"After a series of negotiations, petitioner Viewmaster and defendant Allen
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136283. February 29, 2000]
VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO Y.
MAULIT in his official capacity as administrator of the Land Registration Authority; and
EDGARDO CASTRO, acting register of deeds of Las Pias, Metro Manila; respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A notice of lis pendens may be registered when an action or a proceeding directly affects the title
to the land or the buildings thereon; or the possession, the use or the occupation thereof. Hence,
the registration of such notice should be allowed if the litigation involves the enforcement of an
agreement for the co-development of a parcel of land. h Y
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the February 27, 1998 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA)[3] in CA- GR SP No. 39649 and its November 12, 1998
Resolution[4] denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Resolution[5] of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta No. 2381, which ruled as follows:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Authority is of the considered view and so
holds that the Notice of Lis Pendens subject of this consulta is not
registrable."[6]
The Facts
The undisputed facts were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"The subject property is known as the Las Pias property registered in the
name of Peltan Development Inc. (now State Properties Corporation)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (S-17992) 12473-A situated in
Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las Pias, Rizal.
"The Chiong/Roxas family collectively owns and controls State Investment
Trust, Inc. (formerly State Investment House, Inc.) and is the major
shareholder of the following corporations, namely: State Land Investment
Corporation, Philippine Development and Industrial Corporation and
Stronghold Realty Development.
"Sometime in 1995, the said family decided to give control and ownership
over the said corporations to only one member of the family, through the
process of bidding among the family members/stockholders of the said
companies. It was agreed that the bidder who acquires 51% or more of the
said companies shall be deemed the winner.
"Defendant Allen Roxas, one of the stockholders of State Investment Trust,
Inc. applied for a loan with First Metro Investment, Inc. (First Metro for
brevity) in the amount of P36,500,000.00 in order to participate in the
bidding. Es msc
"First Metro granted Allen Roxas' loan application without collateral
provided, however, that he procure a guarantor/surety/solidary co-debtor to
secure the payment of the said loan.
"Petitioner Viewmaster agreed to act as guarantor for the aforementioned
loan in consideration for its participation in a Joint Venture Project to co-
develop the real estate assets of State Investment Trust, Inc.
Roxas agreed that should the latter prevail and win in the bidding, he shall
sell to petitioner fifty percent (50%) of the total eventual acquisitions of
shares of stock in the State Investment Trust, Inc., at a purchase price
equivalent to the successful bid price per share plus an additiona1 ten
percent (10%) per share.
"As a result of the loans granted by First Metro in consideration of and upon
the guaranty of petitioner Viewmaster, defendant Allen Roxas, eventually
gained control and ownership of State Investment Trust, Inc.
"However, notwithstanding the lapse of two (2) years since defendant Allen
Roxas became the controlling stockholder of State Investment Trust, Inc.,
he failed to take the necessary action to implement the Joint Venture Project
with petitioner Viewmaster to co-develop the subject properties.
"Thus, petitioner's counsel wrote defendant Allen Roxas, reiterating
petitioner's demand to comply with the agreement to co-develop the Las
Pias Property and to set in operation all the necessary steps towards the
realization of the said project.
"On September 8, 1995, petitioner Viewmaster filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance, Enforcement of Implied Trust and Damages against State
Investment Trust, Inc. Northeast Land Development, Inc., State Properties
Corporation (formerly Peltan Development, Inc.) and defendant Allen
Roxas, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of State Investment Trust, Inc., and
Chairman of Northeast Land Development, Inc., State Properties
Corporation, which was docketed as Civil Case No.65277. Esmm is
"On September 11,1995, petitioner Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis
Pendens with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Las Pias for the
annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Transfer Certificate of Title No. (S-
17992) 12473- A, registered in the name of Peltan Development, Inc. (now
State Properties Corporation).
"In a letter dated September 15, 1995, the respondent Register of Deeds of
Las Pias denied the request for annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on
the following grounds:
1. the request for annotation and the complaint [do] not contain an adequate
description of the subject property;
2. petitioner's action only has an incidental effect on the property in
question. Esmso
"On September 20, 1995, petitioner filed an appeal to the respondent Land
Registration Authority, which was docketed as Consulta No. 2381.
"On December 14, 1995, the Respondent Land Registration Authority
issued the assailed Resolution holding that petitioner's 'Notice of Lis
Pendens' was not registrable."[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the ruling of the LRA, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to adequately
describe the subject property in the Complaint and in the application for the registration of a
notice of lis pendens. The CA noted that while Transfer Certificate of Title No. (S-17992) 12473-
A indicated six parcels of land, petitioner's application mentioned only one parcel.
Moreover, the CA also ruled that a notice of lis pendens may be registered only when an action
directly affects the title to or possession of the real property. In the present case, the
proceedings instituted by petitioner affected the title or possession incidentally only, not directly.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
Petitioner submits for the consideration of the Court the following issues:
"I
Whether or not the petitioner failed to adequately describe the subject
property in its complaint and in the notice of lis pendens Mse sm
II
Whether or not the Las Pias property is directly involved in Civil Case No.
65277."[9]
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Description of Property
Petitioner contends that the absence of the property's technical description in either the notice
of lis pendens or the Complaint is not a sufficient ground for rejecting its application, because a
copy of TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A specifically describing the property was attached to and
made an integral part of both documents.
On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioner failed to provide an accurate description of
the Las Pias property, which was merely referred to as a "parcel of land."
The notice of lis pendens described the property as follows:
"A parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Tindig na Manga, Municipality of
Las Pias, Province of Rizal x x x containing an area of Seven Hundred
Eighty Six Thousand One Hundred Sixty Seven (786,167) square meters,
more or less."
By itself, the above does not adequately describe the subject property, pursuant to Section 14 of
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.1529. It does not
distinguish the said property from other properties similarly located in the Barrio of Tindig na
Manga, Municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal. Indeed, by the above description alone, it
would be impossible to identify the property.
In the paragraph directly preceding the description quoted above, however, petitioner specifically
stated that the property referred to in the notice of lis pendens was the same parcel of land
covered by TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A:
"Please be notified that on 08 September 1995, the [p]laintiff in the above-
entitled case filed an action against the above-named [d]efendants for
specific performance, enforcement of an implied trust and damages, now
pending in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, which action
involves a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. (S-
17992) 12473-A, registered in the name of Peltan Development
Incorporated which changed its corporate name to State Properties
Corporation, one of the [d]efendants in the aforesaid case. The said parcel
of land is more particu1arly described as follows: Ex sm
'A parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Tindig na
Manga, Municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal x x x
containing an area of Seven Hundred Eighty Six
Thousand One Hundred Sixty Seven (786,167) square
meters, more or less.'
"Request is therefore made [for] your good office to record this notice of
pendency of the aforementioned action in TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A for
all legal purposes."[10]
As earlier noted, a copy of the TCT was attached to and made an integral part of both
documents. Consequently, the notice of lis pendens submitted for registration, taken as a whole,
leaves no doubt as to the identity of the property, the technical description of which appears on
the attached TCT. We stress that the main purpose of the requirement that the notice should
contain a technical description of the property is to ensure that the same can be distinguished
and readily identified. In this case, we agree with petitioner that there was substantial
compliance with this requirement.
Second Issue: Property Directly Involved
In upholding the LRA, the Court of Appeals held that "the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of [a] money
judgment, though the title [to] or right or possession [of] a property may be incidentally affected.
It is thus essential that the property be directly affected where the relief sought in the action or
suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement [thereof], or an adjudication
between the conflicting claims of title, possession or right of possession to specific property, or
requiring its transfer or sale."[11]
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the civil case subject of the notice of lis
pendens directly involved the land in question, because it prayed for the enforcement of a prior
agreement between herein petitioner and Defendant Allen Roxas to co-develop the latter's
property.
We agree with the petitioner. A notice of lis pendens, which literally means "pending suit," may
involve actions that deal not only with the title or possession of a property, but even with the use
or occupation thereof. Thus, Section 76 of PD 1529 reads: Jjjuris
"Sec. 76. Notice of lis pendens. -- No action to recover possession of real
estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or
for partition, or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the
title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no
judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have
any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties
thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such
action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as
the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of
the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and
the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered."
In Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court did not confine the
availability of lis pendens to cases involving the title to or possession of real property. Thus, it
held:
"According to Section 24, Rule 14[13] of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No.1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the
following cases, viz.:
a).......An action to recover possession of real estate;
b).......An action to quiet title thereto;
c).......An action to remove clouds thereon;
d).......An action for partition; and
e).......Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title
to the land or the use or occupation hereof or the buildings thereon."
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court further declared that the rule of lis
pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right in specific
real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it x x x." Thus, this Court
observed that the said notice pertained to the following: Sjcj
"x x x all suits or actions which directly affect real property and not only
those which involve the question of title, but also those which are brought to
establish an equitable estate, interest, or right, in specific real property or to
enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it, there being in some
cases a lis pendens, although at the commencement of the suit there is no
present vested interest, claim, or lien in or on the property which it seeks to
charge. It has also been held to apply in the case of a proceeding to declare
an absolute deed of mortgage, or to redeem from a foreclosure sale, or to
establish a trust, or to suits for the settlement and adjustment of partnership
interests."
In the present case, petitioner's Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 65277 clearly warrants
the registration of a notice of lis pendens. The Complaint prayed for the following reliefs: Scjj
"1. Render judgment ordering the Defendant Allen Roxas to sell fifty percent
(50%) of his shareholdings in Defendant State Investment to Plaintiff at the
price equivalent to the successful bid price per share plus an additional ten
percent (10%) per share and directing Defendants to co-develop with the
Plaintiff the subject real properties;
2. Render judgment ordering the Defendant Allen Roxas to:
a. Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) and/or such other amounts as may be proven during the
course of the trial, by way of actual damages;
b. Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), by way of moral damages;
c. Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), by way of exemplary damages;
d. Pay the Plaintiff the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P250,000.00) by way of attorney's fees; and
e. Pay expenses of litigation and costs of suit."[15]
Undeniably, the prayer that Defendant Allen Roxas be ordered to sell 50 percent of his
shareholdings in State Investment does not directly involve title to the property and is therefore
not a proper subject of a notice of lis pendens. Neither do the various amounts of damages
prayed for justify such annotation.
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals and the respondents that the prayer for the co-
development of the land was merely incidental to the sale of shares of defendant company. Jjsc
The Complaint shows that the loan obtained by Allen Roxas (one of the defendants in the civil
case) from First Metro was guaranteed by petitioner for two distinct considerations: (a) to enable
it to purchase 50 percent of the stocks that the said defendant may acquire in State Investment
and (b) to co-develop with the defendants the Quezon City and the Las Pias properties of the
corporation. In other words, the co-development of the said properties is a separate undertaking
that did not arise from petitioner's acquisition of the defendant's shares in the corporation. To
repeat, the co-development is not merely auxiliary or incidental to the purchase of the shares; it
is a distinct consideration for Viewmaster's guaranty.[16]
Hence, by virtue of the alleged agreement with Allen Roxas, petitioner has a direct -- not
merely incidental -- interest in the Las Pias property. Contrary to respondents' contention,[17] the
action involves not only the collection of a money judgment, but also the enforcement of
petitioner's right to co-develop and use the property.
The Court must stress that the purpose of lis pendens is (1) to protect the rights of the party
causing the registration thereof[18] and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on
the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending
litigation.[19] One who deals with property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot acquire better
rights than those of his predecessors-in-interest.[20] In Tanchoco v. Aquino,[21] the Court held:
"x x x. _ The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy
and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall
have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the
litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible
of execution. Purchasers pendente lite of the property subject of the
litigation after the notice of lis pendens is inscribed in the Office of the
Register of Deeds are bound by the judgment against their predecessors. x
x x."
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying only on the
Certificate of Title would be deemed a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the
supposed rights of petitioner cannot be enforced, because the former is not bound by the
property owner's undertakings not annotated in the TCT.[22] Kyle
Likewise, there exists the possibility that the res of the civil case would leave the control of the
court and render ineffectual a judgment therein. Indeed, according to petitioner, it was not even
informed when Allen Roxas exchanged the Quezon City property for shares of stock in
Northeast Land Development, Inc.[23] Hence, it maintains that there is a clear risk that the same
thing would be done with the Las Pias property.
In this light, the CA ruling left unprotected petitioner's claim of co-development over the Las Pias
property. Hence, until the conflicting rights and interests are threshed out in the civil case
pending before the RTC, it will be in the best interest of the parties and the public at large that a
notice of the suit be given to the whole world.
The Court is not here saying that petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its Complaint
pending in the RTC. Verily, there is no requirement that the right to or the interest in the property
subject of a lis pendens be proven by the applicant. The Rule merely requires that an affirmative
relief be claimed.[24] A notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a
right or a lien.[25] It merely protects the applicant's rights, which will be determined during the
trial.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Las Pias Register of Deeds is directed to cause the
annotation of lis pendens in TCT No. (S-17992) 12473-A. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148568. March 20, 2003]
ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. HERBAL COVE REALTY
CORPORATION, respondent.
The pendency of a simple collection suit arising from the alleged nonpayment of
construction services, materials, unrealized income and damages does not justify the annotation
of a notice of lis pendens on the title to a property where construction has been done.
Statement of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the May 30, 2000 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
56432. The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed November 4, 1998 and October 22, 1999
orders annulled and set aside. The July 30, 1998 order of respondent judge is reinstated
granting the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens subject of this petition.[3]
In its July 21, 2001 Resolution,[4] the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On June 20, 1996, [respondent] and [petitioner] entered into a Construction Contract whereby
the former agreed to construct four (4) units of [townhouses] designated as 16-A, 16-B, 17-A and
17-B and one (1) single detached unit for an original contract price of P15,726,745.19 which was
late[r] adjusted to P16,726,745.19 as a result of additional works. The contract period is 180
days commencing [on] July 7, 1996 and to terminate on January 7, 1997. [Petitioner] claimed
that the said period was not followed due to reasons attributable to [respondent], namely:
suspension orders, additional works, force majeure, and unjustifiable acts of omission or delay
on the part of said [respondent]. [Respondent], however, denied such claim and instead pointed
to [petitioner] as having exceeded the 180 day contract period aggravated by defective
workmanship and utilization of materials which are not in compliance with specifications.
xxxxxxxxx
On November 21, 1997, [petitioner] filed a complaint for sum of money with damages (Civil Case
No. 97-2707) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati entitled Atlantic Erectors, Incorporated vs.
Herbal Cove Realty Corp. and Ernest C. Escal[e]r. This case was raffled to Branch 137, x x x
Judge Santiago J. Ranada presiding. In said initiatory pleading, [petitioner] AEI asked for the
following reliefs:
AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING, to order x x x defendant to:
1. Pay plaintiff the sum of P4,854,229.94 for the unpaid construction services already rendered;
2. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P1,595,551.00 for the construction materials, equipment and
tools of plaintiff held by defendant;
3. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P2,250,000.00 for the [loss] x x x of expected income from the
construction project;
4. [T]o x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P800,000.00 for the cost of income by way of rental from the
equipment of plaintiff held by defendants;
5. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000,000.00 for moral damages;
6. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000,000.00 for exemplary damages;
7. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum equivalent of 25% of the total money claim plus P200,000.00
acceptance fee and P2,500.00 per court appearance;
8. To x x x pay the cost of suit.
On the same day of November 21, 1997, [petitioner] filed a notice of lis pendens for annotation
of the pendency of Civil Case No. 97-707 on titles TCTs nos. T-30228, 30229, 30230, 30231
and 30232. When the lots covered by said titles were subsequently subdivided into 50 lots, the
notices of lis pendens were carried over to the titles of the subdivided lots, i.e., Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-36179 to T-36226 and T-36245 to T-36246 of the Register of Deeds of
Tagaytay City.
On January 30, 1998, [respondent] and x x x Ernest L. Escaler, filed a Motion to Dismiss
[petitioners] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of action. They
claimed [that] the Makati RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because
the parties Construction Contract contained a clause requiring them to submit their dispute to
arbitration.
xxxxxxxxx
On March 17, 1998, [RTC Judge Ranada] dismissed the Complaint as against [respondent] for
[petitioners] failure to comply with a condition precedent to the filing of a court action which is the
prior resort to arbitration and as against x x x Escaler for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of
action x x x.
[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the March 17, 1998 dismissal
order. [Respondent] filed its Opposition thereto.
On April 24, 1998, [respondent] filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. It argued that the
notices of lis pendens are without basis because [petitioners] action is a purely personal action
to collect a sum of money and recover damages and x x x does not directly affect title to, use or
possession of real property.
In his July 30, 1998 Order, [Judge Ranada] granted [respondents] Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens x x x:
[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid July 30, 1998 Order to which
[respondent] filed an Opposition.
In a November 4, 1998 Order, [Judge Ranada,] while finding no merit in the grounds raised by
[petitioner] in its Motion for Reconsideration, reversed his July 30, 1998 Order and reinstated the
notices of lis pendens, as follows:
1. The Court finds no merit in plaintiffs contention that in dismissing the above-entitled case for
lack of jurisdiction, and at the same time granting defendant Herbal Coves motion to cancel
notice of lis pendens, the Court [took] an inconsistent posture. The Rules provide that prior to the
transmittal of the original record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal
(3rd par., Sec. 10, Rule 41). Even as it declared itself without jurisdiction, this Court still has
power to act on incidents in this case, such as acting on motions for reconsideration, for
correction, for lifting of lis pendens, or approving appeals, etc.
As correctly argued by defendant Herbal Cove, a notice of lis pendens serves only as a
precautionary measure or warning to prospective buyers of a property that there is a pending
litigation involving the same.
The Court notes that when it issued the Order of 30 July 1998 lifting the notice of lis pendens,
there was as yet no appeal filed by plaintiff. Subsequently, on 10 September 1998, after a notice
of appeal was filed by plaintiff on 4 September 1998, the Branch Clerk of Court was ordered by
the Court to elevate the entire records of the above-entitled case to the Court of Appeals. It
therefore results that the above-entitled case is still pending. After a careful consideration of all
matters relevant to the lis pendens, the Court believes that justice will be better served by setting
aside the Order of 30 July 1998.
On November 27, 1998, [respondent] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 4,
1998 Order arguing that allowing the notice of lis pendens to remain annotated on the titles
would defeat, not serve, the ends of justice and that equitable considerations cannot be resorted
to when there is an applicable provision of law.
xxxxxxxxx
On October 22, 1999, [Judge Ranada] issued an order denying [respondents] Motion for
Reconsideration of the November 4, 1998 Order for lack of sufficient merit.[5]
Thereafter, Respondent Herbal Cove filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Setting aside the Orders of the RTC dated November 4, 1998 and October 22, 1999, the
CA reinstated the formers July 30, 1998 Order[6] granting Herbal Coves Motion to Cancel the
Notice of Lis Pendens. According to the appellate court, the re-annotation of those notices was
improper for want of any legal basis. It specifically cited Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (the Property Registration Decree). The decree provides that the registration of such
notices is allowed only when court proceedings directly affect the title to, or the use or the
occupation of, the land or any building thereon.
The CA opined that the Complaint filed by petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-2707 was
intended purely to collect a sum of money and to recover damages. The appellate court ruled
that the Complaint did not aver any ownership claim to the subject land or any right of
possession over the buildings constructed thereon. It further declared that absent any claim on
the title to the buildings or on the possession thereof, the notices of lis pendens had no leg to
stand on.
Likewise, the CA held that Judge Ranada should have maintained the notice
cancellations, which he had directed in his July 30, 1998 Order. Those notices were no longer
necessary to protect the rights of petitioner, inasmuch as it could have procured protective relief
from the Construction Industry Arbitral Commission (CIAC), where provisional remedies were
available. The CA also mentioned petitioners admission that there was already a pending case
before the CIAC, which in fact rendered a decision on March 11, 1999.
The appellate court further explained that the re-annotation of the Notice of Lis
Pendens was no longer warranted after the court a quo had ruled that the latter had no
jurisdiction over the case. The former held that the rationale behind the principle of lis pendens --
to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of final
judgment -- was no longer applicable. The reason for such inapplicability was that the Makati
RTC already declared that it had no jurisdiction or power over the subject matter of the case.
Finally, the CA opined that petitioners Complaint had not alleged or claimed, as basis for
the continued annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, the lien of contractors and laborers under
Article 2242 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, petitioner had not even referred to any lien of
whatever nature. Verily, the CA ruled that the failure to allege and claim the contractors lien did
not warrant the continued annotation on the property titles of Respondent Herbal Cove.
[7]
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether or not money claims representing cost of materials [for] and labor [on] the
houses constructed on a property [are] a proper lien for annotation of lis
pendens on the property title[.]
II. Whether or not the trial court[,] after having declared itself without jurisdiction to
try the case[,] may still decide on [the] substantial issue of the case. [8]
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Proper Basis for a
Notice of Lis Pendens
Petitioner avers that its money claim on the cost of labor and materials for the townhouses
it constructed on the respondents land is a proper lien that justifies the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens on the land titles. According to petitioner, the money claim constitutes a lien that
can be enforced to secure payment for the said obligations. It argues that, to preserve the
alleged improvement it had made on the subject land, such annotation on the property titles of
respondent is necessary.
On the other hand, Respondent Herbal Cove argues that the annotation is bereft of any
factual or legal basis, because petitioners Complaint[9] does not directly affect the title to the
property, or the use or the possession thereof. It also claims that petitioners Complaint did not
assert ownership of the property or any right to possess it. Moreover, respondent attacks as
baseless the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens through the enforcement of a contractors
lien under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. It points out that the said provision applies only to
cases in which there are several creditors carrying on a legal action against an insolvent debtor.
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of
are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and
(c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or
the use or the occupation thereof.[10] Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis
pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real
property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable
estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance
against it.[11]
Apparently, petitioner proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the
enforcement of a lien. Since the money claim is for the nonpayment of materials and labor used
in the construction of townhouses, the lien referred to would have to be that provided under
Article 2242 of the Civil Code. This provision describes a contractors lien over an immovable
property as follows:
Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the
following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred, and shall constitute an encumbrance
on the immovable or real right:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of architects,
engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings,
canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;
(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction, reconstruction, or repair of
buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
However, a careful examination of petitioners Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks,
reveals that no such lien or interest over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely
asked for the payment of construction services and materials plus damages, without mentioning
-- much less asserting -- a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a purely
personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any material averment of any
enforceable right, interest or lien in connection with the subject property.
As it is, petitioners money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the
enforcement of a lien or an encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.[12]
Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its
Complaint, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a
complaint for collection and damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a
contractors lien.
 In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals,[13] the Court explained the concept of a
contractors lien under Article 2242 of the Civil Code and the proper mode for its enforcement as
follows:
Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code enumerates certain credits which enjoy preference with
respect to specific personal or real property of the debtor. Specifically, the contractors lien
claimed by the petitioners is granted under the third paragraph of Article 2242 which
provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or
repair of buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific building
or other immovable property constructed.
However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e., when
the same specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors
and the value of such property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the
creditors. In such a situation, the question of preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to
determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. Fundamental tenets of due
process will dictate that this statutory lien should then only be enforced in the context of
some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be
bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of the lien
thereunder is applicable here, because petitioners Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing
requirements. Nowhere does it show that respondents property was subject to the claims of
other creditors or was insufficient to pay for all concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint did
not pertain to insolvency proceedings or to any other action in which the adjudication of claims of
preferred creditors could be ascertained.
Another factor negates the argument of petitioner that its money claim involves the
enforcement of a lien or the assertion of title to or possession of the subject property: the fact
that it filed its action with the RTC of Makati, which is undisputedly bereft of any jurisdiction over
respondents property in Tagaytay City. Certainly, actions affecting title to or possession of real
property or the assertion of any interest therein should be commenced and tried in the proper
court that has jurisdiction over the area, where the real property involved or a portion thereof is
situated.[15] If petitioner really intended to assert its claim or enforce its supposed lien, interest or
right over respondents subject properties, it would have instituted the proper proceedings or filed
a real action with the RTC of Tagaytay City, which clearly had jurisdiction over those
properties.[16]
Narciso Pea, a leading authority on the subject of land titles and registration, gives an
explicit exposition on the inapplicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to certain actions and
proceedings that specifically include money claims. He explains in this wise:
By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to attachments, levies of
execution, or to proceedings for the probate of wills, or for administration of the estate of
deceased persons in the Court of First Instance. Also, it is held generally that the doctrine of lis
pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the
recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be
incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected, as where the relief
sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or
an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to
specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Pea adds that even if a party initially avails itself of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing
of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal
action. We quote him as follows:
It may be possible also that the case when commenced may justify a resort to lis pendens, but
during the progress thereof, it develops to be purely a personal action for damages or
otherwise. In such event, the notice of lis pendens has become functus
officio.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when a complaint or an action is determined by the courts to be in personam, the
rationale for or purpose of the notice of lis pendens ceases to exist. To be sure, this Court has
expressly and categorically declared that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on titles to
properties is not proper in cases wherein the proceedings instituted are actions in personam.[19]
Second Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Petitioner argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the Order canceling the Notice
of Lis Pendens as well as the Order reinstating it. Supposedly, since both Orders were issued by
the trial court without jurisdiction, the annotation made by the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City
must remain in force.
Petitioner avers that the trial court finally declared that the latter had no jurisdiction over
the case on July 27, 1998, in an Order denying the formers Motion for Reconsideration of the
March 17, 1998 Order dismissing the Complaint. Petitioner insists that the subsequent July 30,
1998 Order cancelling the subject Notice of Lis Pendens is void, because it was issued by a
court that had no more jurisdiction over the case.
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which governs appeals from regional trial
courts, expressly provides that RTCs lose jurisdiction over a case when an appeal is filed. The
rule reads thus:
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. -- A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
xxxxxxxxx
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties. (Emphasis supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case only
on August 31, 1998, when petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal.[20] Thus, any order issued by the
RTC prior to that date should be considered valid, because the court still had jurisdiction over
the case. Accordingly, it still had the authority or jurisdiction to issue the July 30, 1998 Order
canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens. On the other hand, the November 4, 1998 Order that set
aside the July 30, 1998 Order and reinstated that Notice should be considered without force and
effect, because it was issued by the trial court after it had already lost jurisdiction.
In any case, even if we were to adopt petitioners theory that both the July 30, 1998 and
the November 4, 1998 Orders were void for having been issued without jurisdiction, the
annotation is still improper for lack of factual and legal bases.
As discussed previously, erroneously misplaced is the reliance of petitioner on the
premise that its money claim is an action for the enforcement of a contractors lien. Verily, the
annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on the subject property titles should not have been
made in the first place. The Complaint filed before the Makati RTC -- for the collection of a sum
of money and for damages -- did not provide sufficient legal basis for such annotation.
Finally, petitioner vehemently insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction to cancel the
Notice. Yet, the former filed before the CA an appeal, docketed as CA-GR CV No.
65647,[21] questioning the RTCs dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, it
must be remembered that it was petitioner which had initially invoked the jurisdiction of the trial
court when the former sought a judgment for the recovery of money and damages against
respondent. Yet again, it was also petitioner which assailed that same jurisdiction for issuing an
order unfavorable to the formers cause. Indeed, parties cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief, then repudiate or question that same jurisdiction after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief.[22]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
J. CASIM CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES, INC., Petitioner,
-versus-
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168655
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, taken directly on a
pure question of law from the April 14, 2005 Resolution[1] and June 24, 2005 Order[2] issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 253 in Civil Case No. LP-04-0071[3]
one for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. The assailed Resolution dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction the petition filed by J. Casim Construction Supplies Inc. for cancellation of notice
of lis pendens annotated on its certificate of title, whereas the assailed Order denied
reconsideration.
The facts follow.
Petitioner, represented herein by Rogelio C. Casim, is a duly organized domestic
corporation[4] in whose name Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49936,[5] covering a 10,715-
square meter land was registered. Sometime in 1982, petitioner acquired the covered property
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale[6] and as a result the mother title, TCT No. 30459 was
cancelled and TCT No. 49936 was issued in its stead.[7]
On March 22, 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 an original petition
for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as of all the other entries of involuntary
encumbrances annotated on the original copy of TCT No. 49936. Invoking the inherent power of
the trial court to grant relief according to the petition, petitioner prayed that the notice of lis
pendens as well as all the other annotations on the said title be cancelled. Petitioner claimed
that its owners duplicate copy of the TCT was clean at the time of its delivery and that it was
surprised to learn later on that the original copy of its TCT, on file with the Register of Deeds,
contained several entries which all signified that the covered property had been subjected to
various claims. The subject notice of lis pendens is one of such entries.[8] The notations
appearing on the titles memorandum of encumbrances are as follows:
Entry No. 81-8334/T-30459 ADVERSE CLAIM In an affidavit duly
subscribed and sworn to, BRUNO F. CASIM claims, among other things,
that he has the right and interest over the property described herein in
accordance with Doc. No. 336; Page No. 69; Book No. 1; s. of 1981 of Not.
Pub. of Makati, M.M., Romarie G. Villonco, dated August 4, 1981.
Date of inscription Aug. 5, 1981 2:55 p.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds
Entry No. 82-4676/T-49936 CANCELLATION OF ADVERSE CLAIM
inscribed hereon under Entry No. 81-8334/T-30459 in accordance with Doc.
No. 247; Page 50; Book No. CXLI; s. of 1982 of Not. Pub. of Pasay City,
M.M., Julian G. Tubig, dated April 21, 1982.
Date of inscription April 21, 1982 8:40 a.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds
Entry No. 82-4678/T-49936 AFFIDAVIT In accordance with the affidavit duly
executed by the herein registered owners, this title is hereby cancelled and
in lieu thereof TCT No. 49936/T-228 has been issued in accordance with
Doc. No. 249; Page No. 80; Book No. CXLI; s. of 1982 of Not. Pub.
of Pasay City, M.M., Julian G. Tubig, dated April 21, 1982.
Date of inscription April 21, 1982 8:44 a.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds
Entry No. 81-12423/T-30459 NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS: By virtue of the
notice of Lis Pendens presented and filed by CESAR P. MANALAYSAY,
counsel for the plaintiff, notice is hereby given that a petition for review has
been commenced and now pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIX, Pasay, M.M, in Civil Case No. LP-9438-P, BRUNEO F.
CASIM, Plaintiff, vs. SPS. JESUS A. CASIM & MARGARITA CHAVEZ and
Sps. Urbano Nobleza and Cristita J. Nobleza, and Filomena C. Antonio,
Defendants, involving the property described herein.
Date of the instrument - Sept. 17, 1981
Date of the inscription - Sept. 18, 1981 - 3:55 p.m.
(Sgd) VICTORIANO S. TORRES, Actg. Reg. of Deeds[9]
To justify the cancellation, petitioner alleged that the notice of lis pendens, in particular, was a
forgery judging from the inconsistencies in the inscribers signature as well as from the fact that
the notice was entered non-chronologically, that is, the date thereof is much earlier than that of
the preceding entry. In this regard, it noted the lack of any transaction record on file with the
Register of Deeds that would support the notice of lis pendens annotation.[10]
Petitioner also stated that while Section 59 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 requires the
carry-over of subsisting encumbrances in the new issuances of TCTs, petitioners duplicate copy
of the title did not contain any such carry-over, which means that it was an innocent purchaser
for value, especially since it was never a party to the civil case referred to in the notice of lis
pendens. Lastly, it alludes to the indefeasibility of its title despite the fact that the mother title,
TCT No. 30459, might have suffered from certain defects and constraints. [11]
The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim, representing Bruneo F. Casim, intervened in the
instant case and filed a Comment/Opposition[12] in which it maintained that the RTC of Las Pias
did not have jurisdiction over the present action, because the matter of canceling a notice of lis
pendens lies within the jurisdiction of the court before which the main action referred to in the
notice is pending. In this regard, it emphasized that the case referred to in the said notice had
already attained finality as the Supreme Court had issued an entry of judgment therein and that
the RTC of Makati City had ordered execution in that case.[13] It cited the lack of legal basis for
the petition in that nothing in the allegations hints at any of the legal grounds for the cancellation
of notice of lis pendens.[14] And, as opposed to petitioners claim that there was no carry-over of
encumbrances made in TCT No. 49936 from the mother title TCT No. 30459, the latter would
show that it also had the same inscriptions as those found in TCT No. 49936 only that they were
entered in the original copy on file with the Register of Deeds. Also, as per Certification[15] issued
by the Register of Deeds, petitioners claim of lack of transaction record could not stand, because
the said certification stated merely that the corresponding transaction record could no longer be
retrieved and might, therefore, be considered as either lost or destroyed.
On April 14, 2005, the trial court, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over the action,
resolved to dismiss the petition and declared that the action must have been filed before the
same court and in the same action in relation to which the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens had been sought. Anent the allegation that the entries in the TCT were forged, the trial
court pointed out that not only did petitioner resort to the wrong forum to determine the existence
of forgery, but also that forgery could not be presumed merely from the alleged non-
chronological entries in the TCT but instead must be positively proved. In this connection, the
trial court noted petitioners failure to name exactly who had committed the forgery, as well as the
lack of evidence on which the allegation could be based.[16] The petition was disposed of as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[18] but it was denied in the trial courts June 24, 2005
Order.[19]
Now, raising the purely legal question of whether the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has
jurisdiction in an original action to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the subject title
as an incident in a previous case, petitioner, in this present petition, ascribes error to the trial
court in dismissing its petition for cancellation. An action for cancellation of notice of lis
pendens, petitioner believes, is not always ancillary to an existing main action because a trial
court has the inherent power to cause such cancellation, especially in this case that petitioner
was never a party to the litigation to which the notice of lis pendens relates.[20] Petitioner further
posits that the trial court has committed an error in declining to rule on the allegation of forgery,
especially since there is no transaction record on file with the Register of Deeds relative to said
entries. It likewise points out that granting the notice of lis pendens has been properly annotated
on the title, the fact that its owners duplicate title is clean suggests that it was never a party to
the civil case referred to in the notice.[21] Finally, petitioner posits that TCT No. 49936 is
indefeasible and holds it free from any liens and encumbrances which its mother title, TCT No.
30459, might have suffered.[22]
The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim (intervenor), in its Comment on the present petition,
reiterates that the court a quo does not have jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the subject
notice of lis pendens because it is only the court exercising jurisdiction over the property which
may order the same that is, the court having jurisdiction over the main action in relation to
which the registration of the notice has been sought. Also, it notes that even on the assumption
that the trial court had such jurisdiction, the petition for cancellation still has no legal basis as
petitioner failed to establish the grounds therefor. Also, the subject notice of lis pendens was
validly carried over to TCT No. 49936 from the mother title, TCT No. 30459.
In its Reply,[23] petitioner, in a semantic slur, dealt primarily with the supposed inconsistencies in
intervenors arguments. Yet the core of its contention is that the non-chronological annotation of
the notice stands to be the best evidence of forgery. From this, it advances the notion that
forgery of the notice of lis pendens suffices as a ground for the cancellation thereof which may
be availed of in an independent action by the aggrieved party.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
Lis pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the jurisdiction, power or
control which a court acquires over the property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of
the action, and until final judgment.[24] Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is
intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. [25] Its
notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[26]
A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial court
before which the action involving the property is pending. This power is said to be inherent in the
trial court and is exercised only under express provisions of law. [27] Accordingly, Section 14, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the trial court to cancel a notice of lis
pendens where it is properly shown that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
annotated. Be that as it may, the power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under
exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who
caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other
party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis
for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non prosequituron the part of the plaintiff; or
where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation. In such instances,
said notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled.[28]
In theorizing that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has the inherent power to
cancel the notice of lis pendens that was incidentally registered in relation to Civil Case No.
2137, a case which had been decided by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 and affirmed by the
Supreme Court on appeal, petitioner advocates that the cancellation of such a notice is not
always ancillary to a main action.
The argument fails.
From the available records, it appears that the subject notice of lis pendens had been
recorded at the instance of Bruneo F. Casim (Bruneo) in relation to Civil Case No. 2137[29]
one for annulment of sale and recovery of real property which he filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 62 against the spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim, predecessors-in-
interest and stockholders of petitioner corporation. That case involved the property subject of the
present case, then covered by TCT No. 30459. At the close of the trial on the merits therein, the
RTC of Makati rendered a decision adverse to Bruneo and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.[30] Aggrieved, Bruneo lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 54204, which reversed and set aside the trial courts decision.[31] Expectedly, the spouses
Jesus and Margarita Casim elevated the case to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No.
151957, but their appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time.[32]
A necessary incident of registering a notice of lis pendens is that the property covered
thereby is effectively placed, until the litigation attains finality, under the power and control of the
court having jurisdiction over the case to which the notice relates. [33] In this sense, parties
dealing with the given property are charged with the knowledge of the existence of the action
and are deemed to take the property subject to the outcome of the litigation. [34] It is also in this
sense that the power possessed by a trial court to cancel the notice of lis pendens is said to be
inherent as the same is merely ancillary to the main action.[35]
Thus, in Vda. de Kilayko v. Judge Tengco,[36] Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[37] and Tanchoco v. Aquino,[38] it was held that the precautionary notice of lis
pendens may be ordered cancelled at any time by the court having jurisdiction over the main
action inasmuch as the same is merely an incident to the said action. The pronouncement
in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, citing Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[39] is equally instructive
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an
incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the
merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all
people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk,
and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior
and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down
therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore
also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court
having jurisdiction of it at any given time. x x x[40]
Clearly, the action for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in this case must have
been filed not before the court a quo via an original action but rather, before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 62 as an incident of the annulment case in relation to which its registration was
sought. Thus, it is the latter court that has jurisdiction over the main case referred to in the notice
and it is that same court which exercises power and control over the real property subject of the
notice.
But even so, the petition could no longer be expected to pursue before the proper
forum inasmuch as the decision rendered in the annulment case has already attained finality
before both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court on the appellate level, unless of course
there exists substantial and genuine claims against the parties relative to the main case subject
of the notice of lis pendens.[41] There is none in this case. It is thus well to note that the
precautionary notice that has been registered relative to the annulment case then pending
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 has served its purpose. With the finality of the decision
therein on appeal, the notice has already been rendered functus officio. The rights of the parties,
as well as of their successors-in-interest, petitioner included, in relation to the subject property,
are hence to be decided according the said final decision.

To be sure, petitioner is not altogether precluded from pursuing a specific remedy,

only that the suitable course of action legally available is not judicial but rather
administrative. Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529 provides the appropriate measure to have a notice
of lis pendens cancelled out from the title, that is by presenting to the Register of Deeds,
after finality of the judgment rendered in the main action, a certificate executed by the clerk
of court before which the main action was pending to the effect that the case has already been
finally decided by the court, stating the manner of the disposal thereof. Section 77 materially
states:

SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a

notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in
which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as
provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be
deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of
court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof. [42]

Lastly, petitioner tends to make an issue out of the fact that while the original TCT on
file with the Register of Deeds does contain the annotations and notice referred to in this
petition, its owners duplicate copy of the title nevertheless does not reflect the same non-
chronological inscriptions. From this, petitioner submits its puerile argument that the said
annotations appearing on the original copy of the TCT are all a forgery, and goes on to assert
the indefeasibility of its Torrens title as well as its supposed status as an innocent purchaser for
value in good faith. Yet we decline to rule on these assumptions principally because they raise
matters that call for factual determination which certainly are beyond the competence of the
Court to dispose of in this petition.

All told, we find that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has committed no
reversible error in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction
the petition for cancellation of notice of lis pendens filed by petitioner, and in denying
reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 14, 2005 Resolution and the June
24, 2005 Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, in Civil Case
No. LP-04-0071, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 To execute the judgment, the Quezon City RTC levied upon the subject property and
THIRD DIVISION the Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution dated 12 January 1999 was annotated as Entry No.
315074, in relation to Entry No. 319362, at the back of TCT No. T-52319.[7]

ARLYN* PINEDA, G.R. No. 170172 Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff of
Petitioner, the Quezon City RTC an Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim. Arcalas filed a motion to set
Present: aside Pinedas Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim, which on 3 November 1999,
the Quezon City RTC granted, to wit:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, [Arcalas] showed that her levies on the properties were duly
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, registered while the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale between the defendant
CHICO-NAZARIO, Victoria L. Tolentino and Analyn G. Pineda was not. The levies being
NACHURA, and superior to the sale claimed by Ms. Pineda, the court rules to quash and set
REYES, JJ. aside her Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.

JULIE C. ARCALAS, ACCORDINGLY, the motion is granted. The Affidavit of Title and Third-
Respondent. Promulgated: Party Claim is set aside to allow completion of execution proceedings.[8]

November 23, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------x On 2 February 2000, after the finality[9] of the Order of the Quezon City RTC quashing
Pinedas third-party claim, Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna
another Affidavit of Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a notice of adverse claim at
DECISION the back of TCT No. T-52319 under Entry No. 324094. [10]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Resolution[1] dated 25 January 2005, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
82872, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Arlyn Pineda (Pineda) for failure to file her
appellants brief. Under the assailed Resolution, the Order[2] promulgated by Branch 27 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna (Laguna RTC), on 2 February 2004, granting the
petition of respondent Julie Arcalas (Arcalas) for the cancellation of the Affidavit of Adverse
Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-52319 under Entry
No. 324094, became final.
The subject property consists of three parcels of land, which are described as Lot No.
3762-D with an area of 42,958 square meters, Lot No. 3762-E with an area of 4,436 square
meters, and Lot No. 3762-F with an area of 2,606 square meters, the total area of which consists
of 50,000 square meters. These three lots are portions of Lot No. 3762, registered in the name
of Spouses Mauro Lateo and Encarnacion Evangelista (spouses Lateo) under TCT No. T-52319,
with a total area of 74,708 square meters, located at Barrios Duhat and Labuin, Santa Cruz,
Laguna. A certain Victoria Tolentino bought the said property from the
Spouses Lateo. Sometime later, Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, for Sum of Money, was instituted
by Arcalas against Victoria Tolentino. This case stemmed from an indebtedness evidenced by a
promissory note and four post-dated checks later dishonored, which
Victoria Tolentino owed Arcalas.[3]
On 9 September 1997, Branch 93 of the Quezon City RTC, rendered judgment in
favor of Arcalas and against Victoria Tolentino.[4]
On 15 December 1997, Pineda bought the subject property from Victoria
L. Tolentino.[5] Pineda alleged that upon payment of the purchase price, she took possession of
the subject property by allowing a tenant, Rodrigo Bautista to cultivate the same. However,
Pineda failed to register the subject property under her name. [6]
On 3 February 2000, Arcalas and Leonardo Byron P. Perez, Jr. purchased Lot No.
3762 at an auction sale conducted by the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City. The sale was
evidenced by a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale issued on the same day and registered as Entry No.
324225 at the back of TCT No. T-52319.[11]
Arcalas then filed an action for the cancellation of the entry of Pinedas adverse claim
before the Laguna RTC. The Laguna RTC ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Adverse
Claim annotated as Entry No. 324094 at the back of TCT No. 52319 on the ground
of res judicata:
The court order emanating from Branch 91 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City having become final and executory and no
relief therefrom having been filed by [Pineda], the said order granting the
[Arcalass] Motion to Set Aside Affidavit of Title and 3rd Party Claim should
be given due course and the corresponding annotation at the back of TCT
No. T-52319 as Entry No. 324094 dated February 2, 2000 should be
expunged accordingly.[12]
Pineda appealed the Order of the Laguna RTC before the Court of Appeals under
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution dated 25 January 2005,[13] the appellate court
dismissed the appeal and considered it abandoned when Pineda failed to file her appellants
brief.
Pineda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein it was plainly stated that Pinedas counsel
overlooked the period within which he should file the appellants brief. [14] The said motion was
denied in a Resolution dated 26 May 2005. Pineda filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied on 7 October 2005.[15] No appellants brief was attached to either motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues:[16]
I.

WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-96-
 27884 MAY EXEMPT THE PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM
VICTORIA TOLENTINO; [and]
II.
WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF THE 5 HECTARES
PORTION OF LOT 3762 IS ALREADY EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION.
This petition must be dismissed.
The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the case for Pinedas failure to file an appellants
brief. This is in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, which imposes upon
the appellant the duty to file an appellants brief in ordinary appealed cases before the Court of
Appeals, thus:
Section 7. Appellants brief.It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the
court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all
the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7)
copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of
service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.
In special cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, such as certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, a memorandum of appeal
must be filed in place of an appellants brief as provided in Section 10 of Rule 44 of the
Rules of Court
Section 10. Time of filing memoranda in special cases.In certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties
shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-
extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the
clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the
record.
The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the
period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Non-filing of an appellants brief or a memorandum of appeal is one of the explicitly recognized
grounds of dismissal of the appeal in Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed
by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of
his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
This Court provided the rationale for requiring an appellants brief in Enriquez v. Court of
Appeals[17]:
[T]he appellants brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the
decision of the appeal on the merits. This is because on appeal only errors
specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum will
be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as
well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no
power to resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the courts
jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error.
Thus, in Casim v. Flordeliza,[18] this Court affirmed the dismissal of an appeal, even when the
filing of an appellants brief was merely attended by delay and fell short of some of the
requirements of the Rules of Court. The Court, in Gonzales v. Gonzales,[19] reiterated that it is
obligatory on the part of the appellant to submit or file a memorandum of appeal, and that failing
such duty, the Rules of Court unmistakably command the dismissal of the appeal.
In this case, Pineda did not even provide a proper justification for her failure to file her
appellants brief. It was merely alleged in her Motion for Reconsideration that her counsel
overlooked the period within which to file the appellants brief.Although Pineda filed no less than
two motions for reconsideration, Pineda had not, at any time, made any attempt to file her
appellants brief. Nor did she supply any convincing argument to establish her right to the subject
property for which she seeks vindication.
Thus, this Court cannot reverse or fault the appellate court for duly acting in faithful
compliance with the rules of procedure and established jurisprudence that it has been mandated
to observe, nor turn a blind eye and tolerate the transgressions of these rules and
doctrines.[20] An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court since the right to appeal is a purely statutory right.[21]
Even when this Court recognized the importance of deciding cases on the merits to
better serve the ends of justice, it has stressed that the liberality in the application of rules of
procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of justice.[22] The Court eyes with disfavor the unjustified
delay in the termination of cases; once a judgment has become final, the winning party must not
be deprived of the fruits of the verdict, through a mere subterfuge. The time spent by the
judiciary, more so of this Court, in taking cognizance and resolving cases is not limitless and
cannot be wasted on cases devoid of any right calling for vindication and are merely
reprehensible efforts to evade the operation of a decision that is final and executory.[23]
In the present case, there is a clear intent on the part of Pineda to delay the
termination of the case, thereby depriving Arcalas of the fruits of a just verdict. The Quezon City
RTC already quashed Pinedas third party claim over the subject property, yet she filed another
adverse claim before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna based on the same
allegations and arguments previously settled by the Quezon City RTC. Arcalas, thus, had to file
another case to cause the cancellation of Pinedas notice of adverse claim on TCT No. T-52319
before the Laguna RTC. After the Laguna RTC gave due course to Arcalass petition, Pineda
filed a dilatory appeal before the Court of Appeals, where she merely let the period for the filing
of the appellants brief lapse without exerting any effort to file one. The two motions for
reconsideration and even the petition before this Court fail to present new issues. They raised
the very same issues which had been consistently resolved by both the Quezon City RTC and
the Laguna RTC in favor of Arcalas, upholding the superiority of her lien over that of Pinedas
unregistered sale. Considering all these circumstances, there is no basis for the lenient
application of procedural rules in this case; otherwise, it would result in a manifest injustice and
the abuse of court processes.
As a rule, the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client. [24] The only exception
to this rule is when the counsels negligence is so gross that a party is deprived of due process
and, thus, loses life, honor or property on mere technicalities.[25] The exception cannot apply to
the present case, where Pineda is merely repeating arguments that were already heard and
decided upon by courts of proper jurisdiction, and the absolute lack of merit of the petition is at
once obvious.
 Pineda avers that she is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, heard before
the Quezon City RTC, and that the levy on the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-
96-27884 cannot affect her purchase of subject property. Such position runs contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provide that:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.An owner
of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal
with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in
law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this
Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or the city where the land lies. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration.Every conveyance,
mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it
relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering. (Emphasis provided.)
It is clear from these provisions that before a purchaser of land causes the registration
of the transfer of the subject property in her favor, third persons, such as Arcalas, cannot be
bound thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a
persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed. As the deed of sale was
unrecorded, it operates merely as a contract between the parties, namely Victoria Tolentino as
seller and Pineda as buyer, which may be enforceable against Victoria Tolentino through a
separate and independent action. On the other hand, Arcalass lien was registered and
annotated at the back of the title of the subject property and accordingly amounted to a
constructive notice thereof to all persons, whether or not party to the original case filed before
the Quezon City RTC.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondent
appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase
recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and
subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner
acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his title
in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not
absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondent, a
right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.
Pineda also contends that her possession of the subject property cures the defect
caused by her failure to register the subject property in her name. This contention is inaccurate
as well as inapplicable.
True, that notwithstanding the preference given to a registered lien, this Court has
made an exception in a case where a party has actual knowledge of the claimants actual, open,
and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time the levy or attachment was
registered. In such situations, the actual notice and knowledge of a prior unregistered interest,
not the mere possession of the disputed property, was held to be equivalent to registration.[29]
Lamentably, in this case, Pineda did not even allege, much less prove,
that Arcalas had actual knowledge of her claim of ownership and possession of the property at
the time the levy was registered. The records fail to show that Arcalas knew of Pinedas claim of
ownership and possession prior to Pinedas filing of her third party claim before the Quezon City
RTC. Hence, the mere possession of the subject property by Pineda, absent any proof
that Arcalas had knowledge of her possession and adverse claim of ownership of the subject
property, cannot be considered as equivalent to registration.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 82872, promulgated on 25 January 2005,
is AFFIRMED. The Order of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
directing the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel the Notice of Adverse Claim inscribed at the
back of TCT No. T-52319 as Entry No. 324094 is SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale.[26] A registered lien is entitled to preferential
consideration.[27] In Valdevieso v. Damalerio,[28] the Court held that a registered writ of
attachment was a superior lien over that on an unregistered deed of sale and explained the
reason therefor:

This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the

particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching
creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy
itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an
indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt. The
lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on
the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133303. February 17, 2005]
BERNARDO VALDEVIESO, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIO DAMALERIO AND AUREA C.
DAMALERIO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the 25 September 1997 Decision and the 10 February 1998 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43082 entitled, Candelario Damalerio and Aurea Damalerio v.
Honorable Antonio S. Alano, et al.[1]
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On 05 December 1995, Bernardo Valdevieso (petitioner) bought from spouses Lorenzo
and Elenita Uy a parcel of land consisting of 10,000 square meters, more or less, located at Bo.
Tambler, General Santos City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-30586.[2]
The deed of sale was not registered, nor was the title of the land transferred to petitioner.[3]
On 07 December 1995, the said property was immediately declared by petitioner for
taxation purposes as Tax Declaration No. l6205 with the City Assessors Office.[4]
It came to pass that on 19 April 1996, spouses Candelario and Aurea Damalerio
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, a complaint for a
sum of money against spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy docketed as Civil Case No. 5748 with
application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.[5]
On 23 April 1996, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment by virtue of which
the property, then still in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which had already been sold to petitioner,
was levied. The levy was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and
annotated upon TCT No. T-30586.[6]
On 06 June 1996, TCT No. T-30586 in the name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-74439 was issued in the name of petitioner.[7] This new TCT carried with it
the attachment in favor of respondents.
On 14 August 1996, petitioner filed a third-party claim in Civil Case No. 5748 to discharge
or annul the attachment levied on the property covered by TCT No. T-74439 on the ground that
the said property belongs to him and no longer to Lorenzo and Elenita Uy.[8]
In a resolution dated 21 October 1996, the trial court ruled for the
petitioner.[9] Citing Manliguez v. Court of Appeals[10] and Santos v. Bayhon,[11] it held that the levy
of the property by virtue of attachment is lawful only when the levied property indubitably
belongs to the defendant. Applying the rulings in the cited cases, it opined that although
defendant Lorenzo Uy remained the registered owner of the property attached, yet the fact was
that he was no longer the owner thereof as it was already sold earlier to petitioner, hence, the
writ of attachment was unlawful.
Respondents sought reconsideration thereof which was denied by the trial court in a
resolution dated 03 January 1997.[12]
From the unfavorable resolution of the trial court in the third-party claim, respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the resolution and by judgment
promulgated on 25 September 1997, it declared that an attachment or levy of execution, though
posterior to the sale, but if registered before the sale is registered, takes precedence over the
sale.[13] The writ of attachment in favor of the respondents, being recorded ahead of the sale to
petitioner, will therefore take precedence.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of 10 February 1998.[14]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land is
a superior lien over that of an earlier unregistered deed of sale.
Petitioner maintains that he has a superior right over the questioned property because
when the same was attached on 23 April 1996, this property was no longer owned by spouses
Uy against whom attachment was issued as it was already sold to petitioner on 05 December
1995. The ownership thereof was already transferred to petitioner pursuant to Article 1477 [15] in
relation to Article 1498[16] of the Civil Code.
Dismissing the allegation that he slept on his rights by not immediately registering at least
an adverse claim based on his deed of sale, petitioner avers that he promptly worked out for the
transfer of registration in his name. The slight delay in the registration, he claims was not due to
his fault but attributable to the process involved in the registration of property such as the
issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance which was effected only after
compliance with several requirements.
Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, petitioner submits
it would be in accord with justice and equity to declare him as having a superior right to the
disputed property than the respondents.
Respondents maintain the contrary view. They aver that registration of a deed of sale is
the operative act which binds the land and creates a lien thereon. Before the registration of the
deed, the property is not bound insofar as third persons are concerned. Since the writ of
attachment in favor of respondents was registered earlier than the deed of sale to petitioner,
respondents were of the belief that their registered writ of attachment on the subject property
enjoys preference and priority over petitioners earlier unregistered deed of sale over the same
property. They also contend that Articles 1477 and 1498 of the Civil Code as cited by petitioner
are not applicable to the case because said provisions apply only as between the parties to the
deed of sale. These provisions do not apply to, nor bind, third parties, like respondents, because
what affects or binds third parties is the registration of the instrument in the Register of Deeds.
Furthermore, respondents argue that petitioner cannot invoke equity in his favor unless the
following conditions are met: (a) the absence of specific provision of a law on the matter; and (b)
if the person who invokes it is not guilty of delay. Both conditions have not been met, however,
since there is a law on the subject matter, i.e., Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and
that petitioner allegedly slept on his rights by not immediately registering an adverse claim based
on his deed of sale.
We agree with the respondents.
The law applicable to the facts of this case is Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529. Said Section
provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing
laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are
sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land,
but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
It is to be noted that though the subject land was deeded to petitioner as early as 05
December 1995, it was not until 06 June 1996 that the conveyance was registered, and, during
that interregnum, the land was subjected to a levy on attachment. It should also be observed
that, at the time of the attachment of the property on 23 April 1996, the spouses Uy were still the
registered owners of said property. Under the cited law, the execution of the deed of sale in
favor of petitioner was not enough as a succeeding step had to be taken, which was the
registration of the sale from the spouses Uy to him. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what
validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed.
Thus, when petitioner bought the property on 05 December 1995, it was, at that point, no more
than a private transaction between him and the spouses Uy. It needed to be registered before it
could bind third parties, including respondents. When the registration finally took place on 06
June 1996, it was already too late because, by then, the levy in favor of respondents, pursuant
to the preliminary attachment ordered by the General Santos City RTC, had already been
annotated on the title.
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior
unregistered sale.[17] This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property
involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle
that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land.[18]
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the
subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in
rem.[19] It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching
creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. [20] Such a proceeding, in
effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to
pay the owners debt.[21] The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in some manner provided by law.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature of a
real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to
subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner acquired
ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his title in the register, and the right
of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered
lien of respondents, a right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.[22]
Anent petitioners reliance on the rulings laid down in Manliguez v. Court of
Appeals and Santos v. Bayhon, we find the same to be misplaced. These cases did not deal at
all with the dilemma at hand, i.e. the question of whether or not a registered writ of attachment
on land is superior to that of an earlier unregistered deed of sale. In Santos, what was involved
were machinery and pieces of equipment which were executed upon pursuant to the favorable
ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission. A third party claimed that the machinery
were already sold to her, but it does not appear in the facts of the case if such sale was ever
registered. Manliguez is similar to Santos, except that the former involved buildings and
improvements on a piece of land. To stress, in both cited cases, the registration of the sale, if
any, of the subject properties was never in issue.
As to petitioners invocation of equity, we cannot, at this instance, yield to such principle in
the presence of a law clearly applicable to the case. We reiterate that this Court, while aware of
its equity jurisdiction, is first and foremost, a court of law. [23] While equity might tilt on the side of
one party, the same cannot be enforced so as to overrule positive provisions of law in favor of
the other.[24] Equity cannot supplant or contravene the law.[25] The rule must stand no matter how
harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43082
dated 25 September 1997, and its Resolution dated 10 February 1998, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127941. January 28, 1999]
BIBLIA TOLEDO-BANAGA and JOVITA TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
CANDELARIO DAMALERIO respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court of Appeals (CA), in a decision penned by then Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco,[1] categorically declared private respondent as the absolute owner of the land subject
of this case. That decision was affirmed by this Court, became final and executory and was
remanded to the lower court for execution. But the Register of Deeds frustrated private
respondents judicially determined right as it refused to issue Certificates of Title in his name on
the ground that the matter should be referred en consulta to the Register of Deeds before
petitioners title can be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the winning party herein
private respondent. So, for the third time, this simple redemption case which commenced in the
1980s is again before this Court.
Here is a summary of the facts, over which there is no dispute:
In an action for redemption filed by petitioner Banaga, the trial court declared that she had
lost her right to redeem her property earlier foreclosed and which was subsequently sold at
public auction to private respondent.[2] Certificates of Title covering the said property were issued
to private respondent over which petitioner Banaga annotated on March 3, 1983 a notice of lis
pendens.[3] On appeal by petitioner Banaga, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and
allowed the former to redeem the property within a certain period.[4] Private respondents petition
to this Court was dismissed[5] and the decision became final.
On June 11, 1992, petitioner Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing with the
trial court the amount of redemption which was financed by her co-petitioner Tan. Private
respondent opposed the redemption arguing that it was made beyond the time given to her by
the court in the earlier case. However, the lower court issued an order on August 7, 1992
upholding the redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel private respondents
Certificates of Title and issue new titles in the name of petitioner Banaga. [6] When his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 4, 1993, private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
29869. On January 11, 1993, private respondent caused the annotation of said petition as
another notice of lis pendens on the Certificates of Title.Three days later, the CA issued a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993
orders.
Meanwhile, on January 7, 1993, petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner
Tan with the deed of absolute sale mentioning private respondents certificate of title which was
not yet cancelled. Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the
property in question under a subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name
of private respondent. There being no preliminary injunction issued and with the expiration of the
TRO, petitioner Tan asked the Register of Deeds to issue new titles in her name. On March 24,
1993, such titles were issued in petitioner Tans name but it still carried the annotations of the
two notices of lis pendens. Upon learning of the new title of petitioner Tan, private respondent
impleaded the former in his petition in CA-G.R. No. 29869.
On October 28, 1993, the CA set aside the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 orders of
the trial court and declared private respondent absolute owner of the subject property. The CA
disposed of the petition as follows:
WHERFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The orders issued by public respondent judge dated August 7, 1992 and January 4,
1993 are hereby ordered SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered declaring petitioner as
the absolute owner of the parcels of land subject of redemption for failure of private respondent
to exercise the right of redemption within the thirty (30) day period previously granted her by this
court.[7]
That decision became final and executory after petitioner Banagas petition for review was
dismissed by this Court for lack of merit.[8] Upon motion of private respondent, the trial court
issued a writ of execution on December 27, 1994 ordering the Register of Deeds to reinstate the
Certificates of Title in the name of the movant herein private respondent. In its order which
petitioners did not contest, the court a quo said that:
Although there is no specific pronouncement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that reverts
the titles to the land subjects of redemption to the defendant, the fact that it declared the
petitioner (Damalerio) as the absolute owner of the lands entitles him to writ of execution issuing
from this court directing the Register of Deeds to reinstate his titles to his name. As it is implied
from the decision declaring him the absolute owner of the lands that the titles to the land be
reverted to him (See Uy v. Capulong, 221 SCRA 87).
Let therefore a writ of execution issue in this case to enforce the decision of the Court of
Appeals. In this connection, the Register of Deeds of the Registry of Deeds for General Santos
City is hereby ordered to reinstate the titles of Candelario B. Damalerio - Transfer Certificates of
Title No. T- 19570 and T-19571, both of the Registry of Deeds from General Santos City. [9]
But the Register of Deeds refused to comply with the writ of execution alleging that the
Certificates of Title issued to petitioner Tan must first be surrendered. Accordingly, private
respondent moved to cite the Register of Deeds in contempt of court which was denied, as the
trial court ruled on January 11, 1995 that the formers remedy is by consulta to the Commissioner
of Land Registration.[10] In another order (dated March 29, 1996), the trial court likewise denied
private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of possession ruling that the latters remedy
is a separate action to declare petitioner Tans Certificates of Title void. Aggrieved, private
respondent again elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari and mandamus[11] assailing the above-mentioned two orders of the court a
quo naming as respondents the trial court judge, the Register of Deeds and the petitioners. On
November 7, 1996, the CA rendered a decision granting the petition and, among others, set
aside the assailed orders of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment
is hereby rendered:
1) setting aside the orders of the respondent judge dated January11, 1995 and
March 29, 1996;
2) declaring the title issued to Biblia Toledo-Banaga, Jovita Tan and to those other
subsequent transferee or transferees, if any, as null and void;
3) ordering the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to issue new certificates of
title to Candelario Damalerio over the parcels of land in question;
4) ordering the respondent court to issue writ of execution for the enforcement of
this decision and of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29868 (sic), as well as a
writ of possession for the delivery to petitioner Damalerio of the Physical
possession of the parcels of land subject matter of this case.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Upon denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant
petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Court, however, is puzzled why petitioners, in their
petition, would seek to set aside the two orders (January 4, 1995 and March 29, 1996) of
respondent judge who was not named in their petition.[13] Assuming this to be a
mere lapsus since they also confusingly refer to Banaga and Tan as private respondent and to
Damalerio as petitioner,[14] the petition is still utterly without merit. It is petitioners stand (1) that
petitioner Tan is a buyer in god faith and (2) that the remedy of private respondent to secure the
titles in his name is by consulta to the Land Registration Commissioner and not through
contempt.
 The Court is not convinced of the arguments proffered by petitioners.
By arguing that petitioner Tan was a buyer in good faith, petitioners in effect raise once
more the issue of ownership of the subject property. But such issue had already been clearly
and categorically ruled upon by the CA and affirmed by this Court, wherein private respondent
was adjudged the rightful and absolute owner thereof. The decision in that case bars a further
repeated consideration of the very same issue that has already been settled with finality. To
once again re-open that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our
courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond
review or modification even by this Court.[15]
Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final
decision, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. It is to the interest of the public that there
should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated, and an
individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.[16] All the elements of res judicata are
present in this case, which are:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
(d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.[17]
The judgment in the redemption suit had long become final and executory; there is no
question that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; it involves an
adjudication on the merits of the case as the court discussed and passed upon petitioner
Banagas right of redemption which she did not timely exercise and as a consequence, lost her
claim of ownership of the lot. Both petitioners and private respondent are parties to the earlier
cases, disputing the same parcel of land with both opposing parties claiming ownership
thereof. Certainly, res judicata had set in. Besides, once a judgment had become final and
executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be. In any case, no
such error was attributed to in this case.
Contrary to petitioners argument, private respondents remedy is not a direct or
independent civil action for cancellation of petitioner Tans titles. The facts, circumstances,
evidence and arguments invoked in this derailed final and executory decision are the very same
matters that will be established assuming such independent suit is legally warranted. It does not
matter whether the former case was a redemption suit and the new one will be for cancellation of
title because the test of identity of causes of action is not in its form but whether the same
evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of action. [18]
Petitioners other contention that the execution of the final and executory decision - which
is to issue titles in the name of private respondent - cannot be compelled by mandamus because
of the formality that the registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for
cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential Decree 1529[19] cited by the Register of
Deeds,[20] bears no merit. In effect, they argue that the winning party must wait execution until
the losing party has complied with the formality of surrender of the duplicate title. Such
preposterous contention borders on the absurd and has no place in our legal system. Precisely,
the Supreme Court had already affirmed the CAs judgment that Certificates of Title be issued in
private respondents name. To file another action just to compel the registered owner, herein
petitioner Tan, to surrender her titles constitute violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the
highest tribunal. Otherwise, if execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not
surrender her titles, the entire proceeding in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time
of the parties, would be rendered nugatory. It is revolting to conscience to allow petitioners to
further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to
technicality,[21] or formality of surrender of the duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is
implied from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides,
as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply
with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain
person, especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.
In addition, the enforcement of a final and executory judgment is likewise a ministerial
function of the courts[22] and does not call for the exercise of discretion. Being a ministerial duty,
a writ of mandamus lies to compel its performance.[23] Moreover, it is axiomatic that where a
decision on the merits is rendered and the same has become final and executory, as in this
case, the action on procedural matters or issues becomes moot and academic.[24] Thus, the so-
called consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration, which is not applicable herein, was
only a naive and belated effort resorted to by petitioners in order to delay execution. If petitioners
desire to stop the enforcement of a final and executory decision, they should have secured the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,[25] but which they did not avail knowing that there
exists no legal or even equitable justifications to support it.
At any rate, at the time petitioner Banaga sold the property to petitioner Tan, the latter was
well aware of the interest of private respondent over the lot. Petitioner Tan furnished the amount
used by petitioner Banaga for the attempted redemption. One who redeems in vain a property of
another acquires notice that there could be a controversy. It is for the same reason that
petitioner Tan was included as party to the case filed in court. Worse, at the time of the sale,
petitioner Tan was buying a property not registered in the sellers name. This clear from the deed
of absolute sale which even mentioned that the Certificates of Title is still in the name of private
respondent. It is settled that a party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the
Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect her interest. She
has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate of Title. By looking at the title, however,
petitioner Tan cannot feigned ignorance that the property is registered in private respondents
name and not in the name of the person selling to her. Such fact alone should have at least
prompted, if not impelled her to investigate deeper into the title of her seller - petitioner Banaga,
more so when such effort would not have entailed additional hardship, and would have been
quite easy, as the titles still carried the two notices of lis pendens.
By virtue of such notices, petitioner Tan is bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of
the lis pendens. As a transferee pendente lite, she stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor
and must respect any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the
transferor. Her interest is subject to the incidents or results of the pending suit, and her
Certificates of Title will, in that respect, afford her no special protection.[26]
To repeat, at the time of the sale, the person from whom petitioner Tan bought the
property is neither the registered owner nor was the former authorized by the latter to sell the
same. She knew she was not dealing with the registered owner or a representative of the
latter. One who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his
vendor is enough proof of his bad faith[27] and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as
against the owner or of an interest therein.[28] When she nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot,
petitioner Tan gambled on the result of litigation.[29] She is bound by the outcome of her
indifference with no one to blame except herself if she looses her claim as against one who has
a superior right or interest over the property. These are the undeniable and uncontroverted facts
found by the CA, which petitioners even quote and cite in their petition. As aptly concluded by
the CA that petitioner Tan is indeed a buyer in bad faith on which the Court agrees:
Notwithstanding her constructive and actual knowledge that Damalerio was claiming the land,
that the land was in his name, and it was involved in pending litigation, Jovita Tan bought it from
Banaga on January 7, 1993. The deed of sale recites that the parcels of land sold were covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title No. __ (formerly [T-12488] T-530) and TCT No. __ (formerly [T-
12488] T-530) (sic) and TCT No. __ (formerly P-1294). (Annex F, Petition). Apart from the fact
that Banaga was without any TCT, as above stated, TCT No. T-12488 was petitioners title
(Annex C, Petition). Herein private respondent Tan was buying a land not registered in her
sellers (Banagas) name, but in that of petitioner Damalerio who had been claiming it as his
own. She admitted this fact when she had the land subdivided on February 2, 1993 not in her
name but in the name of Candelario Damalerio (Annex Q, Reply). Evidently, she was a
purchaser in bad faith because she had full knowledge of the flaws and defects of title of her action. For while this Court already declared that Banagas redemption of the land
seller, Banaga. X x x. financed by private respondent Tan was invalid, and as a consequence declared
Damalerio absolute owner of the property, which was binding against private
The notice of lis pendens registered on March 3, 1993 involving the land in question and private respondent Tan, as she was a respondent therein and a purchaser pendente
respondent Tans actual knowledge of the then pending Civil Case No. 2556, where the question lite and in bad faith, the order of the respondent Court holding that another civil
as to whether the redemption of the land which she financed was raised, rendered her a action be filed to annul private respondent Tans titles would be to re-litigate such
purchaser in bad faith and made the decision therein binding upon her.[30] issues and modify or alter this Courts final decision.
Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire a better rights than her The respondent Court has no authority to do so.[36]
predecessor in interest,[31] for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. Such finding of
bad faith is final and may not be re-opened for the law cannot allow the parties to trifle with the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
courts.[32] decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against petitioners. No further
proceeding will be entertained in this case.
With respect to the issue of possession, such right is a necessary incident of
ownership.[33] The adjudication of ownership to private respondent includes the delivery of SO ORDERED.
possession since the defeated parties in this case has not shown by what right to retain
possession of the land independently of their claim of ownership which was
rejected.[34] Otherwise, it would be unjust if petitioners who has no valid right over the property
will retain the same.[35] Thus, the CA correctly disagreed with the trial courts order denying
private respondents motion for writ of possession for the following reasons cited in its decision:
1. The order violates the doctrine laid down in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 224
SCRA 704, which ruled that the issuance of title in favor of a purchaser in bad faith
does not exempt the latter from complying with the decision adverse to his
predecessor in interest, nor preclude him from being reached by writ of execution;
2. Private respondent Tan was a party respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869, she
having been impleaded in a supplemental petition, which this Court gave due
course and required the respondents to file their answer. The fact that she did not
file any pleading, nor intervene therein did not excuse her from being bound by the
decision, otherwise all that a party respondent was to fold his arm to prevent him
from being bound by a decision in a case. Her securing titles over the land during
the pendency of said case did not protect her from the effects of said
decision. The validity of tile of a purchaser of registered land depends on whether
he had knowledge, actual or constructive, of defects in the title of his vendor. If he
has such knowledge, he is a purchaser in bad faith and acquires the land subject to
such defects (X x x indicates that citations of authorities omitted) The title secured
by a purchaser in bad faith is a nullity and gave the latter no right whatsoever, as
against the owner (x x x).
3. Private respondent Tans titles and those of her predecessor, Banaga, arose from
the void orders of August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993. Since a void order could not
give rise to valid rights, said titles were also necessarily null and void (x x x).
4. Private respondents and respondent Judge executed the questioned orders of
August 7, 1993 and January 4, 1993, pending review of said orders in CA-G.R. SP
No. 29869. The nullification of said orders by this out imposed upon the private
respondents the obligation to return the property to Damalerio and upon respondent
Judge, upon motion for execution, to order the cancellation of private respondents
titles and the issuance of new titles to him.
5. This Court in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869 declared petitioner Damalerio
absolute owner of the property in question. Private respondents were parties
litigants in said case, who did not claim possession of the land separately from their
claim of ownership thereof. Such being the case, the delivery of possession is
considered included in this Courts decision declaring Damalerio absolute owner of
the property (x x x), which can be enforced by writ of possession (x x x). In denying
petitioners motion for writ of possession, the trial court violated said doctrines, and
6. Lastly, the effect of respondent Judges order of March 29, 1996 is to re-open the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29689 for re-litigation and alteration in a separate
 Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the
THIRD DIVISION unlawful detainer case against petitioners, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO G.R. No. 189239 against the defendants Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als. ordering the latter and
AND ERWIN COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND FELITA all persons claiming rights under them
ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA, Present: to VACATE and SURRENDER possession of the premises (Lots covered
RESTITUTO MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD AND MIRIAM by TCT NOS. (71065) 21712 and (71066) 21713 otherwise known as Purok
MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J., I Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro, Paraaque City to plaintiff and to
SPS. ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, BRION, PAY the said plaintiff as follows:
SPS. HELEN AND ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON, BERSAMIN
SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS. JOSEFINA AND JOEL VILLARAMA, JR., and 1. The reasonable compensation in the amount of P20,000.00
YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA SERENO, JJ. a month commencing November 20, 2002 and every month
AND MARIO ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA thereafter until the defendants shall have finally vacated the
LELIS, FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO, premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to the
Petitioners, plaintiff;
2. P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and finally
3. Costs of suit.
- versus -
SO ORDERED.[1] (emphasis in the original)

FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still
and MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION, Promulgated: maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the
Respondents. issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.

November 24, 2010 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008, [2] reversed the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:

x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents
herein) is unlawful detainer as shown by the allegations of the Complaint.
The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of the
Complaint that finally determine whether a case is unlawful detainer,
DECISION rather it is the evidence in the case.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation
(respondents), co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7,
2003 against above-named petitioners before the Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since
1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.
Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of tolerance.
Tolerance of the occupation of the property must be present right from the
start of the defendants possession. The phrase from the start of defendants
possession is significant. When there is no tolerance right from the start
of the possession sought to be recovered, the case of unlawful
detainer will not prosper.[3] (emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that
respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the
lots. In any event, they contend that the question of ownership must first be settled before the
issue of possession may be resolved.
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the
continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been
rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the
MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the . . . final judgment and writ of possession due to non-
payment of just compensation:

During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties
proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque with the intention of subject of this case had already been given to the City of Paraaque since
establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is serious error for the
petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to court a quo to rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang
the City. Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which
were already expropriated in favor of the City of Paraaque.

There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo
that the case for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court would not bar,
suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had failed to
consider the fact that the case for expropriation was already decided by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in the year 2006 or 2 years
before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the unlawful detainer case in
the year 2008. In fact, there was already a Writ of Possession way back in
the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation case by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the
said final judgment and the writ of possession already issued by the
Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Paraaque and against
Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty Development
Corporation and make another judgment concerning possession of
the subject properties contrary to the final judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 196.[4] (emphasis in the original)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they
maintained that respondents act of allowing several years to pass without requiring [them] to
vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or tolerance of their
possession.[5]
By Decision of May 27, 2009,[6] the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not present
evidence to rebut respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners
admission that they commenced occupation of the property without the permission of the
previous owner ─ Pilipinas Development Corporation ─ as indicium of tolerance by respondents
predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor of respondents. Held the appellate court:
Where the defendants entry upon the land was with plaintiffs
tolerance from the date and fact of entry, unlawful detainer proceedings may
be instituted within one year from the demand on him to vacate upon
demand. The status of such defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or
lessee, the term of whose lease, has expired but whose occupancy is
continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The same rule applies where the
defendant purchased the house of the former lessee, who was already in
arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter occupied the premises
without a new lease contract with the landowner.[7]
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate
court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,[8] held the same does not signify the completion of the
expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court a quo is REVOKED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 3,
2008 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting the award
for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009, hence,
the filing of the present petition for review.
The petition fails.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls
within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social
justice.[9]
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their
resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538[10] enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or
chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants
occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as
may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants
shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due
or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has
been instituted. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the
suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation
proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better right of possession; and that the City
Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings designated them as
beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there.
Petitioners position does not lie.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of
the Local Government Code (LGC):
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through
its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was
not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of
the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation[11] clearly outlines the stages of
expropriation, viz:
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
 compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x
x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners x x x .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just
compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this
case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the
transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property
owners the final just compensation.[12] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings
did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage
in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of
respondents prior to the Citys possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.

Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the
city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state
so.[13] Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.

Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to
claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements
must be met and complied with before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.

In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession
is by mere tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual:[14]

In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to

vacate the premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have
acquiesced to defendants possession and use of the
premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land
of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee
or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the
date of the demand to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They stepped into
the shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even if early on
respondents made no demand or filed no action against petitioners to eject them from the lots,
they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed petitioners possession by tolerance.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.