RULE 111 AND 112 CASES
Verily, no person can be
Dr. Solidum v. People, G.R. No. 192123, 10 March 2014.
26
APR
[BERSAMIN, J.]
FACTS: Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born with an
imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. When
Gerald was three years old, he was admitted at the Ospital ng
Maynila for a pull-through operation Dr. Leandro Resurreccion
headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Lucenñ o,
Dr. Donatella Valenñ a and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists
included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr.
Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald
experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted
for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month.
He could no longer see, hear or move.
A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Dr. Solidum. The RTC
rendered a judgment of conviction against Dr. Solidum with
Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable. The CA affirmed
the RTC judgment. The SC ruled that Dr. Solidum must be
acquitted because the prosecution did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent
in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr.
Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could
not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the
anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to
experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that “although the anesthesiologist followed the
normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and
its corresponding side effects did occur.
ISSUE#1: Will the acquittal of Dr. Solidum exempt him from civil
liability arising from the crime?
HELD#2: NO, it does not follow.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not
immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now
find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that
have been established here do not present the factual and legal
bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from
reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant
that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr.
Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused
the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge
Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not
rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
ISSUE#2: Is the decree that Ospital ng Maynila is jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum correct?
HELD#2: NO, the decree is not correct.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been
alert to this fundamental defect.
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only
when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant
to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary
liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied
with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation “engaged
in any kind of industry.” The term industry means any
department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially
one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.
However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not
engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable
and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng
Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be
shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he
definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital.
And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr.
Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
N.B.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers
only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling,
therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital
ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the
damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being
an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically,
which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as
the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
GR No. 191240, July 30, 2014
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only to the civil aspect of the
case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the
crime of Estafa.
The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged
in real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and
trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his
brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance
business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador
and since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a father
to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to
embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent
and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be
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equally divided among them and that respondent would be in
charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon
would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines
and she would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising
the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation.
When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to
respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-
brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never
operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days.
When she asked respondent about the money and the business,
the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank.
However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used
the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the
US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
Respondent’s defense that he and petitioner became close friends
and eventually fell in love and had an affair. They traveled to Hong
Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was
among the Filipino domestic helpers, which led her to suggest a
remittance business. Although hesitant, he has friends with such
business. He denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 when
he went to Hong Kong and Bangkok. After he came back from the
United States, petitioner had asked him and his brother Ramon
for a meeting. During the meeting, petitioner brought up the
money remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should
make a study of it first. He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner
of a money remittance business in Pasay City. Upon the advice of
Roy, respondent and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to
Palau. He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but
admitted that it was petitioner who paid for the plane
tickets. After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western
Union at the First World Center in Makati City. Ramon, petitioner
and her mother went to Hong Kong to register the business, while
he took care of petitioner’s children here. He and Ramon went
back to Hong Kong but denied having received the amount of
US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the
amount of P100, 000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to
Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she
got from him, which Chau had duly acknowledged. He denied
Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of
US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house. He claimed that no
remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no
license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the
same. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked
him about the business, as she never gave him such amount. He
intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong Kong again to
buy some goods for the latter’s boutique. He admitted that he
loved petitioner and her children very much as there was a time
when petitioner’s finances were short; he gave her P600, 000.00
for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. It is
also not true that he and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and
Bangkok trips
Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case
alleging that even if the Court Of Appeals decided to acquit him it
should have at least retained the award of damages to the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.
RULING:
The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two
kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found
to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of
the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or
omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was
acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been
committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a person
is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The
prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of Estafa are
present in this case as would overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution’s
primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and
precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed
to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations
and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business.
Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case
indicate the weakness of her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,
respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of
preponderance of evidence as follows:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or
“greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability
of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by
preponderance of evidence.
In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent
US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner
failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a
short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the
source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to
sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and
offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-
carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for
not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with
the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and
(4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated
against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who
had been swindled.
The petition for the award of damages is denied.
Lim v. Kou Co Ping
GR No. 175256
August 23, 2012
Facts: FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several
withdrawal authorities1 for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt (FCCT).
2

FCCT then sold the withdrawal authorities covering
50,000 bags of cement to respondent Co for the amount
of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.
Co then sold the same withdrawal authorities to
petitioner Lily Lim for the alleged amount of P3.2
million or P64.00 per bag.
Lim, using the withdrawal authorities, withdrew 2,800
bags of cement from FRCC. He then sold some of the
withdrawal authorities covering 10,000 bags back to
respondent Co. (Remaining: 37,200 bags)
Sometime within the same year, FRCC no longer allowed
Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by
the withdrawal authorities. According to Co and the
manager of FCCT, the plant implemented a price
increase and would only release the goods once Lim
paid for the price difference or agreed to receive a lesser
quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that
the withdrawal authorities were not subject to price
fluctuations.
Because of this, Lim filed an information for Estafa
through Misappropriation or Conversion before the RTC
of Pasig City. The criminal case was dismissed. The civil
liability was subsequently dismissed as well after the
reception of the evidence.
Lim appealed the dismissal of the civil liability before
the CA. While the appeal before the CA was pending, she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
before the RTC of Manila. The complaint asserted two
causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
In his defense, Co maintained that the two causes of
action raise the same issue, which was Co’s liability to
Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement,
and SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUNDS OF LIS
PENDENS AND FORUM SHOPPING.
Issue: Whether or not Lim committed forum shopping in filing
the civil case for specific performance and damages
during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of
Estafa.
Held: Lim did not commit forum shopping in filing the civil
case for specific performance and damages during the
pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of Estafa.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an
offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability
ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal
offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability
that may be pursued independently of the criminal
proceedings. The independent civil liability may be
based on "an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony," as provided in
Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of
contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of
the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries").
The filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the
estafa cases against the offender did not amount to
forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although
the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from
the same act or omission of [the offender], they are,
however, based on different causes of action. The
criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa
criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can
be no forum-shopping in the instant case because
the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO (petitioners)
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA (respondent)
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other
owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Casupanan, figured in an accident. This prompted the filing of two
cases before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac: 1st – a criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property filed by
respondent against Casapunan; 2nd – a civil case arising from a
quasi-delict filed by the petitioners against the respondent. The
civil case was filed pending preliminary investigation on the
criminal case. Respondent as defendant in the civil case filed a
motion to dismiss on ground of forum shopping due pendency of
the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion for dismissal on
basis of forum shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that a separate civil action may be
instituted separately and independently from the criminal case.
MCTC denied the motion. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition
for Certiorari before Capas RTC to assail MCTC’s Order, however
the RTC dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
HELD:
YES. The right of the accused to file a separate civil action for
quasi-delict is akin to the right of the offended party to file an
independent civil action pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 111. Under
the said rule, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed
before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the
offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on
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non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be
litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused,
who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail
of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Petitioners is proper.
PEOPLE V. ROMERO
306 SCRA 90
FACTS:
Complainant was a radio commentator who interviewed the
two accused regarding their marketing business, which
solicits funds from the general public, promising an 800%
profit. The latter induced the complainant to invest in the
business, in the process thereof, issued a postdated check
wherein the amount in figures was P1,200,000 and the
amount in words was P1,000,200. The check when presented in
the bank was dishonored and the accused refused to redeem or
pay the check. This prompted the complainant to file a case of
estafa against the accused to which they were
found guilty of.
HELD:
Accused tried to contend that if the trial court followed the
admission and stipulation of facts submitted by them, it
would prove that there was sufficient funds. The check had
a discrepancy between the amount in figures and in
words. Following NIL, the check was issued for
P1,000,200—meaning that this could be validly supported
by their business’ funds. Nonetheless, this is misplaced
since this rule of interpretation finds no room in this case.
The agreement was perfectly clear that at the end of 21
days, the investment of complainant would increase by 800%
or P1,200,000.
Magestrado v People (Yeshadarling)
July 10, 2007
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner,
v
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO,
Respondents.
Chico-Nazario, J
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for
perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City,
after the filing of petitionerfs counter-affidavit and the
appended pleadings, the OCP recommended the filing of an
information for perjury against petitioner
Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed
information for perjury against petitioner with MeTC QC
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful
statement under oath upon a material matter before a competent
officer authorized to receive and administer oath and which the
law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe and swore to an
Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon
City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial
registry, falsely alleging that he lost Ownerfs Duplicate Certificate
of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a
Petition For Issuance of New Ownerfs Duplicate Copy of Certificate
of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned
to Branch 99 of the said court, to which said Francisco M.
Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413
Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B.
Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the
allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of
the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M.
Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and
as a consequence of which said title to the property was
surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan,
thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo
30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion for suspension of
proceedings based on a prejudicial question
alleged that a civil case for recovery of a sum of money pending
before the RTC QC, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery
of Title and Damages must be resolved first before pesent
Criminal Case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases
are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the
criminal action
14 July 1999: MeTC-Branch 43 denied
motion without merit
resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
trial shall proceed
17 August 1999: MR was filed by petitioner; denied by the MeTC
on 19 October 1999
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of QC
MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion
to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
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14 March 2000: RTC dismissed
civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a
loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he executed
the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered
by TCT No. N-173163,
whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon
petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support
his petition for issuance of a new ownerfs duplicate copy of said
TCT
Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the
criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil
cases.
Note that the affidavit of loss was executed in support of the
petition for issuance of a new ownerfs duplicate copy of TCT No.
N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC
MR also denied
petitioner filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court
RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in
effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitionerfs
motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721,
as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof
CA denied
petitionerfs remedy should have been an appeal from the
dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari
ISSUE: WoN instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the
correct and appropriate remedy? (NO)
HELD: CA affirmed; MeTC QC directed to proceed with the
hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case
RATIO:
resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant
petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the same rules
Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective
memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence,
oral and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.
Petitioner: he correctly questioned RTC's Order of dismissal of his
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case through a Petition for
Certiorari before CA
respondents: an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy
SC: agree with respondents
correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not
only because RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitionerfs Petition for Certiorari in but also because
RTC Order of dismissal was a final order from which
petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of
a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the
trial court
the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court
an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case
completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits
of the latter
RTC's order dismissing petitionerfs Petition for Certiorari in
Civil Case finally disposes of the said case and RTC can do nothing
more with the case
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from
a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules
of Court to be appealable
manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also
provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. \
(a) Ordinary appeal. \ The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record
on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules
so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to
petitioners
Here, appeal was available
it was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of
law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
or error of judgment which the trial court might have committed.
certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,
certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal
perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and
that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the
trial court final and executory
this is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not
part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law
Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice.
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court
of jurisdiction over the appeal.
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive
party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal
Fajardo v Bautista: although the special civil action of certiorari
is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be
granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate,
slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is
inadequate and ineffectual.
December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the
RTC denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case
he had until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal
5
with the Court of Appeals
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001
with CA cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal
As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTCfs dismissal of his
Petition for Certiorari had long become final and executory.
more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition <NOT SO
IMPT>
in a nutshell - there was no prejudicial question as both cases
may proceed independently; diff questions are being resolved as
mentioned
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, [September 13, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
a prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent)
filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel
(petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial
and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before
the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before
the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled
that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is
a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the
filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a
key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person
“who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
were married. The subsequent dissolutionof their marriage will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could
still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the
effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Courtdeclared in that
case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”
6

JM Dominguez Agronomic Co., Inc. v. Liclican
G.R. No. 208587
Topic: Rule 111; Prejudicial question
FACTS:
In their annual stockholders meeting, JM Dominguez Corporation
(JMD) elected their new set of directors. Respondent Liclican
presided over the meeting and conducted the said election.
Thereafter, during the meeting, conflict ensued when private
petitioners Patrick Pacis and Keneth Pacis were not allowed to
vote on the ground that they were not registered stockholders of
JMD. As a result, respondents allegedly walked out of the said
meeting. However, the election of its new officers proceeded
because of the existence of a quorum. Petitioners herein were
then duly elected as the new set of directors of JMD. Respondents,
on the other hand, executed a Board Resolution certifying that
they were the ones duly elected during the said meeting.
Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents
before the RTC of Baguio City seeking the nullification of
meetings, elections, and acts of directors, and other reliefs. The
case was then referred to judicial dispute resolution (JDR). While
the civil case was pending, petitioners represented themselves as
JMD’s lawful directors and collected and deposited rents due to
the company. Petitioners, as directors of JMD, subsequently filed a
complaint charging respondents with qualified theft for
withdrawing from the company’s savings account, without any
authority whatsoever, in the amount of P852,000.00. They also
alleged that respondents issued a check in the amount of
P200,000.00 payable to cash, to be drawn against JMD.
The RTC of Baguio City issued an Order finding probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondents.
However, on appeal, the CA annulled the said Order, and that the
same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The CA stated that the RTC judge should
have refrained from determining probable cause because she is
well aware of the pending validity of the elections in the previous
civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case (validity JMD’s elections)
constitutes a prejudicial question that would warrant a
suspension of the criminal case of qualified theft
RULING + RATIO:
The petition lacks merit.
The Court ruled that the CA was correct in ruling that the Order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The civil case, an intra-corporate dispute,
posed a prejudicial question to the criminal case. Without the
resolution of the civil case, petitioner’s authority to commence
and prosecute the criminal case against respondents for qualified
theft in JMD’s behalf remained questionable, warranting the
suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Further, the resolution of the prejudicial question did not cure the
defect of issuing the Order with grave abuse of discretion. To rule
otherwise would mean that there was a continuance of the
criminal proceeding despite the existence of the prejudicial
question, rendering inutile the essence of the doctrine. The trial
court trying the criminal case would be permitted to proceed
with trial with the assumption that the resolution of the civil case
would benefit the private complainant in the criminal
proceedings.
July 18, 2012
FENEQUITO
v.
VERGARA, JR.
FACTS:
On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public
documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing
Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E.
Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004,
Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on
Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an order granting
the said motion. Upon appeal by the public prosecutor, however,
the RTC set aside the MeTC’s order and directed the latter to trial.
Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA, which subsequent
ruled that the RTC’s assailed decision was interlocutory in nature
and was therefore not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for
review.
Issue:
WON RTC’s decision was interlocutory and can be appealed.
RULING:
RTC’s decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be
appealed.
One of the grounds for the CA’s outright dismissal of Fenequito et
al.’s petition for review was because of the latter’s failure to
submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
to the petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is
not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities
the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition,
the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed
ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously
assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in
fact it is interlocutory. An order is interlocutory if it does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to
be done upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that
which dispose of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of
the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by
allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear
that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the
case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, complainant,
v
JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City, respondent.
FACTS:
The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr. It was initially handled by
Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder who found no probable
cause against Palo. However, complainant, upon review, found
that there was a probable cause against Palo. Thus, complainant
disapproved Jarder’s Resolution and filed the Information in
court.
In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
accused Palo, respondent Judge Bayona issued an order directing
complainant Abanado to present (1) a copy of the Memorandum
of Preliminary Investigation, (2) Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor Dennis Jarder, (3) Memorandum of the transfer of
7
case assignment from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the
City Prosecutor, and (4) Exhibit to the Court, to enable his court
to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause.
With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a letter that
there was no memorandum of transfer of the case from
Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.
Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of the Office of
the City Prosecutor. In an Order, respondent stated that the
Jarder’s Resolution dismissing the complaint was part and parcel
of the official records of the case and, for this reason, must form
part of the records of the preliminary investigation. He further
stated that because there was a conflict between Jarder’s and
complainant’s resolutions, those documents were necessary in
the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to establish
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Palo. He, thus, ordered complainant to complete the records of
the case by producing the Jarder’s Resolution. The Office of the
City Prosecutor again sent a letter explaining the impossibility of
submitting it to the court. The letter stated that the Resolution
was no longer part of the records of the case as it was
disapproved by complainant.
Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of
the City Prosecutor. In an order, he required complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant
requested for a ten-day extension to comply with it but
respondent denied the request. He likewise ordered the Clerk of
Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to Jarder
directing him to testify on the existence of his resolution
dismissing the case against Palo and to Office of the City
Prosecutor’s Records Officer Myrna Vanñ egas to bring the entire
record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo case.
Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for inhibition
against respondent and a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain
respondent from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt
proceedings. Complainant’s prayer for a TRO was granted by
Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
53, Bacolod City.
Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that
when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating
assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding
probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result
would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an
integral part of the records of the case. It is no longer required
that the complaint or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and be examined by the
judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not
intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over
the complete records of the cases all the time for the purpose of
determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest against the accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such
as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements
of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon
which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the same
was received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He
alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law
or procedure and gross misconduct. He essentially asserted that
respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing over the
production of the records of the preliminary investigation,
especially Jarder’s Resolution. Respondent, in his Comment with
Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado,
reiterated the importance of the Jarder’s Resolution in deciding
whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. It noted
Judge Gellada’s Order which held that the resolution of the city or
provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In such case, the
resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no
longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and it
need not be annexed to the information filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an
executive function
HELD:
Yes. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an
executive function.
Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the
Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question.
The Department of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS)
Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
should be attached to the information only as far as practicable.
Such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules
30. HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA VS. OBIAS
FACTS: On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director recommended to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of
Roberto “Obet” Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito “Totoy” Ona y Masalonga
and Atty. Epifania “Fanny” Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr.
Tria. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution
directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan
and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as
against herein respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias. Petitioners
appealed to the DOJ assailing the Provincial Prosecutor’s order to
dismiss the charge against respondent. DOJ Sec. modified the
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and directed the latter to
include respondent in the information for murder filed against
Aclan and Ona. Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a
motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s resolution. Motion was
denied.
The information charging Aclan and Ona has already been
filed with the RTC. Thereafter, prosecution filed with the RTC a
Motion to Admit Amended Information to include respondent as
one of the accused for the murder of Tria. Respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal with the DOJ. In a letter dated December 3,
2001 addressed to respondent’s counsel, the DOJ denied
respondent’s notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated November 4, 1983, as
amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993,
appeals to the OP where the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged is “reclusion perpetua to death,” shall be taken by petition
for review. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial of her notice of appeal. The DOJ denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is
the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not
before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and
erminated. However, the DOJ directed the Provincial Prosecutor
to forward the records of the case to the OP in compliance with
the Order dated October 18, 2001 of Deputy Executive Secretary
Jose Tale. It turned out that respondent filed on October 1, 2001 a
notice of appeal before the OP (O.P. Case No. 01-J-118).
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary adopted the findings of
facts and conclusions of law in the appealed Resolutions DOJ, and
affirmed the same. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
Tespondent filed a Supplemental Pleading and Submission of
8
Newly Discovered Evidence. Presidential Assistant Manuel C.
Domingo granted respondent’s motion for reconsideration and
reversed the DOJ resolutions. Accordingly, the case against
respondent was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the OP in its. Before the CA, petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus/certiorari. The CA denied the petition.
(1998), wherein we have suggested that it would have been wiser
for the court to await the justice secretary’s resolution before
proceeding with the case to avert a miscarriage of justice.
Evidently however, this is not a hard and fast rule, for the court
has complete control over the case before it.

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President erred in taking

cognizance of the appeal of the respondent

RULING: No. On the procedural issue raised by the petitioners,

we hold that the OP did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal
of respondent, and that the CA likewise had jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue of probable cause in a petition challenging the
OP’s ruling. Memorandum Circular No. 58 provides: x x x x No
appeal from or petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained
by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses
punishable by reclu sion perpetua to death wherein new and
material issues are raised which were not previously presented
before the Department of Justice and were not ruled upon in the
subject decision/order/resolution, in which case the President
may order the Secretary of Justice to reopen/review the case,
provided, that, the prescription of the offense is not due to lapse
within six (6) months from notice of the questioned
resolution/order/decision, and provided further, that, the appeal
or petition for review is filed within thirty (30) days from such
notice. Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not
clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as
set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be
dismissed outright and no order shall be issued requiring the
payment of the appeal fee, the submission of appeal brief/memo-
randum or the elevation of the records to the Office of the
President from the Department of Justice.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 (1997), we

clarified that the justice secretary is not precluded from
exercising his power of review over the investigating prosecutor
even after the information has already been filed in court.
However, the justice secretary’s subsequent resolution
withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not
cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court
is duty-bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own
independent judgment in assessing the merits of the resulting
motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution.

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on

the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the
secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make
an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial. While the secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits
reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it
refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply
insists on proceeding with trial on the mere pretext of having
already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.

It is well within the court’s sound discretion to suspend

arraignment to await the result of the justice secretary’s review of
the correctness of the filing of the criminal information. There are
exceptional cases, such as in Dimatulac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679