38.PABLICO V.

VILLAPANDO
G.R. NO. 147870
Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Palawan against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for
abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a
consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate.
Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a government position
within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of
Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated
candidate within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute
an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the
Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the
decision. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of
Villapando.

Issue:

May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the
penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:

NO. It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty
of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed
only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., it was held
that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials,
since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided
for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.”

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be
removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article
[The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by
order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining authority referred to
pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of
the President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to

remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may
alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government
Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they
implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with
the statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)

39.
SALALIMA VS. GUINGONA
G.R. NO. 117589-92
5/22/1996
Facts:
- NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning the validity of the
auction sale, which theProvince conducted because of NPC’s failure to pay real
property taxes assessed.- The Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through
a resolution, authorized respondent Governor to engage the services of a Manila-
based law firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC.
Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty. Cornago. This is despite
the availability of the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the
Province’s comment on the NPC petition.- A retainer agreement was entered into
which provided that Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall receiveP50,000 as
acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property subject matter of the case
which isP214 Million.- The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as
attorney’s fees when the COA disallowed further disbursements for lack of the
requisite prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Sol Gen and the
written concurrence of the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255.- An
administrative complaint was then filed against Gov. Salalima, Vice Gov. Azaña,
and other Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members relative to the questioned
retainer contract and the disbursement of public funds in payment thereof.
Issue:
WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into
the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes
& Reyna Law Firm and in making payments pursuant
to said agreement
Held:
YES. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay,
respondents exceeded their authority and violated a provision of the LGC
and a Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, the entiretransaction was
attended by irregularities.
Ratio:

Sec. 481 LGC : requires the appointment of a legal officer

to represent the LGU in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official capacity is a party

o
EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to
represent the adverse party

It was held in Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok

That LGUs cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the
Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them

Attendant Irregularities:
o
No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA before the disbursements were
made
o
The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only authorized the Governor to sign a
retainer contractwith the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and yet he also signed with
Atty. Cornago, a different entity
o
The Province paid the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm despite the fact that it didn’t
appear as counsel for the Province in the SC case
o
Considering the standing of both Atty. Cornago the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm,
the P38.5 Million attorney’s fees is unconscionable and violative of (a)
COA Circular No. 85-55-A prohibitingirregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of funds; and (b) Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.*** However, it was held that respondents
could no longer be subject to disciplinary action for such administrative
misconduct as it was committed during a prior term.

JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 131255
05/20/1998

FACTS:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner
Eduardo Nonato
Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C.
Tinio is the Vice-Governor of
said province while private respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S.
Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente
C. Palilio and Napoleon Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the
President a letter-complaint dated
September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. Private
respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the
session hall of the
provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
when petitioner belligerently
barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and
uttered threatening words
at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms
who encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to
a pending legislative
measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of
P150 million from the
Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into
approving this loan; that
fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that day for
lack of quorum and the
proposed legislative measure was not considered; that private respondents
opposed the loan because the
province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million
incurred without prior
authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget
officer and treasurer had
earlier disclosed that the province could not afford to contract another obligation;
that petitioner's act of
barging in and intimidating private respondents was a serious insult to the
integrity and independence of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed
grave danger to private
respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or
removal of petitioner; for
an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review
of the proposed loan in
light of the financial condition of the province.
President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the
refusal of the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan, did not appear to
justify "the use of force,
intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary
of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "take appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to
"break not the peace."
Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified
petitioner of the case against him
and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the same
notice, Secretary Barbers
directed petitioner "to submit his verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to
dismiss, together with
such documentary evidence that he has in support thereof, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt.
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and
summoned petitioner and private
respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into
an agreement whereby
petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private
respondents promised to
refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private
respondents reiterated their letter-
complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-complaint
within fifteen days from
receipt. Petitioner submitted requests for extension to submit his answer and was
each request was
granted each time. The DILG however, informed him that his "failure to submit
answer will be considered a
waiver and that the plaintiff shall be allowed to present his evidence ex parte."
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then
Acting Secretary of the DILG,
issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived his right to
present evidence. Private
respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. Respondent was
hereby declared in default.
On June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss."
Petitioner alleged that the letter-
complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President;
and that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him, to answer the
complaint.
On July 4, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration"
of the order of June 23,
1997 reinstating the order of default. Petitioner also prayed that the hearing on
the merits of the case be
held in abeyance until after the "Motion to Dismiss" shall have been resolved. On
July 11, 1997, on
recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued
an order, by authority of
the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days
pending investigation of
the charges against him. Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National
Police to assist in the
implementation of the order of preventive suspension. In petitioner's stead,
Secretary Barbers designated
Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor until such time as petitioner's
temporary legal incapacity
shall have ceased to exist. Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court
of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of
default.
In the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's petition.
A few days after filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a "Motion for
Leave to File Herein
Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the
Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the case finding him
guilty of the offenses
charged. His finding was based on the position papers and affidavits of witnesses
submitted by the parties.
The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of complainants' witnesses to be "more
natural, reasonable and
probable" than those of herein petitioner Joson's.
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
adopted the findings and
recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the penalty of
suspension from office for
six (6) months without pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DILG Secretary, in his resolution, was exercising the powers
of the President
which are clearly vested by law only upon the President or the Executive
Secretary, and thus his action is
contrary to law
RULING:
In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority
of the DILG
Secretary over the case. He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the
President that has
jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying the alter-ego principle
because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not
with the DILG Secretary.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to
these provisions, the
Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by
himself or through the
Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who
may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of
the DILG, however, is not
the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplinary Authority may
designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective
local officials is derived
from his power of general supervision over local governments. The power to
discipline evidently includes
the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials.
A.O. No. 23, however,
delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Joson's claim.
The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power
to investigate, not the
power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is
based on the alter-ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
RATIO:
Under the Constitution and as provided in the Administrative Code of 1987, the
powers of the
National Government are distributed among three (3) branches. The executive
power shall be vested in the President.

42.
Republic of the Philippines v Pacheco
GR No. 178021 January 25, 2012
Doctrine:
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a
scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed toindirectly terminate
his service, or force his resignation.
Facts:
Respondent Minerva Pacheco, through a Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) issued bythe
BIR, was reassigned as Assistant Chief of Legal Division from Quezon City to SanFernando,
Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the revenue service as basis for such issuance.Pacheco
claims that she was constructively dismissed as her reassignment will result in thereduction of her
salary and let her suffer physical burden from waking up early and coming homelate at night. The
CSC dismissed her complaint on the ground that she was not constructivelydismissed as she
maintained her position as Revenue Atty. IV and was designated as AssistantChief. The
CA reversed the CSC’s decision and ordered her immediate reinstatement with full
backwages and benefits.
Issue:
Whether respondent was constructively dismissed, and, therefore, entitled to backwages
Held:
Yes. The contention of the CSC, through the OSG, that the deliberate refusal of Pacheco toreport to
work either in her original station in QC or her new place of assignment in Pampanganegates her
claim of constructive dismissal is untenable. It was legally impossible for Pacheo toreport to her
original place of assignment in Quezon City because the said RTAO also reassignedanother
personnel as Assistant Chief from Pampanga to QC, the very same position that Pachecoheld. It is
also erroneous on the part of the CSC to argue that the subject RTAO was immediatelyexecutory,
unless otherwise ordered by the CSC, and, thus, it was incumbent upon Pacheco toreport to her new
place of assignment. The Court held that it is an order to detail that isimmediately executory and not
reassignment. However, Pacheco is not entitled to full backwagesand benefits. It is a settled
jurisprudence
\
that an illegally dismissed civil service employee isentitled to back salaries but limited only to a
maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his
reinstatement.