Professional Documents
Culture Documents
INTERNACIONALES
Curso 2014/2015
Chapter 1: Introduction
The first international organizations emerged during the 19th century and they became
since then more important. Today, international organizations are involved in
innumerable issue areas: some are specialized in specific issue areas and others in
multitude of them (e.g. European Union or United Nations). Some international
organizations have universal membership while others have a restrict membership on the
basis of criteria such as geography, economy, etc. All the kinds of international
organizations are part of contemporary global governance: they contribute to create and
implement norms and rules which guide the cooperative management of transnational and
cross-border problems.
International organizations can play various roles vis-à-vis their member states, leading
to different scholarly conceptions of international organizations. Three separate
conceptions of IOs are particularly striking: their roles as instruments, as arenas and as
actors.
IOs are often seen as instruments with which states pursue their own interests as best as
they can and in which political processes primarily reflect the interests of the most
powerful member states. As an arena, IOs resemble a playinf field more than a tool of
state policy. In this sense, international organizations are permanent institutions of
conference diplomacy in which states may exchange information, condemn or justify
certain actions and coordinate their national political strategies.
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Whereas the image os IOs as an arena emphasizes that the members states are the
principal actors involved, the third image of IOs is based on the premise that states have
either pooled or delegaes their sovereignty so that IOs themselves embody the
characteristics of a corporate actor capable of independent action. Decisions are made in
or through IOs by a collectivity of states, and the crucial point here is that without the
relevant organization decisions would not have been made in the same way. Pooling
sovereignty occurs when decisions are taken by common voting procedures other tan
unanimity; sovereignty is delegated when supranational organs are permitted to take
certain decisions autonomously, without an interveining vote or a member state’s
unilateral veto.
IOs are a specific class os international institutions. There are two types of international
institutions: international regimes and IOs. Both types are international social institutions
characterized by behavioural patterns based on international norms and rules, which
prescribe behavioural roles in recurring situations that lead to a convergence of reciprocal
expectations. However, international regimes and IOs differ in two ways: whereas
international regimes always relate to specific issue areas, IOs can transcend the
boundaries of issue areas; and while IOs can operate like actors, international regimes
don’t posses actor-like qualities.
Finally, when IOs functioning as a corporate actor, they are real actors who are capable
of independent action internally as well as externally, thanks to pooled or delegated
sovereignty.
We must differentiate three relationships between international regimes and IOs which
are ultimately founded on different levels of abstraction:
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Distinctions between international organizations
We must distinguish between international
governmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN or
the EU, which are founded either through an
intergovernmental agreement or a decision of an
existing IGO and have a membership mainly composed
of or dominated by states, usually represented by
governmental agents; and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) -be it not-for-
profit ones such as Amnesty International or for-profit
transnational organizations such as Microsoft- whose
membership is made up of non-governmental actors.
International governmental organizations can be classified based on their:
1. Main function
a. Programme organizations deal primarily with programme formulation and
they can play a priminent role in the stablishment of international regimes.
b. Operational organizations concentrate on implementation, specially the
monitoring of compliance with norms and rules and capacity-building for
implementation.
2. Decision-making authority
a. In strictly intergovernmental organizations such authority is neither
pooled or delegated. These organizations are limited to providing services
intended to facilitate the intergovernmental coordination of national
decision-making units.
b. Supranational organizations are based on a more hierarchical mode of
coordination through centralized decision-making procedures.
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3. Inclusiveness
a. Inclusive, multipartite organizations include both public actors endowing
them with formal membership and varying, but substantial participatory
rights in the decision-making process.
b. Open executive-multilateral organizations allow for non-governmental
actors’ consultative status only.
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El primer tipo de trabajos, explican teóricamente la cooperación al desarrollo e
identifican un conjunto de propósitos implícitos o explícitos de la ayuda internacional.
Encontramos en este bloque de trabajos dos grandes categorías de las motivaciones:
Egoístas
Altruistas
Una gran cantidad de autores han estudiado la cooperación al desarrollo, autores como:
Morgenthau, McKinlay y Little, Ruttan, Lumsdaine, Montúfar, Ayllón, Lancaster, Van
der Veen, Kern y López Canellas (posturas teóricas con respecto al fenómeno de la
cooperación al desarrollo, identificando posturas realistas, liberales-institucionalistas,
constructivistas y marxistas-funcionalistas)
Los factores explicativos identificados por estos autores serían los intereses nacionales de
inspiración realista, reglas e instituciones internacionales de inspiración liberal, y normas
internacionalmente compartidas de inspiración constructivista. También están presentes
en estas explicaciones factores de tipo material, institucional o ideal.
Concluimos afirmando que existe un déficit de trabajos teóricos sobre el fenómeno desde
las RRII, una falta de trabajos empíricos desde las RRII que estudien las causas de por
qué Estados desarrollados o industrializados transfieren recursos a otros Estados en
grados inferiores de desarrollo y, por último, y como consecuencia de los dos puntos
mencionados anteriormente, no existen trabajos que vinculen datos empíricos con
conceptos teóricos de las RRII.
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Realismo clásico: el cual identifica las causas del comportamiento de los Estados
en la naturaleza humana, o el primer nivel de análisis.
Realismo estructural: explica las RRII a partir de fuerzas que se encuentran en
la tercera imagen, o nivel sistémico.
Para ambas versiones del realismo, las relaciones con otros Estados, a través de
su política exterior, se basan en la utilización de diferentes herramientas para
alcanzar los objetivos de aumento de poder o maximización de seguridad.
Algunos de los que autores han llevado cabo explicaciones a través de la visión liberal
son: Doyle, Rathbun, Goldstein y Keohane, Macmillan, Tingey, Thérien y Nöel etc.
o Marxismo
Para los autores de esta tradición, los Estados subdesarrollados están en una condición de
inferioridad y dependencia debido a las características intrínsecas al capitalismo que,
como consecuencia del proceso de acumulación, genera ganadores y perdedores.
La vida económica de las naciones más débiles está penetrada por los intereses de las
naciones poderosas, incluso en aquellas regiones donde la práctica imperialista ha
desaparecido todavía existen relaciones jerárquicas y de imposición de condiciones. Las
relaciones actuales entre el Norte desarrollado y el Sur subdesarrollado pueden ser
entendidas en clave de neo-imperialismo, como la explotación de los países
subdesarrollados por parte de los centrales. La soberanía legal internacional es uno de
los cuatro significados de soberanía.
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El marxismo en RRII acentúa el significado de soberanía westfaliana, el cual es un
acuerdo institucional basado en dos principios: territorialidad y exclusión de actores
externos de las estructuras de autoridad internas. Esta soberanía se viola cuando actores
externos influyen sobre, o determinan, las estructuras de autoridad internas a través de
acciones coercitivas, voluntarias, intervención o invitación.
Para la teoría del sistema-mundo, la ayuda al desarrollo se ubica dentro del nacimiento
de un nuevo sistema inter-estatal: el de la hegemonía de Estados Unidos, marcado por el
nacimiento de la Organización de Naciones Unidas, destinada a imponer restricciones
institucionales en favor del hegemón.
Por último, para la teoría de la dependencia, el poder del centro se manifiesta a través
de las desiguales condiciones de intercambio en el comercio internacional y en la
presencia de multinacionales, las cuales refuerzan la explotación y dependencia de los
países de la periferia
o Constructivismo
Para esta corriente teórica, existen múltiples formas de entender la anarquía del sistema
internacional por parte de los Estados. Así, los actores entienden a la política internacional
como más o menos anárquica de acuerdo con las diferentes áreas o dominios.
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2. Industrial Expansion
The Industrial Revolution was a great stimulus to the creation of international
organizations in the nineteenth century. Interdependencies increased dramatically, thus
standards with respect to transport, communication, social regulation and intellectual
property had to be harmonized internationally to facilitate trade and commerce (the
problem condition). This was clearly recognized (the cognitive condition) and Britain,
the most industrialized state at the time, was willing to sustain common standards (the
hegemonic condition).
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3. Global economic crises
With the expansion of the world market
facilitated by the activities of international
organizations, the demand for international
organizations that protect open markets in
times of economic crises emerged (the
problem condition). This demand had been
recognized as early as in the Great
Depression of the 1870s and the 1880s and
the world economic crisis of the late 1920s
and early 1930s (the cognitive condition).
However, with the declining hegemony of
Britain after the WW1 the structures of a
liberal economic order, characterized by
relatively free trade, collapsed. The world
economic crisis beginning in 1929 destroyed
any hope of the order’s resurrection.
However, only after the WW2 a liberal
economic order was re-established with the
help of US hegemonic leadership (the
hegemonic condition).
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5. Developmental disparities
After the previous decolonization of South America and parts of the Ottoman Empire in
the nineteenth century, a further wave began in the 1940s, 50s and 60s. Despite their
newfound political independence, economic dependencies of decolonized states on their
former colonial powers persisted. The North – especially the West – had an interest in
reducing these disparities with the view to stabilizing the global economic order (the
problem condition). As soon as the west grasped that these disparities could endanger the
world economic order (the cognitive condition), under the leadership of the USA (the
hegemonic condition). It took the initiative in building IOs that could reconcile the South
with the existing economic order. Two types emerged:
1. Financing development
2. Development and trade
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6. Environmental degradation
Most of the actual environmental problems (nuclear power plants, the diminishing ozone
layer and global warming) transcend national borders and can therefore not be resolved
by one state alone. In order to mitigate these cross-border problems, the international
community of states must act collectively (the problem condition). The resulting demand
for international organizations led to the creation mainly in issue areas in which public
awareness was bolstered by non-governmental environmental organizations (the
cognitive condition), with hegemonic leadership provided by the USA (the hegemonic
condition).
CONCLUSION
The general trend of an increasing role for IOs from 1815 to 1914 can easily be explained
by the three conditions – the problem, cognitive and hegemonic conditions.
The sustained growth of international organizations was only interrupted in the late
1980s. Since 1985, the number of intergovernmental organizations has declined. This
might have been due to the end of the East-West conflict and the decline in the hegemony
of the USA.
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Chapter 4: International Organizations as Political Systems
The composition and competencies of international organizations have a significant
influence on policy-making.
Founding treaties normally outline the organization’s mission, establish its various organs
and determinate the allocation of competencies between them. They thus act as a sort of
“constitution”. As for their precision and ambition, they vary considerably. For example,
the EU treaties are very detailed and ambitious. Besides general statements about the
organization’s mission and structure they also contain both policy programmes and
clauses authorizing the formulation of further policy programmes.
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The institutional structure of international organizations
The institutional structure of international organizations generally provides for the
creation of the following organs:
1. A plenary organ representing all state members.
2. An executive council or board to manage and supervise day-to-day business,
ususally consisting of elected state members.
3. An administrative staff led by a secretary-general, adirector.general or a
commission responsible for policy advice and implementation as well as
administrative tasks.
4. A court-like body or a court of binding arbitration in cases of disputes among
members, between the administrative body and another organ or member.
5. A parliamentary assembly of directly elected representatives of the member
states‘ electorate or of delegates from national parliaments that debates, reviews
and, in certain cases, approves of the organization’s policies.
6. An organ representing civil society organizations and/or other private actors
or sub-national, regional or local administrative bodies.
Plenary organs
The plenary organs of intergovernmental organizations are based on the principle of
member states‘ sovereignty as well as being at the same time an institutionak expression
of their sovereignty. Thus all states have their own representatives, acting according to
their governments´ instructions. Despite the emergence of inclusive, multipartite
organizations in which state and non-state actors hold membership rights, in most plenary
organs it is still only governments that are represented. The plenary organs are frequently
at teh centre of international organizations‘ decision-making.
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The policy-making procedures in plenary organs vary considerably. This variation can
concern both the number of votes required for reaching a decision and the weighting given
to the votes of different members. The closer procedure in the plenary organ is to the
principle of unanimity, the more arduous time-consuming it is to reach decisions. Any
member failing to implement a unanimous decision would in effect act against its own
vote. Infringing a previously accepted decision can also lead to a loss of credibility and
reputation. Therefore compliance with these decisions tends to prevail even if short-term
interests may provide incentives for non.compliance.
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The effects of decision-making procedures within plenary organs based on the majority
principle are reversed: there is a better chance of reaching decisions, but it is less likely
that states will comply with these decisions. In order to improve the probability that
decisions can be made and implemented, many Ios adopt the practice of deciding by a
qualified majority.
Another procedure helping to strike the right balance between the probability of reaching
a decision and the likehood of compliance is a consensus procedure.
The weighting of votes is another way to reconcile smooth decision-making with a high
level of compliance. By giving powerful states more voting power than small states,
majority voting can be introduced while, at the same time, reducing the risk that powerful
states will simply disregard decisions made by a majority of smaller states or their
economic power. However, weighting of votes may raise serious issues of legitimacy
undermining weaker states‘ support to the organization and putting a strain on
intraorganizational relationships.
The plenary organ of the UN is the General Assembly and all member states are
represented there, with one vote each.
The plenary organ of the EU is the Council of the EU, consisting of member states‘
ministers.
When reviewing plenary organs we also need to mention the Broad of Governors of the
IMF and the World Bank. Their decisions are based upon weighted voting and are taken
with a qualified majority. This weighted voting right gives the countries with the largest
number of shares, that is, the Western industrialized nations, a decisive influence in the
decision-making organs of the two organizations.
Executive councils
Executive councils of Ios meet more frequently than the plenary organs, indeed, some
meet in permanent session. Their main task is to supervise tha administrative body of the
organization and to take on the implementation of policy programmes decided by the
plenary organ. Executive councils are always smaller than plenatry organs. In executive-
multilateral organizations, executive councils are composed of member states‘
representatives, often elected by the plenary organ of the organization. In inclusive,
multipartite organizations, the executive council is formed by representatives of state and
non-state (civil society and business) constituencies. Moreover, some executive councils
have a mixture os permanent and non-permanent members.
The division of competencies between the plenary organ and the executive council is of
major importance for the decision-making process of IOs. While it is easier to reach
decisions in the executive council because the number of participants is limited, precisely
because of such limited numbers compliance with these decisions by all members of the
organization is more difficult to achieve. The effects of keeping the major decision-
making competencies within the plenary organ are the reverse: decisions may be easier
to implement, but reaching them is often much more arduous.
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The system of governing bodies and executive councils in the UN system is special
insofar as it follows a functional differentiation. Among the UN principal organs, the
Security Council is responsible for all questions pertaining to international peace and
security, while ECOSOC deals with economic, social and cultural problems of
international politics.
The UN Security Council, by contrast, has far-reaching, competencies. It can pass legally
binding resolutions, including resolutions about military and non-military sanctions.
Due to their limited membership, most regional organizations, in contrast to global
organizations, can do without executive councils. For example, the Council of Europe
does not have an executive council beside its plenary organ, the Committee of Ministes.
However, the EU is an exception.
Administrative staff
An administration is a necessary part of the institutional structure of any international
organizations. Since the administrative staff gives expression to the supranational element
in Ios, it is frequently mistaken for the IOs as a whole. Unlike the members of
interngovernmental organ, the members of the administrative staff are not representatives
of member states‘ governments and are therefore independent of instructions from the
governments of their countries of origin. Initially, the administrative staff only provided
technical services in the preparation for meetings of the plenary organs or executive
councils. However, nowadays, with more and more organizations becoming more
supranational, it frequently exerts an independent influence on policy-making in IOs.
The UN Secretariat’s members are chosen on the basis of ability and suitability as well
as political-geographical distribution. UN personnel constitute an international civil
service and are not allowed to follow instructions from the governments of their countries
of origin or other member states.
The administrative staff of the EU, called the European Commission, has extraordinaryly
wide competencies. Within the EU, the European Commission is the only body that can
submit draft proposals for legislative acts to the Council. The Council is thus dependent
on proposals from the Commission for its law-making activities. Therefore, the
Commission is the engine of law-making in the EU and has, independetly of the Council,
far-reaching law-making competencies.
Courts of justice
Some IOs have courts of justice or court-like bodies as part of their institutional structure.
Their task is to decide on disputes between the members of the organziation, between the
organization and its members, or, in special circumstances, between organs of the
organziation. In some IOs these bodies function as supranational courts in which
independent judges exercise compulsory jurisdiction. In some organziations these bodies
can hardly be regarded as being supranational; the cannot exercise compulsory
jurisdiction and the judges are politically dependent state representatives. Usually these
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bodies are meant to support intergovernmental efforts at dispute settlement through
political compromise rather than to adjudicate disputes supranationally.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hagueis the relevant body for the UN and
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) settles disputes for the EU. The ICJ’s capacity to
decide in cases of a legal dispute between states is rather limited, because the court does
not have compulsory jurisdiction. Thus, before the court can deal with a dispute the
disputant states must accept the court’s authority to decide. The ECJ, by contrast, can
exercise compulsory jurisdiction. The states submit to its jurisdiction as a result of their
membership of the EU.
Parliamentary assemblies
Although most intergovernmental organizations like the UN do not have parliamentary
assemblies, some organizations, such as the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE,
do have them. Their task is to provide legitimacy for the intergovernmental organization’s
decision-making process. However, the competencies of, as well as the representation in,
these assemblies vary considerably. Since 1979 the members of the European Parliament
have been elected directly; the members of the parliamentary assemblies of the Council
of Europe and the OSCE are delegated by member states‘ national parliaments. The EP
has generally accrued major rights but the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of
Europe and the OSCE play only a minor role.
Only since the 1990s has the EP become a supranational institution. Until then its law-
making authority hardly went beyond a consultative role. The members of the EP could
submit their opinions but the Council was free to ignore them. With the cooperation
procedure introduced by the European Single Act of 1987, the Parliament’s opinions have
influenced the legislative process in the Council to the extent that in a second reading the
Council could only ignore them by rejecting them unanimously. However, the EP has
possessed veto power only since the introduction of the co-decision procedure.
Conclusion
The policy-making of IOs is affected by their constitutional and institutional structures.
IOs are normally established by founding treaties, which are based on the international
law of treaties. These founding treaties or “constitutions” shape policy-making by
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outlining the organization’s mission, establishing its organs and determining the
allocation of competencies between them. Furthermore, the constitutional structure of IOs
is not fixed but subject to formal and informal change.
We focus on who produces inputs, which actors can make specific demands, based on the
resources at their disposal. We also examine which actors provide the necessary support
for IOs. To do so we distinguish five groups of actors:
In most IOs the size of national contributions reflects the “ability to pay” based on the
wealth of each of the respective countries.
It goes without saying that states try to convert their financial contributions into a source
of influence. On the other hand, when major contributors turn their backs on IOs, these
organizations get into major financial trouble.
Although states adjust their support according to whether, in return, their demands are
met, withdrawing from an IO or holding back financial contributions is not how states
usually behave. Normally, states make their demands through their delegations or
permanent representatives to the organization. In most cases such demands are voiced in
the plenary organ, since that is where the member states’ representatives have the right to
vote. This holds especially for far-reaching demands.
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The probability of success is, notwithstanding formal state equality, certainly not equal;
albeit not exclusively, on the power position of a state and its control over relevant
resources. This power can take two forms: control over specific resources in an issue areas
(issue-area power) or control over issue-transcending resources (overall power).
The power a state can exert in a given are often depends on its control over resources
specific to that issue area.
However, major states such as China or the USA control important resources in many
issue areas and thus can often use strengths acquired in some areas to exert influence in
those areas in which they lack the relevant power resources.
Despite the influence of powerful states it is a debatable question whether the decision-
making process in IOs exacerbates or reduces power-based differences in influence.
Generally, notwithstanding important exceptions, the differences are more often than not
lessened because IOs offer smaller or weaker states additional opportunities of
influencing decisions in their favour. Weaker states have voting rights in the
organization’s decision –making organs, often on a par with more powerful states.
However, this is only of relevance for them as long as the more powerful states maintain
an interest in collective decision-making within an IO. Smaller and weaker states can
bring their concerns into play when concluding package deals. They agree to certain
policies promoted by the powerful states dependent on recognition of their concerns in
adjoining issue areas.
Moreover, policy-making in IOs gives small states the opportunity of strengthening their
influence by forming coalitions or aligning themselves with an existing coalition led by
a powerful state.
Administrative staff
While most inputs into IOs derive from representatives of member states, the various
organs of IOs themselves, especially the administrative staff, can exert considerable
influence on the input side of policy-making as well.
The influence of IOs’s administrative staff stems mainly from their location at the centre
of the policy-making process. As a result, administrative staff have an information
advantage over member states. The information often comes from studies, reports and
proposals that the administrative staff are asked to prepare, or which they themselves
initiate, in order to forms the basis for policy-making within the organization. In addition,
their central position lends an administration’s leadership a remarkable influence as an
agenda-setter. Where member states’ interests are not clear, the administrative staff’s
influence on policy-making can grow very rapidly to the point where it is not only playing
the role of agenda-setter but also that of policy entrepreneur.
The initiatives, that is, the demands of the administrative staff of IOs, are for the most
part addressed to the member states of the organization or the plenary organ in which they
take decisions. Thus the agenda-setting phase of the policy-making process can be
described as the interplay of initiatives between the member states and the administrative
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staff. While the administrative staff represents, apart from its bureaucratic self-interest,
the collective interest of the organization’s members, each member state mainly looks
after its individual interest. The initiatives of IOs‘ administrative staff will mostly be
directed towards strengthening the authority of the organization, while those of member
states are of various kinds. Some support the strengthening of the organization’s
authority, whereas other states, usually the more powerful ones, try to maintain their
sovereignty.
Parliamentary assemblies
Although generally less effective than representatives of member states’ governments and
the administrative staff, parliamentary assemblies can also formulate demands for or lend
some support to the policy-making processes within IOs. Their most important support is
to increase the legitimacy of the organizations’ policy-making. In fact, parliamentary
assemblies are created in order to reduce the so-called democratic deficit in policy-
making, which is seen as a consequence of policy-making being dominated by
government representatives. Sometimes governments use their privileged position in IOs
to insulate themselves from national parliaments. Not only are policy-making procedures
more complex and less transparent internationally, but often national parliaments are
unable to provide democratic legitimacy internationally to the same degree as in domestic
policy-making. To compensate for this, international parliamentary assemblies were
created to provide additional legitimacy.
While it is not always obvious that parliamentary assemblies are actually able to provide
additional legitimacy, the perception that they do so makes it hard for the member states
and administrative staff of IOs to ignore their demands.
Interest groups
Interest groups, such as civil-society actors and private businesses, are also a source of
inputs in the form of both demands and support. They can use either formal or informal
channels, depending on the institutional structure and the inclusiveness of the IO. There
is a mutual benefit because non-governmental actors frequently have an interest in getting
access to policy-making processes, but likewise IOs also need access to the information,
expertise and legitimacy of non-governmental actors. In inclusive, non-governmental
actors are allowed to participate in the decision-making process of the organization with
a vote. In the more frequent cases of open executive-multilateral organizations, non-
governmental actors do not have a right to vote but can, more or less effectively, take part
in policy deliberations. Two channels of input can be distinguished: non-governmental
actors can act through an institutionalized procedure, which gives them the opportunity
to raise their concerns; and NGOs can act through their own representative organs within
institutional structure of an IO.
Of course, the expression of mutual interest does not always take the form of formal input
channels. In many IOs informal input channels are at least as important as, or
complement, formal input channels. Interest groups settle where the decision-making
authority concerning them is the greatest.
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Non-governmental actors’ influence on policy-making relies on the various material and
immaterial resources, such as providing information, expertise and legitimacy, which
they offer and which are essential for IOS’ goal-achievement. In addition, interest groups
can gain influence by mobilizing public opinion in favour of their own concerns.
Communities of experts
Some inputs into the political system of IOs come from experts giving advice on policy-
making. As the policies of IOs have to respond to increasingly complex problems, the
knowledge resources and advice of experts have a growing importance for their policy-
making. Therefore, the administrative staff often have an interest in bringing experts into
the policy-making processes, while the experts themselves have an interest in being
incorporated because this gives them influence on policy-making within the organization.
Experts’ influence depends, inter alia, on whether they agree or disagree on the advice
that should be given for policy-making within the organization. Moreover, member states
can point to the disagreement among experts in order to justify why their advice does not
have to be taken seriously. And member states with conflicting interests can justify their
positions by relying on those experts whose advice is most in line with their own interests,
which then can easily lead to an impasse in the policy-making process.
Conclusion
The polity provides the framework for the policy-making process, but the politics of IOs
remains the domain actors.
Chapter 6:
Chapter 7: What International Organizations Produce: the Output
Dimension
Policy programmes
Policy programmes are sets of norms and rules aimed at directing the behaviour of social
actors. While they usually set normative standards for the behaviour of their members,
they can also touch upon the interaction between the members and the IO itself.
Sometimes IOs also formulate norms and rules that directly address non-state actors that
are not members of the international organization.
Policy programmes are the result of programme decisions of IOs.
They can be differentiated according to:
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Effects (of the norms and rules)
International examples: not very common on IOs. One rare example is the
allocation of satellite space on the geostationary orbit of the Equator in the
framework of the ITU.
Binding nature
The degree of legal obligation does not necessarily correlate with the level of member
states’ compliance. Nonetheless, it certainly remains an important characteristic of the
programmes, whether they contain legally binding obligations or are simply political
recommendations. It is not unusual to find within one and the same IO the coexistence of
both legally binding and non-binding programmes.
- The EU is one of the few IO that have the authority to make programmes directly
binding not only on member states but also on private actors within member states.
In particular, in matters pertaining to the internal market the EU has for long used
regulations as well as directives for its programme activities. However, most
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policy programmes on issues dealing with foreign and security policy of the EU
are still political recommendations.
- The UN has many programmes with no legally binding effect. With the exception
of decisions on budgetary questions or the UN’s internal organization, resolutions,
as well as declarations of the General Assembly, merely have the character of
recommendations.
Based on the distinctions from above, we can further elaborate on which programmes are
generally made according to which decision-making model. Again, we should emphasize
that these propositions represent statements about probabilities rather than empirical laws.
Operational activities
Apart from policy programmes, a large part of the output of the work of international
organizations takes an operational form. Operational activities of IO are the result of
operational decisions, which relate to the implementation of policy programmes. We can
differentiate five types:
1. Specifications
The norms and rules of policy programmes generally require further specification in order
to implement them. Member states’ authorities often make this specification. Member
states’ parliaments, governments or bureaucracies select the means and measures to fulfill
the commitments laid down in IOs’ policy programmes. Yet in numerous international
organizations such as the EU, IMF, World Bank and UN, the specification of programmes
has become the responsibility of the organizations themselves. (Pg 124 detailed
explanation on each particular IO)
2. Implementation
Through the specification of programmes IOs not only help states to implement norms
and rules, but sometimes implement them directly themselves. In general, however, this
possibility is limited and the implementation of internationally agreed programmes
24
remains the prerogative of member states’ authorities, their parliaments, governments and
bureaucracies. Thus, the standards for the quality of drinking water are set, for all member
states, by the EU, but the measures necessary for their implementations, (water-
purification plants), are taken by the relevant authorities within EU member states.
3. Monitoring
Since implementation of norms and rules is still mostly undertaken by member states
rather than by the IOs itself or its agents, monitoring is required. Without monitoring,
member states might feel tempted to disregard the policy programmes of International
Organizations, because they would expect this would go unnoticed or that other states
could disregard these programmes without being caught. In order to mitigate this
temptation, many IOs were given the task of monitoring member states’ compliance with
agreed policy programmes.
A good example is the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors member
states’ compliance with the NPT of 1968. Its safeguard system is meant to ensure that
states abstain from diverting nuclear material from civilian to military uses. However,
their far-reaching monitoring activities are an exception; even the European
Commission’s abilities to monitor member states’ compliance with EU norms and rules
are limited.
Again, IOs cannot only pursue monitoring on their own. They also lend support to, and
draw on, the contributions of non-state actors to the monitoring of compliance with
international norms and rules. This is particularly salient in the issue area of human rights
protection.
4. Adjudication
Monitoring alone cannot reliably guarantee the compliance of member states. A serious
source of non-compliance is that, in doubtful cases, the member states concerned can
often claim that they are in compliance while other member states may accuse them of
violating the organization’s programmes. If no third party is allowed to adjudicate such
disputes and provide authoritative interpretations of the relevant policy programmes, the
door is wide open to violations of the organization’s policy prgramme. For this reason
many international organizations are given the task of adjudicating disputes about
member states’ compliance. They can thereby contribute to an unbiased interpretation of
their policy programmes.
25
In the UN, the International Court of Justice is generally responsible for the adjudication
of disputes about member states’ compliance. Its competencies are, however, very limited
since it can only become involved if the disputing states accept its jurisdiction. (pg 128
more examples)
5. Sanctions
Adjudication by IOs may help to bring about member states’ compliance with the norms
and rules of their policy programmes. If, however, a member state is not prepared to abide
by the ruling handed down by a court or a court-like body, sanctions may be needed. In
fact, IOs can sometimes help efforts to employ sanctions against states that continuously
disregard their international commitments. Nevertheless, IOs should in most cases not be
regarded as central authorities entrusted with the capacities to employ sanctions against
states violating their policy programmes. Rather, they serve as agents that help to
coordinate member states’ efforts to impose sanctions against cheats.
Some IOs can go beyond mere moral sanctions; they can exclude member states that
continuously violate their obligations, suspend certain rights enjoyed by the state
concerned through its membership of the organization, develop embargos or impose
military enforcement measures.
(Pg 130 shows the different types of sanctions in relation to each particular IO)
Based on the distinction between various operational activities (the five above), we are
now in a better position to specify which operational decisions are typically taken
according to which decision-making model. Usually:
Information activities
An impressive part of the output of IOs takes the form of information activities. These
activities are specific insofar as they have an impact on both programme decisions and
operational decisions. Both types need information as a basis for decision-making.
Through their information activities, international organizations ensure that decisions, be
they programme or operational, are taken as correctly as possible and, if necessary, are
corrected as fast as possible. They can do so by:
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reports, so that beyond the organization itself the wider public can gain access to the
information as well. These reports and surveys from IOs not only influence their own
decision markers, but also state and non-state actors as well as a wider public in most
member states.
- Exchanging information
IOs also act as a ‘market’ for the exchange of information and knowledge about the
subjects with which the organization is concerned. Hence in international
organizations member states get to know the perceptions and positions of other states.
Today this exchange is not restricted to state actors, but increasingly includes non-
state actors, especially NGO’s buy also business actors. Example: Friends of Nature,
World Wide Fund for Nature, provide important information and knowledge for IOs
dealing with environmental issues.
Conclusion
The output of IOs is potentially a crucial component of contemporary global governance.
IOs are involved in both the establishment of norms and rules and in their application.
They perform actions which might make it easier for states and non-state actors to
regulate their social relations in predictable manner.
Chapter 9:
Chapter 10: The Environment
Each state is ultimately interested in the environmental protection of its own territory at the
lowest economic cost. Thus, in international politics, each state is tempted to pass the economic
costs of environmental protection on to other states while benefiting from their efforts in
protecting the environment. However, if all followed this strategy of free-riding, not a single
state would benefit.
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Evaluation of the organizations’ effectiveness: The global ozone regime supported by UNEP,
Greenpeace the WMO, a transnational epistemic community of atmospheric scientists and
environmental INGOs is widely considered a success story and one of the most effective
international environmental regimes. They have managed to create and implement
international norms and rules to stop the depletion of the ozone layer.
The global decrease in the production and consumption of CFCs has continued to a point where
production has virtually ceased and consumption has become marginal.
For states, climate change poses a dilemma similar to the one encountered in combating ozone
depletion. However, international organizations have not been nearly as successful in climate
protection as they have been in dealing with the ozone problem.
Evaluation of the organizations’ effectiveness: UNEP, and the WMO, in conjunction with
environmental INGOs, promoted a relatively early scientific recognition of the climate-change
problem and contributed to the rapid formation of a consensus among scholars and experts on
which international climate policy could be based. They also furthered reaching an agreement
on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions in the Kyoto Protocol.
Resumption by the USA as well as acceptance by emerging economies such as China or India of
a constructive role in global climate policy-making seem a necessary prerequisite for
improvement + dejar de utilizar el método de compra de bonos ecológicos, que Bustos explicó
en clase.
The necessity of securing human rights internationally became apparent in the light of the
crimes against humanity, particularly those committed by Germany during the Second World
28
War. Nevertheless, it was only with the support of powerful states that a policy of international
human rights protection became possible.
However, although the practices of countries that have ratified human rights treaties are
generally better than those of countries that have not, non-compliance with treaty obligations
is still common.
Naming and shaming of human rights violations is still the most common instrument of
promoting international and transnational human rights enforcement. However, by no means it
guarantees sustained norm compliance in political practice; its impact on the actual day-to-day
human rights situation within countries is often limited quantitatively.
The hardest sanction available to the UN is military intervention. However, multilateral military
interventions to protect citizens from their government are thus far from being a reliable
bulwark against the worst human rights atrocities.
In Western Europe during post- Second World War period there were three conditions that
made international cooperation in the field of human rights feasible: the common experience of
Fascist and Nazi terror, the rejection of the Communist system and a high degree of consensus
on fundamental values. In the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, Eastern European
societies were confronted with similar conditions. These conditions were conducive to the
adherence of the states from the former Eastern bloc to the human tights agreement of the
Western European states. We shall focus on how the Council of Europe contributed to sustaining
international human rights cooperation in Europe.
Evaluation of the organization’s effectiveness: The strong standing of the European Court of
Human Rights gives European human rights norms considerable impact.
However, the overall effectiveness of the Court is constrained by the fact that the
implementation of Court rulings within member states can be quite lengthy. Moreover, the
Court has, to an extent, become victim of its own success. Its caseload has virtually exploded,
receiving more than 50,000 petitions a year now, compared to a meagre 4000 in 1988.
Conclusion: in the end, the advanced system of human rights protection in Europe is only
effective because it reflects a high degree of consensus of values among European societies and
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states. If this consensus is not present, as was the case during the Cold War, or if there are
normative differences about some aspects of the legitimate exercise of state authority,
(example: Russia) the Council of Europe and its organs quickly reach the limits of their
effectiveness. This also explains the even greater limits to the impact that international
organizations on the global level have on the human rights policies of their member states.
Nonetheless, both regional and global organisations play a key role in enhancing in coalitions
with national and transnational NGOs, the recognition and implementation of international
human rights. Without the relevant international organizations, international cooperation and
governance in the issue area of human rights would hardly be feasible.
Los Estados pronto fueron conscientes de que muchos de sus problemas no podían ser ya
resueltos en el marco estrictamente nacional, y que su solución pasaba necesariamente
por la cooperación entre ellos. Efectivamente, al trascender las fronteras, exigían una
acción concertada de los Estados, para lo que la técnica tradicional del acuerdo bilateral
resultaba insuficiente. A lo que se unía, además, el hecho de que en la vida internacional
se estaban afirmando progresivamente una serie de intereses colectivos frente a
problemas mundiales como la paz, el desarrollo o el medio ambiente.
30
independientes dotados de voluntad propia destinados a alcanzar unos objetivos
colectivos. Surgen así en la escena internacional las primeras OIs.
Las OIs se han ido afirmando durante el siglo XX. Su multiplicación y el incremento de
sus competencias ha propiciado la aparición de un Derecho institucional cuya lógica
postula un cierto grado de subordinación del Estado a los organismos creados. Conviene
advertir además que las OIs tienden, cualquiera que sea su grado de integración, a crear
estructuras de poder por encima o al lado de los Estados.
Las OIs poseen una competencia general comparable a la de un Estado. El Orden jurídico
internacional va dejando así de ser única y exclusivamente un derecho de coordinación,
para incorporar, merced en buena parte a la actividad de las OIs. Al tiempo que la
presencia de las Organizaciones en la vida internacional está favoreciendo la
humanización, socialización y democratización de la misma.
Esta incidencia se ha manifestado en una pluralidad de planos:
1) Las OIs han servido de foros donde han germinado nuevos valores, como el del
respecto de los derechos humanos, el de la descolonización, el de la protección
del medio ambiente…
2) Las OIs han favorecido la incorporación de nuevos actores en la escena
internacional, como los individuos, a los que reconoce ciertos derechos y la
posibilidad de hacerlos jurídicamente valer.
3) La actividad de las OIs al desarrollarse, frecuentemente a través de debates
públicos, han acercado la acción internacional a los particulares.
4) La creación de una densa red de relaciones en y en torno a las OIs, al favorecer la
permanencia y la institucionalización de las negociaciones internacionales y
posibilitar la adopción de decisiones por mayoría, ha influido considerablemente
en la formas de elaboración de las normas internacionales.
5) El establecimiento de OIs ha favorecido el desarrollo de procedimientos de
control de la aplicación de las normas internacionales, así como la definición de
regímenes de sanciones internacionales organizadas.
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1. Las Conferencias internacionales traen consigo el desarrollo de una diplomacia
parlamentaria y la utilización de un nuevo instrumento jurídico: el tratado
multilateral (cuyo primer ejemplo es el Acta final del Congreso de Viena en 1815).
Las grandes potencias comenzaron a reunirse con cierta periodicidad en el seno
de Conferencias internacionales, adoptando acciones concertadas destinadas a
diseñar primeramente un nuevo orden europeo y más tarde solucionar los
problemas referentes a los territorios no europeos surgidos de la expansión
colonial. A finales del siglo XIX las Conferencias internacionales empiezan a
desbordar el continente europeo, lo que se inicia en las Conferencias
internacionales de Paz de La Haya de 1899 y sobre todo de 1907, que se van a
constituir en un importante punto de referencia en la evolución de las OIs, pues
marcan una clara tendencia hacia la periodicidad y hacia la universalización, al
tiempo que diseñan las primeras instituciones jurisdiccionales internacionales (Ej.
El Tribunal Permanente de Arbitraje).
Estas conferencias internacionales prefiguran las OIs, pero aun no constituyen
Organizaciones dado que carecen de órganos propios permanentes dotados de
competencias particulares. De lo que se deduce que el segundo elemento que ha
posibilitado el nacimiento de las OIs es el establecimiento de estructuras
institucionales permanentes.
2. Las Uniones administrativas internacionales están destinadas a canalizar de
manera permanente e institucionalizada la acción concertada de sus Estados
miembros en sectores técnicos específicos, tales como las telecomunicaciones o
la industria.
Estos son ejemplos de una primera generación de OIs, caracterizada como “coordinación
económica y técnica”. Estas OIs introducen un elemento de institucionalidad y
permanencia representado por una oficina o secretaría, que constituyen las primeras
manifestaciones de la función pública internacional.
La conjunción de los dos procesos a los que nos venimos refiriendo (cooperación
multilateral y creación de estructuras orgánicas) que posibilita la transición de la técnica
de la conferencia internacional a la de OI, va a verse consolidada por la creación,
auspiciada por las potencias aliadas vencedoras de la Primera Guerra Mundial, de la
Sociedad de Naciones (SdN), ya que constituye el primer ejemplo de una OI de vocación
universal y competencia general. La SdN, desde l perspectiva de la institucionalización
de la cooperación internacional, representa un importante paso adelante puesto que va a
proporcionar un modelo institucional que más tarde inspiraría a otras OIs, y va a
establecer un cuerpo de funcionarios internacionales independientes de sus gobiernos a
partir del cual la función pública internacional va a desarrollarse de manera decisiva; con
ella se inicia la segunda generación de OIs, caracterizada como de “cooperación
económica y política”.
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junto a los delegados de los gobiernos van a participar también representantes de los
trabajadores y de los empresarios.
Por otra parte, la propia SdN va a impulsar la creación de nuevas OIs técnicas y
económicas al tiempo que se crea el Tribunal Permanente de Justicia Internacional que
empieza a funcionar a partir de 1922 en La Haya.
A partir de la Segunda Guerra Mundial las OIs van a conocer una espectacular
proliferación, propulsada por dos fenómenos: el de la revitalización de los Organismos
técnicos a escala universal, y el de la institucionalización del regionalismo internacional
a través de la creación de OIs regionales.
Una serie de factores explican la eclosión del segundo de los fenómenos mencionados:
las Organizaciones internacionales regionales. El primero obedece al fracaso del sistema
de seguridad colectiva establecida en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, provocando la
aparición de muchas organizaciones. El segundo fue de orden político tendiendo a
organizar la cooperación a escala de un continente. Un tercero fue de naturaleza
económica y comercial, favorecido por los ensayos de integración regional y por la ola
de descolonización que conoció el planeta a partir de los años 60’.
Podemos definir las OIs como unas asociaciones voluntarias de Estados establecidas por
acuerdo internacional, dotadas de órganos permanentes, propios e independientes,
encargados de gestionar unos intereses colectivos y capaces de expresar una voluntad
jurídicamente distinta de la de sus miembros.
Las OIs están constituidas casi exclusivamente por Estados soberanos, lo que permite
distinguirlas de otras entidades internacionales, como las Confederaciones de Estado o
los Estados federales. Pero también nos encontramos con supuestos de Organizaciones
que permiten la participación en las mismas a otras OIs, incluso como miembros de pleno
derecho.
Las OIs son sujetos de derecho derivados o secundarios, es decir, deben su existencia a
un acto jurídico previo y exterior a la Organización. Lo usual es que este acto jurídico
33
creador adopte la forma de un tratado multilateral negociado en el marco de una
conferencia intergubernamental, por lo que estará sujeto a las normas propias del Derecho
por los tratados; aunque posee una naturaleza particular que lo diferencia de los tratados
multilaterales ordinarios. Se trata, en fin, de un acto jurídico que posee un carácter, a la
vez, convencional e institucional.
En segundo lugar, el criterio diferenciador esencial entre las OIs- cuya base jurídica es un
acuerdo internacional –y las Organizaciones internacionales no gubernamentales (ONG)
en las que la base jurídica está constituida por un acto de derecho interno. Las ONG están
constituidas por asociaciones, fundaciones e instituciones privadas, fruto de la iniciativa
privada o mixta con exclusión de todo acuerdo intergubernamental, constituidas de
manera duradera, espontánea y libre por personas privadas o públicas, físicas o jurídicas
de diferentes nacionalidades que, expresando una solidaridad transnacional, persiguen sin
espíritu de lucro un objetivo de interés internacional y han sido creadas de conformidad
con el derecho interno de un Estado.
Por otra parte, al desplegarse la actividad de las ONG en la vida internacional provoca el
que sus intereses puedan verse afectados por la acción de las OIs, y viceversa.
Estos órganos que son distintos e independientes de los que poseen los Estados miembros,
están encargados de gestionar los intereses colectivos, para los que se les dotará de los
medios necesarios. Se puede observar la existencia de estructuras de base similares
34
apoyadas en un esquema tripartito: una asamblea plenaria en la que participen todos los
Estados miembros, una institución de composición restringida que asegura el gobierno de
la Organización y un secretariado encargado de la administración. Los dos primeros
órganos suelen estar formados por representantes de los gobiernos mientras que el tercero
está integrado por funcionarios internacionales.
D) Autonomía jurídica
Las OIs se caracterizan por poseer una personalidad jurídica distinta de la de sus Estados
miembros necesaria para el cumplimiento de los fines para las que fueron creadas. Las
OIs, aunque su acción se ve influida por la presencia en su seno de sus Estados miembros,
son capaces de elaborar y manifestar una voluntad autónoma en los ámbitos en los que
gozan de competencias; de manera que, cualquiera que sea el órgano que adopte la
decisión, ésta se imputará a la Organización y no a sus Estados miembros individual o
colectivamente considerados.
Se reconoce, pues, a las OIs la capacidad de ser titulares de derecho y obligaciones, tanto
en la relaciones con otros sujetos internacionales, como con ocasión del ejercicio de sus
funciones en el territorio de algún Estado.
Los criterios para clasificar las OIs son: sus fines, su composición y sus competencias.
Las OIs son creadas bajo la presión de unas necesidades y para la consecución de unos
fines. Estos fines, que aparecen descritos en sus instrumentos constitutivos, permiten
distinguir entre aquellas Organizaciones que persiguen unos fines generales, y aquellas
otras que se proponen unos fines específicos.
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o Organizaciones de cooperación preferentemente militar o de seguridad:
este tipo de Organizaciones que proliferaron al acabar la Segunda Guerra
Mundial y durante la Guerra Fría, se proponen unos fines de defensa y
ayuda mutua en caso de agresión (Ej. OTAN).
o Organizaciones de cooperación preferentemente económica: se trata de la
categoría de Organizaciones más numerosas en el momento presente (Ej.
FMI).
o Organizaciones de cooperación social, cultural y humanitaria: su
finalidad es la protección del individuo o de las colectividades en diversos
aspectos (Ej. OIT).
o Organizaciones de cooperación técnica y científica: el progreso de la
ciencia y la tecnología, los avances en las comunicaciones internacionales
han motivado la creación de numerosas Organizaciones destinadas a
canalizar la cooperación de los Estados.
La forma en que está compuesta una OI es un criterio diferenciador que permite distinguir
entre Organizaciones que tienen una vocación universal puesto que están abiertas a la
participación potencial de todos los Estados, y las Organizaciones que tienen un carácter
restringido al estar la participación en las mismas reservado a un número limitado de
Estados que reúnan determinadas condiciones preestablecidas de naturaleza geográfica,
económica, política, etc.
De este modo, frente a unas OIs de vocación universal constituidas para satisfacer unos
fines susceptibles de interesar a la totalidad de los Estados, surgen otras Organizaciones
a las que tradicionalmente se las califica de regionales, que van a responder a unas
solidaridades restringidas sentidas en el interior de un grupo limitado de Estados, que
definen sus intereses comunes no solamente por la convergencia de sus aspiraciones y
objetivos, sino también por oposición a las aspiraciones y objetivos de todos los Estados
exteriores al grupo.
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los procesos de institucionalización de la cooperación más avanzados que conoce
la Sociedad internacional. Ambos datos reflejan la vitalidad y dinamismo del
regionalismo en la vida internacional contemporánea.
Las Organizaciones regionales a pesar de su diversidad ofrecen ciertos rasgos
comunes:
o En comparación con las Organizaciones universales, e
independientemente de la vecindad geográfica de sus Estados miembros,
van a ocupar siempre un área geográficamente limitada.
o Constituyen comunidades de interés restringidos a un número
determinado de Estados, caracterizados por afinidades comunes de diversa
índole. Ello permite la formación de un Derecho particular homogéneo
que en ciertos casos alcanza una alta cota de especificidad, como sucede
con el Derecho comunitario en el ámbito de la UE.
o Sus tratados constitutivos establecen la coordinación o subordinación. No
obstante, y a pesar de estas disposiciones, la coordinación entre ambas
categorías de Organizaciones no siempre es satisfactoria, surgiendo
frecuentes situaciones de competencia y conflicto entre ellas.
o A pesar de la difícil existencia que conocen algunas de estas
Organizaciones, estamos ante un fenómeno que dista mucho de estar
agotado, puesto que las diversidades ideológicas y económicas en el
mundo le sirven de fortalecimiento, así como la necesidad de gestionar
intereses comunes de los Estados en la fase intermedia hasta la superación
del Estado sobre base nacional y hasta que se dé paso a la formación de
organizaciones políticas superadoras de esta forma de Estado.
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unanimidad a unos órganos comunes y permanentes. La cooperación es
estrictamente interestatal, en el sentido de que las decisiones de la Organización-
adoptadas por unanimidad – se dirigen a sus Estados miembros.
b) Organizaciones de integración o de unificación: han surgido recientemente en la
escena internacional unas OIs que pretenden la integración de sus Estados
miembros. En ellas se opera una cesión de competencias de los Estados miembros
a los órganos comunes, que se caracteriza por suponer la atribución de poderes
del mismo tipo que los que resultan de las funciones superiores de un Estado a
unos órganos independientes de los Estados, y por la posibilidad que tienen dichos
órganos de pronunciarse por mayoría en caso de estar formados por representantes
gubernamentales, al tiempo que las decisiones que adopten podrán tener, en
determinadas ocasiones, autoridad directa e inmediata en los órdenes jurídicos
nacionales.
Nos encontramos, pues, ante unas Organizaciones que se sitúan entre las OIs
clásicas y las estructuras federales. Se produce en ellas una verdadera
transferencia de competencias soberanas en favor de sus instituciones, lo que se
plasma:
o En su ámbito de atribución, que, aunque limitado por el principio de la
especialidad, afecta a materias tradicionalmente reservadas al Estado,
teniendo además estas atribuciones un carácter evolutivo pudiendo
ampliarse por el juego de las disposiciones del tratado constitutivo o por
el de la teoría de las competencias implícitas.
o En las funciones que va a ejercer, que cubren la gama de las funciones
estatales (ejecutiva, legislativa y judicial).
o En la posibilidad de adoptar decisiones de carácter general, obligatorias y
directamente aplicables en cada Estado miembro.
o En la existencia de una real independencia orgánica respecto de los
gobiernos nacionales, pues la mayoría de las instituciones están
compuestas por personalidades independientes como ejemplifican las
Comisión y el Tribuna de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas, o reúnen
representantes de los pueblos elegidos directamente por sufragio universal
(Ej. Parlamento Europeo), o bien, si se trata de un órgano formado por
representantes gubernamentales, cabe la posibilidad de que sus
disposiciones se adopten por mayoría.
o En la existencia de una gran autonomía, tanto por lo que respecta a su
orden jurídico, como por lo que se refiere a su independencia financiera,
merced a la existencia de recursos propios.
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Capítulo 3: Principales Manifestaciones de la Personalidad Jurídica
Internacional de las Organizaciones Internacionales
Capítulo 6-7
Apuntes de clase
- Obligatoriedad de las decisiones
- Caso Bernadotte y redes públicas
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