Q — Rev. Nardo B.
Cayat filed his certificate of application of the doctrine on the rejection of the
candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet for the May
2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate
for Mayor filed a petition to annul/nullify his certificate
of candidacy and/or to disqualify on the ground that
Cayat has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Twenty three days before the election,
Cayat’s disqualification became final and executory.
He, however won and was proclaimed and assumed
office. Palileng filed an electoral protest contending
that Cayat was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-
Mayor intervened and contended that he should
succeed Cayat in case he is disqualified because
Palileng was only a second placer, hence, he cannot
be declared as the winner. Is the contention of the
Vice-Mayor correct? Why?
ANS: No, because there was no second placer,
hence, Palileng should be proclaimed as the winner
on the following grounds:
First, the COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004
cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to
disqualification became final and executory on 17
April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed
filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for
Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004
elections. Twenty-three days before the election day,
Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to
run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the
only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On
the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer,
second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer, which triggers the rule on succession,
does not apply in the present case because Palileng
is not a second-placer but the only placer.
Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the
second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s
favor, regardless of his intervention in the present
case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on
Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election
day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the
elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s
disqualification became final only after the elections.
(Cayat v. COMELEC, April 27, 2007).
Q — It was contended that the doctrine of rejection
of the second placer laid down in Labo v. COMELEC
should apply. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: No. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates
the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer,
does not apply because in Labo there was no final
judgment of disqualification before the elections. The
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was
applied in Labo and a host of other cases because
the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification
in Labo and the other cases had not become final
before the elections. Labo and other cases applying
the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer
have one common essential condition – the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final
before the elections. This essential condition does not
exist in the present case. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
Reason in Labo.
In Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on
14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992
elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally
a candidate. In the case of Cayat he was disqualified
by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004
lections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally
a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for
Mayor was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004
elections.
Q — What is the effect if a candidate is disqualified
by final judgment? Explain.
ANS: The law expressly declares that a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections,
which is the situation covered in the first sentence of
Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the
situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified
by final judgment before an election cannot be voted
for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The
Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17
April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections.
Therefore, all the 8, 164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor
are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May
2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper
because he was the sole and only candidate, second
to none. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
Q — Why is the proclamation of Cayat void?
Explain.
ANS: Cayat’s proclamation is void because the
decision disqualifying him had already become final
on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to
ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the
voters of his disqualification when they casted their
votes on election day because the law mandates that
Cayat’s votes “shall not be counted”. There is no
disenfranchisement of the voters. Rather, the voters
are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a
non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and
“shall not be counted”. (Cayat. v. COMELEC).
Q — Is the intervention of the Vice-Mayor proper?
Why?
ANS: No. The petition-in-intervention should be
rejected because the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer does not apply to this case. The
doctrine applies only if the winning candidate’s
disqualification has not yet become final and
executory before the election. In this case, the
disqualification was final and executory before the
election, hence, there was no second placer. (Cayat
v. COMELEC).
Three-term limit; even if “as caretaker”.
Q — Mayor Marino Morales ran for a fourth term
despite having served for three (3) consecutive terms
as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. In answer to a
petition to cancel his certificate of candidacy, he
alleged that while he served his second term, he did it
as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer”
because he was suspended by the Ombudsman from
January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999 and that his
proclamation was declared void and which became
final and executory on August 6, 2001. The
COMELEC declared him disqualified. Before the
Supreme Court, he contended that his second term
from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001 may not be
counted since his proclamation was void. Is the
contention correct? Why?
ANS: No, because his service from July 1, 1999 to
June 30, 2001 was for a full term, hence, the three-
term limit rule applies to him. This is especially so that
he assumed office. He served as mayor up to June
30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the decision in the electoral protest
case ousting him as mayor. As held in Ong v. Alegre,
G.R. Nos. 162395 and 163354, January 23, 2006,
479 SCRA 473, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term. In
Ong, he served the full term even as there was a
declaration of failure of election.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution provides that
the terms of the office of elected local officials x x x,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. x x x
Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code) clearly provides that no local
official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms in the same position.
Morales has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995, hence, he is
disqualified. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
167591 and Dee v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
170577, May 6, 2007).
Q— Explain the reason for the maximum term limit.
ANS: The framers of the Constitution wanted to
establish some safeguards against the excessive
accumulation of power as a result of consecutive
terms.
As held in Latasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829,
December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601, the three-term
limit is an exception to the people’s freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. (Rivera
III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591 and
companion case, May 9, 2007).
Q — Is not the case of Morales similar to the case
of Lonzanida v COMELEC? Explain.
ANS: No. In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, while he
assumed office, he voluntarily vacated when there
was a declaration of failure of election. He did not fully
serve the term, hence, he was qualified to run for a
third term.
The difference between the case at bench and
Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida,
the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a
nullity for the stated reason of “failure of election”,
and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of
Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by
an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. For
another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance
from office as a result of legal processes. In fine,
there was an effective interruption of the continuity of
service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does
not obtain in the present case. But more importantly,
here, there was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-
2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never
unseated during the term in question; he never
ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire
period covering the 1998-2001 term.
Instead, Ong v. Alegre applies to Morales. Francis
Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in
the May 1998 election was declared void. As ruled,
his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full
term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him.
There is no reason why this ruling should not also
apply to Morales who is similarly situated. (Rivera III,
et al. v. COMELEC, et al., May 9, 2007).
Q— Morales cited Borja v. COMELEC to apply to
him. Is this case applicable? Why?
ANS: No, because with the death of Mayor Cruz,
Capco assumed office as mayor by virtue of the
principle of succession, he being the vice-mayor. He
was not therefore, elected even if he served the rest
of the term of the mayor, hence, his assumption of the
office of the mayor upon the death of the incumbent
mayor may not be regarded as a term.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90, it was held
that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall
election for the remaining term is not the “term”
contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. 7160 (the Local
Government Code). There was a “break” in the
service of the mayor. He was a “private citizen” for a
time before running for mayor in the recall elections.
(Rivera III, e al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
167591, May 9, 2007).
Q — What is the effect if the certificate of candidacy
of a candidate is cancelled? Explain.
ANS: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. (Secs. 6
and 7, RA 6646).
Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a
certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for
an office for which he did not present himself shall be
considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate
the whole ballot. (Sec. 211, Omnibus Election Code).

Morales can not be considered a candidate in the
May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes
cast for him should not be counted and must be
considered stray votes. (Rivera III, et al. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007).
Q — It was contended that since Morales was
disqualified, the second placer should be proclaimed
as the winner. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: In Labo v. COMELEC, the Court has ruled that
a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a
substitute winner.
The rule is that, the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of ineligibility, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This
should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance
with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code. (Rivera
III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591, May
9, 2007 citing Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105111,
July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297).
Q — What are the requirements which must concur
for the three-term limit to apply?
ANS: For the three-term limit to apply, the following
two conditions must concur:
1) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495,
September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157; Ong v. Alegre,
479 SCRA 473; Adormeo v. COMELEC, 376 SCRA
90; Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
167591, May 9, 2007).
Effect if there is a tie.
Q — What is the proper procedure to be resorted to
in case of a tie? Explain.
ANS: To resolve the tie, there shall be drawing of
lots. Whenever it shall appear from the canvass that
two or more candidates have received an equal and
highest number of votes, or in cases where two or
more candidates are to be elected for the same
position and two or more candidates received the
same number of votes for the last place in the number
to be elected, the board of canvassers, after recording
this fact in its minutes, shall by resolution, upon five
days notice to all the tied candidates, hold a special
public meeting at which the board of canvassers shall
proceed to the drawing of lots of the candidates who
have tied and shall proclaim as elected the
candidates who may favored by luck, and the
candidates so proclaimed shall have the right to
assume office in the same manner as if he had been
elected by plurality of votes. The board of canvassers
shall forthwith make a certificate stating the name of
the candidate who had been favored by luck and his
proclamation on the basis thereof.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving
a candidate of his right to contest the election. (Sec.
240, BP 881; Tugade v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
171063, March 2, 2007).
Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.
Q — Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy
but withdrew the same. He was substituted by Joy
Luna but the COMELEC denied due course to her
certificate on the ground that Hans being under age,
he could not have filed a valid certificate of candidacy.
There was, however, no petition to deny Hans
certificate of candidacy. Did the COMELEC act
correctly? Why?
ANS: No. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could
not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted
by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without
the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. (Cipriano
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004,
436 SCRA 45). In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court
ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as
to his date of birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned
through a verified petition to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78
of the Election Code.
In this case, there was no petition to deny due court to
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger.
The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did
not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was
not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due
course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In
effect, the COMELEC, without the proper
proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of
candidacy and declared the substitution of Luna
invalid. (Luna v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 165983,
April 24, 2007).
Pre-proclamation controversy; extent of power of
COMELEC.
Q — What is the extent of the power of the
COMELEC in pre-proclamation controversy? Explain.
ANS: It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation
cases that the Board of Canvassers is without
jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of
the election return. The rationale is that a full
reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous
examination of voluminous election documents would
run counter to the summary nature of a pre-
proclamation controversy. However, this rule is not
without any exception. In Lee v. Commission on
Elections, it was held that if there is a prima facie
showing that the return is not genuine, several entries
having been omitted in the questioned election return,
the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus
not powerless to determine if there is basis for the
exclusion of the questioned returns. (G.R. No.
157004, July 4, 2003, 405 SCRA 303; Ewoc, et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 171882, April 3, 2007).

Handwritings have only one general appearance.
Q — May the COMELEC invalidate certain ballots
merely on a finding that the writings have the same
general appearance and pictorial effect? Explain.
ANS: No. General resemblance is not enough to
warrant the conclusion that two writings are by the
same hand. (Silverio v. Clamor, 125 Phil. 917 (1967)).
In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are
by the same hand there must not only be present
class characteristics but also individual characteristics
or ‘dents and scratches’ in sufficient quantity to
exclude the theory of accidental coincidence; to reach
the conclusion that writings are by different hands we
may find numerous likeness in class characteristics
but divergences in individual characteristics, or we
may find divergences in both, but the divergence must
be something more than mere superficial differences.
(Osborn’s Questioned Documents, p. 244; Delos
Reyes v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 170070,
February 28, 2007).
Neighborhood rule.
The votes contested in this appeal are all misplaced
votes, i.e., votes cast for a candidate for the wrong or
inexistent office. In appreciating such votes, the
COMELEC may applied the “neighborhood rule.” As
used by the Court, this nomenclature, loosely based
on a rule of the same name devised by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in
Nograles v. Dureza, HRET Case No. 34, June 16,
1989, 1 HRET Rep. 138), refers to an exception to the
rule on appreciation of misplaced votes under Section
211(19) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) which provides:
Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a
certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for
an office for which he did not present himself shall be
considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate
the whole ballot.
Section 211(19) is meant to avoid confusion in the
minds of the election officials as to the candidates
actually voted for and to stave off any scheming
design to identify the vote of the elector, thus
defeating the secrecy of the ballot which is a cardinal
feature of our election laws. (Amurao v. Calangi, 10
Phil. 347 (1958)). Section 211(19) also enforces
Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides that in preparing the ballot, each voter must
“fill his ballot by writing in the proper place for each
office the name of the individual candidate for whom
he desires to vote.”
Excepted from Section 211(19) are ballots with (1) a
general misplacement of an entire series of names
intended to be voted for the successive offices
appearing in the ballot (Cordero v. Hon. Moscardon,
217 Phil. 392 (1984)); (2) a single (Farin v. Gonzales,
152 Phil. 598 (1973)) or double (Sarmiento v.
Quemado, No. L-18027, 29 June 1962, 5 SCRA 438)
misplacement of names where such names were
preceded or followed by the title of the contested
office or where the voter wrote after the candidate’s
name a directional symbol indicating the correct office
for which the misplaced name was intended (Moya v.
Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939)); and (3) a single
misplacement of a name written (a) off-center from
the designated space (Mandac v. Samonte, 54 Phil.
706 (1930)), (b) slightly underneath the line for the
contested office (Sarmiento v. Quemado, No. L-
18027, 29 June 1962, 5 SCRA 438; Moya v. Del
Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939)), (c) immediately above the
title for the contested office ((Villavert v. Fornier, 84
Phil. 756 (1949)), or (d) in the space for an office
immediately following that for which the candidate
presented himself. ((Abad v. Co, G.R. No. 167438, 25
July 2006, 496 SCRA 505 and Ferrer v. Commission
on Elections, 386 Phil. 431 (2000)). In these
instances, the misplaced votes are nevertheless
credited to the candidates for the office for which they
presented themselves because the voters’ intention to
so vote is clear from the face of the ballots. This is in
consonance with the settled doctrine that ballots
should be appreciated with liberality to give effect to
the voters’ will. (Velasco v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 166931, February 22, 2007).
Marked ballot.
Q — When is a ballot considered as marked?
Explain.
ANS: In order for a ballot to be considered marked,
in the sense necessary to invalidate it, it must appear
that the voter designedly place some superfluous sign
or mark on the ballot which might serve to identify it
thereafter. No ballot should be discarded as a marked
ballot unless its character as such is unmistakable.
The distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be
placed on the ballot is that which the elector may
have placed with the intention of facilitating the means
of identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating
the secrecy of suffrage which the law establishes.
Thus, marked ballots are ballots containing
distinguishing marks, the purpose of which is to
identify them. (Perman v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No.
174010, February 8, 2007, Tinga, J).
Failure of election.
Q— When is there failure of election?
ANS: There are three instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, thus:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes.
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to
elect. In the first instance, the election has not been
held. In the second instance, the election has been
suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns give rise to the
consequent failure to elect; the third instance is
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a
winner. (Mutilan v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
171248, April 2, 2007).

Note:
None of the three instances is present in this case. In
this case, the elections took place. In fact, private
respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner
contests the results of the elections on the grounds of
massive disenfranchisement, substitute voting, and
farcical and statistically improbable results. Petitioner
alleges that no actual election was conducted
because the voters did not actually vote and the
ballots were filled up by non-registered voters.
Q — May an interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division be the subject of certiorari to the SC?
Explain.
ANS: As a rule, No. The exception is in an unusual
case where the petition for certiorari questioning the
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division was
pending before the SC, the main case which was
meanwhile decided by the COMELEC En Banc was
likewise elevated to the Court. Thus, there was a
situation where the petition for certiorari questioning
the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Division and
the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main
case were consolidated. The issues raised in the
petition for certiorari were also raised in the main case
and therefore there was actually no need to resolve
the petition assailing the interlocutory orders. (Rosal
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253 and 172741, March
16, 2007; Soriano, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 164496-505, April 2, 2007).
Note:
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a
COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to the
SupremeCourt through a special civil action for
certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC
Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.
However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory
order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by
the division which issued the interlocutory order,
except when all the members of the division decide to
refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC
Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper
subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise
would not only delay the disposition of cases but
would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and
unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the
aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC
Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The
aggrieved party can still assign as error the
interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings
he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC
En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol
is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division is a patent nullity because of absence of
jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a
COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining
order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or
where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with
counter-protest which was filed beyond the
reglementary period, which is the Kho case.
The Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of
Oriental Mindoro, that “it is the decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance
with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.” The
exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in
this case because unlike in Kho and Repol, the
assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First
Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The
assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the
Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for
certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the
COMELEC Second Division and the petition for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were
already consolidated.
material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate’s
certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or
cancelled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented
must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by
the candidate. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007).

The Court also notes that the COMELEC First

Division has already issued an Order dated 31 May
2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in
EPC Nos. 2004-36, 2004-37, 2004-38, 2004-39,
2004-40, 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and
2004-45 for failure of the protestants and protestees
to pay the required cash deposits. Thus, the Court
have this peculiar situation where the interlocutory
order of the COMELEC First Division is pending
before the Court but the main case has already been
dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This
situation is precisely what the Court are trying to avoid
by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that an
interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of
an appeal or a petition for certiorari.
Misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy; effect.
Q — When is misrepresentation in a certificate of
candidacy material? Explain.
Q — If a candidate misrepresents his profession, is
he disqualified? Explain.
ANS: No. No elective office, not even the office of
the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
requires a certain profession or occupation as a
qualification.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for
elective office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a
situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her
profession or occupation in the certificate of
candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified from
running for office under Section 78 as his or her
certificate of candidacy cannot be denied due course
or canceled on such ground. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007).

ANS: A misrepresentation in a certificate of

candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification
for elective office and affects the candidate’s
eligibility. Second, when a candidate commits a
material misrepresentation, he or she may be
proceeded against through a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, or through criminal prosecution under
Section 262 for violation of Section 74. Third, a
misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-