MVRS Publication vs.

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines

Facts:

Respondent Islamic Da’wah filed a claim for damages against Petitioner MVRS Publication, Inc.
due to an article published by the petitioner which constitute a libelous statement which is
insulting or damaging to the Muslims, stating that the pig was the God of the Muslims.
Respondent Islamic Da’wah alleged that the articles was published out of sheer ignorance as well
as with the intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslim and Islam, as a religion
in this country, in violation of the law, public policy, good morals, and human relations. On the
other hand, Petitioner MVRS contended that the article did not mention Respondents Islamic
Da’wah as the object of the article and therefore not entitled for damages. Likewise they
contended that the said article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published
without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

Issue: W/N the said article published by Petitioner MVRS constitutes as an insult to the Muslim
Community.

Ruling: NO. The SC granted the petition filed by Petitioner MVRS.

Defamation means the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or reputation through false
and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputations or to diminish the esteem,
respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about
the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of
another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest
since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiffs.

It must be stressed that the words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander
per se and mere words of general abuse however, opprobrious, ill-natured or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an
allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not
make it actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified
or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without impairing the equally
demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the
Bulgar Article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, Respondents
Islamic Da ‘wah has no cause of action, hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.
Respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in
order for the case to prosper.
Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak

Facts:

Petitioner Antionio Gonzales, President of Malaya Films while Respondent Maria Kalaw Katigbak
was the Chairman of the Board of Review for Motion pictures and Television. A resolution of a
sub-committee of the respondent Board, a permit to exhibit the film “Kapit sa Patalim” was under
the classification “For Adults Only”, with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted.
Petitioner Gonzales filed for a motion for reconsideration stating that the classification of the film
“For Adults Only” was without basis. However, the Board affirm the resolution of the sub-
committee.

Issue: W/N the film should be under the classification of “For Adults Only”

Held:

Censorship or previous restraints certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were
so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is, however, except in exceptional circumstances a
sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such a right. This is not to deny that equally basic is
the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
litigation, the emphasis should rigidly be on freedom from censorship. It is, beyond questions,
well-settled principle in our jurisdiction.
The test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present
danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger
must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what was feared may be
traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must
be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does
it suffice if such danger be only probable.