CANON 10
G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973
VICENTE MUÑOZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member
of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade,
and Associates, must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting
standard expected of counsel, more specifically with reference to a duty owing this
Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders
when, in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals
decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless disregard, to say the least, of
what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When given an opportunity to
make proper amends, both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her
memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious
and so inexcusable. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her
liability is clear. Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her
from a penalty graver than severe censure. So we rule.
The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12,
1971. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G.R. No. L-
33672, Vicente Muñoz v. People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals, and
considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty of
homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the information; that - in the
language of the decision of the Court of Appeals - "the prosecution and the defense
offered two conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the case"; that, upon
examination of the evidence, the Court of Appeals found, as did the trial court, that
the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is unbelievable;
that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence, whereas
the version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts, for: (a)
petitioner's theory, to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the
complainant, is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the
latter's boat, the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left
front portion of complainant's boat - where the complainant was seated, thereby
hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death - so that,
immediately after the collision - part of petitioner's boat was on top of that of the
complainant; (b) these circumstances, likewise, indicate the considerable speed at
which petitioner's motorboat was cruising, (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very
little damage, which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the
offended party's boat, the latter being bigger than, as well as provided with an engine
twice as powerful as, that of the petitioner; and (d) although appellant's boat carried
several passengers, including children, and was, in fact, overloaded, appellant acted
as pilot and, at the same time, as its machinist, thereby rendering it difficult for him to
manuever it properly; the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it
is mainly factual and for lack of merit. Considering further, that the petition quotes, on
page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed from, summing up evidence for the
defense, and makes reference thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals, which is not
true; that, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a portion of the
same quotation, that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized
by the Court of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue; that, on page 8 of the petition, it
is averred - "It being conceded that the two versions recounted above are by
themselves credible, although they are conflicting the same cannot be binding on,
and is therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on the
Supreme Court. (Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April 30, 1957)" although, in fact,
no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decision appealed from; and that, on
page 9 of the petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had"affirmed the
minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court,"
although, in fact, minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months
of arresto mayor"; the Court resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show
cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making
aforementioned misrepresentations." " 1chanrobles virtual law library
A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed
on August 14, 1971. There was no attempt at justification, because in law there is
none, but it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. If so, such
optimism was misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of
candor, of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court
of Appeals certain alleged facts not so considered as such. It was then to say that the
least a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. Much of what was therein
contained did not ring true.
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same
year, requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. At such a hearing,
respondent Delia T. Sutton appeared. While her demeanor was respectful, it was
obvious that she was far from contrite. On the contrary, the impression she gave the
Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach. Even
when subjected to intensive questioning by several members of the Court, she was
not to be budged from such an untenable position. It was as if she was serenely
unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to, which her evasive answers
gave rise. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of her
misdeed. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to
understand. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter
as a minor peccadillo, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly
acknowledged that what appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent
Delia T. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals
decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible, and did make with the proper
spirit of humility the necessary expression of
regret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court"
filed on December 1, 1971, signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Delia Sutton,
did seek to make amends thus: "1. That undersigned attorney, Delia T. Sutton,
together with Messrs. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Pedro L. Yap and Custodio O. Parlade,
partners in the firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade & Associates, appeared
before this Honorable Court on November 22, 1971, pursuant to an order dated
October 18, 1971; 2. That with all the sincerity and candor at the command of
undersigned attorney, the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the pleading
which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be punished
for contempt of court were explained by her, with the assistance of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez; 3. That the undersigned Delia T. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent
any question of fact before this Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit, and
that it was her lack of adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions
for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition
which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court; 4. That undersigned
Delia T. Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation
of the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she
will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the Canons of
Professional Ethics, which reads: "22. [Candor and Fairness]. - The conduct of the
lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a
paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the argument of opposing counsel,
or the language of a decision or a textbook or; with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite
as authority a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed;
or in argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved, or in those
jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his
opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which
his side then intends to rely. ..." 5. That undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez joins
Atty. Delia T. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not
having thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Delia T. Sutton of a type of
pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar." 2chanrobles virtual law library
The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent
Sutton. Some members of the Court feel, however, that it does not go far enough.
While expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking that free admission
that what was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as
they do of "inaccurate statements." If there were a greater sincerity on her part, the
offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate
misstatements. There ought to be, for the apology to gain significance, no further
attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It is then as if there was hardly
any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. The mood, even at this stage,
seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an
apology were offered. This Court does not view matters thus. To purge herself of the
contempt, she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. The
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what
is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a
client's cause, it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth. As set forth
in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create or
to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession
of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper
discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in
defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever
may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." 3 What is more, the
obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes
precedence. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the
offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T.
Sutton.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners, Attorney
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, both in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings
submitted, must be commended. He has made manifest that his awareness of the
role properly incumbent on counsel, especially in his relationship to this Court, is
deep-seated. It must be stated, however, that in the future he, as well as the other
senior partners, should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys
connected with their law firm, perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called
upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. Let a copy of this
resolution be spread on her record.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
CANON 11
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant
Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
(respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie
R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid
and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and
that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent
to file a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the
copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639.
Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to
file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an
administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause
thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or
any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus
Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her
husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence
at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also
received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law
office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her
younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send
a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to
mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig
has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a
sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to
furnish respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of
such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against
him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of
the administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which
is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by
Registry Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment
despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to
receive a copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied
with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He
requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be
furnished a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the
complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics
allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of
receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for
his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy
of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown
by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply
with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by
registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show
Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It
likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently
indicated in his correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino
Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served
upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server.
Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel
with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as
required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE
upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to
COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required
thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to
comply with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the
complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for
non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of
compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn
M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that
respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora
Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that
the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot
with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be
found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts,
the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's
Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41
Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings
set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to
be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order
of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt.
However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation,
recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2)
years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be
determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in
the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment
continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges
against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted
a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October
3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R.
Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year
from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage
was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for
under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of
the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence
of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his
first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s
defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged
on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous
directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected
only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued
several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him,
yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not
received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint
against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them
have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the
complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a
complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have easily
obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude
towards this case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations
and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as
evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach
respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and
complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent.
However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of
speaking, respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court
in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his
actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the
judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not
only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of
the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor.
- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but
also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.
CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, San Mateo, Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil
Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores
defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan
(Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan
issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of
dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but
also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice
of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to
Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate
investigation and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative
Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for investigation, report and
recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine
Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as
follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold
Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the
defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his
appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance
hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-
Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten
(10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for
failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating
thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated
September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to
submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a
waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September
14, 2010 stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve
truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair
by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer who
violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by
the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which
was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance.
During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day.
On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to submit
the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores
filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am
hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste
basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for
another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I
feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the
court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that
Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof
of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court
orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to
the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government
is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of
the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which
they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the
court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty.
Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his
client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the context
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom
is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common
sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with
the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested
before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century.10 Thus, he
is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of
₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,
SORSOGON CITY,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the
respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because
the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case.
Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent
on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then
pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by
complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente
Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from
entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and
the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."2
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on
February 14, 2007,3 viz:
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal
sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the
other Courts in this province as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a
Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases
against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for
utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as
not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for
inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to
appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the
first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby
DENIED. Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty.
Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being
violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip
William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then
moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse
incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint,
and required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.5
In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of
the February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused
of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge
Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant
ofarrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who
should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance
of the law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
investigation,report and recommendation.7Several months thereafter, the Court also
indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ,
entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap
v. Judge Madrid).8
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the
administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity
of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.9
In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the
following findings and recommendation:10
xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan
S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the
complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4)
Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-
RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed
by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and
personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that
respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose
L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who
are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable
consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the
respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by
respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the
court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before
the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo
Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent
for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No.
2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III"
for: Support pending before the sala ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III,
entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order,
this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case
No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our
Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party
defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of
Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil
Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H.
Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid
(RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court
against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies
available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing
administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.
The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-
DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on
October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA
RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT
and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao
vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005
ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d)
VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled
"Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping),
and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE
LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the
dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part
of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one
executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to
persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered
by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that
respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in
the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter
case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida,
respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to
(e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of
the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures
provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of
the court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-
foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six
(6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S.
Dealca.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and
Recommendation11 finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and
criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the
practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of
factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the
recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of
Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its
Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints
against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of
Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed
against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a
vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.15
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high
sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and
inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be
unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the
ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty.
Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the
Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for
harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his
bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the
Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients
or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety,
because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting
tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass
them.17
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any
violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or
other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and
keep inviolable.19
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath
not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the
whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so
must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against
judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are
intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the
unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the
workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise
ofthe right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty.
Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his
part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not
substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s
precious time and serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had
the temerity to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed
against erring judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even
discussing the facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have
promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant
posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain
ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions
have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever
the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute
resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its
findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution
then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of
the petition, or itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s agreement with and its
adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute
resolutions that the Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court explained why in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and
decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where
the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the
applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to
forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.
xxxx
The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is
given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu
Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the
minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court,
throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe
constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood
it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the
Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the constitutional mandate was
applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was
being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis
of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the
subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the
questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s
decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.30
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited
himself" upon his motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty.
Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being
purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pertinently state:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or haveno materiality to the case.1âwphi1
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.
It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;
elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe
latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him
directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse
to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or
their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously
substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges
in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the
averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification
of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order
to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca
was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s
partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid
would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence
and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative
complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4,
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a
repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based
on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule
1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend
Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective
from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 12
SANTIAGO VS RAFANAN J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,
which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with
the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to
mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
* On leave.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty.
Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged
Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under
Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02
and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr.
summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged,
among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation
regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b)
enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register;
and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and
IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of
the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed
an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence
in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the
hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,[7] Atty.
Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the
affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed,
however, that the
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-
affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to
documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits
related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out
that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors,
did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other
notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the
affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in
their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3
of Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as
counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To
nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said
noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary
investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that
lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where
[their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents
clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house
when the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of
justice.
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and
harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on
January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City
Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to
avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his
allegations, he submitted Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the
Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose
than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto
Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against
complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner
Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the
afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On
the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared.Respondent
was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8,
2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the
verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on
July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with
the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001,
issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which
the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26,
2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report
that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the
execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and
the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found
his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine
to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier
penalty.
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
 The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries
public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged
before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such
certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to
enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the
one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on
which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties would result in the
revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23]
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected,
considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized
documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be
aware of these elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and
meaning of notarization as follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot
be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn
duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial
act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed
with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily
admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents
notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of
the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements
is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and
government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the
requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with
these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or
exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial
procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad
example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are
the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo,
as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for
attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned
clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in
the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer the oath -- to certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that
he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and
Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required
to comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected
to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles.Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon
them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old
practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the
provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear
ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance
of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent
from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.[30] Considering the
nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we
believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient
disciplinary measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor
Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by
respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall
avoid testifying in behalf of his client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in
behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the
mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases
where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his
testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a
witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication
arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task
of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as
advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the
cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a
disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety
rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for
the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to
be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The
testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and
untruthful.[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at
the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from
testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty.
Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for
the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense
that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in
which the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the
accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are
entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to
their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to
law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense
counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every
defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients
would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the
defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of
the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed
the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not
dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which
lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was
submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation
has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of
crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and
protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.[38]The investigation is
advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to
refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to
believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in
future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the ends of
justice, the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active
prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting
words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent
to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-
serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible,
considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police
officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law
and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000
with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 13
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper
and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of
influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by
Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent beissued a
warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will
impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April
2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and
Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was
representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs.3In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of
probable cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions
during the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of
bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional
hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the
release order for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They
stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall
upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law
and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public
official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s
verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP
and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical
conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of
disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his
Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On
2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for
investigation, report and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the
charges against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also
ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high
hopes of the accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the
PDEA still refused to release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients
and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order.
Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice
approves it, then everything may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues,
the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a
mere scrap of paper with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the
letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no
evidence was adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly
irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same
or any similar action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into
charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints
brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it
is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the
bar.17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct
is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence
on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable
grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied
by the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of
his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to
the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for
the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,
respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a
direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take
more serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see
the Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his
[sic] kasihe is very political also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day
because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka
nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung
pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did
was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it
convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it
and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office
of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first
with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after
1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor.
Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x
Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on
this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your
Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito.
So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will
study the matter, those particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang
kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us
away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is
very open;" and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a
political family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family
and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in
Congress. In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him."20 Upon questioning
by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally
acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.21
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s
admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that
the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation
of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do
so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith inthe
judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of
justice.1âwphi1 To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct
of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the
law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to bythe
lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and
unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule
15.06, "a lawyershall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds
of the law.23 A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is
expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find
that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for
the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-
month suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling
whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for
her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with the
Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high
court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found
GUILTYof violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for
six (6) months effective immediately. This also serves as an emphaticWARNING that
repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court
Administrator is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.