STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

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INQUIRY CONCERNING REPORT OF THE
JUDGE BRUCE CLAYTON SPECIAL MASTERS:

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MILLS, FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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NO. 201.

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By Notice of Formal Proceedings filed October 13, 2017, the
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Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) charged
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Contra Costa County Superior Court Judge Bruce Clayton Mills

with two counts of willful misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
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administration of justice that brings the judicial office into

disrepute, and improper action within the meaning of article VI,
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section 18 of the California Constitution. The Chief Justice of

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California appointed the undersigned, Justice Victoria G.

Chaney, Presiding Special Master, Justice Jennifer R.S. Detjen,
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Special Master, and Judge Paul A. Bacigalupo, Special Master, to

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hear and take evidence. On January 17 and 18, 2018, we

conducted an evidentiary hearing in San Francisco, California.
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We now submit this final report containing findings of fact and

conclusions of law in accordance with rule 129 of the Rules of the
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Commission on Judicial Performance.

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As set forth below, we find Judge Mills’s conduct

constitutes violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics that rise to
the level of willful misconduct.
 BACKGROUND
Judge Bruce Clayton Mills was a deputy district attorney
in Contra Costa County for eight years before he was sworn in as

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a Contra Costa County Municipal Court judge in 1995. He was

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elevated to the superior court in 1998. (Ex. 23.) Prior to the
events at issue in this matter, the Commission has disciplined

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Judge Mills five times during his 23 years on the bench. In 2001,
the Commission issued a Notice of Intended Private

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Admonishment to Judge Mills based on conduct that ―fostered an
appearance that the judge was attempting to coerce or intimidate

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[a] defendant into pleading guilty to the charge against him.‖
(Ex. 23.) In 2006, the Commission publicly admonished Judge
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Mills for improper ex parte communications, embroilment, and

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for ―a pattern of making comments that are discourteous,
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sarcastic, demeaning and belittling to those appearing before

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him.‖ (Ex. 24.) The Commission issued Judge Mills an advisory

letter in 2008 for ―[c]onditioning [a] defendant‘s release on
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posting bail for the improper purpose of collecting restitution.‖

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(Ex. 25.) In 2011, the Commission issued Judge Mills another

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advisory letter for ―enabling [his] minor son to bypass the

ordinary application process for going on a ‗ride along‘ ‖ to
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accompany a police officer executing a warrant Judge Mills

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signed. (Ex. 26.) Finally, in 2013, the Commission publicly

admonished Judge Mills for communicating with a courtroom
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clerk and a pro tem judge in another department ―through

channels not available to the public‖ about a case involving his
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son. (Ex. 27.)

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We recite the background associated with this inquiry

chronologically.

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 A. PEOPLE V. JEFFERS (COUNT TWO)
On March 23, 2016, Ryan Smith (Smith), defendant‘s
counsel in People v. Jeffers, Contra Costa County Superior Court

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No. 01-171912-9, left Judge Mills and deputy district attorney

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William Moser (Moser) in the courtroom as the jury retired to the
jury room to begin deliberations. (Exs. 20, 22; RT 106-107.)1 As

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Moser prepared to leave the courtroom, he and Judge Mills had a
conversation. Moser recalls that Judge Mills asked him,

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specifically in the context of the Jeffers trial, ―do you want to
know what I would have done?‖ and talked to him about an

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argument that might have ―defeat[ed] the defense theory.‖ (RT
107-108.) Judge Mills recalls the conversation as a ―war story‖
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about a similar case he had when he was a deputy district

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attorney. (Ex. 22.)
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Moser reported the conversation to his supervisor, Nancy

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Georgiou (Georgiou). (Ex. 21.) On March 24, 2016—the day after

the conversation—Georgiou called Smith to disclose the
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conversation; she also disclosed the conversation to Judge John

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Kennedy, the supervising judge of the Contra Costa County

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criminal courts. (Ex. 21.) Judge Steve Austin, Contra Costa

County‘s Presiding Judge, also learned of the communication on
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March 24. (RT 90.)

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On March 29, 2016, Judge Austin met with Judge Mills to

discuss the Mills-Moser conversation. (RT 90-91.) Judge Austin
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told Judge Mills that the matter was ―potentially serious,‖ told
him that Judge Austin might have to report that communication
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to the Commission, and gave Judge Mills a copy of the

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Commission‘s Public Admonishment of Judge Stuart Scott. (RT

1Citations to the reporter‘s transcript are to the January

17, 2018 reporter‘s transcript.

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 96.) (See In the Matter of Judge Stuart Scott, Decision and Order
Imposing Public Admonishment (Feb. 17, 2016)
<https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/Scott_02-

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17-16.pdf> [as of Feb. 28, 2018].)

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On April 1, 2016, Judge Kennedy had a court reporter
transcribe a disclosure of the communication; both Georgiou and

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Smith were present and acknowledged the disclosure. (Ex. 21.)
Georgiou and Smith then appeared in Judge Mills‘s courtroom,

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where he disclosed on the record his characterization of his
conversation with Moser and recused himself from any further

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involvement in the case. (Ex. 22.) As it turned out, the Jeffers
jury had deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial. (Ex. 20.)
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On April 18, 2016, Judge Mills and Judge Austin spoke

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again. Judge Austin told Judge Mills that he had received an
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ethics opinion about the communication and was still trying to

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decide ―what [his] next step was going to be.‖ (RT 97.) Judge
Mills, through his attorney, James Murphy, self-reported the
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communication to the Commission on April 21, 2016. (Ex. 1.)

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B. EVILSIZOR V. SWEENEY (COUNT ONE)

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On August 12, 2016, Judge Mills presided over a hearing on

an order to show cause regarding contempt stemming from
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Joseph Sweeney‘s (Sweeney) violation of a protective order

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entered in divorce proceedings between Sweeney and Keri

Evilsizor (Evilsizor). (Exs. 6, A.) After determining Sweeney had
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violated the protective order, Judge Mills asked Evilsizor‘s

attorney, Michelene Insalaco (Insalaco), to advise the court
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regarding jail time. (Ex. A.) Insalaco requested Judge Mills

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impose the ―maximum combined sentence‖ for Sweeney, which

Judge Mills believed to be 25 days in jail. (Ex. A.) In response,
Judge Mills advised Insalaco:

CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL BRANCH NEWS SERVICE CJBNS.ORG

 ―THE COURT: Well, keep in mind, he‘s also going to get
good time[] credits. You don‘t do criminal. But he‘s also going to
get one day good time for each day that he serves, probably. So

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out of 25, he‘ll serve 12 or 13?

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―THE BAILIFF: Yes.
―THE COURT: So the reality is he‘ll only serve half of it to

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begin with.‖ (Ex. A.)
Although Judge Mills was initially determined to sentence

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Sweeney on August 12 and attempted to remand Sweeney to
custody, Judge Mills eventually continued sentencing to August

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16 after determining, based on a ―form on the clerk‘s computer,‖
that Sweeney was entitled to a 72-hour stay before sentencing.
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(Ex. A.) At the sentencing hearing, Judge Mills adopted

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Insalaco‘s proposed factual findings and sentenced Sweeney: ―On
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each count there‘s a $1,000 fine. I think it would be appropriate

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to order the fine be paid by a specific date, so I‘ll order 180 days
to pay the fine and five days on each count, to run consecutive, for
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a total of 25 days. And then attorneys‘ fees, as indicated, in the

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amount of $19,080, costs of $930, for a total of $20,010 in costs

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and fees. [¶] That is the order. Defendant‘s remanded into the
custody of the sheriff‘s department.‖ (Ex. C.) Judge Mills signed
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an order outlining the sentence and provided a copy to Evilsizor‘s

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counsel, who later served the order on James Morrison

(Morrison), Sweeney‘s lawyer; the order was silent regarding
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good time credits. (Exs. 11, 15; RT 52, 183-184.)

The sheriff‘s department returned the order to Judge
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Mills‘s courtroom through the Judge‘s bailiff, Deputy Joe

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Harrison, questioning whether the sentence included good time

credits. (RT 163-165, 176.) After consulting with Judge Mills,
his clerk, Lori Bogdan (Bogdan), handwrote on the order ―no good

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 time credits to be given‖ and Judge Mills initialed the notation.
Bogdan sent the form—with the new notation—back to the jail,
but never served it on the parties. (RT 163-164, 169.)

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Sweeney‘s mother contacted Morrison on August 25, 2016,

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concerned about her son‘s release date. (RT 53.) Morrison then
investigated and learned of the revised order when he received a

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copy from the jail. (RT 53-54, 56.) That day, Morrison wrote a
letter to Judge Mills—copied to Insalaco—requesting that Judge

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Mills ―correct‖ the order and notify the sheriff. (Ex. 15, RT 58-
59.) Insalaco‘s office responded by letter the same day urging

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Judge Mills to leave his ―no good time credits‖ order intact. (Ex.
J, RT 189-190.)
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Upon receiving the parties‘ letters, Judge Mills consulted

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with Judge Kennedy, who Judge Mills said ―concurred in the
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opinion‖ that Sweeney was not entitled to ―good time credits in

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connection with the civil contempt citation.‖ (Ex. 5.) According

to Judge Mills, however, ―both judges, who were aware of Mr.
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Sweeney‘s past litigation history of filing appeals, motions, as

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well as complaints against the Commission . . . and others,

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decided to avoid a ‗constitutional crisis‘ and afford [Sweeney] the

credit entitlements which he may not have actually been entitled
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to receive.‖ (Ex. 5.) On August 25, 2016, Judge Mills issued an

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order that Sweeney ―having been ordered to serve 25 days county

jail is entitled to receive good time credits.‖ (Ex. 16.)
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C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. PREHEARING
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Judge Mills self-reported the Jeffers communication to the

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Commission on April 21, 2016. (Ex. 1.) The Commission wrote to

Judge Mills on October 28, 2016, to inform him it had ordered a
preliminary investigation regarding that communication. (Ex. 2.)

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 Judge Mills responded to the Commission on December 13, 2016.
(Ex. 3.)
On January 30, 2017, the Commission wrote to Judge Mills

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informing him it had ordered a supplemental preliminary

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investigation regarding the Evilsizor v. Sweeney orders. (Ex. 4.)
Judge Mills responded through counsel on March 16, 2017. (Ex.

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5.)
The Commission filed a Notice of Formal Proceedings on

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October 13, 2017, charging Judge Mills in two counts with willful
misconduct, prejudicial conduct, and improper action under

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article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution. Judge Mills
noted in his Answer to the Notice of Formal Proceedings, filed on
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October 30, 2017, that on October 19, 2017, he had ―demanded

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that Inquiry No. 201 be dismissed on the ground that the entire
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Commission, including its Executive Director and staff, had

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conflicts of interest and was disqualified . . . .‖ On November 13,

2017, the Commission denied Judge Mills‘s disqualification
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demand and on December 20, 2017, the Supreme Court denied

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Judge Mills‘s writ petition stemming from his disqualification

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demand (case No. S245704). On December 1, the Chief Justice

appointed us ―to hear and take evidence‖ in the above-entitled
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matter ―and report thereon to the Commission.‖

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On December 27, 2017, the parties filed their prehearing

briefs, followed on December 28 by their proposed exhibit and
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witness lists. On January 4, 2018, the parties filed and served

objections to proposed exhibits.
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We conducted a prehearing conference on January 10, 2018

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in advance of the evidentiary hearing set for January 17.

Following the prehearing conference, the parties served offers of
proof and time estimates for their proposed witnesses. Judge

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 Mills also served an amended witness list and an amended
proposed exhibit list, to which the Examiners filed objections.
We issued tentative rulings on the parties‘ objections on

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January 12, 2018. On January 16, Judge Mills served notice that

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he would be arguing certain of our tentative rulings, and filed
and served a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior

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discipline.
2. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

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At the outset of the January 17, 2018 hearing, we heard
argument regarding proposed exhibits and Judge Mills‘s motion

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in limine. For those exhibits on which the parties did not argue,
we adopted our written tentative rulings. Based on the parties‘
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argument, we overruled objections to exhibits 18, 19, 23, 24, 25,

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26, and 27. (RT 13, 19.) We also denied Judge Mills‘s motion in
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limine, which would have excluded exhibits 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.
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Exhibits M and P were excluded per our tentative rulings, and we

excluded exhibits Q and R based on the parties‘ argument at the
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hearing.2 (RT 20.) We admitted all other exhibits, including the

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Examiners‘ exhibits 1 through 12 and 14 through 27, and

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Respondent‘s exhibits A through L, N, O, S, and T.3 (RT 69.)

We heard testimony in the matter on January 17, 2018,
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and closing argument on January 18.

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After the Examiners rested, Judge Mills moved to dismiss

the inquiry because Judge Mills argued there was ―no clear and
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convincing evidence whatsoever‖ to support the Commission‘s

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2 We have detailed the parties‘ objections to exhibits and

our rulings in appendix A.

3The Examiners withdrew their proposed exhibit 13 before

the hearing.

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 charges against Judge Mills. (RT 144.) We denied the motion,
finding we lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the charges under article
VI, section 18 of the California Constitution and the Rules of the

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Commission on Judicial Performance, rule 125(b). Consistent

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with the findings of fact and conclusions of law below, however,
we would have denied the motion had we reached the merits.

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DISCUSSION
A. LEGAL STANDARDS

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The Commission has charged Judge Mills with (a) willful
misconduct in office, (b) conduct prejudicial to the administration

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of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute (prejudicial
conduct), and (c) improper action, as those terms are used in
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article VI, section 18, subdivision (d) of the California

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Constitution.
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1. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
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―To commit willful misconduct in office, a judge must (1)

engage in conduct that is unjudicial and (2) committed in bad
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faith, (3) while acting in a judicial capacity.‖ (Broadman v.

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Commission on Judicial Performance (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1079,

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1091 (Broadman).) ―A judge acts in bad faith only by (1)

performing a judicial act for a corrupt purpose (which is any
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purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties), or (2)

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performing a judicial act with knowledge that the act is beyond

the judge‘s lawful judicial power, or (3) performing a judicial act
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that exceeds the judge‘s lawful power with a conscious disregard

for the limits of the judge‘s authority.‖ (Id. at p. 1092.)
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2. PREJUDICIAL CONDUCT
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―Prejudicial conduct is distinguishable from willful

misconduct in that a judge‘s acts may constitute prejudicial
conduct even if not committed in a judicial capacity, or if

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 committed in a judicial capacity, not committed in bad faith.
Prejudicial conduct is ‗either ―conduct which a judge undertakes
in good faith but which nevertheless would appear to an objective

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observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial

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to public esteem for the judicial office‖ . . . or ―willful misconduct
out of office, i.e., unjudicial conduct committed in bad faith by a

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judge not then acting in a judicial capacity‖ ‘ ‖ (Broadman,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1092-1093.)

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3. IMPROPER ACTION
―The least serious type of judicial misconduct is improper

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action. It is conduct that violates the California Code of Judicial
Ethics, but that does not rise to the level of prejudicial
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misconduct. [Citation.] Improper action thus includes unjudicial

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conduct that an objective observer aware of the circumstances
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would not necessarily deem to have an adverse effect on the

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reputation of the judiciary.‖ (Inquiry Concerning Freedman

(2007) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 223, 232.)
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4. STANDARD OF PROOF
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―The [C]ommission has the burden of proving the charges

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against Judge [Mills] by clear and convincing evidence.

[Citations.] ‗Evidence of a charge is clear and convincing so long
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as there is a ―high probability‖ that the charge is true.

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[Citations.] The evidence need not establish the fact beyond a

reasonable doubt.‘ ‖ (Inquiry Concerning Velasquez (2007) 49
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Cal.4th CJP Supp. 175, 184.)

B. COUNT ONE – EVILSIZOR V. SWEENEY
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1. AUGUST 16, 2016 ORDERS

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a. Findings of Fact – August 16, 2016 Orders

The operative facts regarding Judge Mills‘s ex parte
communication with the sheriff‘s department on August 16, 2016

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 regarding Joseph Sweeney‘s contempt sentence are largely
undisputed, rather the parties primarily disagree about the effect
of those facts.

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The Examiners and Judge Mills agree that on August 12,

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Judge Mills presided over a hearing on an order to show cause
regarding contempt alleging that Sweeney had violated a

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Domestic Violence Prevention Act restraining order issued by
another judge. (Exs. 5, 6.) At the sentencing hearing on August

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16, Judge Mills sentenced Sweeney to 25 days in jail. (Ex. 11.)
The Examiners and Judge Mills also agree that two versions of

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the sentencing order resulted from the hearing, one without and
one with the words ―no good time credits to be given‖
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handwritten on the second page. (Exs. 11, 12.) Finally, there is

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no dispute that one of those versions—the one without ―no good
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time credits to be given‖—found its way to the parties, but Judge

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Mills did not instruct that the revised order be served on the
parties. (Exs. 5, 15; RT 52, 169.)
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The Examiners and Judge Mills disagree about whether

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the version of the order containing the notation ―no good time
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credits to be given‖ constituted a clarification or a modification of

the original order. We find that the notation modified, rather
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than clarified, the order.4

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Although Judge Mills did not testify at the evidentiary

hearing, we find that many of the statements submitted to the
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Commission on his behalf, which bind Judge Mills pursuant to

the Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance, rule 106
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4 Each of our findings is by clear and convincing evidence.

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 and Evidence Code section 1222, lack indicia of credibility.5 As
discussed below, Judge Mills‘s statements evidence a story that
changed incompatibly over time. Nevertheless, Judge Mills‘s

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statements convince us the notation was a modification rather

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than a clarification.
There is no dispute that the order Judge Mills initially

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issued and sent to the jail with Sweeney is silent about the
availability of good time credits. To support his clarification

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argument, Judge Mills now contends that the order‘s silence is
equivalent to an order that Sweeney was to be afforded no good

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Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance, rule

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106 provides: ―A judge may be represented by counsel in all
commission proceedings. The written communications of counsel
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shall be deemed to be the written communications of the judge.

Counsel has the authority to bind the judge as to all matters
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except a stipulation as to discipline.

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―Any paper filed with the commission and any written

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statement made to the commission or to its staff must be signed

by the judge or the judge‘s counsel. A stipulation as to discipline
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must be signed by the judge. The signing of any document or

statement warrants that the signer has personal knowledge of
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the matter contained in the document or statement or has

investigated the matter and has a good faith belief in the
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accuracy of the representations contained in the document or

statement.
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―This rule applies to the filing of responses to staff inquiry

letters and preliminary investigation letters under rules 110 and
111, to the filing of answers in formal proceedings under rule 119,
and to all other filings with the commission and the masters and
all other correspondence with the commission.‖

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 time credits. We are aware of no evidence supporting that
contention.6
But Judge Mills argued in his initial response to the

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Commission (dated March 16, 2017) that ―in any misdemeanor

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sentencing the protocol is not to set forth on the sentencing order
whether good time credits are available or not . . . . Those credits

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are usually available, so it is the sheriff‘s department at jail that
determines the amount of good time that would be allotted . . . .‖

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(Ex. 5, italics added.) Judge Mills‘s admission is bolstered by his
statement that “[t]he sentencing minute order accompanying Mr.

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Sweeney to the jail is silent on the issue [of good time credits], as
are all sentencing orders. After his incarceration, the Sheriff‘s
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Department made an inquiry to Judge Mills‘s clerk Lori Bog[d]an

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seeking a clarification whether the sentencing minute order
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included good time credits. Ms. Bog[d]an then presented the

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issue to Judge Mills. Judge Mills reviewed Penal Code Section

4019 to determine whether the contempt citation giving rise to jail
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time was covered by the statute allowing good time credits, or not.
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Judge Mills concluded, based on his analysis of the statute, that

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the contempt citation at issue was not reduced by the good time
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6 Judge Mills‘s clerk, Lori Bogdan, testified that she

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recalled argument regarding sentencing credits and that Judge

Mills had stated no good time credits were to be given. (RT 166-
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167.) She later said that she could not remember how the
question resolved. (RT 174-176.) The reporter‘s transcripts of
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the August 12 and 16, 2016 hearings do not support Bogdan‘s

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initial assertion that Judge Mills ruled on the issue. (Exs. A, B,

C.) Consequently, while we make no general finding regarding
Bogdan‘s credibility, we find that her memory that Judge Mills
issued a ruling regarding good time credits to be faulty, and
therefore not credible.

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CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL BRANCH NEWS SERVICE CJBNS.ORG

provisions of the Penal Code, so he had his clerk clarify the

minute order, which had been returned to court by the deputy
sheriffs at jail, that good time credits were not available. Judge

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Mills‘[s] Clerk then returned the order, as clarified[,] to the jail.‖

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(Ex. 5, italics added.)
We find the sequence of events Judge Mills outlined in his

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March 16, 2017 letter to be mostly credible. Judge Mills‘s
description of the events following Sweeney‘s remand to county

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jail is a statement against Judge Mills‘s own interest, but
consistent with his sua sponte explanation to Insalaco on the

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record on August 12, 2016 about how much time Sweeney would
spend in jail: ―keep in mind, [Sweeney]‘s also going to get good
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time[] credits. You don‘t do criminal. But he‘s also going to get

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one day good time for each day that he serves, probably.‖ (Ex. A.)
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Judge Mills was a deputy district attorney for eight years

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before going onto the Contra Costa County Municipal Court in

1995. He was elevated to the Superior Court in 1998. (Ex. 23.)
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Judge Mills emphasized his criminal law experience and

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expertise on the record: ―I‘ve been applying [Penal Code section]

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654 in thousands of cases over 21 years,‖ he said. And ―I dealt

with [it] for many years before taking the bench.‖ (Ex. C.) He
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told the parties that he had done ―certainly over a hundred, I

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would think, easily‖ order to show cause hearings before the

Evilsizor v. Sweeney hearing. (Ex. A.)
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All of those circumstances lead us to find that Judge Mills

knew he was modifying the sentencing order when he initialed
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the ―no good time credits to be given‖ notation.7

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7 A clarification of an order, as Bogdan testified, includes

circumstances like illegible handwriting or a written order a
judge forgot to sign. (RT 170.) In this case, however, the new

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 b. Conclusions of Law – August 16, 2016
Orders
California Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7) provides in

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pertinent part: ―A judge shall accord to every person who has a

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legal interest in a proceeding, or that person‘s lawyer, the full
right to be heard according to law. . . . A judge shall not initiate,

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permit, or consider ex parte communications, that is, any
communications to or from the judge outside the presence of the

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parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding, and shall
make reasonable efforts to avoid such communications, except as

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follows: [¶] (a) . . . [¶] A judge may consult with court
personnel or others authorized by law, as long as the
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communication relates to that person‘s duty to aid the judge in

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carrying out the judge‘s adjudicative responsibilities. [¶] . . . For
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purposes of Canon 3B(7)(a), ‗court personnel‘ includes bailiffs,

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court reporters, court externs, research attorneys, courtroom

clerks, and other employees of the court, but does not include . . .
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employees of other governmental entities . . . .‖ (Cal. Code Jud.

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Ethics, canon 3B(7).)

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Judge Mills‘s modified August 16, 2016 order, which he

transmitted to the sheriff‘s department through Bogdan, is a
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communication from the judge outside the presence of the parties

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and concerning a pending proceeding. The sheriff‘s department is

not ―court personnel.‖ Judge Mills‘s communication, therefore,
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violates the Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7).8

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handwritten notation affected the extent of the sentence by 12-

plus days and significantly impacted Sweeney‘s liberty interest.
8 That the communications went through Bogdan is

irrelevant. ―The fact that an ex parte communication is indirect

does not make it permissible. No improper ex parte

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 We further conclude that Judge Mills‘s failure to set the
matter for hearing upon determining that the credits issue
remained undecided was an independent violation of Code of

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Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7), which provides: ―A judge shall

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accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or
that person‘s lawyer, the full right to be heard according to law.‖

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―To commit willful misconduct in office, a judge must (1)
engage in conduct that is unjudicial and (2) committed in bad

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faith, (3) while acting in a judicial capacity.‖ (Broadman, supra,
18 Cal.4th at p. 1091.) ―[I]n order to determine whether a judge‘s

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conduct is ‗unjudicial,‘ we measure that conduct with reference to
the [Code of Judicial Ethics].‖ (Dodds v. Commission on Judicial
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Performance (1995) 12 Cal.4th 163, 172.) Because it violated

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canon 3B(7), Judge Mills‘s conduct was ―unjudicial.‖
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Additionally, based on our findings of fact regarding Judge

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Mills‘s experience and prior discipline, detailed below as factors

in aggravation, and his admissions in this matter, we conclude
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Judge Mills modified his order without a hearing, an act that

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exceeded Judge Mills‘s lawful power and significantly impacted

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Sweeney‘s liberty interests, and did so with at least a conscious

disregard for the limits of his authority. We conclude, therefore,
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that Judge Mills‘s violations of canon 3B(7) constitute willful

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misconduct. (See Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1092.)

2. AUGUST 25, 2016 ORDER
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a. Findings of Fact – August 25, 2016 Order

In its Notice of Formal Proceedings, the Commission
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alleged that Judge Mills issued the August 25, 2016 order
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communications may be sent or received via court staff.‖

(Rothman et al., Cal. Judicial Conduct Handbook (4th ed. 2017) §
5.7, p. 271.)

16
 granting Sweeney good time credits ―even though [Judge Mills]
did not necessarily believe that [Sweeney] was entitled to‖ the
credits.

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The only evidence we have regarding Judge Mills‘s state of

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mind when he issued the August 25, 2016 order is contained in
his written statements to the Commission.9 As with his

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statements regarding his conduct on August 16, 2016, Judge
Mills‘s story has evolved to suit his defense.

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On March 16, 2017, Judge Mills claimed: ―When Judge
Mills found out that Mr. Sweeney‘s lawyer was claiming good

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time entitlements pursuant to statute, he conferred with Judge
John Kennedy, the supervising criminal law judge in Contra
Ju ch
Costa County. Judge Kennedy concurred in the opinion that

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Penal Code § 4019 did not provide good time credits in connection
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with the civil contempt citation adjudicated against Mr. Sweeney.

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However, both judges, who were aware of Mr. Sweeney’s past

litigation history of filing appeals, motions, as well as complaints
no ial

against the Commission on Judicial Performance and others,

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decided to avoid a ‘constitutional crisis’ and afford him the credit

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entitlements which he may not have actually been entitled to

receive. An ‗unreported minute order‘ was prepared specifying
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that Mr. Sweeney was to receive good time credit. [¶] Mr.
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Sweeney did receive the good time credit and was later released
from jail after the credits were applied. It is our understanding
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that Mr. Sweeney did not serve any more jail time than he would
have served had he been given the good time credits from the
al
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9Neither Judge Mills nor Judge Kennedy, upon whom

Judge Mills places the onus of his August 25, 2016 order, testified
at Judge Mills‘s evidentiary hearing.

17
 start of his incarceration following sentencing.‖ (Ex. 5, italics
added.)
In his prehearing brief filed and served December 27, 2017,

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Judge Mills changed his factual contention: ―Judge Mills

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reviewed the submissions of both parties and conferred with
Judge John Kennedy, the supervising criminal law judge in

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Contra Costa County. Judge Kennedy advised that if there was
ambiguity with respect to the application of the criminal statute

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to a civil contempt incarceration, he ought to allow for the credit.
Judge Mills followed Judge Kennedy‘s advice and in exercising

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his discretion issued a new minute order allowing for good time
credits to be applied.‖10
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The evolution of Judge Mills‘s explanation further

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diminishes his credibility. The two explanations are mutually
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exclusive. Either Judge Mills ―decided to avoid a ‗constitutional

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crisis and afford [Sweeney] the credit entitlements which he may

not have actually been entitled to receive,‖ or he ―followed Judge
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Kennedy‘s advice‖ to allow for credit in the event of ambiguity.

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But he did not do both.

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10 The version of Penal Code section 4019 effective on

August 12 and 16, 2016 states: ―(a) The provisions of this section
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shall apply in all of the following cases: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When a
prisoner is confined in or committed to the county jail, industrial
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farm, or road camp or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp
for a definite period of time for contempt pursuant to a
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proceeding other than a criminal action or proceeding.‖ The

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statute expressly applies to the August 16, 2016 sentencing

order, and we see no reasonable argument to the contrary. We do
not find credible in any way Judge Mills‘s attempt to saddle
Judge Kennedy with responsibility regarding the August 25,
2016 order.

18
 We again conclude that Judge Mills‘s March 16, 2017
statement contains indicia of reliability that the statement in his
prehearing brief does not. And Judge Mills‘s earlier statement is

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supported by his statement in the same March 16, 2017 letter

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that on August 16, ―Judge Mills reviewed Penal Code Section
4019 to determine whether the contempt citation giving rise to

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jail time was covered by the statute allowing good time credits, or
not. Judge Mills concluded, based on his analysis of the statute,

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that the contempt citation was not reduced by the good time
provisions of the Penal Code . . . .‖ (Ex. 5.)

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We therefore find that Judge Mills issued the August 25,
2016 order because of Sweeney‘s ―past litigation history of filing
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appeals, motions, [and] complaints against the Commission on

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Judicial Performance and others,‖ rather than for any lawful
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purpose.
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b. Conclusions of Law – August 25, 2016

Order
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―A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the

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judiciary.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 1.) ―A judge shall avoid
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impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the

judge‘s activities.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 2.) ―A judge
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shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in
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a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and

impartiality of the judiciary.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 2A.)
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―A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of partisan

interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism, and shall maintain
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professional competence in the law.‖ (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics,

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canon 3B(2).) ―A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters fairly,

promptly, and efficiently. A judge shall manage the courtroom in
a manner that provides all litigants the opportunity to have their

19
 matters fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.‖ (Cal.
Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(8).)
Judge Mills admitted he issued the August 25, 2016 order

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regarding good time credits because of Sweeney‘s litigation

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history and to avoid what Judge Mills called a ―constitutional
crisis.‖ Judge Mills also admitted that he did so even though he

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did not believe Sweeney was necessarily entitled to the credits.
In issuing the August 25, 2016 order even though he did not

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believe Sweeney was necessarily entitled to credits under Penal
Code section 4019, Judge Mills violated canons 1, 2, 2A, 3B(2),

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and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Deciding an issue for
reasons unconnected to the merits displays no compliance with
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the law, undermines the integrity and independence of the

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judiciary, and deprives litigants the opportunity to have their
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matters adjudicated in accordance with the law. Moreover,

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Judge Mills‘s attempt to deflect his decision to Judge Kennedy

indicates a readiness to abdicate his own responsibility to
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adjudicate the matters that come before him.

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We further conclude that Judge Mills issued the August 25,

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2016 order even though he contemporaneously believed it was

beyond his lawful judicial power. We conclude, therefore, that
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Judge Mills‘s August 25, 2016 conduct in issuing an order even

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though he believed it was not a lawful order rises to the level of

willful misconduct.
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C. COUNT TWO – PEOPLE V. JEFFERS

1. Findings of Fact
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Judge Mills‘s defense of his communication with Moser, the

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deputy district attorney responsible for People v. Jeffers, is that

after the defense attorney left the courtroom, but still in open
court, he merely shared a ―war story‖ with Moser about the last

20
 DUI case that Judge Mills prosecuted 29 years earlier. (Ex. 3.)
Moser testified repeatedly, however, both on direct examination
and on a rigorous cross-examination, that Judge Mills specifically

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asked him ―do you want to know what I would have done?‖ in

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connection with the just-tried People v. Jeffers case. (RT 107,
108, 116, 119, 123, 126-127, 131-132, 137.) Judge Mills then

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offered Moser advice about how he should have handled a specific
part of the case. (RT 108.)

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We find Moser‘s testimony credible. Moser did not recall
many details of the conversation he had with Judge Mills after

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the People v. Jeffers jury retired, but he very specifically
remembered Judge Mills asking ―do you want to know what I
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would have done?‖ and hearing Judge Mills describe what he

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would have done. One of the primary reasons we find Moser‘s
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testimony credible is that the conversation immediately struck

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him as significant enough to report to his supervisor, Georgiou.

(RT 109-110.) Moser told Georgiou about the communication the
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day after it happened.11 (Exs. K, 20; RT 106-108, 110.)

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Georgiou‘s report of the conversation to Judge Kennedy

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further supports Moser‘s testimony. Judge Kennedy explained

that he understood ―from Ms. Georgiou‘s description of the
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conversation it did include suggestions of things that Mr. Moser

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could have done to be more effective in his performance, such as

eliciting particular evidence and so forth.‖ (Ex. K.)
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11The communication happened on March 23, 2016. (Ex.

20; RT 106-108.) On March 24, 2016, Georgiou contacted
defendant‘s counsel and Judge Kennedy to report the
communication. (Ex. J.)

21
 We have no testimony from Judge Mills to consider. We do,
however, have his written submissions to the Commission and
the record he created when he disclosed his conversation with

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Moser to defendant‘s counsel. We do not find the facts in Judge

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Mills‘s statements to be necessarily inconsistent with Moser‘s
testimony.12 It is possible that Judge Mills said all of the things

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he reports he said and said the things Moser recalls him saying.
For that reason, we also find Judge Mills‘s recounting of the

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conversation as he explained it on the record on April 1, 2016 to
be credible.

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Judge Mills reported the conversation as follows: ―After
the jury went out, and here is the disclosure I want to make, Mr.
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Moser remained in court, as I am prone to do, I often work in

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court through inbox matters and whatnot, . . . while I am
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awaiting the jury decision. I never ever discussed anything with

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Mr. Moser in chambers. Everything was out in open court. We

discussed a number of matters, including innocuous things, such
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as where did he go to school, and what did he do before he came

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to the DA‘s office, and those types of things.

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―At one point – and this is where it may become an issue. I

made the observation in relation to the expert witness that was
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presented by Mr. Smith . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .that 29 years ago, when

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I last tried a DUI case that there had been an expert at the
Contra Costa Crime Lab . . . named Grady Goldman, who
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actually tracked the accuracy of the breath machine.

―And what I disclosed to Mr. Moser was that Mr. Goldman
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over a protracted period of time actually monitored the limited

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numbers of cases where there was actually a breath sample and a

As we discuss in our conclusions of law, we do not agree

12

with Judge Mills‘s characterization of those facts.

22
 blood sample taken in the same case, and what I advised him was
that they were able to have a known blood result in a small
number of cases because sometimes you get a breath sample

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taken and they take a reference blood sample, and that they

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monitored in those limited number of cases where the breath
machine measured at or below the actual blood sample so that

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they can tell in the real world, back in the day, whether or not
the machines were actually testing properly. [¶] . . . [¶]

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―And I said, ‘But if there really is a problem with these
machines that the defense expert suggests, then in the future

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someone may have to look at that because if the theory is that –
because our machines here in our county don’t have a temperature
Ju ch
regulator, and that causes inaccurately high results of some type

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being registered, then somebody may[]be ought to take a look at
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that issue.‘ [¶] . . . [¶]

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―But in terms of what went on 29 years ago, and the fact

that that used to be tracked – and frankly, if you had that data,
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Mr. Smith, it could potentially counter the defense that you

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presented in this case, but that data, to my knowledge, hasn‘t

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been monitored in 29 years, and it is not available.‖

(Ex. L, italics added.)
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We find that Judge Mills‘s conversation with Moser was

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related to issues raised during the Jeffers trial.

2. Conclusions of Law
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―A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte

communications, that is, any communications to or from the
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judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or

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impending proceeding, and shall make reasonable efforts to avoid

such communications,‖ subject to exceptions that do not apply
here. (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(7).)

23
 Judge Mills does not dispute that he had a conversation
with Moser outside the presence of defense counsel; he disclosed
as much on the record. Judge Mills, however, characterizes the

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conversation as merely a ―war story,‖ and contends that the

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conversation caused neither side prejudice. We are aware of no
―war story‖ exception to the prohibition against ex parte

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communications. ―An improper ex parte communication violates
canon 3B(7) even if not prejudicial.‖ (Rothman et al., Cal.

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Judicial Conduct Handbook, supra, § 5.1, p. 257.)
Moreover, Judge Mills‘s April 1, 2016 on-the-record-

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disclosure version of the conversation alone violates canon 3B(7).
Judge Mills acknowledged on the record on April 1, 2016 that his
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conversation with Moser was ―in relation to the [defendant‘s]

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expert witness.‖ (Ex. L.) That conversation, then, necessarily
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concerned a pending proceeding. Indeed, at the hearing where

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Judge Mills disclosed the conversation on the record, he

continued to tie the conversation to People v. Jeffers when he told
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defendant‘s counsel that the data he claims to have told Moser

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about ―could potentially counter the defense that you presented

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in this case . . . .‖ (Ex. L.)

Judge Mills‘s conduct was obviously ―unjudicial.‖ And we
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can only conclude that Judge Mills initiated the conversation

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with a conscious disregard for the rules prohibiting ex parte

communications. Judge Mills has been disciplined in the past for
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ex parte communication. (Ex. 24.) The leading treatise on

California judicial ethics repeatedly refers to Judge Mills‘s earlier
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public admonishment in its discussion of improper ex parte

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communications. (See, e.g., Rothman et al., Cal. Judicial Conduct

Handbook, supra, § 5.3, pp. 264, fn. 62, 265, fn. 65.) Judge Mills
should have been well versed about ex parte communications. If

24
 he was not, we can only conclude it is because he chose not to be,
and we conclude that is conscious disregard for the limits of his
authority. Consequently, we conclude that Judge Mills‘s

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violation of canon 3B(7) in the People v. Jeffers matter constituted

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willful misconduct.
D. ADDITIONAL FACTORS

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1. JUDGE MILLS’S CONTENTIONS ABOUT THE
COMMISSION

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Although the Supreme Court denied Judge Mills‘s writ
petition regarding his motion to disqualify the Commission, he

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continued to assert even in his prehearing brief that the
Commission might have some bias related to its own ―personal
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emotional angst with respect to Mr. Sweeney . . .‖ and identified

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Sweeney as ―one of the key leaders in initiating an audit of the
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Commission and forcing the Commission into litigation with the

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State.‖ Even though Judge Mills continued to assert this

connection as the basis for the Commission‘s investigation here,
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no evidence was presented to us that would support such a

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finding.
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2. FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION
a. Dishonesty
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As we noted above, Judge Mills‘s statements regarding the

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Evilsizor v. Sweeney proceedings and the resulting orders

evidence a story that appears to change with the purpose of the
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statement.
In March 2017, when Judge Mills‘s objective was to curtail
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the Commission‘s supplemental investigation, he claimed that

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good time credits ―are usually available,‖ and that ―[t]he

sentencing minute order accompanying Mr. Sweeney to the jail is
silent on the issue, as are all sentencing orders.‖ (Ex. 5.) Judge

25
 Mills claimed that after the sheriff‘s department sent the order
back and asked for information, he ―reviewed Penal Code Section
4019 to determine whether the contempt citation giving rise to

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jail time was covered by the statute, allowing good time credits,

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or not. [He] concluded, based on his analysis of the statute, that
the contempt citation at issue was not reduced by the good time

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provisions of the Penal Code . . . .‖ (Ex. 5.)
Once Sweeney‘s attorney raised the issue, Judge Mills

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claimed he ―conferred with Judge John Kennedy[, who] concurred
in the opinion that Penal Code § 4019 did not provide good time

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credits in connection with the civil contempt citation adjudicated
against Mr. Sweeney. However, both judges, who were aware of
Ju ch
Mr. Sweeney‘s past litigation history of filing appeals, motions, as

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well as complaints against the Commission on Judicial
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Performance and others, decided to avoid a ‗constitutional crisis‘

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and afford him the credit entitlements which he may not have
actually been entitled to receive.‖ (Ex. 5.)
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By the time he filed his Answer to the Commission‘s Notice

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of Formal Proceedings in October 2017, Judge Mills‘s story had

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evolved. While he still claimed that ―in reality, Judge Mills

wasn‘t making a determination or finding on the issue‖ of good
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time credits at the August 12, 2016 hearing, and still

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acknowledged that he researched the issue after the sheriff‘s

department sent the order back and asked about it, the
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circumstances of his August 25, 2016 order were different.

―When Judge Mills found out that Mr. Sweeney‘s lawyer was
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claiming good time entitlements pursuant to the statute,‖ Judge

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Mills explained, ―he conferred with Judge John Kennedy, [who]

also opined that the application of the criminal statute to a civil
contempt incarceration wasn’t clear. Following that discussion,

26
 Judge Mills exercised his discretion and allowed for good time
credits to be applied in this case under Penal Code § 4019. As a
result of the judges‘ conference, an ‗unreported minute order‘ was

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prepared specifying that Mr. Sweeney was to receive good time

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credit.‖ (Italics added.)
In his prehearing brief, Judge Mills‘s story evolved more.

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The notation ―no good time credits to be given,‖ Judge Mills
explained, was how he ―clarified the order by specifically writing

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what the order already provided – no good time credits applied.‖
Judge Mills‘s August 16, 2016 research into Penal Code section

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4019 was omitted from his prehearing brief. Instead, for
purposes of that brief, ―the first time any party identified Penal
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Code § 4019 as being applicable to this family law case‖ was

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August 25, 2016. After the parties raised the good time credits
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issue on August 25, Judge Mills‘s prehearing brief says he

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―reviewed the submissions of both parties and conferred with

Judge John Kennedy, [who] advised that if there was ambiguity
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with respect to the application of the criminal statute to a civil

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contempt incarceration, he ought to allow for the credit. Judge

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Mills followed Judge Kennedy‘s advice and in exercising his

discretion issued a new minute order allowing for good time
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credits to be applied.‖
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By the time he filed his proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law, Judge Mills‘s claim that he had researched
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Penal Code section 4019 on August 16, 2016 was, he claimed,

―simply a mistake. The hearing transcripts establish this error
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and confirm that Judge Mills‘s memory was inaccurate on the

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timing of his review of Penal Code 4019.‖

The evolution of Judge Mills‘s statements about his actions
on August 16, 2016, and about his consultation with Judge

27
 Kennedy parallel the evolution of his defense in this matter.
Judge Mills did not make a mistake. But he did make several
misrepresentations. Moreover, we are particularly concerned

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with Judge Mills‘s attempt to justify his own misconduct by

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reference to his consultation with Judge Kennedy and Judge
Kennedy‘s advice.

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Finally, given Judge Mills‘s explanations of his review and
Judge Kennedy‘s advice about Penal Code section 4019, we are

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not convinced Judge Mills ever read section 4019. As explained
earlier, that section unambiguously applied to Sweeney‘s

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sentence. Consequently, Judge Mills either never read section
4019 in the context of the Sweeney matter, or he became
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embroiled in the matter and his statements represent an attempt

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to justify both his August 16 and 25, 2016 orders. Under either
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scenario, Judge Mills‘s candor and honesty is placed in direct

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question.
Honesty is a ―minimum qualification[] which [is] expected
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of every judge.‖ (Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance

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(1989) 49 Cal.3d 826, 865.) ―The misconduct in this matter is

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especially serious because it indicates that the judge was willing

to fabricate justifications‖ for his actions. (Ryan v. Commission
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on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 535.) ―This is

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misconduct of the worst kind, evidencing moral turpitude and

dishonesty.‖ (Ibid.)
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b. Prior Discipline
Judge Mills has an extensive record of prior discipline. He
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was privately admonished in 2001 for conduct that ―fostered an

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appearance that the judge was attempting to coerce or intimidate

[a] defendant into pleading guilty to the charge against him.‖
(Ex. 23.)

28
 The Commission issued a Decision and Order Imposing
Public Admonishment in 2006 for improper ex parte
communications, for embroilment, and for failing to be patient,

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dignified, and courteous with persons with whom he was dealing

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in an official capacity. (Ex. 24.) This discipline is particularly
relevant to the instant matter because of its focus on improper ex

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parte communications.
The Commission issued an advisory letter in 2008 after

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Judge Mills conditioned a defendant‘s release on posting bail for
the improper purpose of collecting restitution. (Ex. 25.) A second

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advisory letter followed in 2011 for Judge Mills bypassing the
ordinary application process for a ―ride along‖ so his son could
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accompany a police officer executing a search warrant Judge

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Mills signed. (Ex. 26.)
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The Commission issued a second Decision and Order

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Imposing Public Admonishment in 2011 after Judge Mills sought

and received credit through improper communications with a
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courtroom clerk and a pro tem judge for time his son spent in a
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residential program in lieu of community service he failed to

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complete in a tobacco infraction case. (Ex. 27.)

While Judge Mills has been admonished for ex parte
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communications in the past, the unrelated misconduct is also

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relevant because it demonstrates Judge Mills‘s inability to

conform to the Code of Judicial Ethics. (See Inquiry Concerning
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McBrien (2010) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 315, 343.)

c. Experience
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In its 2001 private admonishment, the Commission found

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in aggravation Judge Mills‘s experience on the bench and before:

―In aggravation, the commission found that Judge Mills had been
a judge for more than four years at the time of the incident and

29
 previously had been a deputy district attorney for eight years.‖
(Ex. 23.) Judge Mills has now been a judge for almost 22 years.
The story he claims he told in the Jeffers matter was from 29

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years before the Jeffers trial. (Ex. L.)

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3. FACTORS IN MITIGATION
We find no mitigating factors. We might have considered

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Judge Mills‘s decision to report himself to the Commission a
mitigating factor, but Judge Mills did so more than three weeks

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after the violation and only after Judge Austin advised Judge
Mills that Judge Austin had received an ethics opinion and might

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have to report Judge Mills‘s conduct to the Commission. Coupled
with Judge Mills‘s lack of candor, Judge Mills‘s lengthy delay in
Ju ch
reporting his conduct signals to us that he self-reported only to

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claim mitigation.
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30
 CONCLUSION
On Count One, we conclude that the Examiners proved two
independent violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7)

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regarding the August 16, 2016 orders and violations of canons 1,

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2, 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(8) with regard to the August 25, 2016 order.
As to Count Two, we conclude that the Examiners proved a

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violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, canon 3B(7). We conclude
the Examiners proved all of these violations by clear and

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convincing evidence. We further conclude that all of these
violations rise to the level of willful misconduct pursuant to

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article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution.

Ju ch Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: March 13, 2018

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/s/
Hon. Victoria G. Chaney
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Presiding Special Master

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/s/
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Hon. Jennifer R.S. Detjen

Special Master
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/s/
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Hon. Paul A. Bacigalupo

Special Master
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31
 Appendix A

Ex. Description Objection Ruling

A August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s
Transcript of Proceedings,

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Sweeney v. Evilsizor

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B August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s

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Supplemental Transcript of

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Proceedings, Sweeney v.
Evilsizor

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C August 16, 2016 Reporter‘s

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Transcript of Proceedings,
Sweeney v. Evilsizor
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D August 16, 2016 Findings
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and Order Re Contempt,

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Evilsizor v. Sweeney
(without credits notation)
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E August 25, 2016 letter from

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James Morrison to Judge

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Mills
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F August 25, 2016 Unreported

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Minute Order, Evilsizor v.

Sweeney
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G August 16, 2016 Minute

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Order, Evilsizor v. Sweeney

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 Ex. Description Objection Ruling
H August 16, 2016 Findings
and Order Re Contempt,

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Evilsizor v. Sweeney (with

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credits notation)

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I Order to Show Cause and

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Affidavit for Contempt,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney

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J August 25, 2016 letter from

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Staci Lambright to Judge
Mills Ju ch
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K April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s
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Transcript, Dept. 8, People

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v. Jeffers
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L April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s

Transcript, Dept. 29, People
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v. Jeffers
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M July 2016 E-mail exchange Hearsay, Sustained

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between Doug MacMaster Relevance

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and Sonya Smith

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N Contra Costa County Relevance Overruled

Superior Court Felony
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Order of
C

Probation/Supervision

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 Ex. Description Objection Ruling
O Contra Costa County Relevance Overruled
Superior Court

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Misdemeanor Order of

te vic
Probation

itu r
P William Moser‘s Hearsay, Sustained

st Se
Misdemeanor Trial Report, Relevance, (timeliness
People v. Jeffers Untimely objection

In ws
overruled)

ic Ne
Q August 12, 2016 Hearsay, Sustained
Respondent‘s Trial Brief,
Ju ch Relevance, (timeliness
Evilsizor v. Sweeney Untimely objection

e
ic an
overruled)
st
m Br

R August 16, 2016 Hearsay, Sustained

Respondent‘s Sentencing Relevance, (timeliness
no ial

Memorandum, People v. Untimely objection

co ic

Jeffers overruled)
oe ud

S Form FL-415 – Findings and Cumulative, Overruled

ci a J

Order, Evilsizor v. Sweeney Untimely

(color, with credits notation)
So rni

T Commission on Judicial Hearsay, Overruled

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Performance Response to Relevance,

―Why a Spotlight must be Untimely
al

put on the Commission on

C

Judicial Performance‖

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CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL BRANCH NEWS SERVICE CJBNS.ORG

 Ex. Description Objection Ruling
1 April 21, 2016 letter from Hearsay Overruled
James Murphy to the

e
Commission on Judicial

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Performance

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2 October 28, 2016 letter from Hearsay Overruled

st Se
the Commission to Judge
Mills

In ws
3 December 13, 2016 letter Hearsay Overruled

ic Ne
from James Murphy to the
Commission
Ju ch
e
4 January 30, 2017 letter from Hearsay Overruled
ic an

the Commission to Judge

st
m Br

Mills
no ial

5 March 16, 2017 letter from Hearsay Overruled

James Murphy to the
co ic

Commission
oe ud

6 Order to Show Cause and

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Affidavit for Contempt with

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Exhibits A-D, Evilsizor v.

Sweeney
ifo

7 August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s

al

Transcript of Proceedings,
C

Sweeney v. Evilsizor

iv
 Ex. Description Objection Ruling
8 August 12, 2016 Reporter‘s
Supplemental Transcript of

e
Proceedings, Sweeney v.

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Evilsizor

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9 August 16, 2016 Reporter‘s

st Se
Transcript of Proceedings,
Evilsizor v. Sweeney

In ws
10 August 16, 2016 Minute

ic Ne
Order, Evilsizor v. Sweeney

11
Ju ch
Findings and Order re

e
Contempt, Evilsizor v.
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Sweeney (without credits

st
m Br

notation)
no ial

12 Findings and Order re

Contempt, Evilsizor v.
co ic

Sweeney (with credits

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notation)
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13 Withdrawn
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14 August 25, 2016 letter from

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James Morrison to West

County Detention Center
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with enclosures
C

v
 Ex. Description Objection Ruling
15 August 25, 2016 letter from
James Morrison to Judge

e
Mills with enclosures

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16 August 25, 2016 Unreported

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Minute Order, Evilsizor v.

st Se
Sweeney

In ws
17 Complaint – Misdemeanor,
People v. Jeffers

ic Ne
18 March 17 and 22, 2016 Hearsay, Overruled
Ju ch
Reporter‘s Transcript of Lack of

e
Jury Trial, People v. Jeffers Foundation
ic an
st
m Br

19 March 23, 2016 Reporter‘s Hearsay, Overruled

Transcript of Jury Trial, Lack of
no ial

People v. Jeffers Foundation

co ic

20 Minutes, People v. Jeffers

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21 April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s

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Transcript, Dept. 8, People

v. Jeffers
So rni

22 April 1, 2016 Reporter‘s

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Transcript, Dept. 29, People

al

v. Jeffers
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 Ex. Description Objection Ruling
23 May 7, 2001 Notice of Hearsay, Overruled
Intended Private Evid. Code §§

e
Admonishment to Hon. 350, 352

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Bruce Clayton Mills with
enclosures

itu r
st Se
24 June 12, 2006 Decision and Hearsay, Overruled
Order Imposing Public Evid. Code §§

In ws
Admonishment, In the 350, 352

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Matter Concerning Judge
Bruce Clayton Mills

25
Ju ch
February 25, 2008 Advisory Hearsay, Overruled

e
ic an
Letter to Hon. Bruce C. Evid. Code §§
st
Mills 350, 352
m Br

26 February 7, 2011 Advisory Hearsay, Overruled

no ial

Letter to Hon. Bruce C. Evid. Code §§

co ic

Mills 350, 352

oe ud

27 July 30, 2013 Decision and Hearsay, Overruled

ci a J

Order Imposing Public Evid. Code §§

Admonishment, Inquiry 350, 352
So rni

Concerning Judge Bruce

Clayton Mills, No. 192
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