA, the

Defendant has successfully raised the defence of fair comments
and qualified privilege as the “Laporan Audit Komprehensif
FTKW” disclosed that eight programmes offered by the
Faculty were without MQA’s approval. Those programs were
offered without qualified lecturers in the specified areas. There
were also issues pertaining to inadequacy of lecture halls and
5
clashes with the schedule of classes, which eventually led to

the scraping of those courses.
(f) The Defendant was also justified in making remarks on other

issues such as mismanagement of finance of FTKW and
inaccuracy in reporting of meeting outcomes.
(g) The defamatory remarks were true, which were disclosed only
upon the investigation conducted by the Defendant personally.
(h) The Defendant had raised the defence of qualified privilege

since those issues involved academic staffs and the students of
UMK and is part of the job function of the Defendant as the
Accreditation Officer at the Quality Management Centre of
UMK.
(i) The Defendant had successfully raised the defence of fair

comment and qualified privilege, and the reporting by the
Defendant was based on true facts and not tainted by bad faith.
OUR DECISION
The law
[20] We were mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation
to findings of facts made by the court of first instance.
[21] In the course of that, we had sought guidance from the very often
quoted case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng v. Gan Yook Chin [2003] 2
MLJ 97 where the Court of Appeal held as follows:
“an appellate court will not, generally speaking, intervene

unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving
at its decision. But appellate interference will take place in
cases where there has been no or insufficient judicial
appreciation of the evidence.”
6
[22] Reference is also made to the decision of the Federal Court in Gan
Yook Chin v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng [2004] 4 CLJ 309 where the
Federal Court held that the test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of
evidence” adopted by the Court of Appeal was in relation to the process of
determining whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or
findings correctly on the basis of the relevant law and the established
evidence.
[23] In the above case, the Federal Court had also stated, the Court
hearing the appeal is entitled to reverse the decision of the trial judge after
making its own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses and of its own
view of the probabilities of the case. It is also entitled to examine the
process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court and reverse the
decision if it is wrong.
[24] At the end of the case, the trial judge has a duty to explain how the
said court had come to its findings and /or how it appraised the evidence
and issues which will determine the outcome of the case before it. In doing
so the Judge need not explain or identify every factor that he had
considered. If the learned Judge failed to do so, his decision can be set
aside (see English v. Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd, DJ & C Whithers
(Farms) Ltd v. Ambic Equipment Ltd, Verrechia (trading as Freightmaster
Commercials) v. Commissioner of Police Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ
605, [2002] 3 ER 385).
[25] The appellate court must be slow to interfere with the findings made
by the trial court unless if it can be shown there was no judicial
appreciation of the evidence adduced before it (see Hamit Matusin & Ors
v. Penguasa Tanah dan Survey & Anor Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 251; Tay
Kheng Hong v. Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87).
The Appeal Before Us
7
[26] We have fine-tooth combed the Grounds of Judgment (“GoJ”) and

found the following.
[27] The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendant was premised on the tort
of defamation. The Plaintiff had pleaded that the Defendant had caused to
be published the impugned emails as in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2
attached to the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim (“SOC”) made on 29 th
October 2014 and 30 th October 2014 respectively. In Appendix 1 there
were 150 plus 8 defamatory statements having been made (see pages 82
to100 of Volume 1 of AR). Whilst in Appendix 2, another 155 plus 8
defamatory statements were made (see pages 101 to 124 of Volume 1 of
AR).
[28] According to the Plaintiff the words underlined in the impugned

emails, in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood
to mean the meanings as described by the Plaintiff in paragraph 9 of his
SOC (see pages 61 to 62 of Volume 1 AR). These words according to the
Plaintiff, were calculated to disparage the Plaintiff and were issued with
malice intent and published and circulated.
[29] Despite the magnitude of the complaints made against the Defendant
as evidenced in the impugned emails, the learned Judge had reduced the
complaints to only two issues, the non-existence of “University Manggis”
which was quoted in the Plaintiff’s thesis and the unaccredited programmes
offered by UMK. The rest of the complaints had been disregarded.
[30] The learned Judge had also made a finding that there was plagiarism
in the Plaintiff’s thesis despite the fact that the impugned emails made no
reference to the complaint of plagiarism. The learned Judge had even
proceeded to make a finding that the Defendant could rely on the defence
of justification and qualified privilege when the complaints of the Plaintiff
in the impugned emails did not touch the topic of plagiarism.
[31] At paragraph 20 of the GoJ, the learned Judge stated as follows:
8
“Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Defendan bahawa

segala tulisan di dalam email beliau adalah benar dan bukannya
fitnah berdasarkan penyiasatan beliau ke atas apa yang dialami oleh
pensyarah-pensyarah dan pelajar Universiti Malaysia Kelantan dan
pembelaan oleh Defendan adalah pembelaan justifikasi. Selanjutnya,
Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan bahawa
keterangan Defendan bahawa tulisan email itu telah dibuat
berdasarkan dan merangkuni ulasan saksama mengenai Plaintiff
sebagai Dekan yang mewakili Fakulti Teknologi Kreatif dan Warisan
(FTKW) di Universiti Malaya Kelantan, pendidik, Ahli Majlis
Professor Negara dan penganalisis politik yang terkenal. Plaintif
sepatutnya sebagai seorang dekan, ahli akademik ataupun pensyarah
kanan dan penganalisis politik yang terkenal harus mengetahui
bahawa segala tindakannya diperhati oleh masyarakat awam.”
(emphasis added)
[32] As can be seen from the above-quoted paragraph 20 of the GoJ the
learned Judge made a finding that the words as underlined in the impugned
emails were true. However, at paragraph 14, 15 and 16 of the GoJ, the
learned Judge focused on the issue of plagiarism, at paragraph 17, on the
issue surrounding the Plaintiff’s reference to materials from a non-existent
university known as University Manggis in his thesis and at paragraph 18
on the non-accredited courses. There was no mention of the rest of the over
200 defamatory statements as underlined in the impugned emails.
[33] We were of the view that in arriving at his determination, the learned
Judge did not address the facts in totality and / or make a finding if those
underlined words were defamatory of the Plaintiff based on the Plaintiff’s
pleaded case and the evidence of the witnesses before him.
[34] Upon our perusal of the records of appeal, we found that the learned
Judge did not apply settled principles of law and did not address the three
stages that must be satisfied before resolving whether there is defamation
and whether the defences apply.
9
[35] Despite there is a plethora of cases to guide the learned Judge on how
to resolve the issues before His Lordship when faced with cases of this
nature, the learned Judge went on a frolic of his own and took a very
simplistic approach to resolve the issues before him.
[36] In a defamation case, the learned Judge has a duty to rule on the three
essential ingredients of the tort of defamation before he proceeds to decide
on the defences pleaded by the Defendant in his Defence. Firstly, the
learned Judge ought to determine if the impugned emails were capable of
bearing the defamatory meaning as ascribed in paragraph 9 of the SOC.
Secondly the learned Judge ought to examine if the impugned emails
referred to the Plaintiff. Lastly the learned Judge ought to have resolved if
the impugned emails were published to a third person.
(see Ayob Saudi v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989]1 CLJ (Rep) 321)

Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 31 MLJ; Kian
Lup Construction v. Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ
32 ; Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad
& Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56; Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman
Ya’kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 399; Irene Fernandez v. Utusan
Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ 814).
[37] We could not detect anywhere in the GoJ this task was undertaken
by the learned Judge in the case before His Lordship, especially with
respect to whether the words as underlined in the impugned emails were
capable of bearing the defamatory meaning as ascribed in paragraph 9 of
the SOC and whether there was publication. Despite a sum of 158 and 163
defamatory statements respectively having been made in the impugned
emails, the learned Judge had not made any ruling on these statements. The
learned Judge was selective and had ruled only on the three issues as
highlighted above, one of which was not even the subject matter of the
Plaintiff’s complaint in the SOC.
10
[38] We also observed the learned Judge did not address the third
ingredient of the tort of defamation, the publication of the impugned emails
to a third Party as required of him in resolving cases premised on the tort
of defamation.
[39] We are of the view that in a case of this nature, the learned Judge
ought to have evaluated the evidence before His Lordship and make a
finding on each and every ingredient of the tort of defamation before going
to the defences. Our view is supported by the case of Chok Foo Choo v.
The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461which states as follows:
“In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in the

question: do the words published in their natural meaning
impute to the Plaintiff any dishonourable or discredible
conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the
question invites affirmative response, then the words
complained of are defamatory.”
[40] At paragraph 25 under “Isu: adakah samada pernyataan tersebut

telah disiarkan kepada pihak ketiga” the learned Judge stated as follows:
“[25] Mahkamah mendapati adalah jelas daripada keterangan

yang dikemukakan elemen yang pernyataan-pernyataan
berkenaan telah dihantar dan disiarkan kepada pihak ketiga
adalah tidak dipertikaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak. Di dalam kes
ini, pernyataan-pernyataan melalui email tersebut telah
dihantar kepada pihak ketiga yang lain sepertimana diplidkan
di dalam pernyataan tuntutan Plaintiff. Sama seperti isu kedua,
perkara ini juga tidak diperhalusi dan dibincangkan secara
terperinci di dalam penghakiman ini memandangkan elemen
pertama telah gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak Plaintiff.” (emphasis
added)
11
[41] From the above paragraph, it would appear that the learned judge
was not satisfied that the Plaintiff had proven the first ingredient of the tort
of defamation. However, upon perusal of the GoJ, we found that the
learned Judge proceeded to make a ruling that the Defendant had
successfully raised the defences of justification, qualified privilege and fair
comment. If the learned Judge was of the opinion the first element of the
tort of defamation had not been proven, the learned Judge ought to have
dismissed the Plaintiff’s case as the Plaintiff had failed to prove his case
on the balance of probabilities and ought not to have made a finding that
the Defendant had successfully raised the defences as pleaded in his
Defence. The learned Judge seemed to be confused on the manner the case
before him ought to be resolved. Further, how could the learned Judge say
“Sama seperti isu kedua, perkara ini juga tidak diperhalusi dan
dibincangkan secara terperinci di dalam penghakiman ini memandangkan
elemen pertama telah gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak Plaintiff.” when the
learned Judge did not decide if the 158 and 163 underlined words
respectively in the impugned emails, with the exception of the two we
mentioned above, were defamatory of the Plaintiff and were calculated to
expose the Plaintiff to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the minds of
reasonable man or whether these words tend to lower the Plaintiff in the
estimation of right thinking members of society generally.
[42] The learned Judge erred in deciding in the manner he did, as the
Plaintiff need not prove that the defamatory words were false in order to
prove his case as the law presumes that the defamatory words were false
(see Miles v. Logan (1851) 1 Ky 80 (Civ); Abdul Rahman Talib v.
Seenivasagam & Anor [supra]).
[43] The Plaintiff only needs to prove the publication of the impugned
emails. “It is not part of the plaintiff’s case in an action of defamation to
prove that the defamatory words are false for the law presumes this in his
favour.” (Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [supra]).
12
[44] In Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 2
CLJ 814 the Court provided the guidelines on how a defamation case ought
to be resolved:
(a) The seriousness of the allegation made against the Plaintiff;
(b) The nature of the information;
(c) The source of the information, e.g some information have no

direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to
grind, or are being paid for their stories;
(d) The steps taken by the Respondent to verify the information;
(e) The status of the information;
(f) The urgency of the matter;
(g) Whether comment was sought from the Plaintiff;
(h) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of
the story;
(i) The tone and theme of the offending words; and
(j) The circumstances of the publication including the timing.
[45] On our perusal of the GoJ, we observed that the learned Judge failed
to follow the settled principles of law and had not made any findings on
the matters as discussed above. We were of the view, the learned Judge
erred in not applying the principles set out by the law in resolving the
issues before him.
[46] Only upon having been satisfied that all the three ingredients of the
tort of defamation having been established by the Plaintiff, then the next
step is for the learned Judge to examine if the Defendant could rely on the
defences pleaded in the Defence.
13
[47] The Defendant pleaded that the words underlined in the impugned
emails were true and relied on the defence of justification.
[48] At paragraphs 42-44 of his Defence, the Defendant pleaded that the
impugned emails were “fair comments” on matters of “public interest”
communicated to members of UMK, FTKW as well as UMK’s students.
[49] The Defendant also relied on the defence of qualified privilege and
alleged that the impugned emails were a proposal to resolve pending
problems concerning the administration and management of FTKW and the
alleged wrongdoings of the Plaintiff in the said management.
Defence of Justification
[50] We will now examine if the defence of justification is available to

the Defendant. In Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor
[supra] the Court held as follows:
“In a defamation action, the defence of justification is

complete defense if it succeeds. And the question of malice or
bad faith does not arise. But, in order to succeed in the defence
of justification a Defendant must establish the truth of all the
material statements in the words complained of which may
include defamatory comments made therein. And in order to
justify such comment, it is necessary to show that the comments
are correct imputations or conclusions to be drawn from the
proved facts. However, the plea of justification does not fail by
reason only that the truth of every charge is not provided if the
words proved to be true do not materially injure the Plaintiff’s
reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges
(see s. 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 and Abdul Rahman Talib
v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66). It is also to be
noted the partial justification may be useful in the mitigation
of damages.” (emphasis added)
14
[51] In Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Anor
[2013] 3 MLJ 534, the Court held:
“For the defence of justification, the Defendants failed to

provide that the articles published were true in substance and
effect. In other words, the defence of justification requires the
Defendants to prove the same to be true in substance or
materially different from truth.” (emphasis added)
[52] The Defendant argued that the impugned emails were true in fact and
substance and the same were sent to persons who had the essential interest
in receiving the same and that he has the right to send the same. We agree
with the Plaintiff that the defence of justification and qualified privilege
was wrongly accepted by the learned Judge due to the following reasons as
highlighted by the Plaintiff:
(a) The impugned emails were addressed to third parties who did
not have an interest or duty to receive the same.
(b) The impugned emails were not true nor proven to be true.
(c) When the Defendant wrote the two impugned emails he was a
probationary lecturer and there was a clear avenue and / or
procedure for complaints to be addressed on matters
concerning FTKW. In fact, the Defendant as well as his
witnesses had confirmed under oath this fact. In view of the
aforesaid, the Defendant did not have the duty to send the
impugned emails in the way he did.
(d) The impugned emails were written from the Defendant’s

official UMK email address which has its own guidelines on
the dos and the don’ts to its users on the use of that media. It
was disclosed during trial by the Defendant and his witnesses
that the Defendant did not adhere to UMK’s own guidelines in
15
sending the said impugned emails to the recipients of the three

mentioned email addresses.
(e) The words underlined in the impugned emails were statement

of facts that were not true and not verified to be true prior to
the Defendant having published the same.
(f) The Defendant raised issues of inter alia, racism, corruption,

committing illegal acts, ill-treating staffs, etc.
[53] As shown above, other than the two mentioned issues herein, the
learned Judge did not address the rest of the complaints in the impugned
emails in his GoJ which form the bulk of the complaints. There was a sum
of 155 plus 8 and 163 allegedly defamatory statements respectively having
been identified in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 which the learned Judge had
totally disregarded. Despite the magnitude of the complaints having been
pleaded in the SOC, the learned Judge chose to ignore these and proceeded
to rule only on two statements and another complaint which was not
pleaded. Further there was no analysis of the evidence adduced before the
learned Judge with respect to the bulk of the complaints. If these
complaints were true or otherwise it could not be ascertained as the learned
Judge had ignored these complaints completely. The learned Judge erred
in doing so as we have mentioned earlier, the learned Judge did not make
a finding if the bulk the complaints in the impugned emails were
defamatory of the Plaintiff.
[54] How could the learned Judge make a finding that the impugned
emails were true when he had only considered two of the 155 plus 8 and
163 complaints as underlined in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 of the SOC
and left out the bulk of the complaints as shown above. The learned Judge
fell into an error when he resolved that the Defendant had successfully
raised the defence of justification when there was no explanation afforded
with regards to the bulk of the complaints.
16
[55] The defendant did not prove justification or the words as underlined
in the impugned email were true. A Defendant who relied on the defence
of justification must substantially justify the statements by proving their
precise truth and every defamatory fact as alleged. The Defendant cannot
rely on his honest believe that the statements were true.
[56] On the point of pleading, the plea of justification must be specific as

to which parts of the statements were said to be the truth. We observed that
from the point of pleadings right to actual proof, the learned Judge erred
in law and fact by failing to hold that the Defendant’s defence was
defective as the Defendant had not identified and / or particularised which
part of the impugned emails enjoyed protection of justification.
(see Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [supra]; “The law
of Defamation in Singapore & Malaysia” by Keith R. Evan 2nd
Edition, Butterworth at pages 49-54)
Fair Comments
[57] We move on to the Defendant’s defence of fair comments. At

paragraph 20 of the GoJ, (see paragraph 33 above) the learned Judge
stated that the Defendant could rely on the defence of fair comment as all
the complaints in the impugned emails were true and not defamatory based
on the Defendant’s investigation and from the experience of the lecturers
and students of UMK. The learned Judge agreed that the Defendant has
successfully raised this defence as these were fair comments concerning
the Plaintiff who is the Dean of FTKW in UMK, an educationist, a member
of Majlis Professor Negara, an academia, a senior lecturer and a well-
known political analyst who ought to know that all his acts would be under
the close scrutiny of the public at large.
[58] Based on the same argument as stated under the defence of

justification, we found that as there was no finding of facts made with
respect to other complaints in the impugned emails which contained about
17
150 plus 8 in Appendix 1 and 163 in Appendix 2, except for the two
complaints discussed herein. Hence, the learned Judge’s finding that the
complaints of the Plaintiff were true in substance could not be correct. The
learned Judge ought to have considered if the defence of fair comment
could be relied by the Defendant and only after having found that the 150
plus 8 and 163 complaints were true in substance, then and only then the
learned Judge could decide if the defence of justification is available to the
Defendant. As the learned Judge had failed to undertake this task, the rests
of the complaints were not proved as true.
[59] Even for the two complaints with respect to reference to a non-
existent university as in University Manggis and the unaccredited courses,
which the learned Judge found to have been proved, there was no evidence
before the learned Judge that these complaints were in fact true so as to
afford the protection of the defence of justification to the Defendant. With
respect to University Manggis the evidence showed that the reference was
not to University Manggis but a blog site known as “Universiti.Manggis”.
Whilst the matters concerning the unaccredited courses, the Defendant was
not the person responsible as the approvals of programmes and the
decisions were made by the Chancellor, the Senate of UMK and the
Ministry of Education.
[60] We were guided by the case of Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul
Rahman Ya’kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd [supra] which held as follows:
“For the defence of fair comment, in order to succeed the

following basic elements must be established by the Defendant,
namely:
1. That the words complaint of are comments, though they

may consist of or include inference of fact;
2. That the comments are on a matter of public interest; and
18
3. That the comments are based on facts, truly stated. They

must also be fair and which a fair-minded person can honestly
make on the facts proved.”
[61] Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9 th Edition, states as follows:
“To succeed in a defence of fair comment the Defendant must

show that the words are comment, and not a statement of fact.
He must also show that there is a basis of fact for the comment,
contained or referred to in the matter complained of.”
(emphasis added)
[62] What is fair comment had been defined by Gatley on Libel and
Slander, 9 th Edition as follows:
“More accurately it has been said that the sense of comment is

“something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a
deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark,
observation, etc.” Per Cussen J in Clark v. Norton [1910]
V.L.R. at 499.”
[63] As the learned Judge did not make a finding if the 150 plus 8 and 163
complaints in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 were defamatory of the Plaintiff
how could the learned Judge go on to say that the complaint were fair
comment. Our scrutiny of the complaints stated in the impugned emails,
showed that these were not comments as defined in the Gatley but
statement of fact which could not be termed as comment for the purpose of
the defence of fair comment. In Lee Kuan Yew v. JB Jayaretnam [1979] 1
MLJ 281 the court held that “a libelous statement of fact is not a comment
or criticism of anything”. Therefore, based on the Defendant’s pleadings,
it is not opened to the Defendant to raise defence of fair comment
concerning the public at large (see RV Flower [1880] 44 JP 377).
[64] On the point of pleading, we observed that the Defendant had not
complied with the provision of Order 78 of the Rules of Court 2012. The
19
Defendant had failed to give particulars stating which of the words

complained of, that he alleged were statement of facts and matters he relied
on in support of the allegation that the words were true.
[65] Based on the foregoing, it is our humble view, the learned Judge
erred in law and in fact in his finding that the defence of fair comment was
available to the Defendant.
Qualified Privilege
[66] The Defendant had also relied on the defence of qualified privilege.
In Adam v. Ward [1017] AC 307 at page 334, Lord Atkinson stated as
follows:
“A privilege occasion ….is an occasion where the person who

makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal or
social or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made,
and the person to whom it is made has a corresponding interest
or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential.”
[67] In John Lee & Anor v. Henry Wong Jen Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 it
was held:
“Where a statement made by a person having legal duty to

make it and the recipient has a corresponding interest or duty
to receive it, such communication is privileged.”
[68] Turning now to the case at hand, where the Defendant pleaded that
the impugned emails were sent to the persons who had an essential interest
in receiving the same and that he had the right to send these impugned
emails. We observed that the impugned emails were sent by a person who
did not have the legal duty and interest or a duty, legal or social or moral,
to make it and the recipient of the impugned emails did not have a
corresponding interest or duty to receive it.
20
[69] At the time the impugned emails were sent the Defendant was only a
probationary lecturer. At the material time, there is already in place a
mechanism in UMK for matters such as this to be referred to. The
Defendant and his witnesses had confirmed this in their testimony in court.
Therefore, the Defendant did not have the legal duty and interest or a duty,
legal or social or moral to send the impugned emails to the three email
addresses stated herein. Further, it was shown via evidence there was a set
of procedure for sending emails on the UMK email address but this was
not followed by the Defendant. In fact, the Defendant had breached the
guidelines issued by UMK on the use of the email address. The Defendant
and his witnesses admitted that what the Defendant did was not in
accordance with the guidelines issued by UMK.
[70] The impugned emails were statement of facts that were not true. The
Defendant pleaded that it was based on his personal investigation. Other
than what was pleaded nothing more was shown and / or proved. Issues
such as racism, corruption, committing illegal acts and ill-treating staff
were raised by the Defendant against the Plaintiff, however, no findings
had been made by the learned Judge with respect to the truth of the matter.
[71] In view of the foregoing, the learned Judge erred:
(a) In holding that, the Defendant who was a lecturer on probation

attached to FTKW, could rely on the defence of qualified
privilege and caused the impugned emails to be sent and / or
circulated to various third parties containing the defamatory
statements concerning his superior who was the Dean of
FTKW without having to resort to the legal mechanism
provided by UMK, which the Defendant and his witnesses
confirmed existed.
(b) Despite the magnitude of the complaints and the defective

pleadings, due to lack of particulars with regards to the
relevant part of the words as underlined in the impugned emails
21
that were protected by the defences raised by the Defendant as

discussed above, the learned Judge proceeded to rule that the
Defendant could rely on the defences as pleaded in his
Defence.
(c) With respect to reciprocity of the Defendant to send and the

recipient to receive the same, the learned Judge failed to hold
that the Defendant did not have the legal duty and interest or a
duty, legal or social or moral, to make it and the recipient of
the impugned emails did not have a corresponding interest or
duty to receive as there was already a mechanism for making
complaints about the Plaintiff which was not followed by the
Defendant.
Malice
[72] Malice is an essential element in an action premised on the tort of

defamation. Malice in gist means making use of the occasion for improper
purpose (see pages 84-88 of “The Law of Defamation in Singapore &
Malaysia” [supra]). Malice if established would defeat the defence of fair
comment and qualified privilege. The learned Judge had failed to address
this issue. In this case the Plaintiff contended that there were 8 instances
of malice (elaborated in the Plaintiff’s written submission) which were not
addressed by the learned judge as follows:
(a) The Defendant had sent malicious and offensive text messages
to the Plaintiff. This was admitted by the Defendant.
(b) The Defendant had liaised with and forwarded the impugned
emails to an online news blog known as Suara TV.
(c) The Defendant had liaised and forwarded the impugned emails
to a student blog post known as “Pemudatekat.blogspot”.
22
(d) The Defendant had made a complaint to University of Vienna,

the University the Plaintiff pursued his doctorate.
(e) The Defendant had posted numerous postings on Facebook and

published the impugned emails.
(f) The Defendant had lodged a police report against the Plaintiff.
(g) The Defendant continued to defame the Plaintiff even after the
legal notice was issued.
(h) The Defendant sent a letter to Duli Yang Maha Mulia Sultan
of Kelantan without the approval of UMK and using UMK’s
letter head without the approval and the authority of UMK.
[73] We have perused the Plaintiff’s Written Submission under Heading

“3 rd Stage: DEFENCES DEFEATED BY MALICE” at pages 18 to 26 and
fully agree that the learned Judge failed to address this issue of malice and
whether malice if proved would defeat the defence of fair comment and
qualified privilege. Clearly the learned Judge erred in not addressing this
essential element of the tort of defamation, in that, whether the defences
put forth by the Defendant was defeated by malice.
LIABILITY
[74] Having perused the appeal records and heard the respective
submissions, we hold and conclude, on the balance of probabilities the
Defendant in this action is liable to the Plaintiff. We are satisfied that on
the balance of probabilities the words as underlined in the impugned emails
are capable of and are defamatory of the Plaintiff. These words in their
natural and ordinary meaning, meant or were understood to bear the
meaning as ascribed by the Plaintiff in paragraph 9 of the SOC. We are
satisfied, the words as underlined in the impugned emails which referred
to the Plaintiff were published to third parties. Further we are not satisfied
23
the Defendant has established on the balance of probabilities any of the

defences pleaded in his Defence.
DAMAGES
[75] In awarding damages for a claim founded on defamation we were

guided by the established authorities enunciated by the Higher Courts. One
of such cases which had been often quoted by the Courts across the country
is the case of Chin Choon v. Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569 where His
Lordship Justice Sri Ram JCA had made reference to the book entitled
“Defamation Law, Procedure & Practice” by Price & Doudu 3 rd Edition”
at page 208 which had laid down the principles to guide the Court in
assessing compensatory damages for defamation cases as follows:
(a) The gravity of the allegation;
(b) The size and influence of circulation;
(c) The effect of publication;
(d) The extent and nature of claimant’s reputation;
(e) The behavior of the defendant; and
(f) The behavior of the claimant.
[76] The allegations against the Plaintiff were very serious imputing to
him, inter alia, criminal act, dishonesty, lack of credibility, greed and
cheating. These allegations were highly libelous to the Plaintiff. Any award
to be awarded must be sufficient to vindicate the gravity of the allegations
against the Plaintiff.
[77] The Plaintiff is a senior lecturer, an educationist, a member of Majlis

Professor Negara, political analyst and the Dean of FTKW of UMK. Hence
the Plaintiff deserved an appropriate vindication and ought to be
adequately compensated.
24
[78] The Defendant had never expressed any regret and or remorse on the
alleged defamatory statements which had been published. Neither had the
Defendant apologized for the said publication.
[79] Perhaps it would be appropriate at this juncture for us to examine the

pattern and or trend of damages awarded by the Court in order to ascertain
what would be a fair and suitable damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff.
In Chin Choon v. Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569 for instance where the
defamation case involved a Cabinet Minister, the Court of Appeal saw it
fit to reduce the award of damages of RM1.5 million to only
RM200,000.00. The Court ruled that the award of RM1.5 million awarded
by the High Court was excessive. In AJA Peter v. OG Nio & Ors [1979] 1
LNS 1; [1980] 1 MLJ 226 which case concerned a claim by an insurance
supervisor of an insurance company against another agency supervisor, the
award of damages of RM15,000.00 was reduced to RM9,000.00.
[80] The amount of damages to be awarded by the Court in each case

depends on the facts and the circumstances of the case. Looking at the facts
of this case, the position of the Plaintiff, the behavior of the Defendant, we
awarded compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages of
RM70,000.00 to the Plaintiff. We are of the view that the damages awarded
by the Court is adequate to vindicate the Plaintiff to the public and console
him for the wrong done to him by the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
[81] Having examined the pleadings, the notes of proceedings, and having
heard the respective learned Counsels, we found that the learned Judge had
not given sufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence both testimonial
and documentaries as well as the established principles of law concerning
the tort of defamation. We were constrained to hold that the learned Judge
failed to judicially appreciate the evidence and / or the law presented
before him so as to render his decision plainly wrong and upon curial
scrutiny it merits our appellate intervention. Hence, we unanimously
25
allowed this appeal and set aside the order of the learned Judge dated 24 th
January 2016 with cost of RM20,000.00 subject to payment of allocator
fees. The deposit is refunded to the Plaintiff.
[82] We therefore ordered accordingly.
Dated: 22 OCTOBER 2017.
(ASMABI MOHAMAD)
Judge
Court of Appeal, Malaysia
Counsel:
For and on Behalf of the Appellants - Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, Renu Zechariah
& Cheryl Kwan; M/s Rosley Zechariah
Advocate & Solicitor
17-5, 17 th Floor, Oval Tower @ Damansara
(Menara Permata Damansara)
685, Jalan Damansara
60000 Kuala Lumpur
[Ref: RZ/A1894/AHH/Sub[COA]/rz]
For and on behalf of the respondent - Hisham Fauzi; M/s Hisham Fauzi &
Associates
Advocate & Solicitors
Tingkat 2, Kompleks Niaga Lembaga Tabung Haji
Jalan Dato’ Pati
15000 Kota Bharu
Kelantan
[Ref: HAKB/CIV/103/14]
26
Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng v. Gan Yook Chin [2003] 2 MLJ 97
Gan Yook Chin v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng [2004] 4 CLJ 309
English v. Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605
DJ & C Whithers (Farms) Ltd v. Ambic Equipment Ltd [2001] EWCA

Civ 1362
Verrechia (trading as Freightmaster Commercials) v. Commissioner

of Police Metropolis [2002] 3 ALL ER 385
Hamit Matusin & Ors v. Penguasa Tanah dan Survey & Anor Appeal
[2006] 2 CLJ 251
Tay Kheng Hong v. Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87
Ayob Saudi v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 321
Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 31 MLJ
Kian Lup Construction v. Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ 32
Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor
[1973] 2 MLJ 56
Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1
MLJ 399
Irene Fernandez v. Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ 814
Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461
Miles v. Logan (1851) 1 Ky 80
Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Anor [2013] 3
MLJ 534
27
Lee Kuan Yew v. JB Jayaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281
RV Flower [1880] 44 JP 377
Adam v. Ward [1017] AC 307
John Lee & Anor v. Henry Wong Jen Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108
Chin Choon v. Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569
AJA Peter v. OG Nio & Ors [1979] 1 LNS 1; [1980] 1 MLJ 226
28
K
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH
DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR
[GUAMAN SIVIL: 23NCVC-02-08-2015]
ANTARA
MOHD IQBAL ZAINAL ABIDIN … PLAINTIF
DAN
MOHD KHAIDIR AHMAD … DEFENDAN
PENGHAKIMAN
Pengenalan
[1] Plaintif memfailkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan terhadap

Defendan berdasarkan kausa tindakan fitnah yang diterbitkan dan
dinyatakan melalui mukabukunya ‘facebook’ dan menuntut perintah
serta relif seperti berikut:
(a) Satu perintah injunksi dikeluarkan bagi menghalang

Defendan melalui dirinya, pekerja-pekerjanya atau agen-
agennya daripada mengeluarkan dan menerbitkan sama ada
secara maya, lisan atau bercetak sebarang kelewatan
sebarang kenyataan yang memburukkan serta memfitnah
Plaintif;
(b) gantirugi am;
(c) gantirugi teruk;
1
(d) gantirugi pengajaran;
(e) faedah atas jumlah penghakiman pada kadar 5% setahun

dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh;
(f) kos; dan
(g) Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah.
Latar Belakang Kes
[2] Plaintif adalah Penolong Pentadbir Tanah Temerloh Pahang.
[3] Defendan merupakan seorang penternak ikan sangkar merangkap

Pengerusi Pertubuhan Pelindung Khazanah Alam Malaysia, Cawangan
Pahang [PEKA].
[4] Plaintif telah meluluskan Lesen Pendudukan Sementara [TOL]

dan Permit 4B kepada Defendan di Kampung Tebing Tinggi, Mukim
Lebak, Temerloh untuk mengusahakan operasi pam pasir. Walau
bagaimanapun Plaintif telah menghentikan operasi tersebut kerana
terdapat bantahan oleh penduduk.
[5] Pada 10.2.2015, Plaintif menerima aduan bertulis beserta satu

laporan polis daripada pemegang TOL dan kawasan permit 4B [Kawasan
itu] iaitu Encik Hamzah terdapat pemasangan papan tanda “Projek
Ternakan Ikan Sangkar, Nama: Khaidir Bin Ahmad,
TOL/LPSPTT/234/2015/11” di atas tanah dan/atau di dalam Kawasan itu.
[6] Hasil siasatan Plaintif mendapati Defendan yang meletakkan

papan tanda dan sangkar ikan di dalam Kawasan itu.
[7] Plaintif mendapati Defendan telah memohon TOL dan permit 4A

beberapa hari sebelum itu iaitu pada 4.2.2015 bagi Kawasan itu tetapi
ianya belum mendapat keputusan.
2
[8] Plaintif telah mengeluarkan Notis bertarikh 15.5.2015 kepada

Defendan kerana menduduki tanah Kerajaan tanpa kebenaran pihak
berkuasa negeri mengikut peruntukan undang-undang di bawah Kanun
Tanah Negara.
[9] Susulan dari itu, Defendan telah menerbitkan kenyataan-

kenyataan yang berunsur fitnah dan tidak benar ke atas Plaintif selaku
pegawai Kerajaan yang menandatangani dan mengeluarkan Notis
tersebut di halaman muka buku (Facebook) Defendan di atas namanya
“Khaidir Ahmad” (dirujuk sebagai mukabukunya Tersebut”).
[10] Di Perenggan 12, Pernyataan Tuntutannya, Plaintif mengatakan:
“Defendan telah menerbitkan dan menyatakan kenyataan melalui

mukabukunya tersebut pada 21.5.2015 iaitu “YA ALLAH,
TERGAMAK MEREKA MAHU MENZALIMI AKU!!!” dan
beberapa kenyataan lain seperti:
(a) “Demi menjaga kepentingan projek pam pasir yang akan

diusahakan oleh bangsa asing, Penolong Pentadbir Tanah
Daerah Temerloh, Mohd Iqbal bin Zainal Abidin yang berasal
dari Perak sanggup mencipta sejarah mengeluarkan notis
untuk memusnahkan dan membinasakan sangkar ternakan
yang diusahakan oleh anak tempatan bangsanya sendiri;
(b) “Yang menimbulkan kemusykilan, notis kepada saya

kerana kesalahan menceroboh tanah kerajaan tetapi laporan
kepada Pihak Berkuasa Negeri (PBN) mengatakan sangkar
saya terletak di atas tapak TOL pam pasir, sedangkan pelan
yang disertakan jelas terletak berjauhan;
(c) Kenapa daripada ratusan penternak ikan sangkar di

sepanjang Sungai Pahang yang wujud sejak berpuluh-puluh
tahun lalu… HANYA saya seorang yang menjadi sasaran?”
3
(d) “Apa motif dan agenda Pegawai Melayu ini terhadap

bangsanya sendiri?”
(e) “Siapa di belakang dia?”
(f) “Saya kerugian lebih RM200,000 kerana sangkar saya di

tapak lama musnah akibat kemarau dan banjir. Kenapa di
tapak lama yang tidak sesuai itu Pegawai Melayu ini tidak
ambil tindakan terhadap saya?”;
(g) “Kenapa di tapak berhampiran TOL pam pasir yang belum

beroperasi kerana bantahan penduduk ini, dia mahu
menunjukkan kuasanya?”; dan
(h) “Tidak adakah akal dan hati perut dia memikirkan nasib
dan masa depan anak bangsanya sendiri?”
[11] Kenyataan-kenyataan tersebut telah menundang pelbagai komen-

komen negatif dan tidak benar serta berunsur fitnah daripada rakan
Mukabuku Defendan dan Defendan sendiri ke atas Plaintif seperti:
(a) Harul Azmi: “Viralkan”;
(b) Nizam Mohd: “Nampak gayanya kuasa tokey lebih besar.

Bukan rahsia PTD Temerloh, Jerantut ni suka dengan $$$.
Nak harapkan Adnan Yaakob, dia sendiri pun dah declare
awal-awal takde kuasa”;
(c) Sakit Hati Nya: “Kerana duit sanggup buat apa

saje…hmmm nilah melayu zaman skrg…”;
(d) Tie Manaf: “Apa ke banggang sgt ‘tuan pegawai’ tu…”;
(e) Azmi Ramli: “Dengki x abih2, apabila hati sudah hitam”;
4
(f) Khai K’Roy: “Koi kenal dia sebab koi pernah jumpa
dengan dia atas urusan tanah, tapi masa jumpa ngan dia
baik ngat orangnya bercakap pun sopan santun betul tak
tahulah pulak di sebalik sopan santun ada perangai
sebegini pulak”;
(g) Defendan: “Khai K’roy… Dia yang keluarkan dan sign

surat tu… Kadang2 org lembut dan mulut manis ni lebih
bahaya drp orang kasar dan mulut celupar”;
(h) Khai K’roy: “Cis keparat tidak ku sangka ia mempunyai

wajah sebegini”;
(i) Sofi Ahmad: “Ni golongan bangsa melayu berhati

binatang… kalau saya pun xleh sabar…”;
(j) Temerloh Ikan Jaya: “Ni mesti ada unsur rasuah”;
(k) Amin Firdaus Roslee: “Saya tlg jawab, sebab deal dgn
tokey pasir masyukkkkkk… Deal dgn tokey sangkar dapat
ikan sekali makan”;
(l) Mohd Tohir Ali: “Kalau minta sesuatu itu tak semestinya
dapat itu namanya taka da rezeki… ngapa melatah bila tok
dapat… pendek ceritanya mengikut peraturan tanah…
adalah dilarang memasuki atau mengusahakan tanah selagi
ianya belum diluluskan dgn erti kata lain mengusahakan
secara haram adalah salah di sisi undang-undang utk
menjawab kenapa En Khaidir Ahmad dapat surat …”; dan
(m) Defendan: “Mohd Tahir… Apa yg tak dapat? Apa yg

melatah? Siapa yg usaha tanah haram? Saya buat sangkat
dlm sungai spt orang lain mana ada TOL Bukan buat
sangkar atas tanah… senang cakap macam nilah… ini
semua RASUAH! Rasuah memang bermaharajalela!
5
Sanggup ambil tindakan terhadap bangsa sendiri bila

rasuah dan menguasai diri!..”.
[12] Di perenggan 14 Pernyataan Tuntutannya, Plaintif mengatakan:
“Satu lagi kenyataan-kenyataan yang berunsur fitnah dan tidak

benar ke atas Plaintif diterbit dan dikeluarkan oleh Defendan
pada 23.5.2015 iaitu “MENGAPA MEREKA ZALIM DAN
TIDAK JUJUR???” dan kenyataan-kenyataan lain seperti:
(a) “Jawapannya dia bertindak di atas aduan HANYA seorang

pemilik TOL pam pasir yang terletak berjauhan dengan
sangkar ikan saya”;
(b) “1. Mengapa Pegawai Melayu bernama MOHD IQBAL ini

tidak mengambil apa2 tindakan terhadap beratus-ratus
penternak dan penduduk bangsa Melayu Mukim Lebak,
menurunkan tandatangan membantah projek pam pasir
yang diusahakan oleh TAUKE CINA itu?;
(c) “2. Mengapakah dia hanya memikirkan kepentingan

TAUKE CINA dan langsung tidak mahu berkompromi
terhadap anak bangsanya sendiri untuk mencari rezeki
keluarga?;
(d) “3. Mengapakah dia tidak memberi pilihan atau peluang

kpd saya untuk meneruskan usaha mencari rezeki menerusi
kegiatan menternak ikan dalam sangkar ini?;
(e) “4. Mengapakah dia berdolak-dalik dan tidak jujur dalam

tindakannya? Notis yang dihantar kepada saya menyatakan
saya menduduki tanah Kerajaan tanpa kebenaran Pihak
Berkuasa Negeri (PBN) tetapi laporan jawapannya
berhubung kes saya ini kepada Pengarah Tanah dan Galian
Pahang, Setiausaha Sulit Menteri Besar Pahang dan
6
Perdana Menteri menyatakan sangkat ikan saya bertindih

di ats lokasi pelan TOL pam pasir SEDANGKAN
perbandingan JELAS menunjukkan kedua-dua terletak
BERJAUHAN! Kenapa dia perlu MENIPU dan tidak
menyatakan KEDUDUKAN sebenar?”
[13] Kenyataan-kenyataan yang diterbitkan Defendan pada 23.5.2015

turut menerima pelbagai komen negatif dan berunsur fitnah ke atas
Plaintif seperti:
(a) Hairun Azmi: “Dasar Melayu dibela toke Cina… sanggup

zalimi bangsa sendiri”;
(b) Defendan: “Hairun Azmi… itulah hakikatnya”;
(c) Herman Hassan: “Ni pegawai gampang namanya”;
(d) Sazali Abd Hamid: “Sial hendaknya hidup pegawai macam

ni”;
(e) Kijalena Bay: “Nak Bakar kereta DO?”
(f) Shamsaliza Abdullah: “Mohd Iqbal Zainal Abidin tu da x

nak hidup lama ke?”; dan
(g) Abdul Fatah: “Rasuah rasuah rasuah”.
[14] Di perenggan 16, Pernyataan Tuntutannya, Plaintif mengatakan

Defendan juga dengan niat jahat mengeluarkan dan menerbitkan
gambar-gambar Plaintif, keretanya dan anaknya di halaman
Mukabukunya tersebut apda 24.5.2015 yang juga telah menyebabkan
komen-komen negatif dan berunsur fitnah serta tidak benar ke atas
Plaintif seperti:
(a) Tat Hj Ali: “Muka pon asyuk kuat…”;
7
(b) Zul Ajoi: “Boleh pakai evo ni byk tul gajinya…. Faham2
sendiri lah ohhh!!! Lupa dia ada bisness Pasir kat sangkor
ikan Khaidir baru nak start…. Hahaha”:
(c) Tie Manaf: “Ingatkan tuan pegawai PTD yang ‘banggang’

tu setiap perbuatan ada hokum karmanya”;
(d) Mohd Ziyad Afiq: “Senario bisnes org melayu x habis2

ditikam oleh bangsa sendiri sampai bila lah nak berakhir”;
(e) Afd Jerantut: “masyuk yak kije gomen nih….”;
(f) Kama Azman Abd Karim: “Patutlah boleh drive kete

EVO… MKN RASUAH RUPANYA DIA NIE…”;
(g) Ahmad Razin Hj Yob: “Glamer la budak ni nanti….

Hmmm”;
(h) Mohd Ishak Mat Ali: “Konon-kononnya jalankan

tugasan… pergi jahanam lah tugasan ko org tu… bangsa
lain jual babi tu dpt perlindungan plk.. celaka betul!!!;
(i) Md Syakirin Malique: “Moh pakat belake kita humban ke

sungei budok ni”; dan
(j) Norliza Tajudin: “Kasi ‘share’ mengkuk ni kat fb ni, bia

semua tahu n kenal muka perosak/pendengki bangsa
melayu!”.
[15] Defendan juga membuat aduan kepada pihak YAB Menteri Besar
Pahang dan menyebabkan Plaintif diarahkan memberikan penjelasan
yang mana Plaintif telah berbuat sedemikian melalui satu laporan
lengkap bertarikh 20.5.2015.
8
[16] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa kesemua Perkataan-perkataan

fitnah yang diterbitkan dan dinyatakan di atas adalah merujuk kepada
Plaintif dan boleh difahami untuk merujuk kepada Plaintif.
[17] Plaintif juga memplidkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan fitnah

tersebut secara semulajadinya dan pengertian biasanya membawa erti
dan adalah difahami membawa maksud bahawa:
(a) Plaintif adalah seorang pegawai melayu yang korup dan

terlibat dengan rasuah;
(b) Plaintif hanya menjaga kepentingan bangsa asing, tidak

menjaga kepentingan bangsa sendiri iaitu bangsa melayu;
(c) Plaintif menyalahgunakan kuasa dan niat jahat untuk

memusnah dan membinasakan sangkar ternakan Defendan;
(d) Plaintif hendak memusnahkan sangkar ternakan Defendan

kerana dibayar atau digunakan oleh pihak tertentu;
(e) Plaintif tidak berhati perut, jahat dan kejam serta

menganiaya bangsa sendiri iaitu Defendan; dan
(f) Plaintif seorang penipu.
[18] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan tidak pernah

menghubungi Plaintif untuk mengesahkan perkataan-perkataan
tersebut sama ada ianya benar atau tidak sebelum menerbitkannya.
[19] Plaintif mengatakan beliau telah mengalami satu kecederaan

teruk (serious injury) terhadap reputasinya dan mengalami kerugian
yang teruk dan Plaintif telah dibawa kepada satu pandangan umum
yang buruk terhadapnya.
[20] Perkataan-perkataan fitnah yang diterbit dan dikeluarkan Defendan

pada 21.5.2015, 23.5.2015 dan 24.5.2015 di mukabukunya tersebut telah
9
tersebar luar dan diketahui orang ramai kerana terdapat beribu ‘like’ dan
ianya di ‘tag’ oleh Defendan kepada rakan-rakan mukabuku Defendan
termasuk Menteri dan pegawai menteri selain ianya turut dikongsi oleh
rakan-rakan mukabuku Defendan di halaman mukabuku mereka masing-
masing adalah portal berita yagn paling dikunjungi.
[21] Selanjutnya Plaintif memplidkan perkataan-perkataan fitnah itu

adalah serangan integriti dan hak Plaintif untuk menjalankan tugas
dan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Pentadbir Tanah Daerah yang terikat
dengan undang-undang dan peraturan-peraturan yang telah ditetapkan
Kanun Tanah Negara 1965.
Pembelaan Defendan
[22] Defendan membangkitkan pembelaan bahawa perkataan-

perkataan yang dinyatakan dalam mukabukunya adalah ulasan
saksama. Defendan mengatakan dia tidak dapat mengawal komen-
komen dari orang awam.
[23] Defendan juga mengatakan sebarang aduan yang dibuat kepada

Menteri Besar Pahang dilindungi oleh kepentingan bersyarat.
Tindakan Defendan tersebut menunjukkan bahawa perkara berkenaan
mempunyai elemen awam.
Isu-Isu Untuk Bicara
[24] (a) Sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang dikeluarkan oleh

Defendan seperti dinyatakan di perenggan 12,13,14,15 dan
16 Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif adalah merupakan
perkataan-perkataan yang memfitnah Plaintif;
(b) Sama ada Defendan berhak untuk begantung kepada

pembelaan ulasan saksama, pembelaan dilindungi oleh
10
kepentingan bersyarat dan pembelaan mempunyai elemen

awam.
Penghujahan Peguam Defendan
[25] Peguam Defendan berhujah Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus

standi untuk memulakan tindakan tort fitnah kerana beliau merupakan
pegawai/penjawat awam [public officer] dengan merujuk kes Utusan
Melayu (Malaysia) Bhd. v. Dato’ Sri Diraja Hj. Adnan Hj. Yaakob
[2016] 5 CLJ 857 COA.
[26] Peguam juga mengatakan Defendan tidak pernah menerbitkan

sebarang perkataan fitnah. Perkataan-perkataan yang diterbitkan itu
merupakan ulasan saksama berkait dengan notis yang dikeluarkan oleh
Plaintif sebagai pegawai/penjawat awam terhadap papan tanda yang
dipasang oleh Defendan di atas tanah TOL yang dilesenkan kepada
Encik Hamzah.
[27] Peguam Defendan berhujah oleh kerana Plaintif tidak

memplidkan innuendo dalam plidingnya, maka keterangan Plaintif
berkait dengan dakwaan innuendo semasa perbicaraan perlu
diketepikan.
[28] Peguam Defendan mengatakan aduannya terhadap Plaintif

kepada Menteri Besar Pahang dilindungi oleh kepentingan bersyarat
dengan merujuk kes Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor
[1965] 31 MLJ 154.
Penghujahan Peguam Plaintif
[29] Peguam terpelajar Plaintif berhujah Plaintif mempunyai locus

standi untuk memulakan tindakan kerana beliau memfailkan tuntutan
bukan atas dasar jawatannya tetapi di atas namanya/kapasiti
11
peribadinya. Beliau telah merujuk kes Lim Guan Eng v. Utusan

Melayu (M) Bhd [2012] 3 MLRH 124, Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais
Yatim v. Amizudin Ahmat [2012] 1 MLRH 519 di mana dalam kedua-
dua kes tersebut, Lim dan Dr Rais tidak menyatakan jawatannya di
bawah nama Plantif (the position of chief minister/minister was not
stated in brackets below the plaintiff’s name in the heading to that
civil suit).
[30] Peguam berhujah ‘without any reference of suing in his official

capacity, especially as can be seen in the heading to the civil suit, by
mere citation of his name only, but not his position as chief
minister/minister, it is implicit that the plaintiff was maintaining the
action for defamation in his personal capacity’.
[31] Peguam Plaintif mengatakan pengataan-pengataan Defendan

dalam mukabuku bukan mengkritik cara pentadbiran atau memberikan
pandangan tetapi menuduh Plaintif korup, rasuah, tidak berhati perut,
menyalahgunakan kuasa untuk melindungi taukeh cina dan pelbagai
tuduhan bersifat peribadi.
[32] Peguam Plaintif mengatakan adalah jelas perkataan-perkatan

yang diterbitkan oleh Defendan jelas tidak benar sama sekali dan
bersifat fitnah.
Beban Pembuktian
[33] Dalam tindakan tort fitnah, beban pembuktian adalah ke atas

Plaintif bagi membuktikan tiga elemen berikut wujud iaitu:
(a) pengataan-pengataan mengandungi unsur-unsur fitnah;
(b) pengataan-pengatan fitnah tersebut merujuk kepada

Plaintif; dan
12
(c) pengataan-pengataan fitnah tersebut telah diterbitkan

kepada pihak ketiga.
[34] Prinsip undang-undang ini boleh dilihat dengan jelas dalam kes
Kian Lup Construction v. Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd. [2002]
7CLJ 32, Ayob bin Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep)
321, Chong Swee Huat & Anor v. Lim Shian Gee [2009] 4 CLJ 113
CA; [2009] 3 MLJ 665 CA, Subramaniam Paramasivam v. Courts
Mammoth Berhad & Anor [2010] 1 LNS 904.
[35] Dalam kes Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd. [1999] 1
CLJ 461, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“It cannot, I think, be doubted that the first task of a court, in

action for defamation, is to determine whether the words
complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning.
And it is beyond argument that this is in essence a question of
law that turns upon the construction of the words published.
Having decided whether the words complained of are capable of
being a defamatory meaning, the next step in the enquiry is for a
court to ascertain whether the words complained of are in fact
defamatory. This is a question of fact dependent upon the
circumstances of a particular case”.
[36] Mahkamah itu juga mengatakan:
“…the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the

words published in their natural meaning and ordinary meaning
impute to the plaintiff any dishonorable or discreditable conduct
or motive or lack of integrity on his part?. If the question invites
an affirmative response, the words complained of are
defamatory.”
13
[37] Dalam kes Keluarga Communication Sdn. Bhd. v. Normala

Samsuddin & Another Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 46 MR, Zulkefli
Makinuddin JCA (beliau ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut:
“Held
[1] At the outset we would state that the test to be applied

when considering whether a statement is defamatory of a
plaintiff is well settled in that it is an objective one in which it
must be given a meaning a reasonable man would understand
and for that purpose, that is, in considering whether the words
complained of contained ant defamatory impitations, it is
necessary to consider the whole article. (para 16).”
[38] Dalam kes Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan

Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146:
“Thus, the test of defamation nature of a statement is its

tendency to excite against the Plaintiffthe adverse opinion of
others, although no one believes the statement to be true.
Another test is: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in
the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?
The typical type of defamation is an attack upon the moral
character of the plaintiff attributing crime, dishonesty,
untruthfulness, ingratitude or cruelty.”
[39] Sekiranya beban pembuktian tersebut telah dipenuhi oleh

Plaintif, maka beban berpindah kepada Defendan bagi membuktikan
melalui keterangan yang kredibel bahawa pengataan-pengataannya
bukanlah tergolong dalam pengataan yang berunsur fitnah, Lim Guan
Eng v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd. [supra].
14
[40] Di dalam tindakan tort fitnah, Defendan boleh mendakwa

bahawa perkataan atau pengataan yang dirujukkan bukan merupakan
suatu fitnah berasaskan kepada pembelaan berikut:
(i) justifikasi;
(ii) perlindungan mutlak;
(iii) perlindungan bersyarat dan lanjutan atasnya; atau
(iv) komen berpatutan.
[41] Akta Fitnah 1957 mengiktiraf pembelaan-pembelaan seperti

justifikasi, komen berpatutan dan perlindungan bersyarat masing-
masing di bawah seksyen 8, seksyen 9 dan seksyen 12.
[42] Justifikasi adalah suatu pembelaan yang bersifat sempurna

(complete defence) kepada fitnah jika perkataan dikatakan fitnah itu
adalah benar, tidak berbohong, Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn.
Bhd. v. Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 8 CLJ 477 MP, Dato’ Seri Anwar
Ibrahim v. Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad [1999] 4 AMR 3926,
[2001] 1 CLJ 519.
[43] Dalam kes Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn. Bhd. [supra], YA
Azhar Mohamed HMP memutuskan:
“[45] This area of law is well settled. As a matter of general

rule, the defence of justification is a complete defence to a
defamation action (see Hasnul Abdul Hadi v. Bulat Mohamed &
Anor [1977] 1 LNS 33; [1978] 1 MLJ 75 and Tun Datuk
Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors
[1995] 1 LNS 304; [1996] 1 MLJ 393). The burden is on the
Defendant to show that the defamatory imputations are
substantially true.”
15
[44] Dalam kes Chong Swee Huat & Anor v. Lim Shian Ghee (t/a L &
G Consultants & Education Services) [2009] 3 MLJ 665; [2009] 4
AMR 1, Zainun Ali JCA telah menyatakan seperti berikut:
“…In other words, a purposive approach is taken in interpreting

section 8-when for a defence of justification to be upheld, it is
not necessary to prove the truth of every word in the statement
said to be defamatory. What is relevant is actually the truth of
the imputation of the overall statement.”
[45] Pembelaan Defendan juga boleh diasaskan kepada komen

berpatutan. Prinsip undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa pembelaan
komen berpatutan hanya menjadi justifikasi pembelaan jika terbukti
fakta yang didakwa adalah benar, Sivabalan a/l P Asapathy v. The
New Straits Time Press (M) Sdn. Bhd. [2010] 9 MLJ 320, Dato’ Seri
Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd. &
Anor [2014] 3 CLJ 560 MR.
[46] Dalam kes Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin [supra]

Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“[5] The law on the defence of fair comment is that if a

defendant can prove that the defamatory statement is an
expression of opinion on a matter of public interest and not a
statement of fact, he or she can rely on the defence of fair
comment. The comment must be based on true facts which are
either contained in the publication or are sufficiently referred
to. It is for the defendant to prove that the underlying facts are
true. The defendant does not have to prove the truth of every
fact provided the comment was fair in relation to those facts
which are proved. However, fair in this context does not mean
reasonable, but rather, it signifies the absence of malice. The
views expressed can be exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced,
provided they are honestly held. If the claimant can show that
16
the publication was maliciously, the defence of fair comment

will not succeed.” (paras 50 & 51).
[47] Berkait dengan pembelaan, perlindungan bersyarat, peguam

Defendan merujuk kepada kes Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam
& Anor [1965] 31 MLJ 154 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan seperti
yang berikut:
“A common interest for the purpose of the defence of a qualified

to an action for libel occurs where the words complained of as
defamatory were published in pursuance on an interest or of a
duty, legal, sosial or moral, to publish them to the person to
whom they were published and the person to whom they were
published had a corresponding interest or duty to receive them.
The reciprocity is essential. The bona fide of the defendant that
there existed such an interest that he was under such a duty to
make the communication is immaterial, for the thing which is
relevant to the question whether or not the occasion was
privileged is the existence in fact of the duty or interest and not
merely the defendant’s belief in the existence of the one or
other”.
Dapatan dan Keputusan Mahkamah
[48] Berkaitan dengan elemen (i) iaitu sama ada pengataan-

pengataaan itu mengandungi unsur-unsur fitnah, Defendan tidak
menafikan dia menerbitkan dan mengeluarkan perkataan-perkataan
yang diplidkan oleh Plaintif di perenggan 12, 13, 14, 15 dan 16
Pernyataan Tuntutan.
[49] Justeru adalah menjadi tugas Mahkamah untuk menentukan sama

ada pengataan-pengataan itu mempunyai dan membawa maksud fitnah
17
terhadap Plaintif sama ada secara semula jadi dan biasa atau secara
innuendo.
[50] Untuk menjadikan sesuatu pengataan itu secara biasa atau

semulajadinya membawa maksud fitnah atau suatu fitnah, pengataan-
pengataan yang menjadi perkara subjek itu tidak perlu memberi kesan
sebenar ke atas reputasi seseorang tetapi memadai sekiranya terdapat
kecenderungan bahawa ianya memberi kesan keatas reputasi
seseorang.
[51] Bersandarkan kepada kes Choo Foo Choo [supra], Keluarga

Communication Sdn Bhd [supra] dan Syed Husin Ali [supra]
pendekatan Mahkamah dalam menentukan sama ada kata-kata atau
pernyataan yang diterbitkan itu adalah bersifat fitnah atau tidak
adalah pendekatan yang objektif berasaskan kepada pemahaman
seorang yang munasabah dan bukannya berdasarkan kepada
pemahaman seorang pembaca biasa terhadap kenyataan yang
diterbitkan tersebut, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Wan Muhammad
Aziz bin Wan Deris [2014] 9 MLJ 605 dan juga bukan bergantung
kepada pemahaman dan tanggapan Plaintif atau peguamnya kerana
Plaintif memang tahu apa yang sebenarnya berlaku ke atas dirinya
sedangkan seorang pembaca yang munasabah apabila membaca secara
literal atay tersirat petikan pengataan-pengataan tersebut belum tentu
membuat kesimpulan seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguam Plaintif
atau seperti yang dikatakan oleh Plaintif.
[52] Dengan menerima pakai ujian seperti yang telah dinyatakan di

dalam kes-kes yang dirujuk di atas, berasaskan kepada pliding Plaintif
di perenggan 12-16, adakah seseorang yang munasabah apabila
mereka membaca petikan kata-kata atau pengataan-pengataan tersebut
akan membuat kesimpulan, implikasi atau tanggapan bahawa kata-kata
itu adalah berunsur fitnah.
18
[53] Mahkamah berpendapat melihat dan membaca perkataan itu

perse, secara literal seseorang pembaca yang munasabah akan
mengatakan perkataan-perkataan itu berunsur fitnah. Perkataan-
perkatan yang digunakan sangat kasar dan kesat. Seseorang pembaca
yang munasabah akan dapat memahami maksud disebalik kata-kata
tersebut kerana ianya mengandungi perkataan-perkataan yang
memburukkan atau menghina Plaintif di mana nama dan jawatan
Plaintif dinyatakan dengan jelas sebagai Mohd Iqbal bin Zainal
Abidin, Penolong Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Temerloh.
[54] Jelas terdapat perkataan yang memburuk-burukkan dan

menghina Plaintif di dalam pengataan-pengataan tersebut seperti
“Tidak ada akal dan hati perut dia memikirkan nasib dan masa depan
anak bangsanya sendiri”, “Ini semua RASUAH! Rasuah memang
bermaharajalela!”, “Sanggup ambil tindakan terhadap bangsa sendiri
bila rasuah menguasai diri…”, “Mengapa Pegawai Melayu bernama
Mohd Iqbal ini tidak mengambil tindakan terhadap beratus-ratus
penternak dan penduduk bangsa melayu Mukim Lebak, menurun
tandatangan membantah projek pam pasir yang diusahakan oleh
TAUKE CINA”, “Mengapa dia hanya memikirkan kepentingan
TAUKE CINA”, “Mengapakan dia berdolak dalik dan tidak jujur
dalam tindakannya” dan “Kenapa dia perlu MENIPU dan tidak
menyatakan kedudukan sebenar”.
[55] Dalam kes Keluarga Communication Sdn. Bhd. [supra]

Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan di dalam menentukan sama ada kata-
kata adalah bersifat fitnah, keseluruhan artikel atau tulisan mesti
dipertimbangkan. Selain itu keadaan dan konteks di mana kata-kata
tersebut diterbitkan juga harus diambil kira. Mahkamah memutuskan:
“[16] In considering whether the words complained of

contained any defamatory imputation, it is necessary to consider
19
the whole article. Gatley on Libel & Slander, 10 th edition on this

point at pp. 108 and 110 inter alia states as follows:
It is necessary to take into consideration, not only the actual

words, but the context of the words.
It follows from the fact that the context and circumstances of the
publication must be taken into account, that the plaintiff cannot
pick and choose parts of the publication which, standing alone
would be defamatory. This or that sentence may be considered
defamatory, but they may be other passages which may take
away the sting.”
[56] Perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan dan diterbitkan oleh

Defendan secara semulajadinya dan pengertian biasa membawa
maksud bahawa:
(i) Plaintif adalah seorang pegawai melayu yang korup dan

terlibat dengan rasuah;
(ii) Plaintif hanya menjaga kepentingan bangsa asing, tidak

menjaga kepentingan bangsa sendiri iaitu bangsa melayu;
(iii) Plaintif menyalahgunakan kuasa dan niat jahat untuk

memusnah dan membinasakan sangkar ternakan Defendan;
(iv) Plaintif hendak memusnahkan sangkar ternakan Defendan

kerana dibayar atau digunakan oleh pihak tertentu;
(v) Plaintif tidak berhati perut, jahat dan kejam serta

menganiaya bangsa sendiri iaitu Defendan; dan
(vi) Plaintif seorang yang tidak jujur dan seorang penipu.
[57] Setelah menimbangkan pengataan-pengataan yang menjadi

perkara pengaduan Plaintif dengan mengambil kira konteks
20
pengataan-pengataan tersebut sepenuhnya dan keterangan yang telah

dikemukakan, Mahkamah berpuas hati Plaintif telah memenuhi elemen
(i) iaitu pengataan-pengataan yang diadukan itu adalah membawa
maksud fitnah atau berkecenderungan membawa maksud fitnah
terhadap Plaintif.
[58] Berkaitan dengan elemen (ii) iaitu sama ada pengataan itu
merujuk kepada Plaintif, adalah menjadi fakta dan keterangan yang
tidak dipertikaikan bahawa kata-kata yang diterbitkan iatu merujuk
kepada Plaintif dan pengaduan oleh Defendan adalah berkaitan
Plaintif. Malah Defendan sendiri tidak mempertikaikan kata-kata
fitnah itu ditujukan kepada Plaintif. Di antara pengataan-pengataan
tersebut ialah:
(a) “Demi menjaga kepentingan projek pam pasir yang

diusahakan oleh bangsa asing, Penolong Pentadbir Tanah
Daerah Temerloh, Mohd Iqbal bin Zainal Abidin yang
berasal dari Perak sanggup mencipta sejarah mengeluarkan
notis untuk memusnahkan dan membinasakan sangkar
ternakan yang diusahakan oleh anak tempatan bangsanya
sendiri”.
[59] Berkait dengan elemen (iii) iaitu pengataan-pengataan itu telah

diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga, Defendan tidak mempertikaikan
perkataan-perkataan fitnah tersebut telah diterbitkan di mukabukunya.
Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah berpendapat perkataan-perkataan
fitnah tersebut telah secara luasnya disebarkan dan diketahui oleh
sejumlah besar pihak ketiga yang merupakan pembaca dan/atau
pelawat mukabuku Defendan yang dikenali dan tidak dikenali. Fakta
ini jelas dibuktikan melalui komen-komen pembaca yang terdapat di
dalam mukabuku Defendan. Di antaranya:
(a) Nizam Mohd: “Nampak gayanya kuasa tokey lebih besar.

Bukan rahsia ptd Temerloh, Jerantut ni suka dgn $$$. Nak
21
harapkan Adnan Yaakob, dia sendiri pun dah declare awal2

takde kuasa”;
(b) Tie Manaf: “Apa ke bangang sgt ‘tuan pegawai tu…”; dan
(c) Temerloh Ikan Jaya: “Ni mesti ada unsur rasuah”.
[60] Dalam kes Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another Case [1988]
1 CLJ Rep 233, Mahkamah Agong memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“In order to constitute publication, the defamatory matter must

be published to a third party, and not simply to the Plaintiff. By
publication, it is meant the making known of defamatory matter,
after it has been written, to some person other than the person
to whom it is written, the uttering, of a libel to the party libeled
is no publication for the purposes of a civil action; Wenhak v.
Morgan…”
[61] Di muka surat 41 Ikatan C jelas membuktikan bahawa penerbitan

perkataan-perkataan fitnah Defendan di mukabukunya bertarikh
21.5.2015 dikongsi sebanyak 687 kali oleh permilik akaun mukabuku
yang lain. Manakala penerbitan kenyataan-kenyataan fitnah Defendan
bertarikh 23.5.2015 di muka surat 67 Ikatan C dikongsi sebanyak 121
kali. Penerbitan ketiga bertarikh 24.5.2015 di muka surat 84 Ikatan C
Defendan pula dikongsi sebanyak 31 kali.
[62] Mahkamah telah memutuskan kesemua elemen-elemen fitnah

telah dipenuhi. Maka beban beralih kepada Defendan untuk
mewujudkan pembelaan terhadap perkataan-perkataan fitnah tersebut.
Ulasan Saksama
[63] Berasaskan kepada Pernyataan Pembelaan Defendan, dia

bergantung kepada pembelaan ulasan saksama/ komen yang berpatutan
22
dan elemen awam. Defendan juga mengatakan dia tidak berniat jahat
bila menerbitkan gambar-gambar Plaintif dan anaknya di mukabuku
Defendan.
[64] Mahkamah berpendapat Defendan telah gagal untuk memberikan

secara terperinci butir-butir komen yang adil di dalam plidingnya. Dia
sepatutnya merujuk kepada setiap satu perkataan-perkataan fitnah
yang telah diplidkan dan menyenaraikan secara khusus butir-butir
bagaimana setiap satu perkataan itu adalah komen yang adil.
Defendan tidak boleh semata-mata mendakwa secara rawak bahawa
terdapat komen yang adil tanpa menyangkal dengan khusus dengan
memplidkan butir-butir bagaimana ianya adalah komen yang adil.
[65] A. 78 r. 3(2) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012

memperuntukkan:
“(2) Jika dalam suatu tindakan kerana libel atau slander

defendan mengatakan bahawa, setakat yang kata-kata yang
diadukan itu terdiri daripada penyataan fakta, ia adalah benar
pada isi dan fakta, dan setakat yang ia terdiri daripada
pernyataan pendapat, ia adalah komen berpatutan mengenai
suatu perkara kepentingan awam, atau merayu dengan maksud
yang serupa, dia mestilah memberikan butir-butir yang
menyatakan mana di antara kata-kata yang diadukan itu yang
dikatakannya adalah pernyataan fakta dan mana di antara fakta
dan perkara yang padanya dia bersandarkan untuk menyokong
pengataan bahawa kata-kata itu adalah benar”.
[66] Defendan membuat pelbagai fitnah termasuk Plaintif terlibat

dengan rasuah. Dakwaan ini adalah satu dakwaan yang serius tetapi
Defendan gagal membuktikan dakwaan Plaintif menerima rasuah
daripada Taukey Cina bahkan Defendan berdalih dengan mengatakan
bahawa perkataan rasuah yang dirujuk itu adalah secara umum kerana
terdapat berlambak kes rasuah di Malaysia. Defendan menafikan
23
beliau menuduh Plaintif rasuah. Siapakah Taukey Cina yang didakwa

dilindungi oleh Plaintif tidak pernah dibuktikan. Tidak ada keterangan
yang membuktikan sangkar-sangkar ikan tersebut serta pam-pam pasir
dimiliki oleh Taukey Cina.
[67] Defendan di dalam pembelaanya mendakwa dia tidak mendirikan

papan tanda dan permohonan Lesen Menduduki Sementara [TOL]
adalah di satu kawasan yang lain dan bukannya di Kawasan itu.
Defendan juga mengatakan dia tidak melanggar mana-mana undang-
undang dan terdapat orang lain yang mengusahakan ternakan ikan
dikawasan itu tanpa TOL dan tiada tindakan undang-undang diambil.
[68] Keterangan yang ada membuktikan dakwaan Defendan adalah

tidak benar kerana SP3, En. Sukardi bin Hj Mat Hassan, Penolong
Pegawai Tanah mengesahkan permohonan TOL oleh Defendan dan
pemasangan papan tanda adalah di dalam Kawasan itu di mana TOL
telah dikeluarkan kepada Encik Hamzah. Defendan telah gagal
menyangkal fakta bahawa sangkar ikan, papan tanda dan permohonan
TOL yang dibuatnya memasuki Kawasan itu. Justeru notis yang
dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan pada 18.12.2015 dan
15.1.2016 adalah sah disisi undang-undang.
[69] Defendan mendakwa dia telah mendapat kebenaran dari Ketua

Kampung tetapi tidak ada apa-apa dokumen dikemukakan untuk
menyokong dakwaannya. Begitu juga Ketua Kampung tidak dipanggil
sebagai saksi untuk menyokong dakwaannya. Oleh itu Mahkamah
berpendapat anggapan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan
1950 berbangkit terhadap Defendan.
[70] Justeru Defendan telah gagal membuktikan bahawa perkataan-

perkataan itu adalah benar. Defendan gagal membuktikan kebenaran
dakwaannya bahawa Plaintif tidak berhati perut, melindungi tauke
cina, korup, rasuah, menganiaya defendan dengan secara salah
mengeluarkan notis perobohan, kawasan permohonan TOL Defendan
24
tidak memasuki Kawasan itu. Begitulah juga dakwaan Defendan

bahawa terdapat penternak-penternak sangkar ikan haram yang lain
beroperasi tanpa TOL tidak dibuktikan oleh Defendan.
[71] Adalah jelas bahawa pengataaan Defendan diterbitkan tanpa

disokong oleh kebenaran fakta dan ianya adalah untuk kepentingan
peribadinya dan bukan untuk kepentingan awam. Defendan-Defendan
mempunyai niat jahat terhadap Plaintif dalam menerbitkan pengataan-
pengataan tersebut dalam mukabukunya.
Perlindungan Bersyarat
[72] Dalam kes S. Pakianathan [supra], mahkamah memutuskan:
“However there are occasions upon which, on grounds of public

policy and convenience, a person may, without incurring legal
liability, make statements about another which are defamatory
and in fact true: Watt v. Longsdon. These occasions are called
occasions of qualified privilege. A communication made bona
fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating
has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having corresponding interest or
duty although it contains a crinatory matter which, without this
privilege, would be slanderous and actionable: Harisson v.
Bush. The duty may be legal, social or moral and the person to
whom the communication is made must have a corresponding
interest or duty te receive it. The reprocity is essential: Adam v.
Ward”.
[73] Mahkamah berpendapat Defendan tidak boleh berselindung di

sebalik tabir perlindungan bersyarat kerana adalah jelas pengataan-
pengataan itu dimuat naik oleh Defendan selepas Plaintif mengambil
tindakan ke atasnya yang berpunca
25
dari kesilapan Defendan sendiri kerana mendirikan papan tanda dan

sangkar ikan di atas lesen TOL milik orang lain dan menduduki tanah
kerajaan tanpa kebenaran. Pengataan-pengataan itu jelas dimuatnaik
dan aduan dibuat kepada YAB Menteri Besar untuk kepentingan
peribadi Defendan sendiri dan bukan u
ntuk kepentingan awam. Kecuali Defendan, tidak ada orang lain yang
mengambil tindakan yang menyalahi undang-undang sepertinya.
[74] Aduan yang dibuat kepada Menteri Besar hanyalah satu rekaan
dan tidak berasas kerana masalah ini tidak dialami oleh penternak-
penternak sangkar ikan yang lain. Walaupun Defendan mendakwa
penternak-penternak lain juga menghadapi masalah yang sama tetapi
tidak ada bukti dikemukakan oleh Defendan untuk untuk menyokong
dakwaannya. Defendan hanya membangkitkan satu dakwaan kosong
yang tidak disokong oleh mana-mana saksi dan keterangan
dokumentari.
[75] Adalah tidak boleh dinafikan Defendan tidak mempunyai

kepentingan ketas kawasan yang dirobohkan kerana dia masih belum
diberikan lesen TOL untuk memulakan operasi dikawasan tersebut.
Adalah tidak boleh dinafikan Defendan secara individu cuba
mengusahakan ternakan ikan patin disitu dan dia bukanlah
mengusahakannya bersama-sama dengan penduduk-penduduk yang
lain di kawasan itu. Defendan tidak membuktikan dia mempunyai
kepentingan yang bersalingan dan kepentingan bersama dengan orang
lain. Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tindakan Plaintif menulis surat
kepada Menteri Besar bukanlah mewakili penternak-penternak yang
lain. Tambahan pula dari keterangan yang ada, Plaintif tidak ada
mengambil tindakan undang-undang kepada penternak yang lain
kecuali Defendan sahaja kerana dia sahaja yang melanggar undang-
undang. Tidak ada bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan bahawa
26
Plaintif juga mengambil tindakan undang-undang ketas penternak-

penternak yang lain.
[76] Oleh kerana aduan yang dibuat oleh Defendan lebih bersifat
peribadi dan tidak melibatkan elemen awam, mahkamah berpendapat
pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat juga tidak terpakai kepada
Defendan kerana pengataan-pengataan itu hanya dimuat naik oleh
Defendan setelah wujud masalah dengan Plaintif dan bukan masalah
Plaintif dengan penternak-penternak yang lain dan ia hanya dimuat
naik setelah Plantif merobohkan papan tanda dan sangkar ikan
Defendan sahaja. Mahkamah juga berpendapat pembelaan ini tidak
terpakai kerana Defendan jelas telah melanggar undang-undang kerana
menduduki tanah kerajaan tanpa kebenaran pihak berkuasa negeri dan
menjalankan aktiviti penternakan ikan tanpa lesen tetapi menyalahkan
pihak berkuasa apabila mengambil tindakan undang-undang
terhadapnya. Perbuatan Defendan adalah sama seperti kata pepatah
melayu “menangguk di air keruh dan lempar batu sembunyi tangan”.
[77] Mahkamah tidak fikir telah wujud satu pemikiran atau falsafah
hidup yang baru di mana terdapat kewajipan undang-undang, sosial
dan moral kepada Defendan untuk membuat aduan kepada Menteri
Besar di atas isu Plaintif atau pihak berkuasa negeri telah mengambil
tindakan undang-undang ke atasnya atau ke atas sesiapa sahaja kerana
didapati telah melanggar undang-undang. Walau apapun yang
dikatakan oleh Defendan, tindakannya adalah jelas bertentangan
dengan undang-undang, moral, sosio-budaya masyarakat dan
kepentingan awam. Luahan rasa terkilan dan ketidakpuasan hati
Defendan tidak berasas kerana Plaintif hanya menjalankan tugas dan
tanggungjawabnya sebagai Penolong Pentadbir Tanah untuk
menguatkuasakan undang-undang seperti yang diperuntukkan di
bawah Kanun Tanah Negara. Oleh itu, aduan yang dibuat kepada
Menteri Besar bukanlah aduan benar yang diterbitkan dan lindungi di
bawah perlindungan bersyarat. Aduan yang dibuat kepada Menteri
27
Besar bukanlah untuk mencari penyelesaian terhadap kemelut yang

dihadapi olen penduduk-penduduk lain tetapi untuk menyelesaikan
kemelut yang dibebani oleh Defendan.
[78] Gatley On Libel and Slander Ninth Edition para 14.8

mengatakan:
“Redress of grievance.
Where a person believes that he has suffered a grievance at the

hands of another he is entitled to bring his grievance to the
notice of the person or body whose power or duty it is to grant
redress or to punish or reprimand the offender, or merely to
inquire into the subject matter of the complaint, and any
statement so made is privileged, if made in good faith and not
for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff”.
[79] Berasaskan kepada fakta-fakta yang telah dihuraikan diatas

berkait dengan latar belakang Defendan, Mahkamah tidak fikir dia
telah bertindak dengan jujur apabila dia membuat aduan kepada
Menteri Besar. Tujuan sebenarnya adalah untuk memfitnah Plaintif.
Walau apapun, hasrat Defendan tidak kesampaian kerana tidak ada
apa-apa tindakan yang diambil oleh pihak atasan ke atas Plaintif.
Inferens yang boleh dibuat ialah aduan yang dibuat oleh Defendan
terhadap Plaintif adalah tidak berasas dan Mahkamah mengulanginya,
ianya sengaja diada-adakan untuk memfitnah Plaintif.
[80] Berkait dengan isu lokus standi Mahkamah memutuskan Plaintif

mempunyai hak di sisi undang-undang-undang untuk memulakan
tindakan tort fitnah ke atas Plaintif. Undang-undang membenarkan
penjawat awam memfailkan tindakan saman ini atas kapasiti peribadi,
Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v. Chong Chieng Jen
[2016] MLJU 113. Begitulah juga prinsip undang-undang yang
28
terdapat dalam kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh Plaintif iaitu Lim Guan Eng
[supra], Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais Yatim [supra].
Kuantum
[81] Di dalam kes Datuk Seri Utama Dr. Rais bin Yatim [supra]
Mahkamah telah mengambil kira beberapa faktor di dalam
menentukan kuantum ganti rugi iaitu:
(a) the conduct of the Plaintif;
(b) the Plaintiff’s position and standing in society;
(c) the nature of the libel;
(d) Mode and extent of publication;
(e) The absence or refusal of retraction or apology; and
(f) The whole conduct of the Defendant from the time the
libel was published down to the very moment of the
verdict.
[82] Dalam kes Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. Tan Sri
Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [2000] 3 CLJ 728,
Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
“We cannot by our judgment per set a precedent on the damages

to be awarded. The court must consider a number of factors
when assessing damagesin a libel case. In John v. MGN Ltd
[1997] QB 586 at p 607, Sir Thomas Bingham MR (now CJ)
said:
In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation

the most important factor is the gravity of the libel; the more
closely it (the defamation) touches the plaintiffs personal
29
integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and

the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is
likely to be. The extent of publication is also very relevant; a
libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause
damage than a libel published to a handful of people. A
successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to
vindicate his reputation but the significance of this is much
greater a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel
and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the
defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published, and
publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took
place.”
Damages in defamation cases are described as being at large.

The law has not fixed any exact measure for assessment of
damages in an action for defamation. There is no mathematical
formula by which the quantum can be determined; nor is there
any requirement that the damages be assessed with
mathematical certainty. But a small sum awarded to a prominent
public figure for a serious libel could be interpreted as
trivializing the incident.”
[83] Mahkamah telah memberi pertimbangan yang utama kepada

faktor bahawa perkataan-perkataan fitnah telah menyebabkan Plaintif
mengalami kecederaan yang teruk kepada reputasinya dan kata-kata
fitnah itu telah diterbitkan di mukabuku yang boleh diakses dan
dikongsi oleh ribuan pembaca. Defendan juga telah cuba mengheret
isteri dan anak plaintif yang tidak ada kena mengena dengan tugas dan
tanggungjawab Plaintif tetapi menjadi mangsa kepada kata-kata fitnah
Defendan.
30
[84] Defendan juga semasa perbicaraan tidak menunjukkan rasa insaf

terhadap perbuatan memfitnah Plaintif. Defendan tidak pernah merasa
menyesal memfitnah Plaintif dan meminta maaf kepada Plaintif.
[85] Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada beberapa kes sebelum

menetapkan satu amaun gantirugi yang sesuai dan berpatutan ke atas
Plaintif. Di antara kes-kes yang dirujuk selain kes Datuk’ Seri Utama
Dr. Rais [supra] ialah Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v. Chua Jui Meng
[2005] 3 MLJ 494, Dato’ Musa Hitam v. SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1
CLJ 314, Tun Datuk Pattinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’akub [supra] di
mana award ganti rugi yang diberikan kepada bekas Menteri Kabinet
yang merupakan ahli politik yang terkenal adalah di antara
RM100,000.00 hingga ke RM300,000.00.
[86] Setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor di atas, berasaskan kepada

jawatan Plaintif, kedudukannya di sisi masyarakat, kesan fitnah itu
kepadanya, kelakuan Defendan yang masih menegakkan benang yang
basah dan tiada permohonan maaf daripadanya kepada Plaintif dan
Plaintif tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa membalas serangan
Defendan dan hanya hadir ke Mahkamah untuk membersihkan
namanya, Mahkamah telah memberikan award secara global sebanyak
RM50,000.00 yang meliputi gantirugi am, teruk dan tauladan beserta
dengan kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 dan faedah 5% atas jumlah
penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman hingga penyelesaian tertakluk
kepada alokatur.
[87] Mahkamah juga telah mengeluarkan satu perintah injunksi

menghalang Defendan melalui dirinya, pekerja-pekerjanya atau agen-
agennya daripada mengeluarkan dan menerbitkan sama ada secara
maya, lisan atau bercetak sebarang kenyataan yang memburuk-
burukkan serta memfitnah Plaintif.
31
Konklusi
[88] Setelah meneliti kesemua fakta dan keterangan kes, Mahkamah

memutuskan di atas imbangan kebarangkalian pihak Plaintif telah
membuktikan pengataan-pengataan Defendan yang dimuat naik dalam
mukabukunya jelas bersifat fitnah terhadap Plaintif. Defendan telah
gagal mengemukakan pembelaan komen yang berpatutan,
perlindungan bersyarat dan perkara berkenaan mempunyai elemen
awam. Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dengan award
gantitrugi sebanyak RM50,000.00 berserta dengan kos RM15,000.00
tertakluk kepada alokatur dan faedah 5% seperti dituntut. Mahkamah
juga membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif di perenggan 28(a) Pernyataan
Tuntutan.
(HASSAN ABDUL GHANI)

Mahkamah Tinggi Temerloh
Bertarikh: 5 JULAI 2017
KAUNSEL:
Bagi pihak plaintif - Adnan Seman @ Abdullah; T/n Adnan Sharida &
Associates
Advocates & Solicitors
No. 3-2-2A & 3-2-2B
Jalan Medan PB 2A, Seksyen 9,
43650 Bandar Baru Bangi
Selangor Darul Ehsan
Bagi pihak defendan - Gunaseelan Thambinathan & Ikmal Hisham;

T/n Gunaseelan & Associates
Advocates & Solicitors
No. 378, Jalan Ipoh
51200 Kuala Lumpur
32
Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) Bhd. v. Dato’ Sri Diraja Hj. Adnan Hj.
Yaakob [2016] 5 CLJ 857
Lim Guan Eng v. Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd [2012] 3 MLRH 124
Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais Yatim v. Amizudin Ahmat [2012] 1 MLRH

519
Kian Lup Construction v. Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd. [2002] 7

CLJ 32
Ayob bin Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 321
Chong Swee Huat & Anor v. Lim Shian Gee [2009] 4 CLJ 113 CA;
[2009] 3 MLJ 665
Subramaniam Paramasivam v. Courts Mammoth Berhad & Anor

[2010] 1 LNS 904
Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd. [1999] 1 CLJ 461
Keluarga Communication Sdn. Bhd. v. Normala Samsuddin & Another

Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 46
Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad &

Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146
Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn. Bhd. v. Tony Pua Kiam Wee
[2015] 8 CLJ 477
Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad

[1999] 4 AMR 3926, [2001] 1 CLJ 519
33
Sivabalan a/l P Asapathy v. The New Straits Time Press (M) Sdn. Bhd.
[2010] 9 MLJ 320
Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v. Sistem Televisyen

Malaysia Bhd. & Anor [2014] 3 CLJ 560
Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Wan Muhammad Aziz bin Wan Deris
[2014] 9 MLJ 605
Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 233
Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v. Chong Chieng Jen

[2016] MLJU 113
Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan
Chee Yioun & other appeals [2000] 3 CLJ 728
Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v. Chua Jui Meng [2005] 3 MLJ 494
Dato’ Musa Hitam v. SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314
Akta Fitnah 1957, ss. 8, 9, 12
Akta Keterangan 1950, s. 114 (g)
Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012, A. 78 r. 3(2)
34
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DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM

DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN

GUAMAN NO. BA-B53CY-02-07/2017

JEGANARTH A/L SAMIKANU

VASANTHAN A/L SINNAPPAN

IKATAN AUTHORITI PIHAK PLAINTIFF

MESSRS KALAIVANI LETICIA & PARTNERS

3. CHIN CHOON v. CHUA JUI MENG [2005] 2 CLJ 569 C

6. WAN MAZLAN WAN MOHAMED WOOJDY v. THASLEEM MOHAMED F

7. DR KHAIRUL AZHAR MAT DAUD lwn. DR ZUKERI IBRAHIM [2016] 1 G

8. NORMAL AHMAD @ SALIMAN v. SISTEM TELEVISYEN MALAYSIA H

9. MAJLIS AMANAH RAKYAT & ANOR v. MAT NAWI AWANG & I

10. ABU HASSAN HASBULLAH v. ZUKERI IBRAHIM [2017] 1 LNS 1754 J

12. ROOKES V. BARNARD [1964] AC 1129 L

SYNERGISTIC DUO SDN BHD v. LAI MEI JUAN A

HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction – Interim injunction – Application for interim

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Locus standi – Tort – Application for interim injunction

(4) The defendant continued to publish the postings on her Facebook A

Reported by Najib Tamby

(a) “Never come to BGT Lake view at SS7!!”

J: sorry, no refund as we already stated in the reservation term.”

[10] On or around 26 December 2016, the defendant published or caused

A their argument that under the doctrine of privity of contract, a contract

[28] The questions before this court are:

[37] Therefore, for these reasons, I disallow the defendant’s preliminary A

A [42] The plaintiff relying on the decision in Petroliam Nasional Bhd

A (b) Whether The Defendant’s Defence Of Justification And/Or Fair Comments Is

[56] To successfully establish the defence of justification, the defendant

A [57] Publishing a statement based on comments she received from other

I do not take it to be disputed that whether the words complained of were

(c) Whether There Is Evidence Of Intention To Publish The Impugned Statements A

immediately to restrain the defendant whether by herself, her servants, agents A

10. At [2003] 6 MLJ 590h.

a LING WAH PRESS (M) SDN BHD & ORS

unreasonable, unjust or irrational, the appellate courts should proceed with a

[7] A plaintiff in a libel action is not bound to enter default judgment.

a [2] Hakim bicara sememangnya betul apabila memutuskan bahawa perayu-

Humphries v. TWT Ltd [1994] 120 ALR 693 (refd) a

Reported by Izzaty Izzuddin d

Damages in a libel case are essentially matters of impression. The Federal

sad truth is that no apology, retraction or withdrawal can ever be guaranteed a

Nourse LJ in Sutcliffe v. Pressdam Ltd. [1991] 1 QB 153 at 184 held:

a [2] It is not a fair interpretation of Lord Devlin’s speech in Rookes v.

[3] Mahkamah Tinggi tidak seharusnya memberikan award yang berasingan

a Case(s) referred to:

Other source(s) referred to:

1. The gravity of the allegation.

2. The size and influence of the circulation.

4. The extent and nature of the claimant’s reputation.

5. The behaviour of the defendant.

6. The behaviour of the claimant. i

Karpal Singh v. DP Vijandran is readily distinguishable from the present case.

With respect, we do not think it a fair interpretation of Lord Devlin’s speech

DALAM PERKARA MENGENAI MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA

NOR IZAWATI ABD RAHMAN ... PLAINTIF

SHEIKH MOHD FAIZAL OMAR ... DEFENDAN

mendakwa telah difitnah secara lisan (slander) dan juga secara

bertulis (libel) oleh defendan, Sheikh Mohd Faizal bin Omar.

[2] Pada masa berkaitan, plaintif, seorang pengusaha restoran serta

ketering dan mempunyai perniagaan yang dikenali sebagai ‘Mai

Cuba Corner’ (MCC) yang terletak di Behrang Stesen, Tanjung

dikenali sebagai seorang yang mampu mengubati penyakit pesakit