Case #09

Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava,

105 Phil 173 (1959)

FACTS:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23,
1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the said office. Petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examinations, and is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office and that the respondent Director's holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of
his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but include
the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual purpose
so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice
before the Patent Office. Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted
such examinations and that this is the first time that he is questioned formally.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by
the Patent Office before he would be allowed to practice law in said office;

2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or
patents, etc. constitutes practice of law or is included in the practice of law; and,

3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for
patent attorneys.

RULING:

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation m court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation sendees,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. As such, , the practice of law includes such appear ance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and
the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Thus, under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession
before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the practice of law
covers any activity in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
principles or practice and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. And, only the
Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law.

Case #10

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Case # 11
Eufrosina Y. Tan v.Nicolas El. Sabandal
February 24, 1992

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his
oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since
then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where
Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware
of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar.
However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of
the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a
parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of
acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was
later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement
cancelled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank;
provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to
the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also
paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he
already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending
civil case has been terminated.

HELD:
His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could
not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak
well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service,
which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or
innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his
sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed
against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
Case #12

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO

HERRERA,respondents.

G.R. No. L-77691 August 8, 1988

FACTS:

The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the
registered owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage
over the parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm
initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in question after private respondent failed
to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said
foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the petition,
private respondent and L and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement that renders
the former to be insured another year for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were
the attorney’s fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to
be in turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the
attorney’s fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private
respondent executed a document to redeem the parcels of land and to register the same to his
name. Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his
name but without prior notice, the properties were already registered under the petitioner’s
name. The private respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said adverse
claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties consolidated by the redemption price he
paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the
Court of appeals which ruled over the same.

Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.

Ruling: By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no
financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his
mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise
Judgment," a development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious
reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to
"conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the
occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law
advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming
of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning
Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled
his liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to
enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their
obligations against the other.
Case # 13

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA [G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990]

FACTS:

Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner should pay the certain amount based on the charging lien on the civil case filed
against them which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed case, private respondent filed a
motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an exchange of
arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent,
Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a
compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:

Whether or not: (1) respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of
its attorney’s fees; (2) a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien, and (3)
private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) percent of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:

(1) NO.
(2) YES.
(3) Ruling subject to separate trial.

RATIO:

[A] charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a
condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client

The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney’s fees have the right to be heard
upon the question of their propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is
beyond cavil.

[I]n fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of
quantum meruit, the determination of elements to be considered would indispensably require
nothing less than a full-blown trial.
Case # 14

MELENDRES V. DECENA, 176 SCRA 663 (1989)

FACTS:

There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4,000.00 loan obtained by t
he spouses secured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real estate mortga
ge document that the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that
the signing of the documents was just for formality. So, they did. The spouses religiously paid 1
0% or 500 as interest for only 3months because of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Dece
na made a second real estate mortgage document and the loan extended to complainants had
escalated to P10,000.00. Again,on the assurance that it was only for formality, the spouses sign
ed the new REM document.

After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the
10k and went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the money and instead gave t
hem a sheet of paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity
that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa ag
ainst accused. It was alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning th
e civil liability of accused without the consent and approval of the complainants and that he recei
ved the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment and he did not inform the spouses about thi
s. And even after he was confronted, he still did not turn over the money.

ISSUE:

WON Decena’s acts show gross misconduct and should be disbarred.

RULING:

As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.
From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the R
eal Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that e
ach of the successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate,

respondent, being a lawyer, should have atleast explained to complainants the legal implication
s of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the c
omplainants’ attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants.

As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers cannot
“without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in discharge of a clien
t’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to spouses the partial payment
underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to th
e practice of law but a continuing requirement.

Atty. Decena was disbarred.

CASE #15

G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,

-versus-
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the
then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners
Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat.
Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion
for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of
party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to
be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and
prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the
requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional
requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught.
" (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical
injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that
the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as
they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on
November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all
persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines
vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as
scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar, a party to an action is authorized to appear in court
and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or
agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he
can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the
private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Unless the
offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to
institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of
section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution
of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction
and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case
later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in
the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent
appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law
student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal
Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not
allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in
conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other
hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest
to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
case under his supervision and control. Further, we may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as
defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more
reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control
of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan,
as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it
separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases.
Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil
action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a
friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September
4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila
as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and
respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners
Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining
order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
Case # 16

G.R. No. L-8320 December 20, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIM BEN, defendant-appellant.

Vicente Jayme and Celso C. Veloso for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan Liwag, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and
Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of
violating paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic
films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open
to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the
information without the aid of counsel.

The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was
called for trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if
he desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable
to have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in
the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and
after the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of
the plea of guilty the punishment as provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he
answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered
"Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the
defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional and to pay the costs.lawphi1.net

What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected and
safeguarded. The Court complied with it’s duly when it informed the appellant that it was his
right to have the aid of counsel. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to
ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered.
Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and
entered a plea of guilty to the information.

Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a
fine would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the
appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does not
mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend
a specific penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the
recommendation and metes out to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.