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Volume
IX. July,1900. Whole
Number4. Number52.

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY OF LAUGHTER.

A WRITER who professesto discourse on laughter has to


encountermore than one varietyof irritatingobjection.
He finds to his dismaythata considerablepart of his species,
whichhas been flatteringly describedas the ' laughinganimal,'has
neverexerciseditshigh and distinguishing capacity. Nay, more,
he soon learns thata good manyoppose themselvesto the prac-
tice and are laughter-haters. This kind of person (6 fetar;eso?)
is so possessed withthe spiritof seriousness that the opposite
temperof jocosity appears to him to be somethingshockingly
wrong. All audible laughter is for him an ill-breddisplay,at
once unsightlyas a bodilycontortion, and as a lapse from the
gravityof reason, a kind of mentaldegradation. This estimate
of the laugh as low and unseemly,is well representedin Lord
Chesterfield'swell-knownLetters,in whichthe writercongratu-
lates himselfthatsince he has had the fulluse of his reason, no-
body has ever heard him laugh. In some cases thisfeelingof
repugnancetowards mirthand fun takes on more of an ethical
aspect. The laugher is identified with the scofferat all things
worthy,and condemnedas morallybad. This is illustratedin
the sayingof Pascal, diseurde bonsmnotsnaczuvais caractere.
Now it seems evidentthatone who discourseson laughter is
bound to noticethisattitudeof thelaughter-hater. If he believes
that the moods of hilarity,and the enjoymentof theludicrous,
have theirrightful place in human experience,he must be ready
to challengethe monopolyclaimedby the out-and-out sticklers
366 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. IX.

forseriousness,and to disputethe propositionthattheopen honest


laugh connoteseithera vulgar taste or a depraved moral nature.
Perhaps, however, our discourser need not distress himself
about these rathersour temperedlaughter-haters. In thesedays
we have to confrontnot so much oppositionas indifference.In-
stead of the denouncerof mirthas vulgar or wicked we have the
refrainerfromlaughter,the non-laugherpure and simple. As his
Greek name ' Agelast' (o' Jr'Avaaro) suggests,this ratherannoy-
ing type was not unknownin ancienttimes. In merryEngland
too, Shakespeare had met withthe Agelasts who would
" notshowtheirteethin way of smile,
ThoughNestorswearthejest be laughable."

Yet it is only of late that the varietyhas appeared in its full


force. To what scantyproportionsin these latertimesthe band
of laughers has dwindled is suggested by the name humourist
whichis now giventhem,for' humorist' meantnot so long ago
an odd fellowor ' eccentric.' Indeed, one of our living writers
suggests that" as the worldbecomes moredecorous humour be-
comes tongue-tiedand obsolete."'
Even if we grantthatthe ' Gelasts' are gettingreducedto the
dimensionsof a pettysect, the considerationneed not deter us
fromchoosing laughteras our theme. Those who have the per-
fectear formusic are probablybut a tinyportion of the human
family; yet nobody has suggested that this is an argument
against the writingof books on musical form,the science of
thoroughbass and the rest.
Yet the friendsof laughter have always existed,and even in
these ratherdrearydays are perhapsmorenumerousthan is often
supposed. In supportof this idea one may recall the curious
factthat,as is remarkedby theessayistjust quoted, we all shrink
fromthe ' awfulimputation'impliedin the words, ' You have no
sense of humour.' This recognitionof the capacityforapprecia-
tinga joke, as a human attributewhichitis well notto be without,
is of course veryfarfrombeing proofof a genuinelove of funin
the recognizersthemselves. Yet it at least attests to the exist-
ence of this love in othersin a respectablequantity.
' Articleon Htimourin theCornhillMagazine,Vol. xxxiii,pp. 318-326.
No. 4.] A THEORY OF LAUGHTER. 367

Now the veryfriendof laughter (o (PfAore)Wmay urge his


own objectionto our proposed discussion,an objectionless irri-
tatingperhapsthan that of the zealous laughter-hater and of the
indifferent ' agelast,' but on the otherhand of a more penetrating
thrust. He not unnaturallydislikesthe idea of his dailypastime
being made the subject of graveenquiry. He feelsin its acutest
formthe resentment of the naturalman on seeing his enjoyment
brought under the scalpel and lens of the scientificenquirer.
He urges withforcethat the chucklingsof humor are the very
lightestand flimsiest of human things; and thatto tryto capture
these, and to subject them to serious investigation, looks much
like the procedureof the childwhose impulsivehand would seize
and examine his daintysoap bubbles.
To the truefriendsof the mirthfulgod one owes it to reply
courteouslyand at length to their objections. Yet the answer
cannotwell be given at the outset. A discourseon laughtercan
remove this kind of objection,if at all, only by showing in its
own treatmentof the subject that serious thought may touch
even the gossamer wing of the merrysprite and not destroy;
that all things,and so the lightest,are things to be compre-
hended,if only we can reach the rightpoints of view; and that
the problemswhich rise above the mental horizonas soon as we
begin to thinkabout man's humorousbent,have a quite peculiar
interest,an interestin which all who can both laugh at things
and ponderon them,may be expected to share.
It seems evident that one who is to probe the spiritof funin
man and to extractits meaningshould have special qualifications.
It is by no means sufficient, as some would seem to suppose,
that he should be able to think clearly. He must couple with
the gravityof the thinkersomethingof the intellectuallightness
and nimblenessof the jester. That is to say, he must be in
warmtouch withhis theme,the jocose mood itself,realizinghis
subject at once vividlyand comprehensivelyby help of a rich
personal experience.
Now it cannotbe said thatthose who have offeredto teach us
the secretsof laughterhave commonlyexhibitedthese qualifica-
tions in a conspicuousmeasure. It is a part of the whimsicality
368 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IX.

which seems to run throughhuman affairs,thatthe spiritof fun


should be misunderstoodnot merelyby the avowedly indifferent
and the avowedly hostile,but by those who, since theyofferto
elucidateits ways,mightbe expected to have some personal ac-
quaintancewithit. A combinationof a finefeelingforthe baf-
flingbehaviorof this spirit,and a keen scientificanalysis,such
as we have in Mr. George Meredith'sEssay on Comedy,seems to
be a rarityin literature.
This want of the familiartouch is especially observable in a
good deal of the treatmentof laughter by philosophicwriters.
It is not necessaryto dwell on the sublimesubtletiesof the meta-
physicians,who conceive of the comic as a ' moment' in the dia-
lectic process which the aesthetic' Idea' has to pass through.
The account of the gyrationswhich the Idea has to describe,
when once it passes out of that state of harmoniousunion with
the sensuousimage whichwe call ' the beautiful,'reads strangely
enough. Having for reasons that are not made too clear, torn
itselfaway fromits peacefulcompanion(the image) and set itself
up as antagonistto this in ' the sublime,' it-the august Idea-
encountersthe unpleasant retaliationof the discarded image in
' the ugly,' wherewe see the determination of the injuredparty
to defyits late companion; while in the end, it revivesfromthe
I swoon) into which this rude behavior of the image has
plunged it, and recovers its legitimate claims-with which it
would seem it was at the outset dissatisfied-in what we call
'the ludicrous.'
I have heretriedto putthespeculativesubtletiesof these Hege-
lian writers,so faras I am able to catch theirdrift,into intelligible
English, and not to caricaturethem. Even favorablecriticsof
these theorieshave foundit difficult not to treatthemwithsome
amount of irony; and so far as I am aware no rehabilitatorof
Hegelian thoughtin England or America has as yet been bold
enough to do into our language a chapterof the sacred myster-
ies which,as theymay well suspect,so easily lends itselfto pro-
fanejest.
How remote this kind of treatmentof the ludicrousmustbe
fromthe homely laughterof mortals,may be seen in such at-
No. 4.1 A THEORY OF LA UG11TER. 369

temptsas are made by theseHegelian thinkersto connectthe two.


Hegel himself,in touching on the nature of comedy, asserted
that " onlythatis trulycomic in whichthe personsof the play
are comic for themselves as well as for the spectator."' This
seems to mean (it is always hazardous to say confidentlywhat a
Hegelian pronouncementdoes mean) that a large part of what
the world has foolishlysupposed to be comedy,plays of Aris-
tophanes,or Moliere and the rest,are not so.
It is perhapstoo much to expect that the aspiringmetaphy-
sician,when,as he fondlythinks,he has gained the altitudefrom
which the dialectic process of the World-ideais seen to unfold
itself,shouldtroublehimselfabout so vulgara thingas ourevery-
day laughter. But laughterhas its mildretaliationsforthe neg-
ligent,and the comedianof today,as ofold, is morelikelyto pluck
fromthose who tread the speculative cloud-heightsmaterialfor
his merrimentthan any furtherelucidation of the secretsof his
craft.
In reading these abstruse speculations of Germany on the
natureof that much-misunderstood and impishlittlecreature,the.
spiritof fun,one cannotbut thinkof what has been writtenas to
the poor show made by that countryin the comic literatureof
Europe. Two of the greatestof recentEnglish humoristshave
notedthisfact. George Eliot remarksthat the Germans have
contributedup to the present century "nothing classic to the
commonstock of European wit and humor"2; while Mr. George
Meredithobserves that " German attemptsat comedy remind
one vividlyof Heine's image of his countryin the dancing of
Atta Troll."3 It may seem rudeto criticizethe humorousfaculty
of a people not one's own; for,as we know, enjoymentof the
comical is greatly restrictedby national limitations. Yet it is
certainlycuriousthat the intellectualnationof whichthisabsence
of the comedian's art has been asserted,should have been the
one to evolve theories of the ludicrouswhich themselves so
readilytake on an amusingaspect to the foreigner.
I B. Bosanquet,Historyof zsthetic, p. 36o.
2 Essays, GermanWit: HeinrichHeine, p. 87.

3An Essay on Comnedy,p. 57.


370 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IX.

It is, however,more to the purposeto referto the theoristswho


make some show of explainingwhat the ordinaryman under-
standsby the ludicrous,and of testingtheirtheoriesby an appeal
to recognizableexamples. It is instructive to note the cautious-
ness with which they will sometimes venture on the slippery
'empirical' ground. Schopenhauer, for example, in discours-
ing of the ludicrousin the firstvolume of his chiefwork,thought
it 'superfluous' to illustratehis theory by example. In the
second volume, however,he comes to the help of the " intel-
lectual sluggishness" of his readers and condescends to furnish
illustrations. And what does the readersuppose is the firstto be
selected? The amusinglook of the angle formedby the meeting
of the tangentand the curve of the circle; which look is due, he
thatan angle impliesthe meetingof two
tells us, to the reflection
lines whichwhen prolongedintersect, whereas thestraightline of
the tangentand the curve of the circle are seen merelyto graze
at one point,wherestrictlyspeaking they are parallel. In other
words we laugh here because we cannotsubsumetheangle which
stares us in the face underthe idea of a meetingof a tangentand
a curved line. With charmingcandor the writerproceeds:
" The ludicrousin this case is no doubt,extremelyweak; on the
otherhand it illustrateswith exceptional clearness the originof
the ludicrousin the incongruity betweenwhat is thought and
what is perceived." That is to say, the geometricalillustration
given,though recognizedas by no means a strongone, has been
selected because it so nicelyfitsthe author's theory.
The significanceof this passage is that it comes fromthe pen
of a man who was by no means a metaphysicalrecluse,but, on
the contrary,knew the world,and was versed in European litera-
turesand no doubt in comedy. Some of the other examples
which he adduces show something of this familiarity with the
comic spirit. The presentationof so far-fetched and verydoubt-
fulan example of the ludicrous by such a man seems to show
how hard it is to delay theorizingabout things until a full and
carefulsurveyof the factshas been completed.
Afterwhat has been said above, it seems only fairto add that
Band II., ErstesBuch, Kap. 8.
1Die Wellals Willeund Vorstellung,
No. 4.1 A THEORY OF LA UGHTER. 37r

the mishandlingof factsby those who writeon the natureof the


ludicrous, is by no means confinedto the Germans. A very
curious attemptto explain the effectof the droll on popular sen-
sibilitiescomes fromthe land of Rabelais and Moliere. Accord-
ing to a French essayist,whenwe laugh at a clown pushinghard
against an open door it is not at the absurdityof the superfluous
effort. We only laugh when our mindspass to a secondand re-
flectivestage and recognize that the man doesn't perceive the
door to be open, when, consequently,we are able to view the
disproportionate and quite needlessexertionas natural.' A more
strikinginstanceof an inabilityto understandthe swiftmovement
to find. As we shall see,
of the risiblein us it would be difficult
theoriesof laughter,like theoriesof Shakespeare's genius, have
frequentlycome to griefby projectingbehind the thing which
they seek to account for,too much of the author's own habitual
reflectiveness.
In orderto see more clearlyhow the factsof human mirthare
apt to be twistedinto shapes no longer recognizablein deference
to the requirementsof theory,we will pass to the writingsof a
living psychologistwho may be expected to be trained in the
analysisof our every-dayexperiences. ProfessorLipps has re-
centlyelaborateda theoryof the ludicrous,illustratingit at some
length. This theory may be described as a modificationof
Kant's, whichplaces the cause of laughterin " the sudden trans-
formationof a tense expectation into nothing." According to
Lipps, wheneverwe laugh at somethingfunnythereis a move-
mentof thoughtfromsome belittlingidea to an idea that is be-
littledor nullifiedby this.
In orderto illustratehis pointhe takes among otherexamples
that of a hat on the wrong head. A nian topped by a child's
small cap, and a child covered witha man's big hat are, he tells
us, equally comical. But the reason is different in the two cases.
In the first,startingwiththe perceptionof the worthyman, we
expect an adequate headcovering,and this expectationis nullified
by the obstinatepresence of the tinycap. Here then the funny
1 See an articleentitledPourquoirit on,by CamilleMelinaud,in theRevuedesdeux
mondes,I895. (Tom. 127, pp. 612 ff.)
372 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IX.

cap. In the second


feature,the belittledthing,is the diminutive
case, however,the movementof thoughtis just the reverse. We
hereset out withthe perceptionof the head-gearnotwiththatof
its wearer. It is the dignifiedman's hat that now firstfixesour
attention,and it is the obtrusionof the child beneath,when we
expectthe'properwearer,whichis the comical feature. In other
words,when a man puts on a baby's cap it is the cap which is
absurd; when a baby dons his father'scylinderit is the baby
whichis absurd.
This is ingenious, one mustconfess,but does it not involve
some twistingof facts? Would the unphilosophichumorist
recognize the account of ways of laughter here given? Has
thisaccountthe note of familiarity withthese ways? Let us see.
At theoutsetone may enter a modest protestagainst the quiet
assumptionthatthe two cases hereselected are at the same level
of the laughable. It may be urged that,to the grown-upspec-
tator at least, the sight of the little one crowned with the
whelminghead-gearof his sire is immeasurablymore amusing
than the other. Here the author strikes one as proceeding
ratherhastily,as he seems to do also when he assumes that an
exceptionallybig and an exceptionallylittlenose are equally pal-
pable examplesof thelaughable. This is, to say the least,disput-
able. One can hardlythinkof a comedyturningon thesmallness
of a person'snose,as the Cyranzode Bergeracof M. Rostrandturns
on its bigness. But thisobjectionneed not,perhaps,be pressed.
Passing,then,to the explanationof the two examples offered
by the author, we are firstof all struck by the apparent ar-
bitrarinessof the suppositionthat the movementof thought
whichhe assumes should in the one case take exactly the re-
versedirectionof thattaken in the other. Seeing that both are
instancesof a grotesquelyunsuitablehead-covering,should one
not expect their enjoymentto spring out of a similar kind of
mentalactivity?
The author probablymeans to say thatwe tend to fix the
attentionon the more dignifiedfeaturein each case, the man
beneath the tinycap, and the man's hat above the tinyhead.
But that is far frombeing certain. And in any case thereare
No. 4.1 A THEORY OF LA UGHTER. 373

good reasonsagainst assuming a 'contrarymotion' of thought


here. Dr. Lipps will no doubt allow, as a trainedpsychologist,
that these intellectualmovementsare subject to well-recognized
laws. Our deduction fromthese is that the sightof a hat will
suggest the idea of the human figureto which it belongs much
more certainlyand more powerfullythan the sight of the figure
will suggest the idea of its appropriatecovering. I believe that
everybody'sexperiencewill confirmthis. A hat seen even in a
shop-windowstarts the impulse to thinkof some wearer; but
who would say thatseeing a human head, say across the dinner
table or in an adjoiningstall at the theatre,prompts us to think
of its propercovering? Special circumstances, such as the pres-
ence of an exceptionalbaldness appealing to pity,must be added
beforeour thoughts flitto the out-of-doorreceptacle. In other
words,the whole interestand significanceof a hat lie in a refer-
ence to a wearer,but not vice versa.
We must,then,rejectthe idea of a double and opposed move-
mentof thoughthere. If it takesplace it mustbe assumed to be
in each case a transitionfromtheperceptionof the hat to the idea
of its customaryand properwearer.
Now, are we aware,whenwe laugh at eitherofthese odd sights,
of carryingout this movementof thought? Keeping to the in-
disputablecase of the child's head underor in the man's hat, do
we, beforethe agreeable spasm seizes us, firstmentallygrasp the
hat and then pass to the idea of its rightfulwearer? I at least
cannot findthis to be true in my own experience. But such in-
abilitymay be due to want of a sufficiently delicateintrospection.
Let us thentryto testthe pointin anotherway.
If the smile of amusementwithwhich we greet this spectacle
comes fromthe dissolutionof the idea of the adult male figure,
we should expect the enjoymentof the ludicrousaspect to be es-
pecially conspicuous when the hat appears an instantbeforethe
child-wearer,and so thought is compelled to travel in the re-
quireddirection. Let us suppose that a child in his nurseryputs
on his father'shat and stands on a chair,and that you enterthe
room and catch a glimpse of the hat first,say above a piece of
furniture, and fora briefmomentexpect to see an adult beneath.
374 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IX.

No doubt you will be aware of a definitemovementof thought


in the requireddirection,and of the dissolutionintonothingof the
expectantidea. But will the elementof clear anticipationand its
annihilationintensifyyourfeelingof the funninessof thespectacle,
or even make the funninessmore patent? You would no doubt
in such a case experience a little shock, the fullexcitementof
surprise,and that mightadd volume to the whole feelingof the
moment. You might,too, not improbably,laugh more heartily,
foryou would have a sense of being taken in,and therewould be
a side-current of hilaritydirectedagainst yourself. But I ven-
tureto affirm that the spectacle as such would not impress you
as being one whitmore ludicrouswhen seen in this way, firstthe
hat and thenthe wearer,thenwhen your eye firstlightedon the
two together.
Anotherobjectionmay occur to one here. If when we laugh
at the sight of a child wearinga verybig hat, we execute the
movementof thoughtdescribedby Lipps, startingwitha distinct
apprehensionof the hat and arrivingat the equally distinctap-
prehensionof the child, we should expect other results. A
man's hat hanging on its peg ought to look funny,for here,
as we have seen, there Would be a tendencyof thought to
move to the figurewhich usually carries it, and this movement
would certainlybe dissolved into nothingness. Yet while I am
well aware that an unoccupiedhat may take on a grotesque as-
pect,I ventureto thinkthatthis is comparativelyrare and due to
quite othercauses.
What seems to happen when we are amused by this little
comic scene in the nursery? Do we not at a glance perceive a
grotesque whole, viz., a hat on the wrong'head,and is not our
amusementtoo swiftlyforthcoming to allow of our singlingout
a part of what is seen and going throughthe process of thought
describedby the ingeniousauthor of thistheory? Science seems
to bear out what common observationdiscovers,for the newer
psychologyteaches that,in the firstmomentof perceivingan ob-
ject, we obtain not a distinctapprehensionof parts, but a vague
apprehensionof a whole into which detail and definiteness only
come later and gradually.
No. 4.1 A THEORY OF LAUGHTER. 375

An ensem;ble,which can only be describedas a whole made up


parts,that seems to be the object on which our at-
of ill-fitting
tentionis focussed when we laugh at the child underthis need-
lessly' capacious hat. This intuitioninvolves no doubt some
rapidseizingof details: but the attentionto partsis not to sepa-
rate objects,as the language of Dr. Lipps suggests,but to related
parts,to the hat as worn in relationto the wearer.
This seems to be an adequate account of what takes place so
faras it is the palpable unfitnessof dimensionswhich moves us
to laughter. But it may be urged,and rightlyurged,that the
laughable spectacle is more than this,that which ticklesus is
the uncustomaryand topsy-turvy arrangementof things. And
here,it may be said, thereis implieda movementof thoughtto
somethingoutsidethe spectacle itself,to what is customaryand
in order.
The suppositionis a highly plausible one. Since, moreover,
what we perceiveis a whole, it is reasonable to assume thatif
such movementoccurs it mustbe, not what Dr. Lipps describes,
but one fromthe presentwhole as oddly and wronglycomposed
to some otherwhole as rightlycomposed. Do we not, it may
be asked, here carry out a process fairlywell described in
Schopenhauer'stheoryof the ludicrous,that is, conceiveof " an
incongruencebetweenthe real object and its idea," and so, by
implication, go back to thisidea ?
To this I would reply that,so faras I can analyze my own
mentalstateat such a moment,I do not findthe presenceof any
idea of anotherand normalwhole to be a necessaryelementin a
fullenjoymentof the grotesquewhole beforemy eyes. Such a
second whole would, one supposes, have to be either the same
hat on the righthead, or the same head underits proper cover-
ing; and I findthat I am perfectly well able to enjoythe comedy
of the child crownedwiththe tall hat withoutmakingpresentto
my mindeitherof these combinations.
Here, again, I think a better scientifictheory bears out the
result of one's individual self-examination. Psychology has
made it clear that in recognizingan object, say a weasel crossing
the road on which we are walking,we do not need to have
376 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. IX.

presentto the mind(in additionto the perceptionof this object)


a pictorialidea or image of a weasel as formedfrompast obser-
vations. Owing to the organizingof a certain attitude of per-
ception,a readinessto see an object as a familiarone, as of a
particular'sort,' our mind instantlygreets it as a weasel. In
otherwords we recognizethings by help not of images present
to the mindat the moment,but of certain ingrained ' appercep-
tive' tendencies or attitudes. All the higher animals seem to
share withus this highlyuseful capabilityof immediateand in-
stantaneousrecognition.
Now I take it thatthereis anotherside to these apperceptive
tendencies. Not only do theysecure forus, withoutthe neces-
sityof calling up distinctideas, these instant recognitionsof a
sort of thing,theyenable us as well, as intelligentanimals,to
mentallyrejectpresentations which do not answerto " thesort of
thing." I can say this wax figureis not a man without having
any distinctimage of the livingman presentto my consciousness.
This abilityto recognizewhat we see, as not of a particularkind
of thing,withoutcalling up a definiteidea of this kind,extends to
combinationsand arrangements of partsin a whole. When, after
my servanthas dusted my books and rearrangedthem on the
shelves, I instantlyrecognize that they are wronglyplaced, I
may at the momentbe quite unable to say what the right ar-
rangementwas.
Now, accordingto my view,perceptionsof the laughable,such
as Dr. Lipps illustrates,are instantaneousperceptionswhich can
be and commonlyare carried out immediately,that is without
revertingto the idea of what is the customaryor normalarrange-
ment.
But the authorwhom we are criticizingmay urge with force
that the enjoymentof this charmingbit of childish pretencein-
volves more than a perceptionof the unusual and the irregular.
Do we not at least apprehendthe factthatthe hat is not merely
unfitting,and grotesquelywrong,but an usurpationof the pre-
rogativeof the superior? Is not the behavior of the child so
deliciouslywhimsical just because we fixthe mentaleye on this
elementof make-believe? And if so, does this not implythat
No. 4.1 A THEORY OF LAUGHTER. 377

we have presentto the mind the proper belongingsof the hat,


viz., the father'shead and figure?
I readilyagree that when we make our perceptionsreflective,
as we may do, this idea is apt to emerge. As has been implied
above, the sightof the tall hat does tend to suggestthe idea of its
usual wearer,and in lingeringon this quaint bit ofactingwe may
not improbablycatch ourselves imaginingthe hat on the right
head, especiallyas we see that it is the child's playfulaim to per-
sonate the privilegedowner. And the same thing might occur
in laughingat the fatherunder the small child's hat; for the
laugher,who would in thiscase more probablybe a child,might
naturally enough reinstatein imaginative thought the small
child's head to whichthe cap belongs. This combinationseems
at least to be much more likelyto recurto the imaginationthan
the othercombination,which retainingthe wearersubstitutesthe
idea of the righthat.
How far any distinctimage of the hat, thus mentallytrans-
ferredto the rightwearer,enters into the appreciationof this
humorous spectacle,it would be hard to say. Differentminds
may behave differently here. Judgingfrommy own experience
I should say that at most only a vague 'schematic' outline of
the properarrangementpresentsitselfto the imagination. This
seems to me to be what one might naturallyexpect. Laughter,
as I conceiveof it, fastens upon somethinghuman. It is the
livingwearerthatis emphasizedin the comicaljuxtaposition: we
more naturallydescribeit as the child wearing his father'shat,
than as the father'shat on the child. And for the comic effect
thatwe recognizethe hat to be the father's. This
it is sufficient
we can do withoutmentallypicturingthe hat as worn by the
father. The hat has become a symbol,and just as Taine and
others have shown that those othersymbols,words,may carry
meaning,though we do not distinctlyapprehendthe ideas which
theystand for,so we may say that the hat means for us the
man's hat and the dignitywhich belongs to this, though we
have at the time no mental image of it as worn by its rightful
possessor.
If the writerhad looked a little furtherand cited otherin-
378 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IX.

stances of the comical aspects of the hat, he might have found


factsstill less suitableto his theoryof expectationdissolvedinto
nothingness. I have hintedthat an emptyhat may underspecial
circumstancestake on a funnylook. It maydo thiswhen hang-
ing on a peg, if it happens to hang at such an angle as to sug-
gest the mood of jovial abandon. It may even grow over-
poweringlydroll when it is seen rolling and bobbing down a
street beforea wind,and this too whetheror not we sight the
discomfitedownerin hot pursuit. Surely our authorwould not
say that thereis anythingwhich resemblesan annulled expecta-
tionin these cases. The theoryof anticipationagreeably melt-
ing into nothingnesswill hardly bear the strain to which its
authorsubjects it.
It has seemed worth while to examine at some length the
attemptof a distinguishedpsychologistto deal with one simple
type of the laughable because it illustratesa common tendency
among those who theorizeon the ludicrous. This tendencyis
to overlookthe varietyof impressionwhich our laughtercovers,
and the puzzlingway in which the different aspects of the ludi-
crous maycombineand blend in one and thesame spectacle. The
reputationof the author of what looks so inadequate a theory,
makes the examinationof his mode of dealing with the facts
particularlyinstructive.
It may be added that-suchtheories,even iftheywere not one-
sided and forcedaccounts of the sources of our merriment, would
still sufferfromone fatal defect: as Lotze says of Kant's doc-
trine,'theymake no attemptto show whythe dissolved expecta-
tionor the failureto subsumea presentationunderan idea should
make us laugh, ratherthan,let us say, cough or sigh. Lotze,
besides being a psychologistwas a physiologist,and, it may be
added, a humoristin a quiet way, and the reader of these lines,
who may have had the privilegeof knowinghim,will see again
the ironicallittlepout and the merrytwinkleof the dark eye be-
hind these words.
We have agreed that the discourseron the comic, however
gravelyphilosophiche desiresto be, must touch both finelyand
in Deutschland,p. 343.
der -eFsthetik
1 Geschichte
No. 4.] A THEORY OF LAUGHTER. 379

comprehensivelythe humorousexperiencesof mankind. Yet it


may xvellbe thought,in the light of the attemptsmade in the
past, that this is demanding too much. The relish forthings
which feed our laughter is, as we know,a veryvariableendow-
ment. As the Master tells us, " A jest's prosperitylies in
the ear of him that hears it more than in the tongue of him that
makes it." Thefacet/i of earlierages fall on modern ears with
a sound duller than that of an unstrungdrum. It may well be
that persons who pass a large numberof theirhours in abstruse
reflectiongrow incapable of enjoyingmany of the commonerva-
rietiesof laughter. Their capabilityof lapsing into the jocose
veinbecomes greatlyrestricted, and may take directionsthatseem
out-of-the-way to the more habitual laugher. Schopenhauer's
funnylittle attemptto extracta joke out of the meetingof the
tangentand the circle seems to be a case in point. On reading
some of the definitionsof the ludicrouscontributedby the fertile
Germanmind,one is forcedto conclude thatthewritershad their
own peculiar esoteric modes of laughter. When, forexample,
Herr. St. Schitze, whose " attemptat a theoryof the Comic " is
pronouncedby therenownedTh. Vischeras "excellent" (vorziig-
lick), proceedsto definehis subject in this way: " The comic is
a perceptionor idea, which aftersome momentsexcites the ob-
scure feelingthat naturecarrieson a merrygame withmanwhile
he thinkshimselffree to act, in which game the circumscribed
of man is mocked(vcrsottL't) by a reference
liberty to a higher
liberty,"one seems to measure the scope of the worthywriter's
sense of fun. That the ironyof thingsin theirrelationto our de-
sires and aims has its amusing aspect is certain; but who that
knows anythingof the diversifiedformsof human mirth,could
ever thinkof tryingto drag these underso narrowa rubric?
A vividperceptionof the variabilityof the sense of the laugh-
able in man,its modification
in the case of each of us by a thous-
and unknown influencesof race, temperament, and experience,
may well driveback not merelythe philosophic recluse who can
hardlybe expected perhaps to have followedfar the manywild
excursions of the laughing impulse,but othersas well. Have
we not,it may be asked, in the appreciationof what is funnyor
380 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. VOL. IX.

laughable a mode of sensibilitypreeminently erratic,knowingno


law, and incapable thereforeof being understood? Do the more
grotesqueattemptsto frametheoriesof the subject seem to mock
the search forlaw whereno law is ?
The difficulty may be admittedand yet the practical conclu-
sion drawn rejected. Certainlyno thinkerwill succeed in throw-
ing light on the dark problemwho does not strenuouslyfight
against the narrowinginfluencesof his 'subjectivity,'who does
not make a serious effortto get outside the bounds of his per-
sonal preferences, and to compass in large visionthe far-ranging
play of the mirthfulspirit,and the endless differencing of its
nodes of play. But if a man can only succeed in doing this
withoutlosing his head in thesomewhatrollickingscene,thereis
nothingthatneed repel him fromthe task; forreason assures us
that here too, just as in other domains of human experience
wherethingslooked capriciousand lawless enough at the outset,
orderand law will graduallydisclose themselves.
It has seemed desirableto insiston the lightness,the baffling
transformations of the spiritof fun. This insistenceis rendered
necessaryby the unluckyendeavor of thinkersof too grave a
habit to thruston the daintyshouldersof the merry' imp' their
weightyand ill-fitting theories. Yet one mayinsistthusand still
not forgetthat,if one is to thinkabout laughterat all, what it is,
and how it comes to be, one must perforcebe serious.
Not only so: while I hold thatthe lightnessand capriciousness
of movement,the swiftunpredictablecomingand going, are of
the essence of laughter,it will be one main object of our enquiry
to show how our mirthfulexplosions,our sportiverailleries,are
attached at theirvery roots to our seriousinterests. Laughter,
looked at fromthis point of view, has its significanceas a func-
tion of the human organism,and as spreading its benefitsover
all the paths of life. We must probe thisvalue of the laughing
momentsifwe are to treatthe subject adequately.
In thus proposingto give to laughtera purpose in the scheme
of life,one must face the risk of offendingits friendsyet more
deeply. To these laughteris so preciousand sufficing a good in
itself,that to proposeto connectitwithsome extrinsicand serious
No. 4.] A THEORY OF LAUGHTER. 381

purpose looks like robbingit of its deliciousfreenessand enslav-


ing itto its traditionalfoe,excess of seriousness. To which ob-
jection it may sufficeto say at the presentstage,that the appre-
hension appears to me to be groundless. To laugh away the
spare momentswill continue to be to the laughter-lovingthe
same delightfulpastime,even should we succeed in showingthat
it brings other blessings in its train. On the other hand, to
show that it does bring these blessings may turn out to be a
handy argumenntuvz ad /ominen in meeting the attacks of the
laughter-hater. The lattercould not,one supposes, give himself
quite so much of the look of floutedvirtue,ifwe could convince
himthatlaughter,whenperfectfreedomis guaranteedit in itsown
legitimateterritory, will unasked,and indeed unwittingly, throw
refreshingand healing drops on the dry pasturesof life. Per-
haps some thoughtof these benefitswas present to the Greek
philosopher-the verysame who was for banishing Homer and
otherpoets fromhis ideal commonwealth -when he utteredthe
prettyconceit, that the Graces in searching fora temple which
would not fall,foundthe soul of Aristophanes.
Our subjectis evidentlya large one. We musttryto keep all
parts of it steadilyin view. To begin with,we will tryto avoid
the errorof those,who in theirsubtle disquisitionson the comic
idea, forgetthat laughteris a bodilyact, and not fearto allude to
such unmetaphysicalentitiesas lung and diaphragm,where they
seem to be centralfactsof the situation. A carefulexamination
of the verypeculiarbehaviorof our respiratory and otherorgans
when the exhibitionof the comic seizes us, seems to belong to a
scientificinvestigationof the subject. Indeed, it appears to me
thatin tryingto get at the meaningof these gentleand enjoyable
shakingsof the mind,we shall do well to start,so to speak, with
the bodily shakings,which are, to say the least, much more ac-
cessible to study.
Further,it seems desirableto studythe utterancesof the spirit
of funthrough the whole gamut of its expression. The gros
rire, the ' cacophonous guffaw,'must not be regarded as too
vulgar to be admittedhere. The attemptsin the past to build
up a theory of the ludicrous have commonly failed througha
382 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IX.

fastidiousand highlyartificialrestriction of the laughable attri-


bute to the fieldof wit and refinedhumor which the cultivated
man is in the way of enjoying.
Nor is this all. It may possiblybe found thatno satisfactory
explanationof our enjoymentof the laughable is obtainablewith-
out takinga glance at formsof mirthwhichprecedeit. Among
the strangethingssaid about laughter is surelythe sentenceof
Bacon: " In laughingthereever precedeth a conceit of some-
thingridiculous,and thereforeit is proper to man." That the
fatherof the inductivephilosophy should have approachedthe
subject in thisway is one of the ironiesthat meet us in these dis-
cussions; forallowing that he is right as to his fact,that only
man laughs, we must surelyrecognizethat his reason is hope-
lessly weak. The conceitwhich Bacon here talks about is, we
all know,by no means a universal accompanimentof laughter,
and, what is more important,even when it occurs it is wontto
presentitselfratherin the formof an afterthoughtthan in that
of an antecedent. Among all things human surely laughter
ought least of all to be afraidof recognizingits humblekinsfolk.
The importanceof thus sweepinginto our scientificnet speci-
mens of all ranks of laughterwill be seen when it is recognized
that the one promisingway of dealing withthissubjectis to trace
its developmentfromits earliest and crudest forms. If we be-
gin at the top of the evolutionalscheme,and take no account of
the lower grades,we are very likelyto failto penetrateto the
core of the laughable,as so manyof our predecessorshave failed.
But ifwe will only stoop to consider its manifestationsat the
lowest discoverable levels, and then confineourselves to the
more modest problem: How did the firstlaughter,mindlessas
it may well seem to us, get developed and differentiated into the
varietyof formswhich make up the humorous experience of
civilizedman, we may win a modest success.
It will be evidentthat any attemptto pursue this line of en-
quiry will have to take note not only of factsobtainablefromthe
realm of primitivelaughter,as representedby infancyand the
savage state,but of those social forceswhichhave had so much
to do with shaping the manifestations of mirth. The directions
No. 4.] A THEORY OF LAUGHTER. 383

of our laughterattestits social character,and indicatethe large


part that the communityhas had in mouldingit. The mirthof
the culturedmind,like all its distinctiveattributes,is the product
of thatvast and complex group of processes which we call civil-
ization.
But further,we cannot view laughteron its social side without
confronting the factthatit is not only a product,but also a con-
stituentelementofsocial life. The mirthofmen, the directionsof
theirjesting,have a real significanceas determining forcesin the
stabilityand the progressof communities. This is a large topic.
Yet ifwe treatthe subject at all, we shall do well to touch on it.
For a like reason we shall need to discuss to some extentthe
place of laughterin Art,and the treatmentof the sources of mer-
rimentby the comedian.
Lastly, this larger considerationof this subject will, we shall
probablyfind,drive us to an examinationof certain ethical or
practicalquestions,viz., the value whichis to be assigned to the
laughing propensity,and the properlimitsto be set to its indul-
gence.
The subject so conceived is a large and complex one, and it
will be hard to deal with it at once thoughtfully and familiarly,
with the genuineringof laughterever presentto the ear. Any
writermay well account himselfhappyifin a linewhereso many
appear to have missed success, he attainto a moderatemeasure
of it.
JAMES SULLY.

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