2004 DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
By: Fernando P. Cabato

(Retired Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 62)
Decisions in Criminal Procedure

In the Form of Questions and Answers
with Notes and Cases
Prepared by
FERNANDO P. CABATO
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES – RULE 110
What is included in the power of the public prosecutor to supervise and control criminal
actions?
The authority of the public prosecutor to supervise and control a criminal action includes the
exercise of sound discretion as to how to present hits case and to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses. (People v. Zeng Hua Dian, 432 SCRA 25 [2004]
What is the test in determining the sufficiency of the information or Complaint?
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of material averments of in

Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined by the law. (Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, 441
SCRA 377 [2004]
Thus, discrepancy on the precise date of the alleged trespass – the Information charges
trespass allegedly committed on a particular date while the defense relates to an entry the
following day – does not make the information defective. A variance between the time setout in
the Information and that established by the evidence during the trial does not constitute an error
so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score. (Marzalado Jr. v. People,
441 SCRA 595 [2004]
What should be stated in the Information of Complaint?
The Information or Complaint shall state the (1) designation of the offense given by the
statute,; (2) aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and (3) specify its qualifying, and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1
By: FERNANDO P. CABATO
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (People v. Ebio, 439 SCRA 421 [2004];
People v. Hernandez, 432 SCRA 104 [2004]
The qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances must be expressly and specifically

alleged in the Complaint or Information, otherwise the court will not consider the same even if
proved during the trial. (People v. Delmindo, 429 SCRA 546 [2004]; People v. Simon, 429
SCRA 330 [2004]; People v. Agudez, 428 SCRA 692 [2004];
For example: For a qualified rape to prosper, both the qualifying circumstances of the victim’s
minority (below eighteen years of age) and her relationship with the offender (father) must be
alleged in the Information and proved during the trial. (People v. Jusayan, 428 SCRA 98 [2004]
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege, specify or
enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense – the words
“aggravating/qualifying”, “qualifying”, “qualified by” “aggravating”, or “aggravated by” need
not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the
Information. (Catalina Security Agency v. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628 [2004]
See: In Pari Material: People v. Agudez, 428 SCRA 692 [2004]; People v. Manambay, 422
SCRA 73 [2004]; People v. Estado Jr., 422 SCRA 198 [2004]; People v. Sumarago, 422 SCRA
324 [2004]
Note: While circumstances, which were not specifically alleged in the information, may not
aggravate the crime, insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the presence of these
aggravating circumstances entitles the heirs of the victims to exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000 in accordance with the Article 2230 of the Civil Code and with prevailing
jurisprudence. (People v. Agudez, supra)
Thus, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the facts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense as long as it alleges all the essential elements
of the crime charged. So that any objections as to the form or substance in the Information must
be done before arraignment and plea, otherwise, the right to question the infirmities of the
Information are deemed waived as a rule. (People v. Cadampag, 428 SCRA [2004]
What is the reason for the rule that qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the
Information?
It is to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. (People v. Ibarrientos, 432 SCRA 424 [2004]
What is controlling between the allegation of facts in the Information and the caption of the
Information?
The actual recital of facts in the body of the Information is controlling and not the caption
or preamble of the Information. (Joaquin v. Madrid, 349 SCRA 567 [2004]
Thus, the designation of offense, by making reference to the section of subsection of the
statute punishing it is not controlling. The nature and character of the crime charged are the facts
alleged in the Information. (Flores v. Layosa, 436 SCRA 337 [2004]
Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. (Ngo v. People, 434 SCRA 322 [2004]
Should the information be under oath as in a Complaint?
No. The Information need not be under oath. The reason being principally that the
prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special responsibility of his oath of office.
(Estodillo v. Baluma, 426 SCRA 53 [2004]
What is the remedy when the allegations in the Information are vague or indefinite?
A motion for the bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash the Information, is the
proper remedy. The grounds for a motion to quash are enumerated; hence, the remedy is
available only when one of these grounds exists. (Romualdez v. Sandiganbaya, 435 SCRA 371
[2004]
An accused can not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly chared in the

Information or Complaint. An Information or Complaint must clearly state the acts or omissions
complained of or the essential elements of the crime charged precisely to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him in order that he could prepare his defense.
(People v. Almendral, 433 SCRA 440 [2004]
How should the time in the commission of crime be alleged in the Information or Complaint?
The exact or precise time of the commission of the crime is not required unless time is an
essential ingredient of the crime charged. And when time is not an essential element of the crime
charged, it is sufficient that the Complaint or Information stats that the crime has been committed
at a time as near as possible to the date of its commission. (People v. Almendral, 433 SCRA 440
[2004]
Problem: In an Information against A, it failed to alleged that the victim had been raped
“through force or intimidation”. A was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty on such
defective information. On appeal A questioned the defective Information and claimed the he
cannot be validly convicted in an indictment that does not charge an offense. Is the contention of
A tenable? Why?

Answer: The contention of A is untenable. It is true that the Information failed to allege that the
rape was committed by means of “force and intimidation”, nonetheless, the defect was cured by
the failure of A to raise the issue before the trial court. Despite of the insufficiency of the
Information, it is presumed that the original complaint or sworn affidavit of the victim was made
available to A where it was alleged in said Complaint that A raped the victim by means of force
and intimidation, hence, was duly informed of the accusation against him; and by allowing,
without his objection, evidence which proved that he committed the rape through such means of
force and intimidation the defect had been cured. (See: People v. Galido, 426 SCRA 502 [2004])
Comment: The ultimate facts in this case of Galido are that the three Information for the alleged
rape were committed in April 1994, in January 1996 and in May 1996. The three counts of rape
were then “private crimes” and may only be prosecuted upon the Complaint of the offended
party. Thus, for the crime of rape to be filed in court, it was required that the offended party files
a Complaint or a sworn statement alleging the facts which constitute all the essential element of
the crime of rape. A copy of this Complaint or sworn statement was required to be furnished the
accused before or during the preliminary investigation. Therefore, this Complaint or sworn
statement at the outset informed the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Thus, in the case of People v. Galido, the court observed. The appellant argued that
because the Information on which he was arraigned and convicted did not allege the element of
force or intimidation, he was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause f the accusation against him. He insisted that such failure was a fatal defect that rendered
the Information void. The Court in this way resolved this argument of the accused. As a rule,
the accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the Complaint or
Information. Otherwise, the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him would be violated. The appellant correctly pointed out that the element
of “force or intimidation” should have been expressly alleged in the three Information. This
omission is not fatal, however, because the Complaint specifically accused him of three
counts of rape committed by means of force and intimidation. Hence, the defect was cured
by (1) failure of the accused to raise the defect before the trial court of sufficiency of the
Information; (2) by the allegation of the original complaint that the accused is being charged with
rape through force and intimidation; and (3) by competent evidence which was not objected to
proving that the rape was indeed committed through such means. The Court affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
If the facts in Galisado happened after 1 December 2000, I submit that the defect in the
Information, that is, one of the essential elements of the crime is not alleged, the arraignment
and plea of the accused would nullify the proceedings because there wasno crime charged to
which the accused was arraigned and pled. The defect is in the subject matter, hence,
jurisdictional – and may be assailed at any time during the trial and on appeal because of want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. A substantial defect of the Information, such as the failure to
allege the crime committed, will nullify the proceedings. Moreover, the crime of rape is now a
public crime and can be initiated by the public prosecutor without the complaint of the offended
party having been first filed with the Prosecutor’s Office. Finally, when the accused is arraigned,
he is arraigned upon the reading of the Information to him and not upon the reading of the
complaint of the offended party. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation is derived from the allegations in the Information which is read to the accused and
upon which he is arraigned and enter a plea, and not the Complaint which was not read to him
during the arraignment to which he pleads.
It is thus good to practice for a defense attorney to study carefully the allegations of the
information. If he finds the Information defective in form or in substance, he should undertake
the appropriate remedy such as motion to quash the Information for failure to charge a crime or
that the Information is defective in form or fails to conform to the prescribed form.
Note and Read the case of People v. Palarca, 382 SCRA 741 [2002]. In that case, the Court held
that the evidence presented during trial cured the failure of the Information to allege specifically
that the rape had been committed through force or intimidation. The Court ruled: “While the
accusatory portion of the Information failed to specifically allege that the rape was committed
through force or intimidation, the prosecution was able to establish by evidence that accused-
appellant was guilty of rape as defined under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) [a] of the Revised
Penal Code x x x.” The Court went on to rule that” “In any event, accused-appellant failed to
interpose any objection to the presentation by the prosecution of evidence which intended to
prove that he committed the rape by force or intimidation. While generally an accused can not
be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule is
not without exception. The right to assail the sufficiency of the Information or the admission of
evidence may be waived by the accused-appelant.”
In People v. Torellos, 400 SCRA 243 [2003] the Court ruled that the Information which
had failed to allege that the rape had been committed through force and intimidation, was
considered as merely defective. It ruled that the deficiency was cured by the failure to the
accused to object to the sufficiency of the Information and by competent evidence presented
during the trial.
It appears both in Palarca and Torellos, that the failure of the Information to allege that
rape was committed through force and intimidation is merely a defect of form which may be
waived if accused fails to raised the issue during the trial or accused fails
to object to any evidence to prove force and intimidation, and prosecution was able to prove the
rape through force and intimidation. That is the state of affairs today, and we must respect such a
ruling. But, personally, I hold on to my submission and this question should be put to test when
the opportunity presents itself.
Note: How is jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases determined? Jurisdiction of the Court
is determined by the allegations in the Information or Complaint, the statute in effect at the time
of commencement of the action, unless such as statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. (Escobal v. Garchitorena, 422 SCRA 45 [2004]
When is an amendment a matter of form?

An amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminated
vagueness in the Information and nor to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in the original Information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. (Phoebe v. Sandoval, 426
SCRA 346 [2004]
What is the test to determine whether the rights of the accused are prejudiced by the
amendment in the Information?
The test is whether a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused
might have would be inapplicable to the amended Complaint or Information. (Phoebe v.
Sandoval, supra)
State the rule on the duplicity of the offense.
A complaint or information must charge but one offense. This is the general rule. The
exception is that when the information or complaint alleges various offenses but prescribes a
single punishment. In such a case, the information or complaint is not duplicitous. (See:
Section 13, Rule 110, and Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). Duplicitous Information may
be a valid indictment. This defect of the information may be waived by the accused. And
because of the waiver, the accused could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in
the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. (Dimayacyac v. Court of
Appeals, 430 SCRA 121 [2004]
The remedy of accused to correct the defect is to file a motion to quash the information
on the ground the information charges more than one offense. This motion must be filed before
the arraignment and plea of the accused. If the accused failed to object or raise this issue before
arraignment and plea, and let the duplicitous information remain uncorrected, and enters a please
of not guilty to the information, he waived the defect, and the accused may be found guilty of
any or all of the crimes alleged in the information duly proven during the trial. This is so
because the allegation of all the elements of such component crimes in the said information has
satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense
with which he is being charged. Verily, duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be
waived and the accused, because of the waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those
charged in the information and proved during the trial. (Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 430
SCRA 121 [2004]
In pari material: People v. Tira, 430 SCRA 134 [2004]

State the limitation of the authority of the public prosecutor to appear and represent the
People of the Philippines?
The authority of the public prosecutor to appear and represent the People of the
Philippines is confined only to the proceedings before the trial court. This is based on Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In appeals before the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c) automatic
appeal; or (d) in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines is a party, the general
rule is that the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People. This is
provided for in Section 35 {1} Chapter 12, Title III, and Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code. (Salazar v. Romaquin, 429 SCRA 4 [2004]
May the rules of the criminal procedure be applied retroactively?
Yes. In the light of the well settled rule that statutes or rules regulating the procedure of
the court will be construed as being applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. (People v. Li Ka Lim, 329 SCRA 169 [2004]
What is the legal effect of an information filed by a prosecutor who lack the authority to
do so?
The lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the Information prevents the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Law confers jurisdiction over the subject matter while
jurisdiction over the case is invested by the act of the plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the
complaint or information. For example, while a court may have jurisdiction over violation of the
SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with
the filing of the information (People v. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 [2004] citing with approval the
case of Villa v. Ibanez, 88 Phil. 402 [1951])
Note: In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCXRA 173 [1998] the court cited with approval the
principle enunciated in Vill\a v. Ibanez. The brief facts of Cudia are: The accused was
apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was brought to
Angeles City where the Headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The City Prosecutor
of Angeles City filed an information in the RTC of Angeles City.
Ruling: the information was invalidated because the City Prosecutor had not territorial
jurisdiction as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction
was only in Angeles City. The information when required by law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. Otherwise, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction. It is a valid information, signed by a competent officer who, among other requisites,
confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof.
The accused that pleads to such information waives all formal objections to the said information,
except when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information such as lack of authority of the
officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES – RULE 111
Explain the principle of independent civil action.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000,
only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed instituted in the
criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. This is completely in accord
with the Revised Penal Code, which states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction
meted out to the employee.
Under this revised rule, the requirement of reserving independent civil actions is deleted,
and allowed these actions to proceed separately from criminal actions. The civil action referred
to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and
independent” of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Some direct consequences of such revision are: (1) The right to bring the foregoing
actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are
not deemed included therein. (2) The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action; (3) The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission. What are deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution are the civil liabilities
arising from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. Even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability
in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offender party may subject to the control of the
prosecution – still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, 427 SCRA 456 [2004]
What is the effect on the liability of the accused if acquitted of the crime charged?
Under Article 29 of the Civil code, when the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
fact from which the civil liability might rise did not exist. (Eusebio-Calderon v. People, 441
SCRA 137 [2004]
For instance, an accused is acquitted of estafa, he may nevertheless be held civilly liable
where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. Though no trickery or deceit in
obtaining money from the complainant was employed, the money obtained was undoubtedly a
loan for which the accused must pay with the legal interest. (Eusebio-Calderon v. People, supra)
When is there a prejudicial question?
Where the issues raised in a civil action are so similar or intimately related to those in the
criminal case such that the resolution of the said issues in the civil care are determinative of the
juris et de jure of the guilt of innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the proceedings in
the latter case shall be suspended and the civil action shall proceed until judgment on its merits.
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime because
if both actions arose from the same fact or transaction, the civil case doest not constitute a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal action. (People v. Delizo, 436 SCRA
615 [2004]
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION – ARTICLE 112
What is the purpose of preliminary investigation?
A preliminary investigation is conducted for the purpose of securing the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial. (Okabe v.
Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 [2004]
What is the object of conducting a preliminary investigation?
The investigating officer (the public prosecutor or Municipal Judge) is tasked to

determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. If the
investigating officer finds probably cause for the filing of the Information that from the evidence
presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor
is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said
certification as basis for a finding of the existence of probably cause for the arrest of the accused.
(Okabe v, Gutierrez, supra)
See: In pari material: People v. Pocilan, 167 SCRA 176 [1988]; People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788
[1990]
Briefly explain the scope of preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial approach of the merits of the

case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that whe the case is tried,
the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect
such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigation proceedings conducted by him will grievously hamper the
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complains filed before it. In much the
same way, the court will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of prosecutors each time the latter decide to file Information in court or
dismiss a Complaint by a private complainant. (Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 429 SCRA
357 [2004]
What is the criterion in determining the accused can be charged with an offense or not?
To conduct a inquiry to determine where there is sufficient ground to engender a well

founded belief that a crime has bee committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereor, and
should be held for trial.
Thus, in this inquiry (preliminary investigation) a prosecutor does not decide whether
there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. A finding of
probable cause, therefore, does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure conviction. It is enough that the prosecution believes that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. (Rizon v. Desierto, 441 SCRA 115 [2004]
What is the effect of dismissal of a complaint during preliminary investigation?
The dismissal of the complaint during preliminary investigation does not constitute
double jeopardy. The reason is that preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of evidence but only such as may engender a well-
rounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty thereof. In this
sense, it cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. (Vincoy v.
Court of Appeals, 432 SCRA 36 [2004]
To whom should the motion for re-investigation be addressed?
A motion for re-investigation should, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the
case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. The Secretary of Justice, the State
Prosecutor, or the Prosecutor may not interfere with the disposition of the case by the judge,
much less impose upon the trial court their opinion regarding the innocence or guilt of the
accused for the court is the sole judge of that. Courts are, however, called upon to exercise great
restraint in granting any re-investigation with the consequent delay involved, since the weighing
and evaluation of such evidence in defense of the accused against the evidence of the State is
best left to its judgment and its verdict rather than to the prosecution. To ferret out the truth, trial
is to be preferred than re-investigation. (Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Iligan City, 440 SCRA 1 [2004]
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction,
competence and discretion of the trial court. (Santos v. Orda Jr., 437 SCRA 504 [2004]
Does the absence of preliminary investigation affect the jurisdiction of the trial court?
No. The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court but merely the regularity of the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective. (San Agustin v. People, 437 SCRA 392 [2004]
Failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of
Information. (Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 46 [2004]
How does one determine whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation?
Whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation
to Section 9 of Rule 112 depend upon the impossible penalty for the crime charged in the
complaint filed with the City or Provincial Prosecutor’s Office and not upon the imposable
penalty for the crime found to have been committed by the respondent after a preliminary
investigation. (San Agustin v. People, 437 SCRA 392 [2004]
When may an inquest investigation be made and by whom?
An inquest investigation is proper only when the subject is lawfully arrested without a
warrant. This investigation is conducted by the inquest prosecutor. (San Agustin v. People,
supra)
Explain the policy of non-interference.
The Court adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary

investigations and provided sufficient latitude of discretion to the investigating prosecutor to
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause. (Quiambao v.
Desierto, 438 SCRA 495 [2004]; Punzalan v. Dela Rosa, 434 SCRA 601 [2004]

The settled rule is that the Court refrain from interfering with the powers of investigation
and prosecution of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on
constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. The Constitution and RA 6770 endowed
the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude of investigating and prosecuting, virtually free
from legislative, executive and judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure
and improper influence. (Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 429 SCRA e57 [2004]
Note: In pari material: Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 426 SCFA 461 [2004]
Note: The Deputy Ombudsman has direct supervision and control over the preliminary
investigation conducted by him, and absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it; his actions
is not subject to judicial review. (Velasco v. Casaclang, 294 SCRA 394 [1998]
Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s supervision and control over the preliminary investigation conducted by him.
(Mamburao, Inc v. Office of the Ombudsman, 344 SCRA 805 [2002]
What are the exceptions to the general rule of non-interference of the court in the conduct
of preliminary investigation?
They are:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of suits;
3. When there is prejudicial question which is subjudice;
4. When the acts of the offer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied.
(Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra)
Note: They are the same ground to restrain or stop prosecution of a criminal action. See:
Advincula v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 583 [2000]
Problem: A filed a criminal complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office. Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor X dismissed the complaint of A. What is the remedy of A?
Answer: The remedy of A is to file a motion for reconsideration. If this motion is denied, A can
appeal the order of dismissal to the Regional State Prosecutor or to the Department of Justice. If
the appeal of A is denied or dismissed, his remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. (See: Filadmas Pharma, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 456 [2004])
What is the effect after the judge terminated its preliminary investigation of a case?
After the judge has completed the preliminary investigation and forwarded his findings to
the City or Provincial Prosecutor, he losses jurisdiction over the case, and, necessarily, the
evidence submitted. (City Prosecutor Office of General Santos City b. Bersales, 431 SCRA 430
[2004]
Explain the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation.
Section 13, paragraph [1], Article XI of the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 or RA 6770 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers and
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city
and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from ay investigating agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases. Thus, the DOJ is not precluded from
conducting investigation of cases against public officers involving violation of penal laws but if
the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage. (Honasan II
v. The Panel Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, 427 SCRA 46 [2004]
Problem: A is charged with the crime of qualified theft, after a preliminary investigation had
been conducted. Before A was arraigned, he filed a motion to quash that information for lack of
probable cause during the preliminary investigation. If you were the presiding judge, how would
you resolve the motion of A? Reason.
Answer: I will deny the motion of A for lack of merit. A motion to quash should be based on
any of the grounds for a motion to quash enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Since the ground of A is lack of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation which is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash, it is thus without merit.
(See: Poblete v. Sandoval, 426 SCRA 346 [2004])
Note: If on the face of the Information or Complaint, it appears defective, then the remedy is to
file a motion to quash on the ground that the Information does not charge an offense or on any
grounds for a motion to quash when applicable. If the information is vague or is not clear or
explicit in the allegations of facts, then the remedy is a motion for bill of particulars or a motion

to quash on the ground that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form.
ARREST – RULE 113
What is the task of the trial court when the information is filed? Explain.
The task of the presiding judge when the information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. Probable cause means such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the information or an
offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on the evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bear suspicion, it requires less than evidence, which would
justify conviction. (Okabe v. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 [2004]
Stated in another way, the judge of the trial court is mandated to personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether probable cause
exists and pursuant to its own findings, either dismiss the case immediately if no probable cause
exists, or to issue the warrant of arrest if there is a probable cause. (Okabe v. Gutierrez, 427
SCRA 622 [2004]
Note: In the case of Odilao Jr., it cited with approval the cases of Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA
462 [1987], Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, IKNc, 327 SCRA 588 [2000], Solar Team
Entertainment Inc. v. Hon. Rolando How, 338 SCRA 511 [2000]
For the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. It is not intended to duly
burden the trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the
time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused. What is required, rather, is that
the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-
affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which
to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The judge cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutor’s recommendation. (Okabe v. Gutierrez, supra)
See also: Webb v. de Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]; People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1988]
Note: In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Puno in Roberts Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254
SCRA 307 [1996] he said: It must be stressed, however, that in these exceptional cases, the
Court took the extraordinary step of annulling findings of probable cause either to prevent the
misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The
constitutional duty of this Court in criminal litigations is not only to acquit the innocent after
trial but also to insulate, from the start, the innocent from unfounded charges. The filing of
unfounded criminal information in court exposes the innocent to severe distress especially when
the crime is not bailable. Even an acquittal of the innocent will not fully bleach the dark and
deep stains left by a baseless accusation for reputation once tarnished remains tarnished for a
long length of time. The expense to establish the innocence may also be prohibitive and can be
more punishing especially to the poor and powerless. Innocence ought to be enough and the
business of this Court is to shield the innocent from senseless suits right from the start.
When is there no need for a warrant of arrest? Explain.
An arrest made after an entrapment doest not require a warrant of arrest because it is a
valid arrest without a warrant pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5[a] – in flagrante delicto arrest.
Any search resulting from a lawful arrest without a warrant is valid because the accused
committed a crime in flagrante delicto. (Teodosio v. Court of Appeals, 431 SCRA 194 [2004]
When is the accused considered to have waived his right to question the legality of his
arrest?
The accused waives any irregularities relating to his arrest without a warrant if he fails to
file a motion to quash the information on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in his arrest
before he is arraigned. (People v. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364 [2004]
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over accused must be made
before he enters his plea. (People v. Ayangao, 427 SCRA 428 [2004]; People v. Hijada, 425
SCRA 204 [2004]
BAIL – 114
State the general rule, the purpose, the reason, and the exception in the grant of bail.
As a general rule, a person “in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as
a matter of right”.
The purpose of bail is given for the release of a person under custody of the law, as a
guarantee for his or her appearance before any court as required under specified conditions.
The reason for the bail flows from the presumption of innocence.
The exception is when evidence of guilt is strong; a person shall not be admitted to bail if
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense that under the law is punishable with reclusion
perpetua at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail. (People v.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, 431 SCRA 319 [2004]
Is notice of bail hearing to the public prosecution necessary? Reason.
Yes. Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been
filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought.
Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance

with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded
an opportunity to present evidence that judicial discretion is weighed must be exercised
regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation
of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. (Floresta v. Ubiadas, 429 SCRA 270 [2004]
See: In pari material: Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca, 358 SCRA 615 [2001]
State the duties of a Judge in bail applications.
The duties of a Judge in a bail application are: (1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing on
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) conduct a hearing on
the application for bail whether or not the prosecution presents evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong, to enable the court to exercise its discretion; (3) decide whether the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
and (4) if the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. (P/C Supt. Manguelod v. Judge Fernando M. Paclibon Jr., RTC, Branch 28, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and Judge Francisco J. Go, Municipal Trial Court, Pila, Laguna, A.M. RTJ-02-1726,
March 29, 2004, 426 SCRA 377 [2004] En Banc, Per Curiam
Note: In pari material: Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, 334 SCRA [2000]
Problem: A is charged with serious physical injuries. A filed a motion for reduction of his
recommended bail bond in the amount of P60,000.00 to P30,000.00. The presiding judge
granted the motion of A, and ordered the release of A from custody before the bail bond was
posted. Was the action of the presiding judge legally tenable? Reason.
Answer: No. In bail application, it is the duty of the presiding judge to notify the prosecution of
the bail application set for hearing or require the prosecutor to submit his recommendation. In
the problem given, the presiding judge should have conducted a summary hearing and base on
the evidence adduced, exercise his discretion to reduce or maintain recommended bail bond and
after the filing of the approved bail bond to release A from custody. The presiding judge failed to
comply with his basic duties anent bail application and committed gross misconduct. (See:
Bangayan v. Butacan, 345 SCRA 301 [2000]
When may the court exercise discretion in granting bail?
Judicial discretion in granting bail may be exercised only after the evidence of guilt is
submitted to of guilt is submitted to the court during the bail hearing. (People v. Presiding Judge
of RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, supra).
Due process must be observed in cases involving possible deprivation of life, liberty or
property. The trial court must proceed with extreme caution and observe strictly the rules on
criminal procedure in cases where the possible penalty is in its severest form; that is, death
because of execution of such a sentence is irrevocable. (People v. Beriber, 431 SCRA 332 [2004]
Is the exercise of discretion by the judge absolute in granting bail?
The discretion of the judge to grant bail is neither absolute nor without limitations. The
discretion must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Admission to bail as a matter
of discretion must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Admission to bail as a
matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable legal principles. The discretion may be rightly exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing and properly weighed.
For the judge to exercise his discretion there must be a hearing for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. If the Judge without hearing grants bail
when bail is a matter of discretion, he commits gross ignorance. (Ypil v. Vilo, 436 SCRA 62
[2004]
Is a Judge who conducted preliminary investigation authorized to grant bail to the accused
while its resolution is pending review by the Provincial Prosecutor?
A Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, who has jurisdiction over the place
where the accused was arrested, has authority to grant bail and to order the release of the accused
even if the records of the case has been transmitted for review to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. (Espanol v. Mjupas, 442 SCRA 13 [2002]
If the accused was in detention during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
municipal trial court but wished to put up bail after the records of the investigation had been
forwarded to the provincial prosecutor, bail may not be filed in the municipal court which fixed
the amount of bail but with the Regional Trial Court of the place where he is being held. (Ibid)

A judge who approves the application for bail of an accused whose cases were not only
pending in other courts but who was, likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial
jurisdiction is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violates Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. (Ibid)
Problem: X is charged with murder in a complaint filed with the MTC of Itogon for preliminary
investigation. X was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Sablan, Benguet. X filed an
application for bail with the Municipal Trial Court of Sablan. The MTC Judge of Sablan granted
the application for bail o\f X and fixed the bail at P50,000.00 for X’s temporary liberty. Was the
MTC Judge of Sablan correct? Why?
Answer: No, the MTC Judge of Sabla was not correct in granting the bail of X in granting the
bail of X. The rule states: “Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks
to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is
pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial or appeal.” The crime committed by X is
murder, a non-bailable offense or the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, and pending
preliminary investigation by the MTC Judge of Itogon. X should have filed his application for
bail in MTC Itogon where the case is pending preliminary investigation. The MTC Judge of
Sablan should not have granted the motion but transferred the application for bail of X to the
MTC Judge of Itogon for the latter to have acted upon. (See: Section 18 [b], Rule 14, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Problem: Suppose in the above problem, under the same facts except that the offense
committed by X is qualified theft. Was the MTC Judge of Sable correct?
Answer: Yes, the MTC Judge of Sablan was correct in granting the application of bail of X and
fixed the amount of bail for the temporary liberty of A. The rule states that: “if the accused is
arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any RTC of said place or if no judge thereof is available, with any municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.” (Section 17, second sentence, Rule 114, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure). There being no RTC Judge in Sablan and the only court in Sablan
is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, then the MCTClof Sablan was correct in having granted the
bail and fixed the amount of bail for the provisional liberty of X. The rule states “where the case
is pending”, hence, do not distinguish whether the case is pending trial proper or for preliminary
investigation. I submit that the rule quoted applies to a case pending trial or pending preliminary
investigation.
What are the factors that the trial court should consider in fixing the amount of bail?
The factors are:
1) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
2) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
3) Penalty for the offense charged;
4) Character and reputation of the accused;
5) Age and health of the accused;
6) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
7) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8) Forfeiture of the bonds;
9) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
See: Section 9, Rule 114, and Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The enumeration is
cited in the case of Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo, 425 SCRA 79 [2004]
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. (Victory Liner, Inc. v Bellosillo, supra)
Is the accused that applied for bail precluded from questioning the validity of his arrest?
No. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging
the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
Section 26, Rule 114 is a new rule intended to modify previous rulings that an application
for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the illegalities or irregularities thereon. This rule is
curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. The rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application. Procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively,
even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at that time when they became
effective, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time they became effective. (Okabe
v. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 [2004]
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED – RULE 115
The right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
See: Section 1[a]
The rationale of the requirement under Section 1[a], Rule 116, is that it affords the
accused by way of implementations of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the
right of the accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at hi,. (Gamas
v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588 [2004]

Right to Speedy Trial
Is the accused entitled to speedy trial? What are the factors to determine whether the right
of the accused to speedy trial is violated?
Under Section 1[h], Rule 115, the accused at the trial is entitled to a speedy, impartial and
public trial.
The reason for the rule: The right of the accused to speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the
trial of criminal case. (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, ibid.)
Such right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether
or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The
concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and
not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is to too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is inconsistent with delays andt is inconsistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude
the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by
the Constitution and Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning
to that intent. A balancing test when applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. (Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan, ibid.); Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 12w1 [2004]
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to speedy disposition
of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the
reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration, to minimize anxiety
and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that this defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of the defendant to adequately prepare
for his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restrain on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his
association is curtailed, and he is subject to public obloquy. (Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, ibid.)

The evidence, taken in its entirety, must be clear and convincing to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise, he is entitled to an acquittal. (People v. Petralba,
439 SCRA 158 [2004]
2) Right of the accused to due process
What is the rule on the right of the accused to due process?
The accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to due process as much as the

prosecution. (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294 [2004]. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law. (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] cited in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
What is the effect of admissions of the accused during custodial investigation without the
assistance o fan independent and competent counsel?
The rights of the person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have
attached… Any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of
counsel. Admissions, whether verbal or non-verbal under custodial investigation made by the
accused, without that assistance of counsel are barred as evidence. (People v. Ador, 432 SCRA 1
[2004]
How is waiver to the right of counsel done during custodial investigation?
Such waiver must be voluntary, knowingly and intelligently. To insure that a waiver is
voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution requires that for the right to counsel to be waived, the
waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. (People v. Del
Castillo, 439 SCRA 601 [2004]
Is a Barangay Captain considered an independent and competent counsel to assist an

accused during custodial investigation?
No. The presence of an independent and competent counsel is one who will effectively
undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest. An effective and
vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise
his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. (People v. Tomaquin, 435 SCRA 23
[2004]

Question:
A suspect is not interest nor under custodial investigation. He gave his written statement
to the Branch Chairman without the assistance of counsel. Is the sworn statement of admissible
evidence?
Answer:
The sworn statement of the accused is admissible in evidence against him.
It is admissible against because he was neither under arrest nor under custodial
investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption
that the accused is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. The exclusionary rule applies when police authorities including agents of
the NBA and such other police agencies of the government conduct investigations. The
Barangay Chairman is not deemed not a law enforcement officer for purpose of applying Section
12 [1] and [3] of Article III of the Constitution. (See: People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 [2004])
3) The right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise
Note: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent, until he charge
is proved. The prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. (People v. Canete, 425 SCRA 353 [2004]
How is the constitutional presumption of innocence overcome?
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is indispensable to overcome the constitutional

presumption of innocence. (People v. Montenegro, 436 SCRA 33 [2004]
Thus, as a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude ach
each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. (People v. Calica, 427 SCRA 336
[2004]
4) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
State the rule and purpose of the right to cross-examine a witness?

Under Article III, Section 14 [2] of the Constitution, the accused has a right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him face to face. Under Rule 115, Section 1 [f] of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, he has the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him at the trial, a fundamental right that is part of the due process. However,
the right of confrontation and cross-examination is a personal one. It is not an absolute right,
which a party can claim at all times. This right may be waived by the accused, expressly or
impliedly. (People v. Abatayo, 433 SCRA 562 [2004]
The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose

falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right
of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. (People v. Bagnate, 428 SCRA 633 [2004]
Who may recall a witness to further testify? Explain.
Thus, the task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is imposed on the party who wishes to
exercise said right. It is counsel for the party who has this right to move that the witness to be
cross-examined be called back to the witness stand and be cross-examined. (People v. Abatayo,
supra)
Has the court the discretion to allow recall of a witness? Explain.
Yes. It is well within the trial court’s discretion to allow the recall of a prosecution
witness. For instance: the judge’s refusal to give opportunity to the new counsel of the accused
to cross-examine same witness on the ground that the prosecution had already rested its case is
patently a grave abuse of discretion. (Peopl v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659 [2004]
What is the effect of absence of cross-examination of a witness?
In the absence of cross-examination, which is prescribed by statutory norm and

jurisprudential precept, the direct examination of the lone prosecution witness should have been
expunged from the records, in which case, the trial would have had no basis to deny the demurrer
to evidence. (People v. Ortillas, supra.)
5) Right against self-incrimination
Explain briefly the right against self-incrimination.

The right against self-incrimination is the giving of evidence against him through
testimonial act.
The constitutional and statutory right of the accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be materials. Thus an accused was subjected to
ultra-violet test without the presence of counsel is not a violation of this right against self-
incrimination. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition, as the accused does
not thereby speak his guilt, hence, the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.
(Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 431 SCRA 194 [2004]
In pari material: See: People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 [2002]; People v. Rondre, 320
SCRA 383 [1999] ; People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 [1987] ; People v. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 7777
[1992] ; People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 513 [1994] ; People v. Otadora, 86 Phil.244 [1950] ; People
v. Summers, 41 Phil.62 [1920] ; US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil.145 [1912]; US v. Ong Siu Hong, 36
Phil.735 [1917]; US v. Salas, 25 Phil.337 [1913]; US v. Zara, 42 Phil.308 [1912]
What is the purpose of the right against self-incrimination?
The right against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all is coercive
powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person
subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection. (People v. Besonia, 422
SCRA 210 [2004]
What are the rights of a suspect (accused) who is under custodial investigation?
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means, which vitiate
the free will, shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (See: Section 12, Article III,
Constitution.)
(People v. Duenas Jr., 426 SCRA 666 [2004]; in pari material: People v. Majello, 425 SCRA 11
[2004]
Note: The accused has the right to representation by counsel from the custodial investigation all
the way to the appellate proceedings. (Gamas v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588 [2004]
What does the phrase “preferably of his own choice” convey?
The phrase does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
custodial investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorney from handling the defense.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does
not raise any objection against the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation,
and the accused thereafter subscribed to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.
The failure of the accused to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against
the person who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. (People v. Mojello, 425 SCRA 11 [2004]
Explain in brief the right of the accused to counsel during custodial investigation.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic
law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in
the present of a counsel. In such a case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is
voluntarily made and that the accused understands it’s nature and consequences, but also advise
and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the confession. The counsel’s role cannot be reduced to being that of
a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with
the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and
independent counsel. (People v. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472 [2004]
Note: An infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial
investigation is relevant and material only where an extra-judicial confessin or admission from
the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. (National Bureau of Investigation v. Reyes, 326
SCRA 109 [2000]
Note: On extra-judicial confession.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions by the Constitutional provision
(Section 12, Article III, Constitution), namely: (1) Those resulting from third degree methods
like torture, force, violence, threat and intimidation, and (2) Thos given without the benefit of
having been effectively informed of the right to remain silent and the right to an able, competent
and independent counsel. (See: People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190 [2000]

Forced or coerced extra-judicial confession or where the extra-judicial confession was
involuntarily given or extracted, is inadmissible in evidence and may not be used against the
confessant in any proceeding.
Where a confession contains details and is replete with fact, which could have possibly
been supplied only by the perpetrator of the crime, and could not have been known to or invented
by the investigators, the confession is considered to have been voluntarily given. (See: People.
Abayon, 114 SCRA 219 [1982]
If it is clear that the confession was voluntary until the contrary is proved and the burden
of proof is upon the person making the confession. (People v. Magdamit, 279 SCRA 423 [1997];
People v. Sevilleno, 425 SCRA 247 [2004]
Note: when custodial investigation is said to have begun.
An accused that is on board a police vehicle on the way to the police station is already
under custodial investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the constitution.
(People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 [192] cited in People v. Rodriguez, 341 SCRA 645 [2000]
It refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. (See: People
v. Duenas Jr., 425 SCRA 6666 [2004]
Note: Purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation.
It is to curb uncivilized practice of extracting a confession, even through the slightest

coercion, which might lead the accused to admit something untrue. (People v. Olivares Jr., 299
SCRA 635 [1998]
In pari material: People v. Paule, 261 SCRA 649 [1996]; People v. Andal, 279 SCRA 474
[1997]; People v. Layusa, 175 SCRA 47 [1989]; People v. Besonia, 422 SCRA 210 [2004]
It is the “evil extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for
the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict
him which is sought to be avoided. (People v. Bonola, 274 SCRA 238 [1997]; Guzman v.
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 [1997]; People v. Sandiganbayan, 138 SCRA 294 [1985]
The constitutional guarantees are meant to protect a person from the inherently coercive
psychological, if not, physical, atmosphere f such investigation. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US
436, 16 L Ed 694, 10 A.L.R., 3D, 1974, cited in People v. Duenas Jr., 426 SCRA 666 [2004]
6) The right to be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings.

See: Section 1[c], Rule 115
If at the arraignment the accused informs the trial judge that he cannot afford to secure
the service of a lawyer and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the
accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de
officio to give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.
If the accused at his arraignment is not represented by counsel, and insists on being
arraigned, still, it is no reasons for a trial judge to accede readily to his wish. (Gamas v. Oco,
425 SCRA 530 [2004]
Note: There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de officio was appointed during
the absence of the counsel of the accused de parte, pursuant to the desire of the court to finish the
case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. (People v. Larranga, 421 SCRA
530 [2004]
Note: “Preference in the choice of counsel” pertains more aptly and specifically to a person
under investigation rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution. Even if we are to extend
the application of the concept of “preference in the choice of counsel” to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable him to choose a
particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable. The reason for this rule is that the
“preferably” under Section 12 [1], Article III, of the Constitution does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. If the rule were
otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer,
who for one reason or another, is not available to protect its interest. The framers of the Charter
could not have contemplated this absurd scenario (People v. Larranga, supra). In the same
breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the
chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a
de officio counsel whom it considers competent and independent to enable the trial to proceed
until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution
will be entirely dictated by the counsel to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
(Ibid.)
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA – RULE 116
If at the arraignment, the accused appears without counsel, what should the trial court do?
The trial court should comply with these duties:
1) Inform the accused that he is entitled to have a counsel to assist him;

2) Ask the accused if he desires the aid or assistance of a counsel;
3) If accused desires to be assisted by counsel but is unable to employ one, the court
must assign a de oficio counsel to represent or assist him;
4) If accused desires to secure the services of counsel, he trial court should give him
reasonable time to secure the services of counsel of his choice.
See: Section 1[a], Rule 116; Gamas v. Oco, 425 SCRA 588 [2004]
Note: Every trial court judge should know the fundamental substantive and procedural
requirements at the time of arraignment of the accused; otherwise, he may be guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. (Gamas v. Oco, supra)
What are elements of a valid plea of guilty to a capital offense?
In Section 3, there are three conditions that the trial judge should do before a plea of
guilty can be entered by the accused, to wit: (1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) the
court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove that guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused whether he desire to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. (People v. Espidol, 442
SCRA 360 [2004]; People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 [2004]
See: People v. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 [1987]
This process is mandatory and absent any showing any showing that it has been observed
a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been aptly undertaken. (People v. Oden, 427 SCRA
634 [2004]
But the manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses
much of great significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving
the commission by the person accused of the offense charged. (People v. Oden, supra.)
Note: In pari material: People v. Ebio, 439 SCRA 421 [2004]; People v. Murillo, 434 SCRA 342
[2004]; People v. Tonyacao, 433 SCRA 513 [2004]; People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634 [2004]
A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient.
(People v. Toncayao, supra.)
What is the reason behind these indispensable requirements?
The reason for the rule is that the court must proceed with extreme care where the
imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.
Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident
please of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be averted since by admitting
his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his plea. (People v. Ulit, 423
SCRA 374 [2004]
In pari material: People v. Alborida, 359 SCRA 495 [2004]

Note: A plea guilty to a capital offense is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for
finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense
enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was
entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The
reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trail court, or
the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of
severity in the imposition of prescribed penalties. (People v. Besonia, 422 SCRA 210 [2004]
Note: The trial court must probe thoroughly into the reasons or motivations, as well as the facts
and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused and his comprehension of is plea; explain
to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the nature and effect of any
modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for
the crime for which he would plead to (398 SCRA 132 [2003]
People v. Espidol, 442 SCRA 363 [2004] En Banc
Facts:
Espidol, Dalacat, Tomas, Corpuz and Aniaso were charged with the crime of robbery in
band with homicide before RTC of Vigan City, Branch 20. The case against Tomas was
dismissed for lack of evidence abd gus bane was stricken out from the Information. Danilo died
while in prison. Tomas fled from prison and remains at large. Aniaso was detained in
Cabanatuan for another offense. Dalacat when arraigned initially entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecutors presented three witnesses. When the third witness finished with his testimony,
Attorney Fatima Vitamog, new counsel for Dalacat manifested in open court that Dalacat desired
to change his plea, to a plea of guilty. Dalacat was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of guilty
the trial court re-set the hearing to assess Dalacat’s comprehension of his plea. At said hearing,
Dalacat assisted by Attorney Ligaya Ascano vice Attorney Vitamog. The trial court inquired
from Dalacat if his new counsel clearly explained to him the legal effects and consequences of
his plea of guilty. He answered in the affirmative. Without much ado, the trial court deemed the
case submitted for resolution. The trial court convicted Dalacat of the crime of robbery in band
with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. The case was brought to the
Supreme court by automatic review.

Dalacat, among other errors committed by the trial court, complained that the trial court
erred in failing to consider the appellant’s plea of guilty as improvident.
Issue: Did the trial court conduct searching questions to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea?
Ruling:
It is required that the trial court must conduct searching questions to ascertain the
voluntariness of the plea of guilty and the comprehension of the consequences of such plea so
that the plea can be truly said to be based on a free and informed judgment. (People v. Alicando,
251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v. Durango, 329 SCRA 758 [2000]; People v. Aranzado, 365
SCRA 649 [2001]
In the language of the Court through then Chief Justice Castro in People v. Apduhan trial
judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity the plea of guilty of the accused, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to
it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import
of an inevitable conviction.
Issue: What is the scope or criteria or guidelines anent the trial court’s duty to conduct
searching inquiry?
Ruling:
The following guidelines as evolved in many cases must be followed:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he has the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out
(2) the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.
Note: In pari material: People v. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 412 [1996]; People v.
Durango, 329 SCRA 758 [2000]; People v. Aranzado, 365 SCRA 649 [2001]
(3) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.
Note: In pari material (Ibid. People v. Nadera Jr., 324 SCRA 490 [2000]

(4) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Note: In pari material: People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People v. Bello
316 SCRA 804 [1999].
(5) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed
an accused pleads guilty with the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions.
Note: In pari material: People v. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 [1990]; People v. Alicando,
supra; People v. Durango, supra; People v. Aranzado, supra; People v. Sta. Teresa,
354 SCRA 697 [2001].
(6) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him or make him re-enact the manner which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him
to supply missing details of significance.
Note: In pari material: (People v. Dayot, supra; People v. Alicando, supra; People v.
Durango, supra; People v. Aranzado, supra; People v. Sta. Teres, supra.
Adjudication: The judgment was reversed and set aside; the case was remanded to said
trial of origin for trial against Dalacat; trial court to conduct the proper trial of accused
with all deliberate speed upon receipt of the records of the cases together with accused
Aniasco as he is now detained.
Is there a fixed formula for the trial court to follow in the matter of conducting “searching
inquiry”?
There is no hard-and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry or as to
the number and character of witnesses he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with
which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merits.
The singular barometer is that the judge must, in all cases, fully convince himself that: (1) the
accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily – meaning, he was not coerced or threatened
of physical harm, or placed under a state of duress; and (2) that he is truly guilty on the basis of
his testimony. (People v. Apatay, 433 SCRA 658 [2004]

What are the matters that the trial court should take into consideration when the accused
waives his right to present evidence?
A waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence should never be taken lightly and
should always be subjected to careful scrutiny by the court. To be upheld as valid, it must be
established that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and possible consequences. (People v. Beriber, 431
SCRA 332 [2004] En Banc)
What is the effect of an invalid waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence?
The invalidity of the waiver by an accused to present evidence does not automatically
vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and cause the remand thereof to the trial court.
There must be a showing that the invalid waiver resulted in the inadequate presentation of facts
by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. (People v. Beriber, supra.)
State the scope of the role of the counsel for the accused during trial.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, means and efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation. (People v. Beriber, supra citing People v. Bernas, 306 SCRA 135
[1999]
RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH
May the prosecution file a motion for provisional dismissal of a criminal case?
Yes, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party as
provided for in Section 1. (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 297 [2004])

May the accused invoke the right to speedy trial on the ground that the trial was not
brought within the time limit as provided under Section 9, Rule 119?
Under Section 9, Rule 119, the trial court may dismiss a criminal case on a motion nolle
prosequi if the accused is no brought to trial within the prescribed time and is deprived of this
right to speedy trial or disposition of the case on account of unreasonable or capricious delay
caused by the prosecution. En contrario, the accused is not entitle to dismissal where such delay
was caused by the proceedings or motions instituted by him. But it must be understood that an
overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case may enable the defendant, who may be guilty, to go
free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people accused of
crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal error. (Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan, ibid.)
Is the State entitled to due process in a criminal action?
The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable
opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually
increase the workload of the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays in the final
resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent court,
instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically
enough, unnecessarily delayed the case – in the process, causing the very evil it apparently
sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.
(Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, ibid.)
Is a dismissal of a criminal case the same as the acquittal of the accused therein?
No. Dismissal of a case is different from the acquittal of the accused therein. The
exception is that a dismissal of the criminal action based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal
case will not result in the acquittal of the said accused. (People v. Sandiganbayan, 439 SCRA
390 [2004]
What is the doctrine of “finalty-of-acquittal”? What is the philosophy behind the

constitutional prescription against double jeopardy?
It means simply that the verdict of acquittal is to be regarded as absolutely final and may
not be reviewed by an appellate court. It is a safeguard against double jeopardy.
The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double

jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression though the abuse of criminal processes. The underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. (People v. Court of Appeals, et al.
423 SCRA 605 [2004] citing the case of Green v. United State, 355 US184, 2 L. Ed 199, 78 S.
Ct. 122. 61 ALR 2d 1119)
In pari material: US v. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67; People v. Bringas, 70 Phil. 528;
Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 [1951]; People v. Cabarles, 102 Phil. 926 [1958]; People v.
Bao, 106 Phil. 243 [1959]
Problem: A was charged with and convicted of the crime of qualified theft. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and entered a judgment acquitting A of the
crime charged. May the Solicitor General question the acquittal of A via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 – on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Explain fully your answer.
Answer: The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 455 [2003] it was
observed that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The reason for the rule is when a court exercises
its jurisdiction; an error committed while engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive
it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario,
the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper
recourse for the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
For example: Petitioner alleges in his Petition for Certiorari grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. But in the body of the Petition the discussion
centers on the errors of the judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. Petitioner delves, among others,
with the testimonies relative to the positions of the victim and the accused, and the opinion of the
expert witnesses in respect to certain physical evidence. These errors dwell deeply in the
appellate court’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence proffered by the parties. These are
findings that impinge on errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, correctible by a
petition for review of certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (People v. Court of Appeals, 423
SCRA 605 [2004]

Thus, in the above problem, if the Solicitor General raised in its Petition for Certiorari
plain errors of judgment or errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, then the Petition should be
dismissed. On the other hand, if the Petition clearly sets out facts and circumstances committee
by the Court of Appeals that clearly amount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, then Petition will prosper.
Note: There were similar petitions for erroneous application of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, to name a few – Vda. De Nazareno v. Count of Appeals, 257 SCRA 589 [1996];
Santiago Land Development Company v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 535 [1996]; Sempio v.
Development Bank of the Philippines, 263 SCRA 617 [1996]; Chua v. Samaco, 271 SCRA 546
[1997]; People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 [2002]
Note: In People v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687 [1999], the Court observed: It is quite
obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to the
Respondent Court because of the latter’s suppose misapprehension and wrongful assessment of
factual evidence. However, as earlier stress, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari which extra ordinem – beyond the ambit of
appeal. Stated else wise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court
in a certiorari proceeding. This court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, asses and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial court and the
appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one
party or the other. The mere fact that a court erroneously decided a case does not necessarily
deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its
judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that is has jurisdiction over the
case.
In People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 [2000], the Court likewise dismissed similar petition
not only on the ground that acquittal of the defendant by the lower court was not reviewable via
the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said petition would
constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. In the absence of a
finding of mistrial i.e., the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
43 [1986]; a judgment of acquittal is final and may not be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy whether it happens at the trial or court level or at the Court of Appeals.
Problem: A was charged and acquitted of a criminal case before the RTC. X, the offended party
appealed from the judgment of acquittal with respect to the civil aspect of the criminal case.
May A invoke the double jeopardy?
Answer: No. An accused ma be acquitted on reasonable doubt hence the civil liability remains.
But if the acquittal is clear that A did not commit that crime or that A is not the perpetrator
thereof, the civil liability is thus extinguished. Having been extinguished, there is nothing to
appeal. (See Manantan v. Court of Appeals. 350 SCRA 387 [2001]
Question: When does the rule on double jeopardy attach?
Answer: The exception to the double jeopardy rule attaches only when the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion amounting to violation of due process, i.e., that the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or that the trial court was a sham – if there is no denial
of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the
exception to the double jeopardy rule. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II,
360 SCRA 359 [2001]
TRIAL – RULE 119
What is the effect of a grant of a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence?
Where the accused had filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence which was
granted by the trial court, upon denial of the demurrer to evidence, the trial court should give the
accused the opportunity to present his evidence. If the trial court disallowed the accused to
adduce evidence after the denial of the demurrer to evidence, there is a procedural unfairness and
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the
case for reception of defense evidence is warranted as the constitutional right of the accused to
be heard has been violated. (People v. Alcanzado, 428 SCRA 681 [2004]
JUDGMENT -- RULE 120
Is a verbal judgment or final order of dismissal valid?
No. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of this provision; hence, such
order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. Section 1, Rule 120 mandates
that a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the
law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded
on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442
SCRA 294 [2004])
In what instances may promulgation be made without the presence of the accused?
There are two instances when judgment may be promulgated even without the presence
of the accused: (1) when the judgment is for a light offense, in which case, the counsel of the or a
representative may stand for him; and (2) in cases where despite due notice to the accused or his

bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed to appear at the promulgation of the
decision.
The evident purpose of the latter exception is to afford the offended party the opportunity
to enforce the award of civil indemnity, which could not, otherwise, be effected if the decision
cannot be pronounced on account of the absence of the accused. (Officers and Members of the
IBP, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan, 443 SCRA 87 [2004] En Banc; Dissenting opinion
of Justice Callejo)
Distinguish rendition of judgment from promulgation of judgment
The filing with the clerk of court is the rendition of judgment, while promulgation of
judgment is the reading in the presence of the accused by any judge of the court in which it may
be rendered. A judgment or sentence does not become a judgment in law until the same has been
read or announced to the defendant or has become part of the record of the court. When there is
no valid promulgation of judgment, no right to appeal accrues. (Ibid.)
NEW TRIAL – RULE 121
When may a remedy of new trial be invoked?
A motion for new trial, under this rule, is available only for a limited period of time, and
for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before
a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available
remedy. Section 2 enumerates the grounds for new trial.
Where an accused invokes the ground of newly discovered evidence, like DNA test,
allegedly excluding him from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape. This cannot
prosper. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment. (People v. Judavar, 380 SCRA 580 [2000]; Section 2[b], Rule 121) Thus, although
DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after trial, it does not meet the criteria for “newly-
discovered evidence” that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could
have been discovered and produced at the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. (In Re:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, 442 SCRA 706 [2004]. En Banc)
See: In pari Material: People v. Li Ka Kim, 429 SCRA 169 [2004]

State the requisites for a new trial. Or, what are the requisites of a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence?
They are: (1) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching and of such weight
that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment. (People v. Morales, 427 SCRA 765 [2004]
Is a petition for habeas corpus available as a post-conviction remedy of the accused-

convict? Or is the invocation of the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus valid to collaterally
attack a judgment of conviction after it became final?
What is the nature and extent of the remedy of habeas corpus?
The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the
presentation of what is allegedly newly discovered evidence. This court is tasked to determine,
first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already
convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second, the
propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those
seemingly restrained from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. The writ applies to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In
Villavicencio v. Lukban, it is ruled that any restraint, which will preclude freedom of action, is
sufficient.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form
of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitantly to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly
acquired jurisdiction was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the
conduct of the proceedings. Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the
recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 525 [2000], it was ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only
in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void to such excess.

Where an accused-convict invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the
review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality is a relief far outside the scope of
habeas corpus. Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant are not correctible in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, if at all, these errors must be corrected on
certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law. (Felipe v. Director of Prisons,
24 Phil 121 [1913]; In re Garcia, 339 SCRA 292 [2000] A writ of habeas corpus is not to be used
as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available
only in limited instances when a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction renders a judgment. (In
Re: Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, supra. En Banc)
What is the effect of failure to file a motion for reconsideration on time?
The failure of the accused to file his motion for reconsideration within the period fixed by
law renders the decision final and executory. Such failure carries with it the result that no court
can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. Phrased elsewise, a final and executory
judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land. ( Barnes v. Padilla, 349 SCRA 675 [2004]
Are there exceptions to the above rule?
The Court has relaxed the rule in order to serve substantial justice considering: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby. (Ibid.)
APPEAL – RULE 122
What is the effect of an appeal taken by the accused from a judgment of conviction?
The appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues whether raised or not by
the parties may be resolved by the appellate court. The appeal confers upon the appellate court
full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed
from, increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of law. (Eusebio-Calderon v. People, 441
SCRA 137 [2004]; People v. Alzona, 435 SCRA 461 [2004]; People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 284
[2004]; People v. Pineda, 429 SCRA 478 [2004]; People v. Cadampog, 428 SCRA 336 [2004];
People v. Castillo, 425 SCRA 136 [2004]; People v. Malinao, 423 SCRA 34 [2004]

The rule that the reviewing courts do not disturb the findings of the trial court’s
appreciation of the evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Pineda, supra)
Note: In another way of expressing the principle: Appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo
and the court is not limited to the assigned errors. The appeal thus opens the whole case for
review, and the appellate court may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even
reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.
(People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 [2004]
What is the effect of the finding of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals?
As a rule, such finding of facts is binding upon the Supreme Court. The exception is: this
finding of facts does not bind the Supreme Court when facts are misinterpreted and the
innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the
Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. (Pomoy v. People, 439 SCRA 439 [2004]
May the accused and the offended party appeal the from the decision in a criminal case?
Yes. Both the accused and the prosecution may appeal from the decision in a criminal
action, but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. The offended party may also appeal the judgment with respect only to the civil liability.
(Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, 427 SCRA 456 [2004]
RULE 124- PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
An accused appealed a judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. While his appeal is
pending he escapes from prison or confinement, what will happen to his pending appeal?
The appellate court pursuant to Section 8, second paragraph, Rule 124, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, may dismiss the pending appeal of the accused.
The rule provides that: The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country while his appeal is pending.
Thus, in the event that the appellant (accused) escapes from custody or jumps bail, the
Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal. (People v. Castillo, 430 SCRA 40 [2004]
In People v. Araneta, 300 SCRA 80 [1998], where the appellant jumped bail after the case
was certified to the Court for review, the Court ruled that it is unwise to dismiss the appeal if
such will result to an injustice. In said case, dismissal of the appeal would have rendered the trial
court judgment of sentencing appellant to a lower penalty final, notwithstanding the appellate
court’s finding that a heavier penalty should be imposed. Thus, to avoid a mockery of justice,
whereby an appellant would benefit from his act of jumping bail, the Court resolved to continue
exercising jurisdiction over the case. (Cited in People v. Castillo, supra)
In People v. Castillo, 430 SCRA 40 [2004] where the court decided to dismiss the appeal
at this stage, the decision of the trial court sentencing appellant to a prison term within the range
of reclusion temporal would become final, despite the finding of the Court of Appeals that
appellant should instead be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To avoid the absurdity of
rewarding the appellant for his act of jumping bail, this Court deems it proper to precede
exercising jurisdiction and consider the instant appeal.
May the Court of Appeals dismiss a pending appeal of the accused?
Yes. The appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal pending
determination if the accused jumps bail, on the rationale that the appellant loses his standing in
court when he absconds. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, 427 SCRA 456 [2004]. An
accused who has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal rendering the judgment against him final and executory. (Ibid.)
May the Court of Appeals dismiss an appeal on technical grounds?
Dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon since the general
policy is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits. Hence, on a case-by-case basis, the
Court has relaxed the rules to give way to the paramount and overriding interest of justice.
For example: The petitioner (accused) argued that he should not bear the adverse consequences
of his former counsel’s negligence. His former counsel abandoned his case without informing
him and that it was only when his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals that he learned
of his former counsel’s withdrawal from the case. He argued further that the exercise by the
appellate court of the power to dismiss the appeal was not in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play as he was denied his right to be heard on appeal. The Court of Appeals, he argued,
should have excused the procedural lapse since strict compliance with the rules meant sacrificing
justice for technicality. Considering that no material injury was suffered by the People by reason
of the delay in the filing of his brief, the appellate court should have allowed him to file it even
beyond the required period.
Required to Comment, the Solicitor General argued that the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in issuing the resolution dismissal of the appeal and the denial of the motion for
reconsideration since (1) the delay in the filing of the brief was more than one year; (2) for more
than one year, the petitioner negligently failed to exert effort to confer with his counsel about the
progress of his appeal; (3) knowing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty
imposed on him, petitioner should have been diligent to communicate with his counsel
concerning his case; and (4) even though he filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his appeal, prudence dictated that, without waiting for the resolution of his motion, he should
have filed his brief within a reasonable time. (Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 175
[2004]
May technical and procedural rules be done with to serve the better interest of substantial
justice?
Yes. Except for criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death,
an appeal from the judgment of the lower court is not a matter of right but of sound discretion.
Technical and other procedural requirements are meant to promptly dispose of unmeritorious
petitions that clog the docket and waste the time of the courts. These technical and procedural
rules, however, are intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their
rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain their prime objective for; after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts. (Acme Shoe, Rubber and
Plastic Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 714 [1996]
In this case, the notice of appeal was timely filed with the appellate court, hence acquired
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner merely failed to submit his appellant’s brief within the
period provided by the rules. A distinction should be made between the failure to file a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period and the failure to file a brief within the period granted by
the appellate court. The former results in the failure of the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction
over the appealed decision resulting in its becoming final and executory upon the failure of the
appellant to move for reconsideration. The latter simply results in the abandonment of the appeal,
which can lead to its dismissal upon the failure to move for reconsideration. (Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 501 [2001]
This is not to say, however, that technical and procedural rules governing appeals,
including those prescribing reglementary periods, need not be observed at all or may be ignored
at will.
The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in the manner provided for by law and the
rules. However, while as a general rule, a review on appeal is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion and may be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefore, still it must be remembered that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system.
Courts should thus proceed with extreme care so as not to deprive a party of this right. “Laws
and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light
of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all. (Magsaysay
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 513 [1996]

To what extent may the rules allowing motu proprio dismissals of appeals be applied?
The need to safeguard petitioner’s rights should caution courts against motu proprio
dismissal of appeals, especially in criminal cases where the liberty of the accused is at stake. The
rules allowing motu proprio dismissals merely confer a power and does not impose a duty; and
the same is not mandatory but merely dilatory, which therefore requires a great deal of prudence,
considering all the attendant circumstances. (Sapad v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 304 [2000]
(See: Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 175 [2004])
Problem: A was convicted of murder by the RTC and sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of
death. While the judgment of conviction is pending review by the appellate court, A escaped
detention. Should the appeal be dismissed? Why?
Answer: No. When the appellant (A) escaped detention pending appeal or review of his case, the
appeal is normally dismissed, and the judgment of the trial court becomes final and executory.
However, this rule does not apply to death cases, in which law mandates automatic review even
if appellant has absconded. (People v. Latayada, 423 SCRA 237 [2004]
See: In pari material: People v. Esparas, 260 SCRA 539 [1996]; People v. Pradesh, 293 SCRA
411 [1998]; People v. Raquino, 315 SCRA 670 [1999]
Problem: F was charged and convicted of the crime of attempted homicide. From the judgment,
F appealed to the RTC and insisted that he acted in self-defense. The RTC overruled the plea of
self-defense but deleted the award of moral damages. F filed a petition for review under Rule 42
serving copies of said petition to the City Prosecutor and the RTC. The CA issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition for failure of F to serve a copy of his Petition for Review on the Office of
the Solicitor General. F filed a motion for reconsideration and served a copy of the Petition with
proof of such service. The Solicitor General opposed the motion and argued that no less than a
fealty compliance of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was required of the Petitioner. Service of
copies of the Petition for Review on the City Prosecutor and the RTC was not substantial
compliance with the Rules. Neither was the service of a copy of the Petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General after the dismissal of the petition before the CA is sufficient.
Question: Was the failure of F to serve a copy of Petition for Review on the Office of the
Solicitor General a fatal defect, hence, the dismissal of his Petition was valid?
Answer: No. There is nothing that showed any deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to
subvert and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that his
petition was dismissed by the CA for his failure to serve a copy of his petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General, he forthwith served a copy of his petition on the said office and filed a
motion for reconsideration on the resolution of the CA.
The petition for review on certiorari is meritorious and granted citing the case of Ligon v.
Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 693 [1995] where the court ruled that courts should not be so strict
about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After all,
the higher objective of procedural rules is to insure that the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
administration of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. (See: Fabrigar v.
People, 422 SCRA 395 [2004]
RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Note: The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature.
Without a judicial warrant issued after the prerequisites have been complied with, any search and
seizure made is unreasonable and therefore null and void. All items seized by virtue of an
unreasonable search are inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. But, there are instances
where search and seizure without a judicial warrant are considered valid and lawful.
They are: (1) search is incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) customs search; (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6)
consented search. (See: People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997]; People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA
140 [1999]; Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 [1997]; People v. Hizon, 265 SCRA
517 [1996]; People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 [2000]
In the matter of search incidental to a lawful arrest, the rule is that where the arrest was
incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any evidence
obtained is inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. But where the arrest is legal or
lawful, it follows that the subsequent search is likewise lawful following the rule of search
incident to a lawful arrest. Any evidence obtained as a consequence of the search is admissible in
evidence. (See: People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998]; People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 479 [1999];
People v. Valdez, supra; Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 [1997]
The legality of an arrest may be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, hence, the right to question the legality of an arrest is purely personal, and a
third party cannot avail of said right. This right to question the legality of an arrest may be raised
at any time before arraignment and plea of the accused whose rights were impaired thereby. (Uy
v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344
SCRA 36 [2000]
(See: People v. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472 [2004]

What are the elements of a search warrant?
They are: (1) it must be based on probable cause; (2) contain a particular description of
the place to be searched; (3) must describe the items or property to be seized. (People v. Delos
Reyes, 441 SCRA 305 [2004]
State the duty of the court before it issues a search warrant.
To conduct a full and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and determine the existence of a probable cause. Probable cause must first focus on a
specific location. The lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not
been sufficient showing to the Judge that the described items are to be found in a particular
place. If the applicant or official is unable to state with sufficient precision the place to be
searched and why he reasonably believes that contraband or evidence of criminal activity will be
found therein, it is highly doubtful that he possesses probable cause for a warrant. (People v.
Delos Reyes, 441 SCRA 305 [2004]
What is the rule as to how a Judge may conduct his examination?
Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a Judge may conduct his examination, it
is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinely,
general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent and factual and
legal justifications for a search warrant. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the
averments not stated in the affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the witnesses. If the Judge
fails to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, it constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. (People v. Delos Reyes, supra)
May the judge before whom an application for search warrant is pending delegate the
determination of a probable cause?
The Judge cannot delegate the determination of probable cause, in part, or in whole,
regardless of the qualifications of the person on whom reliance is placed. It is not permissible for
the Judge to share the required determination with another. ( People v. Delos Reyes, supra)
How is a search warrant implemented? Explain.
Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify
themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to
be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to
them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them. This requirement is
not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial provision which
safeguards individual liberty. No precise form of words is required. It is sufficient that the
accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to
be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the
protection of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his property, but also the safety and
well-being of the officers serving and implementing the search warrant.
Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched
is notified of the search warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as
an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the process
may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he would not
be criminally liable.
Also, there is very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the search
warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material
information. Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment
attendant upon an unannounced intrusion. Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of
a reasonable search. A search would violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure if the entry were illegal, whether accompanied by force, or by threat or show
of force or obtained by stealth, or coercion. (People v. Huang Zhen Hua, 439 SCRA 350 [2004]
When is unannounced intrusion lawful and valid?
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises
or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in
the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c)
when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life and limb;
and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for
example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the
officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have
no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the exceptions
above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily
on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced
intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally
defective, if the police officers’ entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement interest
may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Indeed, there is no formula for
determination of reasonableness. In determining the lawfulness of an unannounced entry and the
existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had reason to
believe and the time of the entry. (Ibid.)

When is there probable cause for an arrest without a warrant?
Probable cause exists for the detention and arrest without a warrant of one at the premises
being searched when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reliable and trustworthy information are sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a
cautious person that an offense has been or is being committed. (Ibid.)
What is meant by probable cause?
Probable cause means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper. (Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, 438 SCRA 224 [2004]
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by
the words themselves “probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. (Ibid.)
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under
oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses. (Ibid.)
Is the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest a ground to quash
information? Explain.
No. To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow. The absence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground to quash the Information but is a ground for the
dismissal of the case.
The Regional Trial Court issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused only upon a
finding of probable cause based on the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, the affidavits
and other evidence appended to the Information, whatever evidence the Prosecutor may adduce
upon order of the court. If the court finds that there is no probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, it may dismiss the case. The dismissal of the case is without prejudice to the
refiling thereof unless barred by prescription. Under Section 6, Rule 112, the trial court is
mandated to immediately dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a
warrant of arrest, and after having evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting
evidence. (People v. Sandiganbayan, 439 SCRA 390 [2004]
A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.
(Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 658 [2004]
Things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of
description is not required. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable
the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate the place or thing is sufficient.
(Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
Is it necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search is issued?
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, however, there must be sufficient
showing that the property is under the control or possession of the person. (People v. Del
Castillo, 439 SCRA 601 [2004]
How should the search of a house be done?
The search must be done in the presence of the lawful occupants and it is only in the
absence of the former that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality may be called upon to witness the search. The occupants should be allowed to witness
and see the on-going search. They should be the ones that should accompany the policemen
while the search is being done and not substituted by the barangay tanods in their stead.
What should the policemen do with the seized property?
The police officers must deliver the seized items to the judge who issued the warrant
together with the true inventory of the items seized duly accomplished and verified. The
policemen should not deliver the seized items to the PNP crime laboratory for examination.
(Ibid.)
Is a partially defective warrant valid?
Not necessarily. There is no existing provision of law, which requires that a warrant,
particularly defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to
the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to
the items specifically described in the warrant. (Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp. 438 SCRA
224 [2004]
For the items seized but without having been specifically described in the warrant are
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding because they were obtained through unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Ibid.)

Survey of cases in
2005
Criminal Procedure

Retired RTC Judge of Baguio- Benguet
Guest Lecturer, SLU College of Law
February 11 to 17, 2005
Rule 110 – Prosecution of Offenses
Is the right to institute a criminal action without limit?
No. it is a sound principle of justice and public policy that persons shall have free access
to the courts for redress of wrong and vindication of their rights. But the right to institute
crimination prosecutions has its meters and bounds and can not be exercised maliciously and in
bad faith to the detriment and harassment of a person who, without cause, is pestered,
inconvenienced, and rendered cash-strapped in as much as such suits where liberty is at stakes,
compel an accused to hire a lawyer and incur other expenses for his defense. Over these
monetary costs is the psychological burden that an accused and his family would have to bundle
in the interregnum. ( Martires v. Cokieng, 451 SCRA 696 (Feb. 2005)
How is the sufficiency of Information determined?
In determining the sufficiency of a criminal Information, the basic rule is that the
essential elements of the offense of which the accused is charged must be expressly stated therein
with reasonable certainty to enable the accused to prepare his defense. (Basa v. People, 451
SCRA 510 (Feb. 2005)
Rule 112 – Preliminary Investigation
Section 1- Preliminary investigation defined.
State the concept and purpose of a preliminary investigation?
A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well- found belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. (Sec.1, Rule
112; Department of Justice v. Liwag, supra.) 451 SCRA 83 (Feb. 2005)
How is probable cause determined?
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
( Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 533 [2005])
May the same criminal complaint be filed successively before two or three investigative
bodies?
No. to allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative
bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings – it would also cause undue difficulties to the
respondent who would have to appear and define his position before every agency or body where
the complaint was filed. (DOJ v. Liwag, supra)
Section 7 – When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.
May as person lawfully arrested and detained apply for bail even without any Information
having been filed in court?
A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in
court, can seek his provisional release through the filing of an application for bail. He need not
wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed since bail is available to “all persons”
where the offense is bailable. (Ruiz v. Beldia Jr., 451 SCRA 402 [Feb. 2005])
Comment
Under Section 7, Rule 112, When a person is lawfully arrested involving an offense which
requires a preliminary investigation, the information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
Before the complaint or information is filed the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, in the presence off his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and
the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
It is clear that an accused may file an application for bail even if he has waived the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provided that the offense committed is
bailable.
Problem: Pedro was arrested during entrapment operations relative to the carnapping of
Juan’s vehicle. Pedro was detained in Camp Dangwa, Benguet, pending the filling of formal
charges in court. Upon inquest, Pedro executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
RPC in relation to section 7, of Rule 112. the inquest prosecutor set the hearing of the
preliminary investigation on September 7, 2004 at 2:00pm. However, on September 6, 2004
Pedro obtained an order of release signed by Judge Cabato, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Benguet
Branch 62. Judge Cabato apparently granted bail to Pedro and approved the bail upon an
application for bail filed by Pedro and a notice was served upon the trial prosecutor assigned to
Branch 62.
Juan questioned the Order o Release because Judge Cabato had no authority to grant bail
to Pedro since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to conclude the preliminary investigation. He
further claimed that for as long as the information has not yet been filed in court. A court has no
power to grant bail to a detained person like Pedro since 1 hasn’t yet acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused of Juan tenable?
Answer: No. (See Ruling in Ruiz v. Beldia Jr., supra)
Where an accused is charged with an offense where bail is of right, that is, the offense
does not carry a penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or death is entitled to bail. Even
if the offense is under preliminary investigation, and thus no formal charge has yet been filled
with the court, the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right but should file an application
must be set for hearing with notice to the trial prosecutor. Section 17 [c]; Rule 114 states that any
person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city, or municipality where he is held.
Suppose the offense is not bailable as a matter of right but a matter of discretion, that is
when the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, then
the accused is not entitled to bail pending preliminary investigation. Section 17 [b], Rule 114
states that where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion or the accused seeks to be released on
recognition, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending ,
whether on preliminary investigation, trial or appeal. In this case, there must be (1) an
application for bail and fix bail; (2) the application for bail must be set for hearing with notice to
the prosecutor who may be required by the trial court to file his comment or opposition to the
application.
Notes and Cases
Bail hearing is required whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion. This is
mandatory. The trial prosecutor must be given notice of hearing, or at least his recommendations
should be sought. A trial judge who disregards this basic rule is administratively liable. (Zuno v.
Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382 [2004]; Cortes v. Judge Catral, 279 SCRA 1 [1997] if the prosecutor is
not notified of the hearing, the prosecutor is deprived of his procedural right to due process for
which the trail court is accountable. (Floresita v. Ubiadas, 429 SCRA 270 [2004]) Failure to rise
or the absence of an objection on the part of the prosecutor in an application for bail does not
dispense with the requirements of a bail or hearing. (Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas, 400 SCRA 37
[2003])

Comment
Where the accused is convicted of an offense the penalty imposed is below life
imprisonment and appeals from the said judgment of conviction, bail is am matter of discretion
of the court.
Where the accused is convicted of a capital offense and death penalty is imposed or
sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and he appeals from said judgment of
conviction, he is no longer entitled to bail pending appeal.
Problem: Judge Pablo, presiding judge of MTC Itogon, Benguet conducted a preliminary
investigation of a compliant for homicide committed in Itogon, Benguet and where Marlo, the
accused was arrested. Has judge Pablo the authority to act on an application for bail file by
Marlo, the accused?
Answer: Yes A judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, and who has jurisdiction
over the place the accused was arrested, has authority to grant bail and to order the release of the
accused even if he records of the case had been transmitted for review to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet. (Sec: Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcuno, 387 SCRA 532 [2002])
Notes and Cases
The authority of the Department of Justice to conduct preliminary investigation is based

on the provision of the 1987 Administrative Code. ( Department of Justice v. Liwag, 451 SCRA
83 [2005])
Office of the Ombudsman
The office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the
principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the
bureaucratic maze of procedures, and for this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers
given to prosecutors. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to
investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies. (DOJ v. Liwag, 451 SCRA 83
[2005])
What is the extent of the authority or power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation?
The Ombudsman is given the primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the
investigation of such cases, a power not given to other investigative bodies, such as DOJ. The
Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power. (DOJ v. Liwag,
supra)

To discharge its duty effectively, the constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman
with special features, which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigative
agencies. (DOJ v. Liwag, supra)
Explain the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction.
Concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. The
settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Even if there is concurrent jurisdiction between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, the concurrence is not to
be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a
contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. (DOJ v. Liwag,
supra)
Rule 114 – Bail
May an “assisting judge” in a particular court issue a bail upon application of the accused?
Explain.
Facts: Executive Judge A and Presiding Judge B were present on Sept. 18 2005 to act on the bail
application of the accused X Judge C acted on the bail application of accused on said date, his
designation was merely an “assisting judge” in the RCT- Baguio City, his permanent station
being in RTC San Fernando City, Branch 62. Ruling: As such the authority of Judge C in the
RTC Baguio City is limited and he could only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the
absence or unavailability of the regular judge – Judge B (Ruiz v. Beldia Jr., 451 SCRA 402 [Feb.
2005])
Rule 120 Judgement
Distinguish between final order from interlocutory order.
A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. On the other hand, is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to b done upon its merits. (Basa v. People, 451 SCRA 510 [Feb. 2005]
For instance, an order dismissing the Information upon that the offense charged had
already prescribed. This is a final order as it disposes completely the proceeding and there is
nothing more to be done but to have it executed.
A denial of a motion to quash filled the accused is an interlocutory order because there is
yet to be a full dress trial awaiting for the disposition of the case on the merits.

May an order a motion to quash be appealed? Explain.
No. it is axiomatic that an order denying a motion to quash on the ground that the
allegation in the information do not constitute an offense cannot be challenged by an appeal. The
reason is to avoid multiplicity of appeal in a single action. To tolerate the practice of allowing
appeals from interlocutory order would not only delay the administration of justice but also
unduly burden the courts. (Basa v. People, supra)
Section 6- Promulgation of Judgment
Is the Judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction be promulgated?
No. The judgment which the rule to be promulgated is the sentence rendered by the trial
court, not the judgment of the appellate court sent to the trial court, the latter being unnecessary
to be promulgated to the defendant because it is presumed that the accused or his attorney had
already been notified thereof the appellate court. The latter court sends a copy of its judgment to
the trial court not for promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for execution of the
judgment against him. (Report n the On-the-Spot Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trail
Court, Branch 45 and 53, Bacolod City, 451 SCRA 303 [Feb. 2005])
Rule 124- Procedures in the Court of Appeals.
Section 8 – Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to promote.
An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its motion or that of the appellee
for failure of the appellant to file its brief within the time provided by Section 7,
Rule 44 of the Court of Court (Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista, 451 SCRA 294 [Feb. 2005])
Comment
Section 18, Rule 124 states that Rules 42,44 and 48 to 56 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedures are applicable in criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures.
Rule 125 – Procedures in the Supreme Court
Does the Supreme Court delve into the facts of an appealed case?
A case is brought to the Supreme Court via a petition on certiorari, where only questions
of law are raised. (Verceles v. Bureau of Labor Relations Department of Labor and Employment
– National Capital Region, 451 SCRA 484 [Feb. 2005[)

Notes and Cases
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law and factual issues are not within
its province (Alonzo v. San Juan, 451 SCRA 45 [2005]
Factual findings of trail courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
binding on the Supreme Court. This rule accepts exceptions. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Macalinao, 451 SCRA 63 [2005])
The Supreme Court may renew the facts when:
(1) When the findings of a trail court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(2) A lower court’s influence from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) There is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation facts;
(4) The findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case, or fails to notice certain relevant facts which if properly
considered will justify a different conclusion;
(5) These is a misappreciation of facts;
(6) The findings of facts are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based, are premises on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, supra; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 287
SCRA 465 [1998])
The Supreme Court may determine and resolve questions of facts in cases (1) where the findings
of facts of the trail court and those of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent, (2) where highly
meritorious circumstances are present, and (3) where it is necessary to give substantial justice to
the parties. (Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, 451 SCRA 491 [Feb
2005])
But the Supreme Court does not, of itself, automatically delve into the record of a case to
determine the facts anew where there is disagreement between the findings of facts by the trail
court and by the court of appeals, When the disagreement is merely on the probative value of the
evidence, i.e., which is more credible of two versions, its review is limited to only ascertaining if
the records support the findings of the court of appeals. (Bank of Commerce v. Serrano, 451
SCRA 484 [Feb 2005])

February 18 – March 4, 2005
Jurisdiction
Notes and Cases
Meaning of the term jurisdiction
The term “jurisdiction” is derived from the Latin words “jus” and “dicere”. The word
“jus” means law and the other word “dicere” means the dicere. (I Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd
Ed, p. 1760)
Jurisdiction means, “ the power conferred by the law upon a judge or court to try a case the
cognizance if which belongs to them exclusively. (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, et al., 5 Phil. 265 [1905]
Meaning of territorial jurisdiction
Possible criminal venues for the institution of a criminal and civil aspects of the
crime of libel.
By case law, the Supreme Court has summarized the criminal venue in libel cases, as
follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Insurance (now RTC) of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is private individual, the criminal action may not be field in the
CFI (now RTC) of the province where he resided at the time of the commission of offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose offense is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may filed in the CFI (now RTC) of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding officer outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the CFI ( now RTC ) of the province or city where he held at the time of the
commission of he offense. (Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699 [1979] cited in Macassaet v. People,
supra) 452 SCRA 255 (Feb 2005)
To avoid any conflict or controversy as the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegation as to whether, at the time of
the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and
where he was actually residing at the time. Whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. The allegation would be a
sine qua non if he circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as
the basis of the venue of the action. (Agbayani v. Sayo, supra, citied in Macasaet v. People,
supra)

Section 5 – Who may prosecute criminal actions
Who prosecute criminal actions?
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under

the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The offended party may intervene in the action
personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests and in the interest of the specify and inexpensive administration of justice. ( Mobilia
Products Inc. v. Umesawa, 452 SCRA 736 [March 2005})
Notes and Cases
The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the
case shall be under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination
of the case. (Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umzawa, supra)
The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the
exercise of his discretion, but he may, any time, take over the actual conduct of the trail (Mobilia
Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, supra)
The private complaint or offended party may not undertake such motion for
reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case; the offended party may file a motion
for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal there from but only insofar as the
civil aspect thereof is concerned. The offended party need not secure the conformity of the public
prosecutor. (Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, supra)
Public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint
motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the
criminal aspect, (Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, supra)
Rule 112 – Preliminary investigation
Section 1, par. 2 should be read with Section 7
A preliminary investigation is acquired before the filing of a compliant or information for

an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years two (2) months and one
(1) day without regard to the fine. (Sesbreno v. Aglugub, 452 SCRA 365 [2005}
Power of MTC conducting preliminary investigation to issue warrant of arrest is

discretionary.

It is not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating MTC judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the respondent (accused) even after having personally examined the
compliant and his witnesses in the for m of searching questions for the determine of whether
probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to placed the accused in custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judge’ sound judgment. (Sesbreno v. Aglugub, supra)
Rule 114 – Bail
Duties of the trial court in case of an application for bail by the accused.
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing in the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing on the application for bail whether or not the prosecution
presents evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, to enable the court to exercise
its discretion;
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. (Ocenar v. Mabutin, 452 SCRA 377 [Feb 2005])
Rule 122- Appeal
Notes and Comments
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part o due process, it is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of the law authorizing such exercise. (Baniqued v. Ramos, 452
SCRA 813 [2005])
Comment
When the accused is conviction of a crime the impossible penalty is below life
imprisonment, the accused may appeal from such judgment to the court of appeals by filing a
notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.
Where the judgment of conviction of an accused imposes the death penalty, the appeal is
automatic that is no notice of appeal is required, for intermediate review by the court of appeals.
Where the judgment of conviction of an accused imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed period of
fifteen (15) days of promulgation of judgment.
The Office of the Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the people of the
Philippines in-all criminal cases. (Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255 [2005]

When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case does not
cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. (Ibid).
Notes and Cases
The Clerk of Court in the Regional Trial Court may not be compelled to elevate the
records to the Court of Appeals because he or she is bound to do so only if the appellant
perfected is appeal as required by the Rules. (Banigued v. Ramos, 452 SCRA 813[2005]
When an accused appeals the judgment of conviction against him, he throws open the
whole case for review and it then becomes the duty of the Supreme Court (now an intermediary
appeal in case the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) to correct
any error as many be found in the appeal judgment.( Dico v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 441
[2005]
The failure to appeal within the prescribed period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdiction and failure to do so renders the questioned judgment final and executory,and
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment must less to entertain the
appeal. (Meatmasters International Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development Corporation,
452 SCRA 625 [2005] Just as a long party has the correlative right to appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
judgment. (National Power Corporation v. Degamo, 452 SCRA 634 [2005])
The denial of a motion to dismiss, as a general rule, cannot be questioned in a special

civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lock or excess of jurisdiction. (Lu Ym v. Nubua, 452 SCRA 298 [2005]
Rule 125-Procedure in the Supreme Court
Notes and Cases
As a rule, factual findings of the trial court specially those affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on the part of the Supreme Court when supported by the evidence on
record. (Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, 452 SCRA 285 [2005]
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be filled with the Supreme Court to
assail the judgment of the Regional Trial Court on questions of law. The court will not certain
direct resort to it unless the redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify invoking of remedy within and calling for the
exercise of the Court’s primary jurisdiction. The remedy of a part from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is an appeal by writ of error under Rule 41
to the Court of Appeals. (Gayo v. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504 [2005] ) Thus, petition for certiorari is
not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plan, speedy and adequate in the
ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 312 [2005])
Where there are divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and
evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is the left without choice but to use its latent power to
review such findings of facts. (Nikko Hotel Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 [2005]
Rule 122 – Appeal
Notes and Comments
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercise only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of law authorized such exercise. (Baniqued v. Ramos, 452 SCRA
813 [2005])
Comments
When the accused is conviction of a crime the impossible penalty is below life
imprisonment, the accused may appeal from such judgment to the court of appeals by filing a
notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.
Where the judge of conviction of an accused imposes the death penalty, the appeal is
automatic that is no notice of appeal is required, for intermediate review by the court of appeals.
Where the judgment of conviction of an accused imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed period of
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment.
The office of the Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the people of the
Philippines in all-criminal cases. (Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255 [2005]
Notes and Cases
When a party files a notice of appeal, the trail court’s jurisdiction over the case does not
cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him.
(Macasaet v. People, supra)
The Clerk of Court in the regional trail court may not be compelled to elevate the records
to the court of appeals because he or she is bound to do so only if the appellant perfected its
appeal as required by the Rules. (Baniqued v. Ramos, 452 SCRA 813[2005]
When an accused appeals the judgment of conviction against him, he throws open the
whole case review and it then becomes the duty of the Supreme Court (now an intermediary
appeal in case the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) to correct
any error as may be found in the appealed judgment. (Dico v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 441
[2005]
The failure to appeal within the prescribed period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do s o renders the question judgment final and executory, and
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
appeal. (Meatmaster International Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development Corporation, 452
SCRA 625 [2005]) Just as losing party has the correlative right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the judgment. (National
Power Corporation v. Degamo, 452 SCRA 634[2005])
The denial of a motion to dismiss, as a general rule, cannot be questioned in a special

civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and errors of judgment. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Lu Ym v. Nubua, 452 SCRA 298 [2005])
Notes and Cases
As a rule, factual findings of the trial court especially those affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on the part of the Supreme Court when supported by the evidence in
record. (Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, 452 SCRA 285 [2005])
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be filled with the Supreme Court to
assail the judgment of the Regional Trial Court on questions of law. The Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redness desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify invoking of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of the Court’s primary jurisdiction. The remedy of a party from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is an appeal by writ of error under
Rule 41 to the Court of Appeals. (Gayo v. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504 [2005]) Thus, petition for
certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plan, speedy and
adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or
any other adequate remedy. (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 312 [2005])

Where there divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and
evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to
review such findings of facts. (Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 [2005])
March 8-18, 2005
Rule 110- Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14 – Amendment and Substitution
Facts: Filed with the MTC is a complement, which was later, amended for alleged violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In both complaints there is no allegation that the check was issued by
the accused on account or for value; there is also no allegation in the amended complaint that the
drawee back notified the accused on the dishonor of the check.
Questions: May the successfully file a motion to squash the complaint?
Answer: Yes, because some essential elements of the crime charged are not alleged in the
Complaint his Complaint does not charge an offense under the BP Blg. 22.
The offended party filed a petition for certiorari before RTC against the MTC. While the petition
is pending resolution, the offended party filed a second amended complaint and this time all the
essential requisites of the offence under BP Blg. 22 are alleged. The accused has not yet been
arraigned.
Question: Was the second amended complaint valid?
Answer: Yes. The amended complaint may be amended as to matter of form and substance even
without leave of court in accordance with Section 14 Rule 110, and Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The private complaint can validly sign and file the Second Amended Complaint under
Section 3, Rule 110.
Question: What happens to the pending petition for certiorari before the RTC?
Answer: The Second Amended has rendered moot and academic the Petition for Certiorari. (Lim
v. Ang, 453 SCRA 802 [2005]}
Rule 111 – Prosecution of Civil Action
Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
Every person criminally liable is also is also civilly liable. The civil of a such a person is
established in Article 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. (Article
104,Revised Penal Code; Quinto v. Andres, 453 SCRA 511 [2005])
Notes and Cases
When the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the case is deemed institute.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action to
the criminal action. (Sec. 1) In the sense, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. (Ramsical Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
446 SCRA 166 [2004]
The purpose of the criminal action and that of the civil action.
The criminal action has its basic purpose which is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offenses, to isolate him from society, to
reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. (Ramsical Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, supra; Quinto v. Andres, supra) On the other hand, the civil action has its
purpose which is the restitution, reparation or determination of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the offense committed by the accused. (Ibid) The
presecution is task to established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; it is required
of the offended party to prove the cause of action against the accused for damages and/or
restitution by preponderance of evidence. (Ibid.)
The extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. But,
the civil action based on the offense committed and charged against the accused shall be deemed
extinguish if there is an express finding of the trial court in its judgment in the civil action, that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise does not exist. (Sec. 2, par. 4)
Extent of the civil liability from the offense charged against the accused.
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting there from although the wrongful act did be different from that which he intended.
(Article 4, par.1, Revised Penal Code) “Natural” consequences refers to an occurrence in the
ordinary course of human life or events, while” logical” consequence refers that rational
connection between the act of the accusedand the resulting injury or damage. (Quinto v. Andres,
supra)
Rule 113-Arrrest
Notes and Cases
The determination as to whether or not warrant of arrest should be issued is an exercise of

judicial discretion, hence, it is a judicial in nature. (Dadula v. Ginete, 453 SCRA 575 [2005])
Rule 122-Appeal
Notes and Cases
Nature of the remedy of appeal
The remedy of appeal is not a constitutional right, but merely a statutory privilege. The
party to an action who seeks to avail of the remedy of appeal must comply with the statutory of
rules of allowing it.(Dalton-Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 453 SCRA 498 [2005])
The period of appeal must be construed and complied with strictly
As a rule, the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period
provided by law must be strictly followed. In some instances, however, the Supreme Court has
been liberal and has excused a litigant’s procedural defects and lapses in the interest of
substantial justice. (Dalton-Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra)
Where counsel did not represent the petitioner at the time she filed her appeal and did not
know about the 15-day prescribed period for filling a petition for review on certiorari, the one-
day delay may be considered as excusable negligence on her part. Under the policy of social
justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interest of the working class on the
humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. (Dalton-Reyes
v. Court of Appeals, supra)
The intermediate review of a judgment of conviction
Because of the ruling in People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004], A.M. No. 00-5-03 SC of
the Supreme Court revise Rule122, Section 3 [c] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(People v. Ochoa, 453 SCRA 294 [2005])
Comment
A judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty upon the accused by the RTC, the
appeal is automatic to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review for the case.
A judgment of conviction imposing reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment upon the
accused, the appeal shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
Notes and Cases
In a petition for review on certiorari from a judgment of the court of appeals from a
judgment of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the petition must implead the
people of the Philippines in her petition before the RTC and before the Supreme court. This
defect of the petition is fatal. It behooves the petitioner to implead the people of the Philippines

as respondent in the RTC and before the supreme court to enable the solicitor general to
comment on the petition. (Lim v. Ang, 453 SCRA 802 [2005])
Rule 125 – Procedure in the Supreme Court
Factual issue are, as a rule, not considered by the supreme court except when the factual
inferences of the appellate court are manifestly mistaken, the judgment is hased on a
misapprehension of facts, or the court of appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different legal conclusion. (Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, 453 SCRA 432 [2005])
March 21-31, 2005
Rule 110 – Prosecution of Offense

Notes and Cases
It is the function of the prosecutor or the MTC in conducting preliminary investigation to

determine probable cause.
The general rule is that the determination of the existence of probable cause is the
function of the prosecutor or the MTC judge who conducts preliminary investigation. (Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 [2003])
The rationale of preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State, but more
importantly, it is a significant part of freedom and fair play, which every individual is entitled to.
Absent sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, the filing of information constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. ( Yapangco v. Sandiganbayan, supra)
The Supreme Court adopted a policy of non- interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. Exception.
The Supreme Court adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary

investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will established probable cause for the
filing of a complaint or information.(Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 335 SCRA 581 [2000]; Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan, supra)
This non-interference policy is not a hard and fast rule. It admits exceptions.
This policy of non interference admits several exceptions, namely;
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional right of the accused;

(2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer without or in excess of authority;
(5) When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) Where double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) Where it is case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust of vengeance;
(10) Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on the
ground has been denied’
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners. (Yapangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Mendoza, 454 SCRA 386 [2005]
citing broka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 [1990]
Rule 111- Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1
The trial court in a criminal action cannot award damages to the accused
A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of
the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his
civil liability. Thus a trial court commits an error in ordering the offended party a prosecution
witness, as a part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse P300,000.00 and pay
damages to the accused. A trial court trying a criminal case should limit it self to the criminal and
civil liability of the accused, thus: the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspects and
the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim ( and cross-
claim or third party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refuse cognizance without prejudice
to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time. ( Maccay v. Nobela, 454 SCRA 504
[2005] citing the case of Cabaero v. Cantos 271 SCRA 391[1997])
Comment

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
plainly provides under Section 1 that counter-claims, cross-claims and third-party complaint are
prohibited to be entertained in a criminal action.
Notes and Cases
A court cannot hold a witness liable for damages. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not
parties to the action. A judgment of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is
not a party to the case. (Maccay v. Nobela, supra)
The Supreme Court will not allow the legal processes to serve as tool undermines justice.
The respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while trying
to defend their property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering from severe complications
due to the strain of litigation. While this Court is constrained to grant the instant petition due to
the trial court’s procedural error, we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the
substantive matter of the case. Petitioner’s unconsciousnably used their intelligence and position
to swindle the respondent spouses of heir life savings, abusing their hospitality and kindness in
the process. Petitioners have the temerity to run the tables on the poor couple by abusing the
legal processes. This Court will not allow the legal processes to serve as a tool of swindlers.
(Maccay v. Nobela, supra)
Rule 120-Judgment
Notes and Cases
A void judgment or order is no judgment at all; in contemplation of law it does not exist.
A void judgment or order has no legal and blinding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, a void judgment or order is not-existent and may be resisted in
any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not necessary to take any steps to vacate
or avoid a void judgment or final order. It may simply ignored. (Guevarra v. Sandiganbayan, 454
SCRA 372 [2005]
A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process does no exist
in legal contemplation and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason
that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. (Poso v. Mijares, 387 SCRA 485 [2002]
A judgment or order of the Sandiganbayan which deprive the prosecution due process is
valid.
The sandiganbayan ordered dismissal of the 13 cases as against the Petitioners over the
objection of the special Prosecutor on its erroneous perception that Justice Marigomen
recommended in his report the dismissal of the 13 cases against the petitioner. By the order of
dismissal, the graft court deprived the respondent People of its right to due process. The
Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of its discretion in
dismissing the 13 criminal cases against the petitioners. Hence, its order is null and void; it may
be rectified, as did the graft court, in its Resolution dated April 6, 1999 issued after the lapsed of
the fifteen days from notice of the Special Prosecution of its order issued on Jan. 26, and 1998.
By rectifying its void order, it cannot be said that the graft court acted with grave abuse of its
discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (Guevarra v. Sandiganbayan, supra)
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process of law.
For justice to prevail the sales of justice must balance; justice is not to be dispense for the
accused alone. The interest of society and the offended parties, which have been wronged, must
be equally considered, verify, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a triumph of justice or to
the society offended and the party wronged it could also mean injustice. Justice then be rendered
even-handedly to both accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the order.
(Dimantulac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [2005] cited in Guevarra v. Sandiganbayan, supra)
A judgment rendered by the trial court which was issued on a void plea bargaining is also
void ab initio and cannot be considered to have attained finally for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its inception, and double jeopardy will not lie. (People v. Magat,
332 SCRA 517 [2000])
Comment
In all criminal prosecutions, the prosecution and the accused should be given “ equal
playing field” – both must be afforded procedural and substantive due process. Where a trial
court denies the prosecution its procedural due process it commits grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Hence, all proceedings thereafter
are null and void. Any judgment rendered there under is likewise void. In the same manner that if
the trial court denies the accused his right to due process, its commits grave abuse of discretion
and, as a consequence, the judgment or final order there under rendered is void. The trial court in
the process over-stepped its authority as determined by law. (See: People v. Court of Appeals,
431 SCRA 610[2004])
It logically results that a void judgment or final order has no legal and binding effect for
any and whatever purpose. A judgment is no judgment at all, and it does not legally exist as it
were. (Ibid). In fact it can simply be ignored. (Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 [1989]

April 6-12, 2005
Section 4- Information denied; Section 7 – sufficiency of complaint or information
Notes and Cases
Information is valid if the designation of the offense and the elements of the crime charged
are alleged in clear and distinct manner.
Information is valid as long as sit distinct states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or commissions constitutive thereof. (People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811[1999]; Lasoy v.
Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360 [2005])
Thus, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the
inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid, it ia not necessary to follow the language of
the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined
by law. (Flores v. Layosa, 436 SCRA 937 [2004]; Lasoy v. Zenarosa, supra)
Section 14 – Amendment or substitution
Notes and Cases
Before an accused is arraigned and enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of

the complaint for information may be made without leave of court. After arraignment and plea of
the accused, only formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment and plea, a substantial amendment is
prescribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. (People v. Janairo, 311 SCRA 58
[1999]; Matalan v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 [2005])
Scope o substantial amendment of complaint or information
Substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All others are merely of form. (Almeda v.
Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 [1975]; Matalan v. Sandiganbayan, supra)
Amendment, which are merely formal
1. New allegation which relate only to the range of the penalty that the might impose in the
event of conviction;
2. An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one;

3. Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutor’s theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form o defense he has or will assume;
4. An amendment, which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused.
(Techankee Jr. v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134 [1992]; Villaflor v. Vivar, 349 SCRA 194[2001];
People v. Degamo, 402 SCRA 133 [2003])
5. An amendment that merely adds specification to eliminate vagueness in the information
and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged. (Poblete v. Sandoval, 426 SCRA 346 [2004];
People v. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 [1988]; See: Matalan v. Sandiganbayan, supra)
Test in determining whether the amendment is prejudicial to the accused.
The test as to whether an accused is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence accused might have would be equally applicable
to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an on formation which does
not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one o form and not of substance. (People v. Casey, 103 SCRA 21 [1981]; Matalan v.
Sanduganbayan, supra)
A new preliminary investigation is required after substantial was made; exception.
Before or after a plea of the accused, a substantial amendment in information entitles him
to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended information contains a charged
relate to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not
required. (Matalan v. Sandiganbayan, supra). The exception, that is, that the charge is related or
included in the original complaint for information should not be applied automatically. Rather,
before the accused is deprived of another preliminary investigation, the circumstances in every
case must be taken into consideration. (Ibid)
Notes and Cases
Nature of preliminary investigation; denial of the right to preliminary investigation is a

violation of the right of the accused to due process.
A preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the

case on the merits. Its only purpose is to determine whether a cause has been committed, and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and hence, be
brought to trial. (Community Rural Bank of Guimba, Inc. v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34 [2005]

When preliminary investigation is neither a constitutional right not a natural right, it is a
complaint part of due process in our criminal justice system for it is a statutory and substantive
right given the accused before trial. When an accused is entitled to a preliminary investigation
and denied him without his fault, he is deprived of his right to due process. (Villaflor v. Vivar,
349 SCRA 194 [2001]; Matalan v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 [2005])
Preliminary Investigation is a function of the prosecution; effects of absence or in

completeness of preliminary investigation.
The determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused
probably guilty of the offence and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment
of trial is the function of the prosecution in conducting preliminary investigation. (Sistoza v.
Desierto, 388 SCRA 307 [2002]
The settled rule is that absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the case nor does it impair the validity of the complaint or
information or otherwise render it defective. (People v. Madriaga, 344 SCRA 628 [2001])
The absence or incompleteness of a preliminary investigation does not warrant a motion
to squash or dismissal of the complaint for information. (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA
464 [1991]) In the absence or incompleteness of a preliminary investigation, and the accused
asserts his right to preliminary investigation or its completion, the trial court should hold in
abeyance the proceedings on such information and other the remand of the case preliminary
investigation or it completion. (Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 [2005])
Preliminary investigation should not be comprised or sacrifice at the expense of the accused
for reason of expediency.
In some cases, it was argued that conducting another preliminary investigation is merely
a waste of time, and will further delay the early trial on the merits of the case. The Court
emphasized that it may be true and though the conduct of another preliminary investigation will
delay the progress of the case, still it is necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his
right to preliminary investigation. When the accused is rightfully entitled to a preliminary
investigation, it should never be comprised or sacrificed on the altar of expediency. (Mantalam v.
Sandiganbayan, supra)
A trial court should not entertain for reinvestigation where the accused had earlier
appealed the unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor to the Department of
Justice but the same was denied.
Where the trial court was fully aware that the accused had earlier appealed the
unfavorable Resolution of the prosecutor as approved by the Provincial Prosecutor to the
Department of Justice, which was denied, it should not entertain and grant a motion for
reinvestigation of the accused. In as much as the Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor has
been affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, the existence of probable cause to hold the accused for
trial may be deemed to be the finding of the Secretary himself, not merely of the prosecutor who
had first investigated the case. (Community Rural Bank of Guimba v. Talavera, supra)
The power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers of the Secretary of Justice
includes the power to decide which the conflicting theories of the complaint and the
respondent should believed.
The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited. They are subject to review by the secretary
of justice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their actions and opinions. Consequently
the secretary of justice may direct them to file either a motion to dismiss the case or information
against the accused. In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and
control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting
theories of the complainant and the respondent should be believed. The Provincial or City
Prosecutor has neither the personally nor legal authority to review or overrule the decision of he
secretary of justice. (Community Rural Bank of Guimba v. Talavrera, supra)
The trial court has the sole discretion to deny or grant a motion to dismiss filed by the trial
prosecutor. It must thoroughly asses the evidence of the prosecution before it exercises its
direction.
The discretion to grant or deny a motion to dismiss filed by the trial prosecutor solely rest
with the trial court. The trial court must be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused. Such a conclusion can be arrived at only after thorough assessment
of the evidence of the prosecution. For valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion, accepting
the prosecution’s word that the evidence is insufficient is not enough; strictly required of he order
disposing of the motion is the trial judge’s evaluation of such evidence. Once the complaint or
information is filed in court, the judge, not the prosecutor, assumes full control of the
controversy. Thus, a grant of the motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the itself, a
subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence. (Community Rural
Bank of Guimba, Inc. v. Talavera, supra)
A perfunctory order granting the motion to dismiss based on the reason stated in said
motion does not demonstrate an independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence or lock of
it against the accused. The dismissal of the case by a perfunctory order is not based upon the trial
judge’s own individual conviction that there was no viable case against the accused. (Ibid.)
Case law has set the rule that the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss filed by the
prosecution rest with the trial court.
The rule that the exercise of discretion to accede to a motion to dismiss filed by the trial
prosecutor rest solely with the court is now a settled doctrine. (Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462
[1987];Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307 [1996]; Dunatulac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679
[1988]; Community Rural Bank of Guimba, Inc. v.Talavera, supra)

Rule 117- Motion to Quash
Section 3[i] Grounds for a motion to quash in relation to Section 7
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisite must be present: (1) A
void complaint or information: (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case: (3) the accused has
pleaded to the charged; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated, without his express consent. (Dimayacyac v. Court of
Appeals 430 SCRA 121 [2004]; People v. Tac-an, 398 SCRA 373 [2003]; Lasay v. Zenerosa, 455
SCRA 360 [2005])
April 13-22,2005
In the exercise of its judicial discretion, the Supreme Court may treat a petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65 as an appeal, that is petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
To prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice in a criminal case involving a capital offense,

the Supreme Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion may treat a petition for certiorari
premised on Rule 65 as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. An appeal in a criminal
case opens the entire case for review. The reviewing tribunal can correct errors through
unassigned in the appeal, or even reverse the lower court’s decision on grounds other than those
the parties raised as errors. ( Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 456 SCRA 45 [ 2005]; citing the
cases of People v. Saludes, 403 SCRA 590 [2003] and People v. Jubail, 428 SCRA 478 [2004])
Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152398, 14 April 2005
456 SCRA 45
First Division, Carpio J.
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

denying the motion for Reconsideration filled by. SPO1 Edgar Crisostomo, petitioner, assailing
the court judgment convicting him of the crime of murder and sentenced him accordingly.
Facts:
Crisostomo, a member of the Philippines National Police and a jail guard was charged before and
convicted in Information by the Sandiganbayan for the murder of Suba, a detention prisoner at
the Solano Municipal Jail. It is alleged in the Information that Crisostomo conspired with his co-
accused de la Cruz, Peres, Anggo, Lumabo, Noberte and Calingayan, all inmates at the Solano
Municipal Jail, in murdering Suba, Crisostomo was sentenced to suffer the penalty 12 years, 5
months and 11 days of prison mayor as minimum, to 18 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Crisostomo was arraigned and plead not guilty. Trial on this merits ensued. Only
Crisosotomo and Calingayan stood trial. The other accused were at large.
From the judgment of conviction. Crisosotomo continues to assail the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Question: whether or not the Sandiganbayan exercised valid jurisdiction to hear, try and decide
the case?
Answer : The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the prosecution failed to
prove Crisostomo and Calingayan guilty beyond Reasonable doubt. Thus, the Supreme Court
acquitted both.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case.
The contention of Crisostomo.

Crisostomo argues that the Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to try the case. He
points out the crime of murder is not listed in Section 4 of PD No. 1606 as one of the crime that
the Sabdiganbayan can try. He faults the Sandiganbayan for not applying the ruling in Sanchez v.
Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993] where in that case the court ruled that public office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute before the Sandiganbayan could acquire
jurisdiction over the case. He insists that there is no direct relation between the commission of
murder and his public office. He contends that the mere allegation in the information that the
offense was committed in relation to his office is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Sandiganbayan. Such allegation without the specific factual averments is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual laverments that would show the close intimacy between the offense and the
discharged of his official duties.
Ruling of the Court
The crime was committed on 14 Feb.1989 hence the law applicable is Section 4, of PD
1606 as amended by PD 1981.
Crisostomo was charged with murder. The penalty for which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Crisostomo
would have the court the being a jail guard is a incidental circumstance that bears no close
intimacy with the commission of murder. This theory of Crisostomo would have been tenable if
the murdered victim was not a prisoner under his custody. The function of a jail guard is to
ensure the safe custody and proper confinement of persons detained in the jail. The information
alleges that the victim was a detention prisoner when Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired with
the inmates to kill him.

Murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public office. No public office will
never be a constituent element of murder. When then would murder or homicide, committed by a
public officer within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan? People v.
Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 [1960] provides the answer. The Court explained that a public officer
commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing though
in an improper or irregular manner, is official function and he cannot commit the offense without
holding his public office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between the offense and
the office of the accused. If the information alleges the close connection between the offense
charged and the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
People v. Montejo are no exception that Sanchez v. Demetriou recognized.
The question is: Does the information allege a close or intimate connection between the
offense charged and Crisostomo’s public office?
The Information alleged that Crisostomo “a public officer”, being then a member of the
Philippine National Police stationed at Solano Police Station and as a jailer thereat, taking
advantage of his public position and his committing the offense in relation to his office
conspired, confederated and connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano
Municipal Jail to kill Suba, “a detention prisoner. Thus, the allegations in the Information are
sufficient as to confer jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case tested against the ruling in
People v. Montejo.
It Suba were not a prisoner, the information would have to state particularly the intimate
relationship between the offense charged and the accused public officer’s office to vest
jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. This is not the case here. The law restrain the liberty of a
prisoner and puts him under the custody and watchful eyes of his jail guard. Again, the two-fold
duties of a jail guard are to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of the persons detain
in the jail. The law restricts the access to a prisoner. However, because of the very nature of the
work of the jail guard, he has access to the prisoner. Crisostomo, the jail guard, could not have
conspired with the inmates to murder to detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a
“jailer”.
The information accused Crisostomo of murder a detention prisoner, a crime that collides
directly eith Crisostomo’s office as a jail guard who has the duty to insure the safe custody of the
prisoner. Crisostomo’s purposed act of killing a detention prisoner, while irregular and contrary
to Crisostomo’s duties, was committed while he was performing his official function. The
information sufficiently apprised Crisostomo that he stood accused of committing the crime in
relation to his office, a case that is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not the Regional Trial
Court. There was no prejudice to the substantive rights of Crisostomo.
Assuming that the information failed to allege that Crisostomo committed the crime in
relation to his office, the Sandiganbayan still had jurisdiction to try the case. The information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 19 October 1993. Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545
[1990] promulgated on 21 November 1990, did not require that the information should allege
that the accused public officer committed the offense in relation to his office before the
Sandiganbayan could assume jurisdiction over the case. The Deloso ruling relied solely on PD
1606.
Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 231 SCRA 211 [1991] promulgated on 26 September 1991,
modified the Deloso ruling and clarified that offences specified in Section 4[a] [2] of PD 1606,
as amended by PD 1861, must be committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office and the information must allege this fact. The cases of Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
627 [1993] and Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA 680 [1994] reiterated the ruling in Aguinaldo. But
despite the cases clarifying the Deloso ruling, the Court in Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211
[1994] applied the Deloso ruling promulgated on 11 March 1994. In Republic v. Asuncion, the
Court issued specific directives. It there is doubt as to whether the allegations in the information
may fall either with the jurisdiction of the RTC or the Sandiganbayan, a preliminary
determination should be made. If it can be determined in the affirmative that the offence was
committed by a public officer in relation to the public office, the RTC shall order the transfer of
the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and proceed with the case. In
Republic v. Asuncion the Court directed the RTC to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine
whether the accused public officer committed the crime charged while performing his office. If
so, the trial court must order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan as if they were
originally filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Adjudication
Crisostomo and Calingayan were acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The jail authorities were directed to immediately release both from
custody of the law unless they are being held for another lawful cause.
Comment
The Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan is a case where the Supreme Court delve into the facts
of the case, reversed the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, and entered a new judgement
acquitting Crisostomo and Calingayan. The Court considered the petition for certiorari
formulated under Rule 65 and treated it as a petition for review in certiorari under Rule 45 and
such it ruled that since it is appeal, it has the power to review the case in its entirely, considered
all errors committed assigned or not. Hence, the whole record of the case was given a
Chinaman’s comb, both of fact and questions of law. The Supreme Court, the court of last resort
may in the exercise of its judicial discretion to avoid a miscarriage of justice can thus deviate
from the rules its promulgated but before good and valid reason such as to avoid miscarriage of
justice.
Finally, Section 11 of Rule 122- the effect of appeal by any of several accused was
applied. The Court that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. Crisostomo and Calingayan were accused as conspirator. While
Crisostomo appealed and Calingayan did not, the judgment should not have affected the latter.
But since the acquittal of Crisostomo is favorable and applicable to Calingayan, the latter
likewise acquitted on reasonable doubt.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is solely premised upon the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction committed by the lower court.
Principally Rule 65 governs it. On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari is an appeal
from the judgment of conviction of the lower court on pure questions of law, the facts are
considered conclusive as a rule. Somehow, the distinction between the two petitions was ignored.

Notes and Cases
It is a basic that Rule 45 governs appeals from judgment or final order. (Gallardo v. People, 456
SCRA 4944 [2005]
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is to appeal a judgment where only
questions of law are raised, subject to certain well-defined exceptions.
In the case of Housing Authority v. Appeals, 456 SCRA 17 [2005 the Court ruled that Rule 45
limits the jurisdiction of this Curt to review of errors of law. Absent any of the established
grounds for exception, this Curt will not disturb findings of fact lower courts. Though the matter
raised in this is factual, it deserved resolution because the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court conflict on several points
The Supreme Court is not trier fact. Matters of appreciation of fact, on credibility of
witnesses and assessment of their testimonies, are left to lower the court, and as a rule, the
court as a rule will not disturb such findings of facts.
In the case of Madriga! V. Court of Appeals, 456 SCRA 247 [2005] the Court held that
time and time again, we have made it clear that this Court is not a trial of facts, and that in a
petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in this court. It reiterated
its ruling n Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 244 [1992]: The Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of that may have been committed by the lower court.
This court is not a trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court, which has more
opportunity and facilities to examines these matters. It declared a policy to defer to the factual
findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand
to determine their demeanor whether they are telling or distorting the truth.
Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court
as a rule.
Findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and connate be
reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so if the factual findings of the appellate court
coincide with those of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as administrative
agency with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction. (Ayo-Alburo v.
Matobato, 456 SCRA 399 [2005]
Additional Notes and Cases
Method of review before Sandiganbayan
A.M. 00-5-03 dated October 12, 2004 which was made available only September, 2005

(a) In General – A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan
imposing a penalty less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua in criminal cases, and
in civil cases, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
(b) Exception – Where the judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, imposes the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua of where
a lesser penalty is imposed involving offenses committed on the same occasion or which out of
the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the appeal be taken by filing a notice with
the Sandiganbayan and serving a copy thereof to the adverse party.
(c) Automatic Appeal – Whenever the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction imposes the death penalty, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment within five (5) dyas after the fifteenth (15 th ) day following the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration. The transcript
shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographer reporter.
Whenever the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, finds that the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment should be imposed, it shall render judgment
accordingly. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith ceritf. The case
and elevate its entir e record to the Supreme Court for review.
ADDITIONAL NOTES AND CASES

Survey of decided cases in Criminal Procedures
For the year 2006

Retired RTC Judge
Guest Lecturer, SLU, College of Law
State or briefly explain the concept of probable cause?
Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by the circumstances

sufficiently strong in them to warrant a cautious man’s belief that a person is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. ( Republic v. Desierto, 481 SCRA 153 [2006] the grounds for
suspicion must be reasonable and supported by sufficient strong circumstances. (Ibid. Baylon v.
Ombudsman, 372 SCRA 449 [2001]; People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 [1999]
In pari materia : Baylon v. Ombudsman, 372 SCRA 449 [2001]; Gacia- Rueda v. Pascacio, 278
SCRA 769 [1997]; Baylon v. Ombudsman, 372 SCRA 449 [2001]; People v. Chua Ho San, 308
SCRA 432 [1999]

Probable cause for the filing of an information by the prosecutor has been defined as “ the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.” (Lastrilla v. Granda, 481 SCRA 342 [2006]
In pari materia : Raro v. Sadiganbayan, 335 SCRA 581 [2000]; Cruz v. People, 233 SCRA 439
[1994]
What is the purpose of preliminary investigation?
It is designed to secure the respondent against hasty, malicious and oppressive

prosecution. Basically and principally, it is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It means
of discovering the person or purpose who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Probable
cause need not t be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilty, as the investigating officer
acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence the suspect has committed showing
more likely than not, a crime. Probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there
is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play of the accused and to
protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offense and
holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. ( Ching v. Secretary of Justice,
481 SCRA 609 [2006]
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial on the merits. Its sole
purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent is
probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhausted display of the
parties evidence. Hence, if the investigating officer is already satisfied the he can reasonably
determine the existence of probable cause based on the parties evidence thus presented, he may
terminate the proceedings and resolve the case. (De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA
71 [2006]
In pari materia: Reyes v. Camilon, 192 SCRA 445 [1990]; Section 1, Rule 112; Baytan v.
Commision on Elections, 396 SCRA 703 [2003]; Ang v. Lucero, 449 SCRA 157 [2005]; People
v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 475 [1999]
In pari materia: Nava v. COMELEC 367 SCRA 263 [2001]; Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 280 [1996]; People v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 475 [1999]; Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, 278 SCRA 657[1997]
How is probable cause determine?

In determining probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of
which all reasonable men have abundance. (De Joya v. Marquez, 481 SCRA 376 [2006] thus, the
standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringet that used for establishing
guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the
accused, the trial judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him. (Ibid)
In pari materia : Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]
Upon what evidence should a probable cause be based?
It can be only rest on evidence that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspect-respondent. Stated in a different way, probable cause need not to
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(Lastrillas v. Granda, 481 SCRA 324 [2006]; Ching v. Secretary of Justice, 481 SCRA 609
[2006]
In pari material: Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 [2003]; Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA
652 [1995]; Domalanta v. COMELEC, 334 SCRA 555 [2000]; Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, 221
SCRA 247 [1993]; Nava v. Commission on Audit, 367 SCRA 263 [2001]
Is there a formula or a fix rule for the determination of probable cause?
There is not general formula or fix rule for the determination of probable cause Probable cause
should be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the findings of the opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such findings should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reason. (Lastrilla v. Granda, supra)
How should the trial judge determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against an accused who is at large?
The trial judge does not comfort a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. He just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see of it is supported by substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional. (De Joya
v. Marquez, supra)
In pari materia: Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]
Assuming that a municipal judge still has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation, has
it the power to determine the offence charged? Explain.
No. if the municipal judge is still authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, it has
no authority to determine the character of the crime. The only authority of a municipal judge
conducting preliminary investigation and for admission of the accused to bail is to determine
whether there is probable cause against the accused. (Bitoon v. Toledo-Mupas, 479 SCRA 335
[2006].
Note: That until we have on hand the A.M. Circular of the Supreme Court on this point
disallowing the municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigation, the pertinent provision of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should prevail.
In pari material: Depamaylo v. Brotardo, 265 SCRA 151 [1996]
Are the parties during the conduct of preliminary investigation the right to examine and cross-
examine. (Genil v. Riveera, 479 SCRA 363 [2006]
Is a hearing to conduct clarification questions during preliminary investigation

indispensable.
No. It within the sound discretion of the investigating officer to have one such hearing or
not at all. (De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]. Under Section 3[e], Rule
112, the word “may” and it denotes that the rule is discretionary in nature. The word “may” is
merely permissive and operates to confer discretion. Thus, under Section 3[e], Rule 112, it is
within the discretion of the investigating officer whether to set the case for hearing to clarify
some matter, which are not clear or complete. (Ibid).

SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL

EVIDENCE
JANUARY to DECEMBER 2002
AND JANAUARY to JUNE 2003

Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 62, Benguet
Guest Lecturer, SLU, College of Law
Custodial investigation
People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624 [2003]
When may an accused or suspect invoke his rights to counsel and to remain silent?
An accused or suspect should invoke his right to counsel and right to remain silent the
moment custodial investigation begins. Custodial investigation begins at that stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
People v. Tizon Jr., 385 SCRA 364 [2002 1st Division
What is the scope of the right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights?
The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation

refers to an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected
individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding would
mean that information transmitted was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the
Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to ‘inform’ the person under
investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be ‘informed’.
Is a person under custodial investigation be given the choice of council?
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer in naturally lodged in the police investigator,
the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the council chosen for him and asked for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the lawyer’s appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.

When can it said that the lawyer provided by the investigation deemed to have been
engaged by the accused during custodial investigation?
A lawyer provided the investigation is deemed engaged by the accused where he never
raised any objection against the appointment of the lawyer during the course the investigation
and the accused subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
(Belonghilot v. RTC Zamboanga del Norte, 402 SCRA 221 [2003]
Confession of an accused under custodial investigation

Section 12, Article III, Constitution
People v. Ochate, 385 SCRA 353 [2002] En Bane
What is the effect of a confession made by an accused without the assistance of counsel and
without being informed of his constitutional rights?
His confessions is inadmissible in evidence having been obtained in violation of his

constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Define custodial investigation.
As defined in Miranda v. Arizona is any questioning initiated by the law enforcement

officer a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.
Thus, when a person is effectively deprived of his freedom of action and under detention,
and upon questions of a law enforcement officers elicited questions that prompted the accused to
confess his guilt in the absence of a council and without having been informed of his
constitutional rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence against him in any proceedings.
The reason is that the confession was extracted in violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused guaranteed by the Constitution.
Is the admission of guilt by the accused before the barangay chairman admissible in
evidence?
That at the time the barangay chairman heard the accused admit that he committed the
crime because he was possessed by the evil, it was actually in response to the query of said
barangay chairman as to why he committed the crime charged. Accused has already been singled
out as the suspect, arrested, taken into custody and was being investigated by the police. While it
is true that the barangay chairman is not a police officer or law enforcement agent, it is clear
from the record that he asked the question in the course of police interrogation without the
accused being informed of his rights under the constitution. In People v. Morada, 307 SCRA 362,
379-380, it was held that the confession made by the accused to the barangay captain is
inadmissible because it appeared that the conversation between the two was party of the then
going police investigation.

Note 1. In People v. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 [1999] it was held that a confession extracted
without the assistance of counsel is taboo and useless in a court of law.
Note 1. A videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen, without the presence of nor any direct or indirect
participation of the police authorities, does not form part of custodial investigation, in an attempt
to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. (People v. Endino, 352 SCRA 307 [2001]
It should never be presumed that all media confessions described as voluntary have been
finely given – this type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly
examined and scrutinized. It is because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a
medium for admitting one’s guilt and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cause, it is
prudent that the trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting
confessions. ( People v. Endimo, 352 SCRA 207 [2001]
How should a remedial legislation or procedural law be interpreted in a criminal

proceeding?
Remedial legislation, procedural law, or doctrine enunciated by the supreme court

designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings
may be applied retroactively depending upon several factors such as the history of the new, rule,
its purpose and effects, and whether the retrospective application will further in operation, the
particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice
and criminal laws in particular. (People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA, 267 [2003]
Rule 110
Salazar v. People, 391 SCRA 162, Puno, J. [2002]
Who may file a compliant for purpose of preliminary investigation?
If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and
in the case of an information, the same must be filed by the public prosecution concerned.
The “compliant” referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to
commence a criminal action in case on those cases where a compliant of the offended party is
required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by the public prosecutor.
It is not necessarily that the proper “offended party” files a compliant for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the prosecutor. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the
compliant is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint
for preliminary investigation.
The rule is that unless the offense subject of the compliant is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, any person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus as a
general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which are
filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the offended party must file the same and in

case of information, the public prosecutor must file the same However, a “complaint” filed with
the prosecutor prior to a judicial action may be filed by a person.
CASUPANAS, ET AL., V. LAROVA.

G.R. NO.145391M 26 AUGUST 2002,
388 SCRA 28 [2002]
CAPIO, J.
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

RULE 111
State the present rule anent the filing of a separate civil action.
Under the present Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of civil code is not deemed instituted
with the criminal action. The offended party may file this civil action separately and
independently in the criminal action even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these
Articles of the civil code.
It took effect on December 1, 2000

The rule under Sec.1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure – See: Hambon v. Court of Appeals, 399
SCRA 255 [2003] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal code and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the civil code. Under this rule, civil
action to recover liability arising from crime ex delicto and under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the civil code quasi
delict are deemed impliedly instituted. In Maniago v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 674 [1996] it was ruled that the
right to bring an action of damages under the civil code must be reserved as required under Sec. 1, Rule 111,
otherwise it should be dismissed, and that reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or default substantive
rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. BUT TAKS NOTE: This is no
longer the prevailing rule. Sec. 1, Rule 111 in conjunction with Sec. 2 is now the prevailing rule as enunciated
in Casupanan v. Laroya, supra.
Under Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this civil
action, which is deemed instituted, refers only to the civil liability arising from the crime
pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Article 104 on
preparation, restitution and indemnification of damages. This civil action must reserved before
the prosecution in the criminal action commence to present its evidence or one was filed before
the commencement of the criminal action. This civil action does not refer to nor include the civil
action arising from Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code as these articles refer to cause
of action arising from the sources of obligation under Articles 1157 of the Civil Code.
The offended party in the criminal action can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict-without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitations is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission if he is
the accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111
which stated that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action”.
This is only fair for two reasons. First the accused is prohibited from setting any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second the accused who presumed innocent has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail
of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal
case is to deny due process of law access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
There is a possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary
with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always
been recognized even since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent
civil action under Articles 32,33,34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. But the law itself, in Article 31
of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action “may proceed independently the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter” it was declared that there can
indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplate in
the said article the result of the criminal prosecution – whether it be conviction or acquittal –
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31 that this action “may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter”.
Flores v. Joven, 394 SCRA 339 [2002]
Is the offended party in a criminal action entitled to bring a special action for certiorari in
his own name?
Yes . the offended party in a criminal case has sufficient interest and personality as a
“person aggrieved ” to file a special civil action for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

The offended party may appeal an order of the trial court, which deprives him of due
process, but subject to the limitations that he cannot appeal an adverse ruling if to do so would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
Distinguish confession from admission
S confession as distinguished from an admission, does a person make a declaration at any

time voluntarily without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledgement that he has
committed or participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand,
is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve in acknowledgement of the guilt, of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged.
Rule 115, Sec. 1, par.(b) – To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
accused. Article III, Sec. 14 (2), Bill of Rights, Constitution.
People v. Almazar, 384 SCRA 311 (2002) En Banc
May a person under custodial investigation invoke his right to counsel while under going
police line-up?
The accused-appellant contends that he was without counsel at the time of the police line-
up. Is this argument tenable? No. the right to counsel guaranteed by Section 12 [1], Article III of
the constitution, may be invoked only by a person while under custodial investigation. A police
line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.
When does custodial investigation start? It starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Where a person is not under custodial investigation
when he was brought to the police station, and the police did not, as yet interrogate him of elicit
incriminating statements from him. He was brought to the police station to be presented along
with other men, to be identified by the witness or victim. The presence of counsel at this stage
was not necessary.
Explain the Totality of Circumstances Test in the matter of resolving admissibility of out-of-
court identification of a suspect.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,

courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors,
viz,: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;

and (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification, and (5) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
If there are defects or irregularities in the conduct of the police line-up, do they affect the
admissibility of the out-of-court identification?
No. These irregularities do not foreclose the admissibility of the independent in court
identification absent improper motive or ulterior motive in implicating the accused.
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Essential elements for a court to acquire criminal jurisdiction
CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA 72, [2002]
What are the requisites, which must be present a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction?
1. The court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter;

2. The court must have jurisdiction over the territory, where the offense was committed;
and
3. The court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Cruz v. Court of Appeals

388 SCRA 72 [2002]3rd Div. Capio, J.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution on the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus for lack of substance which sought to nullify
two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 53.
Facts:
Lutgarda Cruz was accused of the crime Estafa through falsification of Public Documents
in Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53. Cruz executed an
Affidavit of Self Adjudication of a parcel of land stating the she is the only surviving heir of the
registered owner when in fact she knew that there were other surviving heirs. The offended party
did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the offense, the civil action
was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Trial ensued and the trial court rendered its decision
dated January 17, 1994 acquitting Cruz and on the civil aspect of the case, the trial court ordered
the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land. On January 28, 1994, Cruz received a copy
of the judgment. On February 10, 1994 Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration assailing the ruling of the trial court on the civil aspect of the criminal case. A
copy of this motion was furnished the prosecution by registered mail. On April 18, 1994, the
trial court denied the motion for reconsideration because there was no showing that the
prosecution was actually furnished or served a copy of the motion for reconsideration within the
period o 15 days from receipt of Cruz of a copy of the decision, hence the decision became final
and executory. Cruz moved to reconsider the order denying her motion for reconsideration. The
trial court denied it because under the rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration. The motion violated this rule, hence denied.
Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the
two orders of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack or sufficiency of
substances. Hence, Cruz went to the Supreme Court via a petition for review of the ruling of the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
1. What is the effect of an acquittal of the accused in a criminal case?
2. In such a case, may the prosecution appeal from the judgment of acquittal?
3. May the offended party or the accused appeal from the judgment rendered on the civil
aspect of the judgment dispite acquittal of the accused?
Ruling
1. A judgment of acquittal of the accused is immediately final and executory.

2. The prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal of the accused. The reason is that an appeal
by the prosecution will violate the rule against double jeopardy.
3. With respect to the civil aspect of the judgment of acquittal, the offended party or the
accused may appeal. The public prosecution has generally no interest in appealing the
civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal of the accused ends the
work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The
real parties in interest in the civil aspect of the decision are the offended party and the
accused. Any appeal for motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a
criminal case must be served upon the real party in interest.
If the offended party appeals or motion for reconsideration, the accused is
necessarily served a copy of said notice of appeal or motion for reconsideration through his
counsel.
The accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended party is
not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present rules only the public
prosecutor is served with notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for reconsideration. To fill this
lacuna, if the accused appeals or moves for a reconsideration, he should serve a copy of notice of
appeal or the motion for reconsideration to the offended party if not represented by private
counsel. He should also furnish a copy of the notice of appeal or motion for reconsideration to
the public prosecutor who is the counsel for the State.
In this case, the accused did not serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration to the
offended party who was not represented by a private counsel in the trial court. In the interest of
justice, and considering that the present rules are silent on the matter, it is only fair to give Cruz a
period of five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for
reconsideration on the offended party.
Issues:
In the trial court vested with power and authority to rule in the civil aspect of the case despite
the fact that the subject matter is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court?
Ruling :
The Cruz contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil
aspect because the land subject of said civil aspect is located in Bulacan obviously outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila Court. This argument holds no water. The civil
liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, not the rules of civil procedure which pertain to civil action arising from the
initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
What are the requistes which must be present before a court cab acquire criminal
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
They are: (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. (2) the court must have
jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. (3) the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
In this case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa thgough falsification
of public document. This trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime
was committed within its territorial jurisdiction – the execution and notarization of the subject
falsification were done in Manila. The trial also acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused because she voluntary submitted to the court’s authority. Thus, the court necessarily
exercise jurisdiction over all issues in a criminal case to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal
case is the civil liability of the accused from the crime. Art. 100 of the RPC provide that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Art 104 RPC civil liability includes
restitution.
Issues:
When is the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime instituted?
Ruling:
The recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime deemed instituted upon the filing
of the criminal action unless the offended party reserved the right to file a separate civil action to
recover the civil liability arising from the crime.
In this case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was
deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted Cruz of the crime
charged on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. The trial court had jurisdiction
to decide the civil aspect of the case although the land was located in Bulacan which ordered the
restitution of the land to the surviving heirs.
Adjudication:

Cruz was directed to furnish within 5 days from receipt of his decision to serve a copy of
her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. The case was remanded for further trial.
Prosecution of criminal actions

Crimes against chastity, par. 2, et seq., Section 5,
Rule 110
People v. Dela Cruz, 384 SCRA 375 [2002] 1st Division
What is the condition sine qua non in crimes against chastity? Why?
A compliant of the offended party or his relatives is required in crimes against chastity.
The compliant is required out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go though with the scandal of a public
trial. The law deems it was wiser to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to
expose to pubic view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts
occurring in the family. (People v. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672,680 [1980]
What does the phrase “that there shall be a compliant of the offended party or her relatives
is jurisdiction” as provided in Articles 344 of the RPC mean?
It means that it is the compliant that starts the prosecution of the offense. It is not the
compliant, which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. Law vests the jurisdiction of
the court. (People v. Babasa, supra; People v. Tanada, 166 SCRA 360,365(1998); People v.
Leoparte,187 SCRA 190,195 [1990])
Sufficiency of compliant or information, Sec. 6, Rule 110

Designation of the offense, Sec. 8, Rule 110
Cause of the accusation, Sec. 9, Rule 110
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 148468,148679,149116,January 28, 2003
What is an Information or Compliant deemed sufficient?
When the acts or omission compliant or are alleged in such a form as to enable a person
of common understanding to know offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to
render the proper judgment. It must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime
charged.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific crime.
People v. Flores Jr., 394 SCRA 325 [2002]

What characterizes the charge in a compliant or information?
The recital of the facts constituting the elements of the crime charged. In fine, specific
allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charge.
Note 1.See also: People v. Ochate, 385 SCRA 353, supra; Peole v. Cuyugan, 392 SCRA 140,
supra.
Note 2 Every Compliant or Information should state not only the qualifying circumstances but
also the aggravating circumstances. (People v. Salvador, 398 SCRA 394 [2003]; People v.
Llanda, 393 SCRA 31 [2002] Even the generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
information in order to be appreciated. (People v. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48 [2003] Section 9 uses
the word “must” hence the requirement is mandatory, and failure to comply with it means that no
generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at trial, cannot be appreciated. (People v.
Buayaban, supra)
Note 3 Any insufficiency in the allegations in the Information should be raised prior to the
arraignment of the accused by filing a motion to quash otherwise the accused is deemed to have
waived any objection on such ground. (People v. Torellos, 400 SCRA 243 [2003]
What is the purpose of the requirement?
The purpose is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to enable him to prepare for his defense. To enable the accused, if found guilty, to plead
his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Note 1: In Dado v. People, 392 SCRA 46 [2002] – In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To ensure that the due process
rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the
crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of
the commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.
Note 2: In People v. Cuyugan, 392 SCRA140 [2002] – The purpose of the constitutional
guarantee that a person accused of an offense be informed of the accusations against him is (1) to
furnish the accused with such description of the charge against him as will enable to make his
defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against further
prosecution of the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
In pari material: People v. Flores Jr. 394 SCRA 325 [2002]
People v. Abala, 385 SCRA 54 [2002] En Banc

What is the effect of failure to allege in the Information the exact dates when the rape was
committed?
The omission of the exact date when the crime of rape was committed is not a fatal
defect. It is so because the exact date is not a material element of the offense of rape. The
accused-appellant argued that he was prejudiced by the testimony of the private compliant. This
argument is tenable because his counsel extensively cross-examined the private compliant in the
date she was abused by the accused-appellant.(See also: People v. Dulay, 385 SCRA 155 [2002]
En Banc; People v. Abala, 385 SCRA 54 [2002] En Banc.
What is the effect of failure to allege the special qualifying circumstances of relationship
between the accused and the victim and the minority of the victim in Information for
qualified rape?
The death penalty may not be impose upon the accused who is found guilty. To impose the death
penalty in qualified rape, the Information must allege the special qualifying circumstances of
relationship between the accused and the victim and the victim’s minority. The fact that it was
proven will not justify the imposition of the death penalty. Accused-appellant can only be
penalized by reclusion perpetua.
Note: In pari material: People v. Aparejado, 385 SCRA 76 [2002] En Banc; People v.
Geron, 385 SCRA 86 [2002] En Banc; People v. Manlod, 385 SCRA 134 [2002] En Banc;
People v. Fabre, 385 SCRA 185 [2002] En Banc; People v. Abala, supra
Should a generic aggravating circumstances be allege in the Information?
In People v. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48 [2003] it was ruled that even generic aggravating
circumstances must be alleged in the Information to be appreciated.
Note: the word “must” in Section 9, Rule 110 indicates that the requirement is
mandatory. Thus, if a generic circumstances is not alleged in the Information but duly proven
during the trial, it cannot be appreciated to effect the imposable penalty. This is the rule from the
time the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure came into effect, and as enunciated in several
cases thereafter.
Date of the commission of the crime

Section 11
PEOPLE V. ABALA, 285 SCRA 54 [2002]
Is the exact date of the commission of rape essential?

No. Failure to allege in the Information the exact date when the rape is committed is not
fatal or renders the information invalid.
What is the remedy where there is deficiency or that there is in sufficiency in the allegation
in the information?
The remedy of the accused is to file a motion to quash the information prior to his
arraignment, otherwise, he is deemed to have waived any objection on such ground. (People v.
Rorellos, 400 SCRA 243 [2003]
Amendment/substitution, Sec. 14
May the Information be amended after the accused entered a plea?
An amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form,
provided: (1) leave of court is obtained; and (2) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights
of the accused. ( People v. Degamo, 402 SCRA 133 [2003]
May an Information be amended on substantial matters after arraignment of the accused?
No. Amendment of the Information is not permitted after the accused had been arraigned.
(People v. Degamo, supra)
When is an amendment said to be a substantial amendment?
A substantial amendment consist of recital of facts constituting, the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following
were held to be merely formal amendments:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different from or distinct
from that charged in the original one;
(3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s of the cases so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and
(4) amendment , which does no adversely affect any substantial right of the accused,
such as his invoke prescription. ( People v. Degamo citing the case of Teehankee
Jr. v. Madayag, 207 SCRA 135 [1992]
What is the test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not
prejudiced by such an amendment?

The test is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the
accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form or the other, if
the answer is in the affirmative, the amendments is one of form and not of substance. ( People v.
Degamo citing Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag supra)
May an Information be amended to charge a more serious offense?
It is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy even, where the accused was
already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge where the basis of the more serious charge
did not exist but comes as a subsequent event. ( People v. Degamo, supra)
Rule 111
Prosecution of civil action
Secs. 6 and 7 – Prejudicial question
People v. Consing Jr. 395 SCRA 366 [2003]
What is prejudicial question? It is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal.
What are the requisites of prejudicial question? They are: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.
Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and criminal action can according to
law, proceed independently of each other.
Rule 122
Preliminary Investigation
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, supra. [2003]
What is the purpose of preliminary Investigation?
To determine whether the crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilt thereof. In Webb v. De Leon, a
finding of probable needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspect.
Note 1. In Sistoza v. Desierto, 388 SCRA 307 [2002] – the purpose of preliminary investigation
it to determine whether there is a reasonable to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial. This is an
executive function.
Note 2. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 [2003] the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right but merely a right conferred by statue. Its purpose is
merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilt thereof and should be held for trial.
Preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded the accused before
trial. It is a component part of due process. To deny the accused of this right when claimed at the
proper time would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. (Villaflor v. Vivar,
349 SCRA 194 [2001]
But the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render if detective, and the trial court, instead of dismissing the
information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct
a preliminary investigation (Villaflor v. Vivar, supra)
Note 4. Baytan v. Commission on Election, 396 SCRA 703 [2003] A preliminary investigation
is purely inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its
function being merely to determine probable cause.
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence on any may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offence has been committed and accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Note 5. Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 [1998]
The purpose of a preliminary investigation or previous inquiry of some kind, before an

accused person is placed on trial, are: [a] to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution; (2) to protect the accused from open and public accusation of a crime,
from trouble, expenses and anxiety of public trial.
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal or technical right. It is a
substantive right and the accused of his right to preliminary investigation would be to deprive of
the full measure of his right due to process.
An inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation would be to deprive
the accused his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

What is the basis of determining problem cause?
It need no be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence

establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, nor on evidence establishing absolute certainly guilt.
Probable cause rest merely on evidence showing that more likely, a crime has been committed
and was committed by accused.
Who determine the existence of a probable cause?
Absent any showing or arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer’s finding and
determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.
What is the effect of the absence of preliminary investigation when it is required?
The absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information
or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction the court over
the case constitute a ground for quashing the Information.
The right preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statue. It is being right and part of procedural due process, it must be invoked at the
proper time. And if duly invoked there is unreasonable delay, his right due process and speedy
disposition of the case are impinged.
Who has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases?
In Miaque v. Pamonag, 400 SCRA 9 [2003] it was ruled that the power and authority to
conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases with the provincial or city prosecutor of the
province or city or with the municipal court of the city or capital of the province.
Sistoza v. Desierto, 388 SCRA 307 [2002]
May a criminal case pending trial be dismissed for want of probable cause?
Yes. In exceptional cases, the Supreme Court may order the dismissal of a criminal case
being heard by a trial court for want of probable cause when at the outset the evidence cannot
sustain a prima facie or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any
person the trauma of going through trial.
Problem: A is accused of murder. Before A was arraigned, he filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause, which would involve the examination of witnesses. How should
the trial court treat the motion and should it hear and rule on the motion?

Answer: The trial court may consider it as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. (See
People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267 [2003]
SANTOS V. PEOPLE, 395 SCRA 507 [2003]
Does the record of the preliminary investigation form part of the record of the RTC?
Section 8, Rule 112
No. The record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the RTC record
unless introduced as evidence during trial. Absent such introduced, the records of preliminary
investigation cannot be treated as evidence in court; neither may the trial court be compelled to
take notice of the same.
VDA DE DANAO V. GINETE, 395 SCRA 542 [2003]
How should the time period set by law – in preliminary investigation – be treated?
The time periods set by law are not be treated lightly. An unreasonable delay could
constitute a serious violation of the constitutional right of the accused to the to the speedy
disposition of cases.
Problem
An information was filed after a preliminary investigation was conducted and the accused
submitted countervailing affidavits. The information was later amended to charge, the more
serious physical injuries. On motion of the accused demanded that a preliminary investigation be
conducted on the amended charge. The court denied the motion because the preliminary
investigation on the original charge was sufficient. Was the trial court correct in denying the
motion of the accused?
Answer:
Yes. The accused cannot demand for a new preliminary investigation on the amended
charge of serious physical injuries because one had already been conducted in the original
information since the charge made is only formal amendment.

ARREST
RULE 113
Arrest in hot pursuit

Section 5(b)
People v. Mendez, 392 SCRA 443 [2002] En Banc
What is the meaning of probable cause in arrests without a warrant?
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Sec. 5(b) of Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures must be based upon “probable cause” which means
“an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion’. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when it is based on actual facts, i.e., when it is supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
Note 1: People v. Chua, 396 SCRA 657 [2003]
In flagranted delicto arrest the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is

committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. It is emphasized that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest. Therefore, a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. For this
exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an over
act indicating that the just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such over act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Note 2: Malcat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159
In this case the court distinguished the concept of “stop and frisk” and of a “search
incidental to a lawful arrest”. These two types of search without a warrant differ in terms of the
requisites of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, legally of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.g
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In instances, the law
cannot be reserved. A bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person
of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the
crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

BAIL
RULE 114
PANGANIBAN V. CUPIN-TESORERO, 388 SCRA 44 [2003]
What is the condition sine qua non before the court grants an application for bail?
Whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion, the prosecution must be given
reasonable notice of the hearing or he must b asked to submit his recommendation before the
judge may grant an application for bail.
Note 1: Section 18, Rule 114 – the court must give reasonable notice of hearing to the
prosecution or require him to submit his recommendation.
In Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas, 400 SCRA 37 [2003] the following are the principles enunciated.
A hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. So that

even if there is failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an
application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of hearing.
The bail hearing is summary which means a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or
digest of a text or statement. The importance of bail hearing and a summary evidence cannot be
downplayed as these are aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and defense.
The right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature not to say incongruous to file a
petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
In People v. Manallo, 400 SCRA 129 [2003] the purpose for bail hearing involves the right of the
accuse to temporary liberty, and the right of the state to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements. These rights must be balanced by the judge in the scale of
issues to guide him in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Note 2: In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 72 [2002], this rule was applied. A hearing is
required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion and the notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecution or he must be asked to submit his recommendation.
Note 3: Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 [2003] even where the prosecution refuses
to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital
offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application.
Note 3: People v. Tuppal, 395 SCRA 72 [2003] The assessment of the prosecution evidence
presented during bail hearing in capital offenses is preliminary and intended only for the purpose
of granting or denying application for provisional release of the accused.

Note 4: Basco v. Papatalo, 269 SCRA 220 [1997] This case set the rules to be followed by the
trial judge ancent the application for bail.
(1) Notify the prosecution of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. Otherwise petition should be denied.
Section 9 Amount of Bail; guidelines.
Masucang v. Balgos, 398 SCRA 158 [2003]
In fixing the amount to bail in a criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider these
factors: (1) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature and circumstances of the
offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5)
weight of the evidence against the accused; (6) probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(7) forfeiture of other bail; (8) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested;
and (9) the pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
The amount of bail should not be excessive
The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In implementing this mandate regard should be taken of the prisoner’s pecuniary circumstances.
That which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged
with a like offense. When the right to bail exist, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the defendant
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose ( Magsucang v.
Balgos)
Note 1. See also: Domingo v. Executive Judge Ernesto Pagatayan, A.M.No. RTJ-03-1751, 10
June 2003, Martinez. Is bail hearing mandatory? Yes.
A hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter or right or discretion. A
hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against accused, in cases where the offense is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. After hearing, the court’s order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence is
presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting
or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary evidence for the
prosecution, which contains the judge’s evaluation of the evidence, may considered as an aspect
of procedural due process for both the prosecution and defense.
Problem: X is charged with murder. At the bail hearing, the prosecution and the defense jointly
manifested that it would be fair and just if the court could fix the bail bond for the provisional
release of the accused at P250,000.00. On that joint manifestation, the trial court grated bail. Was
the court correct?
Answer: No. A hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is matter or right or discretion.
The agreement of the prosecution and defense that the bail bond be fixed by the court at
P250,000.00 does not justify the granting of bail without hearing in a case involving a non-
bailable offense. A hearing is necessary for the court to take into consideration the strength of the
guilt of X and the guidelines in fixing the amount of bail. The judicial discretion is the domain of
the judge and the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed upon the will or whim of the
prosecution and defense. To do away with requisite hearing “is to dispense with this time-tested
safeguard against arbitrariness”.
Note: Even if the offense or crime committed is bailable, there is still a need of bail hearing to
consider the guidelines provided by the rules in fixing the appropriate amount of bail so as not to
be excessive.
Section 26
Bail not bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation.
People v. Baccoy, 388 SCRA 641 [2002]
When should objection to a defect or irregularity attending in arrest be made?

What is the-effect if no timely objection was made?
The objection to any defect in the arrest and search and confiscation of accused
possession must be made before arraignment and plea. It there was an irregularity in the arrest
and search and confiscation of possession but no objection was made at the time of arraignment
and plea, the accused is stopped from assailing the same for failing to raise any objection as the
opportune time, that is, at the time of arraignment and plea.
Note 1: The fact that certain irregularities were never raise before arraignment, and were
therefore considered waived when accused entered his plea. (People v. Mendez, 392 SCRA 443
[2002]
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

RULE 116
Section 3. Plea of guilty to a capital offense; reception of evidence

People v. Ostia, 398 SCRA 132 [2003]
When accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial court is mandated to do
the following: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused’s
full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask the accused
if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This rule is
mandatory an a judge who fails to observe with fealty the rule commits grave abuse of
discretion.
Note 1. People v Bodoso, 398 SCRA 462 [2003] En Banc – Waiver of right to present evidence
and to heard; step-by-step formula. See: Appeal, supra.
Section 5,Rule 116-Improvement plea
People v. Solamillo and Solamillo, G. R. No. 123161, 18 June 2003, Sandoval-Gutierrez,J.
When may a plea be withdrawn?
At any time before judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an
improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
It is clear from the text of the rule that there should be a categorical declaration from the
accused that he is withdrawing his plea of guilty substituting it with a plea of not guilty.
Even that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty and subsequently withdrew it,
such facts does not operate to automatically exculpate him from criminal liability. Convictions
based on improvident plea of guilty a set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment,
if the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but
on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
Problem: X is charged with homicide. At his arraignment he entered a plea guilty assisted
council. The trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence and prove the precise extent
of the participation of X and the aggravating circumstances duly alleged in the information. The
prosecution presented two material and eye-witnesses. Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case.
X moved to withdraw his plea of guilty as it was improvidently made. The prosecution
vigorously objected. The court allowed X to withdraw his plea of guilty and allowed X to
substitute it with a plea of not guilty. X presented his evidence and submitted his case for
resolution. The Court X convicted X of the crime charged. X filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that he was convicted on the basis of his improvident plea of guilty. Resolve the
motion.
Answer: I will deny the motion for reconsideration. Even assuming that X made an improvident
plea of guilty and subsequently withdrew it, such facts foes not operate to automatically
exculpate him from criminal liability. In the case, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence X. the conviction must be sustained proving his commission of the offense. The trial
court relied on the testimonies of the two eye-witnesses, not merely on X plea of guilty. The
conviction of X can be sustained based on independent evidence other than this plea. Whether or
his plea of guilty was improvidently made is inconsequential for the simple reason that his
conviction was based on other evidence proving his culpability for the offense charged.
Section 9. Bill or Particulars

People v. Medina Jr. G.R.Nos. 127756, 18 June 2003 Callejo, Jr.
When may an accused file a bill of particular?
The accused should, when appropriate and proper, file a bill particular before he is
arraigned and enters a plea. After plea, he may no longer be entitled to file one as he is deemed to
waived his right to file one.
MOTION TO SQUASH
RULE 117
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 3[1]-That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
Proscription against double jeopardy-Conrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482 [2003]
The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and that case against him is terminated either by his acquittal
or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his content. As a general rule, the
following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment; (2)
before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the arraignment of the accused; (4) a valid plea
entered by him; and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or dismissal or termination of
the case against him without his express consent.
There are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if
the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of
evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable
delay in the proceedings, the violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
When is an Order provisionally dismissing a case become permanent?
Section 8, Rule 117, par. 2
When the Order of provisional dismissal refers to a criminal case punishable by

imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been arrived.

When the Order of provisional dismissal refers to a criminal case punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance is
said order without the case having been arrived.
Within the time-bar, what can the prosecution do with the provisionally dismissed case?
The case may be revived by the Prosecution (the State) within the time-bar either to refile
the Information or to file a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily
included therein, without need a new preliminary investigation unless the original witnesses of
the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may
no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged. (People v. Lacson, supra)
What is the meaning or important of the time-bar under Section8?
It is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse
of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
Note:
The second paragraph should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year or two years, as the case may be, after the service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case
having been arrived.
In People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267 [2003] Section 8 was applied. Thus, the provisional of
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall permanent one year (1) year after issuance of the order withouy the case having been
arrived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived.
What are the elements to be proved in order to invoke this Section 8?
See: People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267 [2003]
To invoke this provision, Section 8, the party seeking the order to be declared permanent
must show the presence of these elements, to wit:
1. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused moves for a provisional
dismissal (sin perjuicio) of the case;
2. The offended party is notified of the motion for provisional dismissal of the case;
3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
and
4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case. (People v. Lacson, supra.)

What is the reason for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal?
It is to bar the accused from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case
will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein. (People v. Lacson, supra)
Note:
The inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for provisional dismissal of the case or
his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. (People v.
Lacson, supra)
If the criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused,
or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. On the other hand, a motion of the accused
for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent of such provisional dismissal.
People v. Lacson
400 SCRA 267 [2003] En Banc
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Petitioners – People
of the Philippines, Director General of the PNP, Chief State Prosecutor, State Prosecutors, City
and Asst. City Prosecutors of Quezon City.
The resolution sought to be reconsidered was that which the case to the RTC, Branch 81,
for determination of several factual issues in the application of Section8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases referred to as the Kuratong
cases against Respondent Panfilo Lacson and several other police officers.
Facts:
Panfilo Lacson and several other policemen and police were charged with several cases
for multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven persons.these criminal cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 or eleven cases. These cases were provisionally
dismissed by Judge Agnir Jr., pesiding judge of RTC Branch 81, Quezon City.
From the provisional dismissal order of the cases, it reached the Supreme Court where it
issued its question Resolution dated May 2002 remanding the cases to the RTC for the
determination of several factual issues anent the application of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Rule 118-Pre-Trial in criminal cases.
Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, 391 SCRA 415 [200], Panganiban, J.
Is Pre-Trial mandatory or directory in criminal cases? It is mandatory.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 1, Rule 118, in relation to
Section 2, Rule 118, mandate the parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such
stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and
more convenient manner. The save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time,
help unclog court dockets.
Once availability entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for cause. They
should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and
sound public policy. When made before the court, they are exclusive.
May a party be relieved from the stipulations he entered into?
A party validly made them can be relieved from such stipulations only upon a showing of
collision, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence, or upon a showing of
sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. The power to relieve a
party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court’s discretion which, unless exercise with
grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.
Will not stipulations impinge on the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent?
Objection:
The old Rules frowned upon stipulations of facts in criminal cases because of the
perceived danger that by the mere expedient of stipulating with the defense counsel the elements
of the crime charged, the prosecution would relieve itself of its duty to prove he guilt of the
accused beyond reason doubt. (People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25)
Answer to the objection:
The Rules was amended in 1985, precisely to enable the parties to stipulate facts. This
amendment was carried over to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Section 1, Rule 118)
The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. See the
cases of People v. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 91969); People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 [1996]
There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy
encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that “everyone has a
right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large. (People
v. Donato, 198 SCRA 25 [1991]
For stipulations to be valid what is necessary?
For a pre-trial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy two conditions, to
wit: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both accused
and his counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned in the last sentence of Section 2, is needed to
make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the
supervision of the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Note 1. People v. Razul, 392 SCRA 553 [2002] A stipulation of facts in criminal cases is
sanctioned by law
TRIAL
RULE 119
DAYAWON V. GARFIN, 388 SCRA 341 [2002
What is the duty of the trial court before judgment?
Before an accused can be convicted of a crime charged, it is essential that he be given a

chance to refute the allegations against him in proper trial on the merits and not simply in a
hearing on an incident of the case such a motion tom squash. The Rules prescribe the procedure
to be followed in criminal cases and the trial judge is not at liberty to disregard the rules on the
flimsy excuse the peculiarity of the criminal cases required the application of any suitable
proceedings in accordance with Section 6, Rule 135.
An accused in a criminal case must not be precluded from availing of every option
allowed by the rules to adduce in his defense.
The rules do not sanction the “automatic conversion” of a hearing on a motion to dismiss
to a hearing on the merits of a case, in the absence of any clean waiver by the accused of his
right to a regular trial.
May a trial court reopen a case submitted for decision?
Yes, the trial court is not in error, if it opts to open the proceedings of a case, even after
both rules sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional
witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to particular
facts involved in the case – a judge cannot be faulted should be require a material witness to
complete his testimony.

Note 1 – Section 24,Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures states that at any time
finally of the judgment of conviction, the judge may muto propio or upon with hearing in either
case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be
terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
Note 2 Reopening of a case may be done before a judgment has been rendered or after a
judgment of conviction has been rendered. The obvious reason is to avoid injustice.
Problem: In a case for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property, the prosecution and
the defense respectively rested their case and submitted for resolution. The trial court reopened
the case, with noticed to both parties to recall the offended party to testify on the actual damages
sustained to determine the proper and correct penalty. Is the trial court justified in reopening the
case?
Answer: Yes The court may recall witnesses to complete the evidence especially so when the
court cannot determine the proper penalty in the event of conviction. This is to not to frustrate
the ends of justice.
People v. Maguing, G.R. No. 144090, 26 June 2003, Panganiban, J.
Section 8, Provisional dismissal
Conrada v. People, 398 SCRA 482 [2003]
A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer (1) to the termination of the case on
the merits, resulting neither the conviction or acquittal of the accused; (2) to the dismissal of the
case due to prosecution’s failure to prosecute; (3) to the dismissal on the ground of unreasonable
delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused right to speedy disposition or trial of the
case against him.
A provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the

reinstatement thereof the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of the new
information for the offense within the period allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the
Revised Rules of Court.
DEMURER TO EVIDENCE
SAN VICENTE V. PEOPLE,392 SCRA 610 [2002]
May the court dismiss the criminal action after the prosecution has rested its case?
Yes the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
upon a demurer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
What is the basis of the resolving the demurer to evidence?
The court is merely required to ascertain from the evidence of the prosecution whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
For of the evidence as evaluated and assessed by the trial court, fails to measure up to the proof
required beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal. In that sense there is
hardly a justification to proceed and receive the evidence of the defense.
How should the court rule on the demurer to evidence?
The grant or denial of a demurer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and
its ruling shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Once the court
grants the demurer to evidence, such order amount to an acquittal and may further prosecution of
the accused would violate the constitutional prescription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion.
Note 1 Once an accused is required of the crime charged against him, double jeopardy attaches.
Ong v. People, 342 SCRA 372 [2000]; People v. City of Silay,74 SCRA 247 [1976]
Note 2 The finality of acquittal rule was stressed in People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 [2000]
Note 3 No double jeopardy if dismissal is with the express consent of the accused or dismissal
is upon his own motion. Almario v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 1; People v. Bans, 239
SCRA 48 [1994]; People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481 [1991]; People v. Quisada, 160 SCRA 516
[1988]
Note 4 The reason for the finality of an acquittal by the trial court. (People v. Velasco, supra)
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court
cuts deep into the “humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizens, when bought in unequal contest with the state”.
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant
is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of the acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is “part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction” The interest in the finality if acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts
of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for “repose”, a desire to know the exact extent of
one’s liability. With this right of repose the criminal justice system has built in a protection to
ensure that the innocent even those whose innocence upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found
guilty in a subsequent proceeding. (citing American jurisprudence)

Note 5 The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurer to evidence or the
demurer itself is not subject to review by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (People v.
Almendras, 401 SCRA 555 [2003])
Reopening of case
Section 24, Rule 119
Is there a distinction between the control of prosecution over criminal prosecutions and the
court power of determining the sufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction?
Yes, In a criminal trial, it is prosecution that determines the charge(s) to be filed and how
the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information.
Stated differently, the determination of what evidence to address to bolster a successful
prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain of the prosecution in the exercise of
its sound discretion. The court as a rule will not interfere in this exercise of discretion as to
control over criminal prosecution. But it is over the court which ultimately determines whether
such evidence is sufficient to sustain an indictment thus, the care with which the prosecution
must build up its case against the accused can not be gain said because in any criminal
prosecution, the state must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the defense.
People v. Medina, G.R. Nos. 127756-58, 18 June 2003, Callejo, Sr.,J.
What is the duty if the trial court during trial?
The judge has the right, may the duty, to ask questions to elicit relevant facts and to make
the records bear the truth. He is not a merely figurehead or an umpire in a trial and it is his duty
to see that justice is done. He cannot be expected to remain always passive and stoic during the
proceedings. Being an arbiter the judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to
expedite the progress of the trial and present unnecessary waste of time.
In an effort the ascertain the truth, a judge may examine or cross-examine a witness by
leading questions. He may seek to draw relevant and material testimony thought that testimony
may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. Questions designed to
clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence is not improper.
JUDGMENT
RULE 120
People v. Geral and Usnan, G.R. No. 145731 26 June 2003, Bellosilo J.
How should a decision be done?
In writing a decision it is not required of a judge to adopt a florid and dramatic style as
would appeal to the Shakespearean in us yet it is of the essence that the decision be already
lucidly crafted, complete in all is vital details to enable the parties involved to clearly understand
how the judge arrived at his conclusion.
The decision, the ratio decidenti in particular, is not exactly an exemplar in thoroughness
and perspicacity but is rather an expression of slapdashness and lack of interest giving the
impression that the author was move after bare compliance than the need to explain the verdict of
the court in a clear and convincing manner.
CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA 72 [2002]
When accused is acquitted of the crime but is adjudged civilly liable, what is his remedy?
And what is the remedy of the offended party?
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his
remedy is to file a motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect. He must serve a copy of his
motion not only to the prosecutor, but also to the offended party if a private prosecutor does not
represent the latter. If a private prosecutor represents offended party then the notice to the letter is
sufficient at law. The motion must comply with the requirement of notice and hearing pursuant to
Section 4,5 and 6, rule 15, otherwise it shall be a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the
running of the period of appeal.
Proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of service to the offended party and the
prosecution, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance.
The offended party may likewise file a motion for reconsideration observing notice and
hearing requirement. This is preparatory to an appeal, should an appeal be undertaken.
May the accused or offended party appeal from the civil aspect despite acquittal of the
accused?
As a rule a judgment of acquittal final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal
the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. However, either
the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the
acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest I n appealing the civil
aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor
and the case is terminated as far as he is concerned.
Who are the real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision?
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the
accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a
criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party appeals or
moves for a reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the motion through his
counsel.
HUGO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA 458 [2002]
What is the efficacy of a judgment rendered by a ponente who only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided over the trial?
The efficacy of the decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. For it does not follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For as long the
ponente relied upon the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial, and the full record
of the case was available to him, the decision that the penned would show that the thoroughly
examined and analyzed the evidence before him and carefully calibrated the credibility of the
witnesses with a seasoned perspective he had developed as a trial judge, the decision stands as
valid and efficacious.
Note 1 People v. Hamton, 395 SCRA 156 [2003] Unless there is a clear showing of grave
abuse of decision the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.
Section 4 – The rule on variance
Dado v. People, 392 SCRA 46 [2002]
When should the rule on variance be applied?
It applies when there is a variance between the offense charged in the compliant or
information and that the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proven, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
For example: The Dado and Eraso were charged with murder in an information. After
arraignment and trial on the merits, both accused were found by the trial court the crime of
homicide. The trial court found Dado and Eraso acted in conspiracy. On appeal to the court of
appeals, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Eraso filed a petition for review but was
dismissed. Dado filed a petition for review condending that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
the he acted in conspiracy with Eraso.
Issues: Does the information allege conspiracy? Can the accused be convicted of the crime of
homicide when the information charged murder?
Ruling: The information in parts reads: “xxx the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to
kill, with evidence premeditation, and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-
mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his
instantaneous death xxx”.
Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the requirement that conspiracy must be
conveyed in “appropriate language” (See: Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 368 SCRA 22 [2001]) The
words “conspired”, “confederate”, or the phrase “acting in concert” or “in conspiracy”, of their
synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution
in charging the accused and his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which must be
alleged, not merely inferred from the information. Absent particularizing any definitive act
constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the accused who must perforce be
held accountable only his own acts or omissions. (See: Garcia v. Court of Appeals, supra)
Note 1: The Information charges the accused of murder. The accused could be validly
convicted of illegal discharged of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime
of unlawful killing of a person. The rule of variance is applicable (See: Dado v. People, supra)
APPEAL
RULE 122
PEOPLE V. PINUELA, G.R. NOS. 149727-28, 31 JANUARY 2003
What is the effects of an appeal taken by the accused from a judgment of conviction?
When an accused appeals from the judgment of conviction of the trial court, he waives
his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to him, and whether they are assigned as errors
or not. Such an appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and renders it competent
to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.
In case death penalty is imposed, the record is automatically elevated to the Supreme Court
for review and judgment.
Section 3 [d] Notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
RTC. The Supreme Court as provided in Section 10 of this Rule shall automatically review the
same.
Section 10 In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the
fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after
filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.

People v. Manluctao, G.R. Nos. 14360-23 June 2003, Quisumbing, J.
What is the significance of a case subject to automatic review?
The whole case is thrown open for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing court
correct errors as in may find in the trial court’s judgment, regardless of whether it is assigned as
an error or not.
People v. Bodoso, 398 SCRA 642 [2003]
The entire record is open and subject to review assigned or unassigned errors.
In the automatic review of cases, the Supreme Court has the concomitant power to review
and shift through the entire case to correct any error, even if unassigned, since the transcendental
matter of life and liberty, especially of a person who possesses nothing but life and liberty, is at
stake. There can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe than the termination of human
life.
Waiver to present evidence by the accused must be expressed, voluntary and knowing.
The existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated since a waiver by implication

cannot be presumed. The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must
be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. There must thus be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish
the right. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be easily construed as surrender
thereof ; the court must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and validity
of such waiver. Necessarily, where there is a reservation as to the nature of any manifestation or
proposed action affecting the rights of the accused to be heard before he is condemned certainly
the doubt must be resolved in his favor to be allowed to proffer evidence in his behalf.
Procedures to be followed by Trial Court in waivers by the accused of the right to be heard
in Capital offense.
To protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused, in a capital offense
and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes to face
with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his clients right to present evidence and be
heard, shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe as a prerequisite to the validity
of such waiver a procedure akin to a “searching inquiry” as specified in People v. Aranzaldo
when an accused pleads guilty particularly [1] The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and
the accused with their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive
the right to present evidence and be heard; [2] The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the
prosecution and especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must
be recorded; [3] During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to [a] ask the defense a
series of questions to determine whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the
accused that he had the right to present and be heard ad well as its meaning and consequences,
together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the
accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional
obligation. [b] inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he
wants to present or submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of
the prosecution evidence if any or in a default thereof, file a demurer to evidence with prior leave
of court, If he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be
rebutted. If there is a desire to do so the trial court shall give the defense enough time to for this
purpose. [c] elicit information about the personality profile of the accused such as age socio-
economic status and educational background which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed waiver. [4] all questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for
this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English.
State the reason for this step-by-step procedure.
The rationale behind the foregoing requirements is that court must proceed with more
care, where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irreversible and experience has shown that innocent persons have
at times thrown caution to the wind and give up defending themselves out of ignorance or
desperation.
Another reason for this strict formula is to ensure that the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is preserved and the state makes no mistake in taking life and
liberty except that of the guilty. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should
always take into consideration that such a different or extraordinary approach has been taken
voluntarily and intelligently. For otherwise, denial of due process can be successfully invoked
since no valid waiver of right has been made.
Search and Seizure

Rule 126
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a

restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law.
People v. Bongcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 [2002] Third Division
The right against unreasonable search and seizures is right protected by the constitution.
Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure.
However, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As

held in People v. Marti, in the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be against the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the state to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power imposed.
For example; the vessel security personnel searched the baggage of the accused. It was
only after they found “shabu” inside the suite case that the called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suit case of the contraband items was therefore carried
out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search does not apply. The accused-appellant argued that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. This
argument is not valid because the vessel security officer is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked
with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
Cuyupan v. People, 392 SCRA 203 [2003]
Why is the oath required in determining probable cause in the issuance of a search
warrant?
In determining probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, the oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personnel knowledge of the applicant or his witness. The
reason is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
When is the description of the place to be searched sufficient?
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
What is the effect of failure to question the amendment made after accused has pled to the
crime charged?
The accused-appellant contends that trial court erred in convicting him under the
amended information. He argued that under t he rules, after the accused is arraigned, the
information can only be amended, with leave of court, as to matters of form and only when the
amendment can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. He contends the he had
already pled not guilty when the prosecutor moved to amend the prosecution moved to the
information against him, adding that the date of commission of the offense and the legal age of
the victim. He argues that these amendments are substantial and prejudiced his rights to be
informed of the nature of the accusations against him. The accused-appellant was validly tried
under the amended information. The accused-appellant did not raise any objection to the
amendments in the information either before or during his trial. He participated in the trial and
his counsel subjected the prosecution witnesses to grueling cross-examination. It was only after
he was convicted that he assails the amendment. This is impermissible. The settled rule is that
objection as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. (People v. Elpedes, 350 SCRA 716 [2001]) They must be reasonably raised, the
defense are deemed waived. ( U.S. v. Rivera, 23 Phil.383[1912]; U.S. v. Mabirel, 4 Phil. 308
[1905])
People v. Cuyugan, 392 SCRA 149 (2002) 2nd Division, Quisumbing, J.
State the purpose of the constitutional guarantee under Article III, Sec. 14(b) in
conjunction with Sec. 1 par.(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure – the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
The purpose are: (1) to furnish the accuse with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable to make his defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged,
so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had.
Note: In pari material: People v. Manalili, 294 SCRA 220 citing U.S. v. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223
What is the effect of conviction of the accused if a crime for which he was not properly
charged?
The accused cannot be convicted of a crime for which he is not properly charged for him
would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him.
For example: A was charged with and convicted of Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315, par. 2 (d) 0n three counts. On the face of the information charging A of said crimes of Estafa
when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. Joint judgment was promulgated by RTC Branch 117
A appealed from the joint judgment of conviction. On appeal, it was pointed out that the
prosecution did not prove the existence of fraud to constitute the issuance of the checks as fraud
contemplated by law. Indeed, the OSG agreed that prosecution failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt as it failed to prove the fraud to constitute estafa under Article 315, par.2(d).
Decide.
A, the accused, cannot be convicted of Estafa as charged in the three Information. To
constitute under Article 315, par. 2(d), the postdating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such of should be either prior to, or
simultaneously with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property
from the offended party because of the issuance of check whether postdated or not. That is, the
offended party would not have parted with his money or other property were its not for the
issuance of the check.

For another, BP 22 cannot be deemed necessarily in the crime of Estafa under Article
315, par. 2(d). The offense of fraud under the RPC is malum in se, whereas under BP 22, a
special law, punishes the issuance of bouncing check, malum prohibitum. Fraud under the RPC
is a distinct offense from the violation of BP 22. they are different offenses, having different
elements.
Note: People v. Canton, 394 SCRA 478 [2002] In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.
CRIMINAL EVDIENCE
In every criminal prosecution, what must the prosecution establish?
The prosecution must prove two things: (1) the commission of the crime and (2) the
identity of the accused. (People v. Pilola, 405 SCRA 71 [2003]
People v. Catila Jr., 394 SCRA 393 [2003]
What is the effect of failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused?
The presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be
granted as a matter of right.
Note 1. See also People v. Amogis, 368 SCRA 232 [2001]

Note 2. People v. Mandao, 393 SCRA 292 [2002] It is the rule of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional
presumption o innocence.
Sanvicente v. People, 392 SCRA 610 [2002]
Distinguish admission from confession
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Sec. 26 of the Rules of Court as the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession on the other hand, under
Rule 130, Sec. 33 of the Rules of Court is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
A confession is a declaration made at any by a person, voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. The term admission is usually applied in criminal case to statements of
fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt.
In a confession an accused acknowledge his guilt; while there is not such
acknowledgement of guilt is an admission.

Note: In People v. Licayan, 378 SCRA 281 [2002] A confession is an acknowledgement in
express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while and
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and
tending in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. An admission is something
less than a confession and is but an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstances when in
itself to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
When must the prosecution prove, among others, in the prosecution of prohibited drugs?
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the
prosecution shows that the accused knowing possessed the prohibited articles in his person or
that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such
articles. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be
rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in
question, and did not intended to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shited to the possessor to
explain absence of animus possidendi.
What is required for modifying circumstances to be appreciated by the trial court?
Modifying circumstances of use of deadly weapon, dwelling and grave abuse of

confidence and obvious ungratefulness cannot be appreciated of not alleged in the information
and duty proven by the evidence. (People v. Elona, 388 SCRA 547 [2002])
When should an objection be made on matters of form and substance in the Information?
Objections as to matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal. (People v. Aparejado, 385 SCRA 76 [2002]
Note 1 Objections as to form or substance, without leave of court at any time before the accused
enters aplea. (Section 14, first sentence, Rule 110) Usually a motion to amend or correct or
modify the information should be filled. A motion to quash also be filed upon any of the grounds
enumerated under Rule 117 affecting form and or substance.
After plea and during the trial, only formal amendments may be made but leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. (Sec. 14 second
sentence, Rule 110)
People v. Geron, 285 SCRA 86 [2002]
To warrant the imposition of death penalty in incestuous rape, what is the condition sinc
qua non? Or what is required?
The Information must allege, the special circumstances of relationship between the
accused and the victim and the victim’s minority and both must be duly proved.

Note 1: In pari material: People v. Manlod, 385 SCRA 134 [2002]; People v. Dulay, 385 SCRA
155 [2002]; People v. Fabre, 385 SCRA 185 [2002]
Note 2: Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing conducted under Section
3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court would not be considered sufficient compliance with the law.
(People v. Fabre, 385 SCRA 134 [2002]
Note 3: The minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that the accused is the
common- law husband of the victim’s mother is a special qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty if alleged in the information and duly proved, (People v.
Lizada, 396 SCRA 62 [2002] Minority and relationship must be alleged in the information and
proven during the trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. (People v. Marahay, 396
SCRA 129 [2003]
Is the trial court bound to give full weight to the direct examination of a witness when the
cross-examination was waived?
Note 4 The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness
is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth and accuracy of the statements of
the witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem
any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence therefore adduced or
thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon.
Certainly the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examination by the other party, (People v. Fabre,
supra)
PEOPLE V. MACALABA, G.R.NOS. 146284-86, 20 JANUARY 2003
Who has the burden of proof a negative allegation or negative averment?
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicted on a negative allegation, or that a
negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the charge. But this rule is not without exception. Thus, where the negative of an issue does not
permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the
accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. State otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce evidence to support a negative averment the truth which is fairly indicated
by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disapproved by the
production of documents or other evidence within the defendant’s knowledge or control.
For instance where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business
without a license (as when an accused is selling regulated drug without license or authority), the
fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must
establish that fact or suffer conviction (People v. Manalo,230 SCRA 309)
State the elements of “plain view”.

Under this doctrine of plain view, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure in plain view must comply with following
requirements: (1) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally in the pursuit of their
official duties; (2) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are; (3) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (4) the plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. (People v. Macalaba, supra)
PEOPLE V. PINUELA,C.R. NOS. 14727-28, 31 JANUARY 2003
Is the trial court authorized to ask questions for clarification?
The accused contends that the trial court intervention during cross-examination of the
prosecution witness was prejudicial to him. The record fails to disclose bias on the part of the
trial court. The questions were merely to clarify. The trial court is not an idle arbiter during the
trial. He can propound questions to clarify matters in order to ferret out the truth.
LUCES V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 149402,20 JANUARY 2003
What is the value of an affidavit of desistance?
The affidavit of desistance has no value and weight at all where it is sufficiently
impeached by the testimonial evidence of the very person who allegedly executed the affidavit.
SANTOS V. PEOPLE, 395 SCRA 507 [2003]
What is the probative value of entries in police blotters?
The entries in the police blotter should not be given significance or probative value, as
they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. These entries are usually incomplete
and inaccurate; as sometimes they are taken from either partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting
and are hearsay, untested in the crucible of a trial on the merits.
What is the probative value of a affidavit of desistance?
An affidavit of desistance by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable and
deserves only scant attention.
A recantation does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other testimony
it is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and especially the
demeanor of the witness on the stand. Moreover it should be received with caution as otherwise

it could make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witness.
People v. Libnao, 395 SCRA 407 [2003]
May an evidence not formally offered be considered by the court?
Yes, if it has been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and it is incorporated in
the record of the case.
People v. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 [2003]
What is the effect of failure to allege all the grounds then available in a motion to dismiss?
When a motion to quash a warrant is filed all grounds and objection then available, as a
rule should be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise they are deemed waived.
Note 1 the facts do not charge an offense, lack of jurisdiction, double jeopardy, and prescription,
though not alleged in a motion to quash are not waived.
When is the right to speedy trial violated?
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or
justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.
What is the degree of proof required in establishing the identity of the accused?
In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the commission
of the crime and (2) the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
Cursory identification does not suffice to convict he accused. What is needed is positive
identification made with moral certainty as to person of the offender. When the identity of the
appellant is not established beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal necessary follows. Conviction for
a crime rests on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, never on the weakness of that of the
defense.
Note 1. See also People v. Geral and Usman, G.R. No. 145731, 26 June 2003, Bellosillo, J.
Note 2. People v. Maguing, G.R. No. 144090, 26 June 2003. When the identity of the accused is
not established beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal necessary follows. Conviction for a crime
rests on the strength of the prosecution, never on the weakness of that of the defense. In our
criminal justice system the overriding consideration is whether the court reasonably doubts, no
the innocence, but the guilt of the accused. Unless the identity of the accused is established
beyond doubt to the exclusion of all others the charged must be dismissed on the ground that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome.
While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty it connotes that
degree of proof which after an investigation of the whole record produces in an unprejudiced
mind the moral certainty that the accused is culpable.
Bar problem (2002)
X and Y were charged with murder. Upon application of the prosecution, Y was discharged from
the information to be utilized as a state witness. The prosecution presented by as a witness but
forgot to state the purpose of his testimony much less offer it in evidence. Y testified that he and
X conspired to kill the victim but it was X who actually shot the victim. The testimony of Y was
the only material evidence establishing the guilt of X. Y was thoroughly cross-examined by the
defense counsel. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a motion for demurer to
evidence based on the following grounds:
(a) The testimony of Y should be excluded because its purpose was not initially stated and it was
not formally offered in evidence as required by Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence; and
(b) Y’s testimony is not admissible against X pursuant to the rule on “ res inter alios acta”
Rule on the motion demurer to evidence on the above grounds.
Suggested Answer:
(a) The testimony of X should be admitted and not excluded. The counsel for X did not
object to his testimony of Y despite the fact that the prosecution forgot to the purpose for
which his testimony was offered. Moreover. X through his counsel is deemed to have
waived the objection when counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination.
(b) The testimony of Y is admissible against X. The rule of res inter alios acta does not apply
to testimony made in open court and the witness was cross-examined.
Notes and Cases

CASES
PEOPLE V. ESCOTE JR.

400 SCRA 603 [2003] EN BANC
This is a case brought to the Supreme Court on automatic review of the Decision of
RTC Branch 11 in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting Juan Escote Jr. and Victor Acuyan of
the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meted on each of them the supreme penalty of
death.
PEOPLE V. LACSON
400 SCRA 267 [2003] EN BANC
Resolution on the motion for reconsideration on the Resolution of the Court dated 28
May 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the
determination of several issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedures. On the dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 filed against the respondent (Lacson) and his co-accused with the said court.




2004 DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

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2004 DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

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2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

By: Fernando P. Cabato

Decisions in Criminal Procedure

PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES – RULE 110

What is the test in determining the sufficiency of the information or Complaint?

The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of material averments of in

What should be stated in the Information of Complaint?

The qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances must be expressly and specifically

Should the information be under oath as in a Complaint?

An accused can not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly chared in the

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3

When is an amendment a matter of form?

State the rule on the duplicity of the offense.

In pari material: People v. Tira, 430 SCRA 134 [2004]

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6

May the rules of the criminal procedure be applied retroactively?

PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES – RULE 111

Explain the principle of independent civil action.

When is there a prejudicial question?

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION – ARTICLE 112

What is the purpose of preliminary investigation?

What is the object of conducting a preliminary investigation?

The investigating officer (the public prosecutor or Municipal Judge) is tasked to

A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial approach of the merits of the

To conduct a inquiry to determine where there is sufficient ground to engender a well

What is the effect of dismissal of a complaint during preliminary investigation?

To whom should the motion for re-investigation be addressed?

When may an inquest investigation be made and by whom?

Explain the policy of non-interference.

The Court adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11

(Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra)

Explain the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation.

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 13

When is there no need for a warrant of arrest? Explain.

Is notice of bail hearing to the public prosecution necessary? Reason.

Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance

See: In pari material: Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca, 358 SCRA 615 [2001]

State the duties of a Judge in bail applications.

Note: In pari material: Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, 334 SCRA [2000]

When may the court exercise discretion in granting bail?

Is the exercise of discretion by the judge absolute in granting bail?

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 17

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED – RULE 115

See: Section 1[a]

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19

Right to Speedy Trial

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20

2) Right of the accused to due process

What is the rule on the right of the accused to due process?

The accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to due process as much as the

How is waiver to the right of counsel done during custodial investigation?

Is a Barangay Captain considered an independent and competent counsel to assist an

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21

The sworn statement of the accused is admissible in evidence against him.

3) The right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise

How is the constitutional presumption of innocence overcome?

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is indispensable to overcome the constitutional

4) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.

State the rule and purpose of the right to cross-examine a witness?

2004 DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22

The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose