Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CLASSES OF PARTIES:
Notes:
JBD 74
Q: Who may be parties to a civil case?
A: Only the following may be parties to a civil action:
1.He nuts be either:
(a) natural or
(b) juridical persons or
(c) entities authorized by law.
2. he must have the legal capacity to sue; and
3.he must be a real party
-in-interest.
So, you cannot sue or be sued unless you are either a person or an entity
authorized by law.
A dead man cannot sue and he cannot be sued because he has no more
personality.
B sued “Rama Eatery.” So, it is “B vs. Rama Eatery.” It is wrong. Rama Eatery is
not a person nor an entity authorized by law. The correct procedure is you sue
the owner because he is the real person. But the defect is not really substantial. It
is only a formal defect that can easily be corrected.
The juridical persons who may be parties are those enumerated in Art. 44 of the
Civil Code, namely:
JBD 75
Thus, if A, B, C, D and E without incorporating themselves or without
registering as a partnership, enter into transactions using the common name
“Ocean Quest Corporation”, they may be sued as such. When the defendant
“corporation” answers, the names of A, B, C, D and E and their addresses must
be revealed. Note however, that the authority to be a party under this section is
confined only to being a defendant and not as a plaintiff. This is evident from the
words, “they may be sued”.
As to plaintiff:
As to defendant:
Where it is the defendant who is not any of the above, the complaint
may be dismissed on the ground that the “pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action” or “failure to state a cause of action” (Sec. 1[g],
R 16) because there cannot be a cause of action against one who cannot
be a party to a civil action.
That definition is taken from the leading case of SALONGA VS. WARNER
BARNES & CO. (88 Phil. 125). That is exactly how it is defined and that definition
has been repeated through the years.
To be a real party- in- interest, the interest must be “real”, which is present
substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. (Rayo v. Metrobank, 539 SCRA
571; Fortich v. Corona 289 SCRA 624; Figuracion v. Libi 539 SCRA 50. It is an
interest that is material and direct, as distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question. (Samaniego v. Aguila 334 SCRA 438; Mayor Rhustom
Dagadag v. Tongnawa 450 SCRA 437).
When you are riding in a common carrier which collided and you were
injured, do not file a case against the driver for damages. Your contract is not
with the driver. Your contract is with the operator. So you file a case of culpa
contractual against the owner or operator.
GENERAL RULE: In a breach of contract, the real parties in interest are the
parties to the contract. So strangers, as a rule, have no business suing in a
contract because they are not real parties in interest.
FACTS: A student who was riding in one of the Baliwag buses met an
accident. So, an action was filed where the parents and the injured boy
were the co-plaintiffs against Baliwag Transit. While the case was going
on, the boy entered into amicable settlement with the bus company.
Based on the settlement, Baliwag moved to dismiss the case. The parents
objected, “We are objecting because we are also plaintiffs. We didn’t
know about the settlement. We were the ones who spent money, there-
fore it should not be dismissed simply because our son is withdrawing
the case.”
JBD 78
HELD: The parents are not the real party in interest. They were not
the passengers. The real parties in a contract of carriage are the parties to
the contract itself. “In the absence of any contract of carriage between
the transportation company and the parents of the injured party, the
parents are not real parties in interest in an action for breach of
contract.”
Of course, if the child is a minor the parents can file as representatives but not
as principal party.
Example: Third-Party Liability (TPL) in insurance. A insured his car with B for
TPL. A bumped C. C can file a case against A and B to recover from the
insurance contract. In other words, while only A and B are the parties to the
insurance contract yet the third party liability stipulation is intended to benefit a
third party who may be damaged by A while driving his car.
Also parties who have not taken part in a contract may show that they have a
real interest affected by its performance or annulment. In other words, those who
are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in which they had no
intervention, may show their detriment that could result from it. Thus, Article
1313 of the Civil Code provides that “creditors are protected in cases of contracts
intended to defraud them.” Further, Article 1381 of the Civil Code provides that
contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded when the creditors
cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. Thus, a creditor who is not a
party to a contract can sue to rescind the contract to redress the fraud committed
upon him.
A mere agent, who is not an assignee of the principal cannot bring suit under
a deed of sale entered into in behalf of his principal because it is the principal,
not the agent who is the real party in interest (Uy vs. CA 314 SCRA 69). In case
the action is brought against the agent, the action must be brought against an
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
without joining the principal, except when the contract involves things belonging
to the principal. The real party-in-interest is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. An
attorney-in-fact is not a real party-in-interest and that there is no law permitting
an action to be brought by and against an attorney-in-fact (Carillo vs. CA 503
SCRA 66).
JBD 79
SALONGA vs. WARNER BARNES
88 Phil. 125 [Bar Problem]
HELD: NO. The real property in interest is the principal, the owner of
the property. K is only an attorney-in-fact. An attorney-in-fact cannot
use in his own name because he is not the real party in interest. K is
given the authority to sue, to manage, hire a lawyer but not as the
plaintiff because the real party in interest is A. The complaint should be
captioned as “A, plaintiff vs. L, defendant.”
JBD 80
When the corporate offices have been illegally searched, the corporate officer
is not the real party in interest to question the search. The right to contest the
transgression belongs to the corporation alone which has a personality of its own
separate and distinct from that of an officer or a stockholder. The objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
persons (Stonehill vs. Diokno 20 SCRA 383).
Derivative suit:
However, even if the cause of action belongs to the corporation, if the board
refuses to sue despite demand by the stockholders to sue and protect or vindicate
corporate rights, a stockholder is allowed by law to file a derivative suit in the
corporate name. In such a suit, the real party-in-interest is actually the
corporation and the stockholder filing the action is a mere nominal party (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. CA 300 SCRA 579)
Partnerships:
Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code a partnership has a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of each of the partners. Hence, if the contract was
entered into by the partnership in its name, it is the partnership, not its officers or
agents which should be impleaded in any litigation involving property
registered in its name. A violation of this rule will result in dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action (Aguila vs. CA 319 SCRA 345).
The mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of the complaint is
not fatal because the Rules of Court requires the courts to pierce the form and go
into the substance and not be misled by a false or wrong name in the pleadings.
The averments are controlling and not the title. Hence, if the body indicates the
defendant as a party to the action, his omission in the title is not fatal (Vlasons
Enterprises vs. CA 310 SCRA 26).
JBD 81
However, the concept of ‘standing’ because of its constitutional underpinnings
is very different from questions relating to whether or not a particular party is a
real party-in-interest. Although both are directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action, the concept of standing requires an
analysis of broader policy concerns. The question as to who the real party-in-
interest is involves only a question on whether a person would be benefitted or
injured by the judgment or whether or not he is entitled to the avails of the suit
(Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Morato 246 SCRA 540).
Section 3 is consistent with Section 2 because under Section 2, you cannot sue
and be sued if you are not the real party in interest. Section 3 allows one who is
not a real party in interest to sue and be sued in behalf of somebody else but
requires the beneficiary to be named in the Complaint being the real party in
interest.
JBD 82
Example: TRUSTEE; EXECUTOR; ADMINISTRATOR. Another example is a
trustee of an express trust, or executor or administrator of the estate of a
deceased person. When a person dies, what survives after him is his estate which
represents everything that is left behind. This later on will be given to his heirs.
But for the meantime under the law on succession, the executor or administrator
will take charge of his property.
Q: If the estate of the deceased has some collectibles, who will file the case?
A: The administrator or executor as the representative party. If you want to
sue the estate, you should sue the estate through the administrator or executor.
HELD: The decision is void. “The decision of the lower court insofar
as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality,
that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death
(Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).”
“The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached
notwithstanding joinder of B’s estate as co-defendant. It is a well-settled
rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or
administrator in his representative capacity.”
So, the Court cited Section 3. In order to bind the estate, you should sue the
executor or the administrator of his estate. So, either way, the case cannot
prosper.
The agent cannot sue because the principal is the real party in interest. But
when an agent acts in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal, he may sue and be sued, EXCEPT when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal. Under the exception, the principal has really to be
included. The agent cannot file a case where the principal will lose his property
without being named as part to the case.
Normally, the husband and the wife should sue and be sued together. Even if
the wife borrowed money alone and you want to sue the woman, still the
husband should be included. Why? In the property relationship between the
husband and wife, they are governed by absolute community or conjugal
partnership. Whether you like it or not, the implication of the wife is also the
implication of the husband because of the property relationship.
In the same manner, if the wife wants to collect, even if the husband does not
know anything about it, the husband should still be named as party plaintiff, on
the ground again that the income that she can get redounds to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
And there were decided cases in the past where even if for example, a wife
sues without the husband, the defect is not fatal but merely formal. The
complaint should not be dismissed. All that is to be done is to amend the
complaint impleading the husband. (Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 80)
Q: Give an exception to that general rule that husband and wife shall sue or be
sued jointly.
A: The EXCEPTIONS are:
1. in case of Complete Separation of Property (Article 145, Family Code), and
2. under Article 111, Family Code:
JBD 84
3. Another is when a spouse without just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family with respect to the
marital, parental or property relations.
Q: May two or more persons join in one complaint as plaintiffs? Or can two or
more persons be joined together as defendants?
A: YES, under two conditions, to wit:
JBD 85
1.) There is a right to relief in favor of or against the parties joined in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions;
and
2.) There is a question of law or fact common to the parties joined in the
action.
Series of Transactions
This pertains to transactions connected with the same subject matter of the
suit.
Q: But suppose the three of them will file 3 separate cases against M, can it be
done?
A: yes, because it is a permissive joinder of parties, not mandatory.
Now, take note that when there is joinder of parties, there is automatically a
joinder of causes of action. That is why one of the conditions or limitations in
joinder of causes of action is you must observe the rule on joinder of parties. If
joinder of parties is improper under Rule 3, the joinder of causes of action is also
proper under Rule 2, Section 5
EXAMPLE: When there is only one plaintiff and one defendant: Suppose
Melissa will secure three (3) loans from me.
Q: How many causes of action do I have if M will not pay me?
A: Three
JBD 87
So, there can be joinder of causes of action without joinder of parties because
there is only one plaintiff and one defendant. But if you join parties in Rule 3,
automatically, there is joinder of causes of action. This is the relationship of these
two provisions.
Finally, the last two types of parties to the action are the so-called
indispensable parties and necessary parties. (Section 7 and Section 8,
respectively)
Notes:
(See also Lucman vs. Malawi GR No. 159794 December 19, 2006)
JBD 88
Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the
existence of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not
before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is
mandated to implead all the indispensable parties considering that the absence
of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to their absent parties but even as to those
present. One who is not a party to a case is not bound by the decision of the
court; otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process (Sepulveda, Sr.
vs. Pelaez 450 SCRA 302).
It has been ruled on various occasions that since the joinder of indispensable
parties is compulsory, the action should be dismissed when indispensable parties
are not impleaded or are not before the court. The absence of indispensable
parties renders all subsequent actions of the trial court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present
(MWSS vs. CA 297 SCRA 287).
Joint debtor
He is an indispensable party in a suit against him but a necessary party in a
suit against his co-debtor.
Solidary debtor
In a suit brought by a creditor against one solidary debtor, the other solidary
debtor is neither indispensable nor a necessary party.
Now, the surety may be ordered to pay who can sue the principal debtor for
reimbursement. Meaning, there is still a future case. Thus, there could be no
complete relief between those who are parties. So, the debtor is a necessary
party, and not indispensable. But it is advisable to join the debtor in one case, so
that when the creditor claims from the surety, the latter can automatically claim
from the debtor. Multiplicity of suits is then, avoided.
A and B are the signatories in a PN which reads: “We promise to pay to the
order of C P1M on February 27, 2009. On due date the debtors failed to pay.
JBD 91
entire credit of P1M. If he desires a complete recovery, B must be
impleaded.
(3) In the above example, assuming that the debtors bound themselves to pay the
P1M solidarily, would B an indispensable or necessary party to a suit by C
against A? He would not be a necessary party. Complete relief could be had by C
without joining B because the obligation is solidary. A could be ordered to pay
the entire obligation of P1M. Neither is B an indispensable party. There could be
a complete and final determination of the action for a sum of money without B
being joined.
Solidarity does not make a solidary debtor an indispensable party in a suit filed
by the creditor against another solidary debtor. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan 173
SCRA 72; Operators Inc. v. American Biscuit Company 154 SCRA 738)
REVIEW: What is the difference between joint debtors and solidary debtors?
In solidary, the creditor can collect the whole obligation from any of the debtors
without prejudice to the right of the latter for reimbursement of his share in the
obligation from his co-debtors. On the other hand, in joint obligation, the creditor
can only get from a debtor the latter’s share in the whole obligation. Meaning,
the creditor cannot compel the debtor to pay the share of his co-debtor. Kanya-
kanya tayo.
Q: But if D wants to collect the entire P100,000, what should she do?
A: She should file a case against both M and C.
JBD 93
Assuming that a necessary party cannot be impleaded, his non-inclusion does
not prevent the court from proceeding with the action. The judgment rendered
shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
When court may order joinder of a necessary party and effect of failure to
comply
However, if the court finds no valid reason for not impleading a party, the
court may order the inclusion of the necessary party under Section 9. And take
note that under the new rules, the failure to comply with the order of inclusion
without justifiable cause shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such
(necessary) party.
EXAMPLE : There are 4 brothers and 1 sister. They have to file a case against
somebody to recover property which they believe was owned by their parents.
Then, brother 4 say to sister 1, “Let us file a case.” But sabi ni sister 1, “Pilitin mo
muna ako.” Then she says, “Ayoko nga, hindi mo ako pinilit eh!” Meaning, all of
them will suffer because ayaw ni sister 1 mag-file ng kaso.
JBD 94
This is similar to Section 6 of Rule 2 – misjoinder of causes of action is not a
ground for dismissal of an action. Misjoinder or non-joinder at parties is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss because at any stage of the case, the court can
order a misjoined party to be removed or a party not joined to be included.
Q: Does it mean to say therefore, that the plaintiff has the license to include
anybody in an action? Like for example, I have a case against somebody in the
class, the trouble is in the meantime, I cannot identify who among you who did
the wrong to me. So I will file a case against all of you. Anyway later on, I can
dump you. Now, is this allowed?
A: NO. That is not a license. What the law contemplates, according to the SC,
the party was joined in good faith believing that he was a defendant but actually
it turned out to be wrong. So, you have no right to sue anybody just like that.
That is not an excuse for suing any party left and right. In the case of
JBD 95
HELD: Section 11 of Rule 3 “does not comprehend whimsical and
irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. What it really
contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder of
parties. No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to
drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule
presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the honest
conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested
because it turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. And this is the
reason why the rule ordains that the dropping is ‘on such terms as are
just’” (also Lim Tan Hu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425).
CLASS SUIT
As a GENERAL RULE, if there are several real parties in interest, they shall be
included in the case whether indispensable or necessary. Example: There are 30
of us. The general rule is that all parties in interest, indispensable or necessary
shall be included because under Sec. 2 “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.”
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the action was filed in the name of the real
in interest.
HELD: Sulo ng Bayan is not the real party in interest. It violates
Section 2 – “the action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real parties in interest.” The members occupying the land are the
JBD 98
plaintiffs. The association is not the one occupying the lot. So, the first
question is, who should be the plaintiff? It should be the members.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the action was properly pleaded as a class
suit
HELD: NO. This is the more important reason why they cannot
qualify as a class suit: In a class suit, the subject matter is of common
interest to all.
To illustrate:
You are Occupant No. 1, and occupies a particular lot over which
he/she has interest in but he/she does not have interest over the other
lots which he/she does not occupy. If that is so, then the subject matter
is not of common interest. The interest of one occupant is only on the lot
he occupies.
What should be done is for all of them to sue together to cover the entire
property, for each one has a lot. So, in that case, Section 6 should be applied –
permissive joinder of parties because there is a common question of fact. This is
more of permissive joinder of Parties rather than a class suit. That’s why you can
confuse Section 6 with Section 12. But the permissive joinder of parties requires
that all should be impleaded. Unlike in a class suit, the subject matter is of
interest to everybody and we cannot all be joined because we are so numerous.
HELD: That cannot be. The survivors have no interest in the death of
other passengers. The interest in this case is individual. What would
have been proper is permissive joinder of parties because of common
question of tact or law, but not class suit.
FACTS: Oposa et al were all minors. Some were small boys duly
represented by their parents. They filed a case against then DENR
JBD 99
Secretary Factoran. The prayer in the case is to order the DENR to cancel
all existing Timber License Agreements (TLA’s), to cease and desist
from proceeding, accepting, processing, renewing all accruing new
TLA’s. So, in effect, it prays for a total log ban in the country to preserve
the remaining forest all over the Philippines.
These young boys sue with their parents. They are suing in their
behalf, in behalf of the other citizens who are of their age because they
stand to suffer if the environment will be deteriorated. They say that
they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of our country’s rich tropical rainforests. They say, the case
was filed for themselves and others for the preservation of our rainforest
and we are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring all plaintiffs to
court. They say that they represent their generations and generations yet
unborn.
HELD: The civil case is indeed a class suit. The case however has a
special and novel element. The personality of the minors to sue for the
succeeding generations is based on the concept of inter-generational
responsibility insofar as a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Every generation has a responsibility to preserve the ecology. The
minors’ right to a healthful environment constitute at the same time the
performance of the obligation to ensure the protection of the rights or
the generations to come.
JBD 100
Q: Distinguish a representative suit from a class suit.
A: In the case of
HELD: “What makes the situation a proper case for a class suit is
the circumstance that there is only one right or cause of action
pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not separately or
severally to distinct individuals. The object of the suit is to obtain relief
for or against numerous persons as a group or as an integral entity, and
not as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are
separate from and independent of those affecting the others.”
In a representative suit, there are different causes of action
pertaining different persons.
“In the present case, there are multiple rights or causes of action
pertaining separately to several, distinct employees who are members of
respondent Union. Therefore, the applicable rule is that provided in
Rule 3 on Representative Parties. Nonetheless, as provided for in the
Labor Code, a legitimate labor organization has the right to sue and be
sued in its registered name. This authorizes a union to file a
representative suit for the benefit of its members in the interest of
avoiding an otherwise cumbersome procedure of joining all union
members in the complaint, even if they number by the hundreds.” For
convenience, the Labor Code allows a union to file a representative suit.
JBD 101
In a class suit there is one single cause of action pertaining to
numerous persons while in permissive joinder there are multiple
causes of action separately belonging to several persons.
ALTERNATIVE DEFENDANTS
You filed a case against the operators of two vehicles. In effect, your cause of
action is either culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Is that not inconsistent? The
law says, “although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right
against the other.” In other words, even if the two causes of action are
inconsistent with each other, it is allowed.
As a matter of fact, this is the best policy because the plaintiff is a sure winner.
The only question is, who among the two will be held liable.
Just as the rule allows a suit against defendants in the alternative, the rule also
allows alternative causes of action and alternative defenses (Sec. 2 Rule 8;
Sec.5[b] Rule 6; Sec. 20, Rule 14)
JBD 102
Assume that X, a pedestrian, was injured in the collision of two vehicles. He
suffered injuries but does not know with certainty which vehicle caused the
mishap. What should X do if he wants to sue?
Plaintiff may sue the shipping company and the arrastre operator
alternatively for the recovery of damages to goods shipped through a maritime
vessel (Rizal Surety & Insurance Company vs. Manila 70 SCRA 187).
Requisites:
1. there is a defendant;
2. his/her identity is unknown;
3.fictitious name may be used because of ignorance of defendant's true name
and said ignorance is alleged in the complaint;
4.identifying description may be used; sued as unknown owner, heir, deviseee
or other designation;
5.amendment to the pleading when true name is discovered; and
6. defendant is the defendant being sued, not a mere additional defendant.
BAR PROBLEM: While L was walking on the street. He was bumped by a car,
say a Toyota Altis, 2001 model, color blue. Now, so far, he could not determine
who is the owner. If you are the lawyer of L, how would you sue the defendant?
JBD 103
A: Under Section, I will sue the owner of that car as an unknown defendant. I
can place in my complaint, “L’, plaintiff, vs. the registered owner of Honda motor
vehicle with plate number so and so.” And later if you discover the true identity
of the owner, we can amend the complaint to place the name of the defendant.
Section 14 is similar with Rule 110 in Criminal Procedure – a case may be filed
against an unknown accused.
Reqisites:
1. there are two or more persons not organized as a juridical entity;
2. they enter into a transaction;
3.a wrong or delict is committed against a third person in the course of such
transactions.
Rule 1, Section 1 provides that only natural of juridical persons may be sued.
Entity without juridical personality as defendant. Under the old law, this was
known as suing two or more persons involved in a business under a common
name. When two or more persons transact in a business under a common name,
they may be sued under their common name.
JBD 104
Now, it is worded in this manner: “When two or more persons not organized
as an entity with juridical personality,” instead of a ‘common name.’ You cannot
sue the entity because it has no juridical personality. But you do not also know
the members of that entity, so the law allows you to file a case against the entity.
Under the second paragraph of Section 15, when the defendants file an
answer, they must file under their names as they are really the real parties in
interest. When the lawyer answers the complaint, he is duty-bound to provide
the names of all the defendants.
JBD 105
EFFECT OF DEATH OF A PARTY
First of all, there are cases when a party to a pending action dies and the claim
is not thereby extinguished (this is what they called an action which survives as
we will explain later) and there are certain actions where if a party dies, the claim
is automatically extinguished. Meaning, the death of a party causes death of the
action. But these are very few. In majority of cases when the party dies, the case
or the cause of action continues.
JBD 106
Actions to recover real and personal property, actions to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property
and suits based on the alleged tortious acts of the defendant survive.
(Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw 20 SCRA 987). An action for quieting of title
with damages is an action involving real property. It survives and the
claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. (Saligumba v. Calanog
GRT+ 143365 Dec. 4, 2008)
An action of ejectment survives the death of a party. It continues until
judgment because the issue concerning the illegality of the defendant’s
possession is still alive, and upon its resolution depends the corollary issue
of whether and how much damages may be recovered. (Tanhueco v.
Aguilar 33 SCRA 236; Vda de Salazar v. CA; Florendo jr. v.Coloma 129
SCERA 304)
+ Actions for the recovery of money, arising from a contract express or
implied are not extinguished by the death of the defendant. (Sec. 20 R 3)
The purpose there is for substitution so that the legal representative will be
ordered substituted. And there is a new provision under the new rules. That is,
failure of the counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action. That is not found in the prior rule. So, the lawyer can be subjected to
disciplinary action.
Upon receipt of the notice of death, the court shall determine whether or
not the claim is extinguished by such death. If the claim survives, the court
shall order the legal representative or representatives of the deceased to appear
and be substituted for the deceased within 30 days from notice (Sec. 16 Rule 3).
The substitution of the deceased would not be ordered by the court in cases
where the death of the party would extinguish the action because substitution is
proper only when the action survives (Aguas vs. Llamas 5 SCRA 959)
So, other than the legal representative, which refers to the executor or
administrator, the alternative will be to substitute the heirs, such as the
surviving children, wife or spouse.
Although there was a case decided by the SC way back in 1986 in the case of
Under the rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased.
That is, the executor or the administrator of his estate. Many courts do not
enforce it strictly. Normally, patay na, “O! Ito ang heirs o!” “OK! Substitute!”
Actually, that is wrong based on LAWAS case. The priority is given to the admin-
istrator or executor. It is only when there is unreasonable delay in the
appointment, or when the heirs resort to extrajudicial partition because there is
no more administrator or executor in extrajudicial settlement.
Under the second paragraph of Sec. 16 of Rule 3 states: “ … The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator…”
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit. The heirs may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of
an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal
representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a
specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who
shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. The previous
pronouncement of the Court in Lawas v. CA xxxxx is no longer true. Thus, the
heirs do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of the estate
of the deceased because the very moment of death, they stepped into the shoes of
the deceased and acquired the rights as devisee/legatee. Said heirs may
designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court. (San
Juan v. Cruz GR No. 167321, July 31, 2006)
JBD 108
Purpose and Importance of substitution of the deceased
FACTS: This is an ejectment case. The defendant died while the case
is going on. What is the procedure? There should be substitution. But
there was no substitution in the case for ten years, until it was decided.
The court was not informed of the death of the defendant. Until finally,
there was a decision.
In other words, when there was a defect the heirs however cannot use that
because they themselves appeared and continued the case. So, in effect, there
was estoppel.
Note: If the action does not survive (like the purely personal actions of
support, annulment of marriage, and legal separation), the court shall
simply dismiss the case. It follows then that substitution will not be
required.
Now, one of the radical changes again introduced by the new rules is the
effect of the death of the defendant in a money claim – action to collect a sum of
money.
Requisites:
1. the action must primarily be for recovery of money, debt, or interest therein;
2.the claim, subject of the action, arose from contract, express of implied; and
3.defendant dies before the entry of final judgment of the court in which the
action was pending.
Under this section, the death of the defendant will not result in the dismissal
of the action. The deceased shall be substituted by his legal representatives in the
manner provided for in Sec. 16 of this Rule 3 and the action continues until the
entry of final judgment.
JBD 110
However, execution shall not issue in favor of the winning party. The final
judgment should be filed as a claim against the estate of the decedent without
need of proving the claim.
The best example here is an action to collect an unpaid loan. And while the
case is pending the defendant died. What will happen to the case? The law says:
If the defendant dies before the entry of the final judgment in the court at the
time of death, it shall not be dismissed but it shall instead be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment.
Under the OLD RULES, the case shall be dismissed. So, the civil case is not
suspended but it will be dismissed and the creditor can file a case against the
estate of the deceased under the Rules on Special Proceedings. But definitely the
civil case dies when the defendant dies.
Now, under the NEW RULE, the case will not be dismissed but rather, the
case will now continue until entry of final judgment. Meaning, until it becomes
final and executory.
Q: But of course, if the judgment is favorable to you (the plaintiff), can you
move to execute? Can you move to execute the decision against the property of
the defendant?
A: NO, because the law provides, “xxx a favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner specially provided in these Rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.”
JBD 111
Example: The husband files a case against the wife for annulment
of marriage or legal separation. One of them dies. When one of the
parties dies, the marriage is dissolved. There is nothing to annul
because the marriage is already dissolved. So, these are the actions
which are purely personal .
Q: So, what is the effect of the death of the party in actions which
does not survived?
A: The case is dismissed!
2a1.) If it is the plaintiff who dies, the case will continue. The heirs or
legal representatives will proceed. So, there is substitution.
2a2.) If it is the defendant who dies, the question is when did he die?
Before entry of final judgment or after entry? This is where Section 20 will
come in.
2a2b.) If the defendant died after the entry of the final judgment but
before execution (after the judgment became final but before there
could be levy or execution) you cannot move to execute. Again, you
apply Section 5 of Rule 86 which is the governing rule – you file your
judgment as a claim against the estate of the deceased defendant.
[Section 5, Rule 86] The purpose there is, so that the creditor will share
with the other creditors pro-rata in the distribution of the estate.
2a2c) If the defendant died after levy or execution but before the
auction sale, we will now apply Section 7[c] of Rule 39:
Note: What Section 20 says is that: before the case can be decided and the
defendant dies (in actions involving money claims) the case shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.
BUT CONTINUE AGAINST WHOM? Against the deceased? Now, to my mind,
you correlate this with Section 16 --- there should still be substitution.
But assuming, there was no substitution and the heirs fought in the case; there
is waiver because the defect is procedural. Just like what happened in the case of
VDA. DE SALAZAR vs CA 250 SCRA 305). Actually, what Section 20 emphasized
is that, the action shall not be dismissed but shall continue – to emphasize that it
is now different compared with the prior RULE. But obviously, there will always
be a substitution
Requisites:
1. public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity;
2.during the pendency of the action he either dies, resigns, or other wise
ceases to hold office;
3.it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party, within 30 days after the
successor takes office, that there is a substantial need for continuing or
maintaining the action;
4.that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the
action of his predecessor; and
5.the party or officer affected has been given reasonable notice of the
application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
2.) If the successor does not adopt the policy, the case will be dismissed.
JBD 114
This is related to Rule 3, Section 3 on representative party but in Section 3, K
should be already insane before the case is filed.
General rule:
The rule does not consider the transferee an indispensable party. Hence, the
action may proceed without the need to imp lead him.
Exception:
When the substitution by or joinder of the transferee is ordered by the court.
EXAMPLE: R files a case against L to recover a piece of land. While the case is
pending, L sold the land to E. E now assumes the risk and takes the property
subject to the outcome of the case.
Q: Can the case continue against L?
A: YES.
1.) If L loses and cannot pay, E is subsidiarily liable;
2.) L can be removed and E will be substituted; or
3.) L can stay and E will be added.
In civil cases, a plaintiff need not pay docket fee if he is an indigent if he files
an application (ex-parte application) to allow him to litigate as an indigent
litigant. But if the indigent wins, he has to pay the fees – file now, pay later) – the
amount shall be a lien on any favorable judgment.
The third paragraph is new. The other party may contest the claim of the
indigent if he is really an indigent or not.
The rule is that only the Solicitor General can bring and defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that actions filed in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines or its agencies and instrumentalities, if not initiated
by the Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed. The authority of the
Solicitor General is embodied in Sec. 35(1) Chapter 12, Title III and Book IV of the
JBD 116
Administrative Code of 1987 (Cooperative Development Authority vs. Dolefil
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative 382 SCRA 552).
REASON: The Solicitor General is the legal counsel of the Republic of the
Philippines whose duty is to defend all the official acts of the Government.
JBD 117