SPEPRO CASES PART II:

CASES ON GUARDIANSHIP:

1. Cecilio Hernandez, Ma. Victoria Hernandez-Sagun, Teresa Hernandez-Villa Abrille and Natividad
Cruz-Hernandez vs Jovita San Juan-Santos

Facts:
Petitioners are the step-siblings of Maria Lourdez San Juan Hernandez, the heir to properties left
by her maternal grandfather to her married who died when she was young. His father, and later
on her step-siblings, informally managed her property from the time of her emancipation in
1968 until 1993, when his father died. During the informal administration of her properties, part
of her real properties were sold, one of them was allegedly purchased by her father, the others
were sold by her step-siblings after inducing her to sign an SPA and on the promise that she
could have a car and driver at her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita
San Juan-Santos, confiding to her that she was made to live in the basement of the petitioners’
home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Lulu was
severely overweight, unkempt, smelling of urine and was staying in a room without proper toilet.
The San Juans demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulu’s estate but it was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal
alleging that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and in managing her estate because she
was of weak mind.
Petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same, claiming that the issue of
her competency had been settled in 1968 upon her emancipation. They further allege that the
scope of their authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter
being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences
with the families. Medical specialists testified that she is of a below average intelligence level
with a fragile mental state, she is afflicted with diabetes mellitus and artheroselorotic
cardiovascular disease and that she is incapable of taking care of herself and to self-administer
her medications.
The RTC declared Lulu as incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person
and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed. Hence, the
petition for review on certiorari.
While the case was pending in the CA, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA
alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location.
The CA ruled that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied, hence, they filed a petition for review on certiorari which was
consolidated with the guardianship case.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the opinion of attending physicians who are not experts in psychiatry are
inadmissible in evidence over the person’s mental state.
2. Whether or not issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to a legal guardian is proper.

Held:
1. Yes. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion
on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu’s attending
physicians spoke and interacted with her allowing them to thoroughly observe her behavior and
conclude that her intelligence was below average and her mental stage was below normal. In
any case, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary as the
observations of a trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental
sanity suffice.
2. Yes. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by
which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. As judicial
guardian, respondent was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her
obligation, the ward must be in her custody. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.

4. G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008 LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner, vs. ROMMEL, ELMER,
ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents.
Facts:
On February 6, 1984, a complaint for specific performance with damages was filed by Sesinando
Fernando before the RTC alleging that Nelly Nave reneged on their agreement involving the sale
of Nave’s land.
On February 20, 1984, Nelly Nave executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Pabale
siblings. Subsequently, the Pabale siblings filed a Motion to Intervene. Nave filed a Motion to
Dismiss but was denied. Nave then filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer and Amended
Reply and Cross-claim against the Pabale siblings alleging the she is incapacitated to contact
because of her mental deficiency based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on
1985 by a clinical psychologist. The motion was denied. She filed a motion for reconsideration
but before the motion could be acted upon, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, her husband, filed a
Petition for Guardianship of Nave with the RTC. The petition was granted and Atty. Paner was
appointed as regular guardian.
Nave thereafter died, and on September 20, 1993, Atty. Gesmundo executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication for the estate of Nave. On February 14, 1996, he filed a motion to dismiss the case
filed against Nave. The Pabale siblings opposed. On January 9, 1997, Gesmundo filed a motion
asking the court to substitute him over the case as successor to Nelly. Later, Lolita Alamayre, as
buyer of the parcel of land under dispute, petitioned the court to be substituted over
Gesmundo. The RTC decided in favor of Alamayre, contending that the sale to the Pabale siblings
is null and void. The decision was reversed on appeal. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not a person’s incompetence as settled in a special proceeding bars the re-
litigation of the same fact in a Civil Case based on res judicata.
Held:
No. The doctrine of res judicata posits that the conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation
in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. In this case,
conclusiveness of judgment cannot be applied since there is no identity of parties and nor is
there identity of issues between the special proceeding on guardianship and the civil case on the
validity of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding without the usual parties in an
ordinary case, the objective of which is to determine whether a person is indeed a minor or an
incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and to determine
who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. Thus, there is no identity of parties since
the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be identified and notified
since their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian.
There is neither an identity of issue in this case between the special proceeding and the
civil case that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on the competency
of Nave when she executed the Deed of Sale. The main issue in the special proceeding was
whether Nave was incompetent at the time of the filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986. On
the other hand, the issue in the civil case was whether Nave was an incompetent when she
executed a Sees of Sale in 1984, hence rendering the sale void. While both cases involve the
determination of incompetency, it must be established at two separate times, and the finding of
incompetency in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. Capacity to act is
supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable. It was only in
1986 that Nave was declared incompetent, hence there is no basis to declare that she was also
incompetent in 1984.
There being no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding and the civil
case, the Decision in the former on Nave’s incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had capacity and was
competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject property
in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it
upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
5. Juan Gorostiaga vs Manuela Sarte G.R. No. L-45622
Facts:
On May 18, 1936, a petition for guardianship was filed in favor of Manuela Sarte, on the ground
that she was incompetent to manage her estate by reason of her physical and mental incapacity,
to which the court granted, declaring her as incompetent. Nine days thereafter, Juan Gorostiaga
instituted an action to recover a sum of P2,2851.51 from Sarte. An answer was filed by Atty.
Gregorio Sabater invoking Sarte’s incompetence to manage her estate. Sarte failed to appear at
the trial, and a judgement was rendered in favor of Gorostiaga. A motion was then filed by the
general guardian of Sarte, praying that all the proceedings against her be declared null and void
for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The motion was denied, hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the person of a judicially declared
incompetent person.
Held:
No.
According to the evidence relied upon by the lower court, the defendant was
incompetent to manage her affairs for about two or three years prior to her examination by the
alienists. It is clear then that during all the proceedings in the case, from the time of the filing of
the complaint to the rendition of the judgment, the defendant was physically and mentally unfit
to manage her affairs, and there having been no summons and notices of the proceedings
served her and her guardian, because no guardian was then appointed for her, the court trying
the action acquired no jurisdiction over her person (sec. 396, No. 4, of Act No. 190).
It is argued that Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater appeared for the defendant in the case and
filed an answer in her behalf and that the attorney's authority is presumed as well as the
capacity of the defendant giving the authority. But this presumption is disputable and it is here
entirely rebutted by no less than an order of the same court declaring the defendant physically
and mentally unfit to manage her estate since at least May 18, 1936. If the defendant was thus
incompetent, she could not have validly authorized the attorney to represent her. And if the
authority was given by her relatives, it was not sufficient except to show the attorney's good
faith in appearing in the case.
6. see #4

7. Rep. Act No. 7610, Sec. 3(a).

Section 3. Definition of Terms. –

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition;

8. Jose Uy and his spouse Glenda Uy and Gilda Jardeleza v CA and Teodoro Jardeleza
Facts:
Teodoro Jardeleza, son of spouses Gilda and Ernesto Jardeleza, filed a petition with RTC Iloilo
City Branch 25 praying that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of her mother over their
father who was comatose, and that in the meantime, no property of their his father shall be
negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated. A few days later, Gilda also filed a petition with
Branch 32 to declare her husband as incapacitated and for her to assume sole power of
administration of conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code. The trial court of
Branch 32 granted the petition, declaring Ernesto as incapacitated, authorizing Gilda to assume
sole powers of administration of their conjugal property, and authorizing the sale of their lot to
their daughter Glenda. Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration and for consolidation of the
two cases but it was denied. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals on appeal.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the wife of a comatose husband can have sole administration of conjugal
property under Art. 124 of the Family Code without the consent of the husband.
2. If yes, whether or not the administrator has the same powers and duties as a guardian under
the Rules of Court.
Held:
1. No.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this
case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

2. Yes.
Assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply
to the wife’s administration of the conjugal property, the law (Art. 61 Family Code) provides that
the wife who assumes the sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
guardian under the Rules of Court. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as
such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the
wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. There must be service of notice of the
petition to the incapacitated spouse.
9. Catalan et. al., v. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 645.

FACTS:

Feliciano was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
schizophrenia.

On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed of Donation, wherein
Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of a real property. The donation was
registered with the Register of Deeds.

On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed a Special Proceeding before the
CFI to declare Feliciano incompetent. The trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. The
following day, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company (now BPI) as Felicianos’
guardian.

On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos’ guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano
had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of
sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent.

ISSUE:
WON the donation was valid.

HELD:

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the
person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.

A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado
of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by
the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the
allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.

A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of
attending to his property rights. From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person
suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total
control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound
mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced. Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when
the CFI declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.

10. People v. Watiwat, G.R. No. 139400, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 324.

SAME @#3

11. Parco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 33152, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 262.

FACTS:

This case started from a Special Proceeding, a guardianship proceedings for the incompetent
Soledad Rodriguez.

Respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian
of Soledad Rodriguez), respondent, the sale to petitioners 3 lots for the support, maintenance
and medical treatment of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. All the sales of the three (3) lots being
absolute, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of petitioners.

On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the sale of the lots,
respondent filed an urgent petition in the CFI, invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of
Court, praying that an order be immediately issued requiring petitioners to appear before the
court so that they can be examined as regards the three (3) lots in question which are allegedly
in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to do so or to
comply with any order that may be issued in relation therewith to hold them in contempt of
court.

The pertinent allegations read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the abovenamed incompetent and upon
authorization by this Hon. Court he has transferred in good faith to the spouses LUIS PARCO and
VIRGINIA (UY) BAUTISTA, both of Atimonan, Quezon, the titles over the following realties
belonging to his ward, namely:

2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-described he transferred the titles thereto in
favor of the recited spouses under a loan agreement (not an absolute sale thereto and with the
express commitment in writing that he can recover the same within three (3) months from
December 19, 1966.

ISSUE:
WON the CFI, acting with limited jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of
the Rules of Court, has the authority to adjudicate the question of ownership and order the
reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land in question to respondent, guardian of the ward.

HELD:
In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used
in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of
the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical
language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or
where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable.
However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute,
under the Cui case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the person said to
have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary
action and not in guardianship proceedings.

In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not, on the
basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward Soledad
Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in question is clear and undisputable. What is certain
here is the fact that the sale of the properties in question were duly approved by the respondent
Judge in accordance with the provisions on selling and encumbering of the property of the ward
under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the original urgent petition
dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination of petitioners herein regarding the alleged
concealing, conveyancing and embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition
dated March 24, 1969 asked for reconveyance.

Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first two
lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was subject
to condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners,
the sales were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System since new transfer certificate of
titles were issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better
right or title to the disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the determination of title or
ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship
proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio supra.

ADOPTION CASES

1. A.M. No. RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26; MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court
Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR, Stenographic Reporter, Branch
26, PACITA B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, Staff
Assistant I, Branch 26, and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II, Branch 26, all of the
RTC, San Fernando, La Union, respondents.

Facts:

This case was initiated by the Office of the Court Administrator with the filing of an
administrative complaint against the herein respondent judge due to those subjects of cases that
had not been raffled by the appropriate committee including cases under special proceedings.

The case involves a petition for the "judicial confirmation of the defacto adoption" of Cecilia
Averion filed on 11 October 1990. The petitioner therein alleges that she and her late husband,
Fernando Averion -- who died in 1987 -- "adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3
months old at the time, Cecilia was supposedly given up by her natural parents, the whereabouts
of whom remain unknown. Petitioner further avers that she and her husband, during his lifetime,
reared the child and gave her all their love, attention, care and understanding. They also
provided her with an education and considered her as their own child. Hence, the petition was
filed "for the purpose of judicially confirming the defacto adoption of Cecilia Averion by herein
petitioner and her late husband. The said petition was not accompanied by the written consent
of Cecilia Averion who, at the time of filing, was already of legal age. On the very day the petition
was filed, respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of Hearing which provided that the
petition would be heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise ordered therein that "a copy of this
notice be published once a week for three consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner in
a newspaper of general circulation in La Union and in the Philippines.

From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31 October 1990, as prepared by respondent
Flores, it appears that the following exhibits were offered to establish the jurisdiction of the
court: (1) the affidavit of the Editor of the North Tribune, "a newspaper of general circulation in
La Union and Northern Luzon provinces," published in San Fernando, La Union; (2) clippings of
the published order in the 10, 17 and 24 October 1990 issues of the North Tribune; and (3) the
entire issues of the North Tribune for 10, 17 and 24 October 1990.. It may further be gleaned
from the said Minutes that since no opposition was registered by any other party, the
petitioner's testimony was received by the court. On 6 November 1990, the respondent Judge
handed down a decision granting the petition and confirms the defacto adoption of Cecilia
Averion by herein petitioner and her late spouse Fernando Averion retroactive to the year 1967."

Issue:

Whether the act of respondent judge in granting the de facto adoption is proper.

Whether the respondents are administratively liable.

Ruling:

a.No.

In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and decreeing the same to be "retroactive to the
year 1967," respondent Judge has carved a name for himself in history for, as already pointed
out, no action or proceeding for judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in this
jurisdiction. Furthermore, by its very nature and purpose, a decree of adoption can never be
made to retroact. Lastly, considering that the petitioner's husband had died in 1987, or three
years before the petition was filed, he could not now be resurrected for purposes of the
adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be subsequently bound by the decree to the
prejudice of his heirs.

Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the fact that Cecilia Averion had submitted
no written consent to the adoption at the time of the filing of the petition or at any subsequent
date -- a manifest infirmity. Nor was Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover, there seems
to be an irregularity in the publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be observed that as
indicated in the upper right hand corner of the first page of the petition, the proceeding was
instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were so, the notice of hearing which was issued by the
respondent Judge on that same date could not have been published in the North Tribune in its
10 October 1990 issue. In his affidavit, the Editor of the said newspaper disclosed that the notice
was indeed published on 10 October 1990.

All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the procedural rules on adoption and
promulgated guidelines for himself to suit his own purpose and design.

b.Yes
Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and Special Proceeding No. 1967 were not
only directly filed with the court of the respondent Judge without passing through the raffle
procedure, the two cases were also resolved by the latter in a manner that may be characterized
by gross ignorance or the brazen and blatant disregard of the applicable procedural laws, grave
misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. He is therefore unfit to continue in the service a day longer. He has evidently forgotten
that the administration of justice is a sacred task. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to
be an ordinary mortal. He becomes "the visible representation of the law and, more importantly,
of justice. A judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence, and
should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a
demoralizing example to others.

2. G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.

Facts:

Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y.
Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his
sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural
parents 3 and by order of the court issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong
Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an
insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt
the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered
their adopted children with parental love and reared them as their own children.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name
to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any
implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not
oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the
trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with,
petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. 5
On appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the
Solicitor General, the decision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:

whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are
valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

Ruling:

Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority." The application for change of name thereunder involves a special proceeding
governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and one which
involves substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings being the
prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of personal
name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the
object of the statute, court to which application is made should normally make its decree
recording such change of name.

A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relation
with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a
proceeding in rem and, as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements,
particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For
this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register.

To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of name contemplated under Article
376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103 must not be confused with and cannot be
effected through the summary proceeding proposed in Article 412 of the some Code, as
procedurally regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, which refers only to correction of clerical errors,
such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, or an error made by a
clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change,
and not those which will involve substantial changes.

Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification, and a
change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which may
be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.

Thus, petition is denied.

3. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.A
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the
future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

4.Lahom v Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the
trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name
Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband,
their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his
dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect.
The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of
adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was
already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time
the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already
abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right
to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested
right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
5.Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006,

Facts:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother
for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated
that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s
biological mother.

Held:

No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice
if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
6.IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE
CERVANTES ,NELSON CERVANTES ,et.al. and GINA C.FAJARDO AND CONRADO FAJARDO,et.al.

Facts:

Angelie Anne Cervantes ,a minor and a child of respondents Conrado and Gina ,who are
common-law spouse.Respondent offered the child for adoption to petitioners who took care and
custody of the child.An affidavit of consent to the adoption was executed by Gina.

A petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the trial court and thereby
granting the same .The child was then known Angelie Anne Fajardo .In 1987,the adoptive
parents ,herein petitioners ,received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of 150,000.00,otherwise,they would get back their child.Petitioners refused to accede to
the demand.As a result ,Gina took the child and brought to her house.She averred that she had
no desire to give up her child for adoption and the affidavit of consent was not fully explained to
her.

This prompted spouses Cervantes to file a petition for awrit ofHabeas Corpusbefore the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Gina Carreon is entitled to the custody of the child.

Held

No. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under(5) years of age, will not
apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to ruleotherwise.Besides, the minor has been
legally adopted by petitioners with the fullknowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of
adoption has the effect, amongothers, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over
the adopted child,except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of
theadopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercisedjointly by both
spouses.The adopting parents have the right to the care andcustody of the adopted childand
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

7.7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE
C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES vs. GINA CARREON
FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO. G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989.
FACTS:
The minor was born to respondents who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents
offered the child for adoption to petitioners, who took care and custody of the child when she
was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was also
executed by respondent. Appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners over
the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, rendered a decision granting the petition.
Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
Respondent took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence. Petitioners demanded
the return of the child, but respondent refused. She sent word to the petitioners that she will,
however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. Thus,
petitioner filed a petition before the RTC for the release of the child from respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus is proper.
HELD:
YES. The Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig granted the petition. Minor has been
legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of
adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over
the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. Thus, Respondents are ordered to deliver
said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice.
8. EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO V. KAREN SANTOS
FACTS:
Petitioner executed a document declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Geronimo.
Consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names Respondent on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased
Spouses Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the
possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. Petitioner claimed that the birth
certificate of the Respondent was a simulated document as confirmed by an NSO representative.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals held that no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to
respondent on a specific date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the existence of primary evidence of
birth certificate.
HELD:
NO. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name
of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony
of the NSO representative. These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity
attached to the respondent’s birth. With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or
falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Spouses Geronimo, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate

CASES ON TRUSTEES:
1.1. SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE CARPIO IN THE CASE OF IGLESIA
EVANGELICA METODISTA EN LAS ISLAS FILIPINAS V. BISHOP LAZARO ET. AL. GR NO. 184088, JULY
6, 2010
I concur in the result of the majority opinion that IEMELIF, a corporation sole, may be converted
into a corporation aggregate by a mere amendment of its articles of incorporation. However, I
maintain that the amendment can be effected by the corporation sole without the concurrence
of 2/3 of the members of the religious denomination, sect or church that the corporation sole
represents.
First. Sec. 110 provides that a corporation sole administers and manages, as trustee, the affairs,
properties and temporalities of the religious denomination, sect or church.
Second. Sec. 109 allows the application to religious corporations of the general provisions
governing non-stock corporations, insofar as they may be applicable. The lack of specific
provision on amendments of articles of incorporation of a corporation sole calls for the
suppletory application of relevant provisions on non-stock corporations.
Sec. 16 requires the majority vote of the board of trustees and the vote or written assent of at
least 2/3 of the members of a non-stock corporation. Applying this, a corporation sole, as the
lone trustee and member of the corporation, can amend its articles of incorporation.
Once the conversion from corporation sole to corporation aggregate is perfected, the provisions
specifically designed for a corporation sole cease to apply to the corporation aggregate, and the
latter shall be governed by the relevant provisions on nonstock or even stock corporations.
The corporation sole may sell or mortgage real properties held by it in accordance with the
rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, sect or church concerned.
It is only in the absence of such rules that court intervention becomes necessary, and real
properties are sold or mortgaged by obtaining an order from the RTC of the province where the
property is situated.
On the other hand, the sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the properties and
assets of a corporation aggregate shall be governed by Sec. 40 which applies to stock and non-
stock corporations.
Under this section, the sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or disposition of all or
substantially all of the properties and assets of the corporation may generally be done through a
majority vote of its board of trustees, and the vote of at least 2/3 of its members in a members'
meeting duly called for that purpose. Unlike in the case of a corporation sole, a corporation
aggregate may not apply its own rules, regulations and discipline in selling all or substantially all
of its properties, as this process shall be governed by secular principles and rules of law.
2. JOSEPH GOYANKO JR. V. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
FACTS:
The late Goyanko, Sr. invested P2M with Philippine Asia Lending Investors, Inc. family,
represented by the petitioner, and his illegitimate family presented conflicting claims to PALII for
the release of the investment. Pending the investigation of the conflicting claims, PALII deposited
the proceeds of the investment with UCPB under the name "Phil Asia: ITF (In Trust For) The Heirs
of Joseph Goyanko, Sr." (ACCOUNT). The deposit under the ACCOUNT was P1,509,318.76. UCPB
allowed PALII to withdraw P1.5M from the Account, leaving a balance of only P9,318.76. When
UCPB refused the demand to restore the amount withdrawn plus legal interest the petitioner
filed a complaint before the RTC. In its answer to the complaint, UCPB admitted, among others,
the opening of the ACCOUNT under the name "ITF (In Trust For) The Heirs of Joseph Goyanko,
Sr.," (ITF HEIRS) and the withdrawal.
ISSUE:
Whether UCPB should be held liable for the amount withdrawn because a trust agreement
existed between PALII and UCPB, in favor of the HEIRS, when PALII opened the ACCOUNT with
UCPB.
HELD:
NO. SC held that no express trust was created. First, while an ascertainable trust res and
sufficiently certain beneficiaries may exist, a competent trustor and trustee do not. Second,
UCPB, as trustee of the ACCOUNT, was never under any equitable duty to deal with or given any
power of administration over it. On the contrary, it was PALII that undertook the duty to hold the
title to the ACCOUNT for the benefit of the HEIRS. Third, PALII, as the trustor, did not have the
right to the beneficial enjoyment of the ACCOUNT. Finally, the terms by which UCPB is to
administer the ACCOUNT was not shown with reasonable certainty. While we agree with the
petitioner that a trust’s beneficiaries need not be particularly identified for a trust to exist, the
intention to create an express trust must first be firmly established, along with the other
elements laid above; absent these, no express trust exists.
3.Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada V. PILHINO Sales Corp.
Facts:
In 1990,reposdent Pilhino Sales Corp. sued Jose and Maxima Andrada to recover a sum of money
plus interest .Upon Pilhino’s application,the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment which
came to be implemented against a truck owned by Andrada.It rendered a decision against the
spouses .The Sheriff seized the truck and sold I to public auction,with Pilhino as the highest
bidder.However,the truck could not be transferred to the Pilhinos name because it was sold by
Jose Andrada to Moises Andrada,and that Moises mortgaged the truck to BA Finance Corp.
For failure to pay the loan,the Hino truck was seized while it was in the possession of Pilhino and
sold it in public auction with BA Finance as the highest bidder. Pilhino then, instituted an action
with the RTC which rendered a decision case.On appeal ,the CA affirmed with modification that
the sale of the Hino truck by the defendant to appellant is valid.
Hence ,this petition.
Issue:
Whether an appeal by a petition for review is proper in the case.
Held:
An appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine factual issues .In the exercise of
CA’s power to review ,the court is not a trier of facts and does not undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by parties during the trial.The findings of fact by the CA are conclusive
and binding on the court.Rule 45 ,Sec.1 of the Rules of court provides that “ a party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from judgment or final order or the resolution of the court of Appeals,the
Sandiganbayan,the RTC or other courts whenever authorized by law ,file with the Supreme Court
a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.