Washington state provides nearly two million of its residents a convoluted voting right over

Sound Transit’s boardmembers. Here’s how it works:

"To control who the Sound Transit boardmembers are you can vote for any candidate running for
County Executive in the county where you reside. Those three County Executives then are to
appoint different numbers of Sound Transit’s boardmembers. When making those appointments
those officials only may select from separate, limited sets of candidates. That candidate
restriction precludes anyone other than four types of government employees (mayors, county
executives, and city or county councilmembers) from being a Sound Transit boardmember."
That boardmember selection process violates limits the Federal Constitution imposes on the
states. Equal Protection Clause authorities prohibit giving some citizens more effective votes
than other citizens over a local legislature’s membership (and thus the policies it adopts).
Moreover, that boardmember voting right runs afoul of the Due Process Clause because it
restricts candidates who may serve on Sound Transit’s board to only four types of government
employees.
Below are legal authorities for the liability parts of claims to redress these flaws. Appropriate
remedies are not addressed.

I. The Voting Right to Control Who Serves on Sound Transit’s Board is Unequal.
Its Effectiveness Depends on Where the Resident Lives.

Summary of “Equal Protection” Claim.

Residents of the Sound Transit district do not have a direct voting right over that local
government’s legislators. Instead, RCW 81.112.040 operates to provide them with what the US
Supreme Court refers to as an “indirect” voting right. Each resident may vote for a candidate for
one of three County Executive positions, and those County Executives then can appoint certain
persons to Sound Transit’s board. This boardmember selection process results in unequal voting
rights to control the board’s membership.
This voting right is unequal in several ways. For example, fewer citizens reside in the
Snohomish County part and Pierce County part of the district, so those residents’ votes carry
more weight than the King County residents’ votes for determining who will do the appointing.
Also, the statutes operate to provide King County residents with a more effective vote because
their County Executive is authorized to appoint a majority of the board. The board’s majority
can establish and amend most of that powerful local government’s policies. The majority also
can block any policies the appointees of the Snohomish and Pierce Counties’ County Executives
might propose. In contrast, residents of the counties to the north and south never can vote for a

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majority-appointer, leaving them vulnerable to sub-optimal and harmful governmental policies
of the King County appointees. In addition, the weights of the direct votes from residents of the
three parts of the district for the boardmember-appointers are diluted to different degrees by the
votes of the three counties’ residents outside the district’s boundaries. A much smaller
percentage of Snohomish County’s residents are within the district, so their votes are
significantly more diluted by the votes of that county’s “non-district” residents.
The state previously gave a voting right that violated the 14th Amendment to residents of the
Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle district. Washington State’s legislature has difficulty
complying with the “one person, one vote” limit the Equal Protection Clause imposes on it.

Relevant Facts.

Sound Transit is a Regional Transit Authority, a local government created by statute in 1992.
“Sound Transit is a municipal corporation [ ].” Pierce County v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 21 (2006).
Its principal statutes are codified in ch. 81.112 RCW. Those statutes provide the RTA’s board
with broad discretionary governmental authority relating to transit.[Ftnt 1] Most of Sound
Transit’s governmental policies can be established by a majority of its board. Approval by two-
thirds of the board is required for certain “major decisions.”
Sound Transit’s district boundaries overlay parts of three counties, and about 2,950,000 people
live within them. There is a King County part (86.7% of that county’s population), a Pierce
County part (83.7% of that county’s population), and a Snohomish County part (58.8% of that
county’s population). An eligible voter in Snohomish County is one of 594,000 voting age
residents, an eligible voter in King County is one of 1,700,000 voting age residents, and an
eligible voter in Pierce County is one of 650,000 voting age residents.
The district’s residents’ voting right is established by statutes. All residents of the three counties
are provided a direct vote for a County Executive candidate. RCW 81.112.040 then provides
residents within the RTA district boundaries a voting right to control the membership of the
Sound Transit board by authorizing the three County Executives to appoint different numbers of
candidates to it.
The Supreme Court of the United States refers to a voting right like this – where residents are
provided a vote for an official, and that official appoints a public body’s members – as an
“indirect” voting right.[Ftnt. 2]
The number of Sound Transit boardmembers each of the three County Executives is authorized
to appoint depends on the population within each of the three counties’ parts of the district. The
King County Executive gets to appoint 10, the Snohomish County Executive gets to appoint 3,
and the Pierce County Executive gets to appoint 4.

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Authorities and Argument.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States sets limits on the states’ authority to structure any voting right they provide a citizen over
government policy-makers. Such a voting right must have equal weight and effectiveness to the
voting right they provide any other resident:
“[I]n this country, the people govern themselves through their elected representatives,
and [ ] ‘each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation
in the political processes’ of the legislative bodies of the Nation, State, or locality,[Ftnt 3]
as the case may be. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 565. Since ‘[m]ost citizens can
achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to
represent them,’ full and effective participation requires ‘that each citizen have an
equally effective voice in the election of members of his . . . legislature.’ Ibid. As Daniel
Webster once said, ‘the right to choose a representative is every man's portion of
sovereign power.’ [Citation omitted]. Electoral systems should strive to make each
citizen's portion equal.” Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S.
688, 693 (1989).
As the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated, indirect voting rights that are equally effective to
control the membership of government boards can be consistent with Fourteenth Amendment
limits:
“Of course, the effectiveness of any citizen's voice in governmental affairs can be
determined only in relationship to the power of other citizens' votes. For example, if
school board members are appointed by the mayor, the district residents may effect a
change in the board's membership or policies through their votes for the mayor. Each
resident's formal influence is perhaps indirect, but it is equal to that of other residents.”
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), footnote 7.
That illustrative indirect voting right described in Kramer provides “formal influence” that is
equal among all residents. Each resident within the district’s boundaries has a direct vote that is
equally effective for determining who the single appointer (the mayor) will be, so those votes
carry equal weight and effectiveness for the purposes of controlling the school board’s
membership.
Residents within Sound Transit’s boundaries do not have a voting right equal to the voting right
provided any other resident. “In calculating the deviation among districts, the relevant inquiry is
whether ‘the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen,’
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 579, the aim being to provide ‘fair and effective representation for
all citizens,’ id. at 565-566.” Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, supra., at 701.
The Sound Transit voting right violates this constitutional limit in several ways.
One way in which the residents’ voting right is unequal results from how the populations of the
three counties are so different. An eligible voter in Snohomish County is one of 594,000 voting

3
age residents, an eligible voter in King County is one of 1,700,000 voting age residents, and an
eligible voter in Pierce County is one of 650,000 voting age residents. That means the votes of
residents of Pierce and Snohomish Counties for a County Executive who will represent them
when appointing Sound Transit boardmembers carry significantly more weight than the vote
provided to King County residents. That kind of inequality violates the Equal Protection Clause:
“The personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is, without more and without
mathematically calculating his power to determine the outcome of an election, shortchanged . . .
if he may vote for one representative and the voters in another district half the size also elect one
representative.” Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, supra. at 698.
This indirect voting right RCW 81.112.040 establishes also is unequal because one of the three
County Executives has substantially more power than the other two. King County residents
always get to vote for the appointer of a majority of the board, whereas the residents of the other
two parts of the district never have that right. As the board’s majority sets, amends and repeals
most of that government’s policies, King County residents’ votes carry superior weight. The
corollary is everyone else only has a vote for a boardmember-appointer who lacks the ability to
appoint enough boardmembers to adopt resolutions to benefit the interests of the residents of
Snohomish and Pierce Counties (or head off efforts to take advantage of their interests by the
King County Executive’s appointees’ resolutions).
The voting right also is unequal depending on the county because different percentages of the
three counties’ residents are within the RTA boundaries. For example, 86.7% of King County
population is in its part of the RTA district, whereas only 58.8% of Snohomish County’s
population is in its part of the RTA district. That means residents of the three county parts also
have relatively different vote “weights” when they cast votes for a candidate running for the
County Executive position to represent them when appointing RTA boardmembers because the
effectiveness of their votes for that purpose is diluted to different degrees by the votes from the
residents of the same county that are outside the RTA district.
Sound Transit’s statutorily-delegated governmental powers are so substantial the state likely
could not rely on the “water-district opinions” to overcome a one person, one vote Equal
Protection Clause challenge. Fairly characterized, the issues of such an analysis are: How
substantial are the public body’s powers, and how pervasive might the effects be of the policy-
makers using those powers? This analytic approach was used in Board of Estimate of City of
New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) at 696. The Court in that case found the body’s
"powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the district." Id., quoting
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970).
The policy-makers controlling the Sound Transit board wield broad discretionary governmental
powers the state delegated via statutes throughout ch. 81.112 RCW. RCW 81.112.100 is
particularly noteworthy. It expressly transfers to the board any and all the powers the directly-
elected legislators of a handful of other local governments can use relating to transit:
RCW 81.112.100 -- Transfer of local government powers to authority.

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 An authority shall have and exercise all rights with respect to the construction,
acquisition, maintenance, operation, extension, alteration, repair, control and
management of high capacity transportation system facilities that are identified in the
system plan developed pursuant to RCW 81.104.100 that any city, county, county
transportation authority, metropolitan municipal corporation, or public transportation
benefit area within the authority boundary has been previously empowered to exercise
and such powers shall not thereafter be exercised by such agencies without the consent of
the authority.
Within the Sound Transit district are several counties, cities, and a “metropolitan municipal
corporation.” Their policy-making boards are comprised of directly-elected representatives who
were “previously empowered to exercise” legislative functions that RCW 11.81.100 transferred
to Sound Transit’s board.[Ftnt 4]
As referenced in footnote 3, this state’s highest court determined Sound Transit’s boardmembers
were delegated substantial legislative powers. Exhibit A lists some of the actions Sound Transit
engages in pursuant to policies its board resolutions created. The board’s statutorily-delegated
powers required to establish and undertake such policies exceed by a wide margin the powers
delegated to the junior college district in Hadley v. Junior College District, supra., the
countywide district in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), and New York City’s
district in Board of Estimate v. Morris, supra. (its functions included tax/utility rate equalizing,
city budgeting, and municipal-property leasing).
The Sound Transit board was not delegated the kind of mere “minimal governmental powers”
that were held insufficient to invoke a Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny analysis in the
“water district opinions:” Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973),
Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973), and Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981). In each of those opinions the Court held the residents without voting rights over the
policy-makers (non-landowning residents) did not have cognizable claims because those rural
water reclamation districts’ boards performed a few specialized functions that predominantly
impacted landowners (“[the board sets policy for] a governmental unit of special or limited
purpose whose activities have a disproportionate effect on landowners within the district.”
Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec District, 410 U.S. 743 at 744. Sound Transit’s
governmental powers impact all residents within its boundaries and they exceed by wide margins
the scopes of the powers delegated to those water districts.[Ftnt 5]
It is likely a court would determine Sound Transit’s board was delegated such substantial
governmental powers that residents have a fundamental right to a voting right that adheres to the
“one person, one vote” Equal Protection Clause limits. It is not known what the state’s purported
justification for the votes differing in weight and effectiveness depending on county of residence
might be. No other state has set up a local government boardmember voting process like this. A
voting right with inequalities such as these is not likely to be upheld: “[O]nce a State has
decided to use the process of popular election and ‘once the class of voters is chosen and their
qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be
evaded.’ Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).” Hadley v. Junior College District, supra.,
397 U.S. 50 at 59.
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--------------------

[Ftnt1] Some of Sound Transit’s functions are listed in RCW 81.112.010: “planning,
developing, operating, and funding a high capacity transportation system. . . . [It] must
coordinate its activities with other agencies providing local and state roadway services,
implementing comprehensive planning, and implementing transportation demand management
programs and assist in developing infrastructure to support high capacity systems including but
not limited to feeder systems, park and ride facilities, intermodal centers, and related roadway
and operational facilities.”

[Ftnt. 2] See, Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), footnote 7.

[Ftnt 3] Washington’s Supreme Court held Sound Transit’s board has legislative powers. See,
Sane Transit v. Sound Transit, 151 Wn.2d 60 (2004) at 65: “Sound Transit relied upon language
in [its board’s] Resolution 75 in wielding its discretionary authority. That resolution, as we have
observed, was adopted in 1996. It incorporated the Sound Move plan and directed that voters in
the Sound Transit district consider the plan and approve local taxes for its implementation. As
we conclude below, Resolution 75 was the enabling legislation for the Sound Move project, and
it was the measure approved by the voters. Sound Transit relied on section 2 of Resolution 75 in
making its decision to construct a 14-mile light rail line over the course of 13 years.” The board
acknowledges in its resolutions the state delegated it legislative powers (Sound Transit’s board
admits the state delegated it legislative powers, including in the resolution establishing some of
its financial policies (“Existing state law grants all legislative and policy authority to the Board,
and does not allow the Board to abrogate, transfer or delegate such authority to other agencies or
to the five subareas within the Sound Transit District.” Res. 2016 – 16, App. B.)
[Ftnt 4] Section 220.30 of the King County charter denominates the county council as the
policy-making body of the county, and vests it with all of the legislative powers of the county
under the charter. RCW 35.22.280 sets out many of Seattle’s city council’s broad legislative
powers. Metropolitan municipal corporations are enabled pursuant to Ch. 35.58 RCW. RCW
35.58.130 states "every legislative act of the [Metro] Council of a general or permanent nature
shall be by resolution," and RCW 35.58.180 states those local boards shall have "all powers
which are necessary to carry out the purposes of the metropolitan municipal corporation and to
perform authorized metropolitan functions."
[Ftnt 5] In two of those “water district” opinions the majority identifies governmental powers
indicating direct votes for all residents over policy-makers are required. Salyer says: “[The
boardmembers have no authority to set policies with respect to] general public services such as . .
. transportation, . . . roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.

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There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to improve the quality of life
within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses, or trains.”
(Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S. at 728-729). The Ball v. James majority
likewise lists governmental powers indicating all residents require a direct vote: “The District
does not exercise the sort of governmental powers that invoke the strict demands of Reynolds. It
cannot impose ad valorem property taxes or sales taxes or enact laws governing citizens'
conduct. Nor does it administer normal government functions such as the maintenance of streets
[ ].” Ball v. James, 451 U.S. at 355-356. Sound Transit’s board was delegated those significant
government powers that impact all residents within its boundaries -- among many others.

II. The “Indirectness” and Candidate Restrictions of This Unprecedented Voting

Right Violate Due Process Clause Limits.

Summary of “Due Process” Claim.

This voting right is restricted excessively. Residents can vote only for County Executive
candidates to appoint Sound Transit boardmembers, and then the only candidates eligible for
appointment are four types of currently-employed government officials. Such a franchise right
exceeds the voting right restrictions the Due Process Clause permits, such as age, citizenship,
and residence location. It is unlikely such a substantially debased voting right would withstand
strict judicial scrutiny in light of the state’s purported justifications (direct elections of
boardmembers would be more expensive, and cooperation among local governments is
facilitated by these unprecedented limitations).

Authorities and Argument.

When state laws infringe too greatly on Americans’ fundamental rights and liberty interests they
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause:
“The [Due Process] Clause also provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. . . . [W]e have
regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition, so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor

7
 justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Internal citations and quotation marks
omitted. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997).
SCOTUS opinions identify certain fundamental rights and interests as “of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). That opinion
references a number of such interests, and reiterates they are “principles of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental [ ]. "[They are]
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions." Internal citations omitted. Palko v. Connecticut, supra. at 325 – 327. Justice
Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, (381 U.S. 479 (1965) at 486, et seq.)
also is instructive. It describes how and why “due process” limits of the Fourteenth Amendment
prevent state interference with citizens’ fundamental rights and interests.
The right to vote for state and local legislators – the primary means by which Americans wield
personal political power and assert self-governance – is one of these fundamental liberty
interests. SCOTUS consistently has applied a fundamental right analytic approach when a
voting right provided to citizens to exert control over their federal, state or local policy-makers is
challenged. This series of opinions begins with Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) and
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra. at 562-563). As SCOTUS
further recognizes in opinions including Evans v. Cornman 398 U.S. 419 (1970) at 422:
“Moreover, the right to vote, as the citizen's link to his laws and government, is protective of all
fundamental rights and privileges. And before that right can be restricted, the purpose of the
restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional
scrutiny. [Citations omitted].”
SCOTUS has identified permissible restrictions on the right to vote for government policy-
makers – residence, age and citizenship. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, supra. at 625.
The Sound Transit voting right has additional restrictions. Residents only are allowed to vote for
County Executive candidates to make appointments to the Sound Transit board. In addition,
RCW 81.112.040 severely restricts the candidates from which each of the three County
Executives may make appointments. County Executives may appoint themselves and mayors.
None of those “chief administrator” officials was elected to be a legislator. City councilmembers
and county councilmembers also may be appointed.
The “indirect” aspect of this voting right renders it ineffective for its ostensible purpose – the
political means by which district residents can exert control over the Sound Transit board’s
membership, and thus its policies. A citizen may vote for a County Executive candidate. That
voting right is an effective means of political control over who serves as the chief administrative
official for the county. However, Sound Transit is not subject to the county’s enabling statutes,
ordinances, or regulations. Sound Transit is an entirely separate, autonomous local government.
When a citizen casts that direct vote for a County Executive candidate it exerts no formal
influence over the Sound Transit board’s membership that could provide the requisite “link to his
laws and government.”[Ftnt 1] The voting right is so indirect it is incapable of conveying to a
County Executive that some candidate in the authorized group should be appointed as opposed to

8
another because the citizen wants Sound Transit to pursue new or different government policies.
Casting an indirect vote like this could not even inform the County Executive that ends up
making appointments that the citizen intended thereby to object to past Sound Transit policies or
administrative actions, or that the citizen has concerns about either its current practices or future
plans.
This statutory indirect voting right excludes everyone except several dozen currently-serving
government employees from being a candidate eligible to serve on Sound Transit’s legislative
body. “The impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional
rights.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983). State laws restricting candidates
“burden[ ] . . . the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their
votes effectively. … It is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot a candidate who
comes near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues.” Anderson v.
Celebrezze, supra. at 787 (internal citation omitted).” No candidates for Sound Transit
boardmember ever appear on any citizen’s ballot. At the time for casting the direct vote for the
County Executive candidate nobody knows whether, or how many, appointments may be made
during that official’s term in office. When voting for a County Executive candidate the citizen
also can’t know who will be in the set of statutorily-eligible candidates in the event whoever is
serving as County Executive decides to appoint from among them. Unlike in regular campaigns
for legislative offices, the individuals in the eventual candidate pool do not put out messages
during the campaigns for the three County Executives containing information citizens would
want to gauge confluence with respect to the nascent Sound Transit boardmember candidates’
“policy preferences on contemporary issues” related to that government. Id. To the extent the
individuals who eventually will comprise the group of statutorily-authorized candidates may
hold positions regarding what they’d do with respect to establishing or changing Sound Transit’s
policies and practices there’s no way district residents could ascertain what those are prior to
voting for a County Executive candidate. Not only do citizens lack the political means to choose
their own representatives to set Sound Transit’s governmental policies, they have no way of
knowing what policies the boardmembers who end up serving in the future intend to attempt to
adopt, amend or repeal until after they are appointed to that board.
Voting for a candidate running against a Sound Transit boardmember for the office that Sound
Transit boardmember had been elected to fill (say, the mayor Steilacoom) is not a vote for that
challenger to become a Sound Transit boardmember. The County Executive’s appointment
discretion among the set of prescribed candidates is unfettered.
These voting right candidate restrictions preclude anyone not currently in one of four
government employee categories from getting a seat on that board to legislate for Sound Transit.
That aspect of these restrictions prevents district residents from voting for people to represent
them who are not obligated to further other local governments’ interests in the event they conflict
with district residents’ interests (including financing policies, route profiles, service quality and
levels, the large payments to other local governments, etc.).
To the extent any of Sound Transit’s legislators ever appeared on any district resident’s ballot as
a candidate for another office, that resident could not have known 1) that individual later would

9
be appointed to Sound Transit’s legislative body, or 2) if the individual currently was serving on
Sound Transit’s board, either how long the individual might continue to so serve or who would
be appointed to replace them if they ceased being a boardmember.
No Supreme Court opinion analyzes whether this kind of candidate-restricted indirect voting
right over local legislators is a sufficiently effective means for citizens to exert their political will
in light of Due Process Clause precedents. The court would evaluate the impacts of this
unprecedented franchise right to determine whether the interests put forward by the state as the
purported justification for these restrictions satisfies the “strict scrutiny” standard. See, Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) at 422 (“the purpose of the restriction and the assertedly
overriding interests served by it” are at issue). The espoused justifications seem inadequate: a
County Executive can make appointments quickly, and elections cost money. Also, the enabling
legislation says the state legislature found that if the board was comprised of government
officials from the circumscribed set that transit coordination among local jurisdictions would be
helped. Sound Transit might argue those purposes of the restrictions justify the kind of indirect
voting right the state legislature provided to residents, citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), footnote 7[Ftnt 2].

---------------------------

[Ftnt 1] Evans v. Cornman, supra, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) at 422.

[Ftnt 2] The kind of public body mentioned there is a school board, and the residents’ voting
right over the policy-makers was indirect because they could vote for the mayor who would do
the appointing. School boards can be delegated minimal governmental powers by the state that
are nonlegislative and administrative. That was the situation in in Sailors v. Kent Bd. of
Education, 387 U. S. 105 (1967). In that opinion the Supreme Court lists in a footnote the
minimal, administrative governmental powers those school boards possessed. Sound Transit was
delegated far more substantial governmental powers than any school board.

Exhibit A

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 Some of Sound Transit’s Board’s Activities, and its Nascent Authority

Designing, financing, building, and managing permanently a series of bus and train systems
involves the board making scores of exercises of discretionary authority that permanently impact
residents and communities throughout the district. Those impacts result from the board’s
discretionary selections of the rights of way locations and profiles (e.g., surface, tunnel, bridge,
etc.) where train lines will run, and where stations will be located.

Setting, and revising, unlimited spending budgets on dozens of capital projects (including
numerous rail projects with multi-billion dollar costs). The 2018 spending budget calls for about
$2,000,000,000 in spending this year (2018), and this burn rate will grow and continue for
decades.

Condemning private property. Approximately 3,000 full or partial interests in private properties
have been acquired so far under (at least the threat of) eminent domain, and the plans call for
using those powers to acquire many thousands more over the next four decades.

Transit Oriented Development authority, to acquire and develop large residential and commercial
properties near transit stations, and sell surplus property to public and private developers for such
purposes, including sales at below market prices.

Designing and imposing new financing plans involving unlimited billions of dollars of spending
on capital and operating costs for a series of new transit systems. This includes collecting
unlimited scores of billions of dollars of revenue from district residents and communities via
three different kinds of taxes it can pick and choose to impose within its boundaries for decades
(sales taxes, annual car value taxes, and real property value taxes). The board is not limited as to
duration of taxing at particular rates, and its contracts with bondholder require it collect far more
tax revenue than any capital and operations budgets require. The board expects to collect about
$1.78 billion in local taxes in 2018, the tax rates will stay in force for decades, and the revenue
streams will grow at compounded rates over that (unlimited) term.

Issuing unlimited billions of dollars of Sound Transit’s long-term debt securities, secured by
irrevocable pledges to confiscate scores of billions of dollars of its general taxes, over decades.

Land use powers, including the state statute establishing its transit facilities as essential
infrastructure, allowing it immunity from local government land use regulations.

Establishing and maintaining its own police force of statutory law enforcement officers.

11
Setting fares to impose on the public, irrespective of any budget limits or other caps.
Determining how much bus and train service to provide to the public, and the power to change
those service levels.

Defining infractions of its regulations, and both setting and imposing fines on people that courts
will enforce for such infractions.

Forming and using LIDs to assess property owners and sell bonds backed by those LID
assessments (RCW 81.112.150).

Creating public corporations to engage in sale and leaseback transactions (RCW 81.112.320).

Creating and funding “reserve” accounts (currently Sound Transit holds over $2 billion in
investment accounts).

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