Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 17-20360
_____________________________________________________________
v.
CANDACE KUNZ-FREED; ALBERT VACEK, JR.; BERNARD LYLE MATTHEWS,
III; NEAL SPIELMAN; BRADLEY FEATHERSTON; STEPHEN A. MENDEL;
DARLENE PAYNE SMITH; JASON OSTROM; GREGORY LESTER; JILL WILLARD
YOUNG; CHRISTINE RIDDLE BUTTS; CLARINDA COMSTOCK; TONI BIAMONTE;
BOBBIE BAYLESS; ANITA BRUNSTING; AMY BRUNSTING; DOES 1–99,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________
K EITH A. T OLER
Assistant County Attorney
Attorney in Charge
HARRIS COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
1019 Congress Avenue, 15th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 274-5265
Of Counsel:
V INCE R YAN
Filed: November 13, 2017 Harris County Attorney
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ii
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Plaintiffs-Appellants Counsel
Candace Louise Curtis Pro se
Rik Wayne Munson
Defendants-Appellees Counsel
Judge Christine Riddle Butts Keith A. Toler
Judge Clarinda Comstock Lead counsel on appeal
Tony Baiamonte1 Laura Beckman Hedge
Lead counsel in trial court
Of counsel on appeal
Vince Ryan, County Attorney
Of counsel in trial and on appeal
Harris County Attorney’s Office
iii
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iv
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v
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vi
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T ABLE OF C ONTENTS
Certificate of Interested Persons .................................................................... iii
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ............................................................ vi
Table of Contents .......................................................................................... vii
Table of Authorities ....................................................................................... ix
Statement of Jurisdiction .................................................................................2
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review .................................................2
Statement of the Case ......................................................................................3
Summary of the Argument ..............................................................................6
Argument and Authorities ...............................................................................8
I. Standards of Review ................................................................................8
A. Rule 12(b)(1) ....................................................................................8
B. Rule 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................9
C. Rule 9(b)—Pleading fraud with particularity ............................... 10
II. Appellants lack standing to assert their claims ..................................... 11
A. A diminished expectancy interest in a trust or estate is not an
actual, concrete, direct injury ........................................................ 12
B. The Honorable Judges’ state-court rulings and orders did not
cause any legally cognizable injury .............................................. 15
C. Appellants’ alleged injuries are not redressable ........................... 17
III. Appellants cannot meet their burden to show the Honorable
Judges and their court reporter are not immune ................................... 18
A. The Honorable Judges and their court reporter are entitled to
absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity .............................. 18
1. Appellants complain only of the Honorable Judges’
judicial acts ............................................................................ 18
vii
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viii
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Cases
Allen v. DeBello,
861 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 20
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Benhamou,
190 F. Supp. 3d 631 (S.D. Tex. 2016) ............................................... 11
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Receivable Fin. Co., L.L.C.,
501 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2007) .............................................................. 27
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................... 9, 10
Atkins v. Hibernia Corp.,
182 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1999) ................................................................ 8
Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co.,
808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1987) .............................................................. 28
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato,
171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005) .............................................................. 14
Babb v. Dorman,
33 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................................................ 22
Backe v. LeBlanc,
691 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2012) .............................................................. 22
Ballard v. Wall,
413 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 18
Bauer v. Tex.,
341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003) ........................................................ 11, 18
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554 (2007) ....................................................................... 9, 27
Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Co.,
343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2003) .......................................................... 8, 25
Bishop v. Corbett Marine Ways, Inc.,
674 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1986) .............................................................. 28
Boyd v. Biggers,
31 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................................................ 19
ix
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x
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Gonzalez v. Seal,
677 Fed. App’x 918, No. 14-30751, 2017 WL 432794
(5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2017) (per curiam) .................................................. 21
Goodman v. Harris Cnty.,
571 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 22
Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990) ................................................................. 27
HJ, Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229 (1989) ..................................................................... 31, 32
Holmes v. Secs. Inv. Prot. Corp.,
503 U.S. 258 (1992) ........................................................................... 14
Homoki v. Conversion Servs., Inc.,
717 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2013) .............................................................. 27
In re Burzynski,
989 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1993) ........................................................ 31, 32
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,
495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 .................. 9
In re Taxable Mun. Bond. Sec. Litig.,
51 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1995) ................................................................ 15
James v. Underwood,
438 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ..... 19
Johnson v. Kegans,
870 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989) .......................................... 18, 21, 28
Jones v. Judge of 129th Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.,
113 Fed. App’x 603 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2004) ..................................... 19
Kirkendall v. Grambling & Mounce, Inc.,
4 F.3d 989, 1993 WL 360732 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)... 18, 19, 21
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375 (1994) ............................................................................. 8
Ky. v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159 (1985) ........................................................................... 22
Landry v. Airline Pilots Ass’n Int’l,
901 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1990) .............................................................. 29
xi
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Richardson v. Spurlock,
260 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001) .............................................................. 32
Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex.,
444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006) ................................................................ 9
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.,
473 U.S. 479 (1985) ..................................................................... 23, 24
Sheshtawy v. Gray,
No. 17-20019, 697 Fed. App’x 380
(5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2017) (per curiam) ................................................ 15
Spectrum Stores Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
632 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011) .............................................................. 27
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................................................................. 11
Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2010) ................. 10, 25
Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc.,
975 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1992) .......................................... 10, 24, 27, 32
U.S. v. Goot,
894 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1990) .............................................................. 30
U.S. v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576 (1981) ..................................................................... 28, 29
Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.,
821 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 11
Whalen v. Carter,
954 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1992) ............................................................ 12
Whitmore v. Ark.,
495 U.S. 149 (1990) ........................................................................... 11
Williams v. Parker,
843 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 11
Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc.,
112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997) ........................................................ 10, 24
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) ............................................................................. 17
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Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ....................................................................... 11
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ................................................................................ 23
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 ........................................................................... 13
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 1961 ............................................................................... 24, 28, 31
18 U.S.C. § 1964 ........................................................................................... 12
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................................................... 20
TEX. FAMILY CODE § 3.001(2) ...................................................................... 13
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 71.001 .................................................................. 28
Rules
FED. R. CIV. P. 9 ...................................................................................... 10, 24
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) .................................................................................. 8
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................... 8
Other Authorities
5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1297 (1990).......................... 10
xiv
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No. 17-20360
_____________________________________________________________
v.
CANDACE KUNZ-FREED; ALBERT VACEK, JR.; BERNARD LYLE MATTHEWS,
III; NEAL SPIELMAN; BRADLEY FEATHERSTON; STEPHEN A. MENDEL;
DARLENE PAYNE SMITH; JASON OSTROM; GREGORY LESTER; JILL WILLARD
YOUNG; CHRISTINE RIDDLE BUTTS; CLARINDA COMSTOCK; TONI BIAMONTE;
BOBBIE BAYLESS; ANITA BRUNSTING; AMY BRUNSTING; DOES 1–99,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________
1
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S TATEMENT OF J URISDICTIO N
Appellants invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 to hear their numerous claims alleging a vast criminal and civil
conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. On May 16, 2017, the district court granted all
Appellees’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim, and dismissed Appellants’ original (live) complaint
with prejudice. On May 26, 2017, Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal
of the district court’s final judgment. This Honorable Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to hear Appellants’ appeal from a final judgment that
disposed of all parties’ claims.
2
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2 ROA.62 at ¶ 177; ROA.72 at ¶ 215; Appellants’ Brief at pp. 21, 24, 26–27. (Note:
page numbers in Appellants’ Brief refer to the Court’s CM/ECF page number in the
document header, not the parties’ page number in the footer).
3 ROA.18–23 (listing Defendants).
3
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4
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9 ROA.42–44, 45.
10 ROA.22, 53.
11 E.g., ROA.16.
12 ROA.3329–30 (district court’s order dismissing lawsuit).
13 ROA.3330.
5
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Appellants now appeal the district court’s order dismissing all of their
claims with prejudice against all parties for lack of standing, absolute and
other immunities, failure to state a claim, and frivolity.
6
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7
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I. Standards of Review
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s final order dismissing
Appellants’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).16 The Court also reviews de novo Appellants’ failure to plead their
fraud claims with particularity under Rule 9(b).17 Under the de novo standard,
this Court reviews the district court’s dismissal order under the same standard
the district court employed.18
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
In reviewing whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction,
this Court accepts as true the allegations set out in the complaint.19 Courts
have inherent power to dismiss claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
on three grounds: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by
undisputed record facts; and (3) the complaint supplemented by the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.20 The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden
to show the court has subject matter jurisdiction.21
16 Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016); Brown v.
Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1999). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1),
12(b)(6).
17 Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Co., 343 F.3d 719, 723–24 (5th Cir. 2003).
18 E.g., Atkins v. Hibernia Corp., 182 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
19 Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 250–51 (5th Cir. 2015).
20 Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
21 Pershing, L.L.C. v. Kiebach, 819 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
8
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B. Rule 12(b)(6)
When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
Court accepts as true all well-pleaded, non-frivolous facts, viewing them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.22 A plaintiff’s legal conclusions are
not entitled to the same assumption.23
Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”24 “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”25 The
statements in the complaint must be sufficiently detailed to “give the
defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”26 Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, a plaintiff
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the facts will not do.”27
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court stated that “only a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss,” a
determination involving “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
22 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1182 (citations omitted).
23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 679 (2009); Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page,
809 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570
(2007)).
25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 421
(5th Cir. 2006) (“Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a
required element necessary to obtain relief.”).
27 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
9
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33 Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 550–51 (5th Cir. 2010); Williams, 112
F.3d at 177–78 (approving Second Circuit test).
10
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34 E.g., Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 821 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2016);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Benhamou, 190 F. Supp. 3d 631, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (citing Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 84 (1998)). See also City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983).
35 Appellants do not assert any section 1983 claims. See ROA.43, 48–49, 64. To the
extent they intended to assert such claims, Appellants lack standing to sue state-court
judges under § 1983 because they do not present a case or controversy against judges. See
Bauer v. Tex., 341 F.3d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The case or controversy requirement of
Article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff to show that he and defendants have
adverse legal interests. The requirement of a justiciable controversy is not satisfied where
a judge acts in his adjudicatory capacity.”).
36 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990).
37 E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Lyons, 461 U.S.
at 101–02; Williams v. Parker, 843 F.3d 617, 620–21 (5th Cir. 2016).
11
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To show standing under RICO, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1)
a direct injury to business or property and (2) causation, both factual (but-for)
and proximate causation.38 The RICO statute authorizes a suit for treble
damages by “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962.]”39
38 Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1998); Whalen v. Carter,
954 F.2d 1087, 1090–91 (5th Cir. 1992); Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander,
Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 1989).
39 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added).
40 Appellants’ Brief at p. 26. See also id. at p. 30 (arguing Appellants’ litigation
activities “forc[ed] the redirection of time and money away from the California concerns
of Curtis and Munson to the defense of Curtis’ property interests in Texas courts.”)
(emphasis added).
12
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productive pursuits and has thus suffered tangible losses to his property and
business interests . . . ”41
Even if Curtis lost some portion of her expected inheritance as alleged,
there is no actual, concrete injury to Munson, who never expected any
inheritance. Munson is not entitled to any part of Curtis’s inheritance under
Texas law; Curtis’s inheritance is her separate property regardless of her
marital status.42 Munson’s choice to share in Curtis’s finances and fight her
legal battles is not sufficient to confer any injury. Appellants chose to file and
prosecute the multitude of lawsuits that they now contend Appellees “illicitly
multiplied.” To the extent Munson’s claims are derivative, he further lacks
standing for the reasons Curtis lacks standing, as discussed below. Munson
cannot state an injury-in-fact, and he therefore lacks standing.
Curtis likewise cannot show an injury-in-fact. To prove a RICO injury,
Curtis must show “a ‘conclusive financial loss’ and not harm to ‘mere
expectancy’ or ‘intangible’ interests.”43 The Sixth Circuit has decided a
standing issue similar to the one presented here.44 In Firestone v. Galbreath,
grandchildren of the Firestone tire magnate sued the executor of the estate
individually and as executor and trustee, as well as numerous other family
members under RICO.45
41 ROA.72.
42 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAMILY CODE § 3.001(2). See also Perez v. Perez,
587 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1979) (citations omitted).
43 Gil Ramirez Grp., L.L.C. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir.
2015) (citing Price, 138 F.3d at 607).
44 Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1992).
45 Firestone, 976 F.2d at 281–82.
13
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46 Id. at 285 (citing Holmes v. Secs. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992)).
47 Firestone, 976 F.2d at 285. The Fifth Circuit has also used this derivative suit
analogy in deciding that a union, not its members, suffered a direct injury, if any, sufficient
to show RICO standing. Ocean Energy II, Inc., 868 F.2d at 745.
48 Firestone, 976 F.2d. at 285.
49 ROA.62.
50 Under Texas law, only the legal representative of an estate has capacity to sue to
recover property belonging to the estate. See, e.g., Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171
S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005). Appellants claim the executor and trustee is Carl Brunsting,
who is not a party. See Appellants’ Brief at pp. 9, 24.
14
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51 Sheshtawy v. Gray, No. 17-20019, 697 Fed. App’x 380, 381–82 (5th Cir. Sept. 14,
2017) (per curiam) (Citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; In re Taxable Mun. Bond. Sec. Litig.,
51 F.3d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1995)).
52 Sheshtawy, 697 Fed. App’x at 383.
53 Appellants’ Brief at pp. 27–28.
15
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54 ROA.3330.
55 Appellants’ Brief at pp. 33, 34.
56 Appellants’ Brief at p. 26.
16
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17
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III. Appellants cannot meet their burden to show the Honorable Judges
and their court reporter are not immune
18
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19
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68 ROA.43, 48–49.
69 Appellants’ Brief at p. 39 (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)).
70 Compare Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 541–42 with 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Allen v.
DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 2017).
20
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21
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are not entitled to qualified immunity.73 Therefore, the Court should affirm
the district court order dismissing Appellants’ frivolous claims with prejudice.
73 E.g., Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 642, 648 (5th Cir. 2012); Babb v. Dorman, 33
F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994).
74 E.g., Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ky. v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other
than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official
personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.”) (emphasis in original).
75 Gil Ramirez Grp., L.L.C., 786 F.3d at 412 (relying on prohibition of punitive
damages in § 1983 actions against governmental entities).
76 Id.
22
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77 E.g., Fairley v. La. State, 254 Fed. App’x 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. XI; Coll. Sav. Bank. v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)).
78 See Fairley, 254 Fed. App’x at 277 (citing Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 671;
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)).
79 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 481–83 (1985) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962); Marriott Bros. v. Gage, 911 F.2d 1105, 1108 (5th Cir. 1990).
23
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The Fifth Circuit has explained that to show a RICO violation, a plaintiff must
plead (1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity.80 The RICO statute defines “racketeering activity” with
a list of predicate acts.81 For RICO claims predicated on fraud, Appellants
must meet their heightened pleading requirement by alleging such claims with
particularity.82
80 Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473
U.S. at 481–83).
81 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (including mail and wire fraud as predicate acts in definition
of “racketeering activity”). See also, e.g., Elliott, 867 F.2d at 881.
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Williams, 112 F.3d at 177; Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc., 975 F.2d
at 1138–39.
83 ROA.44, 45, 48–49. It appears Appellants’ accusations of mail and wire fraud
during the exchange of discovery responses are limited to other Appellees as the exchange
of discovery does not involve the Honorable Judges or their court reporter. Id.
24
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explain why the statements were fraudulent.”84 In other words, a plaintiff must
set out the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud.85
Despite their 64-page, 217-paragraph complaint, Appellants wholly fail
to plead the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. On appeal,
Appellants inappropriately attempt to shift the burden to Appellees without
stating any specific, particular factual allegation against any Appellee,
including Judicial Appellees.86 Appellants thus failed to plead their fraud
claims with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).
84 Sullivan, 600 F.3d at 551 (citations omitted). See also Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407
F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005).
85 Carroll v. Ft. James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted);
Benchmark Elecs., Inc., 343 F.3d at 724.
86 E.g., Appellants’ Brief at p. 34 (“Defendants advanced fact claims but do not
support their claims with exhibits, because no support can be found for such claims in the
record . . . ”).
87 Appellants’ Brief at p. 35.
25
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****
It was part of the racketeering conspiracy that through the use of
estate plan instruments Defendants, acting in concert both
individually and severally, would and did intercept assets
intended for the heirs of estates that pass through Harris County
Probate Court, an enterprise, which engaged in, and the activities
of which affected interstate and foreign commerce.90
****
It was part of the racketeering conspiracy that through the use of
trust instruments Defendants, acting in concert, both individually
and severally, would and did intercept assets intended for
beneficiaries of trusts that pass through Harris County Probate
Court, an enterprise, which engaged in, and the activities of
which affected interstate and foreign commerce.91
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issuing rulings and orders in a pending case. Appellants cannot show Probate
Court 4 is a RICO enterprise separate and apart from its function as a probate
court.
Appellants’ entire enterprise argument on appeal is that a court “may
be an enterprise.”106 Appellants confusingly explain, “Enterprise, like
business, is both a noun and a verb and the evidence necessary to prove
Enterprise, although distinct, often coalesce with the [sic] those of the pattern
element.”107 This is nonsensical and completely fails to state any facts
showing Probate Court 4 is an illegal RICO enterprise, regardless of whether
used as a noun or a verb.
Appellants’ Complaint offers no clarity. Without stating any supporting
facts, Appellants contend Probate Court 4 is an “enterprise” within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) because it was “involved in various aspects
of interstate and foreign commerce” by adjudicating lawsuits involving
persons or properties outside of Texas.”108 This is simply “a recitation of the
elements masquerading of facts” that this Court has found “does not make it
any more or less probable that the listed parties have an existence separate and
apart from the pattern of racketeering, are an ongoing organization, and
function as a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision
making structure.”109 Appellants fail to plead a plausible enterprise, and the
106 Appellants’ Brief at p. 30 (citing U.S. v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1990))
(emphasis added).
107 Appellants’ Brief at p. 30.
108 ROA.25–26.
109 Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of RICO
claims for failure to plausibly plead existence of enterprise or association-in-fact).
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Court should affirm the district court’s order dismissing Appellants’ claims
with prejudice.
110 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (including mail and wire fraud as predicate acts in definition
of “racketeering activity”). See also, e.g., Elliott, 867 F.2d at 881.
111 In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 741–42 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Delta Truck &
Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S.
1079 (1989)).
112 In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 742 (quoting HJ, Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 239–40 (1989)).
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119 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder,
105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).
120 ROA.3334.
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C ONCLUSION
Appellants’ lawsuit against two state-court probate judges and their
substitute court reporter vaguely alleging a vast criminal and civil RICO
conspiracy is frivolous, malicious, and intended only to harass and annoy.
Appellants lack standing because they only assert injury to Curtis’s
expectancy interest in Nelva Brunsting’s estate and trusts. Appellants further
lack standing because they fail to show the Honorable Judges caused any
injury merely by issuing adverse rulings in Appellant Curtis’s ongoing
probate proceedings.
Even if Appellants could show standing to assert their absurd claims,
they cannot show Judicial Appellees are not entitled to absolute immunity.
Appellants’ complaints of Honorable Judges’ adverse rulings, even if done
maliciously or corruptly (which is vehemently denied), do not show lack of
immunity. Finally, Appellants’ unsupported allegations that simply mirror the
legal elements fail to state a RICO claim against Judicial Appellees, especially
because most of their claims are grounded in fraud and lack the particularity
in pleading required by Rule 9(b).
For these reasons, Appellees the Honorable Christine Riddle Butts, the
Honorable Clarinda Comstock, and Court Reporter Tony Baiamonte
respectfully request the Court to affirm the district court order dismissing
Appellants’ claims against them with prejudice and for such other and further
relief to which Judicial Appellees’ are justly entitled.
Date: November 13, 2017
Respectfully submitted,
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Attorney in Charge
HARRIS COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
1019 Congress Avenue, 15th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 274-5265
Keith.Toler@cao.hctx.net
Of Counsel:
V INCE R YAN
Harris County Attorney
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C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE
I certify that on November 13, 2017, I filed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing brief via the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will automatically
serve a copy on all parties’ counsel.
Plaintiffs-Appellants
Candace Louise Curtis
218 Landana Street
American Canyon, California 94503
occurtis@sbcglobal.net
Pro se
Pro Se
Adraon D. Greene
Kelsi M. Wade
David Christopher Deiss
Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith
1301 McKinney Street, Suite 1400
Houston, Texas 77010
AGreene@gallowaylawfirm.com
KWade@gallowaylawfirm.com
Barry Abrams
Joshua Huber
Blank Rome LLP
717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400
Houston, Texas 77002
BAbrams@blankrome.com
JHuber@blankrome.com
Jason Ostrom
Stacy Lynn Kelly
Ostrom Morris, P.L.L.C.
6363 Woodway Drive, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77057
Jason@ostrommorris.com
Stacy@ostrommorris.com
Stacy L. Kelly
Ostrom Morris, P.L.L.C.
6363 Woodway Drive, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77057
Stacy@ostrommorris.com
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Robert S. Harrell
Rafe A. Schaefer
Norton Rose Fulbright US, L.L.P.
1301 McKinney Street, Suite 5100
Houston, Texas 77010-3095
Robert.Harrell@nortonrosefulbright.com
Rafe.Schaefer@nortonrosefulbright.com
Bobbie G. Bayless
Bayless & Stokes
2931 Ferndale
Houston, Texas 77098
Bayless@baylessstokes.com
Pro Se
Anita K. Brunsting
203 Bloomingdale Circle
Victoria, Texas 77904
Pro Se
Pro Se
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C ERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limit of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) because, excluding the parts of the
document exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f):
39